From landsurveyor@hotmail.com Thu Sep 30 16:12:13 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id QAA25678 for ; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 16:12:13 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGL5QMZ80WB8WSF4@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 16:12:28 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGL5QLPKCGB8X9HX@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 16:12:26 -0700 (MST) Received: from hotmail.com (f201.hotmail.com [207.82.251.92]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id QAA25673 for ; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 16:11:50 -0700 Received: (qmail 11403 invoked by uid 0); Thu, 30 Sep 1999 23:11:57 +0000 Received: from 128.196.51.170 by www.hotmail.com with HTTP; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 16:11:57 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1999 16:11:57 -0700 (PDT) From: Matt Herbert Subject: blindsight and access To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: <19990930231157.11402.qmail@hotmail.com> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; format=flowed; CHARSET=US-ASCII X-Originating-IP: [128.196.51.170] Status: RO Block says that a blindsight patient is both phenomenal- and access-unconscious. This runs contrary to what some theorists think. The striking fact about blindsight is supposed to be that it is a case of access without phenomenal experience. The patient makes an inference about x without experiencing x. I wonder if Block isn't setting the bar too high when he characterizes what might pass for blindsight as superblindsight. Block's distinctions, to review, are among blindsight, superblindsight and super-duperblindsight. The blindsighter has no P-consciousness of x and does not use information about x spontaneously to make inferences, guide action, etc. The superblindsighter has no P-consciousness of x but can be trained/will herself to use information about x spontaneously to make inferences, guide action, etc. The super-duperblindsighter has no P-consciousness of x, but all her relevant cognitive systems function as if she had non-degraded P-consciousness of x. A lot seems to be riding on Block's invocation of spontaneity. So what if the typical blindsighter does not *spontaneously* form judgments about objects that impinge on her sensory organs, as long as the relevant judgments can be elicited? Block seems to contradict himself when he characterizes the blindsighter as having low-grade access. Does she have access or not? If access comes in degrees (which seems perfectly plausible), it should not matter that the blindsighter's access is of a low-grade. To repair this inconsistency (that the blindsighter has no access and low-grade access), Block really ought to say that the blindsighter doesn't have A-consciousness capable of yielding spontaneous reports. There is the possibility that non-spontaneous access turns into low-grade access because the forced choice/training focuses the subject's attention on a phenomenal item that is too low-grade to attract attention. To understand such a scenario, we can extrapolate from the vague phenomenal items of our phenomenal periphery (although it is unclear what these peripheries are like for the non-visual dimensions of the phenomenal field) that barely attract attention to even vaguer items that don't attract attention at all. What are they like when we attend to them? Hmm, probably a poor example, since attention focusing would tend, under normal conditions, to resolve the vague phenomenal item into a more cleanly bounded one. But what I have in mind is something that resolves into a slightly less vague phenomenal item. Maybe one could think of attending to a visual percept in one's far periphery without turning one's head or moving one's eyes. None of this solves any problems for Block, of course, since it would still tie P-consciousness to A-consciousness. Matt Herbert "Nim eat Nim eat. Drink eat me Nim. Me gum me gum. You me banana me banana you." --Nim the signing chimp ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com From logant@U.Arizona.EDU Thu Sep 30 20:08:17 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA25843 for ; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 20:08:17 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGLE0B404WB8WZUU@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 20:08:33 MST Received: from pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (pavo-2.U.Arizona.EDU) by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGLE09WOGGB8W9LL@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 20:08:31 -0700 (MST) Received: from localhost (logant@localhost) by pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id UAA29859; Thu, 30 Sep 1999 20:08:30 -0700 (MST) Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1999 20:08:30 -0700 (MST) From: Logan T Trujillo Subject: Functional role of P consciousness In-reply-to: To: David Chalmers Cc: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO Hello everyone: I find discussions on the functional roles of A consciousness and P consciousness to be very interesting, although most psychologists would probably be uncomfortable with such a distinction. What I find most interesting about this discussion is whether or not A consciousness carries all the functionality attributed to