From sawright@U.Arizona.EDU Sun Oct 24 20:08:51 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Maggie.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.233]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA23514 for ; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 20:08:51 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHIX0RJH8G9GXFON@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Sun, 24 Oct 1999 20:09:29 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHIX0R0XLC9JFHI5@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 20:09:28 -0700 (MST) Received: from pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (pavo-2.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.196]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id UAA23510 for ; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 20:08:30 -0700 Received: from localhost (sawright@localhost) by pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id UAA17440 for ; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 20:09:08 -0700 (MST) Date: Sun, 24 Oct 1999 20:09:08 -0700 (MST) From: Sarah A Wright Subject: Processing and Anatomy To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO A note about the connection between mental processing and brain anatomy: Baars is quick to point out that his model of the processing involved in consciousness does not necessarily closely correspond to our best present neurological pictures. This is not a requirement for his model since it is meant to capture the level of processing, not of neuroanatomy. So he is allowing, quite judiciously, that the organization of the brain into processing systems need not follow any sort of gross brain grouping. A process can be spread out all over the brain, or isolated into a small area, and this has no effect on the processing model. This is in sharp contrast with Schacter, who uses current theories of neuroanatomy to motivate the distinction between the CAS and the Executive system. One is in the posterior parietal cortex and the other is in the prefrontal cortex; they can't be the same thing! Of course, making such an argument requires a reason to think that processing follows gross grouping, and we haven't seen a reason to accept that yet. I have a question and a comment about this issue. 1) Does anyone know exactly how the evidence is developing in other areas besides consciousness? Is there reason to think that simple brain processes are quite diffuse? Is the focus on finding processes for brain areas driven by a prediction that processes will be so localized, or is it merely an artifact of the limitations of current brain mapping technology? 2) If there is reason to believe that brain processes are diffuse, that seems to be at odds with the methodology and results that we have seen in the search for the NCC, which seemed to focus on finding a particular location, and which differed primarily in the size of the NCC and the location chosen. The methodology in those experiments focused on causing the mental process to be tested (e.g. conscious perception), then looking to a particular brain region for any signs of neural activity. In the experiments in which a single cell was monitored, the results from that one cell were taken to indicate the activity of a general area of cells; such a generalization would require a strong thesis that neural grouping follows mental processing. So perhaps we should look back at the results about the NCC from the beginning of the class to see what has actually been demonstrated if we do not assume that all cells in a brain area are engaged in the same sorts of processing activities. Any thoughts on this problem? Sarah From press@U.Arizona.EDU Sun Oct 24 22:13:12 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Hopey.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.234]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id WAA23860 for ; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 22:13:11 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHJ1CXRGV49GXGE0@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Sun, 24 Oct 1999 22:13:49 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHJ1CXC9V49JF49S@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 22:13:49 -0700 (MST) Received: from f1n3.u.arizona.edu (IDENT:press@f1n3.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.103]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id WAA23855 for ; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 22:13:01 -0700 Received: from localhost (press@localhost) by f1n3.u.arizona.edu (8.8.8/8.8.8) with ESMTP id WAA31818 for ; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 22:13:38 -0700 Date: Sun, 24 Oct 1999 22:13:38 -0700 (MST) From: Joel K Press Subject: Verificationism To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: R All, First, a confession. During my formative years as a philosopher, I have been rather heavily exposed to both Dennett and verificationism, and there are soft spots in my heart for both of them. In general, I do not think this has lead to corresponding soft spots in my head, but full disclosure nevertheless seemed appropriate. With that in mind, a few thoughts about Dennett, verificationism, and consciousness. Even if we agree that verificationism is flawed as a theory of meaning, the related epistemological lessons are worthwhile in themselves. I think Simon was right to point out that the issues Dennett and Kinsbourne raise only really show that certain theories of consciousness are underdetermined by the data. But isn't this a fairly