Glossary (for *Constructing the World*)

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A priori: $S$ is a priori iff $S$ can be known with justification independent of experience (or: if there is an a priori warrant for believing $S$).

A priori scrutability: $S$ is a priori scrutable from $C$ iff a material conditional ‘If $C’$, then $S’$ is a priori.

A Priori Scrutability: There is a compact class $C$ of sentences such that for all subjects, all truths are conditionally scrutable from truths in $C$.

Acquaintance expression: A super-rigid expression or a primitive indexical expression.

Acquaintance Scrutability: All truths are scrutable from truths involving only acquaintance expressions.

Alethically fragile truth: See Fitchian truth.

Canonical specification: See scenario.

Compact: A class of sentences is compact iff it involves expressions from only a small number of families and does not involve any trivializing mechanisms.

Conclusive knowledge: knowledge with certainty. Conclusive a priori knowledge is a priori knowledge with certainty. Conclusive scrutability theses replace “know” with “know with certainty”.
Conditional credence: \( cr(P|Q) \) is one’s credence in \( P \)’s being the case conditional on \( Q \)’s being the case.

Conditional scrutability: \( S \) is conditionally scrutatable from \( C \) for \( s \) iff \( s \) is in a position to know that if \( C' \), then \( S \) (or: if the insulated rational credence \( cr^*(S|C') = 1 \)).

Conditional Scrutability: There is a compact class \( C \) of sentences such that for all subjects, all truths are conditionally scrutatable from truths in \( C \).

Conditionalization:

Context-dependence: A context-dependent expression is one whose content depends on the context in which it is uttered. An extensionally context-dependent expression is one whose extension depends on context. An epistemically context-dependent expression is one whose a priori inferential role (or whose associated mode of presentation) depends on context.

Core Evidence thesis: All knowledge is grounded in core evidence: introspective evidence about phenomenal states (and perhaps intentional states) and perceptual evidence about the distribution of primary and secondary qualities in the environment.

Core Knowability thesis: All knowable (non-Fitchian) ordinary truths are knowable with grounds in core evidence.

Cosmoscope: A virtual-reality device for conveying the physical, phenomenal, and indexical information in \( PQI \).

Credence: A subjective probability (or degree of belief, between 0 and 1 inclusive) that a proposition or a sentence is true.

Deferential use of an expression: A use of an expression such that the referent of the expression as used depends on how others in the linguistic community use the expression.

Edenic properties: Edenic redness is primitive redness of a sort that is arguably presented to
us in perceptual experience. Such Edenic properties might be instantiated in some possible worlds (such as the Garden of Eden), but are arguably not instantiated in our world.

Epistemically complete: $S$ is epistemically complete iff $S$ is epistemically possible and there is no $T$ such that $S \& T$ and $S \& \neg T$ are both epistemically possible.

Epistemically possible: $S$ is epistemically possible if $\neg S$ is not a priori. $C$ is epistemically possible if a conjunction of all sentences in $C$ is epistemically possible.

Epistemically possible scenario: see scenario.

Epistemically rigid expression: One whose reference can be known a priori. (Alternatively: one that picks out the same referent in every epistemically possible scenario.)

Epistemic and extensional context-dependence: See context-dependence.

Extension: The extension of a sentence is its truth-value (the extension of ‘Sydney is in Australia’ is true). The extension of a singular term (such as a name) is its referent (the extension of ‘Canberra’ is Canberra). The extension of a predicate is either a class or a property (the extension of ‘hot’ is either the class of hot things or the property of being hot). Extensions for other expressions are analogous entities on which the truth-value of a sentence depends.

Fitchian truth (or: alethically fragile truth): a truth $S$ such that properly investigating the truth-value of $S$ will change the truth-value of $S$.

Fundamental Scrutability: All truths are scrutable from metaphysically fundamental truths plus indexical truths.

Fundamentality Scrutability (also fundamentality structuralism): All truths are scrutable from truths about fundamentality plus indexical truths.

Generalized Scrutability: Scrutability not just in the actual world but in all epistemically possible scenarios. There is a compact class $C$ of sentences such that for all sentences $S$, if $S$ is
epistemically possible, then there is an epistemically possible subclass $C'$ of $C$ such that $S$ is scrutable from $C'$. There are also generalized versions of numerous other scrutability theses: e.g. Generalized Narrow Scrutability requires that $C$ contain only narrow expressions rather than being compact.

Grounding: Given truths $A$ and $B$, $A$ is metaphysically grounded in $B$ when $A$ is true in virtue of $B$ being true. $A$ is epistemically grounded in $B$ (for a subject) when a justification for $B$ is part of a justification for $A$ (for that subject). $A$ is conceptually grounded in $B$, when (roughly) the concepts in $B$ are prior to those in $A$ and $B$ analytically entails $A$.

Humean scrutability: The claim that all nomic truths are conclusively scrutable from non-nomic truths.

Indexical truths: Truths of the form ‘$X$ is ...’, where $X$ is a primitive indexical (‘I’, ‘Now’, or a phenomenal demonstrative).

Inferential scrutability: $S$ is inferentially scrutable from $C$ for $s$ iff, were $s$ to know $C$, $s$ would be in a position to know $S$.

Inferential Scrutability: There is a compact class $C$ of sentences such that for all subjects, all truths are inferentially scrutable from truths in $C$.

Insulated idealization:

Intension: See primary intension.

Macrophysical truths: Truths about any entities, including macroscopic entities, in the language of classical physics.

Microphysical truths: Fundamental physical truths in the language of a completed physics.

