From serobert@U.Arizona.EDU Sun Sep 12 22:24:41 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id WAA05844 for ; Sun, 12 Sep 1999 22:24:40 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JFWDHXESJ4B8TS8F@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Sun, 12 Sep 1999 22:24:43 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JFWDHU6H40B8TRD1@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 12 Sep 1999 22:24:38 -0700 (MST) Received: from f1n2.u.arizona.edu (IDENT:serobert@f1n2.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.102]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id WAA05839 for ; Sun, 12 Sep 1999 22:24:28 -0700 Received: from localhost (serobert@localhost) by f1n2.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id WAA24248 for ; Sun, 12 Sep 1999 22:24:34 -0700 Date: Sun, 12 Sep 1999 22:24:34 -0700 (MST) From: Simon E Roberts-Thomson In-reply-to: To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO Dear all, Given that at this stage we are going on to talk about the neural correlates of consciousness, it may be useful to make clear a relatively simple distinction - that between necessary and sufficient causes. The reason why I think that this is important is that, whilst reading the Crick and Koch article, it occurred to me that they seem to have made the mistake of conflating the two. Specifically, I would refer you to their 1998 article (in this weeks reading), where they are talking about those aspects of the discussion about consciousness that they have deliberately decided to leave out. In (2), they say: "It is plausible that some species of animals ... possess some of the essential features of consciousness, but not necessarily all. For this reason, appropriate experiments on such animals may be relevant to finding the mechanisms underlying consciousness. It follows that a language system (of the type found in humans) is not essential for consciousness -- that is, one can have the key features of consciousness without language." This passage seems rather confused. It seems that they are suggesting that since some animals both have some essential features of consciousness and do not have language, then language is not essential for consciousnesss. What , however, do they mean by "essential"? If they mean that higher mammals have some of the cognitive mechanisms that are *necessary* for consciousness, then their conclusion does not follow - there is no reason to suppose that language is not necessary for consciousness as we understand it. Whilst those animals might possess some of the necessary features of consciousness, it is at least uncertain whether those features are *sufficient* for them to be considered conscious. If on the other hand they are saying that these animals have cognitive features that are sufficient for consciousness, then why do they say that these animals only possess some, but not all, of the "essential" features of consciousness? It would seem that by definition that these animals would have all the cognitive faculties that are required for consciousness. The importance of this distinction may perhaps be made clearer by applying it to a familiar example - Dave's psychophysical principles. If these three principles are merely necessary for connecting processing and experience, then we need to ask the further question of whether they are also sufficien. If the answer is no, then we need to search for further principles that are necessary and which, in combination with the other three, will be sufficient principles. I hope this has helped Simon. From chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Wed Sep 15 01:14:35 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id BAA10428 for ; Wed, 15 Sep 1999 01:14:35 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JFZC1D9JLCB8UQ52@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Wed, 15 Sep 1999 01:14:43 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JFZC1BPNTSB8UMDX@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Wed, 15 Sep 1999 01:14:40 -0700 (MST) Received: (from chalmers@localhost) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) id BAA10419 for scicon; Wed, 15 Sep 1999 01:14:28 -0700 Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1999 01:14:28 -0700 From: David Chalmers Subject: brain pictures To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: <199909150814.BAA10419@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII Status: R Hi all, we were discussing (in class and in break) the frontal lobe, prefrontal corxtex, etc. There's a nice simple diagram at http://www.waiting.com/frontallobe.html It seems that the frontal lobe consists of prefrontal cortex, premotor cortex, and motor cortex (plus the frontal eye fields which are distinct on some accounts). The prefrontal cortex is the front part of the lobe (all the way to the very front), as a couple of us thought. The premotor and motor areas are behind that. You can get from that page to another simple picture of areas of the brain, if that's helpful. There is some info (and diagrams) on the differences between non-human primate vs. human brains at http://psy.anu.edu.au/unit/b07/OnWeb/B07Lect02-99.htm You can get to lots of other pictures of the brain by going to http://dir.yahoo.com/Science/Biology/Anatomy/Brain/ Finally, it turns out the Sheinberg and Logothetis reading for next week is on the web. I've put in a link to it from the main web page for the seminar. --Dave. From lachter@u.arizona.edu Tue Sep 14 10:52:05 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA08876 for ; Tue, 14 Sep 1999 10:52:05 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JFYHW17TN4B8U5E1@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Tue, 14 Sep 1999 10:52:12 MST Received: from trifid.u.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JFYHVZYXJ4B8U2P5@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Tue, 14 Sep 1999 10:52:10 -0700 (MST) Received: from [128.196.99.98] ([128.196.99.98]) by trifid.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id KAA28596; Tue, 14 Sep 1999 10:52:09 -0700 Date: Tue, 14 Sep 1999 10:50:49 -0700 From: Joel Lachter Subject: Re: Comments In-reply-to: <199909140716.AAA08243@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu> X-Sender: lachter@pop.u.arizona.edu To: David Chalmers Cc: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Status: RO Okay, I haven't been saving people's mail and I can't remember exactly what Sarah wrote, but Dave's reply resonated with something I didn't like in his paper from this week's readings. Thus I will reply even if this is off the thread. In the readings for this week both Chalmers and Block seem to assume that it is possible to find a neural correlate of consciousness. This struck me as odd. It seems to me that we are about as likely to find a neural correlate of consciousness as we are to find a silicon correlate of word processing. Lets face it, everything in your computer is involved in word processing, and everything that is involved in word processing is also involved in functions which are not word processing. It seems to me