serious problem in its own right? Several of the issues we've been discussing lately seem to be in this situation. Is the color-phi phenomenon due to an Orwellian revision of memory or a Stalinesque manipulation of the perceptual data? Is inattentional blindness the result of a lack of conscious perception or near-instantaneous memory loss? Do blindsight patients have qualia, and if so, how faded and/or distorted are they? These questions all seem to be unanswerable because any actual or imaginable data appears to be fully and equally consistent with all the answers. Now, a full-fledged verificationist would claim that this makes these questions meaningless. This seems wrong, because even if we cannot decide between them based on the available data, they certainly seem to be conceptually distinct possibilities. But my point would be that even if there is a fact of the matter here, if nothing we can ever observe will verify our acceptance of one or the other of these theories, what is the point of endorsing any theory about these phenomena at all? We can, of course, decide to take a stand on one side of these issues, and others could decide to take a stand on the opposite sides, but on what grounds should the two opposing camps argue? It seems that any evidence offered in support of one side could equally well be used by the opposition. If so, we have guaranteed the existence of a perpetual philosophical argument, which, though possibly good for individual philosophers, is bad for philosophy generally. I'm not sure whether Dennett would agree with this analysis, but when he calls these sorts of issues, "differences that make no difference," I read this as meaning that even if there really is a difference, it wouldn't make us any smarter to believe the true theory than its alternative (we wouldn't be able to explain anything more with the theory than we could without it). Dennett seems to want to take things further by saying that such differences are not really differences at all, but either way, this seems to be bad news for a fair amount of what's been said about consciousness so far. If we really believe that there is a difference between Orwellian and Stanlinesque revisions and so forth, it seems that we need to be looking at ways of teasing apart the verification conditions of the two if at all possible. The other possibility would be to admit that we are only preferring one theory to another for practical or conventional reasons, but if we really believe that there is an actual factual difference, this won't be satisfactory. Or, even less satisfactorily, we could give up, as I suggested Velmans was doing a couple of weeks ago. I think there is probably more to be said on this subject, but the post has gotten rather long already, so I'll let it rest at this for now. Verbosely, Joel From bradt@u.arizona.edu Sun Oct 24 23:18:56 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Maggie.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.233]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA23985 for ; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 23:18:55 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHJ3NFFZDS9GXFAS@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Sun, 24 Oct 1999 23:19:33 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHJ3NF22U89JFJ26@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 23:19:32 -0700 (MST) Received: from hawk.prod.itd.earthlink.net (hawk.prod.itd.earthlink.net [207.217.120.22]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id XAA23980 for ; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 23:18:40 -0700 Received: from mrector.shiva.com (ip112.tucson6.az.pub-ip.psi.net [38.29.66.112]) by hawk.prod.itd.earthlink.net (8.9.3/8.9.3) with SMTP id XAA11670; Sun, 24 Oct 1999 23:19:12 -0700 (PDT) Date: Sun, 24 Oct 1999 23:23:35 -0700 From: Brad Thompson Subject: Comments on Baars To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Cc: Brad Thompson Reply-to: bradt@u.arizona.edu Message-id: <000001bf1eb1$78c0a900$70421d26@mrector.shiva.com> MIME-version: 1.0 X-MIMEOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3110.3 X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook 8.5, Build 4.71.2173.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-transfer-encoding: 7bit Status: R I found the Baars article from last week unsatisfying, so here are a few criticisms that come to mind (in addition to those we discussed in class). 1. "...we can create access to any part of the brain using consciousness" Baars supports this bold claim with the example of biofeedback techniques in which subjects are able to "control" the behavior of even single neurons if given feedback regarding the activity of the neuron (such as a tone). But I don't see what this has to do with consciousness (other than the fact that subjects are conscious human subjects and that they happen to be conscious of the tones, etc.). And it is certainly misleading to say that this ability shows that we have "access" to the particular brain region under "control". If he means by "access" something like consciousness or global availability, it is surely false. And it isn't clear that consciousness is playing a critical role in these cases. I would think that simple behaviorist mechanisms could be at work here. Give a rat yummy food when it is generating high levels of alpha waves, and shock it when it is not, and I'll bet that it will gain "control" too. Maybe I'm wrong about this prediction, but it is still true that Baars doesn't do a very good job of motivating the view that some special property of consciousness is at work here. Rather, the "control" at issue seems extremely indirect and unconscious. Likewise with his example of changes in our understanding of the meaning of the word "set" depending on the conscious hearing of another word, such as "tool". The changes in the meaning of "set" is due to the activation of a semantic representation of "tool". Now maybe semantic representations don't get activated unless the word "tool" is heard consciously. But we can't conclude from this as Baars does that "consciousness is required to integrate the meaning of each word pair." Rather, you have to *hear* (consciously) a word in order for its semantic representation to be activated, and the latter has an effect on the interpretation of subsequent ambiguous words. Consciousness is playing an incidental, not an essential role here. The above criticisms apply as well to some of Baars' other examples, such as memory for visual images. 2. "The Universality of theatre models" Baars seemed to be trying to bolster his theatre metaphor by pointing out how often people appeal to it. That it is a horrible way to argue for a position. And it should be pointed out that his citing of Plato's allegory of the cave was way off the mark as an example of a theatre model of consciousness. 3. The function of consciousness I found the following passage weird. "Consciousness creates access to unconscious problem-solving. The famous "incubation process" in mathematics involves a conscious question, unconscious work on the problem, and a conscious emergence of the solution." Baars takes this as another example of the function of consciousness being to present in the theatre something for the (unconscious) audience to do work on. But again, as in my criticisms above (1), why think that consciousness per se is doing the work here? And why would this support the theatre metaphor anyway? Maybe the question posed must have some threshold of activation in order to trigger some further process of problem solving--but this can all be explained without positing some place (physically or merely functionally specified) where it all comes together. One final problem. Baars says in his conclusion that consciousness *creates* "access to many independent knowledge sources in the brain, most of them quite unconscious". But in the next paragraph, he says that global access may be a necessary condition for consciousness. This would support the view that consciousness *is* a special kind of access, not that it *creates* access. It looks like Baars is confused between these two different views. I think that the rest of the paper supports the "create access" reading, since that is more in line with his view that consciousness has the function of making information available to unconscious processes. From lan@U.Arizona.EDU Mon Oct 25 12:00:37 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Maggie.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.233]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA25329 for ; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 12:00:37 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHJU9SQ0K09GX6HP@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Mon, 25 Oct 1999 12:01:16 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHJU9SCBRK9JF6OP@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 12:01:15 -0700 (MST) Received: from pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (pavo-2.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.196]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id MAA25324 for ; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 12:00:19 -0700 Received: from localhost (lan@localhost) by pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id MAA18099; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 12:00:57 -0700 (MST) Date: Mon, 25 Oct 1999 12:00:57 -0700 (MST) From: Lonnie A Nelson Subject: Re: Verificationism In-reply-to: To: Joel K Press Cc: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO On Sun, 24 Oct 1999, Joel K Press wrote: Joel summarizes the verification and underdetermination of theory by data below. It seems to me that the propblems of orwellian revision and Stalinesque Manuipulation of perceptual data each suggest a "possible world" which are very different worlds. It would seem based on the existence of these possible worlds that it is also likely that if these two issues are different in these worlds, they would imply further differences in the worlds. These further differences would likely be 1)either resultant of the nature of a conscious system that operates this way (Orwellian or stalinesque) also showing the same sort of processing in other modalities and time scales that is at least more consistent with one story than the other. So the question to ask here is: IF this variable is operating according to story X, what else in this world should be different and in what way? OR 2) determined by two or more possible structures in disparate function of the instantiating system in each of these worlds. So the question here is: IF Story x is true, we should see the memory centers behave in way x, if story y is true, we shuld see perceptual systems behave in way y; which way do these things behave? This view of the problem admits the impossibility of choosing between the two possible worlds based on the single story/case of the color Phi instancewith the data already available, but also hypothesizes that there would be other findings that should be more consistent with one overall