From franzen@U.Arizona.EDU Mon Oct 25 08:40:43 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Maggie.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.233]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA24740 for ; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 08:40:43 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHJN9YQKGW9GW97J@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Mon, 25 Oct 1999 08:41:21 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHJN9YD1TS9JFPDE@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 08:41:21 -0700 (MST) Received: from f1n7.u.arizona.edu (IDENT:franzen@f1n7.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.107]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA24735 for ; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 08:40:29 -0700 Received: from localhost (franzen@localhost) by f1n7.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id IAA36970 for ; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 08:41:08 -0700 Date: Mon, 25 Oct 1999 08:41:08 -0700 (MST) From: Peter L Franzen Subject: HOT To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO Rosenthal writes, "We can reasonable assume that many of these children's mental states are conscious. But on the HOT hypothesis those states can be conscious only if the children have HOTs about them." I'm a bit confused about what it means to have an experience of something and to _not_ have a HOT about it, or is Rosenthal just saying that the young kids actually have HOTs that are not verbally expressed. What is the difference between having a conscious experience and having a HOT about it? Can one happen independently of the other? If three year old children do not have HOTs, to what extent, then, are they conscious of thoughts, sensations/perceptions, and the like? Additionally, Rosenthal states that, "even adult HOTs are expressing their nonconscious HOTs in words. Indeed, although almost all verbally expressed thoughts are conscious, HOTs are an important exception. ... Not being conscious does not prevent HOTs from being verbally expressed." But, once a thought is expressed, isn't it then conscious? I'm not sure what else it would be. As to Rosenthal's point about how false HOTs might be used to explain repressed beliefs and desires, I do not follow his argument. "Erroneous HOTs may well also figure in cases of so-called self-deception; there one's HOTs would misprepresent not what one desires but what one believes." This places too much omnipotence of HOTs. Sometimes, we just aren't good guessers (as research on human statistical inferences shows), perceivers, knowers of knowledge, etc.. Humans make a lot of mistakes, rely on heuristics, etc.. Thus, its not simply an erroneous HOT. From landsurveyor@hotmail.com Sun Oct 31 14:11:30 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA06767 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 14:11:30 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHSCLBE0DS9GZAA2@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Sun, 31 Oct 1999 14:12:17 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHSCLAYT6O9JHY6L@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 14:12:16 -0700 (MST) Received: from hotmail.com (f297.hotmail.com [207.82.251.189]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id OAA06762 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 14:11:23 -0700 Received: (qmail 11137 invoked by uid 0); Sun, 31 Oct 1999 21:11:41 +0000 Received: from 128.196.51.170 by www.hotmail.com with HTTP; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 13:11:41 -0800 (PST) Date: Sun, 31 Oct 1999 13:11:41 -0800 (PST) From: Matt Herbert Subject: HOTs and Consciousness To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: <19991031211141.11136.qmail@hotmail.com> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; CHARSET=US-ASCII X-Originating-IP: [128.196.51.170] Status: RO All-- A few notes about HOTs and consciousness, especially as treated by Rosenthal. First, Peter's concern about children's consciousness. Peter writes: Rosenthal writes, "We can reasonable assume that many of these children's mental states are conscious. But on the HOT hypothesis those states can be conscious only if the children have HOTs about them." I'm a bit confused about what it means to have an experience of something and to _not_ have a HOT about it, or is Rosenthal just saying that the young kids actually have HOTs that are not verbally expressed. Yes, Rosenthal (almost) says that children have the HOTs about experience required for consciousness. A few lines after the passage cited by Peter, Rosenthal says that the essential difference is between thought and report. Even adults have thoughts that they cannot formulate as reports, so presumably, children do too. Some such thoughts may be HOTs-- "So it may well be that these children [three and younger]have the relevant HOTs even though they do not express them verbally." This line of thought has the interesting consequence of committing one to nativism about mentalese if one is to maintain that infants are conscious. If there's conscious experience, after all, it is so because it bears the imprint of a thought, and a thought implicates at least one concept. Regarding developing children who have not yet gained a large conceptual repertoire (expressed in a natural language), nativism might be invoked to explain the apparently rich conscious experience that children enjoy. It would not be *required* to explain consciousness, but it does seem like the natural direction to go if one is commited to nativism for infants. On a separate note, Rosenthal poses one argument for the HOT theory as a disjunctive syllogism: We have conscious content either by virtue of sensing it or thinking about it. It cannot be the former; therefore, it is the latter. This conclusion depends, of course, on the original disjunction's being exhaustive and otherwise accurate. For my part, I do not believe it to be either. I think Austin's argument that we do not sense sense data (else a regress follows) is essentially correct. We sense external objects that are internally represented. The internal representations, as far as I can see, do not require a further act of sensing to confer phenomenality on them. Perhaps Rosenthal would take this as evidence in his favor, since it is an argument against our sensing conscious content. However, I take it as an argument against his beginning supposition, since it makes one disjunct out to be not merely wrong, but implausible. To declare cognition as the gatekeeper of consciousness because it excels a plausible contender would be decent argumentation. However, if the competition is downright implausible and not clearly exhaustive (with cognition) of the field, a victory by default seems not to be decisive. (I must confess ignorance of Rosenthal's arguments for HOT cited in note 11.) Matt Herbert Nim eat Nim eat. Drink eat me Nim. Me gum me gum. You me banana me banana you. --Nim the signing chimp ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com From landsurveyor@hotmail.com Sun Oct 31 14:30:13 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA06783 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 14:30:13 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHSD8J6DC09GZ0V7@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Sun, 31 Oct 1999 14:31:00 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHSD8INK289JHWQX@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 14:30:59 -0700 (MST) Received: from hotmail.com (f39.hotmail.com [207.82.250.50]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id OAA06776 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 14:29:56 -0700 Received: (qmail 11789 invoked by uid 0); Sun, 31 Oct 1999 21:30:14 +0000 Received: from 128.196.51.170 by www.hotmail.com with HTTP; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 13:30:14 -0800 (PST) Date: Sun, 31 Oct 1999 13:30:14 -0800 (PST) From: Matt Herbert Subject: P.S. To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: <19991031213014.11788.qmail@hotmail.com> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; CHARSET=US-ASCII X-Originating-IP: [128.196.51.170] Status: RO P.S.-- It just occurred to me that I really didn't know what I meant in saying that a disjunction ought to be exhaustive and "otherwise correct." If it's exhaustive, the DS argument should go thru. So I guess what I mean about Rosenthal's disjunction is that it is simply not exhaustive. On my (Austinian) understanding, sensing and thinking are not jointly exhaustive, because I think there is a third option: *having* conscious experience. This will appear question-begging, since we are trying to give the criteria for *having* conscious experience, but suffice it to say for the moment that I believe it can be had independently of second-order thoughts or sensations. To put it another way, I do not think that second-order mentation is required for conscious mentation. Hope that helps. Matt ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com From hvorecky@U.Arizona.EDU Sun Oct 31 15:17:52 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Maggie.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.233]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA06819 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 15:17:51 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHSEWMDII89GZOPF@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Sun, 31 Oct 1999 15:18:40 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHSEWM2OOW9JHHCU@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 15:18:39 -0700 (MST) Received: from f1n2.u.arizona.edu (IDENT:hvorecky@f1n2.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.102]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id PAA06814 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 15:17:43 -0700 Received: from localhost (hvorecky@localhost) by f1n2.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id PAA42494 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 15:18:32 -0700 Date: Sun, 31 Oct 1999 15:18:32 -0700 (MST) From: Juraj Hvorecky Subject: Block and HOT To: Science of Consciousness Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO The outcome of the last discussion has led me back to the talk Block was giving to the Consciosness Studies meeting couple weeks ago. For those who haven't been there, his message was somehow close to what we have discussed, but he said there is a way how to save HOT theories from common objections. There seems to be a clear distinction between Rosenthal's HOT theory of consciousness and P-consciousness and therefore one cannot take Rosenthal's theory to serve as a basis for explaining the fundaments of conscious experience. So far no problem. Block however suggets that if we enrich the notion of HOT, we might be able to save the theory. Here is how: P-consciousness is phylogenetically much older than any higher order cognition. Therefore in order for HOT to bridge the gap between higher level cognition and phenomenality, HOT has to accomodate P-consiousness. Here is a quote from Block's handout: "S is an R-conscious state iff S is phenomenally represented in a thought about S." Just to remind you that R consciosness is in Block's terms just equivalent to HOT. Is this gonna move us anywhere? I have some dounts about it. Let us forget for now my general worry as to what exactly is meant here by "being phenomenally represented" The issue which puzzles me in this respect is a following one. Let us take Rosenthal's example of Tip-of-Tongue experience. I am afraid that introduction of phenomenality at this stage is going to produce more harm than benefit. I grant that all consious beliefs have some phenomenality. But is the phenomenality in the case of different TOTs also different? Do I experience the same thing as I am having TOT answering question WHAT IS THE