that consciousness is likely to be something like this. In particular, I don't see any reason to think that consciousness is a natural kind from the point of view of neuroscience or cognitive psychology. So, Question: Is it necessary for consciousness to be a natural kind from the point of view of neuroscience (cognitive psychology) for their to be a neural (cognitive) correlate of consciousness? Whether or not it is necessary, it is pretty clear that people who are in the business or looking for correlates of consciousness are looking for natural kinds from their own scientific point of view. Look at the list which begins Dave's paper for this week. People just are not proposing correlates which involve complex conditions and interactions between brain/cognitive states. The point here is that whether or not we think of consciousness as a natural kind (from the point of view of "science") has a big influence on how we carry out the enterprise of creating a science of consciousness. Joel At 12:16 AM -0700 9/14/99, David Chalmers wrote: >Hi, here are some very brief comments on people's postings: > >(1) Re Sarah's comments: The idea that consciousness might not be a >natural kind is interesting. Personally I think it is, if anything >is; but I'm not sure whether any of these issues really turn on the >matter. Even when a property is a very unnatural kind (e.g. "in my >desk"), maybe we won't be able to give a unified explanation of its >instances, but that won't stop one from giving a fine explanation of >any single instance of the property. Here we're not concerned so much >with historical explanation (which can be tricky) as reductive >explanation -- just giving an account of the micro facts which will >necessitate and explain the fact that e.g. a particular pen is in my >desk. And that doesn't seem too hard in principle. But for >consciousness, even explaining a single instance seems tricky. So I'm >not sure the issues are entirely analogous. From acboch@U.Arizona.EDU Mon Sep 27 19:36:45 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id TAA19637 for ; Mon, 27 Sep 1999 19:36:45 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGH612NM2OB8W5KI@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Mon, 27 Sep 1999 19:36:56 MST Received: from kitts.u.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGH611LYRKB8W7NJ@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Mon, 27 Sep 1999 19:36:55 -0700 (MST) Received: from localhost (acboch@localhost) by kitts.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id TAA61940 for ; Mon, 27 Sep 1999 19:36:52 -0700 Date: Mon, 27 Sep 1999 19:36:52 -0700 (MST) From: Adam C Boch Subject: Re:NCC's In-reply-to: <199909050049.RAA05601@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu> To: David Chalmers Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO Dave, I thought I'd post directly to you since I seem to take a radically different angle than you and the others on the topics we've covered so far. The assigned readings just seem to miss the mark, in my opinion, so I'm using some outside sources to inform my posting. Here I'm using the article by Depraz in The View From Within, and Varela's Neurophenomenology paper from the penultimate week's reading list. Perhaps, after reading the post, you could point me to more like this (if there is any). The problem I have with current NCC research projects is a methodological/epistemological one. The criticism is inspired by the Husserlian notion of reductions. A recent trend in first-person approaches insists that it is only within a Husserlian methodological framework that we will be able to get rigorous enough about first-person conscious experiential data such that a Chalmersian science of consciousness project will be possible. That is, the claim is that it is only by practicing Husserlian reductions (the epoche and eidetic) that researchers will be able to rigorously gather relevant 1st person data such that such data can successfully be bridged with 3rd person neuroscientific data (among other 3r person data). The problem is this. Such reductions aim, by definition, at uncovering the essential (irreducible) structure of conscious experience (see Varela p.4 of web print-out). That is, the thought is that what we get when we casually look at the world is only one possible "presentation" (or representation), one we have in virtue of a habitual way of looking at the world. If we bracket this habitual mode, allowing room for other possible presentations, we go from contingent "facts" to essential facts (i.e., we go from facts that are contingent in virtue of being derived from a single perspective to those that are universal in virtue of being derived from a multitude of perspectives--see Depraz p.101). Now, Varela writes: We are similarly assuming that human experience follows fundamental structural principals which...enforces the nature of what is given to us as contents of experience (p.8) and It is one of the most impressive discoveries of the phenomenological movement to have quickly realized that an investigation of the structure of human experience inevitably induces a shift towards considering several levels of my consciousness as inextricably linked to those of others and to the phenomenal world in an emphatic mesh. Consequently, the usual opposition of first-person vs. third-person accounts is misleading. It makes us forget that so-called third-person, objective accounts are done by a community of concrete people who are embodied in their social and natural worlds as much as first-person accounts... (p.9). In other words, the relevant phenomenological reductions aim at irreducible structures of not only the act of consciousness but of the objects of consciousness as well. Depraz uses the example of the experience of red (p.101). After performing the reductions one is left with the essential structure of an experience of red--presumably, one that is much richer than the one had previous to the reduction. In other words, one gets essential (or the essence of) red (as an object of consciousness), and this is DIFFERENT (and epistemically privelleged) from contingent red (red as an object of consciousness before the reductions are performed). The result seems to be that, after one performs these phenomenological reductions, one is left with a more robust and fuller phenomenal world. The world looks different, feels different. And--here's the meat of it-- if a neuroscientist performs these reductions, the BRAIN will look and feel different, perhaps quite different. The essential structure of an experience of the brain might be altogether different from the one we have from habitual observation. For example, the way nuerons look and seem to behave before the reductions might radically differ from the way they look and seem to behave after--if what we get after can even be called a neuron any longer (i.e., things might look VERY different!). With a more robust phenomenal world we would presumably get a more robust nueroscience (since most of neuroscientific data is predicated on observation). After some progress on the first-person side