depiction of how consciousness operates under various conditions than the other story. So at the end of the day we are not choosing an entire story of consciousness based on this one example, but we are choosing the most consistent story of this example based on that story's fit with our overall story of consciousness. THus one avoids giving up, by looking for other possible supporting evidence that is more consistent with one overall story than the other but not directly applicable to the smaller scale question that one desires a direct explanation for. Does this make sense to anyone but me? At least equally verbosely, --Lonnie > Even if we agree that verificationism is flawed as a theory of > meaning, the related epistemological lessons are worthwhile in themselves. > I think Simon was right to point out that the issues Dennett and > Kinsbourne raise only really show that certain theories of consciousness > are underdetermined by the data. But isn't this a fairly serious problem > in its own right? Several of the issues we've been discussing lately seem > to be in this situation. Is the color-phi phenomenon due to an Orwellian > revision of memory or a Stalinesque manipulation of the perceptual data? > Is inattentional blindness the result of a lack of conscious perception or > near-instantaneous memory loss? Do blindsight patients have qualia, and > if so, how faded and/or distorted are they? These questions all seem to > be unanswerable because any actual or imaginable data appears to be fully > and equally consistent with all the answers. > > Now, a full-fledged verificationist would claim that this makes these > questions meaningless. This seems wrong, because even if we cannot decide > between them based on the available data, they certainly seem to be > conceptually distinct possibilities. But my point would be that even if > there is a fact of the matter here, if nothing we can ever observe will > verify our acceptance of one or the other of these theories, what is the > point of endorsing any theory about these phenomena at all? We can, of > course, decide to take a stand on one side of these issues, and others > could decide to take a stand on the opposite sides, but on what grounds > should the two opposing camps argue? It seems that any evidence offered > in support of one side could equally well be used by the opposition. If > so, we have guaranteed the existence of a perpetual philosophical > argument, which, though possibly good for individual philosophers, is bad > for philosophy generally. > > I'm not sure whether Dennett would agree with this analysis, but when he > calls these sorts of issues, "differences that make no difference," I read > this as meaning that even if there really is a difference, it wouldn't > make us any smarter to believe the true theory than its alternative (we > wouldn't be able to explain anything more with the theory than we could > without it). Dennett seems to want to take things further by saying that > such differences are not really differences at all, but either way, this > seems to be bad news for a fair amount of what's been said about > consciousness so far. If we really believe that there is a difference > between Orwellian and Stanlinesque revisions and so forth, it seems that > we need to be looking at ways of teasing apart the verification conditions > of the two if at all possible. The other possibility would be to admit > that we are only preferring one theory to another for practical or > conventional reasons, but if we really believe that there is an actual > factual difference, this won't be satisfactory. Or, even less > satisfactorily, we could give up, as I suggested Velmans was doing a > couple of weeks ago. > > I think there is probably more to be said on this subject, but the post > has gotten rather long already, so I'll let it rest at this for now. > > Verbosely, > Joel > > > ___________________ It is a common fate of all knowledge to begin as heresy and end as orthodoxy. -Thomas Huxley Lonnie A Nelson Department of Psychology Human Energy Systems Laboratory University of Arizona lan@u.arizona.edu From anhabib@U.Arizona.EDU Mon Oct 25 13:09:46 1999 Return-Path: Received: from Arizona.EDU (Maggie.Telcom.arizona.edu [128.196.128.233]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA25542 for ; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 13:09:45 -0700 Received: from DIRECTORY-DAEMON by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) id <01JHJWOJ44IO9GXJH1@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (ORCPT rfc822;chalmers@arizona.edu); Mon, 25 Oct 1999 13:10:24 MST Received: from paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu by Telcom.Arizona.EDU (PMDF V5.2-31 #39830) with ESMTP id <01JHJWOIP76O9JD49C@Telcom.Arizona.EDU> for chalmers@Arizona.EDU; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 13:10:24 -0700 (MST) Received: from pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (pavo-2.U.Arizona.EDU [128.196.137.196]) by paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id NAA25538 for ; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 13:09:30 -0700 Received: from localhost (anhabib@localhost) by pavo.U.Arizona.EDU (8.8.6 (PHNE_17190)/8.8.6) with ESMTP id NAA27225 for ; Mon, 25 Oct 1999 13:10:09 -0700 (MST) Date: Mon, 25 Oct 1999 13:10:09 -0700 (MST) From: Allen N Habib Subject: Dennett et. al. (fwd) To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.arizona.edu Message-id: MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Status: RO ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 22 Oct 1999 17:14:18 -0700 (MST) From: Allen N Habib To: scicon@paradox.soc-sci.edu Subject: Dennett et. al. (sorry Dave, I initially sent this to the incorrect address above) Hey all, Last discussion left me hankering for a clarification of Dennett and Kinsbourne's argument. I'll try to give one, and use it to examine what I think are some problems with their thesis: 0. Cartesian theories of consciousness can offer two explainations of the abberant phenomena that D&K adduce 1. Both the Orwellian and Stalinesque theories adequately explain both the first person and third person data of the various phenomena that D&K adduce (colour phi, sub cutaneous rabbit, etc). 