How to Read This Book

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It is certainly possible to read this book straight through from start to finish. The book is long enough, though, that I cannot expect most readers to do that. Some guidance may be helpful, though readers should feel free to ignore it.

Everyone should read the introduction and chapter 1, which introduce the project, and at least browse chapter 8, which discusses conclusions and some applications. For a minimal path in between, it is possible to read just the first section or two of each of the intervening chapters, especially chapters 2, 3, and 7. The remainder of chapters 2-4 formulate and argue for scrutability theses in considerable detail, and it is quite possible to skip this detail on a first reading, although readers who are skeptical about scrutability theses might want to focus here. Chapters 6 and 7 (and to some extent 8) focus on the question of just what needs to be in a scrutability base. Chapter 7 is the more important of the two (and provides useful background to chapter 8), but readers should feel free to skip to the cases that are most interesting to them. Chapters 5 and 9 are not essential to the central narrative, but both go into important foundational issues (about apriority and primitive concepts respectively) while also developing applications of the framework (to the analysis of meaning and to metaphilosophy respectively). Everyone should read the summation after chapter 8, which sums up some main conclusions.

Readers should feel free to dip into the excursuses as they like. Many of them can be read on their own, at least given chapter 1 as background, although there is usually some connection to the preceding chapter. A few of the excursuses (especially 3-7 and 13-14) go into details that are in principle essential to the theses and arguments of the book, but that in practice can be skipped by those who are not too concerned with the relevant issues. Other excursuses (especially 10-12 and 16-20) develop applications of the framework. Perhaps the most important of the application excursuses are those on meaning, skepticism, and metaphysics (10, 13, and 18), followed by those on epistemic modality, the unity of science, and inferentialism (9, 11, and 17).

The six John Locke lectures correspond roughly to portions of chapters 1 (along with the

introduction), 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 (along with the summation) respectively, with some elements of chapters 2 and 7 thrown in along the way, and with almost none of the material from the excursuses.

Readers without a background in philosophy will probably find this book hard going, but some relatively accessible material includes the introduction and chapter 1, the material on the Cosmoscope in chapter 3, the first halves of chapters 5 and 9, and intermittent cases in chapters 6 and 7. A glossary at the end of the book provides a guide both to expressions and theses that I have introduced and to some commonly used philosophical expressions that I deploy.

Issues in many areas of philosophy are discussed in this book. Here I have indicated where to find material especially relevant to certain areas. In what follows "1" stands for chapter 1, "1.1" stands for section 1 of chapter 1, "1.1-2" stands for sections 1 and 2 of chapter 1, "E1" stands for the first excursus, and so on. Some of these abbreviation formats ("1.1", "E1") are also used for crossreferencing throughout the book.

Informal epistemology: 2.3, 3.3-4, 3.7, 4, 8.5, E1, E4, E7, E8, E16.

Formal epistemology: 2.4, 4.2, 5.6, 5.7, E6.

Metaphysics and modality: 1.4, 6.4, 6.6, 6.16, 7.3, 7.9, 8.6, E5, E10, E19, E20.

Philosophy of language: 1.1, 1.3, 2.2, 5, 6.9-13, 9, E2, E3, E9, E11, E13, E14, E17, E20.

Philosophy of mind: 1.1, 3.7, 6.7, 6.14, 7.4-5, 7.7, 8.3-7, 9.7, E9, E13, E18.

Philosophy of science: 6.2, 6.15, 7.3, 7.5, 7.8, 8.7, E9, E12.

Metaphilosophy: 1.3, 6.5, 9, E15, E17.

Carnap and logical empiricism: 1, 5, 8, 9.1, 9.9, E1, E10, E12, E16.