of the project, it would seem necessary that, with this honed observational tool, we revamp the third-person side. Only then could we be said to be on our way to a RIGOROUS science of consciousness (after all, this was Husserl's goal). Of course, this is only a criticism of someone interested in a science of consciousness who takes Husserlian phenomenology seriously as a means of gathering first-person data (specifically, someone like Varela). If one doesn't take Husserl seriously, one doesn't have to take the criticism seriously. As someone who does take Husserl seriously, it seems that, given the above, it is from the first-person perspective that a science of consciousness must begin. The task of gathering third-person data follows only after significant work has been done on the first-person side. Work done in the third-person beforehand, is, if Husserl is right, haphazard. It may be science, but not, as Husserl says, rigorous science. From acboch@U.Arizona.EDU Mon Sep 27 23:36:39 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA20151 for ; Mon, 27 Sep 1999 23:36:39 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGHEEISHTSB8W0LY@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Mon, 27 Sep 1999 23:36:50 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGHEEHNXZ4B8LRBU@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Mon, 27 Sep 1999 23:36:49 -0700 (MST) Received: from nevis.u.arizona.edu (IDENT:acboch@shell [128.196.137.19]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA20146 for ; Mon, 27 Sep 1999 23:36:11 -0700 Received: from localhost (acboch@localhost) by nevis.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id XAA49114 for ; Mon, 27 Sep 1999 23:36:24 -0700 Date: Mon, 27 Sep 1999 23:36:23 -0700 (MST) From: Adam C Boch Subject: Re:NCC's (fwd) To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 27 Sep 1999 19:36:52 -0700 (MST) From: Adam C Boch To: David Chalmers Subject: Re:NCC's All, The assigned readings just seem to miss the mark, in my opinion, so I'm using some outside sources to inform my posting. Here I'm using the article by Depraz in The View From Within, and Varela's Neurophenomenology paper from the penultimate week's reading list. The problem I have with current NCC research projects is a methodological/epistemological one. The criticism is inspired by the Husserlian notion of reductions. A recent trend in first-person approaches insists that it is only within a Husserlian methodological framework that we will be able to get rigorous enough about first-person conscious experiential data such that a Chalmersian science of consciousness project will be possible. That is, the claim is that it is only by practicing Husserlian reductions (the epoche and eidetic) that researchers will be able to rigorously gather relevant 1st person data such that such data can successfully be bridged with 3rd person neuroscientific data (among other 3r person data). The problem is this. Such reductions aim, by definition, at uncovering the essential (irreducible) structure of conscious experience (see Varela p.4 of web print-out). That is, the thought is that what we get when we casually look at the world is only one possible "presentation" (or representation), one we have in virtue of a habitual way of looking at the world. If we bracket this habitual mode, allowing room for other possible presentations, we go from contingent "facts" to essential facts (i.e., we go from facts that are contingent in virtue of being derived from a single perspective to those that are universal in virtue of being derived from a multitude of perspectives--see Depraz p.101). Now, Varela writes: We are similarly assuming that human experience follows fundamental structural principals which...enforces the nature of what is given to us as contents of experience (p.8) and It is one of the most impressive discoveries of the phenomenological movement to have quickly realized that an investigation of the structure of human experience inevitably induces a shift towards considering several levels of my consciousness as inextricably linked to those of others and to the phenomenal world in an emphatic mesh. Consequently, the usual opposition of first-person vs. third-person accounts is misleading. It makes us forget that so-called third-person, objective accounts are done by a community of concrete people who are embodied in their social and natural worlds as much as first-person accounts... (p.9). In other words, the relevant phenomenological reductions aim at irreducible structures of not only the act of consciousness but of the objects of consciousness as well. Depraz uses the example of the experience of red (p.101). After performing the reductions one is left with the essential structure of an experience of red--presumably, one that is much richer than the one had previous to the reduction. In other words, one gets essential (or the essence of) red (as an object of consciousness), and this is DIFFERENT (and epistemically privelleged) from contingent red (red as an object of consciousness before the reductions are performed). The result seems to be that, after one performs these phenomenological reductions, one is left with a more robust and fuller phenomenal world. The world looks different, feels different. And--here's the meat of it-- if a neuroscientist performs these reductions, the BRAIN will look and feel different, perhaps quite different. The essential structure of an experience of the brain might be altogether different from the one we have from habitual observation. For example, the way nuerons look and seem to behave before the reductions might radically differ from the way they look and seem to behave after--if what we get after can even be called a neuron any longer (i.e., things might look VERY different!). With a more robust phenomenal world we would presumably get a more robust nueroscience (since most of neuroscientific data is predicated on observation). After some progress on the first-person side of the project, it would seem necessary that, with this honed observational tool, we revamp the third-person side. Only then could we be said to be on our way to a RIGOROUS science of consciousness (after all, this was Husserl's goal). Of course, this is only a criticism of someone interested in a science of consciousness who takes Husserlian phenomenology seriously as a means of gathering first-person data (specifically, someone like Varela). If one doesn't take Husserl seriously, one doesn't have to take the criticism seriously. As someone who does take Husserl seriously, it seems that, given the above, it is from the first-person perspective that a science of consciousness must begin. The task of gathering third-person data follows only after significant work has been done on the first-person side. Work done in the third-person beforehand, is, if Husserl is right, haphazard. It may be science, but not, as Husserl says, rigorous science. From acboch@U.Arizona.EDU Wed Sep 29 20:04:40 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA24548 for ; Wed, 29 Sep 1999 20:04:40 