2. But the two theories posit different (non-isomorphic) mechanisms for the phenomena. 3. No empirical test, actual or possible, could tell the difference between these two hypotheses. 4. Any two theories that posit such an untestable difference are suspect. --------------- Conclusion: Cartesian theories of consciousness are suspect I can see two major problems with this line. The first one is with premis three. Arguably it is the case that current science has not found a way to tell which of these two stories is the correct one, but what proof do D&K proffer for their modal claim, that no evidence could ever do this job? Precious little. They do provide an example of the way a Stalinesque theorist might defend against a piece of data that imperils their theory, but this fals as a demonstration of the plausibility of the infinite room available for such moves. Consider, say D&K, what would happen if the subject were asked to signal the moment that they become conscious of the first flash in the coloour phi experiment. Further, imagine if this signal came in advance of the appearance of the second flash. It might seem that this is a decisive piece of evidence in favour of the Orwellian theory, since, regardless of the memory trace or subsequent verbal report of the subject, we have proof that the sunject was conscious of the first flash as a stationary red point, since such consciousness was reported before the advent of the second flash. Not so, say D&K, because the Stalinesque theorist might reply by saying that the subject in such a case signaled of the event before she was actually conscious of it. How? Well, the conscious mind of the subject might have 'leaked' the instruction to push the button to the 'editing room' (the locus posited by Stalinists where the editing of conscious experience gets done), and the editing room pre-consciously initiated the button push. But, as we can plainly see, this greatly sophisticates the Stalinesque theory. It requires that the editing room be able to recieve instructions from the consciousness center, that the editing room have executive control over the motor cortex, etc. Also, if the experiment is done in such a way that the subjects are instructed not to push the button unless they have a conscious experience (and the results are the same), then the Stalinist must posit that the editing room acts upon the 'leaked' command in spite of the conscious determination not to on the part of the subject. Spooky, and more than a little ad hoc. This is not to say that the Stalinist couldn't say such things, but rather to point out that only rarely does one definitive test seperate two competing theories. Normally what happens is that over a series of experiments a preponderance of evidence builds up in favour of one or another hypothesis. And while there is some room for a theorist to make amendments to her theory in the face of recalcitrant data, there isn't an infinite amount, and eventually the theorist is forced to either give up the theory or to make it completely ad hoc. D&K's contention that no evdience could ever surface that would definitively decide between these two theories seems false on its face. Also, as was discussed in class, there is a problem for the fourth premis. This is the verificationist premis, and I have attempted here to provide the least contentious version of it that I could muster. As it stands, I don't think it is too objectionable, but as a result of its weakness, it doesn't grant D&K the conceptual purchase that they might like on cartesian materialism. If we grant that these two theories couldn't ever be decided between on the basis of empirical evidence, then we might well have a reason to question them, or, more specifically, to question the theoretical entities that underly the conflict. In this case, it would be the cartesian theatre (finish line of consciousness) that D&K would have us question. But D&K's answer, i.e. throw out the idea of a cartesian theatre altogether, seems a bit hasty. If we could simply amend the theatre idea in such a way as to solve D&Ks problems, but leave the theatre intact, then we wouldn't have to by their new product. And we might well accomplish this (as we said in class) by making the temporal borders of the cartesian theatre 'fuzzy'. If we say that there is a brief span of time in the course of a percept's journey from unconsciousness to consciousness when there is no determinate fact of the matter whether that percept is conscious or not, then we can solve all of D&Ks temporality problems without throwing out the cartesian baby with the bath. Also,such temporal fuzziness is of a piece with the spatial (regional?) fuzziness of consciousness evidenced by peripheral and unattended conscious percepts. If consciousness' spatial borders are blurred, why not its temporal ones, as well? Any thoughts? (Sorry about the length) Al