CAPITAL OF FRANCE as opposed to WHAT IS THE DIAMETER OF THE EARTH? It seems like I have to, because my access goes to different ideas (althouhg it does not reach their content). But at least to me, the feeling is just about the same - I think I know the answer, but I just can't produce it now. So it seems like we might face a case of (potentially infinite) cases of access consciousness accompanied with a single experience. But that contradicts aal our effort to keep them together... SUrely one can reply by saying that in fact all my individual TOTs are different (in the first case I feel that I know what is the capitol of France, but I just can't say it, other time I feel like I know what the diameter is, but just can't say it...) But what if my phenomenality does not go that far and I only feel that I know the answer, but I am just stuck. At least it is an interesting open possibility... Juraj From jmartine@U.Arizona.EDU Sun Oct 31 17:00:11 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id RAA06960 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:00:11 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHSIHGNWTC9GZLPV@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:00:58 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHSIHG4DB49JHPUD@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:00:58 -0700 (MST) Received: from orion.U.Arizona.EDU (orion.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.206]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id RAA06954 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:00:01 -0700 Received: from localhost (jmartine@localhost) by orion.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id RAA24593; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:00:49 -0700 (MST) Date: Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:00:49 -0700 (MST) From: Joel A Martinez Subject: Re: Block and HOT In-reply-to: To: Juraj Hvorecky Cc: Science of Consciousness Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO Juraj raises an interesting point. It seems like Rosenthal does have to hold that the phenomenality in the case of different TOTs is different. In fact, he does think this. He states in "Consciousness and Metacognition" There is a vivid conscious difference between having one word on the tip of one's tongue and having another. We are conscious of the informational state somehow without being conscious of the information it bears. I too have trouble understanding exactly what Rosenthal means here. What is the phenomenality of a TOT? Perhaps his discussion of the difference between being conscious of a particular informational state and being conscious of the same state *in the relevant way* may be of help here. Rosenthal uses the example of having Mark Twain's real name on the tip of one's tongue. The feeling of is different from the feeling of . Is it possible to extend this sort of example to two different TOTs? I dont see why not. Would'nt the feeling of knowing be phenomenally different from the feeling of knowing ? I think so. If that is right then Rosenthal is not committed to a number of different A-conscious states having the same phenomenology; something which Juraj was worried about. On second thought, I am not sure why I think there is a phenomenological difference here. I suppose all I am really doing in this posting is presenting, in Rosenthal's terms, the opposing intuition to Juraj's. But, there might be more of an argument here. If there is a difference in phenomenology between TOT's I submit that it arises from a difference in description. That is, in TOT-A the relevant informational state bears the description in TOT-B the relevant informational state bears the description . Is this enough to give us different phenomenology? If you hold that all conscious beliefs have some phenomenology, then you need to explain what accounts for the phenomenological difference between two different conscious beliefs. It seems that description could play a role here. That is, two different conscious belief states have different phenomenology just in case they contain different descriptions. If one buys this claim for any conscious belief, it seems to me that one would have to buy it in the case of TOTs. For, TOT-A and TOT-B contain two different descriptions. (Note: there may be a counter example to my account. Consider the following two TOTs: 1) 2) The above two TOTs contain different descriptions. However, it may seem odd to say that the phenomenality is different, since in both cases on has "Venus" on the tip of ones tongue. I am not sure what to say about this yet, since I just thought of it.) -Joel Joel A. Martinez Social Science Bldg. Rm. 213 Dept. of Philosophy University of Arizona P.O. Box 210027 Tucson, AZ 85721-0027 USA Office #138 Phone 520-621-7098 All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare. -Spinoza, The Ethics From logant@U.Arizona.EDU Sun Oct 31 17:49:51 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Maggie.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.233]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id RAA07147 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:49:50 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHSK81M4GG9GZM5D@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:50:39 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHSK814ALS9JFQRF@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:50:38 -0700 (MST) Received: from orion.U.Arizona.EDU (orion.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.206]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id RAA07142 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:49:42 -0700 Received: from localhost (logant@localhost) by orion.