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGJZKGPW5SB8M4GQ@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Wed, 29 Sep 1999 20:04:54 MST Received: from pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (pavo-2.U.Arizona.EDU) by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGJZKFRP68B8WQAN@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Wed, 29 Sep 1999 20:04:53 -0700 (MST) Received: from localhost (acboch@localhost) by pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id UAA23755; Wed, 29 Sep 1999 20:04:51 -0700 (MST) Date: Wed, 29 Sep 1999 20:04:51 -0700 (MST) From: Adam C Boch Subject: Re: NCC postings In-reply-to: <199909290630.XAA22086@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu> To: David Chalmers Cc: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: R Chalmers wrote: > > ADAM: Adam worries that the whole NCC approach is premature, since we > need to get a good phenomenological method off the ground first. Not > just to gather the first-person data, but also to gather the > third-person data from neuroscience, etc. My worry here is that the > same presumably goes for third-person data in any science at all, e > g. physics, chemistry, biology. But if Newton had waited for > phenomenology to be properly developed, we would have been waiting a > long time! My own view is that a developed phenomenology is vital for > gathering first-person data, and may end up helping us gather > third-person data, but that at least the third-person part of the > story ought to be able to get off the ground without it. It's not > clear why the NCC search is any worse off here than any other area of > neuroscience, or of science in general. > > --Dave. > > Exactly. Husserl's methodology was intended as an epistemological overhaul of the sciences--i.e., ALL sciences. What he was looking for was a rigorous method, a reliable means to put it another way, of gathering data for an epistemically privelleged science. A contemporary analytic analog might by the theory-ladennes of perception/observation doctrine--which, in short, claims that conceptual learning influences the mode and content of perception. If perception is theory-laden, proponents of the doctrine say, we may pose an epistemological criticism of traditional science--wherein the data that is to be explained is gathered via observation. This is a real worry in the philosophy of science. That is, it has well-respected advocates and the debate is far being putatively settled. If Husserl (and theory-ladenness advocates) are right, we MUST proceed with the first-person project first. Had we recognized this earlier and directed our focus appropriately, perhaps Newtonian physics would have looked quite different and maybe even gotten things right! Adam From lachter@u.arizona.edu Thu Sep 30 10:44:34 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id KAA25454 for ; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 10:44:34 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGKUBDG028B8W6XN@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 10:44:50 MST Received: from trifid.u.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGKUBCCMZ4B8WHFV@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 10:44:47 -0700 (MST) Received: from [10.0.2.15] ([128.196.99.98]) by trifid.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id KAA23536; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 10:44:45 -0700 Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1999 10:44:59 -0700 From: Joel Lachter Subject: Re: NCC postings In-reply-to: X-Sender: lachter@pop.u.arizona.edu To: Adam C Boch Cc: David Chalmers , scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii References: <199909290630.XAA22086@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu> Status: RO Okay, maybe I am too hung up with my own traditional psychological way of thinking but I really don't understand this first person data business and I am hoping that someone can explain it to me. It seems to me that if we understand the third person perspective in a reasonably thorough manner we can predict any possible finding from the use of first person data. That is because our beliefs about what we are experiencing are accessible from a third person view point. It is hard to see what good first person evidence is going to do us if we don't believe it, but if we believe it it is accessible as third person evidence. Joel At 8:04 PM -0700 9/29/99, Adam C Boch wrote: >Chalmers wrote: > >> >> ADAM: Adam worries that the whole NCC approach is premature, since we >> need to get a good phenomenological method off the ground first. Not >> just to gather the first-person data, but also to gather the >> third-person data from neuroscience, etc. My worry here is that the >> same presumably goes for third-person data in any science at all, e >> g. physics, chemistry, biology. But if Newton had waited for >> phenomenology to be properly developed, we would have been waiting a >> long time! My own view is that a developed phenomenology is vital for >> gathering first-person data, and may end up helping us gather >> third-person data, but that at least the third-person part of the >> story ought to be able to get off the ground without it. It's not >> clear why the NCC search is any worse off here than any other area of >> neuroscience, or of science in general. >> >> --Dave. >> >> >Exactly. Husserl's methodology was intended as an epistemological >overhaul of the sciences--i.e., ALL sciences. What he was looking for was >a rigorous method, a reliable means to put it another way, of gathering >data for an epistemically privelleged science. A contemporary analytic >analog might by the theory-ladennes of perception/observation >doctrine--which, in short, claims that conceptual learning influences the >mode and content of perception. If perception is theory-laden, proponents >of the doctrine say, we may pose an epistemological criticism of >traditional science--wherein the data that is to be explained is gathered >via observation. This is a real worry in the philosophy of science. >That is, it has well-respected advocates and the debate is far being >putatively settled. If Husserl (and theory-ladenness advocates) are >right, we MUST proceed with the first-person project first. Had we >recognized this earlier and directed our focus appropriately, perhaps >Newtonian physics would have looked quite different and maybe even >gotten things right! > >Adam From acboch@U.Arizona.EDU Fri Oct 1 08:30:10 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA00678 for ; Fri, 1 Oct 1999 08:30:10 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGMILQQNK0B8MGII@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Fri, 1 Oct 1999 15:31:09 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGMILPO7ZKB8WR0S@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Fri, 01 Oct 1999 15:31:08 -0700 (MST) Received: from nevis.u.arizona.edu (IDENT:acboch@shell [128.196.137.19]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA00667 for ; Fri, 01 Oct 1999 08:29:56 -0700 Received: from localhost (acboch@localhost) by nevis.