Narrow: A narrow expression is a non-Twin-Earthable expression. Narrow content is a sort of content that is intrinsic to the individual, and does not depend on the environment.
Narrow Scrutability: All truths are scrutable from truths involving only narrow expressions.

Nomic Scrutability (also nomic structuralism): All truths are scrutable from nomic truths, plus indexical and that’s-all truths.

Nomic truths: truths about laws of nature, and associated truths such as those about causation, dispositions, chance, and the like.

Ordinary truths (or ordinary macroscopic truths):

\[ P_{QI} \]: A set containing all microphysical and macrophysical truths, phenomenal truths, and indexical truths.

\[ P_{QTI} \]: A set containing all microphysical and macrophysical truths, phenomenal truths, indexical truths and a “that’s-all” truth.

Panpsychism: The view that everything has a mind, or at least that fundamental microphysical entities are conscious.

Positive sentence: A sentence \( s \) such that if \( s \) holds in a world (or scenario) \( w \), it holds in all worlds (or scenarios) that outstrip \( w \). One world (scenario) outstrips another when the first contains an intrinsic duplicate of the second as a proper part.

Phenomenal realism: The thesis that phenomenal truths are not scrutable from physical truths.

Phenomenal Scrutability: All truths are scrutable from phenomenal truths, plus indexical and that’s-all truths.

Phenomenal truths: Truths about conscious experience, and in particular about what it is like to be a conscious subject.

Primary intension: The primary intension of a sentence \( S \) (in a context) is a function from
scenarios to truth-values, true at a scenario $w$ if $S$ is scrutable (in that context) from a canonical specification of $w$. The primary intension of a subentential expression is a function from scenarios to extensions. The primary intension of an expression can be seen as its epistemic profile.

Primary qualities: Spatiotemporal properties and mass properties.

Primitive concept: A concept such that no concept is conceptually prior to it.


Primitive Scrutability: All truths are scrutable from truths involving only primitive concepts.

Quiddistic Scrutability: All truths are scrutable from truths about quiddities, plus indexical and that’s-all truths.

Quiddity: The categorical basis for microphysical dispositions; for example, the (arguably unknown) intrinsic nature of mass or charge. Varieties of quidditism hold that quiddities can come apart (in various ways) from the associated dispositions. Quiddistic concepts and expressions are concepts and expressions that pick out quiddities super-rigidly.

Ramsification: The process of replacing sentences containing certain theoretical expressions (e.g. sentences about charge) to sentences without them (e.g. sentences about the property that plays a certain role within physical theory). The result is a Ramsey sentence that captures the content of the original sentence.

Scenario: An epistemically possible world. Can be modeled as an equivalence class of epistemically complete sentences in a generalized scrutability base. The sentences in this class serve as canonical specifications of the scenario.

Scrutability: Used alone, either a generic term for various scrutability relations, or (when capitalized) A Priori Scrutability.

Secondary intension: The secondary intension of a sentence $S$ (in a context) is a function from
metaphysically possible worlds to truth-values, true at \( w \) iff \( S \) is true at \( w \) (i.e. if \( S \) is necessitated by a canonical specification of \( w \)) in that context. The secondary intension of a subsentential expression is a function from scenarios to extensions. The secondary intension of an expression can be seen as its modal profile (chapter 1).

Secondary qualities: Color properties and their analogs in other sensory modalities.

Semantically fragile sentence: A sentence \( S \) such that investigating whether \( S \) is true changes the proposition \( S \) expresses.

Spatiotemporal functionalism: the thesis that our ordinary spatiotemporal concepts pick out spatiotemporal properties as the properties that play a certain role, either within physics or with respect to our experience.

Spatiotemporal primitivism: the thesis that we have primitive spatiotemporal concepts (and perhaps that these are expressed by our ordinary spatiotemporal expressions and are instantiated in our world).

Spatiotemporal Scrutability (also spatiotemporal structuralism): All truths are scrutable from spatiotemporal truths plus indexical and that’s-all truths.

Structural expressions: Logical expressions plus nomic/causal expressions and a fundamentality expressions.

Structural Scrutability: All truths are scrutable from truths containing only structural expressions.

Super-rigid expression: An expression that is epistemically rigid and metaphysically rigid de jure.

Super-Rigid Necessitation: All truths are necessitated by super-rigid truths.

Super-Rigid Scrutability: All truths are scrutable from super-rigid truths and indexical truths.

Supervenience: B-properties supervene on A-properties when any two possible worlds with
the same distribution of A-properties have the same distribution of B-properties.

That’s-all sentence: A sentence saying that one’s actual scenario is a minimal scenario satisfying some other sentence or sets of sentences (such as \(PQI\)). For example, it may say that all positive truths are scrutable from \(PQI\).

Twin-earthable expression: An expression \(E\) such that there is a nondeferential utterance of \(E\) that has a possible twin utterance (a corresponding utterance made by a functional and phenomenal duplicate of the speaker of \(E\)) with a different extension. Named after Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth, where our duplicates use ‘water’ to refer to the indistinguishable liquid XYZ.

Translucency: A sentence \(S\) is translucent with respect to a set of sentences \(T\) iff, necessarily, if two competent users of the sentences in \(T\) agree (nonverbally) on all these sentences, then any dispute over \(S\) (where at least one uses \(S\) competently) is verbal. \(S\) is translucently settled by \(T\) iff either \(S\) is a member of \(T\) or \(S\) is translucent with respect to a set \(T’\) all of whose members are translucently settled by \(T\).

Warrant:

Warrant-analytic: