%0 Book %A Armstrong, D. M. %A Malcolm, N. %T Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind %I Blackwell %D 1984 %Z %K consciousness and qualia,consciousness, consciousness -- general %U %0 Book %A Block, N. %A Flanagan, O. %A Guzeldere, G. %T The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates %I MIT Press %D 1997 %Z An anthology of central philosophical papers on consciousness. -DJC %K consciousness and qualia,consciousness, consciousness -- general %U %0 Book %A Carruthers, P. %T Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory %I Cambridge University Press %D 2000 %Z %K consciousness and qualia,consciousness, consciousness -- general %U %0 Book %A Catalano, J. %T Thinking Matter: Consciousness from Aristotle to Putnam and Sartre %I Routledge %D 2000 %Z %K consciousness and qualia,consciousness, consciousness -- general %U %0 Book %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %Z Argues against the reductive explanation of consciousness, and for a kind of naturalistic dualism. Moves toward a "fundamental theory" to bridge the gap, and draws out some consequences. -DJC %K consciousness and qualia,consciousness, consciousness -- general %U %0 Book Section %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Consciousness and its place in nature %I Blackwell %D 2003 %B Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K consciousness and qualia,consciousness, consciousness -- general %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %A Churchland, P. S. %T Recent work on consciousness: Philosophical, theoretical, and empirical %I %D 1997 %B Seminars in Neurology %V 17 %N %P 179-86 %Z %K consciousness and qualia,consciousness, consciousness -- general %U %0 Book %A Davies, M. %A Humphreys, G. %T Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays %I Blackwell %D 1993 %Z A collection of 5 psychological and 8 philosophical essays on consciousness. -DJC %K consciousness and qualia,consciousness, consciousness -- general %U %0 Book Section %A Flanagan, O. J. %T Consciousness %I %D 1991 %B The Science of the Mind %Z On the mysteries of consciousness. Argues with epiphenomenalism, "conscious inessentialism", and the "new mysterians" (Nagel, McGinn). Toward a naturalistic theory, drawing on ideas of Edelman, Calvin, Dennett. -DJC %K consciousness and qualia,consciousness, consciousness -- general %U %0 Book %A Fodor, J. A. %T The Language of Thought %I Harvard University Press %D 1975 %Z Argues that thought involves computation upon representations, and that these are structured as sentences in a mental language. With linguistic and psychological evidence, and arguments that the mental language is innate. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Why there still has to be a language of thought %I %D 1987 %B Psychosemantics %Z Because it fits explanatory methodology, it coheres with the usual ontology of psychological processes, and it explains systematicity. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Propositional attitudes %I %D 1978 %B Monist %V 61 %N %P 501-23 %Z About what PA's are, and why they're at the foundations of thought. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. %T Language, thought and compositionality %I %D 2001 %B Mind and Language %V 16 %N %P 1-15 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Abbott, B. %T Natural language and thought: Thinking in English %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 49-55 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %T On the type/token relation of mental representations %I %D 2000 %B Facta Philosophica %V 2 %N %P 23-50 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Bonjour, L. %T Is thought a symbolic process? %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 89 %N %P 331-52 %Z Argues that symbol processing can't account for the intrinsically contentful nature of thought: using a symbol doesn't give understanding of its content. With defense against arguments from twin earth and conceptual-role semantics. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Braddon-Mitchell, D. %A Fitzpatrick, J. %T Explanation and the language of thought %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 83 %N %P 3-29 %Z No need to postulate LOT: diachronic explanation is as good as synchronic, and high-level laws can exist without high-level causal connections. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Cain, M. J. %T Fodor: Language, Mind, and Philosophy %I Polity Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Carruthers, P. %T On Fodor's problem %I %D 2003 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 502-523 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Clapin, H. %T Problems with principle P %I %D 1997 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 78 %N %P 261-77 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Thoughts, sentences and cognitive science %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 1 %N %P 263-78 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T The language of thought: No syntax without semantics %I %D 1990 %B Mind and Language %V 5 %N %P 187-213 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Aunty's own argument for the language of thought %I Kluwer %D 1992 %B Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy %E J. Ezquerro %E J. Larrazabal %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T A cure for the common code %I %D 1977 %B 1977 %V %N %P %Z Review of Fodor's LOT. Fodor's view is too strong: function, not structure, is criterial for content. The structure of a predictive theory need not be directly reflected in inner processing. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Brain writing and mind reading %I %D 1975 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 7 %N %P 403-15 %Z On the explicit representation of belief: criteria, plausibility, and relationship to verbal reports and conscious judgments. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Granny's campaign for safe science %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z A general treatment of Fodor, identifying him as arch-conservative mentalist. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A DeWitt, R. %T Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought %I %D 1995 %B Psyche %V 1 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Dunlop, C. E. M. %T Conceptual dependency as the language of thought %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 275-96 %Z Relates Schank's conceptual dependency to Fodor's LOT. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, M. F. %T Propositional attitudes and the language of thought %I %D 1991 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 21 %N %P 379-88 %Z Contra two of Fodor's arguments for LOT. Complex causes need not have LOT constituency structure; and evidence from psychological theory falls short. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Field, H. %T Mental representation %I %D 1978 %B Erkenntnis %V 13 %N %P 9-18 %Z Analyzes belief into a relation between a person and an internal sentence, along with a semantic relation between that sentence and e.g. a proposition. With arguments against functionalist analyses, and against propositions. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Syntax in a dynamic brain %I %D 1997 %B Synthese %V 110 %N %P 343-55 %Z There are no good arguments for LOT of the form "The brain needs to do X, and X entails LOT". Considers X = concatenation, logical form, tracking, combinatorial encoding. Either LOT is weakened deeply or is unnecessary. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Garfield, J. %T Thought as language: A metaphor too far %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 85-101 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Gauker, C. %T Thinking Out Loud: An Essay on the Relation between Thought and Language %I Princeton University Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Harman, G. %T Thought %I Princeton University Press %D 1973 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Harman, G. %T Language, thought, and communication %I %D 1975 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 7 %N %P 270-298 %Z Argues that the primary role of language is in thought rather than in communication, and the language of thought incorporates natural language. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Harman, G. %T How to use propositions %I %D 1977 %B 1977 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Harman, G. %T Is there mental representation? %I %D 1978 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 9 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Hauser, L. %T Natural language and thought: Doing without mentalese %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 41-47 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %T Does cognitive psychology rest on a mistake? %I %D 1981 %B Mind %V 90 %N %P 321-42 %Z LOT confuses processes with descriptions of processes. Also, symbols cannot denote solely in virtue of structure, so must rely on human interpretation. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnson, K. %T On the systematicity of the language of thought %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 101 %N %P 111-139 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Kaye, L. J. %T The computational account of belief %I %D 1994 %B Erkenntnis %V 40 %N %P 137-53 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Kaye, L. J. %T The languages of thought %I %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Science %V 62 %N %P 92-110 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Knowles, J. %T The language of thought and natural language understanding %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 264-272 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Loar, B. %T Must beliefs be sentences? %I %D 1982 %B 1982 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T Toward a homuncular theory of believing %I %D 1982 %B Cognition and Brain Theory %V 4 %N %P 139-59 %Z Defends sententialism of the homuncular variety: little modules all the way in. Lots of pro-belief arguments. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T Mental content in linguistic form %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 147-54 %Z Distinguishes varieties of Sententialism, reasonable vs. mad-dog. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T A deductive argument for the representational theory of thinking %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 404-22 %Z Argues from the unboundedness of thinking and the need for a finite stock of elements to something like a language of thought. With remarks on connectionism and instrumentalism, and a reply by Stalnaker. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Laurence, S. %A Margolis, E. %T Regress arguments for the language of thought %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 60-66 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Maloney, J. C. %T The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language %I Cambridge University Press %D 1989 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Markic, O. %T Is language of thought a conceptual necessity? %I %D 2001 %B Acta Analytica %V 16 %N %P 53-60 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T The weak and the strong representational theory of mind: Stich's interpretation of Fodor %I %D 1987 %B Dialogue %V 26 %N %P 349-55 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Matthews, R. J. %T The alleged evidence for representationalism %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Rerepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z Argues that contrary to some claims, cognitive psychology does not provide much support for a computational/representational theory of propositional attitudes. Specifically considers research in psycholinguistics and vision. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Matthews, R. J. %T Is there vindication through representationalism? %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Fodor's theory can't deal with inexplicit attitudes: the core/derivative distinction is untenable. But we can make sense of intentional causation and psychological explanation without explicit representation. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Millikan, R. G. %T On mentalese orthography %I Blackwell %D 1993 %B Dennett and his Critics %E B. Dahlbom %Z On some problems typing tokens in the language of thought. There's no principled distinction between type-identical tokens and type-distinct tokens with an identity judgment. With interesting remarks on co-identification. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Pessin, A. %T Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 78 %N %P 33-53 %Z Argues that there is no good way to individuate syntactic types in Mentalese. Neural typing, causal typing, and semantic typing all fail. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Pollock, J. %T Understanding the language of thought %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 95-120 %Z Remarks on a number of aspects of mental content -- narrow, propositional, qualitative -- with respect to functionalism and the language of thought. With comments by Baker. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Rantala, V. %A Vaden, T. %T Minds as connoting systems: Logic and the language of thought %I %D 1997 %B Erkenntnis %V 46 %N %P 315-334 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Rey, G. %T A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thought %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 201-22 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Rupert, R. %T On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 117 %N %P 95-131 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book Section %A Schiffer, S. %T Does Mentalese have a compositional semantics? %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Argues that the language of thought need not have a compositional semantics; productivity and systematicity can be explained without it. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Schiffer, S. %T The language-of-thought relation and its implications %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 263-85 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwartz, G. %T Symbols and thought %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 106 %N %P 399-407 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Sher, G. %T Sentences in the brain %I %D 1975 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 36 %N %P 94-99 %Z On Danto's suggestion that beliefs are like sentences. Conventionality poses problems, as does differentiating between different sorts of attitudes. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. C. %T Mental content and linguistic form %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 129-46 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T Mental representation: What language is Brainese? %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Studies, %V 43 %N %P 365-82 %Z Motivates LOT and defends it against various objections: e.g. tacit belief, identity conditions, infinite regress, and semantic nativism. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Beliefs and subdoxastic states %I %D 1978 %B Philosophy of Science %V 45 %N %P 499-518 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Teng, N. Y. %T The language of thought and the embodied nature of language use %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 94 %N %P 237-251 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Tienson, J. %T Is this any way to be a realist? %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Warmbrod, K. %T Beliefs and sentences in the head %I %D 1989 %B Synthese %V 2 %N %P 201-30 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Weller, C. %T Bonjour and mentalese %I %D 1997 %B Synthese %V 113 %N %P 251-63 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Journal Article %A Yagisawa, T. %T Thinking in neurons: Comments on Stephen Schiffer's "The language-of-thought relation and its implications" %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 287-96 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the language of thought %U %0 Book %A Dennett, D. C. %T Brainstorms %I MIT Press %D 1978 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Intentional systems %I %D 1971 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 87-106 %Z Can view systems from physical stance, design stance, or intentional stance. Beliefs/desires are attributed under the intentional stance, with help from certain idealized norms of rationality and accuracy licensed by evolution. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Making sense of ourselves %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 63-81 %Z Reply to Stich 1981. Irrationality is misdesign (take design stance). Etc. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book %A Dennett, D. C. %T The Intentional Stance %I MIT Press %D 1987 %Z Beliefs/desires are useful predictive attributions. This isn't inconsistent with a certain degree of realism (abstracta/illata distinction). -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Precis of The Intentional Stance %I %D 1988 %B 1988 %V %N %P %Z TIS, with commentaries and replies. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement) %V 50 %N %P %Z Mental states are underdetermined: like interpreting a text, or finding an object's function. Even adaptationist teleology gives no fact of the matter. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Real patterns %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 88 %N %P 27-51 %Z Proposition attitudes have the ontological status of a noisy pattern that helps make sense of behavior. This degree of realism falls on a scale: Fodor > Davidson > Dennett > Rorty > Churchland. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Instrumentalism: Back from the brink? %I %D 1987 %B Saving Belief %Z Dennett vacillates between stance-dependence, -independence; e.g. on rationality, design features. Instrumentalism can't be rescued. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Instrumental intentionality %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 303-16 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance %I %D 1985 %B Cognitive Science %V 9 %N %P 265-92 %Z Dennett should be a realist, of the relative-to-environment variety. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Byrne, A. %T Interpretivism %I %D 1998 %B European Review of Philosophy %V 3 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Cam, P. %T Dennett on intelligent storage %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 45 %N %P 247-62 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Belief, opinion and consciousness %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z Argues contra Dennett and Smolensky that language is fundamental, not just an add-on. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Cohen, B. %T Patterns lost: Indeterminism and Dennett's realism about beliefs %I %D 1995 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 76 %N %P 17-31 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T What can be learned from Brainstorms? %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 83-92 %Z Questioning Dennett on the bridge between intentional characterization and functional characterization. Arguing for the importance of context. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, D. %T Dennett's stance on intentional realism %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 299-312 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Three cheers for propositional attitudes %I %D 1981 %B Representations %Z Dennett's rationality/intentional idealization assumptions should not be viewed as Platonic but epistemic. PA's are real and play real roles. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %A LePore, E. %T Is intentional ascription intrinsically normative? %I Blackwell %D 1993 %B Dennett and His Critics %E B. Dahlbom %Z Against "interpretivism" about intentionality: projectivism is hopeless, and Dennett's arguments for normativism (via charity and evolution) go wrong or beg the question. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Foss, J. %T On the evolution of intentionality as seen from the intentional stance %I %D 1994 %B Inquiry %V 37 %N %P 287-310 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Objective interpretationism %I %D 1988 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 69 %N %P 136-51 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Gerrans, P. %T Cognitive architecture and the limits of interpretationism %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology %V 11 %N %P 42-48 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Pattern and being %I Blackwell %D 1993 %B Dennett and His Critics %E B. Dahlbom %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Heitner, R. %T Is design relative or real? Dennett on intentional relativism and physical realism %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 267-83 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Hornsby, J. %T Physics, biology, and common-sense psychology %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %B Reduction, Explanation and Realism %E D. Charles %E K. Lennon %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Kenyon, T. %T Indeterminacy and realism %I MIT Press %D 2000 %B Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment %E A. Brook %E D. Ross %E D. Thompson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, R. %T How to get an interpretivist committed %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 180-221 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Lyons, W. %T Intentionality and modern philosophical psychology, I. The modern reduction of intentionality %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 3 %N %P 247-69 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %T Dennett's logical behaviorism %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Topics %V 22 %N %P 189-258 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. %T Why intentional systems theory cannot reconcile physicalism with realism about belief and desire %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 145-157 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A McCulloch, G. %T Dennett's little grains of salt %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 40 %N %P 1-12 %Z Dennett must be one of: realist, eliminativist, instrumentalist. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A McCulloch, G. %T Intentionality and interpretation %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %B Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind %E A. O'Hear %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Narayanan, A. %T The intentional stance and the imitation game %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machines and Thought %E P. Millican %E A. Clark %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelkin, N. %T Patterns %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 56-87 %Z Dennett's instrumentalism can't explain the acquisition of intentional concepts. Proposition attitudes are directly introspectible entities, although still theoretical and still patterns. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Price, H. %T Psychology in perspective %I Kluwer %D 1995 %B Philosophy in Mind %E M. Michael %E J. O'Leary-Hawthorne %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Radner, D. %A Radner, M. %T Cognition, natural selection, and the intentional stance %I %D 1995 %B International Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 9 %N %P 109-19 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Ratcliffe, M. %T A Kantian stance on the intentional stance %I %D 2001 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 16 %N %P 29-52 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Richard, M. %T What isn't a belief? %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Topics %V 22 %N %P 291-318 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T Intentional realism or intentional instrumentalism? %I %D 1980 %B Cognition and Brain Theory %V 3 %N %P 125-35 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Seager, W. %T Real patterns and surface metaphysics %I MIT Press %D 2000 %B Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment %E A. Brook %E D. Ross %E D. Thompson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Sharpe, R. %T Dennett's journey towards panpsychism %I %D 1989 %B Inquiry %V 32 %N %P 233-40 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Slors, M. %T Why Dennett cannot explain what it is to adopt the intentional stance %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 46 %N %P 93-98 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Headaches %I %D 1980 %B Philosophical Books %V 21 %N %P 65-73 %Z Critical review of Brainstorms, with response. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Dennett on intentional systems %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 39-62 %Z Dennett has problems with rationality, realism, etc. Hard line/soft line: either intentional stance is too close to FP or too far away. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Book Section %A Viger, C. %T Where do Dennett's stances stand? Explaining our kinds of minds %I MIT Press %D 2000 %B Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment %E A. Brook %E D. Ross %E D. Thompson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Webb, S. %T Witnessed behavior and Dennett's intentional stance %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Topics %V 22 %N %P 457-70 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilkerson, W. S. %T Real patterns and real problems: Making Dennett respectable on patterns and beliefs %I %D 1997 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 557-70 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Yu, P. %A Fuller, G. %T A critique of Dennett %I %D 1986 %B Synthese %V 66 %N %P 453-76 %Z Very thorough account of the evolution of Dennett's views. Elucidates abstracta/illata, criticizes intentional subpersonal psychology. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, the intentional stance %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. S. %T Language, thought, and information processing %I %D 1980 %B Nous %V 14 %N %P 147-70 %Z Sentential processing is out. Against Harman's mental English and Fodor's Mentalese. Arguments from learning, evolution, neuroscience, mental images. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes %I %D 1981 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 78 %N %P 67-90 %Z Eliminate beliefs/desires, remnants of a stagnant folk theory. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %A Churchland, P. S. %T Stalking the wild epistemic engine %I %D 1983 %B Nous %V 17 %N %P 5-20 %Z How to dethrone language and still handle content. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T On the speculative nature of our self-conception %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 11 %N %P 157-173 %Z Reply to Foss 1985: EM is plausible, though certainly not applicable everywhere -- e.g. sensations will be reduced, not eliminated. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book %A Churchland, P. M. %T A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science %I MIT Press %D 1989 %Z 14 glimpses of the neurophilosophical golden age. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Theory, taxonomy, and methodology: A reply to Haldane's "Understanding folk" %I %D 1993 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 67 %N %P 313-19 %Z Reply to Haldane 1988. Even observations can be reconceived. With remarks perceptual plasticity and propositions, and a rejoinder by Haldane. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Evaluating our self-conception %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 211-22 %Z It's "bad faith" to accept modern epistemology but to deny the possibility of eliminativism. On various objections: "functional kinds", "self-defeating", "what could falsify it?", "different purposes", "no alternatives". -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T The threat of cognitive suicide %I %D 1987 %B Saving Belief %Z Elaborating the paradoxes of disbelieving in belief. Rational acceptability, assertion, and truth are all at risk. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Cognitive suicide %I University of Arizona Press %D 1988 %B Contents of Thought %E R. Grimm %E D. Merrill %Z Eliminativism is pragmatically incoherent, as it implies that language isn't meaningful and that the thesis isn't formulable. Folk psychology needn't be scientifically reduced to be true. With comments by Chastain, and reply. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bertolet, R. %T Saving eliminativism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 87-100 %Z Against Baker's cognitive-suicide arguments against eliminativism. We don't know what a replacement theory will look like, but that doesn't show that none is forthcoming. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bickle, J. %T Revisionary physicalism %I %D 1992 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 7 %N %P 411-30 %Z Argues for a revisionary reduction of the propositional attitudes, rather than elimination or smooth reduction. Sentential aspects will go, but coarse-grained functional profiles and content will remain. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Blunt, P. K. %T A defense of folk psychology %I %D 1992 %B International Philosophical Quarterly %V 32 %N %P 487-98 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Chater, N. %A Oaksford, M. %T The falsity of folk theories: Implications for psychology and philosophy %I Sage Publications %D 1996 %B The Philosophy of Psychology %E W. O'Donahue %E R. Kitchener %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, A. %T Dealing in futures: Folk psychology and the role of representations in cognitive science %I Blackwell %D 1996 %B The Churchlands and their Critics %E R. McCauley %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cling, A. %T Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Studies %V 56 %N %P 53-75 %Z Unbelief in belief is not incoherent. Argues with Baker. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cling, A. %T Disappearance and knowledge %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy of Science %V 57 %N %P 226-47 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cling, A. %T The empirical virtues of belief %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 303-23 %Z Cognitive states like belief are necessary to explain the dependence of behavior on perceptual features of the environment. Informational states alone are not enough, as they can't explain selective response to features. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Foss, J. E. %T A materialist's misgivings about eliminative materialism %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 11 %N %P 105-33 %Z EM needs much more evidence before being so gung ho. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Garzon, F. C. %T Can we turn a blind eye to eliminativism? %I %D 2001 %B International Journal of Philosophical Studies %V 9 %N %P 485-498 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Graham, G. %A Horgan, T. %T Southern fundamentalism and the end of philosophy %I Ridgeview %D 1992 %B Truth and Rationality %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Greenwood, J. D. %T Reasons to believe %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B The Future of Folk Psychology %E J. Greenwood %Z Argues that folk psychological states exist, even if they aren't useful as causal explanation. We have independent reason to believe in them, e.g. from self-knowledge. They're useful in social psychology, too. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Greenwood, J. D. %T Against eliminative materialism: from folk psychology to Volkerpsychologie %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 5 %N %P 349-68 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Haldane, J. %T Understanding folk %I %D 1988 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 62 %N %P 222-46 %Z Argues that folk psychology is not a theory, and that psychological knowledge is a pre-theoretical given. With remarks on laws, the prediction of behavior, and neuroscience. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hannan, B. %T `Non-scientific realism' about propositional attitudes as a response to eliminativist arguments %I %D 1990 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 21-31 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hannan, B. %T Don't stop believing: the case against eliminative materialism %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 165-179 %Z A bundle of arguments against eliminativism, e.g. from incoherence, the lack of alternatives, and against the folk-theory-theory. With commentary. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Woodward, J. %T Folk psychology is here to stay %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Review %V 94 %N %P 197-225 %Z Defending folk psychology against the arguments of Churchland and Stich: e.g. incompleteness, stagnation, irreducibility, dual-control, modularity, and unfalsifiability. Even with no neat reduction, folk psychology may be OK. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Graham, G. %T In defense of Southern Fundamentalism %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 62 %N %P 107-134 %Z FP is almost certainly true, irrespective of scientific absorbability or the language of thought. FP's commitments are austere, and mostly behavioral. Arguments from semantic competence and conceptual conservatism. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T The austere ideology of folk psychology %I %D 1993 %B 1993 %V %N %P %Z Argues that FP is not committed to much. The austere conception is supported by intuitions, conservatism, and the inconceivability of dropping it. Responds to phlogiston objections: they are not analogous. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Horgan, T. %A Henderson, D. %T What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism %I Oxford University Press %D 2005 %B Mind as a Scientific Object %E C. Erneling %E D. Johnson %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horst, S. %T Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief' %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 104 %N %P 123-45 %Z Clarifies different senses of "theoretical" and "belief". Some beliefs are relevantly theoretical (dispositional, infra-conscious, unconscious ones), but conscious occurrent beliefs are not, and so can't be eliminated. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %A Pettit, P. %T In defense of folk psychology %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 59 %N %P 31-54 %Z FP holds that beliefs/desires play a certain functional role, and it's almost certain that objects playing that role exist, so FP is fine, whether or not propositional attitudes are good scientific entities. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacoby, H. %T Eliminativism, meaning and qualitative states %I %D 1985 %B 1985 %V %N %P %Z Even if nothing satisfies all or most common-sense properties of mental terms, reference can still be fixed under a Putnam style theory of meaning. (More about qualia than about intentional states.) -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitcher, P. S. %T In defense of intentional psychology %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 81 %N %P 89-106 %Z The Churchlands underestimate the resources of intentional psychology. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lahav, R. %T The amazing predictive power of folk psychology %I %D 1992 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 70 %N %P 99-105 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lockie, R. %T Transcendental arguments against eliminativism %I %D 2003 %B The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 54 %N %P 569-589 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Melnyk, A. %T Testament of a recovering eliminativist %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Brien, G. %T Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 52 %N %P 49-70 %Z Uses empirical evidence to argue that there is prelinguistic awareness, so nominalistic arguments for eliminativism fail. And some awareness is innate, so we can't reconceive things in less than evolutionary time. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %T Where does the self-refutation objection take us? %I %D 1990 %B Inquiry %V 33 %N %P 453-65 %Z The self-refutation objection reduces to other standard objections: counterexample, promissory note or reductio. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Ramsey, W. %A Stich, S. P. %A Garon, J. %T Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z If connectionism is true, then eliminativism is true, as you can't isolate the causal role of individual beliefs in a connectionist system. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Reppert, V. %T Ramsey on eliminativism and self-refutation %I %D 1991 %B Inquiry %V 34 %N %P 499-508 %Z Response to Ramsey 1990: If there are no beliefs and so no assertions, there is no identifiable propositional content, and truth and knowledge are out. Eliminativism is pragmatically self-refuting. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Reppert, V. %T Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the question %I %D 1992 %B Metaphilosophy %V 23 %N %P 378-92 %Z A careful analysis of whether self-refutation arguments against eliminativism beg the question by supposing that assertion requires belief. An account of what it is to beg the question, and a comparison to arguments about vitalism. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Resnick, P. %T Intentionality is phlogiston %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Richards, G. %T On the necessary survival of folk psychology %I Sage Publications %D 1996 %B The Philosophy of Psychology %E W. O'Donahue %E R. Kitchener %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Toward eliminating Churchland's eliminationism %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Topics %V 13 %N %P 60-67 %Z There's no reason to abandon FP, even if it doesn't reduce. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Rosenberg, A. %T How is eliminative materialism possible? %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B Mind and Common Sense %E R. Bogdan %Z Explaining how singular causal claims based on FP may be true even if FP is false; by analogy with phlogiston, and also because of near-vacuousness. EM isn't incoherent, as we can use a non-intentional replacement for belief. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosenberg, A. %T Naturalistic epistemology for eliminative materialists %I %D 1999 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 59 %N %P 335-358 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Saidel, E. %T What price neurophilosophy? %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1 %N %P 461-68 %Z Folk psychology is compatible with neuroscientific models, but it need not smoothly reduce to neuroscience to have an important role. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Schouten, M. K. D. %A de Jong, H. L. %T Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 489-509 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwartz, J. %T Reduction, elimination, and the mental %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy of Science %V 58 %N %P 203-20 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T Refuting eliminative materialism on the cheap? %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 306-15 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Do true believers exist? %I %D 1991 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 65 %N %P 229-44 %Z Eliminativism may have no determinate truth-conditions: if folk psychology is a poor theory, the question of whether or not "belief" refers may be empty. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T What is a theory of mental representation? %I %D 1992 %B Mind %V 101 %N %P 243-61 %Z Philosophical analysis isn't sufficient to understand intentional concepts; real cognitive science is required, with conceptual revision. The truth of eliminativism will be relative to the theory of reference that we choose. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. P. %T Deconstructing the mind %I %D 1996 %B Deconstructing the Mind %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Tait, W. W. %T The myth of the mind %I %D 2002 %B Topoi %V 21 %N %P 65-74 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Taylor, K. A. %T How not to refute eliminative materialism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 101-125 %Z Against transcendental arguments against eliminativism. These fail on their own terms, and even if successful they would not establish causal/explanatory relevance for the attitudes, which is the real key for folk psychology. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Tomberlin, J. %T Whither Southern Fundamentalism? %I , Ridgeview %D 1994 %B Truth and Rationality %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Trout, J. D. %T Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 87 %N %P 379-400 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Waskan, J. %T Folk psychology and the gauntlet of irrealism %I %D 2003 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 41 %N %P 627-656 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Wright, C. %T Can there be a rationally compelling argument for anti-realism about ordinary ("folk") psychology? %I Ridgeview %D 1996 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, eliminativism %U %0 Book %A Adler, J. %T Belief's Own Ethics %I MIT Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Audi, R. %T Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe %I %D 1994 %B Nous %V 28 %N %P 419-34 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Baker, L. R. %T Saving Belief %I Princeton University Press %D 1987 %Z Beliefs are OK, despite no physicalist reduction of content. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T What beliefs are not %I University of Notre Dame Press %D 1993 %B Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal %E S. Wagner %E R. Warner %Z Against beliefs construed as physically realized internal causes of behavior: syntax of these states can't be determinate, and their explanatory role wrt causation leads to a circle. Belief is irreducible. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Are beliefs brain states? %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Practical realism defended: Replies to critics %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Beckerman, A. %T The real reason for the standard view %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Bogdan, R. %T Belief: Form, Content, and Function %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Falvey, K. %T A natural history of belief %I %D 1999 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 80 %N %P 324-345 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Beyond belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1983 %B Thought and Object %E A. Woodfield %Z What matters are not propositional attitudes but notional attitudes; but it's hard to calibrate notional worlds. Very nice. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Bogdan, R. J. %T The manufacture of belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Belief: Form, Content, and Function %E R. Bogdan %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Bovens, L. %T Do beliefs supervene on degrees of confidence? %I Tilburg University Press %D 1999 %B Belief, Cognition, and the Will %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Cohen, L. J. %T Does belief exist? %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology %E A. Clark %E P. Millican %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Crimmins, M. %T Talk about Beliefs %I MIT Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Crimmins, M. %T Tacitness and virtual beliefs %I %D 1992 %B Mind and Language %V 7 %N %P 240-63 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Frankish, K. %T A matter of opinion %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 423-442 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Funkhouser, E. %T Willing belief and the norm of truth %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 115 %N %P 179-95 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Garfield, J. %T Belief in Psychology: A Study in the Ontology of Mind %I MIT Press %D 1988 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Gilbert, M. %T Belief and acceptance as features of groups %I %D 2002 %B Protosociology %V 16 %N %P 35-69 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Guttenplan, S. %T Belief, knowledge, and the origins of content %I %D 1994 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 287-305 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Lehrer, K. %T Belief, acceptance, and cognition %I De Gruyter %D 1983 %B On Believing %E H. Parret %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Lycan, W. G. %T Tacit belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Belief: Form, Content, and Function %E R. Bogdan %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T It's hard to believe %I %D 1990 %B Mind and Language %V 5 %N %P 122-48 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Manfredi, P. A. %T Tacit beliefs and other doxastic attitudes %I %D 1993 %B 1993 %V %N %P %Z Argues that there are no tacit beliefs: dispositions to believe can do all the explanatory work at lower cost. With some remarks on subdoxastic states, and the difference between belief and opinion. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Marcus, R. B. %T The anti-naturalism of some language-centered accounts of beliefs %I %D 1995 %B Dialectica %V 49 %N %P 113-30 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Individuating beliefs %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 8 %N %P 303-30 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Meijers, A. W. M. %T Believing and accepting as a group %I Tilburg University Press %D 1999 %B Belief, Cognition, and the Will %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Meihers, A. W. M. %T Belief, Cognition, and the Will %I Tilburg University Press %D 1999 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Meijers, A. %T Explaining Beliefs %I University of Chicago Press %D 2001 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Meyering, T. %T The causal powers of belief: A critique from practical realism %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Mosterin, J. %T Acceptance without belief %I %D 2002 %B Manuscrito %V 25 %N %P 313-35 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Morton, A. %T Saving belief from (internalist) epistemology %I %D 2003 %B Facta Philosophica %V 5 %N %P 277-95 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Newen, A. %T Contextual realism: The context-dependency and the relational character of beliefs %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, D. J. %T Does belief have an aim? %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 115 %N %P 283-305 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book %A Parrett, H. %T On Believing %I De Gruyter %D 1983 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Rigterink, R. J. %T What are beliefs (if they are anything at all)? %I %D 1991 %B Metaphilosophy %V 22 %N %P 101-14 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Sobel, D. %A Copp, D. %T Against direction of fit accounts of belief and desire %I %D 2001 %B Analysis %V 61 %N %P 44-53 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Recanati, F. %T Can we believe what we do not understand? %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 84-100 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T States and beliefs %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 33-51 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwitzgebel, E. %T In-between believing %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 51 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwitzgebel, E. %T A phenomenal, dispositional account of belief %I %D 2002 %B Nous %V 36 %N %P 249-75 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Skokowski, P. %T Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy of Science %V 71 %N %P 362-369 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Sperber, D. %T Intuitive and reflective beliefs %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 67-83 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Stainton, R. %T Robust belief states and the right/wrong distinction %I %D 1999 %B Disputatio %V 6 %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. P. %T Some evidence against narrow causal theories of belief %I %D 1983 %B From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Mindful belief: Accountability, expertise, and cognitive kinds %I %D 2002 %B Theoria %V 68 %N %P 224-49 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Free belief %I %D 2003 %B Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences %V 2 %N %P 327-36 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Tuomela, R. %T Can collectives have beliefs? %I %D 1990 %B Acta Philosophica Fennica %V 49 %N %P 454-72 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gulick, R. %T Are beliefs brain states? And if they are what might that explain? %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 205-15 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Velleman, D. %T On the aim of belief %I %D 2000 %B 2000 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Wedgwood, R. %T The aim of belief %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 16 %N %P 267-97 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Wray, K. B. %T Collective belief and acceptance %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 129 %N %P 319-33 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, beliefs %U %0 Journal Article %A Arlo Costa, H. %A Collins, J. %A Levi, I. %T Desire-as-belief implies opinionation or indifference %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 2-5 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Bratman, M. %T Dretske's desires %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 50 %N %P 795-800 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Bratman, M. %T A desire of one's own %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 100 %N %P 221-42 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Bricke, J. %T Desires, passions, and evaluations %I %D 2000 %B Southwest Philosophy Review %V 16 %N %P 59-65 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T The physiology of desire %I %D 1992 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 13 %N %P 69-88 %Z Argues that desire will smoothly reduce to a neurophysiological kind. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Chan, D. K. %T Are there extrinsic desires? %I %D 2004 %B Nous %V 38 %N %P 326-50 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Collins, D. %T Belief, desire, and revision %I %D 1988 %B Mind %V 97 %N %P 333-42 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Davis, W. %T Two senses of desire %I Precedent %D 1986 %B The Ways of Desire %E J. Marks %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Fuery, P. %T Theories of Desire %I Melbourne University Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hajek, A. %A Pettit, P. %T Desire beyond belief %I %D 2004 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 82 %N %P 77-92 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hoffman, C. A. %T Desires and the desirable %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Forum %V 25 %N %P 19-32 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hubin, D. C. %T Desires, whims, and values %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Ethics %V 7 %N %P 315-35 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Humberstone, I. L. %T Wanting as believing %I %D 1987 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 17 %N %P 49-62 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Hulse, D. %A Read, C. %A Schroeder, T. %T The impossibility of conscious desire %I %D 2004 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 73-80 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Kvart, I. %T Beliefs and believing %I %D 1986 %B Theoria %V 52 %N %P 129-45 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Larson, E. %T Needs versus desires %I %D 1994 %B Dialogue %V 37 %N %P 1-10 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Desire as belief %I %D 1988 %B Mind %V 97 %N %P 323-32 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Desire as belief II %I %D 1996 %B Mind %V 105 %N %P 303-13 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Marks, J. %T The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical Psychology on the Concept of Wanting %I Precedent %D 1986 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Marks, J. %T On the need for theory of desire %I Precedent %D 1986 %B The Ways of Desire %E J. Marks %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Mele, A. R. %T Irresistible desires %I %D 1990 %B Nous %V 24 %N %P 455-72 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Pettit, P. %A Price, H. %T Bare functional desire %I %D 1989 %B Analysis %V 49 %N %P 162-69 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Pojman, L. P. %T Believing and willing %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 15 %N %P 37-56 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Price, H. %T Defending desire-as-belief %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 119-27 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Ross, P. W. %T Explaining motivated desires %I %D 2002 %B Topoi %V 21 %N %P 199-207 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Russell, J. M. %T Desires don't cause actions %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 84 %N %P 1-10 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Schroeder, T. %T Three Faces of Desire %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Schueler, G. F. %T Pro-attitudes and direction of fit %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 277-81 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Schueler, G. F. %T Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action %I MIT Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwitzgebel, E. %T Representation and desire: A philosophical error with consequences for theory-of-mind research %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 12 %N %P 157-180 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book %A Silverman, H. J. %T Philosophy and Desire %I Routledge %D 2000 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, M. %T Reason and desire %I %D 1988 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 88 %N %P 243-58 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Stampe, D. W. %T Defining desire %I Precedent %D 1986 %B The Ways of Desire %E J. Marks %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Stampe, D. W. %T The authority of desire %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Review b %V 96 %N %P 335-81 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Stampe, D. W. %T Desire %I Blackwell %D 1994 %B A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind %E S. Guttenplan %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Teichmann, R. %T Whyte on the individuation of desires %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 103-7 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Vadas, M. %T Affective and nonaffective desire %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 45 %N %P 273-80 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Journal Article %A Whyte, J. T. %T Weak-kneed desires %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 107-11 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, desires %U %0 Book Section %A Antony, L. %T Brain states with attitude %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Attitudes as nonentities %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 175-203 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Balaguer, M. %T Attitudes without propositions %I %D 1998 %B Philosophy and phenomenological research %V 58 %N %P 805-26 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book Section %A Bennett, J. %T Analysis without noise %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B Mind and Common Sense %E R. Bogdan %Z Remarks on the conceptual analysis of belief/desire attribution. On the roles of causation, inner-route explanations, belief-desire-action triangles, teleology, unity, the presumption of simplicity, and evolution. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Ben-Yami, H. %T Against characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 186 %N %P 84-89 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Radical ascent %I %D 1991 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 65 %N %P 211-27 %Z The conditions on being a believer are mostly behavioral; to claim otherwise is to fall into a "modularity trap". A counterfactual account of mental causation is enough. With a defense of mentality for giant look-up tables. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Beliefs and desires incorporated %I %D 1994 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 91 %N %P 404-25 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, D. %T Davidson, indeterminacy, and measurement %I %D 1995 %B Acta Analytica %V 10 %N %P 37-56 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, D. %T On gauging attitudes %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Studies %V 90 %N %P 129-54 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, M. F. %T What's wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 664-74 %Z Stich is confused about type-token, syntax/content, etc. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book %A Falk, A. E. %T Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates %I Hamilton Books, University Press of America %D 2004 %Z A taxonomy of positions on the representation of propositional attitudes: dividing up via questions about realism, functionalism, monadicity, and truth-conditions. With arguments for structured representations. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Attitudes without psychology %I %D 2003 %B Facta Philosophica %V 5 %N %P 239-56 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Intentionality and Stich's theory of brain sentence syntax %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Quarterly, %V 40 %N %P 169-82 %Z Things are only syntactic (in SS's sense) in virtue of intentionality. True. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, R. J. %T The measure of mind %I %D 1994 %B Mind %V 103 %N %P 131-46 %Z A theory of propositional attitude ascription as like numerical measurement. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 47-80 %Z Folk psychology isn't a theory about laws, but about proper functions. desires are identified by proper functions; beliefs by Normal explanations. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Moser, P. K. %T Physicalism and intentional attitudes %I %D 1990 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 33-41 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book Section %A Peacocke, C. %T Between instrumentalism and brain-writing %I %D 1983 %B Sense and Content %Z Instrumentalism about belief can't be right, because of Martian marionettes, but the language of thought is too strong a requirement. A state's structured content may reside in its pattern of relations to other states. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Possin, K. %T The case against Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Studies %V 49 %N %P 405-18 %Z Stich is wrong, circular, and representational anyway. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Book Section %A Pratt, I. %T Analysis and the attitudes %I University of Notre Dame Press %D 1993 %B Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal %E S. Wagner %E R. Warner %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T What's in a mind? %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 97-122 %Z Must individuate mental states by semantics, not just by function. -DJC %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Saidel, E. %T Beliefs, desires, and the ability to learn %I %D 1998 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 35 %N %P 21-37 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwartz, J. %T Propositional attitude psychology as an ideal type %I %D 1992 %B Topoi %V 11 %N %P 5-26 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, D. M. %T Toward a perspicuous characterization of intentional states %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 74 %N %P 103-20 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Relativism, rationality, and the limits of intentional ascription %I %D 1984 %B 1984 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Von Eckardt, B. %A Poland, J. %T In defense of the standard view %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 312-331 %Z %K mental content,propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Natural kind terms and recognitional capacities %I %D 1998 %B Mind %V 107 %N %P 275-303 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Contents just aren't in the head %I %D 2003 %B Erkenntnis %V 58 %N %P 1-6 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T The characteristic thesis of anti-individualism %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 146-48 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Bruns, M. %A Soldati, G. %T Object-dependent and property-dependent concepts %I %D 1997 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 185-208 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Other bodies %I Oxford University Press %D 1982 %B Thought and Object %E A. Woodfield %Z On Putnam's Twin Earth. Natural kind terms are not indexical. Even de dicto attitudes are not in the head; they presuppose the existence of other things. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book %A Butler, K. %T Internal Affairs: Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism %I Kluwer %D 1998 %Z Argues that natural kind terms are token-reflexive, with reference ultimately fixed to the underlying explanatory properties of the surface qualities of local matter. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Chomsky, N. %T Internalist explorations %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T All the difference in the world %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 1-25 %Z Twins share the same concepts. Contra Putnam: essentialism is fallacious; contra Burge: speakers share beliefs, but one has false belief about meaning. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Methodological reflections on belief %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B Mind and Common Sense %E R. Bogdan %Z We shouldn't rely on intuitions about thought-experiments; we need an empirical theory about belief. Belief contents are distinct from sentence contents; we have to distinguish linguistic from psychological semantics. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Davis, S. %T Arguments for externalism %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Devitt, M. %T Meanings just ain't in the head %I Cambridge University Press %D 1990 %B Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam %E G. Boolos %Z Against Searle's theory of internal intentionality. Searle's theory requires magic to grasp external contents internally. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Devitt, M. %T A shocking idea about meaning %I %D 2001 %B Revue Internationale de Philosophie %V 55 %N %P 471-494 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T The nature of thought %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 70 %N %P 185-99 %Z Argues that thought is extrinsic, but it is not essentially social. A system without a linguistic community could have thoughts, if it had an appropriate learning history. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Farkas, K. %T What is externalism? %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 112 %N %P 187-208 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Horowitz, A. %T Putnam, Searle, and externalism %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 81 %N %P 27-69 %Z Argues for a moderate externalism by synthesizing Putnam and Searle: internal intension leaves extension indeterminate, but it specifies the facts relevant to filling in the indeterminacy. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Horowitz, A. %T Contents just are in the head %I %D 2001 %B Erkenntnis %V 54 %N %P 321-344 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Koethe, J. %T And they ain't outside the head either %I %D 1992 %B Synthese %V 90 %N %P 27-53 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Lau, J. %T Externalism about mental content %I %D 2002 %B 2002 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Liz, M. %T Intentional states: Individuation, explanation, and supervenience %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Ludwig, K. %T Externalism, naturalism, and method %I Ridgeview %D 1993 %B Naturalism and Normativity %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludwig, K. %T Duplicating thoughts %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 92-102 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Mandelkar, S. %T An argument against the externalist account of psychological content %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 375-82 %Z Argues that conscious experience is required for intentional states, and that any external relations could be satisfied without this experience, so external relations cannot suffice for intentional content. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A McCulloch, G. %T The spirit of twin earth %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 168-174 %Z Various arguments against Crane 1991 on externalism. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A McGilvray, J. %T Meanings are syntactically individuated and found in the head %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 225-280 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T The internal basis of meaning %I %D 1991 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 72 %N %P 143-69 %Z Argues that meaning is determined by a certain kind of internal state, involving de se cognitive attitudes. These states aren't shared by twins, but are still narrow in a strong sense. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T Functionalism and the propositional attitudes %I %D 1983 %B Nous %V 17 %N %P 529-49 %Z Functional organization doesn't determine attitude content, even if we include inputs and outputs. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Owens, J. %T Anti-individualism, indexicality, and character %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Perry, J. %T The problem of the essential indexical %I %D 1979 %B Nous %V 13 %N %P 3-21 %Z Indexicals are essential to some beliefs, so belief cannot just be a relation to a proposition. Belief contents must be at least in part construed relative to a subject. Separate belief object and belief state. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Putnam, H. %T The meaning of `meaning' %I %D 1975 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 7 %N %P 131-193 %Z What is in the head doesn't determine the meaning of our terms: my twin on Twin Earth means XYZ where I mean H2O. Content is determined by environment and linguistic community as well as by internal stereotypes. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book %A Searle, J. R. %T Intentionality %I Cambridge University Press %D 1983 %Z Sure, meanings are in the head -- e.g. the content of a given visual experience is "the thing that is causing this experience". -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Silvers, S. %T Individualism, internalism, and wide supervenience %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Sosa, E. %T Between internalism and externalism %I Ridgeview %D 1991 %B Consciousness %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Sosa, E. %T Abilities, concepts, and externalism %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z On concepts as abilities, and on construals of abilities that lead to internalism and externalism. Maybe the relevant abilities are characterized externally but determined internally. Remarks on Putnam, Davidson, Burge. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. %T Twin earth revisited %I %D 1993 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 63 %N %P 297-311 %Z Making sense of twin earth intuitions with an information-theoretic account of content: information depends on relations in normal conditions, which are extrinsic. With remarks on the context-sensitivity of content-attribution. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Stoneham, T. %T Temporal externalism %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Papers %V 1 %N %P 97-107 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Wikforss, A. M. %T Naming natural kinds %I %D 2005 %B Synthese %V 145 %N %P 65-87 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Book Section %A Wilson, R. %T Individualism %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Yalowitz, S. %T Individualism, normativity, and the epistemology of understanding %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 102 %N %P 43-92 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Zemach, E. M. %T Putnam's theory on the reference of substance terms %I %D 1976 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 73 %N %P 116-27 %Z Argues that the extension of `water' is the same on earth and twin earth, using arguments from isotopes and scientific development. Molar properties determine classification. Remarks on historicism and the division of labor. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , is content in the head? %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, M. V. %T Social relations and the individuation of thought %I %D 1993 %B Mind %V 102 %N %P 247-61 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Benejam, A. %T Thought experiments and semantic competence %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bridges, J. %T Davidson's transcendental externalism %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Defending Burge's thought experiment %I %D 2001 %B Erkenntnis %V 55 %N %P 387-391 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and the mental %I %D 1979 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 4 %N %P 73-122 %Z Belief contents are not fully determined by internal state, as the linguistic community plays an important role: arthritis, brisket, contract, sofa, etc. So mental states are not individuated individualistically. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Intellectual norms and foundations of mind %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 83 %N %P 697-720 %Z On non-individualist elements due to by intellectual norms in the community, to which meanings are answerable. Even meaning-giving truths can be doubted. With remarks on sofas/safos, and on linguistic meaning vs. cognitive value. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Davidson and forms of anti-individualism: Reply to Hahn %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Descartes, bare concepts, and anti-individualism: Reply to Normore. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. Burge, T. 2003. The thought experiments: Reply to Donnellan %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T The indexical strategy: Reply to Owens. In (M. Hahn & B. Ramberg, eds) Reflections and Replies. MIT Press. Burge, T. 2003. Psychology and the environment: Reply to Chomsky %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Replies from Tyler Burge. In (M. Frapolli & E. Romero, eds) Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. CSLI. Donnellan, K. 2003. Burge's thought experiments %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Elugardo, R. %T Burge on content %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 53 %N %P 367-84 %Z Contra Burge on sofas: oblique that-clauses can't identify the (wide) way that the subject thinks of sofas, which is idiosyncratic and inexpressible. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Forbes, G. %T A dichotomy sustained %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 51 %N %P 187-211 %Z Gives a Fregean account of belief semantics to handle the Burge cases, and argues that the *type* of a proposition may be internal even if the token itself is not. With remarks on the relevance to Grice's program. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book %A Frapolli, M. %A Romero, E. %T Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge %I CSLI %D 2003 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Gauker, C. %T Social externalism and linguistic communication %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Georgalis, N. %T Rethinking Burge's thought experiment %I %D 1999 %B Synthese %V 118 %N %P 145-64 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Grimaltos, T. %T Terms and content %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Hahn, M. %T When swampmen get arthritis: "Externalism" in Burge and Davidson %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book %A Hahn, M. %A Ramberg, B. %T Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackman, H. %T Individualism and interpretation %I %D 1998 %B Southwest Philosophy Review %V 14 %N %P 31-38 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Marqueze, J. %T On orthodox and heterodox externalisms %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Curing folk psychology of arthritis %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 70 %N %P 323-36 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Nordby, H. %T Davidson on social externalism %I %D 2005 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 86 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Normore, C. %T Burge, Descartes, and us %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Meaning, other people, and the world %I %D 1987 %B Representation and Reality %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wikforss, A. %T Social externalism and conceptual errors %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 203 %N %P 217-31 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Woodfield, A. %T Thought and the social community %I %D 1982 %B Inquiry %V 25 %N %P 435-50 %Z Burge's arguments show only that context-ascription is pragmatically sensitive to context, depending on the epistemic predicament of the ascriber. Content itself is still internal. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Book Section %A Woodfield, A. %T Social externalism and conceptual diversity %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %B Thought and Language %E J. Preston %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , social externalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Arjo, D. %T Sticking up for Oedipus: Fodor on intentional generalizations and broad content %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 231-45 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %A Robbins, P. %T Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations? %I %D 2001 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 31 %N %P 1-22 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T An externalist account of psychological content %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Topics %V 15 %N %P 191-226 %Z Developing an externalist account consistent with psychological explanation. Contra Burge, social links aren't constitutive of content. Causal links are indirectly constitutive of content, via our conceptions. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Buller, D. J. %T "Narrow"-minded breeds inaction %I %D 1992 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 59-70 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Buller, D. J. %T Individualism and evolutionary psychology (or: In defense of "narrow" functions) %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 74-95 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Two thought experiments reviewed %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 23 %N %P 284-94 %Z Reply to Fodor 1982, clarification of position. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and psychology %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 3-45 %Z Psychology should be and is done non-individualistically, i.e. with reference to environment. Examples from vision, e.g. Marr. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Corazza, E. %T Perspectival thoughts and psychological generalizations %I %D 1994 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 307-36 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T What isn't wrong with folk psychology %I %D 1992 %B Metaphilosophy %V 23 %N %P 1-13 %Z Argues that extrinsic properties can play a respectable role in scientific explanation; e.g. the histories of plants, animals, and devices are relevant in explaining their current behavior. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Where is the mind? %I CSLI %D 2001 %B Explaining Beliefs %E A. Meijers %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T Must psychology be individualistic? %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Review %V 100 %N %P 179-203 %Z Maybe, maybe not. Contra Fodor: science can be non-individualistic. Contra Burge re oblique ascriptions and Marr. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive psychology %I %D 1980 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 3 %N %P 63-109 %Z Should do psychology without reference to the external world. What counts for psychology is in the head; who cares about truth, reference, and the rest? -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 23 %N %P 98-118 %Z Twin Earth isn't a problem for cognitive science. Intents of utterances, de re/de dicto, etc. Truth conditions aren't in the head, but that's no problem. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Mind and chance %I %D 1987 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 17 %N %P 533-52 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Globus, G. %T Can methodological solipsism be confined to psychology? %I %D 1984 %B Cognition and Brain Theory %V 7 %N %P 233-46 %Z Methodological solipsism implies epistemological solipsism. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T [Explanation] is explanation better %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 154-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Hurley, S. L. %T Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure, and externalism %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 1-6 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacob, P. %T Externalism and the explanatory relevance of broad content %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitcher, P. S. %T Narrow taxonomy and wide functionalism %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy of Science %V 52 %N %P 78-97 %Z Argues against Stich, Fodor, Block: use different taxonomies (narrow/wide) for different purposes. Both are OK, functionalism *and* content survive. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kobes, B. %T Semantics and psychological prototypes %I %D 1989 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 70 %N %P 1-18 %Z Relates the individualism debate to Roschian prototype research. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Losonsky, M. %T Emdedded systems vs. individualism %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 357-71 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Macdonald, C. %T Weak externalism and psychological reduction %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %B Reduction, Explanation and Realism %E D Charles %E K. Lennon %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T The Churchlands on methodological solipsism and computational psychology %I %D 1985 %B Philosophy of Science %V 52 %N %P 295-309 %Z MS doesn't rule out all use of content, just of wide content. Narrow content is OK. With remarks on folk psychology and computation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology %I %D 1985 %B Philosophy of Science %V 52 %N %P 451-69 %Z Various problems for computational psychology handling content. It shares the problems of a naturalistic psychology. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A McClamrock, R. %T Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 343-54 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book %A McClamrock, R. %T Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World %I University of Chicago Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Noonan, H. W. %T Methodological solipsism: A reply to Morris %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Studies %V 48 %N %P 285-290 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Noonan, H. W. %T Russellian thoughts and methodological solipsism %I Cambridge University Press %D 1986 %B Language, Mind, and Logic %E J. Butterfield %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Noonan, H. W. %T Object-dependent thoughts and psychological redundancy %I %D 1990 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 1-9 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Noonan, H. W. %T Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency? %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z Object-dependent thoughts are redundant in psychological explanation, as an explanation applying to a hallucinator will work as well. But this needn't defeat externalism in general. With remarks on self-knowledge. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Patterson, S. %T The explanatory role of belief ascriptions %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 59 %N %P 313-32 %Z Uses examples to argue that in explaining behavior we often ascribe beliefs in an individualistic way, even in cases where individual and community use diverge. These contents are at least sometimes expressible. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Patterson, S. %T Individualism and semantic development %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy of Science %V 58 %N %P 15-35 %Z Developmental psychologists attribute concepts individualistically. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Peacocke, C. %T Externalist explanation %I %D 1993 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 67 %N %P 203-30 %Z Externalist states are required for the explanation of relational properties. Counters objections from conceptual connections and dormitive-virtue worries, and applies to teleology, self-knowledge, etc. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Petrie, B. %T Nonautonomous psychology %I %D 1990 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 28 %N %P 539-59 %Z Argues that behavior is often individuated widely for explanatory purposes, so that wide content is relevant, and that there is more to causation than local causation, so Stich's autonomy principle fails. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Pettit, P. %T Broad-minded explanation and psychology %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Subject, Thought and Context %E P. Pettit %E J. McDowell %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowlands, M. %T Against methodological solipsism: The ecological Approach %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 5-24 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %T The return of the individual %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 39-57 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Sterelny, K. %T Animals and individualism %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Autonomous psychology and the belief/desire thesis %I %D 1978 %B Monist %V 61 %N %P 573-91 %Z Beliefs are not in the head, so aren't good for psychological explanation. Interesting, but confuses the role of truth-values with truth-conditions. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Tuomela, R. %T Methodological solipsism and explanation in psychology %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 23-47 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wakefield, J. C. %T Broad versus narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor on Frege cases %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 15 %N %P 119-33 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book Section %A Wallace, J. %A Mason, H. E. %T On some thought experiments about mind and meaning %I CSLI %D 1990 %B Propositional Attitudes %E C. Anderson %E J. Owens %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Causal depth, theoretical appropriateness, and individualism in psychology %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy of Science %V 61 %N %P 55-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Book %A Wilson, R. A. %T Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and psychological explanation %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %T Fodor's modal argument %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 41-56 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Allen, C. %T It isn't what you think: A new idea about intentional causation %I %D 1995 %B Nous %V 29 %N %P 115-26 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Content and context %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 8 %N %P 17-32 %Z Argues contra Fodor that broad contents can be explanatory -- if they can't, no relational properties can. Fodor's "no-conceptual-connection" and "cross-context" tests for causal powers fail to do the job. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Barrett, J. %T Individualism and the cross-contexts test %I %D 1997 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 78 %N %P 242-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Braun, D. %T Content, causation, and cognitive science %I %D 1991 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 69 %N %P 375-89 %Z Arguments for the causal significance of broad content. Physical twins can differ in causal powers; broad content figures in (ceteris paribus) causal generalizations; can make twin arguments against narrow content too. Hmm. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individuation and causation in psychology %I %D 1989 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 707 %N %P 303-22 %Z Contra Fodor: psychological processes can play differing causal roles, despite being physically identical. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Intentional properties and causation %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Psychology: Debates about Psychological Explanation %E C. Macdonald %E G. Macdonald %Z Reply to Fodor 1991. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Content, causal powers, and context %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P 105-14 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Christensen, D. %T Causal powers and conceptual connections %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 163-8 %Z Fodor's modal argument for narrow content rests on a false analogy between cases concerning thoughts and those concerning planets. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T A modal argument for narrow content %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 88 %N %P 5-26 %Z On when a difference in effects amounts to a difference in causal powers: when the effects are connected contingently, not conceptually, to the causes. Differences in wide content don't satisfy this, so aren't causal powers. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Garcia-Carpintero, M. %T The supervenience of mental content %I %D 1994 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 68 %N %P 117-135 %Z Mental content can be extrinsic and efficacious. Narrow content strategies don't work, as observation concepts are still extrinsic. One can't screen of the intrinsic part from the rest. Thought-experiments are inconclusive. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %A Mele, A. %T Mental causes %I %D 1991 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 28 %N %P 61-71 %Z Reconciling Twin Earth with the causal relevance of content. Historical factors can be causally relevant. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacob, P. %T Externalism and mental causation %I %D 1992 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 66 %N %P 203-19 %Z Argues that externalist content is not causally efficacious, but is relevant to causal explanations of behavior indirectly, via the cognitive activities of others external to the system. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Klein, M. %T Externalism, content, and causation %I %D 1996 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 96 %N %P 159-76 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Lalor, B. J. %T It is what you think: intentional potency and anti-individualism %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 165-78 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludwig, K. %T Causal relevance and thought content %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 44 %N %P 334-53 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, C. %T Conceptual causation %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 525-46 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Montgomery, R. %T Non-Cartesian explanations meet the problem of mental causation %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 221-41 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T Content, causation, and psychophysical supervenience %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy of Science %V 60 %N %P 242-61 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Russow, L. M. %T Fodor, Adams, and causal properties %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 57-61 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Saidel, E. %T Content and causal powers %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy of Science %V 61 %N %P 658-65 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %A Sober, E. %T The causal efficacy of content %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 63 %N %P 1-30 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Seymour, D. %T Some of the difference in the world: Crane on intentional causation %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 43 %N %P 83-89 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Sturgeon, S. %T Good reasoning and cognitive architecture %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 88-101 %Z Epistemology requires the causal relevance of content, and the relevant content is narrow. On how various architectures might support this causal relevance, by being realized by more specific intrinsic features. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A van Gulick, R. %T Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't work %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B ReRepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z Against some arguments for internalism: local causation doesn't imply local type-individuation, as distal relations affect distal causes and effects; and processes can have access to semantic properties via formal properties. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Individualism, causal powers, and explanation %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 68 %N %P 103-39 %Z Science frequently appeals to relational and historical taxonomies, so either causal powers can be non-intrinsic or science needn't taxonomize by causal powers. With remarks on causal properties and conceptual connections. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Against a priori arguments for individualism %I %D 1993 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 74 %N %P 60-79 %Z Arguments from causal powers beg the question, either on whether relational properties can have causal powers or on whether science taxonomizes by causal powers, as relational properties are common in scientific explanation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Yablo, S. %T Wide causation %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 11 %N %P 251-81 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and psychology %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 3-45 %Z Psychology should be and is done non-individualistically, i.e. with reference to environment. Examples from vision, e.g. Marr. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Individualism and Marr's computational theory of vision %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 313-37 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Content, computation, and individualism in vision theory %I %D 1996 %B Analysis %V 56 %N %P 146-54 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Cain, M. J. %T Individualism, twin scenarios and visual content %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 441-463 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Individualism and perceptual content %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 461-84 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T Individualism, computation, and perceptual content %I %D 1992 %B Mind %V 101 %N %P 443-59 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Book Section %A Egan, F. %T Intentionality and the theory of vision %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Perception %E K. Akins %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Francescotti, R. M. %T Externalism and the Marr theory of vision %I %D 1991 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 42 %N %P 227-38 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitcher, P. S. %T Marr's computational theory of vision %I %D 1988 %B Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P 1-24 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Morton, P. %T Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy of Science %V 60 %N %P 86-99 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Book Section %A Patterson, S. %T Success-orientation and individualism in the theory of vision %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Perception %E K. Akins %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %T Seeing what is not there %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Review %V 97 %N %P 189-214 %Z Contra Burge, Marr's theory is individualistic. Intentional contents therein are neutral between twins' environments; nothing grounds a more specific attribution. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Segal, G. %T Defence of a reasonable individualism %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 485-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. A. %T Content, kinds, and individualism in Marr's theory of vision %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Review %V 102 %N %P 489-513 %Z Contra Segal, Marr's theory is non-individualistic even though it may classify twins together. Computational-level task descriptions rather than behavior guide content ascription, so the environment plays a crucial role. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. A. %T A clearer vision %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 131-53 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. A. %T Junk representations %I %D 1997 %B 1997 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and the theory of vision %U %0 Book Section %A Andler, D. %T Can we knock off the shackles of syntax? %I Ridgeview %D 1995 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Content, computation, and individuation %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 114 %N %P 277-92 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T Computation and content %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Review %V 104 %N %P 181-203 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T In defence of narrow mindedness %I %D 1999 %B Mind and Language %V 14 %N %P 177-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kazez, J. R. %T Computationalism and the causal role of content %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 75 %N %P 231-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kobes, B. %T Individualism and artificial intelligence %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 4 %N %P 429-56 %Z Winograd's SHRDLU doesn't support individualism: its concepts are anchored (to a fictional world) via its programmer, and it could have made errors. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Miscevic, N. %T Computation, content, and cause %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Studies %V 82 %N %P 241-63 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Book Section %A Peacocke, C. %T Content, computation, and externalism %I Ridgeview %D 1995 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Peacocke, C. %T Computation as involving content: A response to Egan %I %D 1999 %B Mind and Language %V 14 %N %P 195-202 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Seager, W. E. %T Thought and syntax %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1992 %N %P %Z Syntax is extrinsically determined, as well as semantics. So if broad content is irrelevant to psychology, syntax is too. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Shagrir, O. %T Content, computation and externalism %I %D 2001 %B Mind %V 110 %N %P 369-400 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bar-On, D. %T Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression %I %D 2004 %B Nous %V 38 %N %P 430-55 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Beebee, H. %T Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 51 %N %P 356-74 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Berg, J. %T First-person authority, externalism, and wh-knowledge %I %D 1998 %B Dialectica %V 52 %N %P 41-44 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernecker, S. %T Davidson on first-person authority and externalism %I %D 1996 %B Inquiry %V 39 %N %P 121-39 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernecker, S. %T Externalism and the attitudinal component of self-knowledge %I %D 1996 %B Nous %V 30 %N %P 262-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Bernecker, S. %T Self-knowledge and closure %I CSLI %D 1998 %B Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E P. Ludlow %E N. Martin %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernecker, S. %T Memory and externalism %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical and Phenomenological Research %V 69 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T Can externalism be reconciled with self-knowledge? %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Topics %V 20 %N %P 233-68 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T A trilemma for redeployment %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 22-30 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T Content and self-knowledge %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Topics %V 17 %N %P 5-26 %Z We can't know our thought-contents by inference (circular), by introspection (because they're relational), or directly, so we can't know them at all. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P, %T Externalism and inference %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Issues %V 2 %N %P 11-28 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T The transparency of mental content %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 8 %N %P 33-50 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T What the externalist can know a priori %I %D 1997 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 97 %N %P 161-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 149-56 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Critical reasoning, understanding and self-knowledge %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 61 %N %P 659-676 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Reliabilism, knowledge, and mental content %I %D 2000 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 100 %N %P 115-35 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, J. %T Anti-individualism and agnosticism %I %D 2001 %B Analysis %V 61 %N %P 213-24 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Brown, J. %T The reductio argument and transmission of warrant %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Scepticism about knowledge of content %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 447-51 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T What an anti-individualist knows a priori %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 111-18 %Z Contra McKinsey 1991, anti-individualism doesn't lead to a priori knowledge. The belief that water is wet doesn't conceptually entail facts about the external world (e.g. H2O), although it may metaphysically necessitate them. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Semantic answers to skepticism %I %D 1992 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 73 %N %P 200-19 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Skepticism and externalism %I %D 1993 %B Philosophia %V 22 %N %P 169-71 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Knowledge of content and knowledge of the world %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Review: %V 103 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Trying to get outside your own skin %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Topics %V 23 %N %P 79-111 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Externalism and memory %I %D 1997 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 78 %N %P 1-12 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 4 %N %P 287-90 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Two recent approaches to self-knowledge %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 13 %N %P 251-71 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Externalism and the a prioricity of self-knowledge %I %D 2000 %B Analysis %V 60 %N %P 132-136 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Ambiguity and knowledge of content %I %D 2000 %B Analysis %V 60 %N %P 257-60 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T A priori knowledge of the world not easily available %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 104 %N %P 109-114 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Problems for a recent account of introspective knowledge %I %D 2001 %B 2001 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Anti-individualism and analyticity %I %D 2002 %B Analysis %V 62 %N %P 87-91 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Bruckner, A. %T Two transcendental arguments concerning self-knowledge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner A. %T Brewer on the McKinsey problem %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 41-43 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Noordhof on McKinsey-Brown %I %D 2005 %B Analysis %V 65 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Individualism and self-knowledge %I %D 1988 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 85 %N %P 649-63 %Z Knowledge of our thoughts is compatible with externalism: its content is self-referential and self-verifying. We needn't be able to explicate the content or its enabling conditions, or rule out twin possibilities. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Memory and self-knowledge %I CSLI %D 1998 %B Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E P. Ludlow %E N. Martin %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Mental agency in authoritative self-knowledge: Reply to Kobes %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Some reflections on scepticism: Reply to Stroud %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Externalism, internalism, and knowledge of content %I %D 1997 %B philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 57 %N %P 773-800 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Externalism and skepticism %I %D 1998 %B Dialogue %V 37 %N %P 13-34 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Problems for semantic externalism and a priori refutations of skeptical arguments %I %D 2000 %B Dialectica %V 54 %N %P 29-49 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Chase, J. %T Is externalism about content inconsistent with internalism about justification? %I %D 2001 %B Australasian Jouenal of Philosophy %V 79 %N %P 227-46 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Davidson, D. %T Knowing one's own mind %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %B Knowing Our Own Minds %E C. Wright %E B. Smith %E and C. Macdonald %E eds. %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Externalism and armchair knowledge %I Oxford University Press %D 2000 %B New Essays on the A Priori %E P. Boghossian %E C. Peacocke %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Externalism, self-Knowledge and transmission of warrant %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T The problem of armchair knowledge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Externalism and self-knowledge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ebbs, G. %T Can we take our words at face value? %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 499-530 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ebbs, G. %T Is skepticism about self-knowledge coherent? %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 105 %N %P 43-58 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Ebbs, G. %T A puzzle about doubt %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Edwards, J. %T The simple theory of colour and the transparency of sense experience %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %B Knowing Our Own Minds %E C. Wright %E B. Smith %E and C. Macdonald %E eds. %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Falvey, K. %A Owens, J. %T Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Review %V 103 %N %P 107-37 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Falvey, K. %T The compatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access %I %D 2000 %B Analysis %V 60 %N %P 137-142 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Falvey, K. %T Memory and knowledge of content %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Fernandez, J. %T Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions %I %D 2004 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 12 %N %P 17-37 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Frapolli, M. %A Romero, E. %T Anti-individualism and basic self-knowledge %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Fumerton, R. %T Introspection and internalism %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Gallois, A. %T Deflationary self-knowledge %I Kluwer %D 1994 %B Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind %E M. Michael %E J. O'Leary-Hawthorne %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Gallois, A. %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %T Externalism and skepticism %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Studies %V 81 %N %P 1-26 %Z Externalist anti-skeptical arguments fail as they require us to know a priori that our terms designate natural kinds, and also because they require us to know a priori that externalism is true. A thorough analysis. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Georgalis, N. %T No access for the externalist: Discussion of Heil's "Privileged access" %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 101-8 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Georgalis, N. %T Asymmetry of access to intentional states %I %D 1994 %B Erkenntnis %V 40 %N %P 185-211 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Gertler, B. %T We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know a priori that water does? %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 44-47 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibbons, J. %T Externalism and knowledge of content %I %D 1996 %B Philsophical Review %V 105 %N %P 287-310 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibbons, J. %T Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 51 %N %P 13-28 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Glock, H. J. %A Preston, J. M. %T Externalism and first-person authority %I %D 1995 %B Monist %V 78 %N %P 515-33 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the memory argument %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 211-19 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content %I %D 1999 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 80 %N %P 136-56 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T The psychology and epistemology of self-knowledge %I %D 1999 %B Synthese %V 118 %N %P 165-201 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Studies %V 100 %N %P 51-79 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T Belief and its linguistic expression: Toward a belief box account of first-person authority %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 1 %N %P 65-76 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T Do anti-individualistic construals of propositional attitudes capture the agent's conception? %I %D 2002 %B Nous %V 36 %N %P 597-621 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T On our alleged a priori knowledge that water exists %I %D 2003 %B Analysis %V 63 %N %P 38-41 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticism %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 116 %N %P 53-78 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Goldberg, S. C. %T What do you know when you know your own thoughts? %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T (Nonstandard) lessons from world-switching cases %I %D 2005 %B Philosophia %V 32 %N %P 85-131 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, S. C. %T The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument %I %D 2005 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 35 %N %P 135-48 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Hall, L. %T The self-knowledge that externalists leave out %I %D 1998 %B Southwest Philosophy Review %V 14 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Haukioja, J. %T Semantic externalism and a priori self-knowledge %I %D 2006 %B Ratio %V 19 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Heal, J. %T Externalism and memory %I %D 1998 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 72 %N %P 77-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %T Privileged access %I %D 1988 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 238-51 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Hohwy, J. %T Privileged self-knowledge and externalism: A contextualist approach %I %D 2002 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 83 %N %P 235-52 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Kobes, B. %T Mental content and hot self-knowledge %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 71-99 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Kobes, B. %T Mental content and hot self-knowledge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Kraay, K. J. %T Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge %I %D 2002 %B Erkenntnis %V 56 %N %P 297-317 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Langsam, H. %T Externalism, self-knowledge, and inner observation %I %D 2002 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 80 %N %P 42-61 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Larkin, W. S. %T Brute error with respect to content %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 94 %N %P 159-71 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A LePore, E. %T Subjectivism and environmentalism %I %D 1990 %B Inquiry %V 33 %N %P 197-214 %Z Subjectivism and environmentalism seem to clash on knowledge of content, but it's OK: under environmentalism we still know our contents w/o evidence. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludlow, P. %T Externalism, self-knowledge, and the prevalence of slow-switching %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 45-49 %Z Argues that cases of switching between language communities are quite common, so that Warfield's case for externalist self-knowledge doesn't work. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludlow, P. %T Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 157-59 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludlow, P. %T Social externalism and memory: A problem? %I %D 1995 %B Acta Analytica %V 10 %N %P 69-76 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludlow, P. %T On the relevance of slow switching %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 285-86 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book %A Ludlow, P. %A Martin, N. %T Externalism and Self-Knowledge %I CSLI %D 1998 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Macdonald, C. %T Externalism and first-person authority %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 104 %N %P 99-122 %Z On reconciling externalism with the non-evidential character of first-person knowledge. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Macdonald, C. %T Externalism and authoritative self-knowledge %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %B Knowing Our Own Minds %E C. Wright %E P. Smith %E C. Macdonald %E eds. %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Apriorism in the philosophy of language %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 52 %N %P 1-32 %Z Argues that we can know the meaning of our words a priori. Analyzes twin earth cases by separating propositional meaning from linguistic meaning, which is indexical, fixes reference, and is knowable a priori. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Anti-individualism and privileged access %I %D 1991 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 9-16 %Z Contra Burge: if there are conceptual connections between wide contents and and the external world, then we can't know wide contents a priori, as otherwise we could know a priori that the world exists. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Accepting the consequences of anti-individualism %I %D 1994 %B Analysis %V 54 %N %P 124-8 %Z Reply to Brueckner 1992: The claim that belief metaphysically necessitate external facts is trivial. Almost all states do that, for Kripkean reason. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T Forms of externalism and privileged access %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 16 %N %P 199-224 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McKinsey, M. %T On knowing our own minds %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 52 %N %P 107-16 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A McKinsey, M. %T Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A McLaughlin, B. P. %A Tye, M. %T Externalism, Twin Earth, and self-knowledge %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %B Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge %E C. Macdonald %E P. Smith %E C. Wright %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %A Tye, M. %T Is content-externalism compatible with privileged access? %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Review %V 107 %N %P 349-380 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T Self-knowledge, externalism, and skepticism %I %D 2000 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 74 %N %P 93-118 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T Introspecting thoughts %I %D 2001 %B Facta Philosophica %V 3 %N %P 77-84 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T McKinsey's challenge, warrant transmission, and skepticism %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Miller, R. W. %T Externalist self-knowledge and the scope of the a priori %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 67-74 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Moya, C. %T Externalism, inclusion, and knowledge of content %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Nagasawa, Y. %T Externalism and the memory argument %I %D 2002 %B Dialectica %V 56 %N %P 335-46 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Noonan, P. %T Against absence-dependent thoughts %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 92-93 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T Outsmarting the McKinsey-Brown argument? %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 48-56 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T The transmogrification of a posteriori knowledge: Reply to Brueckner %I %D 2005 %B Analysis %V 65 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Nuccetelli, S. %T What anti-individualist cannot know a priori %I %D 1999 %B Analysis %V 59 %N %P 48-51 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Nuccetelli, S. %T Is self-knowledge an entitlement? And why should we care? %I %D 2001 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 39 %N %P 143-155 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Nuccetelli, S. %T Knowing that one knows what one is talking about %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book %A Nuccetelli, S. %T New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %I MIT Press %D 2003 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Owens, D. %T Externalis, Davidson, and knowledge of comparative content %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Peacocke, C. %T Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeployment %I %D 1996 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey %V 96 %N %P 117-58 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Pritchard, D. %T McKinsey paradoxes, radical skepticism, and the transmission of knowledge across known entailments %I %D 2002 %B Synthese %V 130 %N %P 279-302 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Pritchard, D. %A Kallestrup, J. %T An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism %I %D 2004 %B Philosophia %V 2004 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Quesada, D. %T Basic self-knowledge and externalism %I CSLI %D 2003 %B Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind %E M. Frapolli %E E. Romero %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Raffman, D. %T First-person authority and the internal reality of beliefs %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %B Knowing Our Own Minds %E C. Wright %E B. Smith %E C. Macdonald %E eds. %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Sawyer, S. %T Privileged access to the world %I %D 1998 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 76 %N %P 523-533 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Sawyer, S. %T Am externalist account of introspectve knowledge %I %D 1999 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 4 %N %P 358-78 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Sawyer, S. %T In defense of Burge's thesis %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 107 %N %P 109-28 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Sawyer, S. %T Sufficient absences %I %D 2003 %B Analysis %V 63 %N %P 202-8 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Sawyer, S. %T Absences, presences, and sufficient conditions %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 354-57 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Schiffer, S. %T Boghossian on externalism and inference %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Issues %V 2 %N %P 29-38 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Spicer, F. %T On the identity of concepts, and the compatibility of externalism and privileged access %I %D 2004 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 155-168 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Steup, M. %T Two forms of antiskepticism %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Stroud, B. %T Anti-individualism and scepticism %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Stoneham, T. %T Boghossian on empty natural kind concepts %I %D 1999 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 99 %N %P 119-22 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Stueber, K. %T The problem of self-knowledge %I %D 2002 %B Erkenntnis %V 56 %N %P 269-96 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Szubka, T. %T Meaning rationalism, a priori, and transparency of content %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 491-503 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Tye, M. %T Externalism and memory %I %D 1998 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 72 %N %P 77-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. A. %T Privileged self-knowledge and externalism are compatible %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 232-37 %Z Boghossian's argument that externalism threatens self-knowledge fails: twin cases needn't be relevant alternatives (unless they are actual), so they don't threaten knowledge of content, by the usual standards of knowledge. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. A. %T Knowing the world and knowing our minds %I %D 1995 %B 1995 %V %N %P %Z Argues that externalism and self-knowledge imply the falsity of skepticism (though externalism alone does not). And arguments against externalist self-knowledge are no better than standard skeptical arguments. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. A. %T Externalism, privileged self-knowledge, and the irrelevance of slow switching %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 282-84 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Wright, C. %T Cogency and question-begging: Some reflections on McKinsey's paradox and Putnam's proof %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Issues %V 10 %N %P 140-63 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Book Section %A Wright, C. %T Some reflections on the acquisition of warrant by inference %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge %E S. Nuccetelli %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Wyler, T. %T First-person authority and singular thoughts %I %D 1994 %B Zeitschrift fur Philosophie Forschung %V 48 %N %P 585-94 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , externalism and self-knowledge %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Drebushenko, D. %A Fuller, G. %A Stecker, R. %T Narrow content: Fodor's folly %I %D 1990 %B Mind and Language %V 5 %N %P 213-29 %Z Traces and criticizes Fodor's position on narrow content. Argues that narrow content isn't content, and doesn't explain behavior. Fun but arguable. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Fuller, G. %T Names, contents, and causes %I %D 1992 %B Mind and Language %V 7 %N %P 205-21 %Z Argues that problems with names don't require an appeal to narrow content in explanation. Broad content plus associated descriptions will do the job. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Antony, L. %T Semantic anorexia: On the notion of content in cognitive science %I Cambridge University Press %D 1989 %B Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam %E G. Boolos %Z Representational cognitive science has no need for narrow content -- wide contents and formal properties can do all the work. Argues that the semantics of mental expressions needn't mirror the semantics of language. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %T Has Fodor really changed his mind on narrow content? %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 422-58 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T A farewell to functionalism %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Studies %V 48 %N %P 1-14 %Z Argues that type-identical functional states can differ in narrow content, so methodological solipsism fails. Uses the example of identical programs for playing chess and arms negotiations. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Just what do we have in mind? %I %D 1985 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 10 %N %P 25-48 %Z Some implausible twin cases trying to show that mental life can vary wildly while preserving physical/computational state. Bizarre. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Content by courtesy %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 84 %N %P 197-213 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book %A Baker, L. R. %T Saving Belief %I Princeton University Press %D 1987 %Z Lots of arguments against narrow content. Very stimulating, though wrong. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Biro, J. I. %T In defense of social content %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 67 %N %P 277-93 %Z Contra Loar 1988, the contents of "that"-clauses often reflects psychological content, even if it sometimes does not. We don't need narrow content. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Block, N. %T What narrow content is not %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z There are big problems specifying the "mapping" and the relevant contexts for Fodor's theory noncircularly. Narrow content either collapses into syntax or is too coarse-grained. Nontrivial narrow content must be holistic. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Block, N. %T Ruritania revisited %I Ridgeview %D 1995 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, C. %T Belief states and narrow content %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 343-67 %Z Criticizes the "bracketing" strategy of Stich and Walker, and argues that intrinsic belief state should be individuated according to how it embeds in different environments. With a comparison with Fodor's related theory. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, C. %T Narrow mental content %I %D 2002 %B 2002 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The components of content %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings %E D. Chalmers %Z Argues for a two-dimensional intensional theory, with different kinds of intensions constituting epistemic and subjunctive content. Epistemic content governs the dynamics of thought and behavior, and is primary in explanation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The nature of narrow content %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 46-66 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content %I %D 1986 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 60 %N %P 263-83 %Z Comments on Fodor 1987. Fodor doesn't make a conclusive case against externalism; but narrow content may be promising, and inexpressibility doesn't pose any real problems. With comparisons to neo-Fregean theories. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Beyond belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1983 %B Thought and Object %E A. Woodfield %Z What matters are not propositional attitudes but notional attitudes; but it's hard to calibrate notional worlds. Very nice. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Devitt, M. %T The narrow representational theory of mind %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Mind and Cognition %E W. Lycan %Z Not syntactic psychology nor wide psychology, but narrow psychology. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Field, H. %T "Narrow" aspects of intentionality and the information-theoretic approach to content %I Blackwell %D 1989 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Individualism and supervenience %I %D 1987 %B Psychosemantics %Z Science taxonomizes by causal powers, which are locally supervenient, so psychology needs a narrow notion of content. Proposes that a relativized notion -- a function from context to extension -- can do the job. Nice. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Jackson, F. %A and Pettit, P. %T Some content is narrow %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil and A. Mele %Z Argues that folk psychology needs a notion of narrow content to provide robust predictive behavioral generalizations that covers doppelgangers. If not, then some behavioral patterns would be flukey. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %T Representation and narrow belief %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 99-112 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A LePore, E. %A Loewer, B. %T Solipsistic semantics %I %D 1986 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 10 %N %P 595-614 %Z There's no good way to construe narrow content. Phenomenologist strategy is intrinsically wide, and indexicalist strategy can't specify content. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A LePore, E. %A Loewer, B. %T Dual aspect semantics %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B ReRepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Loar, B. %T Social content and psychological content %I University of Arizona Press %D 1987 %B Contents of Thought %E R. Grimm %E D. Merrill %Z Uses examples to argue that psychological content is not fixed by the content of "that"-clauses in belief ascription, and vice versa. We require a subtler kind of narrow content to capture what's going on. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Loar, B. %T Subjective intentionality %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Topics %V 15 %N %P 89-124 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T Saving psychological solipsism %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 61 %N %P 267-83 %Z Contests the "provoked/aggravated assault" example of Baker 1986. If they're doppelgangers, then their narrow content can't differ. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Manfredi, P. %T Two routes to narrow content: both dead ends %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 3-22 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A McDermott, M. %T Narrow content %I %D 1986 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 64 %N %P 277-88 %Z Narrow beliefs are de re beliefs about our inputs and outputs. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A McGilvray, J. %T Meanings are syntactically individuated and found in the head %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 225-280 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Newman, A. E. %T Two grades of internalism (pass and fail) %I %D 2005 %B Philosophical Studies %V 122 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Fodor and Block on narrow content %I %D 1987 %B Representation and Reality %Z Against perceptual-prototype and conceptual-role accounts of narrow content. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Quillen, K. %T Propositional attitudes and psychological explanation %I %D 1986 %B Mind and Language %V 1 %N %P 133-57 %Z Can't get a `mode of presentation' account of narrow content to work, either through description theory or prototypes. Psych should be non-individualist. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Recanati, F. %T Externalism and narrow content %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z There are levels of narrowness, varying by whether independence is of actual or normal environment. Argues that this can be consistent with externalism. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Recanati, F. %T How narrow is narrow content? %I %D 1994 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 209-29 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Schiffer, S. %T Fodor's character %I Blackwell %D 1989 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book %A Segal, G. %T A Slim Book about Narrow Content %I MIT Press %D 2000 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Silverberg, A. %T Narrow content: A defense %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 109-27 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Stalnaker, R. C. %T Narrow content %I CSLI %D 1990 %B Propositional Attitudes %E C. A. Anderson %E J. Owens %Z On some problems with narrow content, contra Loar 1987. Narrow content is hard to spell out with "diagonal" propositions. Loar doesn't show that psychological content is narrow. With some remarks on privileged access. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. P. %T Narrow content meets fat syntax %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Argues that narrow content is still too coarse-grained for explanation, classifying psychologically distinct states together. Use syntax instead. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Taylor, K. %T Supervenience and levels of meaning %I %D 1989 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 27 %N %P 443-58 %Z Argues that the partial character construal of narrow content is not interestingly semantic. It collapses into syntax or phenomenology. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Taylor, K. %T Narrow content functionalism and the mind-body problem %I %D 1989 %B Nous %V 23 %N %P 355-72 %Z Uses a "fraternal twin earth" thought experiment to show that even de dicto attributions don't supervene on narrow role, and that narrow content can't be explicated descriptively unless it collapses into phenomenalism. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Vaughan, R. %T Searle's narrow content %I %D 1989 %B Ratio %V 2 %N %P 185-90 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A White, S. %T Partial character and the language of thought %I %D 1982 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 63 %N %P 347-65 %Z Replies to Burge/Stich arguments by introducing partial character -- a function from context to content, analogous to Kaplan's character -- as the semantic property determined by functional state and relevant to explanation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Book Section %A White, S. %T Narrow content and narrow interpretation %I %D 1992 %B The Unity of the Self %Z Argues for an account of narrow content in terms of notional worlds, by considering "objective optimality" across worlds. This allows for a sort of narrow radical interpretation. With arguments against Stalnaker. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Williams, M. %T Social norms and narrow content %I %D 1990 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 15 %N %P 425-462 %Z Narrow content theories can't handle the normativity of content. In-depth treatment of Burge cases and of the failures of causal and conceptual-role accounts. Normativity is fundamentally social. A long, interesting paper. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Williamson, T. %T The broadness of the mental: Some logical issues %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 389-410 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the status of narrow content %U %0 Journal Article %A Braddon-Mitchell, D. %T Masters of our meanings %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Studies %V 118 %N %P 133-52 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Book Section %A Byrne, A. %A Pryor, J. %T Bad intensions %I Oxford University Press %D 2006 %B Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications %E M. Garcia-Carpintero %E J. Macia %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Book Section %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The components of content %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings %E D. Chalmers %Z Argues for a two-dimensional intensional theory, with different kinds of intensions constituting epistemic and subjunctive content. Epistemic content governs the dynamics of thought and behavior, and is primary in explanation. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T On sense and intension %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 16 %N %P 135-82 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The nature of narrow content %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 46-66 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Epistemic two-dimensional semantics %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Studies %V 118 %N %P 153-226 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Reference, contingency, and the two-dimensional framework %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Studies, %V 118 %N %P 83-131 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Elder, C. %T Kripkean externalism versus conceptual analysis %I %D 2003 %B Facta Philosophica %V 5 %N %P 75-86 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Fernandez, J. %T Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions %I %D 2004 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 12 %N %P 17-37 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Haukioja, J. %T Semantic externalism and a priori self-knowledge %I %D 2006 %B Ratio %V 19 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %T Why we need A-intensions %I %D 2004 %B 2004 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Marconi, D. %T Two-dimensional semantics and the articulation problem %I %D 2005 %B Synthese %V 143 %N %P 321-49 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Miscevic, N. %T Apriority and conceptual kinematics %I %D 2001 %B Croatian Journal of Philosophy %V 1 %N %P 21-48 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Nimtz, C. %T Two-dimensionalism and natural kind terms %I %D 2004 %B Synthese %V 138 %N %P 125-48 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Book Section %A Schiffer, S. %T Two-dimensional semantics and propositional attitude content %I %D 2003 %B The Things We Mean %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Schroeter, L. %T Gruesome diagonals %I %D 2003 %B Philosophers' Imprint %V 3 %N 3 %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Schroeter, L. %T The rationalist foundations of Chalmers' two-dimensional semantics %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Studies %V 18 %N %P 227-55 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. %T On considering a possible world as actual %I %D 2001 %B 2001 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , two-dimensionalism about content %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T The bounds of cognition %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 43-64 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Case, J. %T Offloading memory to the environment: A quantitative example %I %D 2004 %B Minds and Machines %V 14 %N %P 387-89 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The extended mind %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 7-19 %Z Advocates a different sort of "active externalism", based on the role of the environment in actively driving cognition. Beliefs can extend into an agent's immediate environment (e.g. a notebook) in this way. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Reasons, robots and the extended mind %I %D 2001 %B Mind and Language %V 16 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Book %A Clark, A. %T Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies and the Future of Human Intelligence %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Intrinsic content, active memory, and the extended mind %I %D 2005 %B Analysis %V 65 %N %P 1-11 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Dartnall, T. %T Does the world leak into the mind? Active externalism, "internalism", and epistemology %I %D 2005 %B Cognitive Science %V 29 %N %P 135-43 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Mind embodied and embedded %I Academia Sinica %D 1993 %B Mind and Cognition:1993 International Symposium %E Y. Houng %E J. Ho %Z Argues that the mind is not just embedded but intimately intermingled with the world. With some systems-theoretic arguments arguing against a determinate interface. Mind is not an inner realm. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Hurley, S. %T Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure and externalism %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 1-6 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Book %A Hutchins, E. %T Cognition in the Wild %I MIT Press %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirsh, D. %A Maglio, P. %T On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action %I %D 1995 %B Cognitive Science %V 18 %N %P 513-49 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Regan, K. %T Solving the "real" mysteries of visual perception: The world as an outside memory %I %D 1992 %B Canadian Journal of Psychology %V 46 %N %P 461-88 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Rupert, R. %T Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 101 %N %P 389-428 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Book Section %A Sterelny, K. %T Externalism, epistemic artefacts and the extended mind %I de Gruyter %D 2005 %B The Externalist Challenge: New Studies on Cognition and Intentionality %E R. Schantz %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Wide computationalism %I %D 1994 %B Mind %V 103 %N %P 351-72 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , the extended mind %U %0 Journal Article %A Brook, D. %T Substantial mind %I %D 1992 %B South African Journal of Philosophy %V 1 %N %P 15-21 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, D. J. %T Swampman of La Mancha %I %D 1993 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 327-48 %Z An entertaining fable about a swampthing doppelganger of a murder witness. Does he have content? With plot twists about personal identity. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, D. J. %T A furry tile about mental representation %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 185 %N %P 448-66 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Buekens, F. %T Externalism, content, and causal histories %I %D 1994 %B Dialectica %V 48 %N %P 267-86 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A de Vries, W. A. %T Experience and the swamp creature %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Studies %V 82 %N %P 55-80 %Z Argues that a swampthing isn't intelligent or intentional, with different physiological processes and no sensations, as these are functional kinds. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Drai, D. %T Externalism without identity %I %D 2003 %B Synthese %V 134 %N %P 463-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book %A Edwards, S. %T Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind %I Avebury %D 1994 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Engel, P. %T Functionalism, belief, and content %I Horwood %D 1987 %B The Mind and the Machine %E Torrance %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Mental content and the division of epistemic labour %I %D 1991 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 69 %N %P 302-18 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibbons, J. %T Identity without supervenience %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 70 %N %P 59-79 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Houghton, D. %T Mental content and external representations: internalism, anti-internalism %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 47 %N %P 159-77 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %A Pettit, P. %T Functionalism and broad content %I %D 1988 %B Mind %V 97 %N %P 318-400 %Z Should construe functionalism broadly rather than narrowly; then can handle the problem of broad content. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Katz, J. %T The domino theory %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 3-39 %Z Anti-intensional arguments are not independent but a series of dominos. Quine/Quine/Davidson/Putnam/Burge rise and fall together. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Macdonald, C. %T Weak externalism and mind-body identity %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 387-404 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Macdonald, C. %T Externalism and norms %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %B Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind %E A. O'Hear %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book %A McCulloch, G. %T The Mind and its World %I Routledge %D 1995 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A McGinn, C. %T The structure of content %I Oxford University Press %D 1982 %B Thought and Object %E A. Woodfield %Z Belief content has two distinct elements, one causal-explanatory, the other truth-related. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T In defense of a different Doppelganger %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Review %V 96 %N %P 521-54 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T Psychophysical supervenience: Its epistemological foundation %I %D 1992 %B Synthese %V 90 %N %P 89-117 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Pereboom, D. %T Conceptual structure and the individuation of content %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 401-428 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Preti, C. %T Belief and desire under the elms %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 270-284 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Rey, G. %T Semantic externalism and conceptual competence %I %D 1992 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 66 %N %P 315-33 %Z Supplements externalist "locking" theories of content with an account of internal "conceptions" by which thoughts lock onto environmental kinds, with that aid of dthat operators, thus solving various philosophical problems. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowlands, M. %T Externalism and token-token identity %I %D 1995 %B Philosophia %V 24 %N %P 359-75 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Book %A Rowlands, M. %T The Body in Mind: Understanding Cognitive Processes %I Cambridge University Press %D 1999 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Rudd, A. %T Two types of externalism %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 47 %N %P 501-7 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Seager, W. E. %T Externalism and token identity %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 42 %N %P 439-48 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. C. %T On what's in the head %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 3 %N %P 287-319 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Thomas, J. %T Analogies and the mind of the replica: Sunburn, the little green bug, and the fake plant %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 46 %N %P 364-371 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Vahid, H. %T Content externalism and the internalism/externalism debate in justification theory %I %D 2003 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 11 %N %P 89-107 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Voltolini, A. %T On the metaphysics of internalism and externalism %I %D 2005 %B Disputation %V 18 %N %P %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Walker, V. %T In defense of a different taxonomy: A reply to Owens %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Review %V 99 %N %P %Z Contra Owens 1987: wide intentional descriptions and molar bodily descriptions don't exhaust the options. A bracketing strategy gives a narrow intentional taxonomy of mental states. -DJC %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Williams, M. %T Externalism and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 40 %N %P 352-80 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Woodfield, A. %T Two categories of content %I %D 1986 %B Mind and Language %V 1 %N %P 319-54 %Z %K mental content,internalism and externalism , miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %T The informational turn in philosophy %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 471-501 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book %A Barwise, J. %A Perry, J. %T Situations and Attitudes %I MIT Press %D 1983 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Barwise, J. %T Information and circumstance %I %D 1986 %B 1986 %V %N %P %Z Defending information against Fodor 1986. Information is objective but relational, and depends on the relevant constraints between representation and environment. Circumstances play a vital role. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Barwise, J. %T Unburdening the language of thought %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Bogdan, R. J. %T Information and semantic cognition: An ontological account %I %D 1988 %B 1988 %V %N %P %Z From material (formal) info to semantic info via teleology; from semantic information to representation via internal structure. Cute. With a good reply by Israel, and a terse reply by Dretske. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Bogdan, R. J. %T Mind, content and information %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Bridges, J. %T Does informational semantics commit Euthypho's fallacy %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Mice, shrews, and misrepresentation %I %D 1993 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 90 %N %P 290-310 %Z Uses information theory to analyze misrepresentation. A signal represents what it carries most information about, not what it correlates best with. Treating some signals as noise can increase information content. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Coulter, J. %T The informed neuron: Issues in the use of information theory in the behavioral sciences %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 583-96 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book %A Dretske, F. %T Knowledge and the Flow of Information %I MIT Press %D 1981 %Z Defines knowledge content is in terms of information-flow from events, and applies to various aspects of psychology. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information %I %D 1983 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 6 %N %P 55-90 %Z A summary of the book, with commentary and replies. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Putting information to work %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z On the causal role of information (as opposed to meaning). Information is causally efficacious if considered with respect to learning. With commentary by Brian Smith. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book %A Dretske, F. %T Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays %I Cambridge University Press %D 2000 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Floridi, L. %T Two approaches to the philosophy of information %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 459-469 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Information and association %I %D 1986 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 27 %N %P %Z Transmission of information is no good without the encoding of information. With criticisms of associative networks, which transmit without encoding, and criticism of Barwise & Perry's account of attunement to a relation. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T A situated grandmother %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Foley, R. %T Dretske's `information-theoretic' account of knowledge %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Frank, M. C. %T Against informational atomism %I %D 2004 %B The Dualist %V 10 %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Gjelsvik, O. %T Dretske on knowledge and content %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 86 %N %P 425-41 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Grandy, R. %T Information-based epistemology, ecological epistemology and epistemology naturalized %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 191-203 %Z Shannon's notion of information is more useful for naturalized epistemology than Dretske's. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Grim, P. %A St. Denis, P. %A Kokalis, T. %T Information and meaning: Use-based models in arrays of neural nets %I %D 2004 %B Minds and Machines %V 14 %N %P 43-66 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T Indicator semantics and Dretske's function %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 367-82 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Heller, M. %T Indication and what might have been %I %D 1991 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 187-91 %Z We need to analyze indication in terms of "close enough" worlds; the relevant conditionals are "might"-conditionals. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book Section %A Israel, D. %A Perry, J. %T What is information? %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackendoff, R. %T Information is in the mind of the beholder %I %D 1985 %B Linguistics and Philosophy %V 8 %N %P 23-33 %Z Argues that a representationalist theory of semantics beats a realist one. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Kistler, M. %T Source and channel in the informational theory of mental content %I %D 2000 %B Facta Philosophica %V 2 %N %P 213-36 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Kulvicki, J. %T Isomorphism in information-carrying systems %I %D 2004 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 85 %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Loewer, B. %T From information to intentionality %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Morris, W. E. %T The regularity theory of information %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 375-398 %Z Dretske has problems with ruling out alternative possibilities; and there is a gap between information-caused belief and knowledge. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Savitt, S. %T Absolute informational content %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 185-90 %Z Makes a distinction between absolute information and information that's relative to other knowledge. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Sayre, K. M. %T Intentionality and information processing: An alternative model for cognitive science %I %D 1986 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 9 %N %P 121-38 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Sayre, K. M. %T Cognitive science and the problem of semantic content %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 247-69 %Z On problems with a computational approach to content: computers process info(t), the non-semantic content of communication theory, not info(s), or semantic content. Get info(s) from efficient processing of mutual info(t). -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Sturdee, D. %T The semantic shuffle: Shifting emphasis in Dretske's account of representational content %I %D 1997 %B Erkenntnis %V 47 %N %P 89-104 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Taylor, K. %T Belief, information and semantic content: A naturalist's lament %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 71 %N %P 97-124 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Usher, M. %T A statistical referential theory of content: Using information theory to account for misrepresentation %I %D 2001 %B Mind and Language %V 16 %N %P 331-334 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Winograd, T. %T Cognition, attunement and modularity %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Journal Article %A Zalabardo, J. L. %T A problem for information-theoretic semantics %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 105 %N %P 1-29 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, information-based accounts %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Meaning and the world order %I %D 1987 %B Psychosemantics %Z Defends and refines a causal theory, using the notion of asymmetric dependence of a token upon the world. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T A theory of content II %I %D 1990 %B A Theory of Content %Z Defending the asymmetric dependence theory against various objections. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T `X' means X: Semantics Fodor-style %I %D 1992 %B Minds and Machines %V 2 %N %P 175-83 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T Fodorian semantics, pathologies, and "Block's problem" %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 97-104 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T `X' means X: Fodor/Warfield semantics %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 215-31 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T Fodor's asymmetric causal dependency theory and proximal projections %I %D 1997 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 35 %N %P 433-437 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Book Section %A Antony, L. %A Levine, J. %T The nomic and the robust %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T On a causal theory of content %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Has content been naturalized? %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernier, P. %T Narrow content, context of thought, and asymmetric dependence %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 327-42 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Book Section %A Boghossian, P. %T Naturalizing content %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Argues that Fodor's theory is a type-1 theory, requiring naturalistically specifiable circumstances in which a symbol is only caused by its referent; and that these theories fail for various reasons, e.g. verificationism. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Cain, M. J. %T Fodor's attempt to naturalize mental content %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 49 %N %P 520-26 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Cram, H-R. %T Fodor's causal theory of representation %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 42 %N %P 56-70 %Z Fodor's theory has counterexamples and can't explain its counterfactuals; but we can save it by borrowing from Dretske's account of misrepresentation. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibson, M. %T Asymmetric dependencies, ideal conditions, and meaning %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 9 %N %P 235-59 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Book Section %A Loar, B. %T Can we explain intentionality? %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T Mental misrepresentation %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy of Science %V 57 %N %P 445-58 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Manfredi, P. A. %A Summerfield, D. M. %T Robustness without asymmetry: A flaw in Fodor's theory of content %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 66 %N %P 261-83 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Mariano, L. B. %T Content naturalized %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 96 %N %P 205-38 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Mendola, J. %T A dilemma for asymmetric dependence %I %D 2003 %B Nous %V 37 %N %P 232-257 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Rupert, R. %T Dispositions indisposed: Semantic atomism and Fodor's theory of content %I %D 2000 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 81 %N %P 325-349 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Seager, W. E. %T Fodor's theory of content: problems and objections %I %D 1993 %B Phiosophy of Science %V 60 %N %P 262-77 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Wallis, C. %T Asymmetric dependence, representation, and cognitive science %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 373-401 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. A. %T Fodorian semantics: A reply to Adams and Aizawa %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 205-14 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, asymmetric dependence %U %0 Journal Article %A Aizawa, K. %T Lloyd's dialectical theory of representation %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 1-24 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Representation and covariation %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B ReRepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T The LOT of the causal theory of mental content %I %D 1997 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 94 %N %P 535-542 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Semantics, Wisconsin style %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 59 %N %P 231-50 %Z A somewhat sympathetic commentary on the Dretske/Stampe causal theories, but raising the problem of misrepresentation. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Information and representation %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Godfrey-Smith, P. %T Misinformation %I %D 1989 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 533-50 %Z On various attempts to solve the error problem and why they don't work. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Godfrey-Smith, P. %T Signal, decision, action %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 88 %N %P 709-22 %Z World-head reliability is just as important as head-world reliability. With arguments and examples from signal detection theory. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Lloyd on intrinsic natural representation in simple mechanical minds %I %D 1996 %B Minds and Machines %V 6 %N %P 47-60 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T Content: Covariation, control, and contingency %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 100 %N %P 241-90 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T What is wrong with correlational psychosemantics %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Ray, G. %T Fodor and the inscrutability problem %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 475-89 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Stampe, D. %T Towards a causal theory of linguistic representation %I %D 1977 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 2 %N %P 42-63 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Stampe, D. %T Verificationism and a causal account of meaning %I %D 1986 %B Synthese %V 69 %N %P 107-37 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Book Section %A Stampe, D. %T Content, context, and explanation %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Viger, C. D. %T Locking on to the language of thought %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 203-215 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Warmbrod, K. %T Primitive representation and misrepresentation %I %D 1992 %B Topoi %V 11 %N %P 89-101 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Weitzman, L. %T What makes a causal theory of content anti-skeptical? %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 299-318 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, causal accounts, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %T Rock beats scissors: Historicalism fights back %I %D 1997 %B Analysis %V 57 %N %P 273-81 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Agar, N. %T What do frogs really believe? %I %D 1993 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 71 %N %P 1-12 %Z Argues that a teleological account can resolve content indeterminacies, by an appeal to counterfactuals in examining what properties were selected for. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book %A Ariew, A. %T Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Braddon-Mitchell, D. %A Jackson, F. %T The teleological theory of content %I %D 1997 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 75 %N %P 474-89 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Braddon-Mitchell, D. %A Jackson, F. %T A pyrrhic victory for teleonomy %I %D 2002 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 80 %N %P 372-77 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Clarke, M. %T Darwinian algorithms and indexical representation %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P 27-48 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Manuscript %A Dennett, D. C. %T Fear of Darwin's optimizing rationale %I %D 1988 %Z Defends evolutionary theories of content against Fodor. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Evolution, error and intentionality %I %D 1988 %B The Intentional Stance %Z Attacks original intentionality (Fodor/Burge/Dretske/Searle/Kripke) -- our intentionality, if anything, is derived through evolution, and so is as indeterminate as that of an artifact. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Misrepresentation %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Belief: Form, Content, and Function %E R. Bogdan %Z Tries to deal with misrepresentation by appealing to function. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Norms, history, and the mental %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Evolution, Naturalism and Mind %E D. Walsh %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Elder, C. L. %T What versus how in naturally selected representations %I %D 1998 %B Mind %V 107 %N %P 349-363 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Psychosemantics, or, Where do truth conditions come from? %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Mind and Cognition %E W. Lycan %Z Truth conditions are "entry conditions" for belief under "normal function". Later repudiated. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T A theory of content I %I %D 1990 %B A Theory of Content %Z Teleological solutions can't work, because of underdetermination and so on. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Hardcastle, V. %T On the normativity of functions %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Functions %E A. Ariew %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Joyce, R. %T Moral realism and teleosemantics %I %D 2002 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 16 %N %P 723-31 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Keeley, B. %T Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems: The neuroethology of electroreception %I %D 1999 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 14 %N %P 395-430 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Lalor, B. J. %T Swampman, etiology, and content %I %D 1998 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 36 %N %P 215-232 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Levine, J. %T Swampjoe: mind or simulation? %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 86-91 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Macdonald, G. %T Biology and representation %I %D 1989 %B Mind and Language %V 4 %N %P 186-200 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthen, M. %T Biological functions and perceptual content %I %D 1988 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 85 %N %P 5-27 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T An evolutionist approach to language %I %D 1979 %B Philosophy Research Archives %V 5 %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book %A Millikan, R. G. %T Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories %I MIT Press %D 1984 %Z An evolutionary account of thought, content, and various intentional phenomena, appealing to proper functions and adaptational role to individuate contents. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 47-80 %Z The content of a desire is its adaptational Proper Function; the content of a belief is its Normal Condition for success. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Biosemantics %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 86 %N %P 281-97 %Z Representation content is determined by the consumption of a representation, not its production. The representation-world correspondence is best taken as a normal condition for the consumer's function. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T In defense of proper functions %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 288-302 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Compare and contrast Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan on teleosemantics %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Topics %V 18 %N %P 151-61 %Z Contrasting positions on the role of representation production and consumption; also on the role of reliability, articulateness, and learning. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Millikan, R. G. %T Speaking up for Darwin %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z A reply to some of Fodor's criticisms of teleological theories in _Psychosemantics_ and elsewhere. With some remarks on Fodor's asymmetric dependence theory. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book %A Millikan, R. G. %T White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice %I %D 1993 %Z A collection of papers on teleological semantics and other issues about psychology and mental content. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T On swampkinds %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 103-17 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Troubles with Wagner's reading of Millikan %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Studies %V 86 %N %P 93-96 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Millikan, R. G. %T What has natural information to do with intentional representation? %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Evolution, Naturalism and Mind %E D. Walsh %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Millikan, R. G. %T Biofunctions: Two paradigms %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Functions %E A. Ariew %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book %A Millikan, R. G. %T Varieties of Meaning %I MIT Press %D 2004 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Neander, K. %T Misrepresenting and malfunctioning %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 79 %N %P 109-41 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Neander, K. %T Dretske's innate modesty %I %D 1995 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 74 %N %P 258-74 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Neander, K. %T Swampman meets swampcow %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 118-29 %Z It's not unreasonable to deny a swampthing beliefs: swampcows aren't cows and swamphearts aren't hearts. Semantic norms are plausibly grounded in biological norms and so in history. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Newton, N. %T Dennett on intrinsic intentionality %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 18-23 %Z Contra Dennett 1988, designed creatures can have intrinsic (if not original) intentionality. Overall purpose is dependent on designer's goals, but specific contents need not be. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T Representation and explanation %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy of Science %V 51 %N %P 550-72 %Z A teleological theory of belief/desire contents: the satisfaction conditions for a desire are those effects for which it was selected; truth conditions for a belief are circumstances resulting in satisfaction of desires. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Papineau, D. %T Truth and teleology %I Cambridge University Press %D 1990 %B Explanation and its Limits %E D. Knowles %Z Best theory is combination of a success-guaranteeing account of truth-conditions with a teleological account of desire. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T Teleology and mental states %I %D 1991 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 65 %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T Doubtful intuitions %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 130-32 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T Teleosemantics and indeterminacy %I %D 1998 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 76 %N %P 1-14 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T The status of teleosemantics, or how to stop worrying about Swampman %I %D 2001 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 79 %N %P 279-89 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Perlman, M. %T Pagan teleology: Adaptational role and the philosophy of mind %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Functions %E A. Ariew %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Pickles, D. %T Intentionality, representation, and function %I %D 1989 %B Sussex University, Cognitive Science Research Paper %V 140 %N %P %Z Combining the analysis-relative and historical accounts of function, and using these to give an account of intentionality: representation are produced by conditional productive functions. Argues against Fodor on indeterminacy. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Pietrowski, P. M. %T Intentionality and teleological error %I %D 1992 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 73 %N %P 267-82 %Z Millikan's theory has an implausible consequence: creatures' belief contents can involve properties which they cannot discriminate. With examples. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book %A Price, C. %T Functions in Mind: A Theory of Intentional Content %I Oxford University Press %D 2001 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Ross, D. %A Zawidzki, T. %T Information and teleosemantics %I %D 1994 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 32 %N %P 393-419 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Rountree, J. %T The plausibility of teleological content ascriptions: A reply to Pietroski %I %D 1997 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 78 %N %P 404-20 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowlands, M. %T Teleological semantics %I %D 1996 %B Mind %V 106 %N %P 279-304 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Rupert, R. D. %T Mental representations and Millikan's theory of intentionalcontent: Does biology chase causality? %I %D 1999 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 37 %N %P 113-140 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Schroeder, T. %T New norms for teleosemantics %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Sehon, S. R. %T Teleology and the nature of mental states %I %D 1994 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 31 %N %P 63-72 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. %T Representation from bottom to top %I %D 1996 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 26 %N %P 523-42 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. %T Darwin and disjunction: Foraging theory and univocal assignments of content %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1992 %N %P %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Sullivan, S. R. %T From natural function to indeterminate content %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 69 %N %P 129-37 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Wagner, S. %T Teleosemantics and the troubles of naturalism %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Studies %V 82 %N %P 81-110 %Z Teleosemantics has big problems with indeterminacy, holism, false belief, and "psychophysical normalcy" in causation. So do all naturalistic stories. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Walsh, D. M. %T Brentano's chestnuts %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Functions %E A. Ariew %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Zawidzki, T. %A Ross, D. %T Information and teleosemantics %I %D 1994 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 32 %N %P 393-419 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Zawidzki, T. %T Mythological content: A problem for Milikan's teleosemantics %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 16 %N %P 535-538 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, teleological approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T Advertisement for a semantics for psychology %I %D 1986 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 10 %N %P 615-78 %Z An in-depth program for conceptual-role semantics, and its role in a two-factor account of meaning. Also a defense of narrow content. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T Functional role and truth conditions %I %D 1988 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 61 %N %P 157-181 %Z A defense of functional role semantics, and an account of its relation to truth-conditional factors. A two-factor theory will handle wide content. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. A. %T Inferential-role semantics and the analytic/synthetic distinction %I %D 1994 %B 1994 %V %N %P %Z No matter how we understand the denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction, the falsity of inferential-role semantics does not follow. The meaning-constitutive inferences needn't be the analytic inferences. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Brandom, R. %T Reasoning and representing %I Kluwer %D 1994 %B Philosophy in Mind %E M. Michael %E J. O'Leary-Hawthorne %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T Conceptual role semantics and the explanatory role of content %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 65 %N %P 103-127 %Z CRS conflates representation content and attitude content (which depends on a representation's "target"), so can't handle representation content; it makes all content-based explanations vacuous; and it can't handle error properly. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Field, H. %T Logic, meaning, and conceptual role %I %D 1977 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 74 %N %P 379-409 %Z Explicates conceptual role in terms of conditional probability, and analyzes meaning as conceptual role plus reference. With remarks on truth, descriptions, and synonymy. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Field, H. %T Mental representation %I %D 1978 %B Erkenntnis %V 13 %N %P 9-61 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %A LePore, E. %T Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role %I %D 1991 %B Mind and Language %V 6 %N %P 328-43 %Z Conceptual role semantics isn't compatible with compositional semantics and the denial of an analytic/synthetic distinction, as full conceptual roles aren't compositional, and there's no way to specify a relevant subset. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Harman, G. %T Meaning and semantics %I New York University Press %D 1974 %B Semantics and Philosophy %E M. Munitz %E P. Unger %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Book Section %A Harman, G. %T Language, thought, and communication %I University of Minnesota Press %D 1975 %B Language, Mind, and Knowledge %E K. Gunderson %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Harman, G. %T Conceptual role semantics %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 28 %N %P 242-56 %Z Meaning and content is determined by the role of symbols in thought (e.g. inference and perception). With remarks on indeterminacy, context-dependence, the linguistic division of labor, qualia, speech acts, and more. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Horowitz, A. %T Functional role and intentionality %I %D 1992 %B Theoria %V 58 %N %P 197-218 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Loar, B. %T Conceptual role and truth conditions %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 23 %N %P 272-83 %Z On the relation between conceptual role and truth-conditions. Contra Harman, truth-conditions are to an extent independent of conceptual role. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Loewer B. %T The role of `Conceptual role semantics' %I %D 1982 %B Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic %V 23 %N %P 305-15 %Z Contra Harman 1982, truth-conditions are central to a semantic theory. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A McCullagh, M. %T Do inferential roles compose? %I %D 2003 %B Dialectica %V 57 %N %P 431-38 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Perlman, M. %T The trouble with two-factor conceptual role theories %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 495-513 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Silverberg, A. %T Putnam on functionalism %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 67 %N %P 111-31 %Z Argues against Putnam 1987 that conceptual role plays an important role in determining meaning. Appeals to the induction theory of Holland et al. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Twin pleas: Probing content and compositionality %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 57 %N %P 871-89 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. A. %T On a semantic argument against conceptual role semantics %I %D 1993 %B Analysis %V 53 %N %P 298-304 %Z Contra Fodor and Lepore, meanings can be compositional even if inferential roles are not, as long as meanings only supervene on inferential role. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, conceptual role approaches %U %0 Journal Article %A Brook, A. %A Stainton, R. %T Fodor's new theory of content and computation %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 459-74 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %A Churchland, P. S. %T Stalking the wild epistemic engine %I %D 1983 %B Nous %V 17 %N %P 5-18 %Z On "translational" (conceptual) and "calibrational" (referential) content. Relation of content issues to computational issues. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book %A Cummins, R. %T Meaning and Mental Representation %I MIT Press %D 1989 %Z Critiques other views, offers interpretational semantics. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book %A Cummins, R. %T Representations, Targets, and Attitudes %I MIT Press %D 1996 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Haugeland on representation and intentionality %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Philosophy and Mental Representation %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Ways of establishing harmony %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Dretske and his Critics %E B. McLaughlin %Z On the ways in which meanings can come to cohere with their causal roles: learning, natural selection, and design. Criticizes Dretske for undervaluing the latter two: all three are in the same boat. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Aspects of cognitive representation %I University of Arizona Press %D 1986 %B The Representation of Knowledge and Belief %E M. Brand %E R. Harnish %Z On the reference and content of representations. Reference is determined by causation; content, i.e. representation "as", is determined by functional role, when functioning normally in natural habitat. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Dunlop, C. E. M. %T Mentalese semantics and the naturalized mind %I %D 2004 %B Philosphical Psychology %V 17 %N %P 77-94 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Ryder, D. %T SINBAD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation %I %D 2004 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 211-240 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. A. %T The nature of nature: Rethinking naturalistic theories of intentionality %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 309-322 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Stalnaker, R. %T How to do semantics for the language of thought %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z On some tensions in Fodor's view of content: e.g. narrow content must be dependent on functional role, which seems to lead to holism. The role of denotational semantics as a defense is unclear. -DJC %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Usher, M. %T Comment on Ryder's SINBAD neurosemantics: Is teleofunction isomorphism the way to understand representations? %I %D 2004 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 241-248 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Wakefield, J. %T Fodor on inscrutability %I %D 2003 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 524-537 %Z %K mental content,theories of content, theories of content, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Bestor, T. W. %T Naturalizing semantics: New insights or old folly? %I %D 1991 %B Inquiry %V 34 %N %P 285-310 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Beckermann, A. %T Is there a problem about intentionality? %I %D 1996 %B Erkenntnis %V 45 %N %P 1-24 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Book Section %A Bontly, T. %T Should intentionality be naturalized? %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Evolution, Naturalism and Mind %E D. Walsh %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Callaway, H. G. %T Intentionality naturalized: Continuity, reconstruction, and instrumentalism %I %D 1995 %B Dialectica %V 49 %N %P 147-68 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Devitt, M. %T The methodology of naturalistic semantics %I %D 1994 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 91 %N %P 519-44 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Haldane, J. J. %T Naturalism and the problem of intentionality %I %D 1989 %B Inquiry %V 32 %N %P 305-22 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T Naturalism and intentionality %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 76 %N %P 301-26 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Chisholm's legacy on intentionality %I %D 2003 %B Metaphilosophy %V 34 %N %P 649-662 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Madell, G. %T Physicalism and the content of thought %I %D 1989 %B Inquiry %V 32 %N %P 107-21 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Martin, C. B. %A Pfeifer, K. %T Intentionality and the non-psychological %I %D 1986 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 46 %N %P 531-54 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Silvers, S. %T On naturalizing the semantics of mental representation %I %D 1991 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 42 %N %P 49-73 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %A and Laurence, S. %T Intentionality and naturalism %I %D 1994 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 159-82 %Z Argues that a failure to "naturalize" intentionality won't lead to disasters such as irrealism, irrelevance, or non-science, whether naturalization is understood as analysis, property identity, supervenience, or whatever. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Tye, M. %T Naturalism and the problem of intentionality %I %D 1994 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 122-42 %Z There's no deep problem of naturalism about intentionality, as we know it's true already. The real puzzle is that of finding a mechanism to close the gap, e.g. via analysis or essentialism. But naturalism doesn't require that. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, naturalism and intentionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Aldridge, V. C. %T Kripke on Wittgenstein on Regulation %I %D 1987 %B Philosophy %V 62 %N %P 375-384 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Allen, B. %T Gruesome arithmetic: Kripke's sceptic replies %I %D 1989 %B Dialogue %V 28 %N %P 257-264 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Anscombe, G. E. M. %T Review of Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language %I %D 1985 %B Ethics %V 95 %N %P 342-352 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Anscombe, G. E. M. %T Critical Notice: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 15 %N %P 103-9 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, G. %A Hacker, P. %T Critical study: On misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's private language argument %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 58 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, G. %A Hacker, P. %T Reply to Mr. Mounce %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 9 %N %P 199-204 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Blackburn, S. %T The individual strikes back %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 58 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T The rule-following considerations %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 507-49 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T The status of content %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Review %V 99 %N %P 157-84 %Z Irrealism about mental content (and therefore truth-conditions) can't be made sense of. An error thesis presupposes factual truth-conditions, and a non-factualist thesis presupposes a non-deflationary theory of truth. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T The status of content revisited %I %D 1991 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 71 %N %P 264-78 %Z Reply to Devitt 1990. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Byrne, A. %T On misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Canfield, J. %T The community view %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Review %V 105 %N %P 469-488 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Coates, P. %T Kripke's skeptical paradox: Normativeness and meaning %I %D 1995 %B Mind %V 1986 %N %P 77-80 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Coates, P. %T Meaning, mistake, and miscalculation %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 171-97 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Collins, A. %T On the paradox Kripke finds in Wittgenstein %I %D 1992 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 18 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, F. %T How sceptical is Kripke's "sceptical solution" %I %D 1998 %B Philsophia %V 26 %N %P 119-40 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, S. %T Kripke, Crusoe and Wittgenstein %I %D 1988 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 66 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Devitt, M. %T Transcendentalism about content %I %D 1990 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 71 %N %P 247-63 %Z Against Boghossian's critique: the eliminativism will express her claim in a new framework, so appeals to truth beg the question. With a response. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Devitt, M. %A Rey, G. %T Transcending transcendentalism %I %D 1991 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 72 %N %P 87-100 %Z Rejoinder to Boghossian 1990. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Forbes, G. %T Scepticism and semantic knowledge %I %D 1983 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 84 %N %P 223-37 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T A new skeptical solution %I %D 1995 %B Acta Analytica: %V 113 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Gillett, G. %T Humpty Dumpty and the night of the triffids: Individualism and rule-following %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 105 %N %P 191-206 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ginet, C. %T The dispositionalist solutions to Wittgenstein's problem about understanding a rule: Answering Kripke's objection %I %D 1992 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 17 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldfarb, W. %T Kripke on Wittgenstein on rules %I %D 1982 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 82 %N %P 471-488 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hacking, I. %T On Kripke's and Goodman's uses of 'grue' %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy %V 68 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanfling, O. %T Was Wittgenstein a sceptic? %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 8 %N %P 1-16 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Haukioja, J. %T Soames and Zalabardo on Kripke's Wittgenstein %I %D 2002 %B Grazer Philosophische Studien %V 64 %N %P 157-73 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Haukioja, J. %T Hindriks on rule-following %I %D 2006 %B 2006 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hindriks, F. %T A modest solution to the problem of rule-following %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Studies %V 121 %N %P 65-98 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hoffman, P. %T Kripke on private language %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Studies: %V 47 %N %P 23-28 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hohwy, J. %T Semantic primitivism and normativity %I %D 2001 %B Ratio %V 14 %N %P 1-17 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hohwy, J. %T A reduction of Kripke-Wittgenstein's objections to dispositionalism about meaning %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 257-68 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horwich, P. %T Wittgenstein and Kripke on the nature of meaning %I %D 1990 %B Mind and Language %V 5 %N %P 105-121 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Humphrey, J. %T Kripke's Wittgenstein and the impossibility of private language: The same old story? %I %D 1996 %B Journal of Philosophical Research %V 21 %N %P 197-207 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Humphrey, J. %T Quine, Kripke's Wittgenstein, simplicity and sceptical solutions %I %D 1999 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 37 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Inwagen, P. %T There is no such thing as addition %I %D 1992 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 17 %N %P 138-159 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackman, H. %T Foundationalism, coherentism, and rule-following skepticism %I %D 2003 %B International Journal of Philosophical Studies %V 11 %N %P 25-41 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kober, M. %T Kripkenstein meets the Chinese room: Looking for the place of meaning from a natural point of view %I %D 1998 %B Inquiry %V 41 %N %P 317-332 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kremer, M. %T Wilson on Kripke's Wittgenstein %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 60 %N %P 571-584 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kusch, M. %T Fodor v. Kripke: Semantic dispositionalism, idealization, and ceteris paribus clauses %I %D 2005 %B Analysis %V 65 %N %P 156-63 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book %A Lance, M. %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %T The Grammar of Meaning %I Cambridge University Press %D 1997 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Landers, S. %T Wittgenstein, realism, and CLS: Undermining rule scepticism %I %D 1990 %B Law and Philosophy %V 9 %N %P 177-203 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, A. %T Wittgenstein and rule-scepticism %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 38 %N %P 280-304 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Maddy, P. %T Mathematical alchemy %I %D 1986 %B British Journal of Philosophy of Science %V 46 %N %P 555-575 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book Section %A McDonough, R. %T Wittgenstein's refutation of meaning-scepticism %I De Gruyter %D 1991 %B Meaning Scepticism %E K. Puhl %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, M. %T Kripke on Wittgenstein's Sceptical Problem %I %D 1984 %B Ratio, %V 26 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A McManus, D. %T Boghossian, Miller and Lewis on dispositional theories of meaning. Mind and Language 15:393-399. Miller, A. 1997. Boghossian on reductive dispositionalism about content: The case strengthened %I %D 2000 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 1-10 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Truth, rules, hoverflies, and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Review, %V 99 %N %P 323-53 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Oderberg, D. S. %T Kripke and "quus". Theoria 53:115-20. pp %I %D 1987 %B 1 %V 15 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Pettit, P. %T The reality of rule-following %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 1-21 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Preti, C. %T Normativity and meaning: Kripke's skeptical paradox reconsidered %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Forum %V 33 %N %P 39-62 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book %A Puhl, K. (ed.) %T Meaning Scepticism %I de Gruyter %D 1991 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H, %T Why reason can't be naturalized %I %D 1985 %B Realism and Reason %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Read, R. %T The unstatability of Kripkean scepticism %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Papers %V 24 %N %P 67-74 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rudebusch, G. %T Hoffman on Kripke's Wittgenstein %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Research Archives %V 12 %N %P 177-182 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sartorelli, J. %T McGinn on content scepticism and Kripke's sceptical argument %I %D 1991 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 79-84 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Schroeder, T. %T Donald Davidson's theory of mind is non-normative %I %D 2003 %B Philosopher's Imprint %V 3 %N %P 1-14 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Scruton, R. %T Critical Notice: Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language %I %D 1984 %B Mind %V 93 %N %P 592-602 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. %T Indeterminacy, empiricism, and the first person %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 84 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book Section %A Searle, J. %T Skepticism about rules and intentionalilty %I %D 2002 %B Consciousness and Language %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shanker, S. %T Sceptical confusions about rule-following %I %D 1984 %B Mind %V 93 %N %P 423-29 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shogenji, T. %T Boomerang defense of rule following %I %D 1992 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 30 %N %P 115-122 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shogenji, T. %T Modest scepticism about rule-following %I %D 1993 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 71 %N %P 486-500 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shogenji, T. %T The problem of rule-following in compositional semantics %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 97-108 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Soames, S. %T Skepticism about meaning, indeterminacy, normativity, and the rule-following paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. Vol %I %D 1998 %B %V 23 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Soames, S. %T Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 313-48 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stock, G. %T Leibniz and Kripke's sceptical paradox %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 38 %N %P 326-329 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Summerfield, D. M. %T Philosophical Investigations 201: A Wittgensteinian reply to Kripke %I %D 1990 %B Journal of the History of Philosophy %V 28 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Summerfield, D. M. %T On taking the rabbit of rule-following out of the hat of representation: A response to Pettit's 'The reality of rule-following' %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Suter, R. %T Saul Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Research Archives %V 12 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Teghrarian, S. %T Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the 'paradox' of meaning. Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy %I %D 1994 %B 1994 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Meaning, dispositions, and normativity %I %D 1999 %B Minds and Machines %V 9 %N %P 399-413 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Von Morstein, P. %T Kripke, Wittgenstein and the private language argument %I %D 1980 %B Grazer Philosophische Studien %V 11 %N %P 61-74 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Book %A Werhane, P. %T Skepticism, Rules and Private Languages %I Humanities Press %D 1992 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, G. M. %T Kripke on Wittgenstein and normativity %I %D 1994 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 19 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, G. M. %T Semantic realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein %I %D 1998 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 58 %N %P 99-122 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Winch, P. %T Critical Study: Facts and Superfacts %I %D 1983 %B The Philosophical Quarterly %V 33 %N %P 398-404 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wright, C. %T Kripke's account of the argument against private language %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 81 %N %P 759-78 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Zalabardo, J. L. %T Kripke's normativity argument %I %D 1997 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 27 %N %P 467-488 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning skepticism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ackermann, D. F. %T Wittgenstein, rules and origin--privacy %I %D 1983 %B Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research %V 1 %N %P 63-69 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Armstrong, B. %T Wittgenstein on private languages: It takes two to talk %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 7 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Ayer, A. J. %T Can there be a private language? %I %D 1954 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 27 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Baker, G. P. %A Hacker, P. M. S. %T Scepticism, Rules and Language %I Blackwell %D 1984 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Baker, G. P. %A Hacker, P. M. S. %T Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity %I %D 1985 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, G. %A and Hacker, P. %T Malcolm on language and rules %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy %V 65 %N %P 167-179 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Bar-On, D. %T On the possibility of a solitary language %I %D 1992 %B Nous %V 26 %N %P 27-46 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Bloor, D. %T Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions %I Routledge %D 1997 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Budd, M. %T Wittgenstein on meaning, interpretation and rules %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 58 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Carruthers, P. %T Baker and Hacker's Wittgenstein %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 58 %N %P 451-79 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Carruthers, P. %T Ruling-out realism %I %D 1985 %B Philosophia %V 15 %N %P 61-78 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Champlin, T. S. %T Solitary rule-following %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy %V 67 %N %P 285-306 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Craig, E. %T Meaning and privacy %I Blackwell %D 1997 %B A Companion to the Philosophy of Language %E B. Hale %E C. Wright %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Davidson, D. %T The second person %I %D 1992 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 17 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Diamond, C. %T Rules: Looking in the right place. In (D. Phillips & P %I %D 1989 %B 1989 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Dwyer, P. %T Freedom and rule-following in Wittgenstein and Sartre %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 50 %N %P 49-68 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Ebbs, G. %T Rule-Following and Realism %I Harvard University Press %D 1997 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Eldridge, R. %T The normal and the normative: Wittgenstein's legacy, Kripke, and Cavell %I %D 1986 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 46 %N %P 555-575 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Finkelstein, D. H. %T Wittgenstein on rules and Platonism %I Routledge %D 2000 %B The New Wittgenstein %E A. Crary %E R. Read %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Gottlieb, D. F. %T Wittgenstein's critique of the "Tractatus" view of rules %I %D 1983 %B Synthese %V 56 %N %P 239-251 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Hacking, I. %T Rules, scepticism, proof, Wittgenstein. In (I %I %D 1985 %B 1985 %V %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Hale, B. %T Rule-following, objectivity and meaning %I Blackwell %D 1997 %B A Companion to the Philosophy of Language %E B. Hale %E C. Wright %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanfling, O. %T What does the private language argument prove? %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 34 %N %P 468-481 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Haukioja, J. %T Is solitary rule-following possible? %I %D 2004 %B Philosophia %V 32 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %A Martin, C. B. %T Rules and powers %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 283-312 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Holtzman, S. %A Leich, C. %T Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule %I Routledge %D 1981 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Huff, D. %T Family resemblances and rule-governed behavior %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 4 %N %P 1-23 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Krebs, V. %T Objectivity and meaning: Wittgenstein on following rules %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 9 %N %P 177-186 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Malcolm, N. %T Wittgenstein on language and rules %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy %V 64 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Martin, C. B. %A Heil, J, %T Rules and powers %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 283-312 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A McDowell, J. %T Non-cognitivism and rule-following %I Routledge %D 1981 %B Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule %E S. Holtzman %E C. Leich %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A McDowell, J. %T Wittgenstein on following a rule %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 58 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A McDowell, J. %T Meaning and intentionality in Wittgenstein's later philosophy %I %D 1992 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 17 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A McDowell, J. %T Intentionality and interiority in wittgenstein: Comment on Crispin Wright %I De Gruyter %D 1991 %B Meaning Scepticism %E K. Puhl %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A McGinn, C. %T Wittgenstein on Meaning %I Blackwell %D 1984 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Miller, A. %A Wright, C. %T Rule-Following and Meaning %I Acumen %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Minar, E. %T Wittgenstein and the "contingency" of community %I %D 1991 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, %V 72 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Moser, P. %T Malcolm on Wittgenstein on rules %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy %V 66 %N %P 101-105 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Moser, P. %T Beyond the private language argument %I %D 1992 %B Metaphilosophy %V 23 %N %P 77-89 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Mounce, H. O. %T Following a rule %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 9 %N %P 187-198 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Analyticity and apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine %I %D 1983 %B Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Putnam, H. %T On Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics %I %D 1996 %B Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume %V 70 %N %P 243-264 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Read, R. %T What 'There can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word' could possibly mean %I Routledge %D 2000 %B The New Wittgenstein %E A. Crary %E R. Read %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Rhees, R. %T Can there be a private language? %I %D 1954 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume %V 28 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Wittgenstein, following a rule, and scientific psychology %I Kluwer %D 1992 %B The Scientific Enterprise %E E. Ullmann-Margalit %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Stroud, B. %T Wittgenstein and logical necessity %I %D 1965 %B Philosophical Review %V 74 %N %P 504-518 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Stroud, B. %T Mind, meaning and practice %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %B The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein %E H. Sluga %E D. Stern %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Tait, W. W. %T Wittgenstein and the 'skeptical paradoxes' %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 9 %N %P 475-488 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Tanney, J. %T Playing the rule-following game %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy %V 75 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Temkin, J. %T A private language argument %I %D 1986 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 24 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Walton, D. %A Strongman, K. T. %T Neonate Crusoes, the private language argument and psychology %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 443-65 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Williams, M. %T Wittgenstein on representation, privileged objects and private language %I %D 1983 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 13 %N %P 57-78 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Williams, M. %T Blind obedience: Rules, community and the individual %I De Gruyter %D 1991 %B Meaning Scepticism %E K. Puhl %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Wright, C. %T Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics %I Harvard University Press %D 1980 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Wright, C. %T Rule-following, objectivity and the theory of meaning %I Routledge %D 1981 %B Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule %E S. Holtzman %E C. Leich %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Wright, C. %T Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations and the central project of theoretical linguistics %I Blackwell %D 1989 %B Reflections on Chomsky %E A. George %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Wright, C. %T Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mind: Sensation, privacy and intention %I De Gruyter %D 1991 %B Meaning Scepticism %E K. Puhl %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book %A Wright, C. %T Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations %I Harvard University Press %D 2001 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Journal Article %A Zalabardo, J. L. %T Rules, communities and judgement %I %D 1989 %B Critica %V 21 %N %P 33-58 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, rule-following %U %0 Book Section %A Bilgrami, A. %T Norms and meaning %I de Gruyter %D 1993 %B Reflecting Davidson %E R. Stoecker %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T The normativity of content %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 31-45 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Book %A Brandom, R. %T Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment %I Harvard University Press %D 1994 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Brandom, R. %T Modality, normativity, and intentionality %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 63 %N %P 611-23 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Intellectual norms and foundations of mind %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 83 %N %P 697-720 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Engel, P. %T Wherein lies the normative dimension in meaning and mental content? %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Studies %V 100 %N %P 305-321 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Engel, P. %T Intentionality, normativity, and community %I %D 2002 %B Facta Philosophica %V 4 %N %P 25-49 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Gampel, E. H. %T The normativity of meaning %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Studies %V 86 %N %P 221-42 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibbard, A. %T Thoughts, norms, and discursive practices: Commentary on Brandom %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 699-717 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibbard, A. %T Thoughts and norms %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 83-98 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Gluer, K. %T Sense and prescriptivity %I %D 1999 %B Acta Analytica %V 14 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Hattiangadi, A. %T Making it implicit: Brandom on rule-following %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 66 %N %P 419-31 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Timmons, M. %T Metaphysical naturalism, semantic normativity, and meta-semantic irrealism %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Issues %V 4 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Naturalism and semantic normativity %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Issues %V 4 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Loeffler, R. %T Normative phenomenalism: On Robert Brandom's practice-based explanation of meaning %I %D 2005 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 13 %N %P 32-69 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Book Section %A Millar, A. %T The normativity of meaning %I Cambridge University Press %D 2002 %B Logic, Thought, and Language %E A. O'Hear %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %T Normativity and judgment %I %D 1999 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 73 %N %P 16-43 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Book Section %A Peacocke, C. %T Content and norms in a natural world %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosen, G. %T Brandom on modality, normativity, and intentionality %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 63 %N %P 611-23 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. %T Brandom on the normativity of meaning %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 68 %N %P 141-60 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, D. C. %T Meaning, normativity, and reductive naturalism %I %D 2001 %B Sorites %V 12 %N %P 60-65 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Tanney, J. %T Normativity and judgment II %I %D 1999 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 73 %N %P 45-61 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Toribio, J. %T Semantic responsibility %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Explorations %V 1 %N %P 39-58 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Wikforss, A. M. %T Semantic normativity %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 102 %N %P 203-26 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the normativity of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Abbott, B. %T Fodor and Lepore on meaning similarity and compositionality %I %D 2000 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 454-6 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Becker, K. %T On the perfectly general nature of instability in meaning holism %I %D 1998 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 95 %N %P 635-640 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T Why holism is harmless and necessary %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 105-126 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T An argument for holism %I %D 1995 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 95 %N %P 151-70 %Z Uses Putnam's "Ruritania" example to argue that narrow content, if it exists, is holistic. Twins in different communities start with same narrow content, diverge by acquiring new beliefs; so belief change affects narrow content. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Callaway, H. G. %T Meaning holism and semantic realism %I %D 1992 %B Dialectica %V 46 %N %P 41-59 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Conceptual similarity across sensory and neural diversity: The Fodor/Lepore challenge answered %I %D 1998 %B Journal Of Philosophy %V 95 %N %P 5-32 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cozzo, C. %T Does epistemological holism lead to meaning holism? %I %D 2002 %B Topoi %V 21 %N %P 25-45 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Devitt, M. %T A critique of the case for semantic holism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 8 %N %P 281-306 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Book Section %A Devitt, M. %T Semantic localism: Who needs a principled basis? %I Holder-Pichler-Tempsky %D 1994 %B Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences %E R. Casati %E B. Smith %E S. White %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Esfeld, M. %T Holism and analytic philosophy %I %D 1998 %B Mind %V 107 %N %P 365-80 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Book %A Fodor, J. A. %A LePore, E. %T Holism: A Shopper's Guide %I Blackwell %D 1992 %Z Rebutting arguments for meaning holism: those based on confirmation holism (Quine), normativity of interpretation (Davidson, Dennett, Lewis), and functional-role semantics (Block, Field, Churchland). -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %A LePore, E. %T Precis of Holism: A Shopper's Guide %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 53 %N %P 637-682 %Z A discussion of Holism with comments by Devitt, Rey, McLaughlin, Brandom, and Churchland, and a reply by Fodor and Lepore. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T Holism without meaning: A critical review of Fodor and Lepore's Holism: A Shopper's Guide %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 441-49 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Harrell, M. %T Confirmation holism and semantic holism %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 109 %N %P 63-101 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Heal, J. %T Semantic holism: Still a good buy %I %D 1994 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 68 %N %P 325-39 %Z A critique of Fodor and Lepore. Distinguishes versions of holism, and argues for a weak version. Real thinkers are subjects, which imposes constraints on the interrelations of thoughts. Science fiction is irrelevant here. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackman, H. %T Moderate holism and the instability thesis %I %D 1999 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 36 %N %P 361-69 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, A. %A Kukla, R. %T Meaning holism and intentional psychology %I %D 1989 %B Analysis %V 173 %N %P %Z Contra Fodor, meaning holism is compatible with intentional psychology. Most psychological generalizations quantify over contents, rather than appealing to specific contents. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lormand, E. %T How to be a meaning holist %I %D 1996 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 93 %N %P 51-73 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Margolis, E. %A Laurence, S. %T Multiple meanings and stability of content %I %D 1998 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 5 %N %P 255-63 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A McClamrock, R. %T Holism without tears: Local and global effects in cognitive processing %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy of Science %V 56 %N %P 258-74 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A McDermott, M. %T Quine's holism and functionalist holism %I %D 2001 %B Mind %V 110 %N %P 977-1025 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Miller, A. %T Does "belief holism" show that reductive dispositionalism about content could not be true? %I %D 2003 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 77 %N %P 73-90 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Miller, R. B. %T One bad and one not very good argument against holism %I %D 1997 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 75 %N %P 234-40 %Z A nice criticism of Fodor and Lepore's arguments that holism implies (a) the nonexistence of intentional laws and (b) the nonlearnability of language. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Pagin, P. %T Is compositionality compatible with holism? %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 11-33 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Penco, C. %T Holism, strawberries, and hair dryers %I %D 2002 %B Topoi %V 21 %N %P 47-54 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Perry, J. %T Fodor and Lepore on holism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 73 %N %P 123-58 %Z The argument from anatomism and the failure of the analytic/synthetic distinction to holism fails. On the many different interpretations of holism and anatomism: there is a reasonable molecularist position. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Senor, T. D. %T Two-factor theories, meaning holism, and intentionalistic psychology: A reply to Fodor %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 5 %N %P 133-51 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Silverberg, A. %T Meaning holism and intentional content %I %D 1994 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 75 %N %P 29-53 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Talmage, C. J. L. %A Mercer, M. %T Meaning holism and interpretability %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 301-15 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Journal Article %A Talmage, C. J. L. %T Semantic localism and the locality of content %I %D 1998 %B Erkenntnis %V 48 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, meaning holism %U %0 Book Section %A Adams, F. %T Causal contents %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Dretske and his Critics %E B. McLaughlin %Z On Dretske's account of the causal role of content. Addresses some objections: Dennett's worries about intrinsic intentionality, Fodor's about external causal powers, and some worries about syntax. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Dretske on the explanatory role of belief %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 63 %N %P 99-111 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Bogdan, R. J. %T Does semantics run the psyche? %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 49 %N %P 687-700 %Z A critique of Fodor. Semantics per se doesn't cause. Also, Fodor's is an account of the what, not the how, of semantics. Somewhat bizarre. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Epiphenomenalism: Reply to Dretske %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Mental meaning in psychological explanation %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Dretske and his Critics %E B. McLaughlin %Z Criticizes Dretske's account of the role of content, especially because of its dependence on an organism's history; also, it may not cohere with work in cognitive science. Argues for an interpretational, not a causal account. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Devitt, M. %T Why Fodor can't have it both ways %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T The explanatory role of content %I University of Arizona Press %D 1987 %B Contents of Thought %E R. Grimm %E D. Merrill %Z Content must explain why (not how) an internal state caused a certain output. The explanation is given in terms of what a state has historically indicated. With thermostats and sea-snails as examples. Comments by Cummins, and reply. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book %A Dretske, F. %T Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes %I MIT Press %D 1988 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Does meaning matter? %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Reply to Slater and Garcia-Carpintero %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 203-8 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Reply: Causal relevance and explanatory exclusion %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T The explanatory role of content: Reply to Melnyk and Noordhof %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 223-29 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Psychological vs. biological explanations of behavior %I %D 2004 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 32 %N %P 167-177 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Burge on mentalistic explanations, or why I am still epiphobic %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Reflections and Replies %E M. Hahn %E B. Ramberg %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Elder, C. L. %T Content and the subtle extensionality of "... explains ..." %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 46 %N %P 320-32 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Banish DisContent %I Cambridge University Press %D 1986 %B Language, Mind, and Logic %E J. Butterfield %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Garcia-Carpintero, M. %T Dretske on the causal efficacy of meaning %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 181-202 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Godfrey-Smith, P. %T Why semantic properties won't earn their keep %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Studies %V 50 %N %P 223-36 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Hassrick, B. %T Fred Dretske on the explanatory role of semantic content %I %D 1995 %B Conference %V 6 %N %P 59-66 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Horgan, T. %T Actions, reasons, and the explanatory role of content %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Dretske and his Critics %E B. McLaughlin %Z Distinguishes three problems of mental causation (extrinsic factors, exclusion of the nonphysical, anomalism). Criticizes Dretske's theory (can't handle unlearnt or here-and-now reasons), offers a counterfactual account. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Melnyk, A. %T The prospects for Dretske's account of the explanatory role of belief %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 203-15 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T Accidental associations, local potency, and a dilemma for Dretske %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 216-22 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Perry, J. %A Israel, D. %T Fodor and psychological explanation %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T What's in a mind? %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 97-122 %Z We must individuate mental states by semantics, not just by function, as we need representation to capture generalizations about behavior; particularly due to the information-sensitivity and stimulus-independence of behavior. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Slater, C. %T Discrimination without indication: Why Dretske can't lean on learning %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 163-80 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Book Section %A Wallis, C. %T Using representation to explain %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Ward, A. %T The compatibility of psychological naturalism and representationalism %I %D 2001 %B Disputatio %V 11 %N %P %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, the explanatory role of content %U %0 Journal Article %A Bilgrami, A. %T Realism without internalism: A critique of Searle on intentionality %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 86 %N %P 57-72 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Blackman, L. L. %T Mind as intentionality alone %I %D 2002 %B Metaphysica %V 3 %N 2 %P 41-64 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Crane, T. %T Intentionality as the mark of the mental %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %B Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind %E A. O'Hear %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T Intentional objects %I %D 2001 %B Ratio %V 14 %N %P 298-317 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Haugeland, J. %T The Intentionality All-Stars %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 4 %N %P 383-427 %Z Intentionality around the diamond: neoCartesianism, neobehaviorism, neopragmatism. 1B=Fodor/Pylyshyn, 2B=Dennett/Quine, 3B=Heidegger/Sellars. SS=Wittgenstein. RF=Searle, CF=Skinner, LF=Rorty/Derrida. Lots of fun. -DJC %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Book %A Jacob, P. %T What Minds Can Do: Intentionality in a Non-intentional World %I Cambridge University Press %D 1997 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A McDowell, J. %T Lecture III: Intentionality as a relation %I %D 1998 %B Journal Of Philosophy %V 95 %N %P 471-491 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Mumford, S. %T Intentionality and the physical: A new theory of disposition ascription %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 49 %N %P 215-25 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Inentionality as the mark of the dispositional %I %D 1996 %B Dialectica %V 50 %N %P 91-120 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Intentionality and the physical: A reply to Mumford %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 49 %N %P 225-30 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Sellars, W. %A Chisholm, R. %T Intentionality and the mental: A correspondence %I %D 1957 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 2 %N %P 507-39 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, D. C. %T What is so magical about a theory of intrinsic intentionality? %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Papers %V 32 %N %P 83-96 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalnaker, R. %T Lewis on intentionality %I %D 2004 %B Australian Journal of Philosophy %V 82 %N %P 199-212 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Strawson, G. %T Real intentionality %I %D 2004 %B Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences %V 3 %N %P 287-313 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Weir, A. %T Objective content %I %D 2003 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 77 %N %P 47-72 %Z %K mental content,the status of intentionality, intentionality, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Adams, F. %T Mental representation %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bickhard, M. %T Representational content in humans and machines %I %D 1993 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 5 %N %P 285-33 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Bickhard, M. H. %T The dynamic emergence of representation %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Blachowicz, J. %T Analog representation beyond mental imagery %I %D 1997 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 94 %N %P 55-84 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Chomsky, N. %T Rules and representations %I %D 1980 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 3 %N %P 1-61 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Christensen, W. D. %A Hooker C. A. %T Representation and the meaning of life %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book %A Clapin, H. %T Philosophy and Mental Representation %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Clapin, H. %T Tacit representation in functional architecture %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Philosophy and Mental Representation %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book %A Clapin, H. %T Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation %I Elsevier %D 2004 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Moving minds: Situating content in the service of real-time success %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 89-104 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, A. %T The roots of 'norm-hungriness'. In (H. Clapin, ed) Philosophy and Mental Representation. Oxford University Press. Clark, A. 2002. Minds, brains, and tools %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Philosophy and Mental Representation %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T Form, interpretation, and the uniqueness of content: A response to Morris %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 31-42 %Z Morris 1991 is wrong: formal individuation is easy, and objectively determinate content isn't needed. External grounding is also irrelevant. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %A Poirier, P. %T Representation and indication %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Dalenoort, G. J. %T Toward a general theory of representation %I %D 1990 %B Psychological Research %V 52 %N %P 229-237 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Dietrich, E. %A Markman, A. %T Discrete thoughts: Why cognition must use discrete representations %I %D 2003 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 95-119 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Why paramecia don't have mental representations %I %D 1986 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 10 %N %P 3-23 %Z Because paramecia can't respond to non-nomic properties of the stimulus. Perceptual categories vs. sensory manifolds. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Freeman, W. %A Skarda, C. A. %T Representations: who needs them? %I Guilford Press %D 1990 %B Brain Organization and Memory %E J. McGaugh %E J. Weinberger %E G. Lynch %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Gillett, G. %T Representations and cognitive science %I %D 1989 %B Inquiry %V 32 %N %P 261-77 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Goldman, A. %T Constraints on representation %I University of Arizona Press %D 1986 %B The Representation of Knowledge and Belief %E M. Brand %E R. Harnish %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Grush, R. %T The architecture of representation %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 5-23 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Hatfield, G. %T Computation, representation and content in noncognitive theories of perception %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B ReRepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Hogan, M. %T What is wrong with an atomistic account of mental representation %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 100 %N %P 307-27 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackendoff, R. %T The problem of reality %I %D 1991 %B Nous %V 25 %N %P 411-33 %Z On the philosophical (inward-out) vs. psychological (outward-in) approaches to the mind-world relation; the psychological approach is more useful in understanding representation. Internal reality is an imperfect construction. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacobson, A. %T Mental representations: What philosophy leaves out and neuroscience puts in %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 16 %N %P 189-204 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, R. %T Cognitive models and representation %I %D 1992 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 43 %N %P 219-32 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Lloyd, D. %T Mental representation from the bottom up %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 23-78 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A Lycan, W. G. %T Ideas of representation %I Ridgeview %D 1989 %B Mind, Value and Culture: Essays in Honor of E. M. Adams %E Weissbord %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, R. J. %T Troubles with representationalism %I %D 1984 %B Social Research %V 51 %N %P 1065-97 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book Section %A McCulloch, G. %T Mental representation and mental presentation %I Cambridge University Press %D 2002 %B Logic, Thought, and Language %E A. O'Hear %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, R. G. %T Pushmi-pullyu representations %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 185-200 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Morris, M. %T Why there are no mental representations %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 1-30 %Z There can be no non-stipulative content to non-semantically individuated tokens. Mostly a critique of Cummins; also Fodor and Dennett. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T Internal representation: Prologue to a theory of intentionality %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 171-212 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Sedivy, S. %T Minds: Contents without vehicles %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 17 %N %P 149-181 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Shanon, B. %T Representations -- senses and reasons %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 355-74 %Z On different senses of "representation" -- external, experiential, mental locus, substrate of meaning, mediating functions, technicalpsychological. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book %A Shanon, B. %T The Representational and the Presentational: An Essay on Cognition and the Study of Mind %I Prentice-Hall %D 1993 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Sober, E. %T Mental representations %I %D 1976 %B Synthese %V 33 %N %P 101-48 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T Basic minds %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 251-70 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Tegtmeier, E. %T Intentionality is not representation %I %D 2005 %B Metaphysica %V 6 %N 1 %P 77-84 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Book %A Travis, C. %T Unshadowed Thought: Representation in Thought and Language %I Harvard University Press %D 2000 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gulick, R. %T Mental representation: A functionalist view %I %D 1982 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 63 %N %P 3-20 %Z On the distinction between representation and representation-use. -DJC %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A Wallis, C. %T Representation and the imperfect ideal %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy of Science %V 61 %N %P 407-28 %Z %K mental content,representation %U %0 Journal Article %A von Eckardt, B. %T The explanatory need for mental representations in cognitive science. Mind and Language 18:427-439. 2.6 ConceptsPhilosophy of Science %V 59 %N %P 408-28 %Z The relationship between psychology and neuroscience is best characterized not by reduction but by explanatory extension, where each field is enriched by the other. With a number of examples from recent empirical work. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Hyland, M. E. %T Against nomological reductionism in psychology: A response to Robinson %I %D 1995 %B New Ideas in Psychology %V 13 %N %P 9-11 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Jessor, R. %T The problem of reductionism in psychology %I %D 1958 %B Psychological Review %V 65 %N %P 170-78 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T Reduction in psychology %I %D 1990 %B Acta Analytica %V 6 %N %P 65-78 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Martindale, R. L. %A Seidel, R. J. %T Reductionism: Its prodigal encores %I %D 1959 %B Psychological Reports %V 5 %N %P 213-16 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Montgomery, R. %T The reductionist ideal in cognitive psychology %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 85 %N %P 279-314 %Z Anti-reductionism needn't be ad hoc (contra Churchland). Although evolution provides some pressure for 1-1 psychophysical mappings, there are significant countervailing forces, e.g. in vision, memory, learning, and language use. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Olshewsky, T. M. %T Dispositions and reductionism in psychology %I %D 1975 %B Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior %V 5 %N %P 129-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Putnam, H. %T Reductionism and the nature of psychology %I %D 1974 %B Cognition %V 2 %N %P 131-46 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T Cognitive science and neuroscience: New wave reductionism %I %D 1999 %B Philosopical Psychology %V 12 %N %P 297-307 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Ross, D. %A Spurrett, D. %T What to say to a skeptical metaphysician? A defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists %I %D 2004 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 27 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Scott, A. %T Reductionism revisited %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 11 %N 2 %P 51-68 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Sloane, E. H. %T Reductionism %I %D 1945 %B Psychological Review %V 52 %N %P 214-23 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Witmer, D. G. %T Dupre's anti-essentialist objection to reductionism %I %D 2003 %B The Philosophical Quarterly %V 53 %N %P 181-200 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction in psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Barkin, E. %T Relative phenomenalism: Toward a more plausible theory of mind %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N 8 %P 3-13 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Beckermann, A. %T Property physicalism, reduction, and realization %I Pittsburgh University Press %D 1997 %B Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind %E M. Carrier %E P. Machamer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Beckermann, A. %T Physicalism and new wave reductionism %I %D 2001 %B Grazer Philosophische Studien %V 61 %N %P 257-261 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Bickle, J. %T New wave psychophysical reductionism and the methodological caveats %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 57-78 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Book %A Bickle, J. %T Psychoneural Reductionism: The New Wave %I MIT Press %D 1997 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Brooks, D. H. M. %T How to perform a reduction %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 54 %N %P 803-14 %Z Reduction comes to supervenience plus explicability. Thus biconditionals, multiple realizability, etc, are irrelevant. Biology is already reduced (mostly via functional explanation), and psychology looks promising. Nice. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Bunzl, M. %T Reductionism and the mental %I %D 1987 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 24 %N %P 181-9 %Z On the links between supervenience, reduction, and explanation. Supervenience is compatible with reductive explanation of a localized variety. We don't need laws, but explanatory links. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Causey, R. L. %T Attribute identities in microreductions %I %D 1972 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 69 %N %P 407-22 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Combes, R. %T Ockhamite reductionism %I %D 1988 %B International Philosophical Quarterly %V 28 %N %P 325-36 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Foss, J. %T Materialism, reduction, replacement, and the place of consciousness in science %I %D 1995 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 92 %N %P 401-29 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Hill, C. S. %T In defense of type materialism %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 59 %N %P 295-320 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitcher, P. S. %T How to reduce a functional psychology %I %D 1980 %B Philosophy of Science %V 47 %N %P 134-40 %Z Contra Richardson 1979, a purely functional psychology is irreducible. The genetics analogy is misleading; multiple realizations can't explain high-level laws. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, C. %T Reservations about new wave reduction %I %D 2001 %B Grazer Philosophische Studien %V 61 %N %P 263-277 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T Kim on reduction %I %D 2002 %B Erkenntnis %V 57 %N %P 231-57 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Millikan, D. %T Historical kinds and the "special sciences" %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 95 %N %P 45-65 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Papineau, D. %T Social facts and psychological facts %I Martinus Nijhoff %D 1985 %B Popper and the Human Sciences %E G. Currie %E A. Musgrave %Z Mind is not reducible to body, but societies reduce to individuals. Multiple realization is in tension with predictability. Natural selection resolves the tension for the mental, but cannot for the social. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T Functionalism and reductionism %I %D 1979 %B Philosophy of Science %V 46 %N %P 533-58 %Z Argues that functionalism is compatible with reductionism, by analogies. Genetics has multiple realization and multiple function; reduction doesn't require biconditionals. With remarks on the de facto autonomy of psychology. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T How not to reduce a functional psychology %I %D 1982 %B Philosophy of Science %V 49 %N %P 125-37 %Z Response to Kitcher 1980. Reductions are usually domain-specific, and high-level regularities are indeed explained. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Rueger, A. %T Reduction, autonomy, and causal exclusion among physical properties %I %D 2004 %B Synthese %V 139 %N %P 1-21 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Sarkar, S. %T Models of reduction and categories of reductionism %I %D 1992 %B Synthese %V 91 %N %P 167-94 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Schweizer, P. %T Realization, reduction and psychological autonomy %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 126 %N %P 383-405 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Sturgeon, S. %T The roots of reductionism %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Physicalism and its Discontents %E C. Gillett %E B. Loewer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Vicente, A. %T Realization, determination and mental causation %I %D 2001 %B Theoria %V 16 %N %P 77-94 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Wimsatt, W. %T Reductionism, levels of organization, and the mind-body problem %I Plenum Press %D 1976 %B Consciousness and the Brain %E G. Globus %Z Excellent coverage of the notion of level and its applicability to mind. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,reduction, reduction, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T All God has to do %I %D 1991 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 235-44 %Z If there are no contingent psychophysical laws, then there are no mental properties. So physicalism/supervenience is false; God had extra work to do. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T A definition of physicalism: Reply to Pettit %I %D 1993 %B Analysis %V 53 %N %P 224-27 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %A Mellor, D. H. %T There is no question of physicalism %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 185-206 %Z Physical sciences have no ontological authority over the mental. Considers and dismisses arguments from laws, causation, reduction, supervenience. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Crook, S. %T Why physics alone cannot define the 'physical': Materialism, metaphysics, and the formulation of physicalism %I %D 2001 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 31 %N %P 333-360 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Daly, C. %T Does physicalism need fixing? %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 135-41 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Daly, C. %T What are physical properties? %I %D 1998 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 79 %N %P 196-217 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Francescotti, R. %T Ontological physicalism and property pluralism: Why they are incompatible %I %D 2000 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 81 %N %P 349-362 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Gates, G. %T Physicalism, empiricism, and positivism %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Physicalism and its Discontents %E C. Gillett %E B. Loewer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Gillett, C. %T The methodological role of physicalism: A minimal skepticism %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Physicalism and its Discontents %E C. Gillett %E B. Loewer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book %A Gillett, C. %A Loewer, B. %T Physicalism and its Discontents %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hawthorne, J. %T Blocking definitions of materialism %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 110 %N %P 103-13 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book %A Huttemann, A. %T What's Wrong with Microphysicalism %I Routledge %D 2004 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Jackson, F. %T Finding the mind in the natural world %I Holder-Pichler-Tempsky %D 1994 %B Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences %E R. Casati %E B. Smith %E S. White %Z On why materialism requires conceptual analysis to locate mental properties in the natural world. Even a posteriori necessary connections have to be backed by a priori links. With remarks on supervenience. A nice paper. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book %A Kim, J. %T Physicalism, or Something Near Enough %I Princeton University Press %D 2005 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirk, R. %T From physical explicability to full-blooded materialism %I %D 1979 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 29 %N %P 229-37 %Z If every physical events has a physical explanation, and the mental is causally efficacious, then mental facts are strictly implied by physical facts. A nice argument. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirk, R. %T Physicalism, identity, and strict implication %I %D 1982 %B Ratio %V 24 %N %P 131-41 %Z Materialism doesn't need a identity thesis. The requirement that mental facts are entailed by physical facts plays the role played by Kripke's requirement of necessary identity, and is more reasonable. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirk, R. %T Physicalism lives %I %D 1996 %B Ratio %V 9 %N %P 85-89 %Z Nothing in the arguments of Crane and Mellor 1990 count against a physicalism based on strict implication. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Latham, N. %T Substance physicalism %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Physicalism and its Discontents %E C. Gillett %E B. Loewer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Loewer, B. %T From physics to physicalism %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Physicalism and its Discontents %E C. Gillett %E B. Loewer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book %A Madell, G. %T Mind and Materialism %I Edinburgh University Press %D 1988 %Z On the problems posed for materialism by intentionality, autonomy, awareness, and indexicality. Tentatively advocates a Cartesian position. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, C. %T Philosophical materialism %I %D 1980 %B Synthese %V 44 %N %P 173-206 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Melnyk, A. %T Formulating physicalism: Two suggestions %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 105 %N %P 381-407 %Z Discusses two formulations of physicalism: requiring high-level properties to be disjunctions of physical states, or to be functional properties realized physically. Tentatively endorses the latter. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Melnyk, A. %T How to keep the 'physical' in physicalism %I %D 1997 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 94 %N %P 622-637 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Melnyk, A. %T Physicalism %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Melnyk, A. %T Some evidence for physicalism %I Imprint Academic %D 2003 %B Physicalism and Mental Causation %E S. Walter %E H. Heckmann %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Montero, B. %T The body problem %I %D 1999 %B Nous %V 33 %N %P 183-200 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Montero, B. %T Post-physicalism %I %D 2001 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 8 %N %P 61-80 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Montero, B. %T Varieties of causal closure %I Imprint Academic %D 2003 %B Physicalism and Mental Causation %E S. Walter %E H. Heckmann %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Moser, P. K. %T Physicalism and mental causes: Contra Papineau %I %D 1996 %B Analysis %V 56 %N %P 263-67 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Nagel, E. %T Are naturalists materialists? %I %D 1949 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 42 %N %P 515-53 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Nimtz, C. %A Schutte, M. %T On physicalism, physical properties, and panpsychism %I %D 2003 %B Dialectica %V 57 %N %P 413-22 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Noordhof, P. %T Not old... but not that new either: Explicability, emergence, and the characterisation of materialism %I Imprint Academic %D 2003 %B Physicalism and Mental Causation %E S. Walter %E H. Heckmann %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book %A Papineau, D. %T Philosophical Naturalism %I Blackwell %D 1994 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Papineau, D. %T The rise of physicalism %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Physicalism and its Discontents %E C. Gillett %E B. Loewer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Papineau, D. %A Huttemann, A. %T Physicalism decomposed %I %D 2005 %B Analysis %V 65 %N %P 33-39 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Pettit, P. %T A definition of physicalism %I %D 1993 %B Analysis %V 53 %N %P 213-23 %Z Physicalism is the claim that (1) There are microphysical entities, (2) Microphysical entities constitute everything, (3) There are microphysical regularities, (4) Microphysical regularities govern everything. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Pettit, P. %T Microphysicalism without contingent micro-macro laws %I %D 1994 %B Analysis %V 54 %N %P 253-57 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Pettit, P. %T Microphysicalism, dottism, and reduction %I %D 1995 %B Analysis %V 55 %N %P 141-46 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book %A Poland, J. %T Physicalism: The Empirical Foundations %I Oxford University Press %D 1994 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ravenscroft, I. %T Physical properties %I %D 1997 %B Southern Journal Of Philosophy %V 35 %N %P 419-431 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Rey, G. %T Physicalism and psychology: A plea for a substantive philosophy of mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Physicalism and its Discontents %E C. Gillett %E B. Loewer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, D. %T On Crane and Mellor's argument against physicalism %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 135-36 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book %A Robinson, H. %T Objections to Physicalism %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sheldon, W. H. %T Are naturalists materialists? %I %D 1946 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 43 %N %P 197-209 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T The content of physicalism %I %D 1978 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 28 %N %P 339-41 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Snowdon, P. F. %T On formulating materialism and dualism %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin %E J. Heil %Z A construal of materialism in terms of constitution, not identity. Discusses the entailment between physical properties and mental properties; considers a nonreductive physicalism and a primitive dualism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sober, E. %T Physicalism from a probabilistic point of view %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 95 %N %P 135-74 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Spurrett, D. %A Papineau, D. %T A note on the completeness of "physics" %I %D 1999 %B Analysis %V 59 %N %P 25-29 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Spurrett, D. %T What physical properties are %I %D 2001 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 82 %N %P 201-225 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sturgeon, S. %T Physicalism and overdetermination %I %D 1998 %B Mind %V 107 %N %P 411-432 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book %A Wilkes, K. V. %T Physicalism %I Routledge and Kegan Paul %D 1973 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Witmer, D. G. %T Sufficiency claims and physicalism: A formulation %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Physicalism and its Discontents %E C. Gillett %E B. Loewer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Witmer, D. G. %A Gillett, C. %T A 'physical' need: Physicalism and the via negativa %I %D 2001 %B Analysis %V 61 %N %P 302-309 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, physicalism %U %0 Book Section %A Foster, J. %T The token-identity thesis %I Blackwell %D 1994 %B The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate %E R. Warner %E T. Szubka %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, token identity %U %0 Book Section %A Horgan, T. %A Tye, M. %T Against the token identity theory %I Blackwell %D 1985 %B Action and Events %E B. McLaughlin %E E. LePore %Z We individuate mental events by their causal role, but we can't individuate causes uniquely. So each mental event has multiple physical correlates, and token identity doesn't hold. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, token identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Hornsby, J. %T Which physical events are mental events? %I %D 1981 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 55 %N %P 73-92 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, token identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Haugeland, J. %T Weak supervenience %I %D 1982 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 19 %N %P 93-103 %Z Supervenience doesn't imply token identity, and Davidson's argument for token identity equivocates on "event". But weak supervenience (mentally discernible worlds are physically discernible) is all we need. With nice examples. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, token identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Leder, D. %T Troubles with token identity %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Studies %V 47 %N %P 79-94 %Z Physical/psychological token identity is no good: you can't individuate physical events without psychological predicates. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, token identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Lurie, Y. %T Correlating brain states with psychological phenomena %I %D 1978 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 56 %N %P 135-44 %Z Can't isolate the physical token of a belief, say, as it's always accompanied by other beliefs. Meaning doesn't come in discrete tokens. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, token identity %U %0 Book Section %A Peacocke, C. %T Argument for token identity %I %D 1979 %B Holistic Explanation %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, token identity %U %0 Book %A Alexander, S. %T Space, Time, and Deity %I Macmillan %D 1920 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Atkin A. %T On consciousness: What is the role of emergence? %I %D 1992 %B Medical Hypotheses %V 38 %N %P 311-14 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book Section %A Beckermann, A. %T Supervenience, emergence, and reduction %I De Gruyter %D 1992 %B Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism %E A. Beckermann %E H. Flohr %E J. Kim %Z On varieties of supervenience and of emergence, and of what is required for reduction. Argues that reduction involves general explanatory connections, whereas emergence involves unique and ultimate bridge laws. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book %A Beckermann, A, Flohr, H. %A Kim, J. %T Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism %I De Gruyter %D 1992 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Bedau, M. %T Weak emergence %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 11 %N %P 375-399 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Berenda, C. W. %T On emergence and prediction %I %D 1953 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 50 %N %P 269-74 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Bergmann, G. %T Holism, historicism, and emergence %I %D 1944 %B Philosophy of Science %V 11 %N %P 209-21 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book %A Broad, C. D. %T The Mind and its Place in Nature %I Routledge and Kegan Paul %D 1925 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Bruntrup, G. %T Is psychophysical emergentism committed to dualism? The causal efficacy of emergent mental properties %I %D 1998 %B Erkenntnis %V 48 %N %P 133-51 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Bunge, M. %T Emergence and the mind %I %D 1977 %B Neuroscience %V 2 %N %P 501-9 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book %A Clayton, P. %T Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book Section %A Crane, T. %T The significance of emergence %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Physicalism and its Discontents %E C. Gillett %E B. Loewer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Garnett, A. C. %T Scientific method and the concept of emergence %I %D 1942 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 39 %N %P 477-86 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Haldane, J. %T The mystery of emergence %I %D 1996 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 96 %N %P 261-67 %Z A defence of radical emergence against Spencer-Smith 1995. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Hasker, W. %T Emergentism %I %D 1982 %B Religious Studies %V 18 %N %P 473-88 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book %A Hasker, W. %T The Emergent Self %I Cornell University Press %D 1999 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Henle, P. %T The status of emergence %I %D 1942 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 39 %N %P 486-93 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Humphreys, P. %T Aspects of emergence %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 53-71 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Humphreys, P. %T How properties emerge %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 1-17 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Humphreys, P. %T Emergence, not supervenience %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science Supplement %V 64 %N %P 337-45 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Jones, D. H. %T Emergent properties, persons, and the mind-body problem %I %D 1972 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 10 %N %P 423-33 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Kekes, J. %T Physicalism, the identity theory, and the concept of emergence %I %D 1966 %B Philosophy of Science %V 33 %N %P 360-75 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Making sense of emergence %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 95 %N %P 3-36 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Klee, J. %T Microdeterminism and concepts of emergence %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy of Science %V 51 %N %P 44-63 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book Section %A Lovejoy, A. O. %T The meanings of "emergence" and its modes %I Longmans, Green, and Co %D 1927 %B Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy %E E. S. Brightman %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Lowe, E. J. %T Causal closure principles and emergentism %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy %V 75 %N %P 571-586 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Lowry, A. %T A note on emergence %I %D 1974 %B Mind %V 83 %N %P 276-77 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Mackenzie, W. L. %T The notion of emergence %I %D 1926 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 6 %N %P 56-68 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Margolis, J. %T Emergence %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Forum %V 17 %N %P 271-95 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book Section %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T The rise and fall of British emergentism %I De Gruyter %D 1992 %B Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism %E A. Beckermann %E H. Flohr %E J. Kim %Z A careful account of British emergentism. Explicates their view of emergent causal powers and laws in terms of fundamental configurational forces, a coherent idea that turned out to be false. An excellent paper. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book Section %A Meehl, P. E. %A Sellars, W. %T The concept of emergence %I , vol %D 1956 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %E H. Feigl %E M. Scriven %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book %A Morgan, C. L. %T Emergent Evolution %I Williams and Norgate %D 1923 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Morris, C. R. %T The notion of emergence %I %D 1926 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 6 %N %P 49-55 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Newman, D. %T Emergence and strange attractors %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P 245-61 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Newman, D. V. %T Chaos, emergence, and the mind-body problem %I %D 2001 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 79 %N %P 180-96 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Newton, N. %T Emergence and the uniqueness of consciousness %I %D 2001 %B Journal Of Consciousness Studies %V 8 %N %P 47-59 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Connor, T. %T Emergent properties %I %D 1994 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 31 %N %P 91-104 %Z Argues against Alexander's and van Cleve's accounts of emergence, instead suggesting an account in terms of supervenience, non-structurality, and downward causation. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Pap, A. %T The concept of absolute emergence %I %D 1951 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 2 %N %P 302-11 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Pepper, S. C. %T Emergence %I %D 1926 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 241-45 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book %A Peters, S. L. %T Emergent Materialism: A Proposed Solution to the Mind-Body Problem %I University Press of America %D 1995 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Pihlstrom, S. %T What shall we do with emergence? A survey of a fundamenta; issue in the metaphysics and epistemology of science %I %D 1999 %B South African Journal of Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 192-210 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Pluhar, E. %T Emergence and reduction %I %D 1978 %B Studies in History and Philosophy of Science %V 9 %N %P 279-89 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Ripley, C. %T Sperry's concept of consciousness %I %D 1984 %B Inquiry %V 27 %N %P 399-423 %Z An in-depth analysis of Sperry's views on consciousness. Sperry is not a dualist; he believes in "structural causation" based on emergent properties. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Rohrlich, F. %T Cognitive emergence %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science Supplement %V 64 %N %P 346-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Rueger, A. %T Robust supervenience and emergence %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy of Science %V 67 %N %P 466-491 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Rueger, A. %T Physical emergence, diachronic and synchronic %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 124 %N %P 297-322 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Russell, E. S. %T The notion of emergence %I %D 1926 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 6 %N %P 39-48 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Schroder, J. %T Emergence: Non-deducibility or downwards causation? %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 48 %N %P 433-52 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Shoemaker, S. %T Kim on emergence %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 58 %N %P 53-63 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Silberstein, M. %T Emergence and the mind-body problem %I %D 1998 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 5 %N %P 464-82 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Silberstein, M. %A McGeever, J. %T The search for ontological emergence %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 49 %N %P 182-200 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Silberstein, M. %T Converging on emergence: Consciousness, causation and explanation %I %D 2001 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 8 %N %P 61-98 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Physicalism and emergence %I %D 1981 %B Neuroscience %V 6 %N %P 109-13 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Spencer-Smith, R. %T Reductionism and emergent properties %I %D 1995 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 95 %N %P 113-29 %Z Distinguishes radical, epistemic, and interactional emergence, favoring the latter. With consideration of qualia as a radical emergent. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Sperry, R. W. %T A modified concept of consciousness %I %D 1969 %B Psychological Review %V 76 %N %P 532-36 %Z Consciousness is an emergent property of brain dynamics that itself governs low-level flow of excitation. Midway between mentalism and materialism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Sperry, R. W. %T In defense of mentalism and emergent interaction %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 12 %N %P 221-245 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Stace, W. T. %T Novelty, indeterminism, and emergence %I %D 1939 %B Philosophical Review %V 48 %N %P 296-310 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book Section %A Stephan, A. %T Emergence -- a systematic look at its historical facets %I De Gruyter %D 1992 %B Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism %E A. Beckermann %E H. Flohr %E J. Kim %Z On different ways of understanding emergence: as nonadditivity, novelty, nonpredictability, nondeducibility; and on problems about qualia and downward causation. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Stephan, A. %T Armchair arguments against emergence %I %D 1997 %B Erkenntnis %V 46 %N %P 305-14 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book Section %A Teller, P. %T A contemporary look at emergence %I De Gruyter %D 1992 %B Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism %E A. Beckermann %E H. Flohr %E J. Kim %Z An attempt to explicate "emergent" properties in terms of relational properties. Argues that even problem cases, e.g. space-time separation and phenomenal properties, might be treated this way. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A van Cleve, J. %T Mind -- dust or magic? Panpsychism versus emergence %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 4 %N %P 215-226 %Z On Nagel 1979: emergence is more plausible than panpsychism. A construal of emergence as nomological supervenience without logical supervenience. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gulick, R. %T Reduction, emergence and other recent options on the mind/body problem: A philosophic overview %I %D 2001 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 8 %N %P 1-34 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Vandervert, L. R. %T On the modeling of emergent interaction: Which will it be, the laws of thermodynamics or Sperry's "wheel" in the subcircuitry? %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 12 %N %P 535-39 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Welshon, R. %T Emergence, realization, and supervenience %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 108 %N %P 39-51 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Wimsatt, W. C. %T Aggregativity: Reductive heuristics for finding emergence %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 372-84 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Journal Article %A Wynn, M. %T Emergent phenomena and theistic explanation %I %D 1999 %B International Philosophical Quarterly %V 39 %N %P 141-55 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, emergence %U %0 Book %A Almog, J. %T What Am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem %I Oxford University Press %D 2001 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Averill, E. W. %A Keating, B. %T Does interactionism violate a law of classical physics? %I %D 1981 %B Mind %V 90 %N %P 102-7 %Z Interactionism is compatible with conservation of energy and momentum: the mind exerts a non-physical force on the brain. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bricke, J. %T Interaction and physiology %I %D 1975 %B Mind %V 84 %N %P 255-9 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Book Section %A Crane, T. %T Mental substances %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B Minds and Persons %E A. O'Hear %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Efron, A. %T Residual asymmetric dualism: A theory of mind-body relations %I %D 1992 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 13 %N %P 113-36 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Evans, S. %T Separable souls: A defense of minimal dualism %I %D 1981 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 19 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Herbert, R. T. %T Dualism/materialism %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 48 %N %P 159-75 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Himma, K. E. %T When a problem for all in a problem for none: Substance dualism, physicalism, and the mind-body problem %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Book Section %A Kim, J. %T Lonely souls: Causality and substance dualism %I Routledge %D 2003 %B Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings %E T. O'Connor %E D. Robb %E (eds %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Langsam, H. %T Strategy for dualists %I %D 2001 %B Metaphilosophy %V 32 %N %P 395-418 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Larmer, R. %T Mind-body interactionism and the conservation of energy %I %D 1986 %B International Philosophical Quarterly %V 26 %N %P 277-85 %Z Various arguments about interactionism based on conservation of energy. C of E only applies to causally isolated systems, so objections beg the question. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lowe, E. J. %T The problem of psychophysical causation %I %D 1992 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 70 %N %P 263-76 %Z Argues that there can be interaction without breaking physical laws: e.g. by basic psychic forces, or by varying physical constants, or especially by arranging fractal trees of physical causation leading to behavior. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lowe, E. J. %T The causal autonomy of the mental %I %D 1993 %B Mind %V 102 %N %P 629-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Mills, E. %T Interactionism and overdetermination %I %D 1996 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 33 %N %P 105-115 %Z Argues that interactionist dualism is compatible with the causal closure of the physical, if we allow causal overdetermination; and there is a strong case for the latter. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Mills, E. %T Interactionism and physicality %I %D 1997 %B Ratio %V 10 %N %P 169-83 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %A McDonough, J. K. %T Numbers, minds, and bodies: A fresh look at mind-body dualism %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 349-371 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Pap, A. %T Semantic analysis and psychophysical dualism %I %D 1952 %B 1952 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Pietroski, P. M. %T Mental causation for dualists %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 336-66 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Popper, K. R. %T Language and the body-mind problem: A restatement of interactionism %I %D 1953 %B In Proceedings of the %V 11 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Popper, K. R. %T A note on the body-mind problem %I %D 1955 %B Analysis %V 15 %N %P 131-35 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Book Section %A Robinson, H. %T Dualism %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Book %A Rozemond, M. %T Descartes's Dualism %I Harvard University Press %D 2002 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Scheffler, I. %T The new dualism: Psychological and physical terms %I %D 1950 %B 1950 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sellars, W. %T A note on Popper's argument for dualism %I %D 1954 %B Analysis %V 15 %N %P 23-24 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sussman, A. %T Reflection on the chances for a scientific dualism %I %D 1981 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 78 %N %P 95-118 %Z Dualism is an empty hypothesis. Everything must be matter, though we may have to expand the notion of matter. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T The `scandal' of Cartesian dualism %I %D 1982 %B Mind %V 91 %N %P 20-37 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Journal Article %A van Rooijen, K. %T Interactionism and evolution: A critique of Popper %I %D 1987 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 38 %N %P 87-92 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, dualism %U %0 Book Section %A Bolender, J. %T A farewell to isms %I Imprint Academic %D 2003 %B Physicalism and Mental Causation %E S. Walter %E H. Heckmann %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, K. %T Abstract particulars and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1983 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 61 %N %P 129-41 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Caston, V. %T Epiphenomenalisms, ancient and modern %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Review %V 106 %N %P 309-363 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Francescotti, R. %T Understanding physical realization (and what it does not entail) %I %D 2002 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 23 %N %P 279-292 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Hedman, C. G. %T On correlating brain states with psychological states %I %D 1970 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 48 %N %P 247-51 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Book %A Heil, J. %T The Nature of True Minds %I Cambridge University Press %D 1992 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %A Robb, D. %T Mental properties %I %D 2003 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 40 %N %P 175-196 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Hendel, G. %T Realization %I %D 2001 %B Critica %V 33 %N %P 41-70 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Honderich, T. %T Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems %I %D 1981 %B Inquiry %V 24 %N %P 277-303 %Z Defending lawlike connections between physical states & conscious occurrents. Contra anomalous monism and identity theory for occurrents. But occurrents may not be causally efficacious. Comments by Wilson/Sprigge/Mackie/Stich. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Horgan's naturalistic metaphysics of mind %I %D 2002 %B Grazer Philosophische Studien %V 63 %N %P 27-52 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T On Putnam's critique of metaphysical realism: mind-body identity and supervenience %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 126 %N %P 407-426 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, C. %T Mental states, natural kinds and psychophysical laws %I %D 1978 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 52 %N %P 195-220 %Z Argues that mental kinds are not natural kinds, and don't have real essences but nominal essences. For this reason, there are no psychophysical laws. With remarks on psychological laws, and the role of behavior. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, M. %T Real things and the mind-body problem %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 100 %N %P 303-17 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T The two-factor theory of the mind-brain relation %I %D 2000 %B Brain and Mind %V 1 %N %P 29-43 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Schectman, M. %T The brain/body problem %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 149-64 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Scheerer, E. %T Psychoneural isomorphism: Historical background and current relevance %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 183-210 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Shoemaker, S. %T Realization, micro-realization, and coincidence %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 67 %N %P 1-23 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Skillen, A. %T Mind and matter: a problem which refuses dissolution %I %D 1984 %B Mind %V 93 %N %P 514-26 %Z Physical completeness, mental causation, non-reductionism are inconsistent. Ryle and Putnam are closet dualists, and Davidson's an epiphenomenalist. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Stemmer, N. %T The mind-body problem and Quine's repudiation theory %I %D 2001 %B Behavior And Philosophy %V 29 %N %P 187-202 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Book %A Steward, H. %T The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States %I Oxford University Press %D 1997 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Book %A Tye, M. %T The Metaphysics of Mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 1989 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gelder, T. %T Monism, dualism, pluralism %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 76-97 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, R. A. %T Two views of realization %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 104 %N %P 1-31 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical relations, psychophysical relations, misc %U %0 Book %A Armstrong, D. M. %T A Materialist Theory of the Mind %I Routledge and Kegan Paul %D 1968 %Z Mental states should be analyzed as states that are apt to bring about certain kinds of behavior. Analysis of all kinds of mental states as such. With comments on dualism, behaviorism, identity theory, and consciousness. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Book Section %A Armstrong, D. M. %T The nature of mind %I Macmillan %D 1970 %B The Mind/Brain Identity Theory %E C. Borst %Z Mental states are internal states that are apt to cause certain behaviors. A synthesis between the "thesis" of idealism and the "antithesis" of behaviorism. With defense against objections from consciousness. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Braddon-Mitchell, D. %A Jackson, K. %T The divide-and-conquer path to analytic functionalism %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Topics %V 26 %N %P 71-89 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Psychofunctionalism and chauvinism %I %D 1986 %B Philosophy of Science %V 53 %N %P 535-59 %Z Psychofunctionalism can evade chauvinism by specifying different functional identifications within each species. Applying same mental terms to each is justified by theory similarity; but it still isn't analytic functionalism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldstein, I. %T Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted %I %D 1994 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 72 %N %P 46-62 %Z Against functionalism: experiences have intrinsic introspectible acausal properties, such as duration, felt location, and unpleasantness. Both analytic and empirical functionalism fail. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T Functionalism and token physicalism %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 59 %N %P 321-38 %Z Formalizing versions of functionalism, and seeing which entail token physicalism and/or type physicalism. On the most plausible versions, we have token physicalism without type physicalism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hornsby, J. %T On functionalism, and on Jackson, Pargetter, and Prior on functionalism %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Studies %V 46 %N %P 75-96 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %A Pargetter, R. %A Prior, E. W. %T Functionalism and type-type identity theories %I %D 1982 %B Philosophical Studies %V 42 %N %P 209-25 %Z Functionalism is compatible with type identity, as e.g. "pain" designates the state-type that fills the right functional role in an organism at a given time, i.e. a brain state. Contra Kripke, pain is not a rigid designator. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kernohan, A. %T Lewis's functionalism and reductive materialism %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 3 %N %P 235-46 %Z Argues that Lewis's functionalism founders on the specification of behavior. Described intentionally => non-materialist; physically => chauvinist. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T An argument for the identity theory %I %D 1966 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 63 %N %P 17-25 %Z Causal roles are definitive of mental states. Since physical states fill these causal roles (by the explanatory adequacy of physics), mental states are physical states. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Psychophysical and theoretical identifications %I %D 1972 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 50 %N %P 249-58 %Z Mental states can be defined, via a Ramsey-sentence analysis of the platitudes of folk psychology, as entities that fill causal roles specified by the analysis. These fillers turn out to be physical. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Book Section %A Lewis, D. %T Mad pain and martian pain %I , Vol %D 1978 %B Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology %E N. Block %Z Accounting for both pains that don't play the usual causal role and for pains that are realized in different substances, by a mixed theory: pain is the physical state that typically occupies a certain causal role in a population. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, C. %T Functionalism and phenomenalism: A critical note %I %D 1980 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 58 %N %P 35-46 %Z Functionalism (reducing the mental to its effects on the physical) is no more plausible than phenomenalism (reducing the physical to its effects on the mental). -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T The failure of Lewis's functionalism %I %D 1982 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 36 %N %P 159-73 %Z Lewis's original theory leads to Kripkean reference-fixing, so chauvinism. Token functionalism can't deal with paralytics. Species-relative functionalism fails as pain is intrinsic, not extrinsic. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rogler, E. %T On David Lewis' philosophy of mind %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 285-311 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sayward, C. %T Taking actions seriously %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 51-60 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shoemaker, S. %T Some varieties of functionalism %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 93-119 %Z Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Tye, M. %T Functionalism and type physicalism %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Studies %V 44 %N %P 161-74 %Z Contra Lewis: Functionalism isn't compatible with type physicalism. There are intra-population difficulties with species-relative construals, and individual-relative construals can still have multiple fillers. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Weir, A. %T More trouble for functionalism %I %D 2001 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 101 %N %P 267-94 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , causal role functionalism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Minds and machines %I New York University Press %D 1960 %B Dimensions of Mind %E S. Hook %Z The relationship between mental and physical states is just like that between logical and structural states of Turing Machines, so no great mystery. With comments on privacy and semantic analysis. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T The nature of mental states %I Pittsburgh University Press %D 1967 %B Art, Mind, and Religion %E Capitan %E Merrill %Z Why mental states are more likely to be functional states (in probabilistic automata) than brain states or behavioral dispositions. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T The mental life of some machines %I Wayne State University Press %D 1967 %B Intentionality, Minds and Perception %E H. Castaneda %Z On explaining behavior via TM states, e.g. explaining preference via utility functions. Logical behaviorism assumes rational preference functions. Functional organization is what matters, not physical make-up. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Philosophy and our mental life %I %D 1975 %B Mind, Language, and Reality %Z Psychological states aren't TM states after all: we have lots of psych states at once; they depend on learning/memory; disjunctions of TM states are no good. But functional organization rather than physics is still what counts. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Book %A Putnam, H. %T Representation and Reality %I MIT Press %D 1987 %Z Type functionalism isn't any better than type physicalism, as mental states can be multiply realized as functional states. With what in common? -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T Mental states and Putnam's functionalist hypothesis %I %D 1974 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 52 %N %P 48-62 %Z On abstract vs. physical TMs: Putnam should say that mental states are physical TM states. But then functionalism is compatible with physicalism. On the relation between Putnam's and Armstrong's functionalism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T A New Lilliputian argument against machine functionalism %I %D 1979 %B Philosophical Studies %V 35 %N %P 279-87 %Z If machine functionalism were true, a homunculus-head would have all the mental states of its homunculus (by the definition of "realization"), which is absurd. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T The moral of the New Lilliputian argument %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Studies %V 43 %N %P 277-80 %Z Reply to Elugardo 1983: so how do you specify what count as inputs/outputs? -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Elugardo, R. %T Machine functionalism and the New Lilliputian argument %I %D 1981 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 62 %N %P 256-61 %Z Criticism of Lycan 1979, and a re-making of the argument. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Elugardo, R. %T Machine realization and the New Lilliputian argument %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Studies %V 43 %N %P 267-75 %Z Lycan's New Lilliputian argument fails as inputs/outputs for the homunculus are not the same as inputs/outputs for the full system. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kane, R. H. %T Turing machines and mental reports %I %D 1966 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 44 %N %P 344-52 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelson, R. %T Mechanism, functionalism, and the identity theory %I %D 1974 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 73 %N %P 365-86 %Z Argues for mechanism rather than functionalism. Criticizes Putnam for hypostasizing mental states, which are disanalogous to mental states. Defending mechanism against Kalke's & Rorty's objections. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rorty, R. %T Functionalism, machines and incorrigibility %I %D 1972 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 69 %N %P 203-20 %Z Logical states don't give us any understanding of mind over and above what the function/structure distinction gives us. In particular, it doesn't help with the understanding of privacy and incorrigibility. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Tomberlin, J. %T About the identity theory %I %D 1965 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 43 %N %P 295-99 %Z Contra Putnam: logical states are not physical states, and utterances about them are not about physical states. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wagner, S. J. %T The liberal and the lycanthrope %I %D 1988 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 69 %N %P 165-74 %Z Contra Lycan: machine functionalism can handle Bolivia and CRT cases by a causal/counterfactual account, and Lilliputian case by assigning mental states to minds, not bodies. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , machine functionalism %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %T Properties, functionalism, and the identity theory %I %D 1979 %B Eidos %V 1 %N %P 153-79 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Batitsky, V. %T A formal rebuttal of the central argument for fnuctionalism %I %D 1998 %B Erkenntnis %V 49 %N %P 201-20 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Bealer, G. %T An inconsistency in functionalism %I %D 1978 %B 1978 %V %N %P %Z A formal argument showing that functional definitions are equivalent to behavioral definitions. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Bealer, G. %T Mind and anti-mind: Why thinking has no functional definition %I %D 1985 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 9 %N %P 283-328 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Bealer, G. %T Self-consciousness %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Review %V 106 %N %P 69-117 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Bealer, G. %T The self-consciousness argument: Why Tooley's criticisms fail %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 105 %N %P 281-307 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Autonomous psychology: What it should and should not entail %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1984 %N %P %Z The functional level is the appropriate level for psychology, but neurophysiological facts constrain this level and are thus relevant. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Ben-Yami, H. %T An argument against functionalism %I %D 1999 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 77 %N %P 320-324 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Book %A Biro, J. I. %A Shahan, R. W. %T Mind, Brain and Function %I Oklahoma University Press %D 1982 %Z Ten papers on functionalism. Originally was Philosophical Topics, volume 12. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Block, N. %T Functionalism %I , Vol %D 1980 %B Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology %E N. Block %Z Distinguishes varieties of functionalism, e.g. machine and Ramsey-sentence functionalism; and compares to behaviorism. With a historical overview, and arguments for why functionalism is incompatible with physicalism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T Troubles with functionalism %I %D 1978 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 9 %N %P 261-325 %Z Distinguishes analytic and empirical functionalism. Both have problems with absent qualia, and inputs/outputs. Analytic functionalism has problems with paralytics, etc; empirical functionalism has problems with Martians. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %A Fodor, J. A. %T What psychological states are not %I %D 1972 %B Philosophical Review %V 81 %N %P 159-81 %Z Mental states are not physical or behavioral states; could they be functional states? With various arguments against type identity, and against machine-table functionalism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Functionalism at forty: A critical retrospective %I %D 2005 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 102 %N %P 33-50 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T Functional analysis %I %D 1975 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 72 %N %P 741-64 %Z On the role of functional explanation versus other kinds of explanation. Functionalism applies an analytic, not subsumptive strategy. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A David, M. %T Kim's functionalism %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 11 %N %P 133-48 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Fischer, J. %T Functionalism and propositions %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Studies %V 48 %N %P 295-311 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Materialism %I %D 1968 %B Psychological Explanation %Z On mental state as inferred theoretical entities, individuated according to their function (cf. valve-lifters). Psychology and neuroscience will mutually constrain each other, giving a relation more complex than reduction. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Gendron, B. %T On the relation of neurological and psychological theories: A critique of the hardware thesis %I %D 1970 %B Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 8 %N %P 483-95 %Z Argues that functional explanation are reducible to structural explanations. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Gertler, B. %T Functionalism's methodological predicament %I %D 2000 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 38 %N %P 77-94 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Hornsby, J. %T Physicalist thinking and conceptions of behaviour %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %B Subject, Thought, and Context %E P. Pettit %E J. McDowell %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Hoy, R. C. %T Dispositions, logical states, and mental occurrents %I %D 1980 %B Synthese %V 44 %N %P 207-40 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Kalke, W. %T What's wrong with Fodor's and Putnam's functionalism %I %D 1969 %B Nous %V 3 %N %P 83-93 %Z There's no absolute functional/structural distinction, as it depends on how you choose boundaries and levels of abstraction. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T Form, function and feel %I %D 1981 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 78 %N %P 24-50 %Z Pursue a multi-leveled homuncular functionalism, with mental states characterized as states of teleologically identified subsystems. Even the identity theorist is a functionalist at a low level. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Malcolm, N. %T `Functionalism' in philosophical psychology %I %D 1980 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 80 %N %P 211-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A McCullagh, M. %T Functionalism and self-consciousness %I %D 2000 %B Mind and Language %V 15 %N %P 481-499 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Pereboom, D. %T Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 88 %N %P 341-58 %Z Scientific realism requires dispositions of kinds be explained by intrinsic properties. Neural/functional properties won't work, because of reductionism and circularity. Use intrinsic psychological properties instead. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Pineda, D. %T Functionalism and nonreductive physicalism %I %D 2001 %B Theoria %V 16 %N %P 43-63 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T Functionalism and reductionism %I %D 1979 %B Philosophy of Science %V 46 %N %P 533-58 %Z Argues that functionalism is compatible with reductionism, by analogies. Genetics has multiple realization and multiple function; reduction doesn't require biconditionals. With remarks on the de facto autonomy of psychology. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Schiffer, S. %T Functionalism and belief %I University of Arizona Press %D 1986 %B The Representation of Knowledge and Belief %E M. Brand %E R. Harnish %Z Against functionalism for beliefs. Both common-sense functionalism and psychofunctionalism have problems with finding the right functional theory, distinguishing beliefs, perceptual input conditions, Twin Earth, etc. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Shoemaker, S. %T Realization and mental causation %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Physicalism and its Discontents %E C. Gillett %E B. Loewer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Shope, R. K. %T Functional equivalence and the defense of materialism %I %D 1973 %B Philosophical Forum %V 4 %N %P 500-12 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Sober, E. %T Putting the function back into functionalism %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Mind and Cognition %E W. Lycan %Z Need teleological functionalism, not Turing Machine functionalism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Sober, E. %T Panglossian functionalism and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1985 %B Synthese %V 64 %N %P 165-93 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Tooley, M. %T Functional concepts, referentially opaque contexts, causal relations, and the definition of theoretical terms %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 105 %N %P 251-79 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gulick, R. %T Functionalism as a theory of mind %I %D 1982 %B Philosophy Research Archives %V 185 %N %P %Z The structure/function distinction is level-relative, so physiology might be relevant even under functionalism. Problems with automata, and with causal connections to nonintentionally characterized behavior. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gulick, R. %T Functionalism, information and content %I %D 1980 %B Nature and System %V 2 %N %P 139-62 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Ward, A. %T Philosophical functionalism %I %D 1989 %B Behaviorism %V 17 %N %P 155-8 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Weckert, J. %T Functionalism's impotence %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Inquiry %V 32 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Weir, A. %T More trouble for functionalism %I %D 2001 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 101 %N %P 267-293 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilkes, K. V. %T Functionalism, psychology and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 147-67 %Z Functionalism may be appropriate for cognitive psychology but not for folk psychology, due to differing goals. Neuroscience will play an important role in developing functional theories. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Zangwill, N. %T Variable realization: not proven %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 42 %N %P 214-19 %Z Argues that the possibility of multiple realization has not been established, whether by arguments from imagination, concepts, or empirical facts. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,functionalism , functionalism, miscellaneous %U %0 Book %A Ryle, G. %T The Concept of Mind %I Hutchinson and Co %D 1949 %Z The ancestor of most contemporary philosophy of mind. Among other things, argues that the "ghost in the machine" view of mind is a category mistake, and presents dispositional analyses of many mental concepts. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bestor, T. W. %T Gilbert Ryle and the adverbial theory of mind %I %D 1979 %B Personalist %V 60 %N %P 233-42 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Burgos, J. %T Realism about behavior %I %D 2004 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 32 %N %P 69-95 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, C. A. %T Ryle on the intellect %I %D 1953 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 3 %N %P 115-38 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Book Section %A Carnap, R. %T Psychology in physical language %I Free Press %D 1959 %B Logical Positivism %E Ayer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Carrier, L. %T Professor Shaffer's refutation of behaviourism %I %D 1973 %B Mind %V 80 %N %P 249-52 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Chemero, A. %T Reconsidering Ryle: Editor's introduction %I %D 2002 %B Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy %V 7 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Chisholm, R. %T A note on Carnap's meaning analysis %I %D 1955 %B 1955 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Chisholm, R. %T Intentionality and the theory of signs %I %D 1952 %B 1952 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Chisholm, R. %T Sentences about believing %I %D 1958 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 2 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Dalrymple, H. %T Some logical muddles in behaviorism %I %D 1977 %B Southwestern Philosophical Studies %V 2 %N %P 64-72 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ewing, A. C. %T Professor Ryle's attack on dualism %I %D 1953 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 53 %N %P 47-78 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Farrell, B. %T Experience %I %D 1950 %B Mind %V 59 %N %P 170-98 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Finn, D. R. %T Putnam and logical behaviourism %I %D 1971 %B Mind %V 80 %N %P 432-36 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Flanagan, O. J. %A McCreadie-Albright, T. %T Malcolm and the fallacy of behaviorism %I %D 1974 %B Philosophical Studies %V 26 %N %P 425-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Book %A Geach, P. %T Mental Acts %I Routledge and Kegan Paul %D 1957 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Goudge, T. A. %T Ryle's last thoughts on thinking %I %D 1982 %B Dialogue %V 21 %N %P 125-32 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Graham, G. %T Spartans and behaviorists %I %D 1982 %B Behaviorism %V 10 %N %P %Z Defends behaviorism as a scientific hypothesis, so that conceivability arguments aren't relevant, and advocates "penetrability" behaviorism which can appeal to internal physical states. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hamer, C. %T Why Ryle is not a behaviourist %I %D 1970 %B Philosophical Studies (Ireland) %V 17 %N %P 7-25 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hamlyn, D. W. %T Behaviour %I %D 1953 %B Philosophy %V 28 %N %P 132-45 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanson, N. R. %T Professor Ryle's "mind" %I %D 1952 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 2 %N %P 246-48 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Harzem, P. %T Behaviorism for new psychology: What was wrong with behaviorism and what is wrong with it now %I %D 2004 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 32 %N %P 5-12 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Heidelberger, H. %T On characterizing the psychological %I %D 1966 %B 1966 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Killeen, P. R. %T Minding behavior %I %D 2004 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 32 %N %P 125-147 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitchener, R. F. %T Behavior and behaviorism %I %D 1977 %B Behaviorism %V 5 %N %P 11-68 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Logical behaviorism and the simulation of mental episodes %I %D 1985 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 6 %N %P 325-332 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Longworth, G. %T Where should we look for the mind? %I %D 2003 %B Think %V 5 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Mace, C. A. %T Some implications of analytical behaviourism %I %D 1949 %B 1949 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Malcolm, N. %T Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations %I %D 1954 %B Philosophical Review %V 43 %N %P 530-9 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Mandelbaum, M. %T Professor Ryle and psychology %I %D 1958 %B Philosophical Review %V 67 %N %P 522-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %T Dennett's logical behaviorism %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Topics %V 22 %N %P 189-258 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Miller, D. S. %T Is consciousness "a type of behaviour"? %I %D 1911 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 8 %N %P 322-27 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Miller, D. S. %T "Descartes myth" and "Professor Ryle's fallacy" %I %D 1951 %B 1951 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelson, R. %T Behaviorism is false %I %D 1969 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 66 %N %P 417-52 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelson, R. %T Behaviorism, finite automata, and stimulus-response theory %I %D 1975 %B Theory and Decision %V 6 %N %P 249-67 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Oosthuizen, D. C. S. %T Phenomenological psychology %I %D 1970 %B Mind %V 79 %N %P 487-501 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Park, S. %T Reinterpreting Ryle: A nonbehaviorist analysis %I %D 1994 %B Journal of the History of Philosophy %V 32 %N %P 265-90 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T A radical behaviorist methodology for the empirical investigation of private events %I %D 1993 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 25-35 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Book Section %A Price, H. H. %T Some objections to behaviorism %I New York University Press %D 1960 %B Dimensions of Mind %E S. Hook %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Brains and behavior %I Blackwell %D 1963 %B Analytical Philosophy: Second Series %E R. Butler %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Book Section %A Quine, W. V. %T Mind and verbal dispositions %I Oxford University Press %D 1975 %B Mind and Language %E Guttenplan %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Quine, W. V. %T Sellars on behaviorism, language, and meaning %I %D 1980 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 61 %N %P 26-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ribes-Inesta, E. %T Behavior is abstraction, not ostension: Conceptual and historical remarks on the nature of psychology %I %D 2004 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 32 %N %P 55-68 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Book Section %A Robinson, H. %T Behaviorism and stimulus materialism %I %D 1982 %B Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowlands, M. %T A defense of behaviorism %I %D 1991 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 93-100 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Book %A Ryle, G. %T On Thinking %I Blackwell %D 1979 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Scriven, M. %T A study of radical behaviorism %I %D 1956 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 1 %N %P 88-130 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sellars, W. %T Mind, meaning, and behavior %I %D 1952 %B 1952 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shuford, H. %T Logical behaviorism and intentionality %I %D 1966 %B Theoria %V 32 %N %P 246-51 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Skinner, B. F. %T The operational analysis of psychological terms %I %D 1945 %B Psychological Review %V 52 %N %P 270-78 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Ryle on mechanism and psychology %I %D 1959 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 9 %N %P 349-55 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stemmer, N. %T Behavioral materialism, the success of folk psychology, and the first-person case %I %D 1993 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 1-14 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stout, R. %T What you know when you know how someone behaves %I %D 2002 %B Electronic Journal of Anlaytic Philosophy %V 7 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stout, R. %T Behaviourism %I %D 2003 %B Think %V 5 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Vendler, Z. %T Ryle's thoughts on thinking %I %D 1981 %B Midwest Studies of Philosophy %V 6 %N %P 335-43 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Weitz, M. %T Professor Ryle's "logical behaviourism" %I %D 1951 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 48 %N %P 297-300 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Whitely, C. A. %T Behaviourism %I %D 1961 %B Mind %V 70 %N %P 164-74 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wisdom, J. %T The concept of mind %I %D 1950 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 50 %N %P 189-204 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Book %A Wittgenstein, L. %T Philosophical Investigations %I %D 1953 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Wright, J. N. %T Mind and the concept of mind %I %D 1959 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 33 %N %P 1-22 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ziff, P. %T About behaviourism %I %D 1958 %B Analysis %V 18 %N %P 132-6 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, logical behaviorism %U %0 Journal Article %A Feigl, H. %T The `mental' and the `physical' %I %D 1958 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 2 %N %P 370-497 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Is consciousness a brain process? %I %D 1956 %B British Journal of Psychology %V 47 %N %P 44-50 %Z The idea that consciousness is a brain process is logically coherent. It's a scientific hypothesis, not a necessary truth. On the "is" of composition vs the "is" of definition, and the fallacy of the internal phenomenal field. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Sensations and brain processes %I %D 1959 %B Philosophical Review %V 68 %N %P 141-56 %Z Defending the thesis that sensations are contingently identical to brain processes against various objections. Topic-neutral analysis of sensation reports. Materialism beats epiphenomenalism on grounds of simplicity. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Abelson, R. %T A refutation of mind-body identity %I %D 1970 %B Philosophical Studies %V 18 %N %P 85-90 %Z The number of possible mental states is infinite (think of any number), whereas there are only finitely many brain states, so they're not identical. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Armstrong, D. M. %T The headless woman and the defense of materialism %I %D 1968 %B Analysis %V 29 %N %P 48-49 %Z Likens the anti-materialist position to the "headless woman" fallacy: "I'm not aware the mental states are physical", so "I'm aware that mental states are non-physical". -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Armstrong, D. M. %T Epistemological foundations for a materialist theory of mind %I %D 1973 %B Philosophy of Science %V 40 %N %P 178-93 %Z A prima facie case for materialism based on grounds of rational consensus, arising especially from common-sense and scientific evidence. Mental states exist (common-sense) but should be analyzed causally (evidence from science). -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book Section %A Aune, B. %T Feigl on the mind-body problem %I University of Minnesota Press %D 1966 %B Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl %E P. Feyerabend %E G. Maxwell %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Baier, K. %T Smart on sensations %I %D 1962 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 40 %N %P 57-68 %Z Mental states are necessarily private, and so cannot be physical states, which are public. We have epistemological authority about our mental states. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book Section %A Beloff, J. %T The identity hypothesis: A critique %I Routledge and Kegan Paul %D 1965 %B Brain and Mind %E J. R. Smythies %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Blumenfeld, J-B. %T Phenomenal properties and the identity theory %I %D 1979 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 63 %N %P 485-93 %Z Argues that phenomenal properties aren't needed to identify sensations with brain-states, and nor are topic-neutral analyses. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book %A Borst, C. V. %T The Mind/Brain Identity Theory %I Macmillan %D 1970 %Z An anthology of central articles on the identity theory. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Bradley, M. C. %T Sensations, brain-processes, and colours %I %D 1963 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 41 %N %P 385-93 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book Section %A Brandt, R. %T Doubts about the identity theory %I New York University Press %D 1960 %B Dimensions of Mind %E S. Hook %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Brandt, R. %A Kim, J. %T The logic of the identity theory %I %D 1967 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 66 %N %P 515-537 %Z Arguing for an event-identity construal of the identity theory. Comparing the identity theory to the weaker "principle of simultaneous isomorphism". The only reason to accept the identity theory is ontological simplicity. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book Section %A Brodbeck, M. %T Mental and physical: Identity versus sameness %I University of Minnesota Press %D 1966 %B Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl %E P. Feyerabend %E G. Maxwell %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Candlish, S. %T Mind, brain, and identity %I %D 1970 %B Mind %V 79 %N %P 502-18 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Carney, J. %T The compatibility of mind-body identity with dualism %I %D 1971 %B 1971 %V %N %P %Z Argues that the identity theory is compatible with linguistic dualism, as the mental and the physical may differ in intensional properties only. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Clarke, J. %T Mental structure and the identity theory %I %D 1971 %B Mind %V 80 %N %P 521-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Coburn, R. %T Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes %I %D 1963 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 60 %N %P 89-92 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Coder, D. %T The fundamental error of central-state materialism %I %D 1973 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 10 %N %P 289-98 %Z On problems with theories that leave the nature of mind open a priori: how can we even understand the possibilities? -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Cornman, J. %T The identity of mind and body %I %D 1962 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 59 %N %P 486-92 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Coburn, R. C. %T Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes %I %D 1963 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 60 %N %P %Z Location of mental states by convention (Shaffer 1961) won't work, as it (a) makes mental states public, and (b) conflicts with connections to behavior. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Crittenden, C. %T Ontology and mind-body identity %I %D 1971 %B Philosophical Forum %V 2 %N %P 251-70 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A de Boer, R. %T Cartesian categories in mind-body identity theories %I %D 1976 %B Philosophical Forum %V 7 %N %P 139-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T Central state materialism %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Studies (Ireland) %V 28 %N %P 229-37 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Enc, B. %T In defense of the identity theory %I %D 1983 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 80 %N %P 279-98 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Feigl, H. %T Some crucial issues of mind-body monism %I %D 1971 %B 1971 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Garnett, A. C. %T Body and mind: the identity thesis %I %D 1965 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 43 %N %P 77-81 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Grunbaum, A. %T Abelson on Feigl's mind-body identity thesis %I %D 1972 %B Philosophical Studies %V 23 %N %P 119-21 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gustafson, D. F. %T On the identity theory %I %D 1963 %B Analysis %V 24 %N %P 30-32 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanratty, G. %T The identity theory of Herbert Feigl %I %D 1972 %B Philosophical Studies %V 20 %N %P 113-23 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Harris, E. E. %T The neural identity thesis and the person %I %D 1966 %B International Philosophical Quarterly %V 6 %N %P 515-37 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Hedman, C. G. %T On correlating brain states with psychological states %I %D 1970 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 48 %N %P 247-51 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %T Sensations, experiences, and brain processes %I %D 1970 %B Philosophy %V 45 %N %P 221-6 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Hinton, J. M. %T Illusions and identity %I %D 1967 %B Analysis %V 27 %N %P 65-76 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Hockutt, M. %T In defense of materialism %I %D 1967 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 27 %N %P 366-85 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Hoffman, R. %T Malcolm and Smart on brain-mind identity %I %D 1967 %B Philosophy %V 42 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Joske, W. %T Sensations and brain processes: A reply to Professor Smart %I %D 1960 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 38 %N %P 157-60 %Z On topic-neutral reports, after-images, and after-radishes. Such a report requires epistemic access to physical resemblance, which we don't have. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T On the psycho-physical identity theory %I %D 1966 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 3 %N %P 227-35 %Z There's no empirical support for identity, over and above that for correlation; and unity of science gives no reason to accept identity. The only reason might be that of ontological simplicity. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Phenomenal properties, psychophysical laws and the identity theory %I %D 1972 %B Monist %V 56 %N %P 178-92 %Z Deal with phenomenal properties by allowing only mental events, and eliminating mental objects. Identity theories needn't suppose psychophysical laws. With defense against multiple realizability arguments. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitcher, P. S. %T Two versions of the identity theory %I %D 1982 %B Erkenntnis %V 17 %N %P 213-28 %Z Recasting the identity theory and functionalism, using Kripkean theories of reference, so mental states can refer to physiological or psychological states that we don't yet understand; and qualia problems are handled better. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T An argument for the identity theory %I %D 1965 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 63 %N %P 17-25 %Z Mental states are defined by their causal roles. So, by the completeness of physics, they must be physical states. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Locke, D. %T Must a materialist pretend he's anaesthetized? %I %D 1971 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 49 %N %P 217-31 %Z On how materialism, as opposed to a double aspect view, can handle mental features -- by moving them into the world via a realist theory of perception. Remarks on identification of states. After-images, etc, cause problems. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Lockwood, M. %T Einstein and the identity theory %I %D 1984 %B 1984 %V %N %P %Z Using the special theory of relativity to show that if mental events have a temporal location, then they must have a spatial location. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Lubow, N. %T Mind-body identity and irreducible properties %I %D 1978 %B Philosophy Research Archives %V 4 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Luce, D. R. %T Mind-body identity and psycho-physical correlation %I %D 1966 %B Philosophy of Science %V 17 %N %P 1-7 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Malcolm, N. %T Scientific materialism and the identity theory %I %D 1964 %B Dialogue %V 3 %N %P 115-25 %Z The identity theory is meaningless, if identity is analyzed as spatiotemporal coincidence, as thoughts don't have location. Thoughts also require context. Even if identity holds, explaining brain doesn't imply explaining mind. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book %A Macdonald, C. %T Mind-Body Identity Theories %I Routledge %D 1989 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Malcolm, N. %T Scientific materialism and the identity theory %I %D 1964 %B 1964 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Margolis, J. %T Brain processes and sensations %I %D 1965 %B Theoria %V 31 %N %P 133-38 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book Section %A Meehl, P. %T The compleat autocerebroscopist: A thought-experiment on Professor Feigl's mind-body identity thesis %I University of Minnesota Press %D 1966 %B Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl %E P. Feyerabend %E G. Maxwell %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Mucciolo, L. %T The identity theory and criteria for the mental %I %D 1974 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 35 %N %P 167-80 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Munsat, S. %T Could sensations be processes? %I %D 1969 %B Mind %V 78 %N %P 247-51 %Z Sensations and processes have different logical type, so it is a priori impossible that they should be identical. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Nagel, T. %T Physicalism %I %D 1965 %B Philosophical Review %V 74 %N %P 339-56 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Noren, S. J. %T Identity, materialism, and the problem of the danglers %I %D 1970 %B Metaphilosophy %V 4 %N %P 318-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Noren, S. J. %T Smart's materialism: The identity thesis and translation %I %D 1970 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 48 %N %P 54-66 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Norton, R. %T On the identity of identity theories %I %D 1964 %B Analysis %V 25 %N %P 14-16 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book Section %A Pepper, S. %T A split in the identity theory %I Hawaii University Press %D 1975 %B Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem %E C. Cheng %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Pitcher, G. %T Sensations and brain processes: A reply to Professor Smart %I %D 1960 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 38 %N %P 150-7 %Z Identity requires explanation to be accepted, but Smart doesn't provide this. But one can deny identity without claiming dualism -- e.g. a "duck-rabbit" theory of mind/brain. With remarks on the completeness of descriptions. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Materialism as a scientific hypothesis %I %D 1960 %B Philosophical Review %V 69 %N %P 101-4 %Z Contra Smart 1959: Materialism is a scientific hypothesis, if we accept certain logical criteria for what a sensation is; otherwise it's just false. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Sensations and processes: A reply to Munsat %I %D 1972 %B 1972 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Thirty years on -- Is consciousness still a brain process? %I %D 1988 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 66 %N %P 208-19 %Z Comparing contemporary materialism to Pace's 1956 variety. With remarks on whether the thesis is empirical or a priori, and on deciding the issue between materialism and epiphenomenalism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book Section %A Place, U. T. %T Low claim assertions %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin %E J. Heil %Z Discusses a paper of Martin's and the genesis of the identity theory, with a focus on `public' and 'private logic' and topic-neutral descriptions. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book %A Place, U. T. %T Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book %A Presley, C. P. %T The Identity Theory of Mind %I University of Queensland Press %D 1967 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T The refutation of materialism %I %D 1978 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 8 %N %P 157-62 %Z The identity theory must be false, as pain centers in vitro will not be pains. With a reply by G. Pearce and a rejoinder. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Ripley, C. %T The identity theory and scientific hypotheses %I %D 1969 %B Dialogue %V 2 %N %P 308-10 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book Section %A Robinson, H. %T The disappearance theory %I %D 1982 %B Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosenbaum, S. %T The property objection and the principles of identity %I %D 1977 %B Philosophical Studies %V 32 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Routley, R. %A MaCrae, V. %T On the identity of sensations and physiological occurrences %I %D 1966 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 3 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Schlagel, R. H. %T The mind-body identity impasse %I %D 1977 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 14 %N %P 231-37 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book Section %A Scriven, M. %T The limitations of the identity theory %I University of Minnesota Press %D 1966 %B Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl %E P. Feyerabend %E G. Maxwell %Z On the identity theory as a linguistic proposal, compatible with dualism; epiphenomenalism and parallelism must be false, leaving interactionism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Sellars, W. %T The identity approach to the mind-body problem %I %D 1965 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 18 %N %P 430-51 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Shaffer, J. %T Could mental states be brain processes? %I %D 1961 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 58 %N %P 813-22 %Z Mental states don't have a location, and brain processes do; but we could stipulate a location for mental states. With remarks on possible relations between mental and physical features, states, and concepts. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Shaffer, J. %T Mental events and the brain %I %D 1963 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 60 %N %P 160-6 %Z We identify mental events by noticing mental features that must be nonphysical, but still might be empirically reducible. Against topic-neutral definitions, and with response to Coburn 1963 on location. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Simon, M. A. %T Materialism, mental language, and the mind-body identity %I %D 1970 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 30 %N %P 514-32 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Sensations and brain processes: A rejoinder to Dr. Pitcher and Mr. Joske %I %D 1960 %B Australasian Journal of Philsophy %V 38 %N %P 252-54 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Further remarks on sensations and brain processes %I %D 1961 %B 1961 %V %N %P %Z Reply to Stevenson 1960: There are no irreducible mental properties; they reduce to physical properties via topic-neutral definitions. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Brain processes and incorrigibility %I %D 1962 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 40 %N %P 68-70 %Z Reply to Baier 1962: epistemological authority is compatible with materialism. Mental state reports are not completely incorrigible, though. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Materialism %I %D 1963 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 60 %N %P 651-62 %Z Defending topic-neutral analyses of mental reports, and arguing against Wittgensteinian behaviorism via brain-in-vat examples. With remarks on the appeal of materialism and on compatibility with ordinary language. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T The identity thesis: A reply to Professor Garrett %I %D 1965 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 43 %N %P 82-3 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Further thoughts on the identity theory %I %D 1972 %B Monist %V 56 %N %P 177-92 %Z On some problems for the identity theory arising from the intensionality of mental states and from the appeal to properties, and on how to modify the translation form of the theory without embracing the disappearance version. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Smythies, J. R. %T Requiem for the identity theory %I %D 1994 %B Inquiry %V 37 %N %P 311-29 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Sosa, E. %T Professor Malcolm on "Scientific materialism and the identity theory" %I %D 1965 %B Dialogue %V 4 %N %P 422-23 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Stevenson, J. T. %T `Sensations and brain processes': A reply to J. J. C. Smart %I %D 1960 %B Philosophical Review %V 69 %N %P 505-10 %Z Identity theory implies nomological danglers, due to the irreducibility of defining mental properties. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Stoutland, F. %T Ontological simplicity and the identity hypothesis %I %D 1971 %B 1971 %V %N %P %Z The identity thesis isn't ontologically simpler than dualism: we still need a dualism of properties, and explanatory danglers. Not much turns on the issue, except in teleological explanation. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Sosa, E. %T Professor Malcolm on `Scientific materialism and the identity theory' %I %D 1965 %B Dialogue %V 3 %N %P 422-23 %Z Contra Malcolm 1965: explaining brain will explain mind, if the explanation is conjoined with the identity statement. With rejoinder from Malcolm. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Swartz, N. %T Can the theory of contingent identity between sensation-states and brain-states be made empirical? %I %D 1974 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 3 %N %P 405-17 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Swinburne, R. %T Are mental events identical with brain events? %I %D 1993 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 19 %N %P 173-181 %Z Property identity theses fail due to meaning differences, and event identity these fail due to a lack of entailment relations. Rebuts objections from weaker identity criteria and analogies with scientific identification. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Taylor, C. %T Mind-body identity, a side issue? %I %D 1967 %B Philosophical Review %V 76 %N %P 201-13 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Teichmann, J. %T The contingent identity of minds and brains %I %D 1967 %B Mind %V 76 %N %P 404-15 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Thalberg, I. %T A novel approach to mind-brain identity %I %D 1978 %B Philosophy of Science %V 3 %N %P 255-72 %Z Suggests a theory in which neural states are components of, but not identical to, overall psychological states. This can accommodate raw feels if necessary as a further component, but is mostly materialistic. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book Section %A Thomson, J. J. %T The identity theory %I St %D 1969 %B Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel %E S. Morgenbesser %E P. Suppes %E M. White %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Tomberlin, J. E. %T About the identity theory %I %D 1965 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 53 %N %P 295-9 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Book Section %A Watkins, J. W. N. %T A basic difficulty in the mind-brain identity hypothesis %I Paragon House %D 1978 %B Mind and Brain %E J. Eccles %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Weismann, D. %T A note on the identity thesis %I %D 1965 %B Mind %V 74 %N %P 571-77 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Whitely, C. H. %T The mind-brain identity hypothesis %I %D 1970 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 20 %N %P 193-99 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Wolfe, J. %A Nathan, G. J. %T The identity theory as a scientific hypothesis %I %D 1968 %B Dialogue %V 7 %N %P 469-72 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Ziedins, R. %T Identification of characteristics of mental events with characteristics of brain events %I %D 1971 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 8 %N %P 13-23 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, identity theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Austin, J. W. %T Rorty's materialism %I %D 1975 %B Auslegung %V 3 %N %P 20-28 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernstein, R. %T The challenge of scientific materialism %I %D 1968 %B International Philosophical Quarterly %V 8 %N %P 252-75 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bush, E. %T Rorty revisited %I %D 1974 %B Philosophical Studies %V 25 %N %P 33-42 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cam, P. %T "Rorty revisited", or "Rorty revised" %I %D 1978 %B Philosophical Studies %V 33 %N %P 377-86 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Carter, W. R. %T On incorrigibility and eliminative materialism %I %D 1974 %B Philosophical Studies %V 28 %N %P 113-21 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cornman, J. %T On the elimination of `sensations' and sensations %I %D 1968 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 22 %N %P 15-35 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Donovan, C. %T Eliminative materialism reconsidered %I %D 1978 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 8 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Doppelt, G. %T Incorrigibility, the mental, and materialism %I %D 1977 %B 1977 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Everitt, N. %T A problem for the eliminative materialist %I %D 1981 %B Mind %V 90 %N %P 428-34 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Everitt, N. %T How not to solve a problem for the eliminative materialist %I %D 1983 %B Mind %V 92 %N %P 590-92 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Feyerabend, P. %T Mental events and the brain %I %D 1963 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 40 %N %P 295-6 %Z Identity theory implies dualism, though its acceptance of mental properties. Instead we should eliminate talk of mental processes altogether, or redefine them in physiological terms. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Feyerabend, P. %T Materialism and the mind-body problem %I %D 1963 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 17 %N %P 49-67 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Book Section %A Globus, G. %T The strict identity theory of Schlick, Russell, Maxwell, and Feigl %I University Press of America %D 1989 %B Science, Mind, and Psychology: Essays in Honor of Grover Maxwell %E M. Maxwell %E C. Savage %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Godow, R. %T Eliminative materialism and denotation %I %D 1976 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 36 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Goodman, R. B. %T A note on eliminative materialism %I %D 1974 %B Journal of Critical Analysis %V 5 %N %P 80-83 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hiley, D. R. %T Is eliminative materialism materialistic? %I %D 1978 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 38 %N %P 325-37 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hiley, D. R. %T The disappearance theory and the denotation argument %I %D 1980 %B Philosophical Studies %V 37 %N %P 307-20 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %A Pappas, G. %T What is eliminative materialism? %I %D 1972 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 50 %N %P 149-59 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T Quine's materialism %I %D 1976 %B Philosophia %V 6 %N %P 101-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Book Section %A Quine, W. V. %T On mental entities %I %D 1966 %B The Ways of Paradox %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T Disappearance and the identity theory %I %D 1981 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 11 %N %P 473-85 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rorty, R. %T Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories %I %D 1965 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 19 %N %P 24-54 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rorty, R. %T In defense of eliminative materialism %I %D 1970 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 24 %N %P 112-21 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosenthal, D. M. %T Keeoing matter in mind %I %D 1980 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 5 %N %P 295-322 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Savitt, S. %T Rorty's disappearance theory %I %D 1974 %B Philosophical Studies %V 28 %N %P 433-36 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shirley, E. S. %T Rorty's "disappearance" version of the identity theory %I %D 1974 %B Philosophical Studies %V 25 %N %P 73-75 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sikora, R. I. %T Rorty's mark of the mental and his disappearance theory %I %D 1974 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 4 %N %P 191-93 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sikora, R. I. %T Rorty's new mark of the mental %I %D 1975 %B Analysis %V 35 %N %P 192-94 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Steiling, K. %T The elimination of sensations and the loss of philosophy %I %D 1976 %B Auslegung %V 3 %N %P 20-28 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, eliminative materialism %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, M. V. %T Davidson's argument for monism %I %D 2003 %B Synthese %V 135 %N %P 1-12 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Davidson, D. %T Mental events %I Humanities Press %D 1970 %B Experience and Theory %E L. Foster %E J. Swanson %Z Arguing for anomalous monism: no strict psychophysical laws, no strict psychological laws, and token identity without type identity. Mental events can still cause, via subsumption under physical laws. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Davidson, D. %T The material mind %I North-Holland %D 1973 %B Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science %E P. Suppes %Z The psychological supervenes on the physical but is not reducible to it, because of the holistic nature of intentional attribution. So building a perfect physical model may not explain psychology. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Davidson, D. %T Psychology as philosophy %I Harper & Row %D 1974 %B Philosophy of Psychology %E S. Brown %Z On the differing constitutive standards of mental and physical concepts. Attribution of mental concepts is holistic, and presupposes a background of rationality, etc. With examples from decision theory. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book %A Davidson, D. %T Essays on Actions and Events %I Oxford University Press %D 1980 %Z A collection of papers on action, causation and the philosophy of psychology. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Davidson, D. %T Problems in the explanation of action %I Blackwell %D 1987 %B Metaphysics and Morality %E P. Pettit %E R. Sylvan %E J. Norman %Z Remarks on how mental properties can explain action without strict laws. The mental is a conceptual, not an ontological category, governed by normative standards, and not reducible to the non-normative. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Davidson, D. %T Thinking causes %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Davidson, D. %T Laws and cause %I %D 1995 %B Dialectica %V 49 %N %P 263-79 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Davidson, D. %T The emergence of thought %I %D 1999 %B Erkenntnis %V 51 %N %P 511-21 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, L. %T Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Review %V 98 %N %P 153-87 %Z Criticism of Davidson's argument for rational causation. Reasons must cause in virtue of their rational properties. Token identities can't exist, due to normativity. Quinean psychology can't yield rational explanations. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bickle, J. %T Mental anomaly and the new mind-brain reductionism %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy of Science %V 59 %N %P 217-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, N. %T The standard objection to anomalous monism %I %D 1997 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 75 %N %P 373-82 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, N. %T Anomalous monism and the charge of epiphenomenalism %I %D 1998 %B Dialectica %V 52 %N %P 23-39 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cheng, K. %T Davidson's action theory and epiphenomenalism %I %D 1997 %B Journal of Philosophical Research %V 22 %N %P 81-95 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Child, W. %T Anomalism, uncodifiability, and psychophysical relations %I %D 1993 %B 1993 %V %N %P %Z Anomalism is compatible with supervenience, if it is construed as denying psychophysical laws useful for explaining behavior. It is incompatible with token identity, though. With much on the uncodifiability of rationality. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cooper, W. E. %T Materialism and madness %I %D 1980 %B Philosophical Papers %V 9 %N %P 36-40 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Daniel, S. G. %T Why even Kim-style psychophysical laws are impossible %I %D 1999 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 80 %N %P 225-237 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Elgin, C. %T Indeterminacy, underdetermination and the anomalous monism %I %D 1980 %B Synthese %V 45 %N %P 233-55 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Garrett, B. J. %T Davidson on causal relevance %I %D 1999 %B Ratio %V 12 %N %P 14-33 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldberg, B. %T A problem with anomalous monism %I %D 1977 %B Philosophical Studies %V 32 %N %P 175-80 %Z Davidson's argument equivocates on the term "physical": the physical events that mental events cause might not be subsumed under laws. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Herstein, G. L. %T Davidson on the impossibility of psychophysical laws %I %D 2005 %B Synthese %V 145 %N %P 45-63 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hess, P. %T Actions, reasons and Humean causes %I %D 1981 %B Analysis %V 41 %N %P 77-81 %Z Anomalous monism implies that mental properties don't cause anything. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Honderich, T. %T The argument for anomalous monism %I %D 1982 %B Analysis %V 42 %N %P 59-64 %Z If anomalous monism is true, mental events may cause, but their mental properties aren't causally relevant. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Hum, D. D. %T Davidson's identity crisis %I %D 1998 %B Dialectica %V 52 %N %P 45-61 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Jackman, H. %T Belief, rationality, and psychophysical laws %I %D 2000 %B Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philsophy of Mind %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Johnston, M. %T Why having a mind matters %I Blackwell %D 1985 %B Action and Events %E B. McLaughlin %E E. LePore %Z Anomalous monism loses out to Australian materialism. It can't be a priori, it leads to exhaustive monism, it doesn't support a new view of free action, and it implies the causal irrelevance of the mental. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kalderon, M. E. %T Epiphenomenalism and content %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 52 %N %P 71-90 %Z Davidson's view leads to epiphenomenalism about content, as it can't support the appropriate counterfactuals. Strong supervenience might be a way out, but that is inconsistent with anomalism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kernohan, A. %T Psychology: Autonomous or anomalous? %I %D 1985 %B Dialogue %V 24 %N %P 427-42 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Kim, J. %T Psychophysical laws %I Blackwell %D 1985 %B Action and Events %E B. McLaughlin %E E. LePore %Z How there can be psychophysical generalizations but no laws -- they might lack modal force. On the relation between psychophysical anomalism and psychological anomalism. Casting Davidson as a Kantian dualist. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Kim, J. %T Can supervenience and "non-strict laws" save anomalous monism? %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Klagge, J. C. %T Davidson's troubles with supervenience %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 85 %N %P 339-52 %Z Anomalous supervenience is consistent, at the cost of anti-realism about the mental. Supervenience is a constraint on interpretation, but needn't support counterfactuals as different interpretation schemes are possible, -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Klee, R. %T Anomalous monism, ceteris paribus, and psychological explanation %I %D 1992 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 43 %N %P 389-403 %Z Problems with holism and ceteris paribus laws aren't unique to psychology. One finds the same thing in the physical sciences. So rationality plays no special role, and psychological laws are as reasonable as physical laws. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kuczynski, J. M. %T A proof of the partial anomalousness of the mental %I %D 1998 %B Southern Journal Of Philosophy %V 36 %N %P 491-504 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Latham, N. %T Davidson and Kim on psychophysical laws %I %D 1999 %B Synthese %V 118 %N %P 121-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A LePore, E. %A Loewer, B. %T Mind matters %I %D 1987 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 630 %N %P %Z Anomalous monism is not committed to epiphenomenalism, as even non-strict laws can ground counterfactuals and so support the causal relevance of mental properties. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T Psychological laws %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 9-38 %Z A functionalist defense against anomalous monism. Psychofunctional laws and psychological laws, though not psychophysical laws, may exist. Rebutting arguments from rationality, indeterminism, intensionality, etc. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A McDowell, J. %T Functionalism and anomalous monism %I Blackwell %D 1985 %B Action and Events %E B. McLaughlin %E E. LePore %Z Against Loar's functionalist reductionism: it doesn't begin to capture the normative role of rationality or the subjectivity of the mental. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T Anomalous monism and the irreducibility of the mental %I Blackwell %D 1985 %B Action and Events %E B. McLaughlin %E E. LePore %Z A very thorough summary of Davidson's views. Highly recommended. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book %A McLaughlin, B. P. %A LePore, E. %T Actions and Events %I Blackwell %D 1985 %Z 30 essays on Davidson. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z Comments on Davidson 1992. Davidson can respond to critics accepting causal relevance of mental properties and still denying strict laws. Davidson misconstrues his critics' positions on supervenience. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Melchert, N. %T What's wrong with anomalous monism %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 80 %N %P 265-74 %Z Davidson is concerned with intentional, not phenomenal states; and his characterization of these is just as physical states under a certain description. So he avoids epiphenomenalism (contra e.g. Honderich 1982). -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Miller, A. %T Some anomalies in Kim's account of Davidson %I %D 1993 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 31 %N %P 335-44 %Z Kim's version of Davidson's argument against psychophysical laws cannot work. Elucidating the notion of a constitutive principle. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Nasrin, M. %T Anomalous monism in Carnap's Aufbau %I %D 2004 %B Erkenntnis %V 60 %N %P 283-293 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Noren, S. J. %T Anomalous monism, events, and `the mental' %I %D 1979 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 40 %N %P 64-74 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Patterson, S. A. %T The anomalism of psychology %I %D 1996 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 96 %N %P 37-52 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Preyer, G. %T Primary reasons: From radical interpretation to a pure anomalism of the mental %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 158-179 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Robinson, H. %T Davidson and nonreductive materialism: A tale of two cultures %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Physicalism and its Discontents %E C. Gillett %E B. Loewer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Rosenberg, A. %T Davidson's unintended attack on psychology %I Blackwell %D 1985 %B Action and Events %E B. McLaughlin %E E. LePore %Z Anomalous monism implies that there aren't even heteronomic psychological generalizations, as variables can't be independently measured. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowlands, M. %T Anomalism, supervenience, and Davidson on content-individuation %I %D 1990 %B Philosophia %V 295 %N %P %Z Supervenience is compatible with anomalism: biconditional laws are ruled out by the disjunctive base, and the wideness of mental states rules out one-way psychophysical laws, as there's no single property in the base. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Seager, W. E. %T The anomalousness of the mental %I %D 1981 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 389-401 %Z Elucidating Davidson's argument, focusing on the argument against strict psychophysical laws. Generalizations involve disjunctive kinds and so are heteronomic and not law-like. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Seager, W. E. %T Disjunctive laws and supervenience %I %D 1991 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 93-98 %Z Argues contra Kim that supervenience is compatible with anomalous monism: the the disjunctive generalizations aren't lawlike, as they aren't confirmed by their instances. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Shea, N. %T Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental? %I %D 2003 %B The Philosophical Quarterly %V 53 %N %P 201-213 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Davidson's minimal materialism %I Oxford University Press %D 1985 %B Essays on Davidson %E B. Vermazen %E M. Hintikka %Z Some comments on holism, indeterminacy, anomalism, and materialism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, P. %T Bad news for anomalous monism? %I %D 1982 %B Analysis %V 42 %N %P 220-4 %Z Response to Honderich 1982: physical events are individuated as mental states by virtue of their causal role, so the mental is causally relevant. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Sosa, E. %T Davidson's thinking causes %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stanton, W. L. %T Supervenience and psychophysical law in anomalous monism %I %D 1983 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 64 %N %P 72-9 %Z Supervenience entails psychophysical principles, but this is compatible with anomalous monism. On what constitutes a strict psychophysical law. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book Section %A Suppes, P. %T Davidson's views on psychology as a science %I Oxford University Press %D 1985 %B Essays on Davidson %E B. Vermazen %E M. Hintikka %Z Various: physics is indeterministic and intensional, animals have beliefs, psychology has derived laws, and decision-theory doesn't need speech. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Tiffany, E. C. %T The rational character of belief and the argument for mental anomalism %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 103 %N %P 258-314 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gulick, R. %T Rationality and the anomalous nature of the mental %I %D 1980 %B Philosophy Research Archives %V 7 %N %P %Z Rationality constraints don't introduce an irreducibly normative element into intentional attributions. Rationality serves as a condition of adequacy for psychophysical theories, but it doesn't rule them out. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Book %A Vermazen, B. %A Hintikka, M. %T Essays on Davidson %I Oxford University Press %D 1985 %Z 12 essays on Davidson, with replies. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Walsh, D. M. %T Wide content individualism %I %D 1998 %B Mind %V 107 %N %P 625-652 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Welshon, R. %T Anomalous monism and epiphenomenalism %I %D 1999 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 80 %N %P 103-120 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Yalowitz, S. %T Rationality and the argument for anomalous monism %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Studies %V 87 %N %P 235-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Yalowitz, S. %T Causation in the argument for anomalous monism %I %D 1998 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 28 %N %P 183-226 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Zangwill, N. %T Supervenience and anomalous monism: Blackburn on Davidson %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 71 %N %P 59-79 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,other psychophysical theories, anomalous monism %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, L. %T The causal relevance of the mental %I %D 1991 %B Mind and Language %V 6 %N %P 295-327 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Audi, R. %T Mental causation: Sustaining and dynamic %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Baker, L. R. %T Metaphysics and mental causation %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z Mental causation is incompatible with strong supervenience and causal closure of physics, as we can't distinguish high-level causes from non-causes. So reject the metaphysics and make explanation prior to causation. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Barrett, J. %T Rationalizing explanation and causally relevant mental properties %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 74 %N %P 77-102 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bennett, K. %T Why the exclusion problem seems intractable and how, just maybe, to tract it %I %D 2003 %B Nous %V 37 %N %P 471-97 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Blackburn, S. %T Losing your mind: Physics, identity, and folk burglar prevention %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B The Future of Folk Psychology %E J. Greenwood %Z Arguing for the causal efficacy and scientific respectability of higher-order states, such as functional-role states. To require appeal to particular physical states is to succumb to a "Tractarian" view of physical primacy. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Block, N. %T Can the mind change the world? %I Cambridge University Press %D 1989 %B Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam %E G. Boolos %Z Rescuing content from epiphenomenalism via functional role argument; but then functional roles aren't really causally efficacious (cf. dormitive virtue), so epi all over again? Roles vs fillers, causation vs explanation. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Block, N. %T Reply: Causation and two kinds of laws %I Oxford University Press %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation %E C. Macdonald %E G. Macdonald %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T Do causal powers drain away %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 67 %N %P 133-150 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bontly, T. D. %T The supervenience argument generalizes %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 109 %N %P 75-96 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Braun, D. %T Causally relevant properties %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 447-75 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Brewer, B. %T Compulsion by reason (Mental Causation II) %I %D 1995 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 69 %N %P 237-53 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Buckley, R. %T Physicalism and the problem of mental causation %I %D 2001 %B Journal of Philosophical Research %V 26 %N %P 155-174 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Burge, T. %T Mind-body causation and explanatory practice %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z Mental causation is not a real worry, but the to-do shows that materialist metaphysics has shed little light on it. It needs to be understood at the mental level. With remarks on exclusion arguments and token identity. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T On an alleged analogy between numbers and propositions %I %D 1990 %B Analysis %V 50 %N %P 224-30 %Z How can a relation to a proposition (an abstract object) be causally efficacious? Analogy with numbers doesn't work: weight properties are only pseudo-relational, depending on units, but propositions are absolute. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T Mental causation and mental reality %I %D 1992 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 66 %N %P 185-202 %Z Argues that anomalism and causal closure don't pose problems for mental causation as they are false, and that functional properties can efficacious. States with content may be efficacious, although content itself may not be. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T The mental causation debate (Mental causation I) %I %D 1995 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 69 %N %P 211-36 %Z Argues that mental causation is a deep problem for constitutive (but not identity) forms of physicalism. The only way out is to argue that it is a different variety of causation. But then what motivates physicalism? -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Crane, T. %T Jacob on mental causation %I %D 2001 %B Acta Analytica %V 16 %N %P 15-21 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Dretske, F. %T Mental events as structuring causes of behavior %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z Mental events are structuring causes of behavior; biological events are triggering causes, dependent on previous mental structuring. This allows extrinsic properties to play a causal role. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Ehring, D. %T Mental causation, determinables, and property instances %I %D 1996 %B Nous %V 30 %N %P 461-80 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Ehring, D. %T Part-whole physicalism and mental causation %I %D 2003 %B Synthese %V 136 %N %P 359-388 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Elder, C. %T Physicalism and the fallacy of composition %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 50 %N %P 332-43 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Elder, C. %T Mental causation versus physical causation: no contest %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 62 %N %P 110-127 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Elder, C. %T Materialism and the mediated causation of behavior %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 103 %N %P 165-75 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Ellis, R. D. %T Can dynamical systems explain mental causation? %I %D 2001 %B Journal of Mind And Behavior %V 22 %N %P 311-334 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Garrett, B. J. %T Pluralism, causation, and overdetermination %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 116 %N %P 355-78 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Gibb, S. C. %T The problem of mental causation and the nature of properties %I %D 2004 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 82 %N %P 464-75 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T On the matter of minds and mental causation %I %D 1998 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 58 %N %P 1-25 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %T Mentality and causality %I %D 1992 %B Topoi %V 11 %N %P 103-110 %Z On various problems with mental causation, and the relationship between psychology ans philosophy. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Heil, J. %T Mental causation %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Honderich, T. %T The union theory and anti-individualism %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z The identity theory and psychoneural correlation can't handle mental causation; only the union theory can. Anti-individualism causes problems, but should be rejected in any case. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T Mental quausation %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 3 %N %P 47-74 %Z How mental events are causally relevant qua mental: via an account of "qua" causation in general, using counterfactuals on "pertinently similar worlds". -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T Kim on mental causation and causal exclusion %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 11 %N %P 165-84 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T Causal compatibilism and the exclusion problem %I %D 2001 %B Theoria %V 16 %N %P 95-116 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Hornsby, J. %T Agency and causal explanation %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %A Pettit, P. %T Causation and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Supplement %V 50 %N %P 195-214 %Z A defense of functional role as a causally efficacious property of physical states. With application to connectionism & eliminativism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %A Pettit, P. %T Program explanation: A general perspective %I %D 1990 %B Analysis %V 50 %N %P 107-17 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %T Essentialism, mental properties, and causation %I %D 1995 %B 1995 %V %N %P %Z How can content properties be causes, given that content is a matter of functional role and that functional properties are not causes? Defends a type-identity answer against various objections. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %T Mental causation %I %D 1996 %B Mind %V 105 %N %P 377-413 %Z A "state of the art" review paper, concentrating on problems posed by autonomy, functionalism, and externalism, and advocating a sort of identity theory. With discussion of a "map-system" view vs. a language of thought. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kazez, J. R. %T Can counterfactuals save mental causation? %I %D 1995 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 73 %N %P 71-90 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation %I %D 1984 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 9 %N %P 257-70 %Z Psychological causation, like all macrocausation, is supervenient epiphenomenal causation. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Kim, J. %T The nonreductivist's trouble with mental causation %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z Argues that nonreductive materialism implies downward causation (as the mental has more causal powers than the physical alone), and that downward causation violates the causal closure of the physical. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Kim, J. %T "Downward causation" in emergentism and nonreductive physicalism %I De Gruyter %D 1992 %B Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism %E A. Beckermann %E H. Flohr %E J. Kim %Z Argues that nonreductive materialism is just like 1930s emergentism, with the the mental contributing new causal powers, and so implies downward causation. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Kim, J. %T Mental causation in a physical world %I Ridgeview %D 1993 %B Science and Knowledge %E E. Villanueva %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Manuscript %A Kim, J. %T `Second-order' properties and mental causation %I %D 1994 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Kim, J. %T Mental causation: What? Me worry? %I Ridgeview %D 1995 %B Content %E E. Villanueva %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Does the problem of mental causation generalize? %I %D 1997 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 97 %N %P 281-97 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Supervenient properties and micro-based concepts: A reply to Noordhof %I %D 1999 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 99 %N %P 115-118 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book %A Kim, J. %T Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation %I MIT Press %D 2000 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Blocking causal drainage and other maintenance chores with mental causation %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 67 %N %P 151-176 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Lackey, J. %T Explanation and mental causation %I %D 2002 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 40 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Leiter, B. %A Miller, A. %T Mind doesn't matter yet %I %D 1994 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 72 %N %P 220-28 %Z Argues that the arguments of Fodor and LePore & Loewer don't succeed in defeating the threat of epiphenomenalism. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Leiter, B. %A Miller, A. %T Closet dualism and mental causation %I %D 1998 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 28 %N %P 161-181 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A LePore, E. %A Loewer, B. %T More on making mind matter %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Topics %V 17 %N %P 175-91 %Z On the problems that irreducibility -- multiple realizability, normativity, and non-supervenience -- poses for mental causation. Criticizes Kim's supervenient causation and Fodor's causal powers, and looks to "quasation". -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Lowe, E. J. %T Physical causal closure and the invisibility of mental causation %I Imprint Academic %D 2003 %B Physicalism and Mental Causation %E S. Walter %E H. Heckmann %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Macdonald, C. %A Macdonald, G. %T Mental causes and explanation of action %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 36 %N %P 145-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Macdonald, C. %A Macdonald, G. %T Mental causation and nonreductive monism %I %D 1991 %B Analysis %V 51 %N %P 23-32 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Macdonald, C. %A Macdonald, G. %T How to be psychologically relevant %I Oxford University Press %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation %E C. Macdonald %E G. Macdonald %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Macdonald, G. %T The nature of naturalism %I %D 1992 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 66 %N %P 225-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Marcus, E. %T Mental causation in a physical world %I %D 2005 %B Philosophical Studies %V 122 %N %P 27-50 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Marcus, E. %T Mental causation: unnaturalized but not unnatural %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 63 %N %P 57-83 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T Nonreductive materialism and mental causation %I %D 1994 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 24 %N %P 465-93 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T The causal relevance of mental properties %I %D 1997 %B Philosophia %V 25 %N %P 389-400 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Marras, A. %T Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion %I %D 1998 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 76 %N %P 439-451 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Marras, A. %T Methodological and ontological aspects of the mental causation problem %I Imprint Academic %D 2003 %B Physicalism and Mental Causation %E S. Walter %E H. Heckmann %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A McGrath, M. %T Proportionality and mental causation: A fit? %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 12 %N %P 167-176 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T Type epiphenomenalism, type dualism, and the causal priority of the physical %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 3 %N %P 109-135 %Z Physical comprehensiveness and mental/physical non-reductionism don't imply mental inefficacy; nor does anomalous monism. Non-physical types can still can be causal, though they must be accompanied by physical causation. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Menzies, P. %T The causal efficacy of mental states %I Imprint Academic %D 2003 %B Physicalism and Mental Causation %E S. Walter %E H. Heckmann %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Nannini, S. %T Mental causation and intentionality in a mind naturalising theory %I John Benjamins %D 2004 %B Mind and Causality %E A. Peruzzi %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T Making the change: The functionalist's way %I %D 1997 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 48 %N %P 233-50 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T Do tropes resolve the problem of mental causation? %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 48 %N %P 221-26 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T Micro-based properties and the supervenience argument: A response to Kim %I %D 1999 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 99 %N %P 115-18 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T Personal dualism and the argument from differential vagueness %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Papers %V 31 %N %P 63-86 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Pettit, P. %T The nature of naturalism %I %D 1992 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 66 %N %P 245-66 %Z On making sense of the causal efficacy of higher-level properties under naturalism. They're relevant at the program level, not quite in the way that basic properies are. With remarks on Macdonald's objections. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Pietroski, P. %A Menzies, P. %T Causing actions %I %D 2003 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 440-446 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Raymont, P. %T Are mental properties causally relevant? %I %D 2001 %B Dialogue %V 40 %N %P 509-528 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A Raymont, P. %T Kim on closure, exclusion, and nonreductive physicalism %I Imprint Academic %D 2003 %B Physicalism and Mental Causation %E S. Walter %E H. Heckmann %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Robb, D. %T The properties of mental causation %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 187 %N %P 178-94 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Robb, D. %T Reply to Noordhof on mental causation %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 51 %N %P 90-94 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Do pains make a difference to our behavior? %I %D 1979 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 16 %N %P 327-34 %Z On Goldman's (1969) argument that dualism and causal closure are compatible with mental causation. Goldman establishes only hypothetical necessity, not causal necessity -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Sabates, M. H. %T Varieties of exclusion %I %D 2001 %B Theoria %V 16 %N %P 13-42 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Schroder, J. %T The supervenience argument and the generalization problem %I %D 2002 %B Erkenntnis %V 56 %N %P 319-28 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. R. %T Intentionality and its place in nature %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 61 %N %P 3-16 %Z Intentionality is caused by the physical, and causes. More a 1P emphasis. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Sosa, E. %T Mind-body interaction and supervenient causation %I %D 1984 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 9 %N %P 271-81 %Z Interactionist dualism is out, supervenient causation is in. But there are problems with mental events' causal relevance qua mental, especially for anomalous monism. Cf: a loud shot causes death, but loudness isn't relevant. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Stueber, K. R. %T Mental causation and the paradoxes of explanation %I %D 2005 %B Philosophical Studies %V 122 %N %P 243-77 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Suster, D. %T Semifactuals and epiphenomenalism %I %D 2001 %B Acta Analytica %V 16 %N %P 23-43 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Thomasson, A. %T A nonreductivist solution to mental causation %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Studies %V 89 %N %P 181-95 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Tienson, J. %T Higher-order causation %I %D 2002 %B Grazer Philosophische Studien %V 63 %N %P 89-101 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Tuomela, R. %T A defense of mental causation %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Studies %V 90 %N %P 1-34 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book Section %A van Gulick, R. %T Who's in charge here? And who's doing all the work? %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z On three arguments against mental causation, from strict laws, non-local supervenience, and especially exclusion. Mental properties are stable, recurring high-level patterns with their own causal relevance. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Vicente, A. %T The overdetermination argument revisited %I %D 2004 %B Minds and Machines %V 14 %N %P 331-47 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Book %A Walter, S. %A Heckmann, H. %T Physicalism and Mental Causation %I Imprint Academic %D 2003 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Worley, S. %T Determination and mental causation %I %D 1997 %B Erkenntnis %V 46 %N %P 281-304 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Yablo, S. %T Mental causation %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Review %V 101 %N %P 245-280 %Z Argues that mental events/properties stand to physical events/properties as determinable to determinates, solving the exclusion problem. Some mental events are *better* candidates for the cause of action than physical events. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Yablo, S. %T Superproportionality and mind-body relations %I %D 2001 %B Theoria %V 16 %N %P 65-75 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Yablo, S. %T Causal relevance %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Issues %V 13 %N %P 316-28 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Zangwill, N. %T Good old supervenience: Mental causation on the cheap %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 106 %N %P 67-101 %Z Argues that anomalous monism is compatible with mental causation: supervenience is necessary and sufficient for causal efficacy. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,mental causation %U %0 Journal Article %A Agar, N. %T Functionalism and personal identity %I %D 2003 %B Nous %V 37 %N %P 52-70 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Baillie, J. %T Recent work on personal identity %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Books %V 34 %N %P 193-206 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Baillie, J. %T Personal identity and mental content %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 323-33 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Baker, L. R. %T Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View %I Cambridge University Press %D 2000 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Beck, S. %T Let's exist again (like we did last Summer) %I %D 2001 %B South African Journal of Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 159-170 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Brennan, A. %T Personal identity and personal survival %I %D 1982 %B Analysis %V 42 %N %P 44-50 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Brennan, A. %T Survival %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 59 %N %P 339-62 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Brennan, A. %T Discontinuity and identity %I %D 1987 %B Nous %V 21 %N %P 241-60 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Brennan, A. %T Conditions of Identity: A Study of Identity and Survival %I Oxford University Press %D 1988 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Brooks, D. H. M. %T Group minds %I %D 1986 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 64 %N %P 456-70 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, S. %T Is connectedess necessary to what mattres in survival? %I %D 2001 %B Ration %V 14 %N %P 193-202 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, S. %T Rapid psychological change %I %D 2004 %B Analysis %V 64 %N %P 256-264 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, S. %T Can you survive a brain-zap? %I %D 2004 %B Theoria %V 70 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Carter, W. %T Will I be a dead person? %I %D 1999 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 59 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book Section %A Cartwright, H. M. %T Ruminations on an account of personal identity %I MIT Press %D 1987 %B On Being and Saying: Essays on Honor of Richard Cartwright %E J. J. Thomson %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Cartwright, H. M. %T On two arguments for the indeterminacy of personal identity %I %D 1993 %B Synthese %V 95 %N %P 241-273 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Cockburn, D. %T Human Beings %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Coleman, S. %T Thought experiments and personal identity %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Studies %V 98 %N %P 51-66 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Cowley, F. %T The identity of a person and his body %I %D 1971 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 678-683 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Dainton, B. %T Survival and experience %I %D 1996 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 96 %N %P 17-36 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Davis, L. H. %T Functionalism and personal identity %I %D 1998 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 58 %N %P 781-804 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Davis, L. H. %T Functionalism, the brain, and personal identity %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 102 %N %P 259-79 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Where am I? %I %D 1978 %B Brainstorms %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Eklund, M. %T Personal identity and conceptual incoherence %I %D 2002 %B Nous %V 36 %N %P 465-485 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Elliot, R. %T Personal identity and the causal continuity requirement %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 55-75 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Ganeri, J. %T Cross-modality and the self %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 61 %N %P 639-658 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Garrett B. %T Personal identity and extrinsicness %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Studies %V 59 %N %P 177-194 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Garrett, B. %T Personal identity and reductionism %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 51 %N %P 361-373 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Garrett, B. %T Persons and values %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 42 %N %P 337-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Glover, J. %T I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity %I Penguin %D 1988 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Hamilton, A. %T A new look at personal identity %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 45 %N %P 332-349 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Harris, H. %T Identity %I Oxford University Press %D 1995 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book Section %A Harris, H. %T An experimentalist looks at identity %I Oxford University Press %D 1995 %B Identity %E H. Harris %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Hasker, W. %T The Emergent Self %I Cornell University Press %D 1999 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Hershenov, D. %T Do dead bodies pose a problem for biological approaches to personal identity? %I %D 2005 %B Mind %V 114 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Hope, T. %T Personal Identity and Psychiatric Illness %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy %V 37 %N %P 131-143 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnston, M. %T Reasons and reductionism %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Review %V 3 %N %P 589-618 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Kolak, D. %A Martin, R. %T Personal identity and causality: Becoming unglued %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Kolak, D. %T The metaphysics and metapsychology of personal identity: Why thought experiments matter in deciding who we are %I %D 1993 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 30 %N %P 39-50 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Kolak, D. %A Martin, R. %T Self and Identity: Contemporary Philosophical Issues %I Macmillan %D 1991 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Langsam, H. %T Pain, personal identity, and the deep further fact %I %D 2001 %B Erkenntnis %V 54 %N %P 247-271 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Mackie, D. %T Animalism vs. Lockeanism: No contest %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 49 %N %P 369-76 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Mackie, D. %T Personal identity and dead people %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 95 %N %P 219-42 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Madell, G. %T The Identity of the Self %I Edinburgh University Press %D 1981 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Madell, G. %T Personal identity and the idea of a human being %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy %V 29 %N %P 127-142 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Martin, R. %T Self-interest and survival %I %D 1992 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 29 %N %P 319-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Martin, R. %A Barresi, J. %T Naturalizing the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century %I Routledge %D 2004 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, S. %T Survival and separation %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Studies %V 98 %N %P 279-303 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A McCall, C. %T Concepts of Person: An Analysis of Concepts of Person, Self, and Human Being %I Avebury %D 1990 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Merricks, T. %T Perdurance and psychological continuity %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 61 %N %P 195-199 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Miri, M. %T Memory and personal identity %I %D 1973 %B Mind %V 82 %N %P 1-21 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Nerlich, G. C. %T Sameness, difference, and continuity %I %D 1958 %B 1958 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Noonan, H. %T Personal Identity %I Routledge %D 1989 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Noonan, H. %T Chisholm, persons, and identity %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 69 %N %P 35-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Noonan, H. %T Personal Identity %I Routledge %D 2003 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book Section %A Nozick, R. %T The identity of the self %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Explanations %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Olson E. %T Is Psychology relevant to personal identity? %I %D 1994 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 72 %N %P 173-186 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Olson, E. T. %T The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology %I Oxford University Press %D 1997 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Olson, E. %T Personal identity and the radiation argument %I %D 2001 %B Analysis %V 61 %N %P 38-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book Section %A Olson, E. %T Personal identity %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Olson, E. %T Animalism and the corpse problem %I %D 2004 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 82 %N %P 265-74 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Peacocke, A. %A Gillett, G. %T Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry %I Blackwell %D 1987 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Penelhum, T. %T Personal identity, memory, and survival %I %D 1959 %B 1959 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Penelhum, T. %T The importance of self-identity %I %D 1971 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 667-78 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Perrett, R. W. %A Barton, C. %T Personal identity, reductionism, and the necessity of origins %I %D 1999 %B Erkenntnis %V 51 %N %P 277-94 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Perry, J. %T Can the self divide? %I %D 1972 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 69 %N %P 463-88 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Perry, J. %T Personal Identity %I University of California Press %D 1975 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book Section %A Perry, J. %T Personal identity, memory, and the problem of circularity %I University of California Press %D 1975 %B Personal Identity %E J. Perry %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book Section %A Perry, J. %T The importance of being identical %I University of California Press %D 1976 %B The Identities of Persons %E A. Rorty %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Perry, J. %T A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality %I Hackett %D 1978 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Persson, I. %T Self-doubt: Why we are not identical to things of any kind %I %D 2004 %B Ratio %V 17 %N %P 390-408 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Pogue, J. E. %T Identity, survival, and the reasonableness of replication %I %D 1993 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 31 %N %P 45-70 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Rea, M. %A Silver, D. %T Personal identity and psychological continuity %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 61 %N %P 185-194 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book Section %A Rey, G. %T Survival %I University of California Press %D 1976 %B The Identities of Persons %E A. Rorty %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Rieber, S. %T The concept of personal identity %I %D 1998 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 58 %N %P 581-594 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Robert, M. %T Lewis's theory of personal identity %I %D 1983 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 61 %N %P 58-67 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Rorty, A. %T The Identities of Persons %I University of California Press %D 1976 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book Section %A Seager, W. %T The constructed and the secret self %I John Benjamins %D 2001 %B Self-Reference and Self-Awareness %E A. Brook %E R. DeVidi %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Shalom, A. %T The Body-Mind Conceptual Framework and the Problem of Personal Identity %I Humanities Press %D 1985 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Schechtman, M. %T Personhood and personal identity %I %D 1990 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 87 %N %P 71-92 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Schechtman, M. %T Personality and persistence: The many faces of personal survival %I %D 2004 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 87-106 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book Section %A Seager, W. %T The constructed and the secret self %I John Benjamins %D 2001 %B Self-reference and Self-Awareness %E A. Brook %E R. DeVidi %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Shoemaker, S. %T Personal identity and memory %I %D 1959 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 56 %N %P 868-902 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Shoemaker, S. %T Persons and their pasts %I %D 1970 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 7 %N %P 269-85 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Shoemaker, S. %A Swinburne, S. %T Personal Identity: Great Debates in Philosophy %I Blackwell %D 1984 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Shoemaker, S. %T Self, body, and coincidence %I %D 2003 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 63 %N %P 287-306 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Shorter, J. M. %T More about bodily continuity and personal identity %I %D 1962 %B Analysis %V 22 %N %P 79-85 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Sidelle, A. %T On the prospects for a theory of personal identity %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Topics %V 26 %N %P 351-72 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Strawson, G. %T Against narrativity %I %D 2004 %B Ration %V 17 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Unger, P. %T Identity, Consciousness, and Value %I Oxford University Press %D 1990 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A van Fraassen, B. %T Transcendence of the ego (the nonexistent knight) %I %D 2004 %B Ratio %V 17 %N %P 453-77 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Vesey, P. %T Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis %I Cornell University Press %D 1974 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A White, S. %T Metapsychological relativism and the self %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 86 %N %P 298-323 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Whiting, J. %T Friends and future selves %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 547-80 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Wilkes, K. V. %T Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments %I Oxford University Press %D 1988 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Williams, B. %T Personal identity and individuation %I %D 1957 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 67 %N %P 229-52 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Book %A Williams, B. %T Problems of the Self %I Cambridge University Press %D 1973 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Zemach, E. %T Looking out for number one %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Zuboff, A. %T Moment universals and personal identity %I %D 1978 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 52 %N %P 141-55 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Zuboff, A. %T One self: The logic of experience %I %D 1990 %B Inquiry %V 33 %N %P 39-68 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, personal identity, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Alter, T. %A Rachels, S. %T Epistemicism and the combined spectrum %I %D 2002 %B Ratio %V 17 %N %P 241-55 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Baillie, J. %T What matters in survival %I %D 1993 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 31 %N %P 255-61 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Baillie, J. %T Identity, relation R, and what matters: A challenge to Derek Parfit %I %D 1996 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 77 %N %P 263-267 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Beck, S. %T Parfit and the Russians (personal identity and moral concepts) %I %D 1989 %B Analysis %V 49 %N %P 205-209 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Bodansky, E. %T Parfit on selves and their interests %I %D 1987 %B Analysis %V 47 %N %P 47-50 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Brennan, A. A. %T Survival and importance %I %D 1987 %B Analysis %V 47 %N %P 225-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Brueckner, A. %T Parfit on what matters in survival %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 70 %N %P 1-22 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Bushnell, D. E. %T Identity, psychological continuity, and rationality %I %D 1993 %B Journal of Philosophical Research %V 18 %N %P 15-24 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, S. %T Strawson, Parfit and impersonality %I %D 2000 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 30 %N %P 207-225 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Cassam, Q. %T Parfit on persons %I %D 1993 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 93 %N %P 17-37 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Chappell, T. %T Personal identity, R-relatedness, and the empty question argument %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 45 %N %P 88-92 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Chappell, T. %T Reductionism about persons; and what matters %I %D 1998 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 98 %N %P 41-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Collins, A. W. %T