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id PAA24834; Fri, 01 Oct 1999 15:30:42 -0700 Date: Fri, 01 Oct 1999 15:30:42 -0700 (MST) From: Adam C Boch Subject: Re: NCC postings In-reply-to: To: Joel Lachter Cc: David Chalmers , scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO Joel (and all listening in), I'm having some trouble understanding your post, especially the stuff about belief in the last two sentences. You start with: It seems to me that if we understand the third-person perspective in a reasonably thorough manner we can predict any possible finding from the use of first-person data. You seem to be saying that once we have an adequately robust neuroscience, we can correlate brain states (or processes) with our first-person data, and so be able to, from then on, predict first-person experience just from looking at the third-person data. But then you say that this is the case because, "...our beliefs about what we are experiencing are accessible from a third-person viewpoint". First, I don't understand the role beliefs are (or ought to be) playing here. Second, you seem to be saying that after we correlate third-person and first-person data, by looking at the former we can predict the latter, and that this is BECAUSE first-person experience is accessible from third-person data. But this doesn't seem to be saying anything substantial. Finally, you write: It is hard to see what good first-person evidence is going to do us if we don't believe it, but if we believe it it is accessible as third-person evidence. Here, again, I'm not sure I understand what role beliefs are playing (or, perhaps I think you mean one thing by beliefs but you really mean something else). Also, I'm unsure in what way you are using 'third-person data' and 'first-person data'. At first, I thought you just meant to point to observations in nueroscience when you uses 'third-person data'. But then you seemed to mean observation of verbal reports when you used the phrase later. But verbal reports can also be considered indicators of first-person experience. I hope that you will take the time to clarify these points. Perhaps just mentally noting them and re-phrasing your point would be enough. I am excited about this dialogue and eagerly await your reply. Adam On Thu, 30 Sep 1999, Joel Lachter wrote: > Okay, maybe I am too hung up with my own traditional psychological way of > thinking but I really don't understand this first person data business and > I am hoping that someone can explain it to me. It seems to me that if we > understand the third person perspective in a reasonably thorough manner we > can predict any possible finding from the use of first person data. That is > because our beliefs about what we are experiencing are accessible from a > third person view point. It is hard to see what good first person evidence > is going to do us if we don't believe it, but if we believe it it is > accessible as third person evidence. > > > Joel > > > At 8:04 PM -0700 9/29/99, Adam C Boch wrote: > >Chalmers wrote: > > > >> > >> ADAM: Adam worries that the whole NCC approach is premature, since we > >> need to get a good phenomenological method off the ground first. Not > >> just to gather the first-person data, but also to gather the > >> third-person data from neuroscience, etc. My worry here is that the > >> same presumably goes for third-person data in any science at all, e > >> g. physics, chemistry, biology. But if Newton had waited for > >> phenomenology to be properly developed, we would have been waiting a > >> long time! My own view is that a developed phenomenology is vital for > >> gathering first-person data, and may end up helping us gather > >> third-person data, but that at least the third-person part of the > >> story ought to be able to get off the ground without it. It's not > >> clear why the NCC search is any worse off here than any other area of > >> neuroscience, or of science in general. > >> > >> --Dave. > >> > >> > >Exactly. Husserl's methodology was intended as an epistemological > >overhaul of the sciences--i.e., ALL sciences. What he was looking for was > >a rigorous method, a reliable means to put it another way, of gathering > >data for an epistemically privelleged science. A contemporary analytic > >analog might by the theory-ladennes of perception/observation > >doctrine--which, in short, claims that conceptual learning influences the > >mode and content of perception. If perception is theory-laden, proponents > >of the doctrine say, we may pose an epistemological criticism of > >traditional science--wherein the data that is to be explained is gathered > >via observation. This is a real worry in the philosophy of science. > >That is, it has well-respected advocates and the debate is far being > >putatively settled. If Husserl (and theory-ladenness advocates) are > >right, we MUST proceed with the first-person project first. Had we > >recognized this earlier and directed our focus appropriately, perhaps > >Newtonian physics would have looked quite different and maybe even > >gotten things right! > > > >Adam > > From lachter@u.arizona.edu Fri Oct 1 14:41:03 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA00842 for ; Fri, 1 Oct 1999 14:41:03 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGMVJL0JE8B8VHRG@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Fri, 1 Oct 1999 21:42:02 MST Received: from trifid.u.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGMVJJWFNKB8WUR3@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Fri, 01 Oct 1999 21:42:01 -0700 (MST) Received: from [128.196.99.98] (tec3.Psych.arizona.edu [128.196.98.11]) by trifid.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id VAA26712; Fri, 01 Oct 1999 21:41:57 -0700 Date: Fri, 01 Oct 1999 21:42:09 -0700 From: Joel Lachter Subject: Re: NCC postings In-reply-to: X-Sender: lachter@pop.u.arizona.edu To: Adam C Boch Cc: David Chalmers , scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii References: Status: RO Let me see if I can be clearer. Step one. I do not see any way of having first person data which the person whose first person data it is does not believe. This is not supposed to be any claim about NCCs or something which we might discover. This seems to me like a conceptual truth. If I had some experience, but I did not believe that I had it I don't see how I could use it as data. Furthermore, if I believe I have a certain experience I will count it as data. Someone might convince me that I am incorrect in thinking that I had this experience, but then I will throw out the data just as I no longer believe I had the experience. Thus it seems to me that the information available from first person data is the same information available from beliefs about experience. I don't think this is an a posteriori discovery. I think this is conceptually necessary: Data is data only insofar as you believe it. Step two. Beliefs are accessible via third person methods. Unlike qualia, we have third person methods for getting at beliefs. We have every reason to think that we will have a very good understanding of beliefs based on cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Anticipating an objection, it may be that we cannot completely individuate beliefs without qualia. If you and I have inverted qualia, one might argue that there is some part of our color beliefs that is different. However, whatever there might be to beliefs that is not accessible to third person analysis, it is not structural. Whatever theory you develop with your inverted qualia will be structurally identical to one based on my qualia or one simply based on the third person data. Notice that any data which you could potentially communicate (even through demonstration) is third person data. Thus it is not clear how useful any residual first person properties of beliefs are going to be in any science of consciousness. Step three. From these it follows all the information available from first person methodologies is also available through third person methodologies (modulo qualia inversion type issues). Joel At 3:30 PM -0700 10/1/99, Adam C Boch wrote: >Joel (and all listening in), > >I'm having some trouble understanding your post, especially the stuff >about belief in the last two sentences. > >You start with: >It seems to me that if we understand the third-person >perspective in a reasonably thorough manner we can predict any possible >finding from the use of first-person data. > >You seem to be saying that once we have an adequately robust neuroscience, >we can correlate brain states (or processes) with our first-person data, >and so be able to, from then on, predict first-person experience just from >looking at the third-person data. > >But then you say that this is the case because, "...our beliefs about what >we are experiencing are accessible from a third-person viewpoint". > >First, I don't understand the role beliefs are (or ought to be) playing >here. Second, you seem to be saying that after we correlate third-person >and first-person data, by looking at the former we can predict the latter, >and that this is BECAUSE first-person experience is accessible from >third-person data. But this doesn't seem to be saying anything >substantial. > >Finally, you write: >It is hard to see what good first-person evidence is going to do us if we >don't believe it, but if we believe it it is accessible as third-person >evidence. > >Here, again, I'm not sure I understand what role beliefs are playing (or, >perhaps I think you mean one thing by beliefs but you really mean >something else). Also, I'm unsure in what way you are using >'third-person data' and 'first-person data'. At first, I thought you just >meant to point to observations in nueroscience when you uses 'third-person >data'. But then you seemed to mean observation of verbal reports when you >used the phrase later. But verbal reports can also be considered >indicators of first-person experience. > >I hope that you will take the time to clarify these points. Perhaps just >mentally noting them and re-phrasing your point would be enough. I am >excited about this dialogue and eagerly await your reply. > >Adam > > > >On Thu, 30 Sep 1999, Joel Lachter wrote: > >> Okay, maybe I am too hung up with my own traditional psychological way of >> thinking but I really don't understand this first person data business and >> I am hoping that someone can explain it to me. It seems to me that if we >> understand the third person perspective in a reasonably thorough manner we >> can predict any possible finding from the use of first person data. That is >> because our beliefs about what we are experiencing are accessible from a >> third person view point. It is hard to see what good first person evidence >> is going to do us if we don't believe it, but if we believe it it is >> accessible as third person evidence. >> >> >> Joel >> >> >> At 8:04 PM -0700 9/29/99, Adam C Boch wrote: >> >Chalmers wrote: >> > >> >> >> >> ADAM: Adam worries that the whole NCC approach is premature, since we >> >> need to get a good phenomenological method off the ground first. Not >> >> just to gather the first-person data, but also to gather the >> >> third-person data from neuroscience, etc. My worry here is that the >> >> same presumably goes for third-person data in any science at all, e >> >> g. physics, chemistry, biology. But if Newton had waited for >> >> phenomenology to be properly developed, we would have been waiting a >> >> long time! My own view is that a developed phenomenology is vital for >> >> gathering first-person data, and may end up helping us gather >> >> third-person data, but that at least the third-person part of the >> >> story ought to be able to get off the ground without it. It's not >> >> clear why the NCC search is any worse off here than any other area of >> >> neuroscience, or of science in general. >> >> >> >> --Dave. >> >> >> >> >> >Exactly. Husserl's methodology was intended as an epistemological >> >overhaul of the sciences--i.e., ALL sciences. What he was looking for was >> >a rigorous method, a reliable means to put it another way, of gathering >> >data for an epistemically privelleged science. A contemporary analytic >> >analog might by the theory-ladennes of perception/observation >> >doctrine--which, in short, claims that conceptual learning influences the >> >mode and content of perception. If perception is theory-laden, proponents >> >of the doctrine say, we may pose an epistemological criticism of >> >traditional science--wherein the data that is to be explained is gathered >> >via observation. This is a real worry in the philosophy of science. >> >That is, it has well-respected advocates and the debate is far being >> >putatively settled. If Husserl (and theory-ladenness advocates) are >> >right, we MUST proceed with the first-person project first. Had we >> >recognized this earlier and directed our focus appropriately, perhaps >> >Newtonian physics would have looked quite different and maybe even >> >gotten things right! >> > >> >Adam >> >> From chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Mon Oct 4 23:42:53 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA06959 for ; Mon, 4 Oct 1999 23:42:52 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGR6NWTQS0B8X97J@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Mon, 4 Oct 1999 23:43:16 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGR6NVRXTCB8XEJK@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Mon, 04 Oct 1999 23:43:14 -0700 (MST) Received: (from chalmers@localhost) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) id XAA06950 for scicon; Mon, 04 Oct 1999 23:42:31 -0700 Date: Mon, 04 Oct 1999 23:42:31 -0700 From: David Chalmers Subject: First-person data To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: <199910050642.XAA06950@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII Status: R Hi all, I'm back from Memphis. Here are some thoughts on recent discussion topics. First, the issue of reducing first-person data to third-person data. I think there is definitely something important in what Joel says. Given that first-person data are only usable if they give rise to beliefs, and given that beliefs always show up in behavioral dispositions such as reportability, then it may