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id RAA05784 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:50:31 -0700 (MST) Date: Sun, 31 Oct 1999 17:50:31 -0700 (MST) From: Logan T Trujillo Subject: HOTs, unconscious processes, and qualia In-reply-to: To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO Hello all. I was thinking about the discussion in class concerning the distinction between a conscious mental state and being conscious of a mental state. Dave gave a good example of this distinction (I am describing this from memory, so if I have this example wrong please let me know): show a subject a visual stimulus consisting of a large number of dots for a brief period of time, and then follow this with a second presentation of a group of dots whose number is one less than that of the original presentation. In most cases people would be unaware that there is a difference between the two sets of stimuli, and thus would report that the two sets are the same. It was argued in class that during the first stimulus presentation the extra dot was present in the person's phenomenology (i.e. the visual state corresponding to perception of the dot was conscious) but that the person was not aware of it (i.e. the person was not conscious of the dot). Now it seems to me (using Block's terminology) that this implies a dissociation between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness (or at least higher order thoughts that are conscious). One may say that while the subjects have phenomenal consciousness of the dot, they do not have access consciousness of the dot. The dot produces a shift or change in the subjects' phenomenology, but the subjects are not aware of this change because they don't have access to, or cannot discriminate, the change. But if one says this, then couldn't one also say that, in a sense, the experience of the dot is unconscious (or to be more precise un-access conscious)? If one can say this, then it leads naturally to the following questions: is it possible that all the mental processes that are currently considered to be unconscious or nonconscious could be in fact conscious, but we have no access to them? Could these processes have experiential aspects that remain un-access conscious? If one wished to deny this, how could one build a case from the evidence? Consider the case of a cognitive task where one wishes to infer that some unconscious process played a role in the instantiation of that task because the subjects undergoing the task had no awareness of the processes themselves. However one could equally say that the process is conscious (in a phenomenological sense) but that the subjects have no consciousness of the process (i.e. the process is un-access conscious). How could one empirically distinguish between these two interpretations? In light of the strong arguments for the existence of the hard problem, it seems to me that the latter interpretation may be more metaphysically parsimonious. Instead of trying to figure out how qualia arises from certain brain processes while not arising from others, one posits that qualia arises from all brain processes. However, not all of these brain processes are in the category of which one is conscious of those processes. Of course this requires an explanation of why some processes make it into conscious access and others do not. However this may be a more tractable problem then the one suggested by denying that qualia is ubiquitous to all brain processes. Take a look around you right now at your present visual scene. All the processes that enabled you to perceive that scene may contribute qualia to your overall visual phenomenology. The fact that we are not conscious of most of those processes does not argue against the possibility that such processes are conscious, with a rich phenomenology interwoven with the phenomenology of those processes to which we may be conscious of. Logan T. From chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Sun Oct 31 19:40:37 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id TAA07636 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 19:40:37 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHSO3CMVDS9GZ40O@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Sun, 31 Oct 1999 19:41:24 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHSO3C8TZ49JHX62@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 19:41:23 -0700 (MST) Received: (from chalmers@localhost) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) id TAA07626 for scicon; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 19:40:14 -0700 Date: Sun, 31 Oct 1999 19:40:14 -0700 From: David Chalmers Subject: HOTs, etc To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: <199911010240.TAA07626@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu> Status: R Hi, a couple of notes: (1) In response to Joel, one might try to make a case that the actual information that is on the tip of one's tongue can make a difference in phenomenology. E.g., if one is trying to think of the capital of Wyoming, it might feel different to have Cheyenne on the tip of one's tongue compared to having Laramie there. After all, there is often the feeling that some of the information is vaguely present -- maybe the first letter of the world, or some of the feel. On the other hand, this feeling might be fairly coarse-grained, so it might be that e.g. Casper and Canter would feel the same? (2) Logan suggests that in the dot case, the extra dot seems to be phenomenally conscious but not access conscious. I think one could make a case that we are access conscious of the extra dot -- it's visually there and available to play a role in our reasoning (e.g. counting the dots) and action (e.g. pointing to it). What it seems that we're not access conscious of is the fact that it *is* an extra dot -- i.e. the fact that the two displays contain different numbers of dots. But that's a slightly different thing. The idea that lots of our supposedly "unconscious" mental states might be phenomenally conscious but access unconscious is interesting. But I don't think it gets support from this analogy, since we can point to and talk about the dot in the case above, but we can't point to and talk