consciousness, or does it only play a partial role, thus leaving a functional position for P consciousness. If the former case is true, then it would seem to suggest an epiphenomenal status for P consciousness, as was discussed in last Tuesday's class. Even if the latter case is true, it still seems unclear what functional role P consciousness might play. My own view on this is in accord with the viewpoint mentioned by Dave that P consciousness is the means by which A consciousness is instantiated. Such a viewpoint obviously addresses the question of the functional status of P consciousness by suggesting that P consciousness is fundamentally necessary for access (in terms of consciousness) to the information carried throughout various processes in the brain; hence P consciousness would not be epiphenomenal. I don't think the case of blindsight goes against this notion; evidence from the Riddoch syndrome suggests that the processing that is spared from the effects of lesioning still has a qualitative component, however impoverished and seemingly different in nature from the qualia that arises from V1 activity. Patients with intermediate blindsight claim some kinds of experiences (however strange and distorted) associated with their cognitive/perceptual appraisal of the various visual situations they are presented with experimentally. Thus it may be that this associated qualia is part of the mechanism by which the patients gain conscious access to their remaining cognitive/perceptual representations. In the case of full blindsight this view runs into a little more difficulty in that the patients report no explicit qualia in conjunction with their guesses as towards the nature of the visual stimuli that they are presented with. However it may be that such qualia are merged into the individual's "background" qualitative state that is present due to the processing occurring in the rest of the the brain. Such a background is presumably awash with all kinds of qualia that may not be explicitly distinguishable from one another. Thus the patient would not be able to explicitly differentiate them from the other qualia present in the background state, and hence would report an absence of any qualia associated with the identification task they are presented with. Therefore even in the case of full blindsight, it is still coherent to say that P consciousness plays a functional role in regards to access. Such a viewpoint would also have something to say about the search for a NCC in that P consciousness would be present throughout all brain processes, and thus there could not be a NCC in any localized sense. Such a view would also be consistent with panprotopsychism in that qualia could be present in all matter/energy and would play a fundamental role in material/energetic processes (as evidenced by their role in the brain). Logan T. From hvorecky@U.Arizona.EDU Sun Oct 3 06:27:43 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA01992 for ; Sun, 3 Oct 1999 06:27:43 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGP6WOP71SB8WW27@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Sun, 3 Oct 1999 13:28:45 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGP6WNIP8GB8XNWZ@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 03 Oct 1999 13:28:44 -0700 (MST) Received: from f1n3.u.arizona.edu (IDENT:hvorecky@f1n3.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.103]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id GAA01987 for ; Sun, 03 Oct 1999 06:27:34 -0700 Received: from localhost (hvorecky@localhost) by f1n3.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id NAA37398 for ; Sun, 03 Oct 1999 13:28:37 -0700 Date: Sun, 03 Oct 1999 13:28:37 -0700 (MST) From: Juraj Hvorecky Subject: Aceess and phenomenality To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO I am still quite puzzled about the connecton of access consciousness (AC) and phenomenal consciousness (PC). Ok, Block claims that they are fairly tied together, there are hardly any existent cases of AC without PC and there is a slight possibility of PC without AC. Let us take into account Dave's reply where he says that the exchange of the notion "poised" for the notion "available" in the definition of AC, might lead to an even stronger connection between those two. (So AC is going to be defined as "availability for (global) rational control of behavior). So far so good. But how is the strong relation realized in the case Dave was mentioning at the end of class? I forgot the name of the guy he mentioned, but the case involved two people, one blindsight and one with a very bad vision (let's say strongly shortsighted). Now it might be the case that these two people supposedly have the same access, but they would strongly differ in phenomenality. (I am intentionaly not speaking about neither AC nor PC, because supposedly there is not such a thing in blindsight.) Well, I somehow question this conclusion. First because we are comparing a case of access to a case of AC and then show they have a different phenomenality. Well, surely they have, after all they are two different things! So if this case was supposed to show that there is a real distincion between access and phenomenality, it in fact didn't reveal anything. Second, my prediction would be that if we would be somehow capable of measuring access (it surely is easier than measuring phenomenality), we