%0 Book %A Fodor, J. A. %T The Language of Thought %I Harvard University Press %D 1975 %Z Argues that thought involves computation upon representations, and that these are structured as sentences in a mental language. With linguistic and psychological evidence, and arguments that the mental language is innate. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Why there still has to be a language of thought %I %D 1987 %B Psychosemantics %Z Because it fits explanatory methodology, it coheres with the usual ontology of psychological processes, and it explains systematicity. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Propositional attitudes %I %D 1978 %B Monist %V 61 %N %P 501-23 %Z About what PA's are, and why they're at the foundations of thought. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. %T Language, thought and compositionality %I %D 2001 %B Mind and Language %V 16 %N %P 1-15 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Abbott, B. %T Natural language and thought: Thinking in English %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 49-55 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %T On the type/token relation of mental representations %I %D 2000 %B Facta Philosophica %V 2 %N %P 23-50 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Bonjour, L. %T Is thought a symbolic process? %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 89 %N %P 331-52 %Z Argues that symbol processing can't account for the intrinsically contentful nature of thought: using a symbol doesn't give understanding of its content. With defense against arguments from twin earth and conceptual-role semantics. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Braddon-Mitchell, D. %A Fitzpatrick, J. %T Explanation and the language of thought %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 83 %N %P 3-29 %Z No need to postulate LOT: diachronic explanation is as good as synchronic, and high-level laws can exist without high-level causal connections. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Cain, M. J. %T Fodor: Language, Mind, and Philosophy %I Polity Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Carruthers, P. %T On Fodor's problem %I %D 2003 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 502-523 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Clapin, H. %T Problems with principle P %I %D 1997 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 78 %N %P 261-77 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Thoughts, sentences and cognitive science %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 1 %N %P 263-78 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T The language of thought: No syntax without semantics %I %D 1990 %B Mind and Language %V 5 %N %P 187-213 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Aunty's own argument for the language of thought %I Kluwer %D 1992 %B Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy %E J. Ezquerro %E J. Larrazabal %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T A cure for the common code %I %D 1977 %B 1977 %V %N %P %Z Review of Fodor's LOT. Fodor's view is too strong: function, not structure, is criterial for content. The structure of a predictive theory need not be directly reflected in inner processing. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Brain writing and mind reading %I %D 1975 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 7 %N %P 403-15 %Z On the explicit representation of belief: criteria, plausibility, and relationship to verbal reports and conscious judgments. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Granny's campaign for safe science %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z A general treatment of Fodor, identifying him as arch-conservative mentalist. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A DeWitt, R. %T Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought %I %D 1995 %B Psyche %V 1 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Dunlop, C. E. M. %T Conceptual dependency as the language of thought %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 275-96 %Z Relates Schank's conceptual dependency to Fodor's LOT. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, M. F. %T Propositional attitudes and the language of thought %I %D 1991 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 21 %N %P 379-88 %Z Contra two of Fodor's arguments for LOT. Complex causes need not have LOT constituency structure; and evidence from psychological theory falls short. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Field, H. %T Mental representation %I %D 1978 %B Erkenntnis %V 13 %N %P 9-18 %Z Analyzes belief into a relation between a person and an internal sentence, along with a semantic relation between that sentence and e.g. a proposition. With arguments against functionalist analyses, and against propositions. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Syntax in a dynamic brain %I %D 1997 %B Synthese %V 110 %N %P 343-55 %Z There are no good arguments for LOT of the form "The brain needs to do X, and X entails LOT". Considers X = concatenation, logical form, tracking, combinatorial encoding. Either LOT is weakened deeply or is unnecessary. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Garfield, J. %T Thought as language: A metaphor too far %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 85-101 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Gauker, C. %T Thinking Out Loud: An Essay on the Relation between Thought and Language %I Princeton University Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Harman, G. %T Thought %I Princeton University Press %D 1973 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Harman, G. %T Language, thought, and communication %I %D 1975 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 7 %N %P 270-298 %Z Argues that the primary role of language is in thought rather than in communication, and the language of thought incorporates natural language. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Harman, G. %T How to use propositions %I %D 1977 %B 1977 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Harman, G. %T Is there mental representation? %I %D 1978 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 9 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Hauser, L. %T Natural language and thought: Doing without mentalese %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 41-47 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %T Does cognitive psychology rest on a mistake? %I %D 1981 %B Mind %V 90 %N %P 321-42 %Z LOT confuses processes with descriptions of processes. Also, symbols cannot denote solely in virtue of structure, so must rely on human interpretation. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnson, K. %T On the systematicity of the language of thought %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 101 %N %P 111-139 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Kaye, L. J. %T The computational account of belief %I %D 1994 %B Erkenntnis %V 40 %N %P 137-53 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Kaye, L. J. %T The languages of thought %I %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Science %V 62 %N %P 92-110 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Knowles, J. %T The language of thought and natural language understanding %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 264-272 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Loar, B. %T Must beliefs be sentences? %I %D 1982 %B 1982 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T Toward a homuncular theory of believing %I %D 1982 %B Cognition and Brain Theory %V 4 %N %P 139-59 %Z Defends sententialism of the homuncular variety: little modules all the way in. Lots of pro-belief arguments. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T Mental content in linguistic form %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 147-54 %Z Distinguishes varieties of Sententialism, reasonable vs. mad-dog. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T A deductive argument for the representational theory of thinking %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 404-22 %Z Argues from the unboundedness of thinking and the need for a finite stock of elements to something like a language of thought. With remarks on connectionism and instrumentalism, and a reply by Stalnaker. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Laurence, S. %A Margolis, E. %T Regress arguments for the language of thought %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 60-66 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Maloney, J. C. %T The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language %I Cambridge University Press %D 1989 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Markic, O. %T Is language of thought a conceptual necessity? %I %D 2001 %B Acta Analytica %V 16 %N %P 53-60 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T The weak and the strong representational theory of mind: Stich's interpretation of Fodor %I %D 1987 %B Dialogue %V 26 %N %P 349-55 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Matthews, R. J. %T The alleged evidence for representationalism %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Rerepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z Argues that contrary to some claims, cognitive psychology does not provide much support for a computational/representational theory of propositional attitudes. Specifically considers research in psycholinguistics and vision. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Matthews, R. J. %T Is there vindication through representationalism? %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Fodor's theory can't deal with inexplicit attitudes: the core/derivative distinction is untenable. But we can make sense of intentional causation and psychological explanation without explicit representation. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Millikan, R. G. %T On mentalese orthography %I Blackwell %D 1993 %B Dennett and his Critics %E B. Dahlbom %Z On some problems typing tokens in the language of thought. There's no principled distinction between type-identical tokens and type-distinct tokens with an identity judgment. With interesting remarks on co-identification. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Pessin, A. %T Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 78 %N %P 33-53 %Z Argues that there is no good way to individuate syntactic types in Mentalese. Neural typing, causal typing, and semantic typing all fail. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Pollock, J. %T Understanding the language of thought %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 95-120 %Z Remarks on a number of aspects of mental content -- narrow, propositional, qualitative -- with respect to functionalism and the language of thought. With comments by Baker. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Rantala, V. %A Vaden, T. %T Minds as connoting systems: Logic and the language of thought %I %D 1997 %B Erkenntnis %V 46 %N %P 315-334 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Rey, G. %T A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thought %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 201-22 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Rupert, R. %T On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 117 %N %P 95-131 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Schiffer, S. %T Does Mentalese have a compositional semantics? %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Argues that the language of thought need not have a compositional semantics; productivity and systematicity can be explained without it. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Schiffer, S. %T The language-of-thought relation and its implications %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 263-85 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwartz, G. %T Symbols and thought %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 106 %N %P 399-407 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Sher, G. %T Sentences in the brain %I %D 1975 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 36 %N %P 94-99 %Z On Danto's suggestion that beliefs are like sentences. Conventionality poses problems, as does differentiating between different sorts of attitudes. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. C. %T Mental content and linguistic form %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 129-46 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T Mental representation: What language is Brainese? %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Studies, %V 43 %N %P 365-82 %Z Motivates LOT and defends it against various objections: e.g. tacit belief, identity conditions, infinite regress, and semantic nativism. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Beliefs and subdoxastic states %I %D 1978 %B Philosophy of Science %V 45 %N %P 499-518 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Teng, N. Y. %T The language of thought and the embodied nature of language use %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 94 %N %P 237-251 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Tienson, J. %T Is this any way to be a realist? %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Warmbrod, K. %T Beliefs and sentences in the head %I %D 1989 %B Synthese %V 2 %N %P 201-30 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Weller, C. %T Bonjour and mentalese %I %D 1997 %B Synthese %V 113 %N %P 251-63 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Yagisawa, T. %T Thinking in neurons: Comments on Stephen Schiffer's "The language-of-thought relation and its implications" %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 287-96 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Dennett, D. C. %T Brainstorms %I MIT Press %D 1978 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Intentional systems %I %D 1971 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 87-106 %Z Can view systems from physical stance, design stance, or intentional stance. Beliefs/desires are attributed under the intentional stance, with help from certain idealized norms of rationality and accuracy licensed by evolution. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Making sense of ourselves %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 63-81 %Z Reply to Stich 1981. Irrationality is misdesign (take design stance). Etc. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book %A Dennett, D. C. %T The Intentional Stance %I MIT Press %D 1987 %Z Beliefs/desires are useful predictive attributions. This isn't inconsistent with a certain degree of realism (abstracta/illata distinction). -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Precis of The Intentional Stance %I %D 1988 %B 1988 %V %N %P %Z TIS, with commentaries and replies. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement) %V 50 %N %P %Z Mental states are underdetermined: like interpreting a text, or finding an object's function. Even adaptationist teleology gives no fact of the matter. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Real patterns %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 88 %N %P 27-51 %Z Proposition attitudes have the ontological status of a noisy pattern that helps make sense of behavior. This degree of realism falls on a scale: Fodor > Davidson > Dennett > Rorty > Churchland. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Instrumentalism: Back from the brink? %I %D 1987 %B Saving Belief %Z Dennett vacillates between stance-dependence, -independence; e.g. on rationality, design features. Instrumentalism can't be rescued. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Instrumental intentionality %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 303-16 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance %I %D 1985 %B Cognitive Science %V 9 %N %P 265-92 %Z Dennett should be a realist, of the relative-to-environment variety. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Byrne, A. %T Interpretivism %I %D 1998 %B European Review of Philosophy %V 3 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Cam, P. %T Dennett on intelligent storage %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 45 %N %P 247-62 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Belief, opinion and consciousness %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z Argues contra Dennett and Smolensky that language is fundamental, not just an add-on. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Cohen, B. %T Patterns lost: Indeterminism and Dennett's realism about beliefs %I %D 1995 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 76 %N %P 17-31 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T What can be learned from Brainstorms? %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 83-92 %Z Questioning Dennett on the bridge between intentional characterization and functional characterization. Arguing for the importance of context. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, D. %T Dennett's stance on intentional realism %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 299-312 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Three cheers for propositional attitudes %I %D 1981 %B Representations %Z Dennett's rationality/intentional idealization assumptions should not be viewed as Platonic but epistemic. PA's are real and play real roles. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %A LePore, E. %T Is intentional ascription intrinsically normative? %I Blackwell %D 1993 %B Dennett and His Critics %E B. Dahlbom %Z Against "interpretivism" about intentionality: projectivism is hopeless, and Dennett's arguments for normativism (via charity and evolution) go wrong or beg the question. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Foss, J. %T On the evolution of intentionality as seen from the intentional stance %I %D 1994 %B Inquiry %V 37 %N %P 287-310 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Objective interpretationism %I %D 1988 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 69 %N %P 136-51 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Gerrans, P. %T Cognitive architecture and the limits of interpretationism %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology %V 11 %N %P 42-48 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Pattern and being %I Blackwell %D 1993 %B Dennett and His Critics %E B. Dahlbom %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Heitner, R. %T Is design relative or real? Dennett on intentional relativism and physical realism %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 267-83 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Hornsby, J. %T Physics, biology, and common-sense psychology %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %B Reduction, Explanation and Realism %E D. Charles %E K. Lennon %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Kenyon, T. %T Indeterminacy and realism %I MIT Press %D 2000 %B Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment %E A. Brook %E D. Ross %E D. Thompson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, R. %T How to get an interpretivist committed %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 180-221 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Lyons, W. %T Intentionality and modern philosophical psychology, I. The modern reduction of intentionality %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 3 %N %P 247-69 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %T Dennett's logical behaviorism %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Topics %V 22 %N %P 189-258 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. %T Why intentional systems theory cannot reconcile physicalism with realism about belief and desire %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 145-157 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A McCulloch, G. %T Dennett's little grains of salt %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 40 %N %P 1-12 %Z Dennett must be one of: realist, eliminativist, instrumentalist. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A McCulloch, G. %T Intentionality and interpretation %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %B Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind %E A. O'Hear %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Narayanan, A. %T The intentional stance and the imitation game %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machines and Thought %E P. Millican %E A. Clark %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelkin, N. %T Patterns %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 56-87 %Z Dennett's instrumentalism can't explain the acquisition of intentional concepts. Proposition attitudes are directly introspectible entities, although still theoretical and still patterns. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Price, H. %T Psychology in perspective %I Kluwer %D 1995 %B Philosophy in Mind %E M. Michael %E J. O'Leary-Hawthorne %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Radner, D. %A Radner, M. %T Cognition, natural selection, and the intentional stance %I %D 1995 %B International Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 9 %N %P 109-19 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Ratcliffe, M. %T A Kantian stance on the intentional stance %I %D 2001 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 16 %N %P 29-52 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Richard, M. %T What isn't a belief? %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Topics %V 22 %N %P 291-318 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T Intentional realism or intentional instrumentalism? %I %D 1980 %B Cognition and Brain Theory %V 3 %N %P 125-35 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Seager, W. %T Real patterns and surface metaphysics %I MIT Press %D 2000 %B Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment %E A. Brook %E D. Ross %E D. Thompson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Sharpe, R. %T Dennett's journey towards panpsychism %I %D 1989 %B Inquiry %V 32 %N %P 233-40 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Slors, M. %T Why Dennett cannot explain what it is to adopt the intentional stance %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 46 %N %P 93-98 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Headaches %I %D 1980 %B Philosophical Books %V 21 %N %P 65-73 %Z Critical review of Brainstorms, with response. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Dennett on intentional systems %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 39-62 %Z Dennett has problems with rationality, realism, etc. Hard line/soft line: either intentional stance is too close to FP or too far away. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Viger, C. %T Where do Dennett's stances stand? Explaining our kinds of minds %I MIT Press %D 2000 %B Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment %E A. Brook %E D. Ross %E D. Thompson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Webb, S. %T Witnessed behavior and Dennett's intentional stance %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Topics %V 22 %N %P 457-70 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilkerson, W. S. %T Real patterns and real problems: Making Dennett respectable on patterns and beliefs %I %D 1997 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 557-70 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Yu, P. %A Fuller, G. %T A critique of Dennett %I %D 1986 %B Synthese %V 66 %N %P 453-76 %Z Very thorough account of the evolution of Dennett's views. Elucidates abstracta/illata, criticizes intentional subpersonal psychology. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. S. %T Language, thought, and information processing %I %D 1980 %B Nous %V 14 %N %P 147-70 %Z Sentential processing is out. Against Harman's mental English and Fodor's Mentalese. Arguments from learning, evolution, neuroscience, mental images. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes %I %D 1981 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 78 %N %P 67-90 %Z Eliminate beliefs/desires, remnants of a stagnant folk theory. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %A Churchland, P. S. %T Stalking the wild epistemic engine %I %D 1983 %B Nous %V 17 %N %P 5-20 %Z How to dethrone language and still handle content. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T On the speculative nature of our self-conception %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 11 %N %P 157-173 %Z Reply to Foss 1985: EM is plausible, though certainly not applicable everywhere -- e.g. sensations will be reduced, not eliminated. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book %A Churchland, P. M. %T A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science %I MIT Press %D 1989 %Z 14 glimpses of the neurophilosophical golden age. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Theory, taxonomy, and methodology: A reply to Haldane's "Understanding folk" %I %D 1993 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 67 %N %P 313-19 %Z Reply to Haldane 1988. Even observations can be reconceived. With remarks perceptual plasticity and propositions, and a rejoinder by Haldane. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Evaluating our self-conception %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 211-22 %Z It's "bad faith" to accept modern epistemology but to deny the possibility of eliminativism. On various objections: "functional kinds", "self-defeating", "what could falsify it?", "different purposes", "no alternatives". -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T The threat of cognitive suicide %I %D 1987 %B Saving Belief %Z Elaborating the paradoxes of disbelieving in belief. Rational acceptability, assertion, and truth are all at risk. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Cognitive suicide %I University of Arizona Press %D 1988 %B Contents of Thought %E R. Grimm %E D. Merrill %Z Eliminativism is pragmatically incoherent, as it implies that language isn't meaningful and that the thesis isn't formulable. Folk psychology needn't be scientifically reduced to be true. With comments by Chastain, and reply. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bertolet, R. %T Saving eliminativism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 87-100 %Z Against Baker's cognitive-suicide arguments against eliminativism. We don't know what a replacement theory will look like, but that doesn't show that none is forthcoming. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bickle, J. %T Revisionary physicalism %I %D 1992 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 7 %N %P 411-30 %Z Argues for a revisionary reduction of the propositional attitudes, rather than elimination or smooth reduction. Sentential aspects will go, but coarse-grained functional profiles and content will remain. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Blunt, P. K. %T A defense of folk psychology %I %D 1992 %B International Philosophical Quarterly %V 32 %N %P 487-98 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Chater, N. %A Oaksford, M. %T The falsity of folk theories: Implications for psychology and philosophy %I Sage Publications %D 1996 %B The Philosophy of Psychology %E W. O'Donahue %E R. Kitchener %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, A. %T Dealing in futures: Folk psychology and the role of representations in cognitive science %I Blackwell %D 1996 %B The Churchlands and their Critics %E R. McCauley %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cling, A. %T Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Studies %V 56 %N %P 53-75 %Z Unbelief in belief is not incoherent. Argues with Baker. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cling, A. %T Disappearance and knowledge %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy of Science %V 57 %N %P 226-47 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cling, A. %T The empirical virtues of belief %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 303-23 %Z Cognitive states like belief are necessary to explain the dependence of behavior on perceptual features of the environment. Informational states alone are not enough, as they can't explain selective response to features. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Foss, J. E. %T A materialist's misgivings about eliminative materialism %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 11 %N %P 105-33 %Z EM needs much more evidence before being so gung ho. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Garzon, F. C. %T Can we turn a blind eye to eliminativism? %I %D 2001 %B International Journal of Philosophical Studies %V 9 %N %P 485-498 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Graham, G. %A Horgan, T. %T Southern fundamentalism and the end of philosophy %I Ridgeview %D 1992 %B Truth and Rationality %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Greenwood, J. D. %T Reasons to believe %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B The Future of Folk Psychology %E J. Greenwood %Z Argues that folk psychological states exist, even if they aren't useful as causal explanation. We have independent reason to believe in them, e.g. from self-knowledge. They're useful in social psychology, too. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Greenwood, J. D. %T Against eliminative materialism: from folk psychology to Volkerpsychologie %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 5 %N %P 349-68 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Haldane, J. %T Understanding folk %I %D 1988 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 62 %N %P 222-46 %Z Argues that folk psychology is not a theory, and that psychological knowledge is a pre-theoretical given. With remarks on laws, the prediction of behavior, and neuroscience. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hannan, B. %T `Non-scientific realism' about propositional attitudes as a response to eliminativist arguments %I %D 1990 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 21-31 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hannan, B. %T Don't stop believing: the case against eliminative materialism %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 165-179 %Z A bundle of arguments against eliminativism, e.g. from incoherence, the lack of alternatives, and against the folk-theory-theory. With commentary. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Woodward, J. %T Folk psychology is here to stay %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Review %V 94 %N %P 197-225 %Z Defending folk psychology against the arguments of Churchland and Stich: e.g. incompleteness, stagnation, irreducibility, dual-control, modularity, and unfalsifiability. Even with no neat reduction, folk psychology may be OK. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Graham, G. %T In defense of Southern Fundamentalism %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 62 %N %P 107-134 %Z FP is almost certainly true, irrespective of scientific absorbability or the language of thought. FP's commitments are austere, and mostly behavioral. Arguments from semantic competence and conceptual conservatism. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T The austere ideology of folk psychology %I %D 1993 %B 1993 %V %N %P %Z Argues that FP is not committed to much. The austere conception is supported by intuitions, conservatism, and the inconceivability of dropping it. Responds to phlogiston objections: they are not analogous. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Horgan, T. %A Henderson, D. %T What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism %I Oxford University Press %D 2005 %B Mind as a Scientific Object %E C. Erneling %E D. Johnson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horst, S. %T Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief' %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 104 %N %P 123-45 %Z Clarifies different senses of "theoretical" and "belief". Some beliefs are relevantly theoretical (dispositional, infra-conscious, unconscious ones), but conscious occurrent beliefs are not, and so can't be eliminated. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %A Pettit, P. %T In defense of folk psychology %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 59 %N %P 31-54 %Z FP holds that beliefs/desires play a certain functional role, and it's almost certain that objects playing that role exist, so FP is fine, whether or not propositional attitudes are good scientific entities. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacoby, H. %T Eliminativism, meaning and qualitative states %I %D 1985 %B 1985 %V %N %P %Z Even if nothing satisfies all or most common-sense properties of mental terms, reference can still be fixed under a Putnam style theory of meaning. (More about qualia than about intentional states.) -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitcher, P. S. %T In defense of intentional psychology %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 81 %N %P 89-106 %Z The Churchlands underestimate the resources of intentional psychology. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lahav, R. %T The amazing predictive power of folk psychology %I %D 1992 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 70 %N %P 99-105 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lockie, R. %T Transcendental arguments against eliminativism %I %D 2003 %B The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 54 %N %P 569-589 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Melnyk, A. %T Testament of a recovering eliminativist %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Brien, G. %T Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 52 %N %P 49-70 %Z Uses empirical evidence to argue that there is prelinguistic awareness, so nominalistic arguments for eliminativism fail. And some awareness is innate, so we can't reconceive things in less than evolutionary time. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %T Where does the self-refutation objection take us? %I %D 1990 %B Inquiry %V 33 %N %P 453-65 %Z The self-refutation objection reduces to other standard objections: counterexample, promissory note or reductio. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Ramsey, W. %A Stich, S. P. %A Garon, J. %T Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z If connectionism is true, then eliminativism is true, as you can't isolate the causal role of individual beliefs in a connectionist system. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Reppert, V. %T Ramsey on eliminativism and self-refutation %I %D 1991 %B Inquiry %V 34 %N %P 499-508 %Z Response to Ramsey 1990: If there are no beliefs and so no assertions, there is no identifiable propositional content, and truth and knowledge are out. Eliminativism is pragmatically self-refuting. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Reppert, V. %T Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the question %I %D 1992 %B Metaphilosophy %V 23 %N %P 378-92 %Z A careful analysis of whether self-refutation arguments against eliminativism beg the question by supposing that assertion requires belief. An account of what it is to beg the question, and a comparison to arguments about vitalism. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Resnick, P. %T Intentionality is phlogiston %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Richards, G. %T On the necessary survival of folk psychology %I Sage Publications %D 1996 %B The Philosophy of Psychology %E W. O'Donahue %E R. Kitchener %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Toward eliminating Churchland's eliminationism %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Topics %V 13 %N %P 60-67 %Z There's no reason to abandon FP, even if it doesn't reduce. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Rosenberg, A. %T How is eliminative materialism possible? %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B Mind and Common Sense %E R. Bogdan %Z Explaining how singular causal claims based on FP may be true even if FP is false; by analogy with phlogiston, and also because of near-vacuousness. EM isn't incoherent, as we can use a non-intentional replacement for belief. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosenberg, A. %T Naturalistic epistemology for eliminative materialists %I %D 1999 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 59 %N %P 335-358 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Saidel, E. %T What price neurophilosophy? %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1 %N %P 461-68 %Z Folk psychology is compatible with neuroscientific models, but it need not smoothly reduce to neuroscience to have an important role. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Schouten, M. K. D. %A de Jong, H. L. %T Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 489-509 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwartz, J. %T Reduction, elimination, and the mental %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy of Science %V 58 %N %P 203-20 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T Refuting eliminative materialism on the cheap? %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 306-15 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Do true believers exist? %I %D 1991 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 65 %N %P 229-44 %Z Eliminativism may have no determinate truth-conditions: if folk psychology is a poor theory, the question of whether or not "belief" refers may be empty. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T What is a theory of mental representation? %I %D 1992 %B Mind %V 101 %N %P 243-61 %Z Philosophical analysis isn't sufficient to understand intentional concepts; real cognitive science is required, with conceptual revision. The truth of eliminativism will be relative to the theory of reference that we choose. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. P. %T Deconstructing the mind %I %D 1996 %B Deconstructing the Mind %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Tait, W. W. %T The myth of the mind %I %D 2002 %B Topoi %V 21 %N %P 65-74 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Taylor, K. A. %T How not to refute eliminative materialism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 101-125 %Z Against transcendental arguments against eliminativism. These fail on their own terms, and even if successful they would not establish causal/explanatory relevance for the attitudes, which is the real key for folk psychology. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Tomberlin, J. %T Whither Southern Fundamentalism? %I , Ridgeview %D 1994 %B Truth and Rationality %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Trout, J. D. %T Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 87 %N %P 379-400 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Waskan, J. %T Folk psychology and the gauntlet of irrealism %I %D 2003 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 41 %N %P 627-656 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Wright, C. %T Can there be a rationally compelling argument for anti-realism about ordinary ("folk") psychology? %I Ridgeview %D 1996 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book %A Adler, J. %T Belief's Own Ethics %I MIT Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Audi, R. %T Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe %I %D 1994 %B Nous %V 28 %N %P 419-34 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Baker, L. R. %T Saving Belief %I Princeton University Press %D 1987 %Z Beliefs are OK, despite no physicalist reduction of content. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T What beliefs are not %I University of Notre Dame Press %D 1993 %B Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal %E S. Wagner %E R. Warner %Z Against beliefs construed as physically realized internal causes of behavior: syntax of these states can't be determinate, and their explanatory role wrt causation leads to a circle. Belief is irreducible. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Are beliefs brain states? %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Practical realism defended: Replies to critics %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Beckerman, A. %T The real reason for the standard view %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Bogdan, R. %T Belief: Form, Content, and Function %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Falvey, K. %T A natural history of belief %I %D 1999 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 80 %N %P 324-345 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Beyond belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1983 %B Thought and Object %E A. Woodfield %Z What matters are not propositional attitudes but notional attitudes; but it's hard to calibrate notional worlds. Very nice. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Bogdan, R. J. %T The manufacture of belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Belief: Form, Content, and Function %E R. Bogdan %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Bovens, L. %T Do beliefs supervene on degrees of confidence? %I Tilburg University Press %D 1999 %B Belief, Cognition, and the Will %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Cohen, L. J. %T Does belief exist? %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology %E A. Clark %E P. Millican %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Crimmins, M. %T Talk about Beliefs %I MIT Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Crimmins, M. %T Tacitness and virtual beliefs %I %D 1992 %B Mind and Language %V 7 %N %P 240-63 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Frankish, K. %T A matter of opinion %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 423-442 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Funkhouser, E. %T Willing belief and the norm of truth %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 115 %N %P 179-95 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Garfield, J. %T Belief in Psychology: A Study in the Ontology of Mind %I MIT Press %D 1988 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Gilbert, M. %T Belief and acceptance as features of groups %I %D 2002 %B Protosociology %V 16 %N %P 35-69 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Guttenplan, S. %T Belief, knowledge, and the origins of content %I %D 1994 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 287-305 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Lehrer, K. %T Belief, acceptance, and cognition %I De Gruyter %D 1983 %B On Believing %E H. Parret %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Lycan, W. G. %T Tacit belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Belief: Form, Content, and Function %E R. Bogdan %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T It's hard to believe %I %D 1990 %B Mind and Language %V 5 %N %P 122-48 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Manfredi, P. A. %T Tacit beliefs and other doxastic attitudes %I %D 1993 %B 1993 %V %N %P %Z Argues that there are no tacit beliefs: dispositions to believe can do all the explanatory work at lower cost. With some remarks on subdoxastic states, and the difference between belief and opinion. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Marcus, R. B. %T The anti-naturalism of some language-centered accounts of beliefs %I %D 1995 %B Dialectica %V 49 %N %P 113-30 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Individuating beliefs %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 8 %N %P 303-30 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Meijers, A. W. M. %T Believing and accepting as a group %I Tilburg University Press %D 1999 %B Belief, Cognition, and the Will %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Meihers, A. W. M. %T Belief, Cognition, and the Will %I Tilburg University Press %D 1999 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Meijers, A. %T Explaining Beliefs %I University of Chicago Press %D 2001 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Meyering, T. %T The causal powers of belief: A critique from practical realism %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Mosterin, J. %T Acceptance without belief %I %D 2002 %B Manuscrito %V 25 %N %P 313-35 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Morton, A. %T Saving belief from (internalist) epistemology %I %D 2003 %B Facta Philosophica %V 5 %N %P 277-95 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Newen, A. %T Contextual realism: The context-dependency and the relational character of beliefs %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, D. J. %T Does belief have an aim? %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 115 %N %P 283-305 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Parrett, H. %T On Believing %I De Gruyter %D 1983 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Rigterink, R. J. %T What are beliefs (if they are anything at all)? %I %D 1991 %B Metaphilosophy %V 22 %N %P 101-14 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Sobel, D. %A Copp, D. %T Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desire %I %D 2001 %B Analysis %V 61 %N %P 44-53 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Recanati, F. %T Can we believe what we do not understand? %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 84-100 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T States and beliefs %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 33-51 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwitzgebel, E. %T In-between believing %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 51 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwitzgebel, E. %T A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief %I %D 2002 %B Nous %V 36 %N %P 249-75 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Skokowski, P. %T Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy of Science %V 71 %N %P 362-369 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Sperber, D. %T Intuitive and reflective beliefs %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 67-83 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Stainton, R. %T Robust belief states and the right/wrong distinction %I %D 1999 %B Disputatio %V 6 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. P. %T Some evidence against narrow causal theories of belief %I %D 1983 %B From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Mindful belief: Accountability, expertise, and cognitive kinds %I %D 2002 %B Theoria %V 68 %N %P 224-49 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Free belief %I %D 2003 %B Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences %V 2 %N %P 327-36 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Tuomela, R. %T Can collectives have beliefs? %I %D 1990 %B Acta Philosophica Fennica %V 49 %N %P 454-72 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gulick, R. %T Are beliefs brain states? And if they are what might that explain? %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 205-15 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Velleman, D. %T On the aim of belief %I %D 2000 %B 2000 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Wedgwood, R. %T The aim of belief %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 16 %N %P 267-97 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Wray, K. B. %T Collective belief and acceptance %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 129 %N %P 319-33 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Arlo Costa, H. %A Collins, J. %A Levi, I. %T Desire-as-belief implies opinionation or indifference %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 2-5 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Bratman, M. %T Dretske's desires %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 50 %N %P 795-800 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Bratman, M. %T A desire of one's own %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 100 %N %P 221-42 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Bricke, J. %T Desires, passions, and evaluations %I %D 2000 %B Southwest Philosophy Review %V 16 %N %P 59-65 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T The physiology of desire %I %D 1992 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 13 %N %P 69-88 %Z Argues that desire will smoothly reduce to a neurophysiological kind. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Chan, D. K. %T Are there extrinsic desires? %I %D 2004 %B Nous %V 38 %N %P 326-50 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Collins, D. %T Belief, desire, and revision %I %D 1988 %B Mind %V 97 %N %P 333-42 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Davis, W. %T Two senses of desire %I Precedent %D 1986 %B The Ways of Desire %E J. Marks %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Fuery, P. %T Theories of Desire %I Melbourne University Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hajek, A. %A Pettit, P. %T Desire beyond belief %I %D 2004 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 82 %N %P 77-92 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hoffman, C. A. %T Desires and the desirable %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Forum %V 25 %N %P 19-32 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hubin, D. C. %T Desires, whims, and values %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Ethics %V 7 %N %P 315-35 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Humberstone, I. L. %T Wanting as believing %I %D 1987 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 17 %N %P 49-62 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hulse, D. %A Read, C. %A Schroeder, T. %T The impossibility of conscious desire %I %D 2004 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 73-80 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Kvart, I. %T Beliefs and believing %I %D 1986 %B Theoria %V 52 %N %P 129-45 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Larson, E. %T Needs versus desires %I %D 1994 %B Dialogue %V 37 %N %P 1-10 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Desire as belief %I %D 1988 %B Mind %V 97 %N %P 323-32 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Desire as belief II %I %D 1996 %B Mind %V 105 %N %P 303-13 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Marks, J. %T The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical Psychology on the Concept of Wanting %I Precedent %D 1986 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Marks, J. %T On the need for theory of desire %I Precedent %D 1986 %B The Ways of Desire %E J. Marks %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Mele, A. R. %T Irresistible desires %I %D 1990 %B Nous %V 24 %N %P 455-72 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Pettit, P. %A