about typical "unconscious" information. The motivation of suggesting that qualia are associated with all brain processes is interesting; but note that that doesn't force us into holding that they are all phenomenally conscious for me (the person with the brain). Another alternative might be that those qualia are not part of my phenomenal consciousness, but are part of another subject's consciousness (e.g., a proto-subject corresponding to an individual neuron, or neural system). Given that we're going to have qualia or proto-qualia all over, maybe it's not so bad to have subjects or proto-subjects all over, too. And this way we avoid the consequence that we as subjects experience a whole lot of qualia that we can never know about. --Dave. From acboch@U.Arizona.EDU Mon Nov 1 05:15:16 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id FAA09116 for ; Mon, 1 Nov 1999 05:15:16 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHT85U2B689GZS90@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Mon, 1 Nov 1999 05:16:04 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHT85TOYEO9JHYW1@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Mon, 01 Nov 1999 05:16:03 -0700 (MST) Received: from orion.U.Arizona.EDU (orion.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.206]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id FAA09111 for ; Mon, 01 Nov 1999 05:15:00 -0700 Received: from localhost (acboch@localhost) by orion.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id FAA26173; Mon, 01 Nov 1999 05:15:49 -0700 (MST) Date: Mon, 01 Nov 1999 05:15:49 -0700 (MST) From: Adam C Boch Subject: Re: HOTs and Consciousness In-reply-to: <19991031211141.11136.qmail@hotmail.com> To: Matt Herbert Cc: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: R Matt writes: > > Yes, Rosenthal (almost) says that children have the HOTs about experience > required for consciousness. A few lines after the passage cited by Peter, > Rosenthal says that the essential difference is between thought and report. > Even adults have thoughts that they cannot formulate as reports, so > presumably, children do too. Some such thoughts may be HOTs-- "So it may > well be that these children [three and younger]have the relevant HOTs even > though they do not express them verbally." > > This line of thought has the interesting consequence of committing one to > nativism about mentalese if one is to maintain that infants are conscious. > If there's conscious experience, after all, it is so because it bears the > imprint of a thought, and a thought implicates at least one concept. > Regarding developing children who have not yet gained a large conceptual > repertoire (expressed in a natural language), nativism might be invoked to > explain the apparently rich conscious experience that children enjoy. It > would not be *required* to explain consciousness, but it does seem like the > natural direction to go if one is commited to nativism for infants. I took it that Rosenthal wanted to go in a different direction. That is, it seems that rather than say that children under three have a mentalese (which, as an aside, does not commit one to nativism with respect to mentalese since it seems prima facie plausible that a mental natural language could form after birth and before verbalization) Rosenthal wants to say that the relevant concepts necessary for a consciousness-bestowing HOT (a concept of self and of mental states (mental state types and mental states in general)) are merely content based. In other words, instead of a HOT with the content "I am in M." where M is some mental state and where the sentence "I am in M" is considered a mentalese sentence, the concept "I" and "M" are minimalistic concepts filled out by a pre-linguistic content. Exactly how this is to be cashed out is presumably left up to us since Rosenthal doesn't give us much of a story. In "A Theory of Consciousness" he says that [a] minimal concept of self will suffice; no more than a concept that allows distinguishing between oneself and other things... Nor is there reason to suppose that rich conceptual resources are necessary for a thought to refer to one's own mental states. We refer in thought to physical objects by way of their position in our visual field. It is natural to suppose that a thought can similarly refer to sensory states by way of their position in the relevant sensory field. So it seems that here he wants to put forth some sort of demonstrative reference story where a HOT merely points to a mental state (here a sensory mental state). Mental state concepts (at least sensory ones) are differentiated merely with respect to their content (e.g., a sensory mental states S with the (phenomenal) content "reddish sphere" is different from a sensory mental states M with (phenomenal) content "greenish cube"). Since Rosenthal thinks one needs only a minimal concept of self (presumably in the background of all thought-pointing events--as Brad pointed out in class) children under three have all that they need to form the relevant HOTs necessary for making mental states conscious without the need to posit an infant pre-verbalized mentalese. HOTs, then, for children under three, are, according to Rosenthal, merely pointers to mental states. But, as Dave stated in class, it seems Rosenthal is going to have to employ HOTs in this role even in adults. Rosenthal writes (in ATOC): In any case, conscious differentiation of sensory detail quickly outstrips one's conceptual resources; so some such means of referring to sensory states is necessary. In other words, even as adults our sensory concepts are incommensurate with our sensory consciousness. We are conscious of sensory detail of which we have no corresponding sensory concept. So the HOTs in virtue of which we are conscious of our sensory mental states must "fill-in" by means of this demonstrative referring to which Rosenthal alludes. There is, however, more story-telling to be told. For instance, if it is the richness of our mental state concepts that determines the richness of our conscious experience when HOTs are construed as mentalese sentences (which it seems Rosenthal is committed to claiming) then what is it that determines the richness of the "gaps" that are filled-in by these referring HOTs? Or, as is more glaringly problematic, what determines the richness of the conscious lives of children under three (since all of their HOTs are of this referring kind)? From logant@U.Arizona.EDU Mon Nov 1 22:40:10 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Maggie.