would always end up with the same phenomenality (at least as "measured" from the first person perspective). So on one hand Dave might be right about the intrinsic relation between those two, but on the other hand if somebody is not buying the "phenomenal stuff", this strict correlation really boost Dennett in saying the second thing is an absolutely redundant. j. From jmartine@U.Arizona.EDU Sun Oct 3 07:21:52 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA02020 for ; Sun, 3 Oct 1999 07:21:52 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGP8STLR74B8WOPT@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Sun, 3 Oct 1999 14:22:54 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGP8SSE2BKB8VNOS@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 03 Oct 1999 14:22:53 -0700 (MST) Received: from orion.U.Arizona.EDU (orion.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.206]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id HAA02011 for ; Sun, 03 Oct 1999 07:20:11 -0700 Received: from localhost (jmartine@localhost) by orion.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id OAA20577; Sun, 03 Oct 1999 14:21:12 -0700 (MST) Date: Sun, 03 Oct 1999 14:21:12 -0700 (MST) From: Joel A Martinez Subject: Functional role of P consciousness In-reply-to: To: Logan T Trujillo Cc: David Chalmers , scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO I agree with Logan that in the case of partial blindsight we can still find a role for P-consciousness. That is, there is still some phenomenal experience, however degraded and vague, which provides the individual with some information for making a judgement. So, these cases would be compatible with the view that it is through P-consciosuness that A-conscious information is instantiated or made available. I also agree that it is the cases of full blindisght that create a real problem. I think what Logan says here is interesting: > In the case of full blindsight this view runs into a > little more difficulty in that the patients report no explicit > qualia in conjunction with their guesses as towards the nature of the > visual stimuli that they are presented with. However it may be that such > qualia are merged into the individual's "background" qualitative state > that is present due to the processing occurring in the rest of the > the brain. Such a background is presumably awash with all kinds > of qualia that may not be explicitly distinguishable from one another. > Thus the patient would not be able to explicitly differentiate them from > the other qualia present in the background state, and hence would report > an absence of any qualia associated with the identification task they are > presented with. Therefore even in the case of full blindsight, it is still > coherent to say that P consciousness plays a functional role in regards to > access. What I think is interesting here is the notion of qualia as an element of one's background state. These qualia that are merged in the background state could be taken to be like the, for lack of a better phrase, "strange qualia" mentioned in the session last Tuesday. That is, qualia that are so wierd that the brain would not know what to do with them and, hence, not process the info. as anything. (This would result in the subject not reporting any experience). I did not buy that suggestion, for various reasons, and I dont think others did either. So, I think we want to distinguish the background state and associated qualia that Logan talks about from "strange qualia". But, this is where I become confused. How do we disntinguish the background state and associated qualia that Logan talks about from Block's examples of P-consciousness w/out A-consciousness (like the refrigerator example)? That is, Logan's description of the background state and the relevant qualia that are merged in it sounds to me like a case where one has P-consc. without A-consciousness. The goal is to find a role for P-consciousness as the means through which A-consciousness is instantiated (as I understand it this means how the information becomes available for rational control,etc...). So, in the case of full blindsight (since this is a case of A-unconsciousness) we want to say that one is not A-conscious b/c one is not P-consc., something like that. However, we still need to explain how there is low-grade access. Logan explains this by making reference to the "background state". That is, there is still a background state that influences the behavior of the individual and gives her low-grade access. I guess my worry is that we need to make sure that we are talking about a background state different from P-Conscious "background" states where one is A-unconscious (like my background state, including the buzz of the refrigerator, which I dont notice as I type this posting). This is because, 1), we dont want to separate P-consciousness from A-consciousness too much; and, 2), Block's examples of P-consciousness w/out A-consciousness are very controversial (its not clear what is going on in those examples). I dont have anything against Logan's suggestion in principle (I think it sounds interesting). I just think that in trying to keep A-consciousness and P-consciousness tied together we should be careful that we dont actually push them farther apart. Joel M. Joel A. Martinez Social Science Bldg. Rm. 213 Dept. of Philosophy University of Arizona P.O. Box 210027 Tucson, AZ 85721-0027 USA Office #138 Phone 520-621-7098 From chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Tue Oct 5 00:07:07 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Penny.