Price, H. %T Bare functional desire %I %D 1989 %B Analysis %V 49 %N %P 162-69 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Pojman, L. P. %T Believing and willing %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 15 %N %P 37-56 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Price, H. %T Defending desire-as-belief %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 119-27 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Ross, P. W. %T Explaining motivated desires %I %D 2002 %B Topoi %V 21 %N %P 199-207 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Russell, J. M. %T Desires don't cause actions %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 84 %N %P 1-10 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Schroeder, T. %T Three Faces of Desire %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Schueler, G. F. %T Pro-attitudes and direction of fit %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 277-81 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Schueler, G. F. %T Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action %I MIT Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwitzgebel, E. %T Representation and desire: A philosophical error with consequences for theory-of-mind research %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 12 %N %P 157-180 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Silverman, H. J. %T Philosophy and Desire %I Routledge %D 2000 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, M. %T Reason and desire %I %D 1988 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 88 %N %P 243-58 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Stampe, D. W. %T Defining desire %I Precedent %D 1986 %B The Ways of Desire %E J. Marks %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Stampe, D. W. %T The authority of desire %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Review b %V 96 %N %P 335-81 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Stampe, D. W. %T Desire %I Blackwell %D 1994 %B A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind %E S. Guttenplan %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Teichmann, R. %T Whyte on the individuation of desires %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 103-7 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Vadas, M. %T Affective and nonaffective desire %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 45 %N %P 273-80 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Whyte, J. T. %T Weak-kneed desires %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 107-11 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Antony, L. %T Brain states with attitude %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Attitudes as nonentities %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 175-203 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Balaguer, M. %T Attitudes without propositions %I %D 1998 %B Philosophy and phenomenological research %V 58 %N %P 805-26 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book Section %A Bennett, J. %T Analysis without noise %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B Mind and Common Sense %E R. Bogdan %Z Remarks on the conceptual analysis of belief/desire attribution. On the roles of causation, inner-route explanations, belief-desire-action triangles, teleology, unity, the presumption of simplicity, and evolution. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Ben-Yami, H. %T Against characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 186 %N %P 84-89 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Radical ascent %I %D 1991 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 65 %N %P 211-27 %Z The conditions on being a believer are mostly behavioral; to claim otherwise is to fall into a "modularity trap". A counterfactual account of mental causation is enough. With a defense of mentality for giant look-up tables. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Beliefs and desires incorporated %I %D 1994 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 91 %N %P 404-25 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, D. %T Davidson, indeterminacy, and measurement %I %D 1995 %B Acta Analytica %V 10 %N %P 37-56 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, D. %T On gauging attitudes %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Studies %V 90 %N %P 129-54 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, M. F. %T What's wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 664-74 %Z Stich is confused about type-token, syntax/content, etc. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book %A Falk, A. E. %T Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates %I Hamilton Books, University Press of America %D 2004 %Z A taxonomy of positions on the representation of propositional attitudes: dividing up via questions about realism, functionalism, monadicity, and truth-conditions. With arguments for structured representations. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Attitudes without psychology %I %D 2003 %B Facta Philosophica %V 5 %N %P 239-56 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Intentionality and Stich's theory of brain sentence syntax %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Quarterly, %V 40 %N %P 169-82 %Z Things are only syntactic (in SS's sense) in virtue of intentionality. True. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, R. J. %T The measure of mind %I %D 1994 %B Mind %V 103 %N %P 131-46 %Z A theory of propositional attitude ascription as like numerical measurement. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 47-80 %Z Folk psychology isn't a theory about laws, but about proper functions. desires are identified by proper functions; beliefs by Normal explanations. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Moser, P. K. %T Physicalism and intentional attitudes %I %D 1990 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 33-41 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book Section %A Peacocke, C. %T Between instrumentalism and brain-writing %I %D 1983 %B Sense and Content %Z Instrumentalism about belief can't be right, because of Martian marionettes, but the language of thought is too strong a requirement. A state's structured content may reside in its pattern of relations to other states. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Possin, K. %T The case against Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Studies %V 49 %N %P 405-18 %Z Stich is wrong, circular, and representational anyway. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book Section %A Pratt, I. %T Analysis and the attitudes %I University of Notre Dame Press %D 1993 %B Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal %E S. Wagner %E R. Warner %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T What's in a mind? %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 97-122 %Z Must individuate mental states by semantics, not just by function. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Saidel, E. %T Beliefs, desires, and the ability to learn %I %D 1998 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 35 %N %P 21-37 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwartz, J. %T Propositional attitude psychology as an ideal type %I %D 1992 %B Topoi %V 11 %N %P 5-26 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, D. M. %T Toward a perspicuous characterization of intentional states %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 74 %N %P 103-20 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Relativism, rationality, and the limits of intentional ascription %I %D 1984 %B 1984 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Von Eckardt, B. %A Poland, J. %T In defense of the standard view %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 312-331 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Natural kind terms and recognitional capacities %I %D 1998 %B Mind %V 107 %N %P 275-303 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Contents just aren't in the head %I %D 2003 %B Erkenntnis %V 58 %N %P 1-6 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T The characteristic thesis of anti-individualism %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 146-48 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Bruns, M. %A Soldati, G. %T Object-dependent and property-dependent concepts %I %D 1997 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 185-208 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Other bodies %I Oxford University Press %D 1982 %B Thought and Object %E A. Woodfield %Z On Putnam's Twin Earth. Natural kind terms are not indexical. Even de dicto attitudes are not in the head; they presuppose the existence of other things. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book %A Butler, K. %T Internal Affairs: Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism %I Kluwer %D 1998 %Z Argues that natural kind terms are token-reflexive, with reference ultimately fixed to the underlying explanatory properties of the surface qualities of local matter. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Chomsky, N. %T Internalist explorations %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T All the difference in the world %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 1-25 %Z Twins share the same concepts. Contra Putnam: essentialism is fallacious; contra Burge: speakers share beliefs, but one has false belief about meaning. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Methodological reflections on belief %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B Mind and Common Sense %E R. Bogdan %Z We shouldn't rely on intuitions about thought-experiments; we need an empirical theory about belief. Belief contents are distinct from sentence contents; we have to distinguish linguistic from psychological semantics. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Davis, S. %T Arguments for externalism %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Devitt, M. %T Meanings just ain't in the head %I Cambridge University Press %D 1990 %B Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam %E G. Boolos %Z Against Searle's theory of internal intentionality. Searle's theory requires magic to grasp external contents internally. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Devitt, M. %T A shocking idea about meaning %I %D 2001 %B Revue Internationale de Philosophie %V 55 %N %P 471-494 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T The nature of thought %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 70 %N %P 185-99 %Z Argues that thought is extrinsic, but it is not essentially social. A system without a linguistic community could have thoughts, if it had an appropriate learning history. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Farkas, K. %T What is externalism? %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 112 %N %P 187-208 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Horowitz, A. %T Putnam, Searle, and externalism %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 81 %N %P 27-69 %Z Argues for a moderate externalism by synthesizing Putnam and Searle: internal intension leaves extension indeterminate, but it specifies the facts relevant to filling in the indeterminacy. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Horowitz, A. %T Contents just are in the head %I %D 2001 %B Erkenntnis %V 54 %N %P 321-344 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Koethe, J. %T And they ain't outside the head either %I %D 1992 %B Synthese %V 90 %N %P 27-53 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Lau, J. %T Externalism about mental content %I %D 2002 %B 2002 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Liz, M. %T Intentional states: Individuation, explanation, and supervenience %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Ludwig, K. %T Externalism, naturalism, and method %I Ridgeview %D 1993 %B Naturalism and Normativity %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludwig, K. %T Duplicating thoughts %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 92-102 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Mandelkar, S. %T An argument against the externalist account of psychological content %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 375-82 %Z Argues that conscious experience is required for intentional states, and that any external relations could be satisfied without this experience, so external relations cannot suffice for intentional content. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A McCulloch, G. %T The spirit of twin earth %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 168-174 %Z Various arguments against Crane 1991 on externalism. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A McGilvray, J. %T Meanings are syntactically individuated and found in the head %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 225-280 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T The internal basis of meaning %I %D 1991 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 72 %N %P 143-69 %Z Argues that meaning is determined by a certain kind of internal state, involving de se cognitive attitudes. These states aren't shared by twins, but are still narrow in a strong sense. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T Functionalism and the propositional attitudes %I %D 1983 %B Nous %V 17 %N %P 529-49 %Z Functional organization doesn't determine attitude content, even if we include inputs and outputs. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Owens, J. %T Anti-individualism, indexicality, and character %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Perry, J. %T The problem of the essential indexical %I %D 1979 %B Nous %V 13 %N %P 3-21 %Z Indexicals are essential to some beliefs, so belief cannot just be a relation to a proposition. Belief contents must be at least in part construed relative to a subject. Separate belief object and belief state. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Putnam, H. %T The meaning of `meaning' %I %D 1975 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 7 %N %P 131-193 %Z What is in the head doesn't determine the meaning of our terms: my twin on Twin Earth means XYZ where I mean H2O. Content is determined by environment and linguistic community as well as by internal stereotypes. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book %A Searle, J. R. %T Intentionality %I Cambridge University Press %D 1983 %Z Sure, meanings are in the head -- e.g. the content of a given visual experience is "the thing that is causing this experience". -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Silvers, S. %T Individualism, internalism, and wide supervenience %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Sosa, E. %T Between internalism and externalism %I Ridgeview %D 1991 %B Consciousness %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Sosa, E. %T Abilities, concepts, and externalism %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z On concepts as abilities, and on construals of abilities that lead to internalism and externalism. Maybe the relevant abilities are characterized externally but determined internally. Remarks on Putnam, Davidson, Burge. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. %T Twin earth revisited %I %D 1993 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 63 %N %P 297-311 %Z Making sense of twin earth intuitions with an information-theoretic account of content: information depends on relations in normal conditions, which are extrinsic. With remarks on the context-sensitivity of content-attribution. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Stoneham, T. %T Temporal externalism %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Papers %V 1 %N %P 97-107 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Wikforss, A. M. %T Naming natural kinds %I %D 2005 %B Synthese %V 145 %N %P 65-87 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Wilson, R. %T Individualism %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Yalowitz, S. %T Individualism, normativity, and the epistemology of understanding %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 102 %N %P 43-92 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Zemach, E. M. %T Putnam's theory on the reference of substance terms %I %D 1976 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 73 %N %P 116-27 %Z Argues that the extension of `water' is the same on earth and twin earth, using arguments from isotopes and scientific development. Molar properties determine classification. Remarks on historicism and the division of labor. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, M. V. %T Social relations and the individuation of thought %I %D 1993 %B Mind %V 102 %N %P 247-61 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Benejam, A. %T Thought experiments and semantic competence %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bridges, J. %T Davidson's transcendental externalism %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Defending Burge's thought experiment %I %D 2001 %B Erkenntnis %V 55 %N %P 387-391 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and the mental %I %D 1979 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 4 %N %P 73-122 %Z Belief contents are not fully determined by internal state, as the linguistic community plays an important role: arthritis, brisket, contract, sofa, etc. So mental states are not individuated individualistically. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Intellectual norms and foundations of mind %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 83 %N %P 697-720 %Z On non-individualist elements due to by intellectual norms in the community, to which meanings are answerable. Even meaning-giving truths can be doubted. With remarks on sofas/safos, and on linguistic meaning vs. cognitive value. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Davidson and forms of anti-individualism: Reply to Hahn %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Descartes, bare concepts, and anti-individualism: Reply to Normore. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. Burge, T. 2003. The thought experiments: Reply to Donnellan %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T The indexical strategy: Reply to Owens. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. Burge, T. 2003. Psychology and the environment: Reply to Chomsky %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Replies from Tyler Burge. In (M. Frapolli & E. Romero, eds) Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. CSLI. Donnellan, K. 2003. Burge's thought experiments %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Elugardo, R. %T Burge on content %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 53 %N %P 367-84 %Z Contra Burge on sofas: oblique that-clauses can't identify the (wide) way that the subject thinks of sofas, which is idiosyncratic and inexpressible. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Forbes, G. %T A dichotomy sustained %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 51 %N %P 187-211 %Z Gives a Fregean account of belief semantics to handle the Burge cases, and argues that the *type* of a proposition may be internal even if the token itself is not. With remarks on the relevance to Grice's program. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book %A Frapolli, M. %A Romero, E. %T Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge %I CSLI %D 2003 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Gauker, C. %T Social externalism and linguistic communication %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Georgalis, N. %T Rethinking Burge's thought experiment %I %D 1999 %B Synthese %V 118 %N %P 145-64 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Grimaltos, T. %T Terms and content %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Hahn, M. %T When swampmen get arthritis: "Externalism" in Burge and Davidson %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book %A Hahn, M. %A Ramberg, B. %T Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackman, H. %T Individualism and interpretation %I %D 1998 %B Southwest Philosophy Review %V 14 %N %P 31-38 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Marqueze, J. %T On orthodox and heterodox externalisms %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Curing folk psychology of arthritis %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 70 %N %P 323-36 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Nordby, H. %T Davidson on social externalism %I %D 2005 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 86 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Normore, C. %T Burge, Descartes, and us %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Meaning, other people, and the world %I %D 1987 %B Representation and Reality %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wikforss, A. %T Social externalism and conceptual errors %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 203 %N %P 217-31 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Woodfield, A. %T Thought and the social community %I %D 1982 %B Inquiry %V 25 %N %P 435-50 %Z Burge's arguments show only that context-ascription is pragmatically sensitive to context, depending on the epistemic predicament of the ascriber. Content itself is still internal. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Woodfield, A. %T Social externalism and conceptual diversity %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %B Thought and Language %E J. Preston %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Arjo, D. %T Sticking up for Oedipus: Fodor on intentional generalizations and broad content %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 231-45 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %A Robbins, P. %T Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations? %I %D 2001 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 31 %N %P 1-22 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T An externalist account of psychological content %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Topics %V 15 %N %P 191-226 %Z Developing an externalist account consistent with psychological explanation. Contra Burge, social links aren't constitutive of content. Causal links are indirectly constitutive of content, via our conceptions. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Buller, D. J. %T "Narrow"-minded breeds inaction %I %D 1992 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 59-70 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Buller, D. J. %T Individualism and evolutionary psychology (or: In defense of "narrow" functions) %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 74-95 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Two thought experiments reviewed %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 23 %N %P 284-94 %Z Reply to Fodor 1982, clarification of position. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and psychology %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 3-45 %Z Psychology should be and is done non-individualistically, i.e. with reference to environment. Examples from vision, e.g. Marr. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Corazza, E. %T Perspectival thoughts and psychological generalizations %I %D 1994 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 307-36 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T What isn't wrong with folk psychology %I %D 1992 %B Metaphilosophy %V 23 %N %P 1-13 %Z Argues that extrinsic properties can play a respectable role in scientific explanation; e.g. the histories of plants, animals, and devices are relevant in explaining their current behavior. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Where is the mind? %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T Must psychology be individualistic? %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Review %V 100 %N %P 179-203 %Z Maybe, maybe not. Contra Fodor: science can be non-individualistic. Contra Burge re oblique ascriptions and Marr. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive psychology %I %D 1980 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 3 %N %P 63-109 %Z Should do psychology without reference to the external world. What counts for psychology is in the head; who cares about truth, reference, and the rest? -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 23 %N %P 98-118 %Z Twin Earth isn't a problem for cognitive science. Intents of utterances, de re/de dicto, etc. Truth conditions aren't in the head, but that's no problem. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Mind and chance %I %D 1987 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 17 %N %P 533-52 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Globus, G. %T Can methodological solipsism be confined to psychology? %I %D 1984 %B Cognition and Brain Theory %V 7 %N %P 233-46 %Z Methodological solipsism implies epistemological solipsism. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T [Explanation] is explanation better %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 154-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Hurley, S. L. %T Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure, and externalism %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 1-6 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacob, P. %T Externalism and the explanatory relevance of broad content %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitcher, P. S. %T Narrow taxonomy and wide functionalism %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy of Science %V 52 %N %P 78-97 %Z Argues against Stich, Fodor, Block: use different taxonomies (narrow/wide) for different purposes. Both are OK, functionalism *and* content survive. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kobes, B. %T Semantics and psychological prototypes %I %D 1989 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 70 %N %P 1-18 %Z Relates the individualism debate to Roschian prototype research. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Losonsky, M. %T Emdedded systems vs. individualism %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 357-71 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Macdonald, C. %T Weak externalism and psychological reduction %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %B Reduction, Explanation and Realism %E D Charles %E K. Lennon %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T The Churchlands on methodological solipsism and computational psychology %I %D 1985 %B Philosophy of Science %V 52 %N %P 295-309 %Z MS doesn't rule out all use of content, just of wide content. Narrow content is OK. With remarks on folk psychology and computation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology %I %D 1985 %B Philosophy of Science %V 52 %N %P 451-69 %Z Various problems for computational psychology handling content. It shares the problems of a naturalistic psychology. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A McClamrock, R. %T Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 343-54 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book %A McClamrock, R. %T Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World %I University of Chicago Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Noonan, H. W. %T Methodological solipsism: A reply to Morris %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Studies %V 48 %N %P 285-290 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Noonan, H. W. %T Russellian thoughts and methodological solipsism %I Cambridge University Press %D 1986 %B Language, Mind, and Logic %E J. Butterfield %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Noonan, H. W. %T Object-dependent thoughts and psychological redundancy %I %D 1990 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 1-9 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Noonan, H. W. %T Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency? %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z Object-dependent thoughts are redundant in psychological explanation, as an explanation applying to a hallucinator will work as well. But this needn't defeat externalism in general. With remarks on self-knowledge. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Patterson, S. %T The explanatory role of belief ascriptions %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 59 %N %P 313-32 %Z Uses examples to argue that in explaining behavior we often ascribe beliefs in an individualistic way, even in cases where individual and community use diverge. These contents are at least sometimes expressible. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Patterson, S. %T Individualism and semantic development %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy of Science %V 58 %N %P 15-35 %Z Developmental psychologists attribute concepts individualistically. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Peacocke, C. %T Externalist explanation %I %D 1993 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 67 %N %P 203-30 %Z Externalist states are required for the explanation of relational properties. Counters objections from conceptual connections and dormitive-virtue worries, and applies to teleology, self-knowledge, etc. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Petrie, B. %T Nonautonomous psychology %I %D 1990 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 28 %N %P 539-59 %Z Argues that behavior is often individuated widely for explanatory purposes, so that wide content is relevant, and that there is more to causation than local causation, so Stich's autonomy principle fails. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Pettit, P. %T Broad-minded explanation and psychology %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Subject, Thought and Context %E P. Pettit %E J. McDowell %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowlands, M. %T Against methodological solipsism: The ecological Approach %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 5-24 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %T The return of the individual %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 39-57 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Sterelny, K. %T Animals and individualism %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis %I %D 1978 %B Monist %V 61 %N %P 573-91 %Z Beliefs are not in the head, so aren't good for psychological explanation. Interesting, but confuses the role of truth-values with truth-conditions. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Tuomela, R. %T Methodological solipsism and explanation in psychology %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 23-47 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wakefield, J. C. %T Broad versus narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor on Frege cases %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 15 %N %P 119-33 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Wallace, J. %A Mason, H. E. %T On some thought experiments about mind and meaning %I CSLI %D 1990 %B Propositional Attitudes %E C. Anderson %E J. Owens %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Causal depth, theoretical appropriateness, and individualism in psychology %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy of Science %V 61 %N %P 55-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book %A Wilson, R. A. %T Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %T Fodor's modal argument %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 41-56 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Allen, C. %T It isn't what you think: A new idea about intentional causation %I %D 1995 %B Nous %V 29 %N %P 115-26 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Content and context %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 8 %N %P 17-32 %Z Argues contra Fodor that broad contents can be explanatory -- if they can't, no relational properties can. Fodor's "no-conceptual-connection" and "cross-context" tests for causal powers fail to do the job. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Barrett, J. %T Individualism and the cross-contexts test %I %D 1997 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 78 %N %P 242-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Braun, D. %T Content, causation, and cognitive science %I %D 1991 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 69 %N %P 375-89 %Z Arguments for the causal significance of broad content. Physical twins can differ in causal powers; broad content figures in (ceteris paribus) causal generalizations; can make twin arguments against narrow content too. Hmm. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individuation and causation in psychology %I %D 1989 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 707 %N %P 303-22 %Z Contra Fodor: psychological processes can play differing causal roles, despite being physically identical. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Intentional properties and causation %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Psychology: Debates about Psychological Explanation %E C. Macdonald %E G. Macdonald %Z Reply to Fodor 1991. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Content, causal powers, and context %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P 105-14 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Christensen, D. %T Causal powers and conceptual connections %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 163-8 %Z Fodor's modal argument for narrow content rests on a false analogy between cases concerning thoughts and those concerning planets. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T A modal argument for narrow content %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 88 %N %P 5-26 %Z On when a difference in effects amounts to a difference in causal powers: when the effects are connected contingently, not conceptually, to the causes. Differences in wide content don't satisfy this, so aren't causal powers. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Garcia-Carpintero, M. %T The supervenience of mental content %I %D 1994 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 68 %N %P 117-135 %Z Mental content can be extrinsic and efficacious. Narrow content strategies don't work, as observation concepts are still extrinsic. One can't screen of the intrinsic part from the rest. Thought-experiments are inconclusive. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %A Mele, A. %T Mental causes %I %D 1991 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 28 %N %P 61-71 %Z Reconciling Twin Earth with the causal relevance of content. Historical factors can be causally relevant. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacob, P. %T Externalism and mental causation %I %D 1992 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 66 %N %P 203-19 %Z Argues that externalist content is not causally efficacious, but is relevant to causal explanations of behavior indirectly, via the cognitive activities of others external to the system. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Klein, M. %T Externalism, content, and causation %I %D 1996 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 96 %N %P 159-76 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Lalor, B. J. %T It is what you think: intentional potency and anti-individualism %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 165-78 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludwig, K. %T Causal relevance and thought content %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 44 %N %P 334-53 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, C. %T Conceptual causation %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 525-46 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Montgomery, R. %T Non-Cartesian explanations meet the problem of mental causation %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 221-41 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T Content, causation, and psychophysical supervenience %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy of Science %V 60 %N %P 242-61 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Russow, L. M. %T Fodor, Adams, and causal properties %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 57-61 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Saidel, E. %T Content and causal powers %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy of Science %V 61 %N %P 658-65 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %A Sober, E. %T The causal efficacy of content %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 63 %N %P 1-30 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Seymour, D. %T Some of the difference in the world: Crane on intentional causation %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 43 %N %P 83-89 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Sturgeon, S. %T Good reasoning and cognitive architecture %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 88-101 %Z Epistemology requires the causal relevance of content, and the relevant content is narrow. On how various architectures might support this causal relevance, by being realized by more specific intrinsic features. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A van Gulick, R. %T Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't work %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B ReRepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z Against some arguments for internalism: local causation doesn't imply local type-individuation, as distal relations affect distal causes and effects; and processes can have access to semantic properties via formal properties. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Individualism, causal powers, and explanation %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 68 %N %P 103-39 %Z Science frequently appeals to relational and historical taxonomies, so either causal powers can be non-intrinsic or science needn't taxonomize by causal powers. With remarks on causal properties and conceptual connections. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Against a priori arguments for individualism %I %D 1993 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 74 %N %P 60-79 %Z Arguments from causal powers beg the question, either on whether relational properties can have causal powers or on whether science taxonomizes by causal powers, as relational properties are common in scientific explanation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Yablo, S. %T Wide causation %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 11 %N %P 251-81 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and psychology %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 3-45 %Z Psychology should be and is done non-individualistically, i.e. with reference to environment. Examples from vision, e.g. Marr. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Individualism and Marr's computational theory of vision %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 313-37 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Content, computation, and individualism in vision theory %I %D 1996 %B Analysis %V 56 %N %P 146-54 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Cain, M. J. %T Individualism, twin scenarios and visual content %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 441-463 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Individualism and perceptual content %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 461-84 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T Individualism, computation, and perceptual content %I %D 1992 %B Mind %V 101 %N %P 443-59 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Book Section %A Egan, F. %T Intentionality and the theory of vision %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Perception %E K. Akins %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Francescotti, R. M. %T Externalism and the Marr theory of vision %I %D 1991 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 42 %N %P 227-38 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitcher, P. S. %T Marr's computational theory of vision %I %D 1988 %B Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P 1-24 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Morton, P. %T Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy of Science %V 60 %N %P 86-99 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Book Section %A Patterson, S. %T Success-orientation and individualism in the theory of vision %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Perception %E K. Akins %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %T Seeing what is not there %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Review %V 97 %N %P 189-214 %Z Contra Burge, Marr's theory is individualistic. Intentional contents therein are neutral between twins' environments; nothing grounds a more specific attribution. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %T Defence of a reasonable individualism %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 485-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. A. %T Content, kinds, and individualism in Marr's theory of vision %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Review %V 102 %N %P 489-513 %Z Contra Segal, Marr's theory is non-individualistic even though it may classify twins together. Computational-level task descriptions rather than behavior guide content ascription, so the environment plays a crucial role. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. A. %T A clearer vision %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 131-53 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. A. %T Junk representations %I %D 1997 %B 1997 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Book Section %A Andler, D. %T Can we knock off the shackles of syntax? %I Ridgeview %D 1995 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Content, computation, and individuation %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 114 %N %P 277-92 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T Computation and content %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Review %V 104 %N %P 181-203 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T In defence of narrow mindedness %I %D 1999 %B Mind and Language %V 14 %N %P 177-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kazez, J. R. %T Computationalism and the causal role of content %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 75 %N %P 231-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kobes, B. %T Individualism and artificial intelligence %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 4 %N %P 429-56 %Z Winograd's SHRDLU doesn't support individualism: its concepts are anchored (to a fictional world) via its programmer, and it could have made errors. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Miscevic, N. %T Computation, content, and cause %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Studies %V 82 %N %P 241-63 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Book Section %A Peacocke, C. %T Content, computation, and externalism %I Ridgeview %D 1995 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Peacocke, C. %T Computation as involving content: A response to Egan %I %D 1999 %B Mind and Language %V 14 %N %P 195-202 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Seager, W. E. %T Thought and syntax %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1992 %N %P %Z Syntax is extrinsically determined, as well as semantics. So if broad content is irrelevant to psychology, syntax is too. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Shagrir, O. %T Content, computation and externalism %I %D 2001 %B Mind %V 110 %N %P 369-400 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bar-On, D. %T Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression %I %D 2004 %B Nous %V 38 %N %P 430-55 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Beebee, H. %T Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 51 %N %P 356-74 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Berg, J. %T First-person authority, externalism, and wh-knowledge %I %D 1998 %B Dialectica %V 52 %N %P 41-44 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernecker, S. %T Davidson on first-person authority and externalism %I %D 1996 %B Inquiry %V 39 %N %P 121-39 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernecker, S. %T Externalism and the attitudinal component of self-knowledge %I %D 1996 %B Nous %V 30 %N %P 262-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Bernecker, S. %T Self-knowledge and closure %I CSLI %D 1998 %B Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E P. Ludlow %E N. Martin %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernecker, S. %T Memory and externalism %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical and Phenomenological Research %V 69 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T Can externalism be reconciled with self-knowledge? %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Topics %V 20 %N %P 233-68 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T A trilemma for redeployment %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 22-30 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T Content and self-knowledge %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Topics %V 17 %N %P 5-26 %Z We can't know our thought-contents by inference (circular), by introspection (because they're relational), or directly, so we can't know them at all. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P, %T Externalism and inference %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Issues %V 2 %N %P 11-28 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T The transparency of mental content %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 8 %N %P 33-50 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T What the externalist can know a priori %I %D 1997 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 97 %N %P 161-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 149-56 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Critical reasoning, understanding and self-knowledge %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 61 %N %P 659-676 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Reliabilism, knowledge, and mental content %I %D 2000 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 100 %N %P 115-35 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Anti-individualism and agnosticism %I %D 2001 %B Analysis %V 61 %N %P 213-24 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Brown, J. %T The reductio argument and transmission of warrant %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Scepticism about knowledge of content %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 447-51 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T What an anti-individualist knows a priori %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 111-18 %Z Contra McKinsey 1991, anti-individualism doesn't lead to a priori knowledge. The belief that water is wet doesn't conceptually entail facts about the external world (e.g. H2O), although it may metaphysically necessitate them. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Semantic answers to skepticism %I %D 1992 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 73 %N %P 200-19 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Skepticism and externalism %I %D 1993 %B Philosophia %V 22 %N %P 169-71 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Knowledge of content and knowledge of the world %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Review: %V 103 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Trying to get outside your own skin %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Topics %V 23 %N %P 79-111 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Externalism and memory %I %D 1997 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 78 %N %P 1-12 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 4 %N %P 287-90 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Two recent approaches to self-knowledge %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 13 %N %P 251-71 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Externalism and the a prioricity of self-knowledge %I %D 2000 %B Analysis %V 60 %N %P 132-136 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Ambiguity and knowledge of content %I %D 2000 %B Analysis %V 60 %N %P 257-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T A priori knowledge of the world not easily available %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 104 %N %P 109-114 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Problems for a recent account of introspective knowledge %I %D 2001 %B 2001 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Anti-individualism and analyticity %I %D 2002 %B Analysis %V 62 %N %P 87-91 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Bruckner, A. %T Two transcendental arguments concerning self-knowledge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner A. %T Brewer on the McKinsey problem %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 41-43 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Noordhof on McKinsey-Brown %I %D 2005 %B Analysis %V 65 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and self-knowledge %I %D 1988 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 85 %N %P 649-63 %Z Knowledge of our thoughts is compatible with externalism: its content is self-referential and self-verifying. We needn't be able to explicate the content or its enabling conditions, or rule out twin possibilities. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Memory and self-knowledge %I CSLI %D 1998 %B Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E P. Ludlow %E N. Martin %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Mental agency in authoritative self-knowledge: Reply to Kobes %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Some reflections on scepticism: Reply to Stroud %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Externalism, internalism, and knowledge of content %I %D 1997 %B philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 57 %N %P 773-800 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Externalism and skepticism %I %D 1998 %B Dialogue %V 37 %N %P 13-34 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Problems for semantic externalism and a priori refutations of skeptical arguments %I %D 2000 %B Dialectica %V 54 %N %P 29-49 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Chase, J. %T Is externalism about content inconsistent with internalism about justification? %I %D 2001 %B Australasian Jouenal of Philosophy %V 79 %N %P 227-46 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Davidson, D. %T Knowing one's own mind %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant %I