Part 3: Metaphysics of Mind =========================== 3.1 Supervenience [102] 3.1a Psychophysical Supervenience (Kim, etc) [14] 3.1b Supervenience and Physicalism [31] 3.1c Technical Issues in Supervenience [27] 3.1d Supervenience, General [30] 3.2 Reduction [91] 3.2a Multiple Realizability and Reduction [28] 3.2b Nonreductive Materialism [29] 3.2c Reduction in Psychology [15] 3.2d Miscellaneous [19] 3.3 Other Psychophysical Relations [132] 3.3a Physicalism [30] 3.3b Token Identity [7] 3.3c Emergence [59] 3.3d Dualism [24] 3.3e Miscellaneous [12] 3.4 Functionalism [66] 3.4a Causal Role Functionalism (Armstrong/Lewis) [17] 3.4b Machine Functionalism (Putnam) [15] 3.4c Miscellaneous [34] 3.5 Other Psychophysical Theories [238] 3.5a Logical Behaviorism (Ryle, etc) [53] 3.5b Identity Theory (Smart, Place, etc) [98] 3.5c Eliminative Materialism (Rorty, Feyerabend) [30] 3.5d Anomalous Monism (Davidson) [57] 3.6 Mental Causation [68] 3.7 Personal Identity [192] 3.7a Personal Identity, General [78] 3.7b Parfit on Personal Identity [49] 3.7c Persons [23] 3.7d Split Brains [23] 3.7e Multiple Personality Disorder [19] 3.8 Free Will [286] 3.9 The Problem of Other Minds [46] 3.1 Supervenience ----------------- 3.1a Psychophysical Supervenience (Kim, etc) -------------------------------------------- Crane, T. 1991. Why indeed? Papineau on supervenience. Analysis 51:32-7. Contra Papineau 1989: the assumption of completeness is false or trivial. Maybe the mental is part of a complete physics. With response by Papineau. Elugardo, R. 1988. Against weak psychophysical supervenience. Dialectica 42:129-43. Various objections to Kim's arguments for supervenience. Not all internal states relevant to I/O relations are psychological states. Strange. Hendel, G. 2002. On what does the issue of supervenience and psychophysical dependence depend? Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 41. Kim, J. 1979. Causality, identity and supervenience in the mind-body problem. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:31-49. Supervenience of the mental on the physical is what is required to make mental causation possible. Very nice. Kim, J. 1982. Psychophysical supervenience. Philosophical Studies 41:51-70. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Internal mental states (i.e. ones that are not rooted outside) supervene on synchronous internal physical states, and internal states are all that is relevant in the explanation of behavior. Kim, J. 1982. Psychophysical supervenience as a mind-body theory. Cognition and Brain Theory 5:129-47. Distinguishes weak (within-world) vs strong (across-worlds) supervenience. Relates to reduction, internal/external mental states, and various theories. Kim, J. 1997. Supervenience, emergence, and realization in the philosophy of mind. In (M. Carrier & P. Machamer, eds) _Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind_. Pittsburgh University Press. Lewis, H. 1985. Is the mental supervenient on the physical? In (B. Vermazen & M. Hintikka, eds) _Essays on Davidson_. Oxford University Press. On some problems with supervenience, the relation between supervenience and reduction, and on reasons for accepting psychophysical supervenience. Loose. Loar, B. 1993. Can we confirm supervenient properties? In (E. Villanueva, ed) _Naturalism and Normativity_. Ridgeview. If mental properties are supervenient but irreducible to physical/functional properties, we can't confirm them. Confirmation requires an indispensable explanatory role, which irreducibility precludes. With comments by Schiffer. Macdonald, C. 1995. Psychophysical supervenience, dependency, and reduction. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. Cambridge University Press. Merricks, T. 1998. Against the doctrine of microphysical supervenience. Mind 107: 59-72. Noonan, H. 1999. Microphysical supervenience and consciousness. Mind 108:755-9. Papineau, D. 1989. Why supervenience? Analysis 50:66-71. Psychophysical supervenience follows from completeness of physical laws. Papineau, D. 1995. Arguments for supervenience and physical realization. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. Cambridge University Press. Sider, T. 2003. Maximality and microphysical supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:139-149. Witmer, D.G. 1998. What is wrong with the manifestability argument for supervenience? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:84-89. 3.1b Supervenience and Physicalism [see also 3.3a] ---------------------------------- Armstrong, D.M. 1982. Metaphysics and supervenience. Critica 42:3-17. Argues that everything is logically supervenient on the physical. Considers classes, possibilities, numbers, universals, and objects of thought. Bailey, A. 1998. Supervenience and physicalism. Synthese 117:53-73. Botterell, A. 2002. Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence: a reply to Campbell. Dialogue 41:155-161. Campbell, N. 2002. Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence: a reply to Botterell. Dialogue 41:163-167. Chalmers, D.J. 1996. Supervenience and materialism. In _The Conscious Mind_ (pp. 41-42). Oxford University Press, 1996. Charles, D. 1992. Supervenience, composition, and physicalism. In (D. Charles & K. Lennon, eds) _Reduction, Explanation and Realism_. Oxford University Press. Francescotti, R.M. 1998. Defining "physicalism". Journal of Mind and Behavior 19:51-64. Haugeland, J. 1984. Ontological supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:1-12. Supervenience is all we need for materialism. Various materialist arguments (unity, "nothing but", history, fear of darkness, simplicity, law) don't support physical exhaustion & token identity, over and above supervenience. Hellman, G. & Thomson, F. 1975. Physicalism: ontology, determination and reduction. Journal of Philosophy 72:551-64. Hellman, G. & Thomson, F. 1977. Physicalist materialism. Nous 11:309-45. Some applications of the earlier treatment: examples of determination without reduction; the statuf of properties and universals; the mental; the life sciences; modalities and essentalism; theoretical equivalence. Hellman, G. 1985. Determination and logical truth. Journal of Philosophy 82:607-16. Some remarks on determination, physicalism, model theory, and logical truth. Hendel, G. 2001. Physicalism, nothing buttery, and supervenience. Ratio 14:252-262. Horgan, T. 1981. Token physicalism, supervenience, and the generality of physics. Synthese 49:395-413. Argues that the generality of physics should be a supervenience thesis, not token physicalism. Fodor's token physicalism is untenable but might be saved with an appropriate view of events. Horgan, T. 1982. Supervenience and microphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63:29-43. An account of how all facts supervene on microphysical facts, and how all intrinsic facts supervene on intrinsic microphysical facts. Horgan, T. 1984. Supervenience and cosmic hermeneutics. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:19-38. Laplacean demon's job: number crunching, plus cosmic hermeneutics to explain high-level truths. All high-level truths follow from low-level by meaning constraints. Application to theoretical/mentalistic/everyday terms. Nice. Jack, A. 1994. Materialism and supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:426-43. Supervenience is neither necessary nor sufficient for materialism. With various (contentious) counterexamples. So we need a different formulation. Kirk, R. 1996. Strict implication, supervenience, and physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74:244-57. Argues for strict implication rather than supervenience as a formulation of "minimal physicalism" (unless supervenience is formulated just right). Lewis, D. 1983. New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Formulates a definition of materialism: among worlds where no natural properties alien to our worlds are instantiated, no two differ without differing physically. With a lot of other material on universals. Melnyk, A. 1991. Physicalism: From supervenience to elimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51:573-87. How can supervenience, as a relationship between ontologically distinct properties, be explained? Modal realism and grand-properties don't work. Eliminativism about supervenient properties is the only possibility. Moreland, J.P. 1999. Should a naturalist be a supervenient physicalist? Metaphilosophy 29:35-57. Moser, P, & Trout, J.D. 1996. Physicalism, supervenience, and dependence. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. Cambridge University Press. Pettit, P. 1993. A definition of physicalism. Analysis 53:213-23. Defines physicalism in terms of claims that microphysical entities constitute everything and that microphysical laws govern everything. With a reply by Crane. Rowlands, M. 1995. _Supervenience and Materialism_. Avebury. Seager, W.E. 1988. Weak supervenience and materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:697-709. Weak supervenience provides a more tenable form of materialism than strong supervenience, because of inverted spectrum possibilities, etc. Wilson, J.M. 1999. How superduper does a physicalist supervenience need to be? Philosophical Quarterly 49:33-52. Wilson, J.M. 2002. Causal powers, forces, and superdupervenience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63:53-77. Witmer, D.G. 1999. Supervenience physicalism and the problem of extras. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37:315-31. 3.1c Technical Issues in Supervenience -------------------------------------- Bacon, J. 1986. Supervenience, necessary coextensions, and reducibility. Philosophical Studies 49:163-76. A modal-logic analysis of the relations between various notions of supervenience. Most concepts of supervenience entail necessary co-extension, under certain closure assumptions for properties. Bacon, J. 1995. Weak supervenience supervenes. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. Cambridge University Press. Bennett, K. 2004. Global supervenience and dependence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68:501-529. Bonevac, D. 1988. Supervenience and ontology. American Philosophical Quarterly 25:37-47. A model-theoretic treatment of supervenience, in terms of relations between theories. Supervenience turns out to be equivalent to reduction. Bovens, L. 1994. Principles of supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:294-301. Divers, J. 1996. Supervenience for operators. Synthese 106:103-12. Forrest, P. 1988. Supervenience: The grand-property hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:1-12. A nonreductive supervenience hypothesis: supervenient properties are properties of properties, e.g intrinsic goodness is a property of an object's nature. Forrest, P. 1992. Universals and universalisability: An interpretation of Oddie's discussion of supervenience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70:93-98. Grim, P. 1997. Worlds by supervenience: Some further problems. Analysis 2:146-51. Grimes, T. 1991. Supervenience, determination, and dependency. Philosophical Studies 62:81-92. On dependency supervenience (B properties determine A properties) versus determination supervenience (A properties need B properties). Grimes, T. 1995. The Tweedledum and Tweedledee of supervenience. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. Cambridge University Press. Humberstone, I.L. 1992. Some structural and logical aspects of the notion of supervenience. Logical Analysis 35:101-37. Kim, J. 1984. Concepts of supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:153-76. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Distinguishes weak and strong supervenience. A mistaken proof that strong and global supervenience are equivalent. Strong supervenience implies a kind of reduction, but not an explanatorily useful reduction. Kim, J. 1987. `Strong' and `global' supervenience revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:315-26. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Reasons why global supervenience doesn't entail strong supervenience, and trying to rescue global supervenience as a useful notion. Suggests a similarity-based notion of global supervenience. Kim, J. 1988. Supervenience for multiple domains. Philosophical Topics 16:129-50. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). How properties in one domain can supervene on properties in another, with or without co-ordination between domains. Relation to global supervenience. Klagge, J.C. 1995. Supervenience: Model theory or metaphysics? In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. Cambridge University Press. Marras, A. 1993. Supervenience and reducibility: An odd couple. Philosophical Quarterly 43:215-222. Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility, as necessary coextension doesn't suffice, and is incompatible with reducibility, due to ontological asymmetry. McLaughlin, B.P. 1995. Varieties of supervenience. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. Cambridge University Press. Distinguishes modal-operator and possible-worlds versions of supervenience, and explicates global supervenience and its relation to weak and strong. With remarks on multiple-domain supervenience and the relation to reduction. McLaughlin, B. P. 1997. Supervenience, vagueness, and determination. Philosophical Perspectives 11:209-30. Melnyk, A. 1997. On the metaphysical utility of claims of global supervenience. Philosophical Studies 87:277-308. Moser, P.K. 1992. Physicalism and global supervenience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30:71-82. Argues that global supervenience has epistemological problems -- how could we ever know that it holds, and that certain worlds are impossible? Oddie, G. & Tichy, P. 1990. Resplicing properties in the supervenience base. Philosophical Studies 58:259-69. Closure under resplicing makes supervenience both too narrow and too wide. Weak supervenience is generally too weak to capture the dependence relation. Oddie, G. 1991. Supervenience and higher-order universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69:20-47. Paull, R.C. & Sider, T.R. 1992. In defense of global supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:833-53. Gives a proof of the distinction between strong and global supervenience that improves on Petrie's, and argues contra Kim that global supervenience is a perfectly reasonable dependence relation for physicalism. Petrie, B. 1987. Global supervenience and reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48:119-30. Defending global supervenience: it's weaker than strong supervenience, as base properties of other individuals are relevant. It doesn't entail type or token reducibility. On the relation to implicit definability and reduction. Post, J.F. 1995. "Global" supervenient determination: Too permissive? In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. Cambridge University Press. Shagrir, O. 1999. More on global supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:691-701. Shagrir, O. 2002. Global supervenience, coincident entities, and anti-individualism. Philosophical Studies 109:171-96. van Cleve, J. 1990. Supervenience and closure. Philosophical Studies 58:225-38. Properties in supervenience relations shouldn't be closed under negation or resplicing, due to bad consequences. With reply by Bacon on resplicing. 3.1d Supervenience, General --------------------------- Blackburn, S. 1984. Supervenience revisited. In (I. Hacking, ed) _Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy_. Cambridge University Press. On the incompatibility of weak supervenience without strong supervenience and realism. With discussion of various strengths of necessity involved in supervenience claims, and application to moral realism and anomalous monism. Bontly, T. 2002. The supervenience argument generalizes. Philosophical Studies 109:75-96. Currie, G. 1984. Individualism and global supervenience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35:345-58. How social facts supervene on the totality of individual facts. Application to belief, etc. Enc, B. 1996. Nonreducible supervenient causation. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. Cambridge University Press. Grimes, T. 1988. The myth of supervenience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69:152-60. Supervenience is too weak to function as a dependency relation, as e.g. it can hold in two directions at once. Hare, R.M. 1984. Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:1-16. On the universal conditionals that underlie supervenience, and the necessity thereof. A discussion of the necessity of moral, natural kind, and other sorts of supervenience. Contra Davidson, anomalous supervenience is silly. Heil, J. 1995. Supervenience redux. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. Cambridge University Press. Hellman, G. 1992. Supervenience/determination a two-way street? Yes, but one of the ways is the wrong way! Journal of Philosophy 89:42-47. Reply to Miller 1990. Miller underestimates the modal force of supervenience and invokes irrelevant dispositional properties. Hendel, G. 2001. Supervenience, metaphysical reduction, and metaphysics of properties. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 39:99-118. Horgan, T. 1993. From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102:555-86. An overview of supervenience, with focus on the problem of explaining supervenience relations. With remarks on mental causation, emergence, physicalism, and reduction. Kim, J. 1978. Supervenience and nomological incommensurables. American Philosophical Quarterly 15:149-56. Developing and motivating the notion of supervenience. Investigating the relationship to reducibility and definability (equivalence, under certain conditions), and to microphysical determination. Kim, J. 1984. Supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:45-56. On weak/strong supervenience, and high-level causation via supervenience. Kim, J. 1991. Supervenience as a philosophical concept. Metaphilosophy 21:1-27. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). A nice overview of supervenience and covariance. Kim, J. 1993. _Supervenience and Mind_. Cambridge University Press. A collection of articles on supervenience and causation in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, with some added postscripts. Kincaid, H. 1987. Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25:343-56. Supervenience doesn't entail reducibility, which is epistemological. The problem's not just huge disjuncts, but also the sharing of bases, no local correlations, and base-properties presupposing supervenient properties. Kincaid, H. 1988. Supervenience and explanation. Synthese 77:251-81. Argues that lower-level theories can explain supervenient but irreducible higher-level theories, but only under certain conditions, as low-level accounts don't have the relevant kind terms. Klagge, J.C. 1988. Supervenience: Ontological and ascriptive. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:461-70. On supervenience as an ontological relation (via metaphysical necessity) or as an ascriptive relation (via conceptual necessity). The first doesn't preclude the second. Moral realism and mental realism are in the same boat. Loewer, B. 1995. An argument for strong supervenience. In (E. Savellos & U. Yalcin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. Cambridge University Press. Lynch, M. & Glasgow, J. 2003. The impossibility of superdupervenience. Philosophical Studies 113:201-221. McLaughlin, B.P. 1983. Event supervenience and supervenient causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:71-91. McLaughlin, B.P. 1994. Varieties of supervenience. In (E. Savellos & O. Yalchin, eds) _Supervenience: New Essays_. On a number of issues: possible worlds vs modal notions, explicating global supervenience, the relation between weak/strong/global supervenience, multiple-domain supervenience, and implications for reduction. Melnyk, A. 1997. On the metaphysical utility of claims of global supervenience. Philosophical Studies 87:277-308. Merricks, T. 1998. Against the doctrine of microphysical supervenience. Mind 107:59-71. Miller, R.B. 1990. Supervenience is a two-way street. Journal of Philosophy 87:695-701. If supervening properties can make arbitrarily fine distinctions, then physical properties supervene on moral/aesthetic/mental properties. Noonan, H. 1987. Supervenience. Philosophical Quarterly 37:78-85. Contra Blackburn 1984 on the possibility of weak supervenience without strong supervenience, even with metaphysical necessity; using Nozick's concept structures, or indexical definitions. With application to moral realism. Post, J.F. 1984. On the determinacy of valuation. Philosophical Studies 45:315-33. Post, J. 2001. Sense and supervenience. Philo 4:123-137. Stalnaker, R. 1996. Varieties of supervenience. Philosophical Perspectives 10:221-42. Distinguishes "reductionist" and "metaphysical" conceptions of supervenience. Also discusses the relation between strong and global supervenience, degrees of necessity, and the explanatory role of supervenience. Teller, P. 1984. The poor man's guide to supervenience and determination. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 22:137-62. Compares the Hellman/Thompson notion of determination with Kim's development of supervenience. Uses these to investigate the concept of materialism, and argues that materialism isn't contingent. Teller, P. 1985. Is supervenience just disguised reduction? Southern Journal of Philosophy 23:93-100. van Brakel, J. 1996. Interdiscourse or supervenience relations: The primacy of the manifest image. Synthese 106:253-97. van Brakel, J. 2005. Supervenience and anomalous monism. Dialectica 53:3-24. Zangwill, N. 1997. Explaining supervenience: Moral and mental. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:509-18. 3.2 Reduction ------------- 3.2a Reduction and Multiple Realizability ----------------------------------------- Antony, L.M. & Levine, J. 1997. Reduction with autonomy. Philosophical Perspectives 11:83-105. Antony, L.M. 1999. Multiple realizability, projectibility, and the reality of mental properties. Philosophical Topics 26:1-24. Antony, L.M. 2003. Who's afraid of disjunctive properties? Philosophical Issues 13:1-21. Bechtel, W., & Mundale, J. 1999. Multiple realizability revisited: Linking cognitive and neural states. Philosophy of Science 66:175-207. Bickle, J. 1992. Multiple realizability and psychophysical reduction. Behavior and Philosophy 20:47-58. Bickle, J. 1995. Connectionism, reduction, and multiple realizability. Behavior and Philosophy 23:29-39. Block, N. 1997. Anti-reductionism slaps back. Philosophical Perspectives 11:107-32. Bolender, J. 1995. Is multiple realizability compatible with antireductionism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 33:129-42. Boyd, R. 1999. Kinds, complexity, and multiple realization. Philosophical Studies 95:67-98. Clapp, L. 2001. Disjunctive properties: multiple realizations. Journal of Philosophy 98:111-136. Endicott, R.P. 1991. Macdonald on type reduction via disjunction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29:209-14. Endicott, R.P. 1989. On physical multiple realization. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70:212-24. Endicott, R.P. 1993. Species-specific properties and more narrow reductive strategies. Erkenntnis 38:303-21. On species-specific reductions. These can't reduce standard psychological properties, and problems with intra-species multiple realization can't be circumvented without giving up property reduction for token event identity. Endicott, R.P. 1998. Collapse of the new wave. Journal of Philosophy 95:53-72. Fodor, J. 1997. Special sciences: Still autonomous after all these years. Philosophical Perspectives 11:149-63. Francescotti, R.M. 1997. What multiple realizability does not show. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18:13-28. The anti-reductionist argument assumes that functional properties aren't physical properties (not even extrinsic physical properties). This, not multiple realizability, does the work. Gillett, C.; Rives, B. 2001. Does the argument from realization generalize? Responses to Kim. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39:79-98. Gillett, C. 2003. The metaphysics of realization, multiple realizability, and the special sciences. Journal of Philosophy 100:591-603. Heil, J. 1999. Multiple realizability. American Philosophical Quarterly 36:189-208. Heil, J. 2003. Multiply realized properties. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) _Physicalism and Mental Causation_. Imprint Academic. Jaworksi, W. 2002. Multiple-realizability, explanation, and the disjunctive move. Philosophical Studies 108:298-308. Kim, J. 1992. Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52:1-26. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Multiple realization is compatible with reductionism. Jade (= jadeite or nephrite) isn't a scientific kind, and neither are multiply realizable mental properties. So there's no global psychology, just lots of local reductions. Kim, S. 2002. Testing multiple realizability: A discussion of Bechtel and Mundale. Philosophy of Science 69:606-610. Kistler, M. 1999. Multiple realization, reduction and mental properties. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13. Nelson, A. 1985. Physical properties. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66:268-82. Some comments on Wilson 1985: some special-science properties may be relevantly different in kind from his expanded physical properties. Macdonald, C. 1992. Psychological type-type reduction via disjunction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30:65-69. Mucciolo, L. 1974. The identity thesis and neuropsychology. Nous 8:327-42. Argues contra Fodor and Block that neurological equipotentiality doesn't refute type materialism. Mental states may not be anatomically defined neural states, but they may be more abstract neural holograms. Nasrin, M. 2000. Multiple realizability: Also a difficulty for functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7:25-34. Polger, T. 2002. Putnam's intuition. Philosophical Studies 109:143-70. Ross, P.A. 1999. The limits of physicalism. Philosophy of Science 66:94-116. Schwartz, J. 1992. Who's afraid of multiple realizability?: Functionalism, reductionism, and connectionism. In (J. Dinsmore, ed) _The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap_. Lawrence Erlbaum. Shagrir, O. 1998. Multiple realization, computation and the taxonomy of psychological states. Synthese 114:445-461. Shapiro, L. 2000. Multiple realizations. Journal of Philosophy 97:635-654. Shapiro, L. 2004. _The Mind Incarnate_. MIT Press. Wilson, M. 1985. What is this thing called `pain'? -- The philosophy of science behind the contemporary debate. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66:227-67. Argues for type-type identities and for an expanded view of the physical, as properties from physics exhibit the same sort of multiple realizability as functional properties. Sophisticated, with many interesting examples. Witmer, G. 2003. Multiple realizability and psychological laws: Evaluating Kim's challenge. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) _Physicalism and Mental Causation_. Imprint Academic. Zangwill, N. 1995. Supervenience, reduction, and infinite disjunction. Philosophia 24:321-30. 3.2b Nonreductive Materialism [see also 3.5d] ----------------------------- Antony, L. 1999. Making room for the mental. Philosophical Studies 95:37-44. Barrett, J. 1995. Causal relevance and nonreductive physicalism. Erkenntnis 42:339-62. Beckermann, A. 1992. Reductive and nonreductive physicalism. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. On varieties of physicalism with respect to reduction: semantic physicalism, identity theory, supervenience, and the denial of emergence. Advocates a version on which physical states realize mental states. Beckermann, A, Flohr, H. & Kim, J. (eds) 1992. _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. Boyd, R. 1980. Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol 1. MIT Press. Clarke, R. 1999. Nonreductive physicalism and the causal powers of the mental. Erkenntnis 51:295-322. Dupre, J. 1988. Materialism, physicalism, and scientism. Philosophical Topics 16:31-56. Arguing for a pluralistic conception. With criticism of Churchland's reductionism, Davidson's token identity, and more generally reverential "scientism". Reductionist explanation is not the general rule. Ellis, R. 2000. Consciousness, self-organization, and the process-substratum relation: Rethinking nonreductive physicalism. Philosophical Psychology 13:173-190. Fodor, J.A. 1974. Special sciences. Synthese 28:97-115. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Psychological kinds can't be reduced to physical kinds, due to cross-classification, although token physicalism still holds. How to maintain the generality of physics without a reductionist unity of science. Francescotti, R.M. 1998. The nonreductionist's troubles with supervenience. Philosophical Studies 89:105-24. Gillett, C. 2003. Nonreductive realization and nonreductive identity: What physicalism does not entail. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) _Physicalism and Mental Causation_. Imprint Academic. Horgan, T. 1993. Nonreductive materialism and the explanatory autonomy of psychology. In (S. Wagner & R. Warner, eds) _Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal_. University of Notre Dame Press. Gives four constraints on interlevel connections, and some arguments against reductionism and for the autonomy of psychology. Argues that supervenience fact are themselves in need of explanation. Horgan, T. 1994. Nonreductive materialism. In (R. Warner & T. Szubka, eds) _The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate_. Blackwell. Hunter, D. 2002. Mind-brain identity and the nature of states. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:366-86. Kernohan, A. 1988. Non-reductive materialism and the spectrum of mind-body identity theories. Dialogue 27:475-88. Classifying psychophysical theories by the status (necessary, lawful, anomalous, false) of psychophysical/psychological generalizations. Defending autonomous monism: nonreductive materialism with psychological laws. Kim, J. 1989. The myth of non-reductive materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63(3):31-47. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Somewhat loose arguments that non-reductive physicalist realism is untenable. Anomalous monism makes the mental irrelevant, functionalism is compatible with species-specific reduction, and supervenience is weak or reductive. Kim, J. 1992. The nonreductivist's trouble with mental causation. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). Argues that nonreductive materialism implies downward causation (as the mental has more causal powers than the physical alone), and that downward causation violates the causal closure of the physical. Kim, J. 1992. "Downward causation" in emergentism and nonreductive physicalism. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. Argues that nonreductive materialism is just like 1930s emergentism, with the the mental contributing new causal powers, and so implies downward causation. Kirk, R. 1996. How physicalists can avoid reductionism. Synthese 108:157-70. Contra Kim, physicalists can avoid reduction by embracing strict implication. Kirk, R. 2001. Nonreductive physicalism and strict implication. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:544-552. Knowles, J. 1999. Physicalism, teleology and the miraculous coincidence problem. Philosophical Quarterly 49:164-81. Margolis, J. 1978. _Persons and Minds: The Prospects of Non-Reductive Materialism_. D. Reidel. Markic, O. 2002. Nonreductive materialism and the problem of causal exclusion. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63:79-88. Marras, A. 1993. Psychophysical supervenience and nonreductive materialism. Synthese 95:275-304. Marras, A. 1994. Nonreductive materialism and mental causation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24:465-93. Melnyk, A. 1995. Two cheers for reductionism, or, the dim prospects for nonreductive materialism. Philosophy of Science 62:370-88. Melnyk, A. 1998. The prospects for Kirk's nonreductive physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:323-32. Loar, B. 1992. Elimination versus nonreductive physicalism. In (D. Charles & K. Lennon, eds) _Reduction, Explanation and Realism_. Oxford University Press. Papineau, D. 1992. Irreducibility and teleology. In (D. Charles & K. Lennon, eds) _Reduction, Explanation and Realism_. Oxford University Press. Non-reductive physicalism is a mystery unless we invoke teleology. Pereboom, D. & Kornblith, H. 1991. The metaphysics of irreducibility. Philosophical Studies 63:125-45. Explicating anti-reductionism: mental causal powers are constituted of physical causal powers, but aren't type- or token-identical to them. Against arguments from local reduction, neuroscience, explanatory exclusion, etc. Pereboom, D. 2002. Robust nonreductive materialism. Journal of Philosophy 99:499-531. Robinson, H. 2001. Davidson and nonreductive materialism: A tale of two cultures. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Silvers, S. 1997. Nonreductive naturalism. Theoria 12:163-84. Smith, A.D. 1993. Non-reductive physicalism? In (H. Robinson, ed) _Objections to Physicalism_. Oxford University Press. A careful discussion of how to characterize physicalism, in terms of identity or supervenience, and argues that physicalism must reduce (bowdlerize) qualia to something they are not, as physicalism requires topic-neutral analyses. Stephan, A. 2001. How to lose the mind-body problem. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:279-283. Ten Elshof, G. 1997. Supervenient difficulties with nonreductive physicalism: A critical analysis of supervenience physicalism. Kinesis 24:3-22. van Gulick, R. 1992. Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. On how a nonreductive materialism can handle problems about mental causation, psychophysical dependencies, and qualia. A teleofunctionalist view with different conceptual frameworks, but mental properties physically realized. Wedgwood, R. 2000. The price of non-reductive physicalism. Nous 34:400-421. 3.2c Reduction in Psychology ---------------------------- Bickle, J. 1995. Psychoneural reduction of the genuinely cognitive: Some accomplished facts. Philosophical Psychology 8:265-85. Argues that cognitive theories have already been reduced to neurobiology in some domains, such as associative learning. Bickle, J. 2001. New wave metascience: Replies to Beckermann, Maloney, and Stephan. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:285-293. Churchland, P.M. 1982. Is `thinker' a natural kind? Dialogue 21:223-38. Psychology shouldn't be autonomous from natural science. By analogy with biology, nature provides (a) conceptual insight, and (b) real constraints, e.g. thermodynamic ones. Biology and psychology are continuous. Crooks, M. 2002. Intertheoretic identification and mind-brain reductionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23:193-222. Fonseca, J. 2004. On Bickle's failure to give a formal account of the location in the new-wave reductionist spectrum. Disputatio 17. Gaito, J. 1960. Description, explanation, and reductionism in psychology. Psychological Reports 6:203-5. Gaito, J. & Leonard, D. 1965. Philosophical and empirical reductionism in psychology. Journal of General Psychology 72:69-75. Hardcastle, V.G. 1992. Reduction, explanatory extension, and the mind/brain sciences. _Philosophy of Science_ 59:408-28. The relationship between psychology and neuroscience is best characterized not by reduction but by explanatory extension, where each field is enriched by the other. With a number of examples from recent empirical work. Hyland, M.E. 1995. Against nomological reductionism in psychology: A response to Robinson. New Ideas in Psychology 13:9-11. Jessor, R. 1958. The problem of reductionism in psychology. Psychological Review 65:170-78. Marras, A. 1990. Reduction in psychology. Acta Analytica 6:65-78. Martindale, R.L. & Seidel, R.J. 1959. Reductionism: Its prodigal encores. Psychological Reports 5:213-16. Montgomery, R. 1990. The reductionist ideal in cognitive psychology. Synthese 85:279-314. Anti-reductionism needn't be ad hoc (contra Churchland). Although evolution provides some pressure for 1-1 psychophysical mappings, there are significant countervailing forces, e.g. in vision, memory, learning, and language use. Olshewsky, T.M. 1975. Dispositions and reductionism in psychology. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 5:129-44. Putnam, H. 1974. Reductionism and the nature of psychology. Cognition 2:131-46. Richardson, R.C. 1999. Cognitive science and neuroscience: New wave reductionism. Philosopical Psychology 12:297-307. Ross, D. & Spurrett, D. 2004. What to say to a skeptical metaphysician? A defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27. Scott, A. 2004. Reductionism revisited. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(2):51-68. Sloane, E.H. 1945. Reductionism. Psychological Review 52:214-23. Witmer, D.G. 2003. Dupre's anti-essentialist objection to reductionism. The Philosophical Quarterly 53:181-200. 3.2d Reduction, Misc -------------------- Barkin, E. 2003. Relative phenomenalism: Toward a more plausible theory of mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10(8):3-13. Beckermann, A. 1997. Property physicalism, reduction, and realization. In (M. Carrier & P. Machamer, eds) _Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind_. Pittsburgh University Press. Beckermann, A. 2001. Physicalism and new wave reductionism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:257-261. Bickle, J. 1996. New wave psychophysical reductionism and the methodological caveats. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56:57-78. Bickle, J. 1997. _Psychoneural Reductionism: The New Wave_. MIT Press. Brooks, D.H.M. 1994. How to perform a reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54:803-14. Reduction comes to supervenience plus explicability. Thus biconditionals, multiple realizability, etc, are irrelevant. Biology is already reduced (mostly via functional explanation), and psychology looks promising. Nice. Bunzl, M. 1987. Reductionism and the mental. American Philosophical Quarterly 24:181-9. On the links between supervenience, reduction, and explanation. Supervenience is compatible with reductive explanation of a localized variety. We don't need laws, but explanatory links. Causey, R.L. 1972. Attribute identities in microreductions. Journal of Philosophy 69:407-22. Combes, R. 1988. Ockhamite reductionism. International Philosophical Quarterly 28:325-36. Foss, J. 1995. Materialism, reduction, replacement, and the place of consciousness in science. Journal of Philosophy 92:401-29. Hill, C.S. 1984. In defense of type materialism. Synthese 59:295-320. Kitcher, P.S. 1980. How to reduce a functional psychology. Philosophy of Science 47:134-40. Contra Richardson 1979, a purely functional psychology is irreducible. The genetics analogy is misleading; multiple realizations can't explain high-level laws. Maloney, C. 2001. Reservations about new wave reduction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 61:263-277. Marras, A. 2002. Kim on reduction. Erkenntnis 57:231-57. Millikan, D. 1999. Historical kinds and the "special sciences". Philosophical Studies 95:45-65. Papineau, D. 1985. Social facts and psychological facts. In (G. Currie & A. Musgrave, eds) _Popper and the Human Sciences_. Martinus Nijhoff. Mind is not reducible to body, but societies reduce to individuals. Multiple realization is in tension with predictability. Natural selection resolves the tension for the mental, but cannot for the social. Richardson, R.C. 1979. Functionalism and reductionism. Philosophy of Science 46:533-58. Argues that functionalism is compatible with reductionism, by analogies. Genetics has multiple realization and multiple function; reduction doesn't require biconditionals. With remarks on the de facto autonomy of psychology. Richardson, R.C. 1982. How not to reduce a functional psychology. Philosophy of Science 49:125-37. Response to Kitcher 1980. Reductions are usually domain-specific, and high-level regularities are indeed explained. Rueger, A. 2004. Reduction, autonomy, and causal exclusion among physical properties. Synthese 139:1-21. Sarkar, S. 1992. Models of reduction and categories of reductionism. Synthese 91:167-94. Schweizer, P. 2001. Realization, reduction and psychological autonomy. Synthese 126:383-405. Sturgeon, S. 2001. The roots of reductionism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Vicente, A. 2001. Realization, determination and mental causation. Theoria 16:77-94. Wimsatt, W. 1976. Reductionism, levels of organization, and the mind-body problem. In (G. Globus, ed) _Consciousness and the Brain_. Plenum Press. Excellent coverage of the notion of level and its applicability to mind. 3.3 Other Psychophysical Relations ---------------------------------- 3.3a Physicalism [see also 1.3, 1.7b, 3.1b, 3.2b, 3.5] ---------------- Crane, T. 1991. All God has to do. Analysis 51:235-44. If there are no contingent psychophysical laws, then there are no mental properties. So physicalism/supervenience is false; God had extra work to do. Crane, T. 1993. A definition of physicalism: Reply to Pettit. Analysis 53:224-27. Crane, T. & Mellor, D.H. 1990. There is no question of physicalism. Mind 99:185-206. Physical sciences have no ontological authority over the mental. Considers and dismisses arguments from laws, causation, reduction, supervenience. Crook, S. 2001. Why physics alone cannot define the 'physical': Materialism, metaphysics, and the formulation of physicalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31:333-360. Daly, C. 1995. Does physicalism need fixing? Analysis 55:135-41. Daly, C. 1998. What are physical properties? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79:196-217. Francescotti, R. 2000. Ontological physicalism and property pluralism: Why they are incompatible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81:349-362. Gates, G. 2001. Physicalism, empiricism, and positivism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Gillett, C. 2001. The methodological role of physicalism: A minimal skepticism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Gillett, C., & Loewer, B. (eds) 2001. _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Hawthorne, J. 2002. Blocking definitions of materialism. Philosophical Studies 110:103-13. Huttemann, A. 2004. _What's Wrong with Microphysicalism_. Routledge. Jackson, F. 1994. Finding the mind in the natural world. In (R. Casati, B. Smith, & S. White, eds) _Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences_. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. On why materialism requires conceptual analysis to locate mental properties in the natural world. Even a posteriori necessary connections have to be backed by a priori links. With remarks on supervenience. A nice paper. Kim, J. 2005. _Physicalism, or Something Near Enough_. Princeton University Press. Kirk, R. 1979. From physical explicability to full-blooded materialism. Philosophical Quarterly 29:229-37. If every physical events has a physical explanation, and the mental is causally efficacious, then mental facts are strictly implied by physical facts. A nice argument. Kirk, R. 1982. Physicalism, identity, and strict implication. Ratio 24:131-41. Materialism doesn't need a identity thesis. The requirement that mental facts are entailed by physical facts plays the role played by Kripke's requirement of necessary identity, and is more reasonable. Kirk, R. 1996. Physicalism lives. Ratio 9:85-89. Nothing in the arguments of Crane and Mellor 1990 count against a physicalism based on strict implication. Latham, N. 2001. Substance physicalism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Loewer, B. 2001. From physics to physicalism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Madell, G. 1988. _Mind and Materialism_. Edinburgh University Press. On the problems posed for materialism by intentionality, autonomy, awareness, and indexicality. Tentatively advocates a Cartesian position. McGinn, C. 1980. Philosophical materialism. Synthese 44:173-206. Reprinted in _The Problem of Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991). Melnyk, A. 1994. Being a physicalist: How and (more importantly) why. Advocates "realization physicalism": all properties are either physical or functional properties realized by physical ones. This achieves unity between sciences better than alternatives, and avoids overdetermination. Melnyk, A. 1996. Formulating physicalism: Two suggestions. Synthese 105:381-407. Discusses two formulations of physicalism: requiring high-level properties to be disjunctions of physical states, or to be functional properties realized physically. Tentatively endorses the latter. Melnyk, A. 1997. How to keep the 'physical' in physicalism. Journal of Philosophy 94:622-637. Melnyk, A. 2002. Physicalism. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) _Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind_. Blackwell. Melnyk, A. 2003. Some evidence for physicalism. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) _Physicalism and Mental Causation_. Imprint Academic. Montero, B. 1999. The body problem. Nous 33:183-200. Montero, B. 2001. Post-physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:61-80. Montero, B. 2003. Varieties of causal closure. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) _Physicalism and Mental Causation_. Imprint Academic. Moser, P.K. 1996. Physicalism and mental causes: Contra Papineau. Analysis 56:263-67. Nagel, E. 1949. Are naturalists materialists? Journal of Philosophy 42:515-53. Nimtz, C. & Schutte, M. 2003. On physicalism, physical properties, and panpsychism. Dialectica 57:413-22. Noordhof, P. 2003. Not old... but not that new either: Explicability, emergence, and the characterisation of materialism. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) _Physicalism and Mental Causation_. Imprint Academic. Papineau, D. 1994. _Philosophical Naturalism_. Blackwell. Papineau, D. 2001. The rise of physicalism. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Papineau, D. & Huttemann, A. 2005. Physicalism decomposed. Analysis 65:33-39. Pettit, P. 1993. A definition of physicalism. Analysis 53:213-23. Physicalism is the claim that (1) There are microphysical entities, (2) Microphysical entities constitute everything, (3) There are microphysical regularities, (4) Microphysical regularities govern everything. Pettit, P. 1994. Microphysicalism without contingent micro-macro laws. Analysis 54:253-57. Pettit, P. 1995. Microphysicalism, dottism, and reduction. Analysis 55:141-46. Poland, J. 1994. _Physicalism: The Empirical Foundations_. Oxford University Press. Ravenscroft, I. 1997. Physical properties. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 35:419-431. Rey, G. 2001. Physicalism and psychology: A plea for a substantive philosophy of mind. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Robinson, D. 1991. On Crane and Mellor's argument against physicalism. Mind 100:135-36. Robinson, H. (ed) 1993. _Objections to Physicalism_. Oxford University Press. Sheldon, W.H. 1946. Are naturalists materialists? Journal of Philosophy 43:197-209. Smart, J.J.C. 1978. The content of physicalism. Philosophical Quarterly 28:339-41. Snowdon, P.F. 1989. On formulating materialism and dualism. In (J. Heil, ed) _Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin_. Kluwer. A construal of materialism in terms of constitution, not identity. Discusses the entailment between physical properties and mental properties; considers a nonreductive physicalism and a primitive dualism. Sober, E. 1999. Physicalism from a probabilistic point of view. Philosophical Studies 95:135-74. Spurrett, D. & Papineau, D. 1999. A note on the completeness of "physics". Analysis 59:25-29. Spurrett, D. 2001. What physical properties are. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82:201-225. Sturgeon, S. 1998. Physicalism and overdetermination. Mind 107:411-432. Wilkes, K.V. 1973. _Physicalism_. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Witmer, D.G. 2001. Sufficiency claims and physicalism: A formulation. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Witmer, D.G. & Gillett, C. 2001. A 'physical' need: Physicalism and the via negativa. Analysis 61:302-309. 3.3b Token Identity [see also 3.5b, 3.5d] ------------------- Foster, J. 1994. The token-identity thesis. In (R. Warner & T. Szubka, eds) _The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate_. Blackwell. Horgan, T. & Tye, M. 1985. Against the token identity theory. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. We individuate mental events by their causal role, but we can't individuate causes uniquely. So each mental event has multiple physical correlates, and token identity doesn't hold. Hornsby, J. 1981. Which physical events are mental events? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55:73-92. Haugeland, J. 1982. Weak supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19:93-103. Supervenience doesn't imply token identity, and Davidson's argument for token identity equivocates on "event". But weak supervenience (mentally discernible worlds are physically discernible) is all we need. With nice examples. Leder, D. 1985. Troubles with token identity. Philosophical Studies 47:79-94. Physical/psychological token identity is no good: you can't individuate physical events without psychological predicates. Lurie, Y. 1978. Correlating brain states with psychological phenomena. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56:135-44. Can't isolate the physical token of a belief, say, as it's always accompanied by other beliefs. Meaning doesn't come in discrete tokens. Peacocke, C. 1979. Argument for token identity. In _Holistic Explanation_. Oxford University Press. 3.3c Emergence -------------- Alexander, S. 1920. _Space, Time, and Deity_. Macmillan. Atkin A. 1992. On consciousness: What is the role of emergence? Medical Hypotheses 38:311-14. Beckermann, A. 1992. Supervenience, emergence, and reduction. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. On varieties of supervenience and of emergence, and of what is required for reduction. Argues that reduction involves general explanatory connections, whereas emergence involves unique and ultimate bridge laws. Beckermann, A, Flohr, H. & Kim, J. (eds) 1992. _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. Bedau, M. 1997. Weak emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 11:375-399. Berenda, C.W. 1953. On emergence and prediction. Journal of Philosophy 50:269-74. Bergmann, G. 1944. Holism, historicism, and emergence. Philosophy of Science 11:209-21. Broad, C.D. 1925. _The Mind and its Place in Nature_. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Bruntrup, G. 1998. Is psychophysical emergentism committed to dualism? The causal efficacy of emergent mental properties. Erkenntnis 48:133-51. Bunge, M. 1977. Emergence and the mind. Neuroscience 2:501-9. Clayton, P. 2004. _Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness_. Oxford University Press. Crane, T. 2001. The significance of emergence. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Garnett, A.C. 1942. Scientific method and the concept of emergence. Journal of Philosophy 39:477-86. Haldane, J. 1996. The mystery of emergence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:261-67. A defence of radical emergence against Spencer-Smith 1995. Hasker, W. 1982. Emergentism. Religious Studies 18:473-88. Hasker, W. 1999. _The Emergent Self_. Cornell University Press. Henle, P. 1942. The status of emergence. Journal of Philosophy 39:486-93. Humphreys, P. 1996. Aspects of emergence. Philosophical Topics 24:53-71. Humphreys, P. 1997. How properties emerge. Philosophy of Science 64:1-17. Humphreys, P. 1997. Emergence, not supervenience. Philosophy of Science Supplement 64:337-45. Jones, D.H. 1972. 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Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. A careful account of British emergentism. Explicates their view of emergent causal powers and laws in terms of fundamental configurational forces, a coherent idea that turned out to be false. An excellent paper. Meehl, P.E. & Sellars, W. 1956. The concept of emergence. In (H. Feigl & M. Scriven, eds) _Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science_, vol. 1. University of Minnesota Press. Morgan, C.L. 1923. _Emergent Evolution_. Williams and Norgate. Morris, C.R. 1926. The notion of emergence. Aristotelian Society Supplement 6:49-55. Newman, D. 1996. Emergence and strange attractors. Philosophy of Science 63:245-61. Newman, D.V. 2001. Chaos, emergence, and the mind-body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:180-96. Newton, N. 2001. Emergence and the uniqueness of consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8:47-59. O'Connor, T. 1994. Emergent properties. 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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:113-29. Distinguishes radical, epistemic, and interactional emergence, favoring the latter. With consideration of qualia as a radical emergent. Sperry, R.W. 1969. A modified concept of consciousness. Psychological Review 76:532-36. Consciousness is an emergent property of brain dynamics that itself governs low-level flow of excitation. Midway between mentalism and materialism. Sperry, R.W. 1991. In defense of mentalism and emergent interaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 12:221-245. Stace, W.T. 1939. Novelty, indeterminism, and emergence. Philosophical Review 48:296-310. Stephan, A. 1992. Emergence -- a systematic look at its historical facets. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. On different ways of understanding emergence: as nonadditivity, novelty, nonpredictability, nondeducibility; and on problems about qualia and downward causation. Stephan, A. 1997. Armchair arguments against emergence. Erkenntnis 46:305-14. Teller, P. 1992. A contemporary look at emergence. In (A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, & J. Kim, eds) _Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism_. De Gruyter. An attempt to explicate "emergent" properties in terms of relational properties. Argues that even problem cases, e.g. space-time separation and phenomenal properties, might be treated this way. van Cleve, J. 1990. Mind -- dust or magic? Panpsychism versus emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:215-226. On Nagel 1979: emergence is more plausible than panpsychism. A construal of emergence as nomological supervenience without logical supervenience. van Gulick, R. 2001. Reduction, emergence and other recent options on the mind/body problem: A philosophic overview. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:1-34. Vandervert, L.R. 1991. On the modeling of emergent interaction: Which will it be, the laws of thermodynamics or Sperry's "wheel" in the subcircuitry? Journal of Mind and Behavior 12:535-39. Welshon, R. 2002. Emergence, realization, and supervenience. Philosophical Studies 108:39-51. Wimsatt, W.C. 1997. Aggregativity: Reductive heuristics for finding emergence. Philosophy of Science 64:372-84. Wynn, M. 1999. Emergent phenomena and theistic explanation. International Philosophical Quarterly 39:141-55. 3.3d Dualism [see also 1.3f, 1.4f, 1.4g] ------------ Almog, J. 2001. _What Am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem_. Oxford University Press. Averill, E.W. & Keating, B. 1981. Does interactionism violate a law of classical physics? Mind 90:102-7. Interactionism is compatible with conservation of energy and momentum: the mind exerts a non-physical force on the brain. Bricke, J. 1975. Interaction and physiology. Mind 84:255-9. Crane, T. 2003. Mental substances. In (A. O'Hear, ed) _Minds and Persons_. Cambridge University Press. Efron, A. 1992. Residual asymmetric dualism: A theory of mind-body relations. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13:113-36. Evans, S. 1981. Separable souls: A defense of minimal dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19. Herbert, R.T. 1998. Dualism/materialism. Philosophical Quarterly 48:159-75. Himma, K.E. 2005. When a problem for all in a problem for none: Substance dualism, physicalism, and the mind-body problem. American Philosophical Quarterly. Kim, J. 2003. Lonely souls: Causality and substance dualism. In (T. O'Connor & D. Robb, (eds) _Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings_. Routledge. Langsam, H. 2001. Strategy for dualists. Metaphilosophy 32:395-418. Larmer, R. 1986. Mind-body interactionism and the conservation of energy. International Philosophical Quarterly 26:277-85. Various arguments about interactionism based on conservation of energy. C of E only applies to causally isolated systems, so objections beg the question. Lowe, E.J. 1992. The problem of psychophysical causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70:263-76. Argues that there can be interaction without breaking physical laws: e.g. by basic psychic forces, or by varying physical constants, or especially by arranging fractal trees of physical causation leading to behavior. Lowe, E.J. 1993. The causal autonomy of the mental. Mind 102:629-44. Mills, E. 1996. Interactionism and overdetermination. American Philosophical Quarterly 33:105-115. Argues that interactionist dualism is compatible with the causal closure of the physical, if we allow causal overdetermination; and there is a strong case for the latter. Mills, E. 1997. Interactionism and physicality. Ratio 10:169-83. O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. & McDonough, J.K. 1998. Numbers, minds, and bodies: A fresh look at mind-body dualism. Philosophical Perspectives 12:349-371. Pap, A. 1952. Semantic analysis and psychophysical dualism. Mind. Pietroski, P.M. 1994. Mental causation for dualists. Mind and Language 9:336-66. Popper, K.R. 1953. Language and the body-mind problem: A restatement of interactionism. In _Proceedings of the 11th International Congress of Philosophy. Reprinted in _Conjectures and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge_. Basic Books, 1962. Popper, K.R. 1955. A note on the body-mind problem. Analysis 15:131-35. Popper, K.R. 1977. Natural selection and the emergence of mind. Robinson, H. 2002. Dualism. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) _Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind_. Blackwell. Rozemond, M. 2002. _Descartes's Dualism_. Harvard University Press. Scheffler, I. 1950. The new dualism: Psychological and physical terms. Journal of Philosophy. Sellars, W. 1954. A note on Popper's argument for dualism. Analysis 15:23-24. Sussman, A. 1981. Reflection on the chances for a scientific dualism. Journal of Philosophy 78:95-118. Dualism is an empty hypothesis. Everything must be matter, though we may have to expand the notion of matter. Richardson, R.C. 1982. The `scandal' of Cartesian dualism. Mind 91:20-37. van Rooijen, K. 1987. Interactionism and evolution: A critique of Popper. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38:87-92. 3.3e Psychophysical Relations, Misc ----------------------------------- Bolender, J. 2003. A farewell to isms. In (S. Walter & H. Heckmann, eds) _Physicalism and Mental Causation_. Imprint Academic. Campbell, K. 1983. Abstract particulars and the philosophy of mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61:129-41. Caston, V. 1997. Epiphenomenalisms, ancient and modern. Philosophical Review 106:309-363. Francescotti, R. 2002. Understanding physical realization (and what it does not entail). Journal of Mind and Behavior 23:279-292. Hedman, C.G. 1970. On correlating brain states with psychological states. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48:247-51. Heil, J. 1992. _The Nature of True Minds_. Cambridge University Press. Heil, J. & Robb, D. 2003. Mental properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 40:175-196. Hendel, G. 2001. Realization. Critica 33:41-70. Honderich, T. 1981. Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24:277-303. Defending lawlike connections between physical states & conscious occurrents. Contra anomalous monism and identity theory for occurrents. But occurrents may not be causally efficacious. Comments by Wilson/Sprigge/Mackie/Stich. Kim, J. 2002. Horgan's naturalistic metaphysics of mind. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63:27-52. Marras, A. 2001. On Putnam's critique of metaphysical realism: mind-body identity and supervenience. Synthese 126:407-426. McGinn, C. 1978. Mental states, natural kinds and psychophysical laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:195-220. Reprinted in _The Problem of Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991). Argues that mental kinds are not natural kinds, and don't have real essences but nominal essences. For this reason, there are no psychophysical laws. With remarks on psychological laws, and the role of behavior. McGinn, M. 2000. Real things and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Psychology 100:303-17. Place, U.T. 2000. The two-factor theory of the mind-brain relation. Brain and Mind 1:29-43. Schectman, M. 1997. The brain/body problem. Philosophical Psychology 10:149-64. Scheerer, E. 1994. Psychoneural isomorphism: Historical background and current relevance. Philosophical Psychology 7:183-210. Shoemaker, S. 2003. Realization, micro-realization, and coincidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67:1-23. Skillen, A. 1984. Mind and matter: a problem which refuses dissolution. Mind 93:514-26. Physical completeness, mental causation, non-reductionism are inconsistent. Ryle and Putnam are closet dualists, and Davidson's an epiphenomenalist. Stemmer, N. 2001. The mind-body problem and Quine's repudiation theory. Behavior And Philosophy 29:187-202. Steward, H. 1997. _The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States_. Oxford University Press. Tye, M. 1989. _The Metaphysics of Mind_. Cambridge University Press. van Gelder, T. 1998. Monism, dualism, pluralism. Mind and Language 13:76-97. Wilson, R.A. 2001. Two views of realization. Philosophical Studies 104:1-31. 3.4 Functionalism [see also 1.8, 4.6] ----------------- 3.4a Causal Role Functionalism (Armstrong/Lewis) ------------------------------------------------ Armstrong, D.M. 1968. _A Materialist Theory of the Mind_. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Mental states should be analyzed as states that are apt to bring about certain kinds of behavior. Analysis of all kinds of mental states as such. With comments on dualism, behaviorism, identity theory, and consciousness. Armstrong, D.M. 1970. The nature of mind. In (C. Borst, ed) _The Mind/Brain Identity Theory_. Macmillan. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Mental states are internal states that are apt to cause certain behaviors. A synthesis between the "thesis" of idealism and the "antithesis" of behaviorism. With defense against objections from consciousness. Braddon-Mitchell, D. & Jackson, K. 1999. The divide-and-conquer path to analytic functionalism. Philosophical Topics 26:71-89. Clark, A. 1986. Psychofunctionalism and chauvinism. Philosophy of Science 53:535-59. Psychofunctionalism can evade chauvinism by specifying different functional identifications within each species. Applying same mental terms to each is justified by theory similarity; but it still isn't analytic functionalism. Goldstein, I. 1994. Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72:46-62. Against functionalism: experiences have intrinsic introspectible acausal properties, such as duration, felt location, and unpleasantness. Both analytic and empirical functionalism fail. Horgan, T. 1984. Functionalism and token physicalism. Synthese 59:321-38. Formalizing versions of functionalism, and seeing which entail token physicalism and/or type physicalism. On the most plausible versions, we have token physicalism without type physicalism. Hornsby, J. 1984. On functionalism, and on Jackson, Pargetter, and Prior on functionalism. Philosophical Studies 46:75-96. Jackson, F., Pargetter, R. & Prior, E.W. 1982. Functionalism and type-type identity theories. Philosophical Studies 42:209-25. Functionalism is compatible with type identity, as e.g. "pain" designates the state-type that fills the right functional role in an organism at a given time, i.e. a brain state. Contra Kripke, pain is not a rigid designator. Kernohan, A. 1990. Lewis's functionalism and reductive materialism. Philosophical Psychology 3:235-46. Argues that Lewis's functionalism founders on the specification of behavior. Described intentionally => non-materialist; physically => chauvinist. Lewis, D. 1966. An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 63:17-25. Reprinted in _Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1_ (Oxford University Press, 1980). Causal roles are definitive of mental states. Since physical states fill these causal roles (by the explanatory adequacy of physics), mental states are physical states. Lewis, D. 1972. Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:249-58. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Mental states can be defined, via a Ramsey-sentence analysis of the platitudes of folk psychology, as entities that fill causal roles specified by the analysis. These fillers turn out to be physical. Lewis, D. 1978. Mad pain and martian pain. In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol. 1. MIT Press. Accounting for both pains that don't play the usual causal role and for pains that are realized in different substances, by a mixed theory: pain is the physical state that typically occupies a certain causal role in a population. McGinn, C. 1980. Functionalism and phenomenalism: A critical note. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58:35-46. Reprinted in _The Problem of Consciousness_ (Blackwell, 1991). Functionalism (reducing the mental to its effects on the physical) is no more plausible than phenomenalism (reducing the physical to its effects on the mental). Owens, J. 1982. The failure of Lewis's functionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 36:159-73. Lewis's original theory leads to Kripkean reference-fixing, so chauvinism. Token functionalism can't deal with paralytics. Species-relative functionalism fails as pain is intrinsic, not extrinsic. Rogler, E. 2000. On David Lewis' philosophy of mind. Protosociology 14:285-311. Sayward, C. 1995. Taking actions seriously. Behavior and Philosophy 23:51-60. Shoemaker, S. 1981. Some varieties of functionalism. Philosophical Topics 12:93-119. Reprinted in _Identity, Cause, and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1984). Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper. Tye, M. 1983. Functionalism and type physicalism. Philosophical Studies 44:161-74. Contra Lewis: Functionalism isn't compatible with type physicalism. There are intra-population difficulties with species-relative construals, and individual-relative construals can still have multiple fillers. Weir, A. 2001. More trouble for functionalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101:267-94. 3.4b Machine Functionalism (Putnam) [see also 4.8] ----------------------------------- Putnam, H. 1960. Minds and machines. In (S. Hook, ed) _Dimensions of Mind_. New York University Press. Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975). The relationship between mental and physical states is just like that between logical and structural states of Turing Machines, so no great mystery. With comments on privacy and semantic analysis. Putnam, H. 1967. The nature of mental states. In (Capitan & Merrill, eds) _Art, Mind, and Religion_. Pittsburgh University Press. Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975). Why mental states are more likely to be functional states (in probabilistic automata) than brain states or behavioral dispositions. Putnam, H. 1967. The mental life of some machines. In (H. Castaneda, ed) _Intentionality, Minds and Perception_. Wayne State University Press. Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975). On explaining behavior via TM states, e.g. explaining preference via utility functions. Logical behaviorism assumes rational preference functions. Functional organization is what matters, not physical make-up. Putnam, H. 1975. Philosophy and our mental life. In _Mind, Language, and Reality_. Cambridge University Press. Psychological states aren't TM states after all: we have lots of psych states at once; they depend on learning/memory; disjunctions of TM states are no good. But functional organization rather than physics is still what counts. Putnam, H. 1987. _Representation and Reality_. MIT Press. Type functionalism isn't any better than type physicalism, as mental states can be multiply realized as functional states. With what in common? Lycan, W.G. 1974. Mental states and Putnam's functionalist hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52:48-62. On abstract vs. physical TMs: Putnam should say that mental states are physical TM states. But then functionalism is compatible with physicalism. On the relation between Putnam's and Armstrong's functionalism. Lycan, W.G. 1979. A New Lilliputian argument against machine functionalism. Philosophical Studies 35:279-87. If machine functionalism were true, a homunculus-head would have all the mental states of its homunculus (by the definition of "realization"), which is absurd. Lycan, W.G. 1983. The moral of the New Lilliputian argument. Philosophical Studies 43:277-80. Reply to Elugardo 1983: so how do you specify what count as inputs/outputs? Elugardo, R. 1981. Machine functionalism and the New Lilliputian argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62:256-61. Criticism of Lycan 1979, and a re-making of the argument. Elugardo, R. 1983. Machine realization and the New Lilliputian argument. Philosophical Studies 43:267-75. Lycan's New Lilliputian argument fails as inputs/outputs for the homunculus are not the same as inputs/outputs for the full system. Kane, R.H. 1966. Turing machines and mental reports. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44:344-52. Nelson, R. 1974. Mechanism, functionalism, and the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 73:365-86. Argues for mechanism rather than functionalism. Criticizes Putnam for hypostasizing mental states, which are disanalogous to mental states. Defending mechanism against Kalke's & Rorty's objections. Rorty, R. 1972. Functionalism, machines and incorrigibility. Journal of Philosophy 69:203-20. Logical states don't give us any understanding of mind over and above what the function/structure distinction gives us. In particular, it doesn't help with the understanding of privacy and incorrigibility. Tomberlin, J. 1965. About the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43:295-99. Contra Putnam: logical states are not physical states, and utterances about them are not about physical states. Wagner, S.J. 1988. The liberal and the lycanthrope. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69:165-74. Contra Lycan: machine functionalism can handle Bolivia and CRT cases by a causal/counterfactual account, and Lilliputian case by assigning mental states to minds, not bodies. 3.4c Functionalism, Miscellaneous --------------------------------- Adams, F. 1979. Properties, functionalism, and the identity theory. Eidos 1:153-79. Batitsky, V. 1998. A formal rebuttal of the central argument for fnuctionalism. Erkenntnis 49:201-20. Bealer, G. 1978. An inconsistency in functionalism. Synthese. A formal argument showing that functional definitions are equivalent to behavioral definitions. Bealer, G. 1985. Mind and anti-mind: Why thinking has no functional definition. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:283-328. Bealer, G. 1997. Self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 106:69-117. Bealer, G. 2001. The self-consciousness argument: Why Tooley's criticisms fail. Philosophical Studies 105:281-307. Bechtel, W. 1984. Autonomous psychology: What it should and should not entail. Philosophy of Science Association 1984, 1:43-55. The functional level is the appropriate level for psychology, but neurophysiological facts constrain this level and are thus relevant. Ben-Yami, H. 1999. An argument against functionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77:320-324. Biro, J.I. & Shahan, R.W. (eds) 1982. _Mind, Brain and Function_. Oklahoma University Press. Ten papers on functionalism. Originally was Philosophical Topics, volume 12. Block, N. 1980. Functionalism. In (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_, Vol. 1. MIT Press. Distinguishes varieties of functionalism, e.g. machine and Ramsey-sentence functionalism; and compares to behaviorism. With a historical overview, and arguments for why functionalism is incompatible with physicalism. Block, N. 1978. Troubles with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325. Reprinted in _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Distinguishes analytic and empirical functionalism. Both have problems with absent qualia, and inputs/outputs. Analytic functionalism has problems with paralytics, etc; empirical functionalism has problems with Martians. Block, N. & Fodor, J.A. 1972. What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review 81:159-81. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). Mental states are not physical or behavioral states; could they be functional states? With various arguments against type identity, and against machine-table functionalism. Churchland, P.M. 2005. Functionalism at forty: A critical retrospective. Journal of Philosophy 102:33-50. Cummins, R. 1975. Functional analysis. Journal of Philosophy 72:741-64. Reprinted in (N. Block, ed) _Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology_ (MIT Press, 1980). On the role of functional explanation versus other kinds of explanation. Functionalism applies an analytic, not subsumptive strategy. David, M. 1997. Kim's functionalism. Philosophical Perspectives 11:133-48. Fischer, J. 1985. Functionalism and propositions. Philosophical Studies 48:295-311. Fodor, J.A. 1968. Materialism. In _Psychological Explanation_. Random House. On mental state as inferred theoretical entities, individuated according to their function (cf. valve-lifters). Psychology and neuroscience will mutually constrain each other, giving a relation more complex than reduction. Gendron, B. 1970. On the relation of neurological and psychological theories: A critique of the hardware thesis. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8:483-95. Argues that functional explanation are reducible to structural explanations. Gertler, B. 2000. Functionalism's methodological predicament. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38:77-94. Hornsby, J. 1986. Physicalist thinking and conceptions of behaviour. In (P. Pettit & J. McDowell, eds) _Subject, Thought, and Context_. Oxford University Press. Hoy, R.C. 1980. Dispositions, logical states, and mental occurrents. Synthese 44:207-40.n Kalke, W. 1969. What's wrong with Fodor's and Putnam's functionalism. Nous 3:83-93. There's no absolute functional/structural distinction, as it depends on how you choose boundaries and levels of abstraction. Lycan, W.G. 1981. Form, function and feel. Journal of Philosophy 78:24-50. Pursue a multi-leveled homuncular functionalism, with mental states characterized as states of teleologically identified subsystems. Even the identity theorist is a functionalist at a low level. Malcolm, N. 1980. `Functionalism' in philosophical psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80:211-30. McCullagh, M. 2000. Functionalism and self-consciousness. Mind and Language 15:481-499. Pereboom, D. 1991. Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist. Synthese 88:341-58. Scientific realism requires dispositions of kinds be explained by intrinsic properties. Neural/functional properties won't work, because of reductionism and circularity. Use intrinsic psychological properties instead. Pineda, D. 2001. Functionalism and nonreductive physicalism. Theoria 16:43-63. Richardson, R.C. 1979. Functionalism and reductionism. Philosophy of Science 46:533-58. Argues that functionalism is compatible with reductionism, by analogies. Genetics has multiple realization and multiple function; reduction doesn't require biconditionals. With remarks on the de facto autonomy of psychology. Schiffer, S. 1986. Functionalism and belief. In (M. Brand & R. Harnish, eds) _The Representation of Knowledge and Belief_. University of Arizona Press. Against functionalism for beliefs. Both common-sense functionalism and psychofunctionalism have problems with finding the right functional theory, distinguishing beliefs, perceptual input conditions, Twin Earth, etc. Shoemaker, S. 2001. Realization and mental causation. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Shope, R.K. 1973. Functional equivalence and the defense of materialism. Philosophical Forum 4:500-12. Sober, E. 1990. Putting the function back into functionalism. In (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_. Blackwell. Need teleological functionalism, not Turing Machine functionalism. Sober, E. 1985. Panglossian functionalism and the philosophy of mind. Synthese 64:165-93. Tooley, M. 2001. Functional concepts, referentially opaque contexts, causal relations, and the definition of theoretical terms. Philosophical Studies 105:251-79. van Gulick, R. 1982. Functionalism as a theory of mind. Philosophy Research Archives 185-204. The structure/function distinction is level-relative, so physiology might be relevant even under functionalism. Problems with automata, and with causal connections to nonintentionally characterized behavior. van Gulick, R. 1980. Functionalism, information and content. Nature and System 2:139-62. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition (Blackwell, 1990). Ward, A. 1989. Philosophical functionalism. Behaviorism 17:155-8. Weckert, J. 1990. Functionalism's impotence. Philosophical Inquiry 32-43. Weir, A. 2001. More trouble for functionalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101:267-293. Wilkes, K.V. 1981. Functionalism, psychology and the philosophy of mind. Philosophical Topics 12:147-67. Functionalism may be appropriate for cognitive psychology but not for folk psychology, due to differing goals. Neuroscience will play an important role in developing functional theories. Zangwill, N. 1992. Variable realization: not proven. Philosophical Quarterly 42:214-19. Argues that the possibility of multiple realization has not been established, whether by arguments from imagination, concepts, or empirical facts. 3.5 Other Psychophysical Theories --------------------------------- 3.5a Logical Behaviorism (Ryle, etc) ------------------------------------ Ryle, G. 1949. _The Concept of Mind_. Hutchinson and Co. The ancestor of most contemporary philosophy of mind. Among other things, argues that the "ghost in the machine" view of mind is a category mistake, and presents dispositional analyses of many mental concepts. Bestor, T.W. 1979. Gilbert Ryle and the adverbial theory of mind. Personalist 60:233-42. Burgos, J. 2004. Realism about behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32:69-95. Campbell, C.A. 1953. Ryle on the intellect. Philosophical Quarterly 3:115-38. Carnap, R. 1959. Psychology in physical language. In (Ayer, ed) _Logical Positivism_. Free Press. Carrier, L. 1973. Professor Shaffer's refutation of behaviourism. Mind 80:249-52. Chemero, A. 2002. Reconsidering Ryle: Editor's introduction. Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy 7. Chisholm, R. 1955. A note on Carnap's meaning analysis. Philosophical Studies. Chisholm, R. 1952. Intentionality and the theory of signs. Philosophical Studies. Chisholm, R. 1958. Sentences about believing. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2. Dalrymple, H. 1977. Some logical muddles in behaviorism. Southwestern Philosophical Studies 2:64-72. Ewing, A.C. 1953. Professor Ryle's attack on dualism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 53:47-78. Farrell, B. 1950. Experience. Mind 59:170-98. Finn, D.R. 1971. Putnam and logical behaviourism. Mind 80:432-36. Flanagan, O.J. & McCreadie-Albright, T. 1974. Malcolm and the fallacy of behaviorism. Philosophical Studies 26:425-30. Geach, P. 1957. _Mental Acts_. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Goudge, T.A. 1982. Ryle's last thoughts on thinking. Dialogue 21:125-32. Graham, G. 1982. Spartans and behaviorists. Behaviorism 10. Defends behaviorism as a scientific hypothesis, so that conceivability arguments aren't relevant, and advocates "penetrability" behaviorism which can appeal to internal physical states. Hamer, C. 1970. Why Ryle is not a behaviourist. Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 17:7-25. Hamlyn, D.W. 1953. Behaviour. Philosophy 28:132-45. Hanson, N.R. 1952. Professor Ryle's "mind". Philosophical Quarterly 2:246-48. Harzem, P. 2004. Behaviorism for new psychology: What was wrong with behaviorism and what is wrong with it now. Behavior and Philosophy 32:5-12. Heidelberger, H. 1966. On characterizing the psychological. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Killeen, P. R. 2004. Minding behavior. Behavior and Philosophy 32:125-147. Kitchener, R.F. 1977. Behavior and behaviorism. Behaviorism 5:11-68. Jacquette, D. 1985. Logical behaviorism and the simulation of mental episodes. Journal of Mind and Behavior 6:325-332. Longworth, G. 2003. Where should we look for the mind? Think 5. Mace, C.A. 1949. Some implications of analytical behaviourism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Malcolm, N. 1954. Wittgenstein's _Philosophical Investigations_. Philosophical Review 43:530-9. Mandelbaum, M. 1958. Professor Ryle and psychology. Philosophical Review 67:522-30. McLaughlin, B. & O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. 1995. Dennett's logical behaviorism. Philosophical Topics 22:189-258. Miller, D.S. 1911. Is consciousness "a type of behaviour"? Journal of Philosophy 8:322-27. Miller, D.S. 1951. "Descartes myth" and "Professor Ryle's fallacy". Journal of Philosophy. Nelson, R. 1969. Behaviorism is false. Journal of Philosophy 66:417-52. Nelson, R. 1975. Behaviorism, finite automata, and stimulus-response theory. Theory and Decision 6:249-67. Oosthuizen, D.C.S. 1970. Phenomenological psychology. Mind 79:487-501. Park, S. 1994. Reinterpreting Ryle: A nonbehaviorist analysis. Journal of the History of Philosophy 32:265-90. Place, U.T. 1993. A radical behaviorist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events. Behavior and Philosophy 20:25-35. Price, H.H. 1960. Some objections to behaviorism. In (S. Hook, ed) _Dimensions of Mind_. New York University Press. Putnam, H. 1963. Brains and behavior. In (R. Butler, ed) _Analytical Philosophy: Second Series_. Blackwell. Reprinted in _Mind, Language, and Reality_ (Cambridge University Press, 1975). Quine, W.V. 1975. Mind and verbal dispositions. In (Guttenplan, ed) _Mind and Language_. Oxford University Press. Quine, W.V. 1980. Sellars on behaviorism, language, and meaning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61:26-30. Ribes-Inesta, E. 2004. Behavior is abstraction, not ostension: Conceptual and historical remarks on the nature of psychology. Behavior and Philosophy 32:55-68. Robinson, H. 1982. Behaviorism and stimulus materialism. In _Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism_. Cambridge University Press. Rowlands, M. 1991. A defense of behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy 19:93-100. Ryle, G. 1979. _On Thinking_. Blackwell. Scriven, M. 1956. A study of radical behaviorism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:88-130. Sellars, W. 1952. Mind, meaning, and behavior. Philosophical Studies. Shuford, H. 1966. Logical behaviorism and intentionality. Theoria 32:246-51. Skinner, B.F. 1945. The operational analysis of psychological terms. Psychological Review 52:270-78. Smart, J.J.C. 1959. Ryle on mechanism and psychology. Philosophical Quarterly 9:349-55. Stemmer, N. 1993. Behavioral materialism, the success of folk psychology, and the first-person case. Behavior and Philosophy 20:1-14. Stout, R. 2002. What you know when you know how someone behaves. Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy 7. Stout, R. 2003. Behaviourism. Think 5. Vendler, Z. 1981. Ryle's thoughts on thinking. Midwest Studies of Philosophy 6:335-43. Weitz, M. 1951. Professor Ryle's "logical behaviourism". Journal of Philosophy 48:297-300. Whitely, C.A. 1961. Behaviourism. Mind 70:164-74. Wisdom, J. 1950. The concept of mind. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:189-204. Wittgenstein, L. 1953. _Philosophical Investigations_. Wright, J.N. 1959. Mind and the concept of mind. Aristotelian Society Supplement 33:1-22. Ziff, P. 1958. About behaviourism. Analysis 18:132-6. 3.5b Identity Theory (Smart, etc) [see also 1.3c, 1.4h, 3.3b] --------------------------------- Feigl, H. 1958. The `mental' and the `physical'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:370-497. Reprinted as _The `Mental' and the `Physical'_. University of Minnesota Press, 1967. Place, U.T. 1956. Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology 47:44-50. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_ (Blackwell, 1990). The idea that consciousness is a brain process is logically coherent. It's a scientific hypothesis, not a necessary truth. On the "is" of composition vs the "is" of definition, and the fallacy of the internal phenomenal field. Smart, J.J.C. 1959. Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68:141-56. Defending the thesis that sensations are contingently identical to brain processes against various objections. Topic-neutral analysis of sensation reports. Materialism beats epiphenomenalism on grounds of simplicity. Abelson, R. 1970. A refutation of mind-body identity. Philosophical Studies 18:85-90. The number of possible mental states is infinite (think of any number), whereas there are only finitely many brain states, so they're not identical. Armstrong, D.M. 1968. The headless woman and the defense of materialism. Analysis 29:48-49. Likens the anti-materialist position to the "headless woman" fallacy: "I'm not aware the mental states are physical", so "I'm aware that mental states are non-physical". Armstrong, D.M. 1973. Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of mind. Philosophy of Science 40:178-93. A prima facie case for materialism based on grounds of rational consensus, arising especially from common-sense and scientific evidence. Mental states exist (common-sense) but should be analyzed causally (evidence from science). Aune, B. 1966. Feigl on the mind-body problem. In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell, eds) _Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl_. University of Minnesota Press. Baier, K. 1962. Smart on sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:57-68. Mental states are necessarily private, and so cannot be physical states, which are public. We have epistemological authority about our mental states. Beloff, J. 1965. The identity hypothesis: A critique. In (J.R. Smythies, ed) _Brain and Mind_. Routledge and Kegan Paul. Blumenfeld, J-B. 1979. Phenomenal properties and the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63:485-93. Argues that phenomenal properties aren't needed to identify sensations with brain-states, and nor are topic-neutral analyses. Borst, C.V. (ed) 1970. _The Mind/Brain Identity Theory_. Macmillan. An anthology of central articles on the identity theory. Bradley, M.C. 1963. Sensations, brain-processes, and colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41:385-93. Brandt, R. 1960. Doubts about the identity theory. In (S. Hook, ed) _Dimensions of Mind_. New York University Press. Brandt, R. & Kim, J. 1967. The logic of the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 66:515-537. Arguing for an event-identity construal of the identity theory. Comparing the identity theory to the weaker "principle of simultaneous isomorphism". The only reason to accept the identity theory is ontological simplicity. Brodbeck, M. 1966. Mental and physical: Identity versus sameness. In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell, eds) _Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl_. University of Minnesota Press. Candlish, S. 1970. Mind, brain, and identity. Mind 79:502-18. Carney, J. 1971. The compatibility of mind-body identity with dualism. Mind. Argues that the identity theory is compatible with linguistic dualism, as the mental and the physical may differ in intensional properties only. Clarke, J. 1971. Mental structure and the identity theory. Mind 80:521-30. Coburn, R. 1963. Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes. Journal of Philosophy 60:89-92. Coder, D. 1973. The fundamental error of central-state materialism. American Philosophical Quarterly 10:289-98. On problems with theories that leave the nature of mind open a priori: how can we even understand the possibilities? Cornman, J. 1962. The identity of mind and body. Journal of Philosophy 59:486-92. Coburn, R.C. 1963. Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes. Journal of Philosophy 60:89. Location of mental states by convention (Shaffer 1961) won't work, as it (a) makes mental states public, and (b) conflicts with connections to behavior. Crittenden, C. 1971. Ontology and mind-body identity. Philosophical Forum 2:251-70. de Boer, R. 1976. Cartesian categories in mind-body identity theories. Philosophical Forum 7:139-58. Double, R. 1981. Central state materialism. Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 28:229-37. Enc, B. 1983. In defense of the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 80:279-98. Feigl, H. 1971. Some crucial issues of mind-body monism. Synthese. Garnett, A.C. 1965. Body and mind: the identity thesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43:77-81. Grunbaum, A. 1972. Abelson on Feigl's mind-body identity thesis. Philosophical Studies 23:119-21. Gustafson, D.F. 1963. On the identity theory. Analysis 24:30-32. Hanratty, G. 1972. The identity theory of Herbert Feigl. Philosophical Studies 20:113-23. Harris, E.E. 1966. The neural identity thesis and the person. International Philosophical Quarterly 6:515-37. Hedman, C.G. 1970. On correlating brain states with psychological states. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48:247-51. Heil, J. 1970. Sensations, experiences, and brain processes. Philosophy 45:221-6. Hinton, J.M. 1967. Illusions and identity. Analysis 27:65-76. Hockutt, M. 1967. In defense of materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27:366-85. Hoffman, R. 1967. Malcolm and Smart on brain-mind identity. Philosophy 42: 128-36. Joske, W. 1960. Sensations and brain processes: A reply to Professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:157-60. On topic-neutral reports, after-images, and after-radishes. Such a report requires epistemic access to physical resemblance, which we don't have. Kim, J. 1966. On the psycho-physical identity theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 3:227-35. There's no empirical support for identity, over and above that for correlation; and unity of science gives no reason to accept identity. The only reason might be that of ontological simplicity. Kim, J. 1972. Phenomenal properties, psychophysical laws and the identity theory. Monist 56:178-92. Deal with phenomenal properties by allowing only mental events, and eliminating mental objects. Identity theories needn't suppose psychophysical laws. With defense against multiple realizability arguments. Kitcher, P.S. 1982. Two versions of the identity theory. Erkenntnis 17:213-28. Recasting the identity theory and functionalism, using Kripkean theories of reference, so mental states can refer to physiological or psychological states that we don't yet understand; and qualia problems are handled better. Lewis, D. 1965. An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 63:17-25. Reprinted in _Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1_ (Oxford University Press, 1980). Mental states are defined by their causal roles. So, by the completeness of physics, they must be physical states. Locke, D. 1971. Must a materialist pretend he's anaesthetized? Philosophical Quarterly 49:217-31. On how materialism, as opposed to a double aspect view, can handle mental features -- by moving them into the world via a realist theory of perception. Remarks on identification of states. After-images, etc, cause problems. Lockwood, M. 1984. Einstein and the identity theory. Analysis. Using the special theory of relativity to show that if mental events have a temporal location, then they must have a spatial location. Lubow, N. 1978. Mind-body identity and irreducible properties. Philosophy Research Archives 4:1240. Luce, D.R. 1966. Mind-body identity and psycho-physical correlation. Philosophy of Science 17:1-7. Malcolm, N. 1964. Scientific materialism and the identity theory. Dialogue 3:115-25. The identity theory is meaningless, if identity is analyzed as spatiotemporal coincidence, as thoughts don't have location. Thoughts also require context. Even if identity holds, explaining brain doesn't imply explaining mind. Macdonald, C. 1989. _Mind-Body Identity Theories_. Routledge. Malcolm, N. 1964. Scientific materialism and the identity theory. Dialogue. Margolis, J. 1965. Brain processes and sensations. Theoria 31:133-38. Meehl, P. 1966. The compleat autocerebroscopist: A thought-experiment on Professor Feigl's mind-body identity thesis. In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell, eds) _Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl_. University of Minnesota Press. Mucciolo, L. 1974. The identity theory and criteria for the mental. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35:167-80. Munsat, S. 1969. Could sensations be processes? Mind 78:247-51. Sensations and processes have different logical type, so it is a priori impossible that they should be identical. Nagel, T. 1965. Physicalism. Philosophical Review 74:339-56, 1965. Noren, S.J. 1970. Identity, materialism, and the problem of the danglers. Metaphilosophy 4:318-44. Noren, S.J. 1970. Smart's materialism: The identity thesis and translation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48:54-66. Norton, R. 1964. On the identity of identity theories. Analysis 25:14-16. Pepper, S. 1975. A split in the identity theory. In (C. Cheng, ed) _Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem_. Hawaii University Press. Pitcher, G. 1960. Sensations and brain processes: A reply to Professor Smart. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:150-7. Identity requires explanation to be accepted, but Smart doesn't provide this. But one can deny identity without claiming dualism -- e.g. a "duck-rabbit" theory of mind/brain. With remarks on the completeness of descriptions. Place, U.T. 1960. Materialism as a scientific hypothesis. Philosophical Review 69:101-4. Contra Smart 1959: Materialism is a scientific hypothesis, if we accept certain logical criteria for what a sensation is; otherwise it's just false. Place, U.T. 1972. Sensations and processes: A reply to Munsat. Mind. Place, U.T. 1988. Thirty years on -- Is consciousness still a brain process? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66:208-19. Comparing contemporary materialism to Pace's 1956 variety. With remarks on whether the thesis is empirical or a priori, and on deciding the issue between materialism and epiphenomenalism. Place, U.T. 1989. Low claim assertions. In (J. Heil, ed) _Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin_. Kluwer. Discusses a paper of Martin's and the genesis of the identity theory, with a focus on `public' and 'private logic' and topic-neutral descriptions. Place, U.T. 2003. _Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place_. Oxford University Press. Presley, C.P. (ed) 1967. _The Identity Theory of Mind_. University of Queensland Press. Puccetti, R. 1978. The refutation of materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8:157-62. The identity theory must be false, as pain centers in vitro will not be pains. With a reply by G. Pearce and a rejoinder. Ripley, C. 1969. The identity theory and scientific hypotheses. Dialogue 2:308-10. Robinson, H. 1982. The disappearance theory. In _Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism_. Cambridge University Press. Rosenbaum, S. 1977. The property objection and the principles of identity. Philosophical Studies 32. Routley, R. & MaCrae, V. 1966. On the identity of sensations and physiological occurrences. American Philosophical Quarterly 3. Schlagel, R.H. 1977. The mind-body identity impasse. American Philosophical Quarterly 14:231-37. Scriven, M. 1966. The limitations of the identity theory. In (P. Feyerabend & G. Maxwell, eds) _Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl_. University of Minnesota Press. On the identity theory as a linguistic proposal, compatible with dualism; epiphenomenalism and parallelism must be false, leaving interactionism. Sellars, W. 1965. The identity approach to the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 18:430-51. Shaffer, J. 1961. Could mental states be brain processes? Journal of Philosophy 58:813-22. Mental states don't have a location, and brain processes do; but we could stipulate a location for mental states. With remarks on possible relations between mental and physical features, states, and concepts. Shaffer, J. 1963. Mental events and the brain. Journal of Philosophy 60:160-6. We identify mental events by noticing mental features that must be nonphysical, but still might be empirically reducible. Against topic-neutral definitions, and with response to Coburn 1963 on location. Simon, M.A. 1970. Materialism, mental language, and the mind-body identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30:514-32. Smart, J.J.C. 1960. Sensations and brain processes: A rejoinder to Dr. Pitcher and Mr. Joske. Australasian Journal of Philsophy 38:252-54. Smart, J.J.C. 1961. Further remarks on sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review. Reply to Stevenson 1960: There are no irreducible mental properties; they reduce to physical properties via topic-neutral definitions. Smart, J.J.C. 1962. Brain processes and incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 40:68-70. Reply to Baier 1962: epistemological authority is compatible with materialism. Mental state reports are not completely incorrigible, though. Smart, J.J.C. 1963. Materialism. Journal of Philosophy 60:651-62. Defending topic-neutral analyses of mental reports, and arguing against Wittgensteinian behaviorism via brain-in-vat examples. With remarks on the appeal of materialism and on compatibility with ordinary language. Smart, J.J.C. 1965. The identity thesis: A reply to Professor Garrett. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43:82-3. Smart, J.J.C. 1972. Further thoughts on the identity theory. Monist 56:177-92. On some problems for the identity theory arising from the intensionality of mental states and from the appeal to properties, and on how to modify the translation form of the theory without embracing the disappearance version. Smythies, J.R. 1994. Requiem for the identity theory. Inquiry 37:311-29. Sosa, E. 1965. Professor Malcolm on "Scientific materialism and the identity theory". Dialogue 4:422-23. Stevenson, J.T. 1960. `Sensations and brain processes': A reply to J.J.C. Smart. Philosophical Review 69:505-10. Identity theory implies nomological danglers, due to the irreducibility of defining mental properties. Stoutland, F. 1971. Ontological simplicity and the identity hypothesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. The identity thesis isn't ontologically simpler than dualism: we still need a dualism of properties, and explanatory danglers. Not much turns on the issue, except in teleological explanation. Sosa, E. 1965. Professor Malcolm on `Scientific materialism and the identity theory'. Dialogue 3:422-23. Contra Malcolm 1965: explaining brain will explain mind, if the explanation is conjoined with the identity statement. With rejoinder from Malcolm. Swartz, N. 1974. Can the theory of contingent identity between sensation-states and brain-states be made empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3:405-17. Swinburne, R. 1993. Are mental events identical with brain events? American Philosophical Quarterly 19:173-181. Property identity theses fail due to meaning differences, and event identity these fail due to a lack of entailment relations. Rebuts objections from weaker identity criteria and analogies with scientific identification. Taylor, C. 1967. Mind-body identity, a side issue? Philosophical Review 76:201-13. Teichmann, J. 1967. The contingent identity of minds and brains. Mind 76:404-15. Thalberg, I. 1978. A novel approach to mind-brain identity. Philosophy of Science 3:255-72. Suggests a theory in which neural states are components of, but not identical to, overall psychological states. This can accommodate raw feels if necessary as a further component, but is mostly materialistic. Thomson, J.J. 1969. The identity theory. In (S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes, & M. White, eds) _Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel_. St. Martin's Press. Tomberlin, J.E. 1965. About the identity theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53:295-9. Watkins, J.W.N. 1978. A basic difficulty in the mind-brain identity hypothesis. In (J. Eccles, ed) _Mind and Brain_. Paragon House. Weismann, D. 1965. A note on the identity thesis. Mind 74:571-77. Whitely, C.H. 1970. The mind-brain identity hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 20:193-99. Wolfe, J. & Nathan, G.J. 1968. The identity theory as a scientific hypothesis. Dialogue 7:469-72. Ziedins, R. 1971. Identification of characteristics of mental events with characteristics of brain events. American Philosophical Quarterly 8:13-23. 3.5c Eliminative Materialism (Rorty, Feyerabend) [see also 1.4e, 1.7c, 2.1c] ------------------------------------------------ Austin, J.W. 1975. Rorty's materialism. Auslegung 3:20-28. Bernstein, R. 1968. The challenge of scientific materialism. International Philosophical Quarterly 8:252-75. Bush, E. 1974. Rorty revisited. Philosophical Studies 25:33-42. Cam, P. 1978. "Rorty revisited", or "Rorty revised". Philosophical Studies 33:377-86. Carter, W.R. 1974. On incorrigibility and eliminative materialism. Philosophical Studies 28:113-21. Cornman, J. 1968. On the elimination of `sensations' and sensations. Review of Metaphysics 22:15-35. Donovan, C. 1978. Eliminative materialism reconsidered. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8. Doppelt, G. 1977. Incorrigibility, the mental, and materialism. Philosophy Research Archives. Everitt, N. 1981. A problem for the eliminative materialist. Mind 90:428-34. Everitt, N. 1983. How not to solve a problem for the eliminative materialist. Mind 92:590-92. Feyerabend, P. 1963. Mental events and the brain. Journal of Philosophy 40:295-6. Reprinted in (W. Lycan, ed) _Mind and Cognition_ (Blackwell, 1990). Identity theory implies dualism, though its acceptance of mental properties. Instead we should eliminate talk of mental processes altogether, or redefine them in physiological terms. Feyerabend, P. 1963. Materialism and the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 17:49-67. Globus, G. 1989. The strict identity theory of Schlick, Russell, Maxwell, and Feigl. In (M. Maxwell & C. Savage, eds) _Science, Mind, and Psychology: Essays in Honor of Grover Maxwell_. University Press of America. Godow, R. 1976. Eliminative materialism and denotation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36. Goodman, R.B. 1974. A note on eliminative materialism. Journal of Critical Analysis 5:80-83. Hiley, D.R. 1978. Is eliminative materialism materialistic? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38:325-37. Hiley, D.R. 1980. The disappearance theory and the denotation argument. Philosophical Studies 37:307-20. Lycan, W.G. & Pappas, G. 1972. What is eliminative materialism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:149-59. Lycan, W.G. 1976. Quine's materialism. Philosophia 6:101-30. Quine, W.V. 1966. On mental entities. In _The Ways of Paradox_. Random House. Richardson, R.C. 1981. Disappearance and the identity theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:473-85. Rorty, R. 1965. Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories. Review of Metaphysics 19:24-54. Rorty, R. 1970. In defense of eliminative materialism. Review of Metaphysics 24:112-21. Rosenthal, D.M. 1980. Keeoing matter in mind. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5:295-322. Savitt, S. 1974. Rorty's disappearance theory. Philosophical Studies 28:433-36. Shirley, E.S. 1974. Rorty's "disappearance" version of the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 25:73-75. Sikora, R.I. 1974. Rorty's mark of the mental and his disappearance theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4:191-93. Sikora, R.I. 1975. Rorty's new mark of the mental. Analysis 35:192-94. Steiling, K. 1976. The elimination of sensations and the loss of philosophy. Auslegung 3:20-28. 3.5d Anomalous Monism (Davidson) -------------------------------- Antony, M.V. 2003. Davidson's argument for monism. Synthese 135:1-12. Davidson, D. 1970. Mental events. In (L. Foster & J. Swanson, eds) _Experience and Theory_. Humanities Press. Reprinted in _Essays on Action and Events_ (Oxford University Press, 1980). Arguing for anomalous monism: no strict psychophysical laws, no strict psychological laws, and token identity without type identity. Mental events can still cause, via subsumption under physical laws. Davidson, D. 1973. The material mind. In (P. Suppes, ed) _Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science_. North-Holland. Reprinted in _Essays on Action and Events_ (Oxford University Press, 1980). The psychological supervenes on the physical but is not reducible to it, because of the holistic nature of intentional attribution. So building a perfect physical model may not explain psychology. Davidson, D. 1974. Psychology as philosophy. In (S. Brown, ed) _Philosophy of Psychology_. Harper & Row. Reprinted in _Essays on Action and Events_ (Oxford University Press, 1980). On the differing constitutive standards of mental and physical concepts. Attribution of mental concepts is holistic, and presupposes a background of rationality, etc. With examples from decision theory. Davidson, D. 1980. _Essays on Actions and Events_. Oxford University Press. A collection of papers on action, causation and the philosophy of psychology. Davidson, D. 1987. Problems in the explanation of action. In (P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, & J. Norman, eds) _Metaphysics and Morality_. Blackwell. Remarks on how mental properties can explain action without strict laws. The mental is a conceptual, not an ontological category, governed by normative standards, and not reducible to the non-normative. Davidson, D. 1992. Thinking causes. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Davidson, D. 1995. Laws and cause. Dialectica 49:263-79. Davidson, D. 1999. The emergence of thought. Erkenntnis 51:511-21. Antony, L. 1989. Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force. Philosophical Review 98:153-87. Criticism of Davidson's argument for rational causation. Reasons must cause in virtue of their rational properties. Token identities can't exist, due to normativity. Quinean psychology can't yield rational explanations. Bickle, J. 1992. Mental anomaly and the new mind-brain reductionism. Philosophy of Science 59:217-30. Campbell, N. 1997. The standard objection to anomalous monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75:373-82. Campbell, N. 1998. Anomalous monism and the charge of epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 52:23-39. Cheng, K. 1997. Davidson's action theory and epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:81-95. Child, W. 1993. Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations. Philosophical Review. Anomalism is compatible with supervenience, if it is construed as denying psychophysical laws useful for explaining behavior. It is incompatible with token identity, though. With much on the uncodifiability of rationality. Cooper, W.E. 1980. Materialism and madness. Philosophical Papers 9:36-40. Daniel, S.G. 1999. Why even Kim-style psychophysical laws are impossible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80:225-237. Elgin, C. 1980. Indeterminacy, underdetermination and the anomalous monism. Synthese 45:233-55. Garrett, B.J. 1999. Davidson on causal relevance. Ratio 12:14-33. Goldberg, B. 1977. A problem with anomalous monism. Philosophical Studies 32:175-80. Davidson's argument equivocates on the term "physical": the physical events that mental events cause might not be subsumed under laws. Herstein, G.L. 2005. Davidson on the impossibility of psychophysical laws. Synthese 145:45-63. Hess, P. 1981. Actions, reasons and Humean causes. Analysis 41:77-81. Anomalous monism implies that mental properties don't cause anything. Honderich, T. 1982. The argument for anomalous monism. Analysis 42:59-64. If anomalous monism is true, mental events may cause, but their mental properties aren't causally relevant. Hum, D.D. 1998. Davidson's identity crisis. Dialectica 52:45-61. Jackman, H. 2000. Belief, rationality, and psychophysical laws. In _Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philsophy of Mind_. Philosophy Documentation Center. Johnston, M. 1985. Why having a mind matters. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. Anomalous monism loses out to Australian materialism. It can't be a priori, it leads to exhaustive monism, it doesn't support a new view of free action, and it implies the causal irrelevance of the mental. Kalderon, M.E. 1987. Epiphenomenalism and content. Philosophical Studies 52:71-90. Davidson's view leads to epiphenomenalism about content, as it can't support the appropriate counterfactuals. Strong supervenience might be a way out, but that is inconsistent with anomalism. Kernohan, A. 1985. Psychology: Autonomous or anomalous? Dialogue 24:427-42. Kim, J. 1985. Psychophysical laws. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. Reprinted in _Supervenience and Mind_ (Cambridge University Press, 1993). How there can be psychophysical generalizations but no laws -- they might lack modal force. On the relation between psychophysical anomalism and psychological anomalism. Casting Davidson as a Kantian dualist. Kim, J. 1993. Can supervenience and "non-strict laws" save anomalous monism? In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Klagge, J.C. 1990. Davidson's troubles with supervenience. Synthese 85:339-52. Anomalous supervenience is consistent, at the cost of anti-realism about the mental. Supervenience is a constraint on interpretation, but needn't support counterfactuals as different interpretation schemes are possible, Klee, R. 1992. Anomalous monism, ceteris paribus, and psychological explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43:389-403. Problems with holism and ceteris paribus laws aren't unique to psychology. One finds the same thing in the physical sciences. So rationality plays no special role, and psychological laws are as reasonable as physical laws. Kuczynski, J.M. 1998. A proof of the partial anomalousness of the mental. Southern Journal Of Philosophy 36:491-504. Latham, N. 1999. Davidson and Kim on psychophysical laws. Synthese 118:121-44. LePore, E. & Loewer, B. 1987. Mind matters. Journal of Philosophy 630-42. Anomalous monism is not committed to epiphenomenalism, as even non-strict laws can ground counterfactuals and so support the causal relevance of mental properties. Lycan, W.G. 1981. Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics 12:9-38. A functionalist defense against anomalous monism. Psychofunctional laws and psychological laws, though not psychophysical laws, may exist. Rebutting arguments from rationality, indeterminism, intensionality, etc. McDowell, J. 1985. Functionalism and anomalous monism. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. Against Loar's functionalist reductionism: it doesn't begin to capture the normative role of rationality or the subjectivity of the mental. McLaughlin, B.P. 1985. Anomalous monism and the irreducibility of the mental. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. A very thorough summary of Davidson's views. Highly recommended. McLaughlin, B.P. & LePore, E. (eds) 1985. _Actions and Events_. Blackwell. 30 essays on Davidson. McLaughlin, B.P. 1992. On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Comments on Davidson 1992. Davidson can respond to critics accepting causal relevance of mental properties and still denying strict laws. Davidson misconstrues his critics' positions on supervenience. Melchert, N. 1986. What's wrong with anomalous monism. Journal of Philosophy 80:265-74. Davidson is concerned with intentional, not phenomenal states; and his characterization of these is just as physical states under a certain description. So he avoids epiphenomenalism (contra e.g. Honderich 1982). Miller, A. 1993. Some anomalies in Kim's account of Davidson. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31:335-44. Kim's version of Davidson's argument against psychophysical laws cannot work. Elucidating the notion of a constitutive principle. Nasrin, M. 2004. Anomalous monism in Carnap's Aufbau. Erkenntnis 60:283-293. Noren, S.J. 1979. Anomalous monism, events, and `the mental'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40:64-74. Patterson, S.A. 1996. The anomalism of psychology. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:37-52. Preyer, G. 2000. Primary reasons: From radical interpretation to a pure anomalism of the mental. Protosociology 14:158-179. Robinson, H. 2001. Davidson and nonreductive materialism: A tale of two cultures. In (C. Gillett & B. Loewer, eds) _Physicalism and its Discontents_. Cambridge University Press. Rosenberg, A. 1985. Davidson's unintended attack on psychology. In (B. McLaughlin & E. LePore, eds) _Action and Events_. Blackwell. Anomalous monism implies that there aren't even heteronomic psychological generalizations, as variables can't be independently measured. Rowlands, M. 1990. Anomalism, supervenience, and Davidson on content-individuation. Philosophia 295-310. Supervenience is compatible with anomalism: biconditional laws are ruled out by the disjunctive base, and the wideness of mental states rules out one-way psychophysical laws, as there's no single property in the base. Seager, W.E. 1981. The anomalousness of the mental. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19:389-401. Elucidating Davidson's argument, focusing on the argument against strict psychophysical laws. Generalizations involve disjunctive kinds and so are heteronomic and not law-like. Seager, W.E. 1991. Disjunctive laws and supervenience. Analysis 51:93-98. Argues contra Kim that supervenience is compatible with anomalous monism: the the disjunctive generalizations aren't lawlike, as they aren't confirmed by their instances. Shea, N. 2003. Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental? The Philosophical Quarterly 53:201-213. Smart, J.J.C. 1985. Davidson's minimal materialism. In (B. Vermazen & M. Hintikka, eds) _Essays on Davidson_. Oxford University Press. Some comments on holism, indeterminacy, anomalism, and materialism. Smith, P. 1982. Bad news for anomalous monism? Analysis 42:220-4. Response to Honderich 1982: physical events are individuated as mental states by virtue of their causal role, so the mental is causally relevant. Sosa, E. 1993. Davidson's thinking causes. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Stanton, W.L. 1983. Supervenience and psychophysical law in anomalous monism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64:72-9. Supervenience entails psychophysical principles, but this is compatible with anomalous monism. On what constitutes a strict psychophysical law. Suppes, P. 1985. Davidson's views on psychology as a science. In (B. Vermazen & M. Hintikka, eds) _Essays on Davidson_. Oxford University Press. Various: physics is indeterministic and intensional, animals have beliefs, psychology has derived laws, and decision-theory doesn't need speech. Tiffany, E.C. 2001. The rational character of belief and the argument for mental anomalism. Philosophical Studies 103:258-314. van Gulick, R. 1980. Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mental. Philosophy Research Archives 7:1404. Rationality constraints don't introduce an irreducibly normative element into intentional attributions. Rationality serves as a condition of adequacy for psychophysical theories, but it doesn't rule them out. Vermazen, B. & Hintikka, M. (eds) 1985. _Essays on Davidson_. Oxford University Press. 12 essays on Davidson, with replies. Walsh, D.M. 1998. Wide content individualism. Mind 107:625-652. Welshon, R. 1999. Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80:103-120. Yalowitz, S. 1997. Rationality and the argument for anomalous monism. Philosophical Studies 87:235-58. Yalowitz, S. 1998. Causation in the argument for anomalous monism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28:183-226. Zangwill, N. 1993. Supervenience and anomalous monism: Blackburn on Davidson. Philosophical Studies 71:59-79. 3.6 Mental Causation [see also 2.2d] -------------------- Antony, L. 1991. The causal relevance of the mental. Mind and Language 6:295-327. Audi, R. 1993. Mental causation: Sustaining and dynamic. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Baker, L.R. 1993. Metaphysics and mental causation. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Mental causation is incompatible with strong supervenience and causal closure of physics, as we can't distinguish high-level causes from non-causes. So reject the metaphysics and make explanation prior to causation. Barrett, J. 1994. Rationalizing explanation and causally relevant mental properties. Philosophical Studies 74:77-102. Bennett, K. 2003. Why the exclusion problem seems intractable and how, just maybe, to tract it. Nous 37:471-97. Blackburn, S. 1991. Losing your mind: Physics, identity, and folk burglar prevention. In (J. Greenwood, ed) _The Future of Folk Psychology_. Cambridge University Press. Arguing for the causal efficacy and scientific respectability of higher-order states, such as functional-role states. To require appeal to particular physical states is to succumb to a "Tractarian" view of physical primacy. Block, N. 1989. Can the mind change the world? In (G. Boolos, ed) _Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam_. Cambridge University Press. Rescuing content from epiphenomenalism via functional role argument; but then functional roles aren't really causally efficacious (cf. dormitive virtue), so epi all over again? Roles vs fillers, causation vs explanation. Block, N. 1995. Reply: Causation and two kinds of laws. In (C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald, eds) _Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation_. Oxford University Press. Block, N. 2003. Do causal powers drain away. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67:133-150. Bontly, T.D. 2002. The supervenience argument generalizes. Philosophical Studies 109:75-96. Braun, D. 1995. Causally relevant properties. Philosophical Perspectives 9:447-75. Brewer, B. 1995. Compulsion by reason (Mental Causation II). Aristotelian Society Supplement 69:237-53. Buckley, R. 2001. Physicalism and the problem of mental causation. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:155-174. Burge, T. 1993. Mind-body causation and explanatory practice. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Mental causation is not a real worry, but the to-do shows that materialist metaphysics has shed little light on it. It needs to be understood at the mental level. With remarks on exclusion arguments and token identity. Crane, T. 1990. On an alleged analogy between numbers and propositions. Analysis 50:224-30. How can a relation to a proposition (an abstract object) be causally efficacious? Analogy with numbers doesn't work: weight properties are only pseudo-relational, depending on units, but propositions are absolute. Crane, T. 1992. Mental causation and mental reality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:185-202. Argues that anomalism and causal closure don't pose problems for mental causation as they are false, and that functional properties can efficacious. States with content may be efficacious, although content itself may not be. Crane, T. 1995. The mental causation debate (Mental causation I). Aristotelian Society Supplement 69:211-36. Argues that mental causation is a deep problem for constitutive (but not identity) forms of physicalism. The only way out is to argue that it is a different variety of causation. But then what motivates physicalism? Crane, T. 2001. Jacob on mental causation. Acta Analytica 16:15-21. Dretske, F. 1993. Mental events as structuring causes of behavior. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. Mental events are structuring causes of behavior; biological events are triggering causes, dependent on previous mental structuring. This allows extrinsic properties to play a causal role. Ehring, D. 1996. Mental causation, determinables, and property instances. Nous 30:461-80. Ehring, D. 2003. Part-whole physicalism and mental causation. Synthese 136:359-388. Elder, C. 1999. Physicalism and the fallacy of composition. Philosophical Quarterly 50:332-43. Elder, C. 2001. Mental causation versus physical causation: no contest. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62:110-127. Elder, C. 2001. Materialism and the mediated causation of behavior. Philosophical Studies 103:165-75. Ellis, R.D. 2001. Can dynamical systems explain mental causation?. Journal of Mind And Behavior 22:311-334. Garrett, B.J. 1998. Pluralism, causation, and overdetermination. Synthese 116:355-78. Gibb, S.C. 2004. The problem of mental causation and the nature of properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82:464-75. Hardcastle, V.G. 1998. On the matter of minds and mental causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58:1-25. Heil, J. 1992. Mentality and causality. Topoi 11:103-110. On various problems with mental causation, and the relationship between psychology ans philosophy. Heil, J. 2002. Mental causation. In (S. Stich & T. Warfield, eds) _Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind_. Blackwell. Honderich, T. 1993. The union theory and anti-individualism. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental Causation_. Oxford University Press. The identity theory and psychoneural correlation can't handle mental causation; only the union theory can. Anti-individualism causes problems, but should be rejected in any case. Horgan, T. 1989. Mental quausation. Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74. How mental events are causally relevant qua mental: via an account of "qua" causation in general, using counterfactuals on "pertinently similar worlds". Horgan, T. 1997. Kim on mental causation and causal exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 11:165-84. Horgan, T. 2001. Causal compatibilism and the exclusion problem. Theoria 16:95-116. Hornsby, J. 1993. Agency and causal explanation. In (J. Heil & A. Mele, eds) _Mental C