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.233]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id WAA11111 for ; Mon, 1 Nov 1999 22:40:09 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHU8NDNBBK9GZOZH@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Mon, 1 Nov 1999 22:41:00 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHU8NDAJ3K9JIF4Z@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Mon, 01 Nov 1999 22:40:59 -0700 (MST) Received: from pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (pavo-2.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.196]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id WAA11093 for ; Mon, 01 Nov 1999 22:40:02 -0700 Received: from localhost (logant@localhost) by pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id WAA05161; Mon, 01 Nov 1999 22:40:52 -0700 (MST) Date: Mon, 01 Nov 1999 22:40:51 -0700 (MST) From: Logan T Trujillo Subject: Re: HOTs, etc In-reply-to: <199911010240.TAA07626@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu> To: David Chalmers Cc: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: R On Sun, 31 Oct 1999, David Chalmers wrote: > (2) Logan suggests that in the dot case, the extra dot seems to be > phenomenally conscious but not access conscious. I think one could > make a case that we are access conscious of the extra dot -- it's > visually there and available to play a role in our reasoning (e.g. > counting the dots) and action (e.g. pointing to it). What it seems > that we're not access conscious of is the fact that it *is* an extra > dot -- i.e. the fact that the two displays contain different numbers > of dots. But that's a slightly different thing. Perhaps the idea of access consciousness was the wrong thing to use to contrast against the phenomenality in this case, but it does seem that there is a distinction to be made. We can only point to and talk about the dot if there is an opportunity for our attention to make the dot's existence plain to us. Yes the dot is available for reasoning, etc., but such processes do not occur until conscious access to the dot is instantiated. Until then, the dot remains phenomenaly present, but not accessed. Perhaps there could be a distinction between potential for access and actual access? Certainly the former obtains in this example, but does the latter? (I am admittedly out on a limb here). > > The idea that lots of our supposedly "unconscious" mental states might > be phenomenally conscious but access unconscious is interesting. But > I don't think it gets support from this analogy, since we can point to > and talk about the dot in the case above, but we can't point to and > talk about typical "unconscious" information. Again, per the discussion above, I am not entirely convinced that the dot is access conscious before it is actually accessed. Thus the fact that we have the potential to point to the dot is not directly relevant to the current state of consciousness of actual access during the period before this occurs. Furthermore wouldn't evidence from biofeedback and studies of meditation that purport to demonstrate effects of conscious intention upon autonomic physiology (processes usually considered to be unconscious) seem to indicate that in the case of some unconscious processes we can "point and talk" to them (metaphorically)? Perhaps states of consciousness exist where access is available to other typical unconscious processes? Such states certainly wouldn't be considered normal consciousness, but then normal conscious states are considered as such because the majority of people tested exhibit the inability to access information considered unconscious. > > The motivation of suggesting that qualia are associated with all brain > processes is interesting; but note that that doesn't force us into > holding that they are all phenomenally conscious for me (the person > with the brain). Another alternative might be that those qualia are > not part of my phenomenal consciousness, but are part of another > subject's consciousness (e.g., a proto-subject corresponding to an > individual neuron, or neural system). Given that we're going to have > qualia or proto-qualia all over, maybe it's not so bad to have > subjects or proto-subjects all over, too. And this way we avoid the > consequence that we as subjects experience a whole lot of qualia that > we can never know about. This is a very interesting idea, perhaps closer to the idea I was trying to get across in my post. I think that such a situation is intimately associated with the problem of phenomenal/perceptual/cognitive binding. Perhaps binding regulates what qualia is associated with which subject. However whether or not this could be empirically tested remains to be seen. Thanks Dave. As usual your comments and observations are astute and clarifying. Logan T. From anhabib@U.Arizona.EDU Sun Oct 31 21:59:04 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id VAA08191 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 21:59:03 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHSSX0V6U89GZ3N5@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Sun, 31 Oct 1999 21:59:51 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHSSX0MAN49JHZT5@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 21:59:51 -0700 (MST) Received: from orion.U.Arizona.EDU (orion.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.206]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id VAA08186 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 21:58:54 -0700 Received: from localhost (anhabib@localhost) by orion.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id VAA05881 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 21:59:42 -0700 (MST) Date: Sun, 31 Oct 1999 21:59:42 -0700 (MST) From: Allen N Habib Subject: Joel, Rosenthal and the HOT theory To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO All Joel's post got me thinking about the need for HOTs to make sensory data conscious. Perhaps we can modify Rosenthal's proposal to make it more acceptable in the following manner: we remove the requirement that HOTs are necessary to make incoming sens data conscious, but are required for all other conscious thoughts. Allow me to present an analogy to make my point. Imagine that memories are like data files. In order to become conscious, a memory must be 'copied' into the cache (working memory). The HOT is the equivalent of the copied file in the cache. Now files come in two parts, an index and a content part. The index segment contains information about the file, things like (in a computer) its size and origin and type. Perhaps our memories also contain an index, and when we have a TOT experience, we only have the index (or maybe even part of the index) copied into the cache, and that is why we have only partial consciousness. Only when the content part of the file is copied into memory will we be fully conscious of it. Of course, the problem is that, even on this generous analogy, sense data will not seem to require a HOT to be conscious, because the computer equivalent of sense data, data from peripherals that lie outside the bus (the infromation exchange, or CNS of a computer) is not copied into the cache via a subroutine, but is rather streamed into the cache through the bus. Perhaps this is what happens with sense data, then. Rather than eliciting an HOT, like other conscious experiences, sensory experiences would have a free ride to consciousness, as it were. Although, this limitation might not be as devastating as it seems, since Rosenthal might argue that attending to sense data inevitably results in HOTs. Perhaps if we concentrate on a stream of incoming sense datd, we, as a matter of empirical fact, begin to process the stream in a manner that requires the use of memory, and thus the production of HOTs. It is not implausible that the simple act of turning our attention to an incoming sensory stream results in our processing the units of the stream for memory matches, or trying to anticipate the upcoming units in the stream, or comparing past units looking for patterns, or any number of processes that would require HOTs on this formulation. So the HOT theorist can say that HOTs are necessary for a vast number of conscious experiences, including most of those inside attention. Of course, this argument is offered in the spirit of science fiction, and I don't have a good reason to think that human cognition is sufficiently similar to computer architecture as to allow the inferences I have drawn here. . . still, a good story, no? From switanek@U.Arizona.EDU Sun Oct 31 22:31:20 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id WAA08273 for ; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 22:31:20 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHSU20V8LC9GZMWP@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Sun, 31 Oct 1999 22:32:08 MST Received: from pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (pavo-2.U.Arizona.EDU) by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHSU20EUI89JI04R@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 22:32:07 -0700 (MST) Received: from localhost (switanek@localhost) by pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id WAA14243; Sun, 31 Oct 1999 22:32:06 -0700 (MST) Date: Sun, 31 Oct 1999 22:32:06 -0700 (MST) From: Nicholas J Switanek Subject: Re: HOTs, etc In-reply-to: <199911010240.TAA07626@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu> To: David Chalmers Cc: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO Juraj's post regarding the homogeneity of TOT phenomenology was interesting. There does seem to be significant commonality between all experiences of this. There is something distinctive about the brain stalling out because of (what I think might be described as) informational inadequacy. And Juraj's suggestion that the phenomenality of every "brain stall" is roughly the same is both intuitive and helpful. Yet it is hard to deny that tip-of-the-tongue experiences are strongly intentional. If we separate the TOT experience from the information a quest for which resulted in the TOT, and call all TOT phenomenologically equivalent, then it seems *any* answer to the frustrated search would dissolve the block, give that distinctive catharsis (and post-catharsis self-reprimand for having forgotten.) This is manifestly not the case, so it seems that paralyzing TOTs must need be chained to their antidotes, the informational states that are the TOTs' resolutions. But to say the question, the quest, and the answer are linked is not yet to describe the phenomenological nature of the link. A TOT is like being lost. You've departed with a set of directions, but the directions are inadequate. There is a phenomenality that is specific to being lost with *this* set of directions (which corresponds to Joel's "description" and to Dave's "course-grained" "feel"), but the overwhelming feeling is simply that of being lost (which corresponds to Juraj's intuition that TOT phenomenology is all roughly the same). There is a sort of access consciousness, but what is available for verbal report is only that the access failed, the destination was not reached--along with some vague, "course-grained" information about where the destination "should be." The phenomenology of reaching the destination, of remembering the answer, is very little like that of being lost; the catharsis that comes with the answer arises because of this large disparity. Or else a TOT is like having an adequate set of directions, but an outdated one. A metaphor that seems more apt is getting lost when driving home after a long time away and after the surroundings have changed. I'm originally from Phoenix, which has been spreading, mutating, and losangelizing for the past couple of years: eight months is time enough for any number of gaudy strip malls to swell like lumps on the desert. So when I meant to drive home after a stay abroad, and looked for the old clues, I was disoriented by the faux adobe franchises. The city planning of the mind is also in flux (please correct me if I'm wrong on this) which can disorient quests for information, apart from any consideration of the quality of the set of directions, and whether the ink has faded or the page has torn. Last, the getting lost metaphor can be extended to be suggestive in the case of overconfident feeling-of-knowledge. The executive "manages" all the business of the mind with the outside. He takes the request for a memory and sets his people working. If the only answer his consulting firm is able to come up with is that they can't get the requested information, but they can describe some characteristics of it, the executive, in order to save face and continue to legitimize his high fees, claims he's eighty percent sure of his guess. Or else the executive is a nimwit who doesn't understand what his techies and sundry minions do in their cubicles, but is confident and dependent upon them, regardless of their troubles--indeed, he can't understand their troubles. Whatever the case, the executive is clearly male, and hates getting lost. Nick From rachaelp@U.Arizona.EDU Tue Nov 2 07:45:12 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Maggie.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.233]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA11844 for ; Tue, 2 Nov 1999 07:45:12 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHURO5YVY89H01ND@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Tue, 2 Nov 1999 07:46:03 MST Received: from odo.U.Arizona.EDU by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHURO5NTI89JIGGI@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Tue, 02 Nov 1999 07:46:03 -0700 (MST) Received: from pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (pavo-1.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.195]) by odo.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id HAA00106 for ; Tue, 02 Nov 1999 07:45:55 -0700 (MST) Received: from localhost (rachaelp@localhost) by pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id HAA01819 for ; Tue, 02 Nov 1999 07:45:55 -0700 (MST) Date: Tue, 02 Nov 1999 07:45:54 -0700 (MST) From: Rachael J Parkinson Subject: consiousness and meta-processing In-reply-to: To: David Chalmers Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO Dear Dave, I wrote this message last Thursday. I thought that I had sent it out but instead I had hit 'postpone'. This whole time I have been thinking that I had posted to the listserve with plenty of time. (happy that I hadn't procrastinated until Sunday.) When I was talking with Adam last night I figured out that he hadn't gotten my post and that further, it hadn't been sent. So here it is. Sorry that it is late but know that I did finish writing it on time. If you decide to send it on to the listserve please take off this excuse (its an embarrassing mistake to make.) Thanks, Rachael Our discussion on Tuesday raised another concern that I had with the Johnson and Reeder article. In the section, Consciousness and Attention, on page 283, they make some pretty interesting claims about consciousness and attention. In this section, they say that the familiar example of driving the car to work is one where the person is paying attention but is not necessarily conscious. This is because consciousness can be distinguished from attention "in that consciousness includes the idea that processes are engaged and monitored by another subsystem, whereas attention does not necessarily involve transactions across subsystems." So it appears that Johnson and Reeder want to claim that what is going on when we are 'unconsciously' driving to work is that transactions are taking place across one subsystem but processes are not being engaged and monitored across subsystems. But recall, theirs is a picture in which the fulfilling of agendas requires control and monitoring *across* subsystems. (Strangely, the MEM framework doesn't leave room for these functions within a particular subsystem). So what they would have to say about the experience of driving 'unconsciously', while 'paying attention' is one in which no agendas are being carried out, that is, where no control or monitoring is taking place. Anyone who has driven to the store, even 'unconsiously' should recognize that some controlling and monitoring must take place as accomplishing this task requires heading in a basic direction, changing lanes, and in general, not being killed. Even on 'automatic' there must be some control/monitoring processes taking place for us to accomplish our goal. There are a number of ways Johnson and Reeder could adjust their position to make it more tenable. First, as I pointed to before, they could allow for control and monitoring to take place across a particular subsystem. Secondly, as Liz pointed out, their description of the driving example seems to get things backwards. Most of our intuitions seem to suggest that we are conscious but not paying attention in those scenarios, not the other way around. I am not sure that this claim about consciousness and attention coming apart is that important for Johnson and Reeder's overall project anyway. The claim that consciousness arises from meta-processing (though problematic in itself) is better supported without tacking it to the stronger claim about what attention involves. Just some thoughts...