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.217]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id AAA06983 for ; Tue, 5 Oct 1999 00:07:06 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) id <01JGR7HZ2JK0B8XCUP@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Tue, 5 Oct 1999 00:07:30 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.1-12 #24137) with ESMTP id <01JGR7HX2R5CB8X4NJ@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Tue, 05 Oct 1999 00:07:27 -0700 (MST) Received: (from chalmers@localhost) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) id AAA06977 for scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu; Tue, 05 Oct 1999 00:06:58 -0700 Date: Tue, 05 Oct 1999 00:06:58 -0700 From: David Chalmers Subject: A-con, P-con, blindsight To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: <199910050706.AAA06977@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII Status: RO Re A and P consciousness, and blindsight: It's very important to remember that access consciousness and mere access are not the same thing. There are zillions of different sorts of access. Access consciousness is the very specific sort where information that one has access to is made available for verbal report, rational inference, and spontaneous voluntary control of behavior, and so on. Most instances of access won't be instances of access consciousness. In particular, the access that a blindsight patient has won't necessarily be access consciousness. The point of talk of "low-grade access" is for just this reason. High-grade access is the specific sort of access above that corresponds to A-consciousness. Low-grade access is mere access that may have some impact on brain or behavior, but that doesn't play the role specified in the definition of A-consciousness. Matt suggests that Block's invocation of spontaneity in the' definition of A-consciousness leads to inconsistency, since one can have access without spontaneity. I think this would only lead to inconsistency if it were held that all instances of access should be instances of A-consciousness. As it is, Block can define A-consciousness how he likes, so he is welcome to include spontaneity in his definition if he wants. Juraj asks about Siewert's case discussed in class of (i) Belinda with blindsight on one visual hemifield and (ii) Connie with low-grade phenomenal vision in that hemifield. These two people might have quite similar functional capacities. One difference is that the blindsight patient might not make spontaneous judgments. Siewert in his discussion stipulates that they do make these judgments; the cost is that the case may now be impossible in nature, but he says it is quite conceptually possible. Apart from this, the obvious difference is that Belinda will report conscious vision and Connie won't; Siewert is willing to keep this difference, so this isn't a zombie case. If we stipulate spontaneous judgments and voluntary control, etc, then it seems that both Belinda and Connie have visual A-consciousness, but only Belinda has visual P-consciousness (this is part of Siewert's point about the irreducibility of P-consciousness). Of course Belinda is somewhat hypothetical, so this may not be a counterexample to the link between A and P in the actual world. If we go with actual counterparts of Connie, we may have to lose spontaneous judgments etc, and thereby lose visual A-consciousness. Either way, measurements of A-con will differ slightly from measurements of P-con here, since Connie will have verbal reports *of consciousness* and Belinda won;t. So we don't obviously end up collapsing the notions into one, even on measurement grounds. Re a functional role for P-consciousness: I agree with Logan and Joel M. that all the empirical results are compatible with the hypothesis that the role of P-consciousness is to enable A-consciousness. Though I do think there are other problems here, concerning the sufficiency of neural mechanisms and the apparent redundancy of P-consciousness in this role. I like Joel's idea that "strange qualia" that we can't deal with are potentially cases of P-con without A-con. No rational control etc, just phenomenality. Of course it is not clear that there are really such cases. Neglect is one interesting possibility, though one could argue that there is limited A-con in such a case, and the phenomenal aspect of neglect is never clear. But anyway, it does seem that these strange qualia might have the effect of separating P and A. So if Logan wants to keep the two associated, it might be better to make the "background state" that he appeals to in blindsight either not a matter of qualia, or a matter of a special sort of qualia that don't play the usual access role. (E.g., maybe nonstrange qualia play the access role, and strange qualia play the enabling role?) I suspect that we don't need to say qualia do everything here -- we know that lots of what happens in the brain (e.g. low-grade access everywhere) is not obviously qualia-associated, so maybe one could leave the role of qualia for the high-grade stuff. Though of course there are still the general epiphenomenalistic problems mentioned above. --Dave.