seem that first-person data insofar as they are usable can be found in third-person data. A few comments that might be made in response: (i) Even if the content of first-person data had analogs in third-person data (as is suggested e.g. by my principle of structural coherence), this wouldn't mean that the data themselves are eliminable or reducible. It would just mean that we have a natural mapping between the two. Of course this mapping is used all the time by experimenters who use reportability etc as their epistemic route to consciousness. Note that the reports and beliefs themselves aren't so much what the experimenters care about (as they would be if they were studying third-person data); rather, they are mostly interested in them as a guide to first-person phenomenal experience. (ii) It could be that there are first-person data that don't give rise to beliefs, or that can't be articulated in reports. If so, they may be usable in our science, but that doesn't mean their reality as data must be denied. (iii) There may be aspects of the first-person data that can only be understoof from a first-person point of view. The obvious example is Joel's inverted spectrum case. For someone who has experienced color, the distinction between red and blue first-person data is obvious, but it doesn't really show up in the third-person data. Does that mean we can't have a science of it? Well, if we can assume that our scientists have the concepts of red and blue experience, then we can, as long as our science includes interpreted first-person concepts such as these. Whereas from the third-person case, we'd have to give up right away. Of course, this method isn't useful for those without the concepts, such as Mary in her room. Still, it can take us some distance (and e.g. suggests that Robinson Crusoe might be able to come up with a rich first-person science that third-person data wouldn't approach). There are also more general versions of this problem (not just for "intrinsic" inverted spectrum cases), e.g. in understanding the very concept of consciousness and first-person data. Someone without consciousness couldn't even start on this part of the science, for all their grasp of the third-person data, since they wouldn't know what we're talking about re first-person data. But a conscious scientist has no problems at all. So one shouldn't underestimate the role of first-person concept possession in individuating the subject matter of our science here. And it may be the possession of those concepts that makes third-person data indirectly usable in just the way Joel suggests. Without it, one couldn't use third-person data as a guide to first-person data. One would be stuck with zombie science. --Dave. From lachter@u.arizona.edu Tue Oct 5 08:13:40 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA07423 for ; Tue, 5 Oct 1999 08:13:40 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGROI8983KB8VXNW@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Tue, 5 Oct 1999 08:14:05 MST Received: from trifid.u.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGROI6WOZKB8WV30@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Tue, 05 Oct 1999 08:14:03 -0700 (MST) Received: from [10.0.2.15] (tec3.Psych.arizona.edu [128.196.98.11]) by trifid.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id IAA26704; Tue, 05 Oct 1999 08:14:00 -0700 Date: Tue, 05 Oct 1999 08:14:17 -0700 From: Joel Lachter Subject: Re: First-person data In-reply-to: <199910050642.XAA06950@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu> X-Sender: lachter@pop.u.arizona.edu To: David Chalmers Cc: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Status: R At 11:42 PM -0700 10/4/99, David Chalmers wrote: > One would be stuck with zombie science. Exactly my point. A zombie (being exactly the same as a normal person physically) could be just as good a visual scientist as anyone else. (i) A zombie would ask to see the stimuli just like anyone else. It is not like he is just faking it when he asks. He wants to see the data that everyone else sees. And he does. Seeing the stimuli causes him to have beliefs about the strategies used by the subjects in the experiment and the information provided by the stimuli just like anyone else. (ii) It seems to me that any "first person data" that can be used when collected from a non-zombie, can also be collected from a zombie. But in what sense is it "first person" then? (iii) The zombie distinguishes red and blue. The zombie can argue about the inverted spectrum problem. What is it about our science of vision that we could not discover if we were zombies? Joel >Hi all, I'm back from Memphis. Here are some thoughts on recent >discussion topics. First, the issue of reducing first-person data >to third-person data. > >I think there is definitely something important in what Joel says. >Given that first-person data are only usable if they give rise to >beliefs, and given that beliefs always show up in behavioral >dispositions such as reportability, then it may seem that first-person >data insofar as they are usable can be found in third-person data. A >few comments that might be made in response: > >(i) Even if the content of first-person data had analogs in >third-person data (as is suggested e.g. by my principle of structural >coherence), this wouldn't mean that the data themselves are eliminable >or reducible. It would just mean that we have a natural mapping >between the two. Of course this mapping is used all the time by >experimenters who use reportability etc as their epistemic route to >consciousness. Note that the reports and beliefs themselves aren't so >much what the experimenters care about (as they would be if they were >studying third-person data); rather, they are mostly interested in >them as a guide to first-person phenomenal experience. > >(ii) It could be that there are first-person data that don't give rise >to beliefs, or that can't be articulated in reports. If so, they may >be usable in our science, but that doesn't mean their reality as data >must be denied. > >(iii) There may be aspects of the first-person data that can only be >understoof from a first-person point of view. The obvious example is >Joel's inverted spectrum case. For someone who has experienced color, >the distinction between red and blue first-person data is obvious, but >it doesn't really show up in the third-person data. Does that mean we >can't have a science of it? Well, if we can assume that our >scientists have the concepts of red and blue experience, then we can, >as long as our science includes interpreted first-person concepts such >as these. Whereas from the third-person case, we'd have to give up >right away. Of course, this method isn't useful for those without the >concepts, such as Mary in her room. Still, it can take us some >distance (and e.g. suggests that Robinson Crusoe might be able to come >up with a rich first-person science that third-person data wouldn't >approach). > >There are also more general versions of this problem (not just for >"intrinsic" inverted spectrum cases), e.g. in understanding the very >concept of consciousness and first-person data. Someone without >consciousness couldn't even start on this part of the science, for all >their grasp of the third-person data, since they wouldn't know what >we're talking about re first-person data. But a conscious scientist >has no problems at all. So one shouldn't underestimate the role of >first-person concept possession in individuating the subject matter of >our science here. And it may be the possession of those concepts that >makes third-person data indirectly usable in just the way Joel >suggests. Without it, one couldn't use third-person data as a guide >to first-person data. One would be stuck with zombie science. > >--Dave. From lachter@u.arizona.edu Tue Oct 5 08:25:43 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id IAA07439 for ; Tue, 5 Oct 1999 08:25:43 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGROX6B6E8B8XKLU@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Tue, 5 Oct 1999 08:26:08 MST Received: from trifid.u.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGROX4UJEOB8XGW6@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Tue, 05 Oct 1999 08:26:06 -0700 (MST) Received: from [10.0.2.15] (tec3.Psych.arizona.edu [128.196.98.11]) by trifid.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id IAA27888; Tue, 05 Oct 1999 08:26:03 -0700 Date: Tue, 05 Oct 1999 08:26:20 -0700 From: Joel Lachter Subject: Oops...(Re: First-person data) X-Sender: lachter@pop.u.arizona.edu To: David Chalmers Cc: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Status: R At 8:19 AM -0700 10/5/99, Joel Lachter wrote: > One would be stuck with zombie science. >visual scientist >science of vision ... I don't think it matters if you substitute consciousness scientist, science of consciousness etc (or anything else for that matter). But since it is a science of consciousness not vision that is at issue, I should have used "consciousness" not "vision." Joel From acboch@U.Arizona.EDU Tue Oct 5 14:33:04 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id OAA01439 for ; Tue, 5 Oct 1999 14:33:04 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGS1Q59DQ8B8XBQA@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Tue, 5 Oct 1999 14:33:05 MST Received: from nevis.u.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGS1Q3X6UOB8X55A@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Tue, 05 Oct 1999 14:33:04 -0700 (MST) Received: from localhost (acboch@localhost) by nevis.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id OAA35332; Tue, 05 Oct 1999 14:33:01 -0700 Date: Tue, 05 Oct 1999 14:33:01 -0700 (MST) From: Adam C Boch Subject: Re: NCC postings In-reply-to: To: Joel Lachter Cc: David Chalmers , scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO Joel, I guess the source of my confusion was the following. I was trying to interpret your point regarding beliefs about first-person data vis-a-vis my point regarding Husserlian reductions. That was a mistake since it seems to be a separate point. But now I would like to address the point by invoking some of the notions I brought out for discussion before. You wanted to say that all this business about first-person experience was superfluous, since any relevant first-person data (i.e., the ones a subject has beliefs about) can be had by third-person investigation, viz., observation of subject reports. But, there are still problems (Dave mentioned a few. I'll mention some more, maybe overlapping a bit with his stuff.). There might be much we are missing if we limit first-person data to those that we can glean from subject reports. (1) There may be important experiential data that subjects are not forming beliefs about. I talked before about possible "presentations" of objects of consciousness. These are other 'points of view' to put it simply, other perspectives with respect to objects of consciousness and modes of being conscious. If Husserl is right, in virtue of relying solely on our habitual perspectives we miss out on the other possibilities. That is, we are conscious of less than is possible and so limit our domain of inquiry. If our domain of conscious experience is restricted, so is our domain of belief with respect to what we are conscious of. (2) There are some experiences that just cannot adequately be reported. Take as an example, G.Y., a subject used in the blindsight experiments we've discussed. The experimenters made a point to convey statements made by G.Y. to the effect that he could not accurately explain to the experimenters the content of his "blindsight" experiences. He would say things like "the closest I could come to describing it", which points to his inability to EXACTLY describe it. Other subjects in blindsight experiments express similar difficulties. The notion seems to be that 'if you haven't experienced it for yourself, you can't know what I'm talking about'. Luckily, a phenomenologically-based research project eliminates these problems. Regarding (1), those other possible perspectives of objects (or modes) of consciousness are opened up via employment of the reductions. One's domain of conscious experience expands thereby expanding ones domain of belief with respect to conscious experience. But the point about belief and reportability is moot since... Regarding (2), in a phenomenologically-based research program, each individual experimenter is herself her own subject. Each individual investigator performs his own reductions. When a given phenomenon is experienced by all, a common language to describe it is set up, and intersubjectivity is reached. Using blindsight experimentation as an example, we can see the limitations pointed to above. The subjects, by the very nature of their maladies, are limited with respect to their domain of P-consciousness. Also, they have trouble describing to their investigators just what they ARE P-conscious of. Perhaps, using a different methodological paradigm, namely a Husserlian phenomenological one, we might be able to experience the 'blinsight' phenomenon for ourselves. That is, the phenomenon would be one amongst a variety of different modes of being conscious. Each investigator could perform the necessary reductions such that she came to have the relevant experience. Perhaps then, other, closely related modes could be experienced, and the data compared with that of other investigators (who themselves had had the same experiences), to arrive at some objective (i.e., intersubjective) explanation of the matter (of course this might need to include the relevant 'neural' data, but, as I have said before, this itself must be done only after the relevant reductions have been performed (viz., those having to do with physical objects, motion, tie, etc,, i.e., the one's pertinent to doing brain science)). Perhaps notions of A and P consciousness would become more clearly individuated (or perhaps they would bleed into each other). Regardless of the outcome, the point is that the methodological tools provided by phenomenology provide a solution to problems that arise upon employment of more traditional methodological tools, namely, those of experimental psychology. Cheers, Adam