Personal identity and the coherence of q-memory %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 47 %N %P 73-80 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Curzer, H. %T An ambiguity in Parfit's theory of personal identity %I %D 1991 %B Ratio %V 4 %N %P 16-24 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Book %A Dancy, J. (ed). %T Reading Parfit %I Blackwell %D 1997 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Doepke, F. %T The practical importance of personal identity %I %D 1990 %B Logos %V 83 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Ehring, D. %T Survival and trivial facts %I %D 1987 %B Analysis %V 47 %N %P 50-54 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Ehring, D. %T Personal identity and the R-relation: Reconciliation through cohabitation %I %D 1995 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 73 %N %P 337-346 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Ehring, D. %T Fission, fusion, and the Parfit revolution %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 94 %N %P 329-32 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Fields, L. %T Parfit on personal identity and desert %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 37 %N %P 432-41 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Gendler, T. %T Personal identity and thought-experiments %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 52 %N %P 34-54 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Book Section %A Gillett, G. %T Reasoning about persons %I Blackwell %D 1987 %B Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry %E A. Peacocke %E G. Gillett %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Goodenough, J. M. %T Parfit and the Sorites paradox %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Studies %V 2 %N %P 113-20 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Haugen, D. %T Personal identity and concern for the future %I %D 1995 %B Philosophia %V 24 %N %P 481-492 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Hirsch, E. %T Divided minds %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Review %V 1 %N %P 3-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnston, M. %T Fission and the facts %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 3 %N %P 369-97 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Korsgaard, C. %T Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy and Public Affairs %V 18 %N %P 103-31 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Lee, W. %T Personal identity, the temporality of agency, and moral responsibility %I %D 1990 %B Auslegung %V 16 %N %P 17-29 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Book Section %A Lewis, D. %T Survival and identity %I University of California Press %D 1976 %B The Identities of Persons %E A. Rorty %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Madell, G. %T Derek Parfit and Greta Garbo %I %D 1985 %B Analysis %V 45 %N %P 105-9 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Maddy, P. %T Is the importance of identity derivative? %I %D 1979 %B Philosophical Studies %V 35 %N %P 151-70 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, G. B. %T Surviving as %I %D 1977 %B Analysis %V 37 %N %P 53-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Martin, R. %T Memory, connecting, and what matters in survival %I %D 1987 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 65 %N %P 82-97 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Measor, N. %T On what matters in survival %I %D 1980 %B Mind %V 89 %N %P 406-11 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Merricks, T. %T Fission and personal identity over time %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Studies %V 88 %N %P 163-186 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Northoff, G. %T Are "q-memories" empirically realistic?: A neurophilosophical approach %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 191-211 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Oaklander, L. N. %T Parfit, circularity, and the unity of consciousness %I %D 1987 %B Mind %V 96 %N %P 525-29 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Parfit, D. %T Personal identity %I %D 1971 %B Philosophical Review %V 80 %N %P 3-27 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Parfit, D. %T On the importance of self-identity %I %D 1971 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 683-90 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Book Section %A Parfit, D. %T Later selves and moral principles %I Routledge and Kegan Paul %D 1973 %B Philosophy and Personal Relations %E A. Montefiore %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Book Section %A Parfit, D. %T Lewis, Perry, and what matters %I University of California Press %D 1976 %B The Identities of Persons %E A. Rorty %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Parfit, D. %T Personal identity and rationality %I %D 1982 %B Synthese %V 53 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Book %A Parfit, D. %T Reasons and Persons %I Oxford University Press %D 1984 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Book Section %A Parfit, D. %T The unimportance of identity %I Oxford University Press %D 1995 %B Identity %E H. Harris %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Parfit, D. %T Experiences, subjects, and conceptual schemes %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Topics %V 26 %N %P 217-70 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, J. %T Personal identity and survival %I %D 1988 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 85 %N %P 319-28 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Rovane, C. %T Branching self-consciousness %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Review %V 99 %N %P 355-95 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Seibt, J. %T Fission, sameness, and survival: Parfit's branch line argument revisited %I %D 2002 %B Metaphysica %V 1 %N 2 %P 95-134 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Siderits, M. %T Ehring on Parfit's relation R %I %D 1988 %B Analysis %V 48 %N %P 29-32 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Slors, M. %T Personal identity, memory, and circularity: An alternative for q-memory %I %D 2001 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 98 %N %P 186-214 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Sprigge, T. L. S. %T Personal and impersonal identity %I %D 1988 %B Mind %V 97 %N %P 29-49 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Storl, H. %T The problematic nature of parfitian persons %I %D 1992 %B Personalist Forum %V 8 %N %P 123-31 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Stone, J. %T Parfit and the Buddha: Why there are no people %I %D 1988 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 48 %N %P 519-32 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Wolf, S. %T Self-interest and interest in selves %I %D 1986 %B Ethics %V 96 %N %P 704-20 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, parfit on personal identity %U %0 Journal Article %A Aune, B. %T Speaking of selves %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 44 %N %P 279-93 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Barresi, J. %T On becoming a person %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 12 %N %P 79-98 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Bertocci, P. A. %T The essence of a person %I %D 1978 %B Monist %V 61 %N %P 28-41 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Biro, J. I. %T Persons as corporate entities and corporations as persons %I %D 1981 %B Nature and System %V 3 %N %P 173-80 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, S. %T Persons and substances %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 104 %N %P 253-67 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Book %A Chisholm, R. M. %T Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study %I Open Court %D 1976 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Dainton, B. %T The self and the phenomenal %I %D 2004 %B Ratio %V 17 %N %P 365-89 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Degrazia, D. %T Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Forum %V 33 %N %P 81-99 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Conditions of personhood.Lewis, D. 1976 %I University of California Press %D 1976 %B The Identities of Persons %E A. Rorty %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T The origins of selves %I %D 1989 %B Cogito %V 3 %N %P 163-73 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Ganeri, J. %T An irrealist theory of self %I %D 2004 %B Harvard Review of Philosophy %V 12 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Hasker, W. %T The constitution view of persons: A critique %I %D 2004 %B International Philosophical Quarterly %V 44 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Heinimaa, M. %T Ambiguities in the psychiatric use of the concepts of the person: An analysis %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology %V 7 %N %P 125-136 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Lowe, E. J. %T Real selves: Persons as a substantial kind %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy %V 29 %N %P 87-107 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnston, M. %T Human beings %I %D 1987 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 84 %N %P 59-83 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Margolis, J. %T Minds, selves, and persons %I %D 1988 %B Topoi %V 7 %N %P 31-45 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A McInerney, P. K. %T Persons and psychological systems %I %D 1998 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 35 %N %P 179-193 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A McInerney, P. K. %T Conceptions of persons and persons through time %I %D 2000 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 37 %N %P 121-134 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Book %A Merricks, T. %T Objects and Persons %I Oxford University Press %D 2001 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Oderberg, D. %T Johnston on human beings %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 86 %N %P 137-41 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Olson, E. %T Human atoms %I %D 1998 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 76 %N %P 396-406 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Peterson, J. %T Persons and the problem of interaction %I %D 1985 %B Modern Schoolman %V 62 %N %P 131-38 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Book Section %A Rorty, A. O. %T A literary postscript: Characters, persons, selves, individuals %I University of California Press %D 1976 %B The Identities of Persons %E A. Rorty %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Shoemaker, D. W. %T Selves and moral units %I %D 1999 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 80 %N %P 391-419 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Shoemaker, S. %T Self, body, and coincidence %I %D 1999 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 73 %N %P 287-306 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, B. %T Synchronous and diachronous selves %I %D 1976 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 6 %N %P 13-33 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Sosa, E. %T The essentials of persons %I %D 1999 %B Dialectica %V 53 %N %P 227-41 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Steinhart, E. %T Persons versus brains: Biological intelligence in human organisms %I %D 2001 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 16 %N %P 3-27 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Strawson, P. %T Persons %I %D 1958 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 2 %N %P 330-53 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Stone, J. %T Why there are still no people %I %D 2005 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 70 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Book Section %A Unger, P. %T I do not exist %I Cornell University Press %D 1979 %B Perception and Identity %E G. Macdonald %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Unger, P. %T Why there are no people %I %D 1979 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 4 %N %P 177-222 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A van Inwagen, P. %T The self: The incredulous stare articulated %I %D 2004 %B Ratio %V 17 %N %P 478-91 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Vincent, A. %T Can groups be persons? %I %D 1989 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 42 %N %P 687-715 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A White, S. %T Skepticism, deflation and the rediscovery of the self %I %D 2004 %B Monist %V 87 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Book Section %A Wiggins, D. %T The person as object of science, as subject of experience, and as locus of value %I Blackwell %D 1987 %B Persons and Personality %E A. Peacocke %E G. Gillett %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, persons %U %0 Journal Article %A Baillie, J. %T Split brains and single minds %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Philosophical Research %V 16 %N %P 11-18 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Davis, L. %T Cerebral hemispheres %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Studies %V 87 %N %P 207-22 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Gill, J. H. %T Of split brains and tacit knowing %I %D 1980 %B International Philosophical Quarterly %V 20 %N %P 49-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Gillett, G. %T Brain bisection and personal identity %I %D 1986 %B Mind %V 95 %N %P 224-9 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Greenwood, J. D. %T Split brains and singular personhood %I %D 1993 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 31 %N %P 285-306 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Book %A Marks, C. %T Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and Unity of Mind %I MIT Press %D 1980 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Martin, R. %T Fission rejuvenation %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 80 %N %P 17-40 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Merricks, T. %T Fission and personal identity over time %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Studies %V 88 %N %P 163-186 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Mills E. %T Dividing without reducing: Bodily fission and personal identity %I %D 1993 %B Mind %V 102 %N %P 37-51 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Moor, J. %T Split brains and atomic persons %I %D 1982 %B Philosophy of Science %V 49 %N %P 91-106 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Morin, A. %T The split brain debate revisited: on the importance of language and self recognition for right hemispheric consciousness %I %D 2001 %B Journal Of Mind and Behavior %V 22 %N %P 107-118 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Nagel, T. %T Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness %I %D 1971 %B Synthese %V 22 %N %P 396-413 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Book Section %A Parfit, D. %T Divided minds and the nature of persons %I Blackwell %D 1987 %B Mindwaves %E C. Blakemore %E S. Greenfield %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T Brain bisection and personal identity %I %D 1973 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 24 %N %P 339-55 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T Multiple identity %I %D 1973 %B Personalist %V 54 %N %P 203-13 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T The mute self: A reaction to DeWitt's alternative account of the split-brain data %I %D 1975 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 27 %N %P 65-73 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T The case for mental duality: Evidence from split-brain data and other considerations %I %D 1981 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 4 %N %P 93-123 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T Two brains, two minds %I %D 1989 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 40 %N %P 137-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T Mind with a double brain %I %D 1993 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 44 %N %P 675-92 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T Dennett on the split-brain %I %D 1993 %B Psycoloquy %V 4 %N 52 %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, D. N. %T What sort of persons are hemispheres? Another look at "split-brain" man %I %D 1976 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 27 %N %P 73-8 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Shaffer, J. %T Personal identity: The implications of brain bisection and brain transplants %I %D 1977 %B Journal of Medicine and Philosophy %V 2 %N %P 147-61 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Sperry, R. W. %T Consciousness, personal identity and the divided brain %I %D 1984 %B Neuropsychologia %V 22 %N %P 611-73 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, split brains %U %0 Journal Article %A Apter, A. %T The problem of who: Multiple personality, personal identity, and the double brain %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 219-48 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Benner, D. G. %A Evans, C. S. %T Unity and multiplicity in hypnosis, commissurotomy, and multiple personality disorder %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 5 %N %P 423-431 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Boden, M. A. %T Multiple personality and computational models %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy %V 37 %N %P 103-114 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Book %A Braude, S. E. %T First-person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind %I Routledge %D 1991 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Braude, S. E. %T Multiple personality disorder and moral responsibility %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology %V 3 %N %P 37-54 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Brown, M. T. %T Multiple personality and personal identity %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 435-47 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, S. R. L. %T How many selves make me? %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy %V 29 %N %P 213-33 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, S. R. L. %T Minds, memes, and multiples %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology %V 3 %N %P 21-28 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Book Section %A Flanagan, O. %T Multiple identity, character transformation, and self-reclamation %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychopathology %E G. Graham %E G. Stephens %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Gillett, G. %T Multiple personality and the concept of a person %I %D 1986 %B New Ideas in Psychology %V 4 %N %P 173-84 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Gillett, G. %T A discursive account of multiple personality disorder %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology %V 4 %N %P 213-22 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hacking, I. %T Two souls in one body %I %D 1991 %B Critical Inquiry %V 17 %N %P 838-67 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Book %A Hacking, I. %T Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory %I Princeton University Press %D 1995 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Humphrey, N. %A Dennett, D. C. %T Speaking for ourselves %I %D 1989 %B Raritan %V 9 %N %P 68-98 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Kolak, D. %T Finding our selves: Identification, identity, and multiple personality %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 363-86 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Lizza, J. P. %T Multiple personality and personal identity revisited %I %D 1993 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 44 %N %P 263-274 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, S. %T Personal identity, multiple personality disorder, and moral personhood %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 67-88 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Book %A Radden, J. %T Divided Minds and Successive Selves: Ethical Issues in Disorders of Identity and Personality %I MIT Press %D 1996 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilkes, K. V. %T Multiple personalty and personal identity %I %D 1981 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 32 %N %P 331-48 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilkes, K. V. %T How many selves make me? %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy %V 66 %N %P 235-43 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,personal identity, multiple personality %U %0 Journal Article %A Albritton, R. %T Freedom of the will and freedom of action %I %D 1985 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 59 %N %P 239-51 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Almeida, M. %A Bernstein, M. %T Lucky libertarianism %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 22 %N %P 93-119 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Anscombe, G. E. M. %T Causality and Determinism %I Cambridge University Press %D 1971 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Anscombe, G. E. M. %T `Soft' determinism %I Oriel Press %D 1976 %B Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy %E G. Ryle %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Audi, R. %T Moral responsibility, freedom, and compulsion %I %D 1974 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 11 %N %P 1-14 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Aune, B. %T Free will, 'can', and ethics: A reply to Lehrer %I %D 1970 %B Analysis %V 30 %N %P 77-83 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Ayer, A. J. %T Freedom and necessity %I %D 1954 %B Philosophical Essays %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Ayer, A. J. %T Free will and rationality %I Oxford University Press %D 1980 %B Philosophical Subjects %E Z. van Straaten %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Ayers, M. %T The Refutation of Determinism %I Methuen %D 1968 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Balaguer, M. %T Libertarianism as a scientifically respectable view %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 93 %N %P 189-211 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Balaguer, M. %T A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will %I %D 2002 %B Nous %V 38 %N %P 379-406 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Benn, S. %T A Theory of Freedom %I Cambridge University Press %D 1988 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Benson, S. %T Freedom and value %I %D 1987 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 84 %N %P 465-87 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Benson, S. %T Free agency and self-worth %I %D 1994 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 91 %N %P 650-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Bergmann, F. %T On Being Free %I University of Notre Dame Press %D 1977 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Benstein, M. %T Fatalism %I University of Nebraska Press %D 1992 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernstein, M. %T Kanean libertarianism %I %D 1995 %B Southwest Philosophical Review %V 11 %N %P 151-57 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Bernstein, M. %T Fatalism %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Berofsky, B. %T Free Will and Determinism %I Harper and Row %D 1966 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Berofsky, B. %T Determinism %I Princeton University Press %D 1971 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Berofsky, B. %T Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility %I Routledge %D 1987 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Berofsky, B. %T Ultimate rsponsibility in a determined world %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 60 %N %P 135-40 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Berofsky, B. %T Ifs, cans, and free will: The issues %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Bishop, J. %T Agent-causation %I %D 1983 %B Mind %V 92 %N %P 61-79 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Bishop, J. %T Is agent-causality a conceptal primitive? %I %D 1986 %B Synthese %V 67 %N %P 225-47 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Bishop, J. %T Compatibilism and the free will defense %I %D 1993 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 71 %N %P 104-20 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Bishop, R. C. %T Chaos, indeterminism, and free will %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Blumenfeld, D. %T The principle of alternate possibilities %I %D 1971 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 67 %N %P 339-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Blumenfeld, D. %T Freedom and mind control %I %D 1988 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 25 %N %P 215-27 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Bok, H. %T Freedom and Responsibility %I Princeton University Press %D 1998 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A BonJour, L. %T Deeterminism, libertarianism, and agent causation %I %D 1976 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 14 %N %P 145-56 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, C. A. %T Is "free will" a pseudoproblem? %I %D 1951 %B Mind %V 60 %N %P 441-65 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Campbell, C. A. %T In Defense of Free Will %I Allen and Unwin %D 1967 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, J. K. %T A compatibilist theory of alternate possibilities %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Studies %V 67 %N %P 339-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Carlson, E. %T In defense of the Mind argument %I %D 2002 %B Philosophia %V 29 %N %P 393-400 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. S. %T Is determinism self-refuting? %I %D 1981 %B Mind %V 90 %N %P 99-101 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Clarke, R. %T Free will and the conditions of moral responsibility %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 66 %N %P 53-72 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Clarke, R. %T Toward a credible agent-causal account of free will %I %D 1993 %B Nous %V 27 %N %P 191-203 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Clarke, R. %T Agent causation and event causation in the production of free action %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 19-48 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Clarke, R. %T On the possibility of rational free action %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Studies %V 88 %N %P 37-57 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Clarke, R. %T Modest libertarianism %I %D 2000 %B Philosopical Perspectives %V 14 %N %P 21-46 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Clarke, R. %T Libertarian views: Critical survey of noncausal and event-causal accounts of free agency %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Clarke, R. %T Free will %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Clarke, R. %T Libertarian views: Noncausal and event-causal sccounts of free agency %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Cover, J. %A Hawthorne, J. %T Free agency and materialism %I Rowman and Littlefield %D 1996 %B Faith, Freedom, and Rationality %E D. Howard-Snyder %E J. Jordan %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Crisp, T. %A Warfield, T. %T The irrelevance of indeterministic counterexamples to principle beta %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy & Phenomenological Research %V 61 %N %P 173-185 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Davidson, D. %T Freedom to act %I Routledge %D 1973 %B Essays on Freedom of Action %E T. Honderich %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Daw, R. %A Alter, T. %T Free acts and robot cats %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 102 %N %P 345-57 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T On giving libertarians what they say they want %I %D 1978 %B Brainstorms %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Dennett, D. C. %T Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting %I MIT Press %D 1984 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Dilman, I. %T Free Will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction %I Routledge %D 1999 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Dorschel, A. %T The authority of the will %I %D 2002 %B The Philosophical Forum %V 33 %N %P 425-442 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T Puppeteers, hypnotists, and neurosurgeons %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Studies %V 56 %N %P 163-73 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Double, R. %T The Non-Reality of Free Will %I Oxford University Press %D 1991 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T Determinism and the experience of freedom %I %D 1991 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 72 %N %P 1-8 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T How rational must free will be? %I %D 1992 %B Metaphilosophy %V 23 %N %P 268-78 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T How to frame the free will problem %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 75 %N %P 149-72 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Double, R. %T Metaphilosophy and Free Will %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T Misdirection on the free will problem %I %D 1997 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 34 %N %P 359-68 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T In defense of the smart aleck: A reply to Ted Honderich %I %D 1999 %B Journal of Philosophical Research %V 24 %N %P 305-9 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Double, R. %T Metaethics, metaphilosophy, and free will subjectivism %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Double, R. %T Metaethics, metaphilosophy and free will subjectivism %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T The ethical advantages of free will subjectivism %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 69 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Duggan, T. %A Gert, B. %T Free will as the ability to will %I %D 1979 %B Nous %V 13 %N %P 197-217 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Dupre, J. %T The solution to the problem of freedom of the will %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 10 %N %P 385-402 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Dworkin, G. %T Acting freely %I %D 1970 %B Nous %V 4 %N %P 367-83 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Dworkin, G. %T Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility %I Prentice-Hall %D 1970 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Eccles, J. %T Brain and free will %I Plenum Press %D 1976 %B Consciousness and the Brain %E G. Globus %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Ekstrom, L. W. %T Freedom, causation, and the consequence argument %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 115 %N %P 333-54 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Ekstrom, L. W. %T Protecting incompatibilist free action %I %D 1998 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 35 %N %P 281-91 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Ekstrom, L. W. %T Free Will: A Philosophical Study %I Westview %D 2000 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Ekstrom, L. W. %T Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom %I Westview %D 2001 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Ekstrom, L. W. %T Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style cases %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Ekstrom, L. W. %T Free will, chance, and mystery %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 22 %N %P 153-80 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Falk, A. %T On some modal confusions in compatibilism %I %D 1981 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 18 %N %P 141-48 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Finch, A. %A Warfield, T. %T The Mind argument and libertarianism %I %D 1998 %B Mind %V 107 %N %P 515-28 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Fine, A. %T Indeterminism and the freedom of the will %I University of Pittsburgh Press %D 1993 %B Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External World %E J. Earman %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Fisher, C. M. %T If there were no free will %I %D 2001 %B Medical Hypotheses %V 56 %N %P 364-366 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Fischer, J. M. %T Responsibility and control %I %D 1982 %B Journal of Philsophy %V 79 %N %P 24-40 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Ficsher, J. M. %T Incompatibilism %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Studies %V 43 %N %P 127-37 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Fischer, J. M. %A Ravizza, M. %T When the will is free %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 6 %N %P 423-51 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Fischer, J. M. %T The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Study of Control %I Blackwell %D 1994 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Fischer, J. M. %T A new compatibilism %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 49-66 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Fischer, J. M. %A Ravizza, M. %T Free will and the modal principle %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Studies %V 3 %N %P 213-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Fischer, J. M. %A Ravizza, M. %T Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Fischer, J. M. %T Frankfurt-type examples and semi-compatibilism %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Flint, T. %T Compatibilism and the argument from unavoidability %I %D 1987 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 84 %N %P 423-40 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Foley, R. %T Compatibilism %I %D 1978 %B Kind %V 87 %N %P 421-28 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Foot, P. %T Free will as involving determinism %I %D 1957 %B Philosophical Review %V 66 %N %P 439-50 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Forrest, P. %T Backwards causation in defense of free will %I %D 1985 %B Mind %V 94 %N %P 210-17 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Fowler, C. %T A pragmatic defense of free will %I %D 1996 %B Journal of Value Inquiry %V 30 %N %P 247-60 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Frankfurt, H. %T Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility %I %D 1969 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 65 %N %P 829-39 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Frankfurt, H. %T Freedom of the will and the concept of a person %I %D 1971 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 5-20 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Furlong, F. W. %T Determinism and free will: Review of the literature %I %D 1981 %B American Journal of Psychiatry %V 138 %N %P 435-39 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Gallois, A. %T Van Inwagen on free will and determinism %I %D 1977 %B Philosophical Studies %V 32 %N %P 99-105 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Chaos and free will %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 365-74 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Gillett, G. %T Free will and events in the brain %I %D 2001 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 22 %N %P 287-310 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Ginet, C. %T The conditional analysis of freedom %I Reidel %D 1980 %B Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor %E P. van Inwagen %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Ginet, C. %T In defense of incompatibilism %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Studies %V 44 %N %P 391-400 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Ginet, C. %T Reasons explanation of action: An incompatibilist account %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 3 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Ginet, C. %T On Action %I Cambridge University Press %D 1990 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Ginet, C. %T In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don't find Frankfurt's argument convincing %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 10 %N %P 403-17 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Ginet, C. %T Reasons and explanations of action: Causalist versus noncausalist accounts %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldman, A. %T Actions, predictions, and books of life %I %D 1968 %B 1968 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldman, A. %T The compatibility of mechanism and purpose %I %D 1969 %B Philosophical Review %V 78 %N %P 468-82 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Gomberg, P. %T Free will as ultimate responsibility %I %D 1975 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 15 %N %P 205-12 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Gosselin, P. %T The principle of alternative possibilities %I %D 1987 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 17 %N %P 91-104 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Griffiths, A. P. %T Is free will incompatible with something or other? %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy %V 24 %N %P 101-19 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Greenspan, P. S. %T Behavior control and freedom of action %I %D 1978 %B Philosophical Review %V 87 %N %P 225-40 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Greenspan, P. S. %T Free will and the genome project %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy and Public Affairs %V 22 %N %P 31-43 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Grunbaum, A. %T Free will and the laws of human behavior %I %D 1971 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 8 %N %P 299-317 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Haji, I. %A Cuypers, S. %T Libertarian free will and CNC manipulation %I %D 2001 %B Dialectica %V 55 %N %P 221-238 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Haji, I. %T Compatibilist views of freedom and responsibility %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Heinaman, R. %T Incompatibilism without the principle of alternative possibilities %I %D 1986 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 64 %N %P 266-76 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Heller, M. %T The mad scientist meets the robot cats: Compatibilism, kinds, and counterexamples %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 333-37 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Hill, C. S. %T Watsonian freedom and the freedom of the will %I %D 1984 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 62 %N %P 294-98 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Hill, C. S. %T Van Inwagen on the consequence argument %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 49-55 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Hobart, R. E. %T Free will as involving determinism and inconceivable without it %I %D 1934 %B Mind %V 43 %N %P 1-27 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Hodgson, D. %T The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World %I Oxford University Press %D 1991 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Hodgson, D. %T Consciousness, quantum physics, and free will %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Hodgson, D. %T Physics, consciousness and free will %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Hodgson, D. %T A plain person's free will. [With commentaries and replies %I %D 2005 %B ] Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 12 %N 1 %P 3-19 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Honderich, T. %T Essays on Freedom of Action %I Routledge and Kegan Paul %D 1973 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Honderich, T. %T A Theory of Determinism %I Oxford University Press %D 1988 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Honderich, T. %T How Free Are You? %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Honderich, T. %T Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and the smart aleck %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 855-62 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Honderich, T. %T Determinism as true, compatibilism and incompatibilism as false, and the real alternative %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Honderich, T. %T How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem. Oxford University Press. Honderich, T. 2002. Determinism as true, compatibilism and incompatibilism as both false, and the real problem %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Hook, S. %T Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science %I %D 1958 %B 1958 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T Compatibilism and the consequence argument %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Studies %V 47 %N %P 339-56 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Hospers, J. %T Meaning and free will %I %D 1950 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 10 %N %P 307-30 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Howard, G. S. %T Steps toward a science of free will %I %D 1993 %B Counseling and Values %V 37 %N %P 116-28 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Huby, P. %T The first discovery of the free will issue %I %D 1967 %B Philosophy %V 42 %N %P 333-62 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Kane, R. %T Free Will and Values %I SUNY Press %D 1985 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Kane, R. %T Libertarianism and rationality revisited %I %D 1988 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 26 %N %P 441-60 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Kane, R. %T Two kinds of incompatibilism %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 69 %N %P 219-54 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Kane, R. %T Free will: The illusive ideal %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 75 %N %P 25-60 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Kane, R. %T The Significance of Free Will %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Kane, R. %T Free will, responsibility, and will-setting %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 67-90 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Kane, R. %T Responsibility, luck, and chance: Reflections on free will and determinism %I %D 1999 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 96 %N %P 217-40 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Kane, R. %T The dual regress of free will and the role of alternative possibilities %I %D 2000 %B Philosopical Perspectives %V 14 %N %P 57-80 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Kane, R. %T Free Will %I Blackwell %D 2001 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Kane, R. %T The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Kane, R. %T Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Kane, R. %T The contours of contemporary free will debates %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Kane, R. %T The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Kane, R. %T Some neglected pathways in the free will labyrinth %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Kapitan, T. %T Deliberation and the presumption of open alternatives %I %D 1986 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 40 %N %P 230-51 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Kapitan, T. %T Ability and cognition: A defense of compatibilism %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 63 %N %P 231-43 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Kapitan, T. %T Modal principles in the metaphysics of free will %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 10 %N %P 419-45 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Kapitan, T. %T Autonomy and manipulated freedom %I %D 2000 %B Philosopical Perspectives %V 14 %N %P 81-104 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Kapitan, T. %T A master argument for incompatibilism? %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Kapitan, T. %T A master argument for incompatibilism? %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Kenny, A. %T Will, Freedom, and Power %I Blackwell %D 1976 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Kenny, A. %T Free Will and Responsibility %I Routledge %D 1978 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Klein, M. %T Determinism, blameworthiness, and deprivation %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Koons, R. %T Is hard determinism a form of compatibilism? %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Forum %V 33 %N %P 81-99 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Ladd, J. %T Free will and voluntary action %I %D 1952 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 12 %N %P 392-405 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Lahav, R. %T Between pre-determinism and arbitrariness: A Bergsonian approach to free will %I %D 1991 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 29 %N %P 487-99 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Lamb, J. W. %T On a proof of incompatibilism %I %D 1977 %B Philosophical Review %V 86 %N %P 20-35 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Lamb, J. W. %T Evaluative compatibilism and the principle of alternate possibilities %I %D 1993 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 90 %N %P 517-27 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Lehrer, K. %T 'Could' and determinism %I %D 1964 %B Analysis %V 24 %N %P 159-60 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Lehrer, K. %T Freedom and Determinism %I Random House %D 1966 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Lehrer, K. %T An empirical disproof of determinism %I Random House %D 1966 %B Freedom and Determinism %E K. Lehrer %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Lehrer, K. %T 'Can' in theory and practice: A possible worlds analysis %I Reidel %D 1976 %B Action Theory %E M. Brand %E D. Walton %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Levy, K. %T The main problem with USC libertarianism %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 105 %N %P 107-127 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Levy, D. %T Neural holism and free will %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 16 %N %P 205-229 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Are we free to break the laws? %I %D 1981 %B Theoria %V 47 %N %P 113-21 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Libet, B. %T Do we have free will? %I %D 1999 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 6 %N %P 47-57 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Libet, B. %A Freeman, A. %A Sutherland, K. %T The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will %I Imprint Academic %D 1999 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Libet, B. %T Consciousness, free action and the brain: Commentary on John Searle's article (with reply from Searle) %I %D 2001 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 8 %N %P 59-65 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Libet, B. %T Do we have free will? %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Locke, D. %T Three concepts of free action %I %D 1975 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 75 %N %P 95-112 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Loewer, B. %T Freedom from physics: Quantum mechanics and free will %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 91-112 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Lowe, E. %T Event causation and agent causation %I %D 2001 %B Grazer Philosophische Studien %V 61 %N %P 1-20 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Lucas, J. R. %T The Freedom of the Will %I Oxford University Press %D 1970 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Lycan, W. G. %T Free will and the burden of proof %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B Minds and Persons %E A. O'Hear %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Machina, K. %T Challenges for compatibilism %I %D 1994 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 31 %N %P 213-22 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A MacKay, D. M. %T Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe %I Cambridge University Press %D 1967 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Mackie, P. %T Fatalism, incompatibilism, and the power to do otherwise %I %D 2003 %B Nous %V 37 %N %P 672-689 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Magill, K. %T Experience and Freedom: Self-Determination without Illusions %I Macmillan %D 1997 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Malcolm, N. %T The conceivability of mechanism %I %D 1968 %B Philosophical Review %V 77 %N %P 45-72 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Margenau, H. %T The uncertainty principle and free will %I %D 1931 %B 1931 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Mayr, U. %T Conflict, consciousness, and control %I %D 2004 %B Trends in Cognitive Science %V 8 %N %P 145-148 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A McCall, S. %T Freedom defined as the power to decide %I %D 1984 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 21 %N %P 329-38 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A McCann, H. %T The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom %I Cornell University Press %D 1998 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A McCrone, J. %T A bifold model of free will %I %D 1999 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 5 %N %P 241-59 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A McIntyre, A. %T Compatibilists could have done otherwise: Responsibility and negative agency %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Review %V 103 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A McKay, T. %A Johnson, D. %T A reconsideration of an argument against compatibilism %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 113-22 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A McKenna, M. %T Does strong compatibilism survive Frankfurt-style counterexamples? %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Studies %V 91 %N %P 259-64 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A McKenna, M. %A Widerker, D. %T Freedom, Responsibility, and Action: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities %I Ashgate Press %D 2002 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Melden, A. I. %T Free Action %I Routledge %D 1961 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Mele, A. %T Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy %I Oxford University Press %D 1995 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Mele, A. %T Soft libertarianism and Frankfurt-style scenarios %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 123-41 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Mele, A. %A Robb, D. %T Rescuing Frankfurt-style cases %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Review %V 107 %N %P 97-112 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Mele, A. %T Kane, luck, and the significance of free will %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Explorations %V 2 %N %P 96-104 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Mele, A. %T Autonomy, self-control and weakness of will %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Moore, G. E. %T Free will %I %D 1912 %B Ethics %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Morden, M. %T Free will, self-causation, and strange loops %I %D 1990 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 59-73 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Moreland, J. P. %T Timothy O'Connor and the harmony thesis: A critique %I %D 2002 %B Metaphysica %V 3 %N 2 %P 5-40 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Morgan, V. %T The metaphysics of naturalism %I %D 2001 %B American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly %V 75 %N %P 409-431 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Morgenbesser, S. %A Walsh, J. J. %T Freedom and Responsibility %I Prentice-Hall %D 1962 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Nahmias, E. %A Morris, S. %A Nadelhoffer, T. %T The phenomenology of free will %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 11 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Narveson, J. %T Compatibilism defended %I %D 1977 %B Philosophical Studies %V 32 %N %P 83-7 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Nathan, N. %T Will and World %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Naylor, M. B. %T Frankfurt on the principle of alternative possibilities %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Studies %V 46 %N %P 249-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Neely, W. %T Freedom and desire %I %D 1974 %B Philosophical Review %V 83 %N %P 32-54 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelkin, D. %T The consequence argument and the "mind" argument %I %D 2001 %B Analysis %V 61 %N %P 107-115 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Nichols, S. %T The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts %I %D 2004 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 473-502 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Nowell-Smith, P. %T Free will and moral responsibility %I %D 1948 %B Mind %V 57 %N %P 45-61 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A O'Connor, D. J. %T Free Will %I Anchor Books %D 1971 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Connor, T. %T Indeterminism and free agency: Three recent views %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 53 %N %P 499-26 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Connor, T. %T On the transfer of necessity %I %D 1993 %B Nous %V 27 %N %P 204-18 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A O'Connor, T. %T Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will %I Oxford University Press %D 1995 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A O'Connor, T. %T Agent causation %I %D 1995 %B Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Connor, T. %T Why agent causation? %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 143-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A O'Connor, T. %T Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will %I Oxford University Press %D 2000 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A O'Connor, T. %T Libertarian views: Dualist and agent-causal theories %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %A Pettit, P. %T Strategies for free will compatibilists %I %D 1996 %B Analysis %V 56 %N %P 191-201 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A O'Shaughnessy, B. %T The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory %I Cambridge University Press %D 1980 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Peacocke, C. %T Free will %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %B Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind %E A. O'Hear %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Pereboom, D. %T Determinism al dente %I %D 1995 %B Nous %V 29 %N %P 21-45 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Pereboom, D. %T Alternative possibilities and causal histories %I %D 2000 %B Philosopical Perspectives %V 14 %N %P 119-138 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Pereboom, D. %T Living without Free Will %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Pereboom, D. %T Living without free will: The case for hard incompatibilism %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Perszyk, K. J. %T Compatibilism and the free will defence: A reply to Bishop %I %D 1999 %B Australasian Journal of Philosopy %V 77 %N %P 92-105 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Popper, K. %T Is determinism self-refuting? %I %D 1983 %B Mind %V 92 %N %P 103-4 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Ravizza, M. %T Semi-compatibilism and the transfer of non-responsibility %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 75 %N %P 61-93 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowe, W. %T Two concepts of freedom %I %D 1987 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 61 %N %P 43-64 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Russell, P. %T Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the new compatibilism %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Rychlak, J. F. %T Can psychology be objective about free will? Philosophical Psychologist 10:2-9 %I %D 1976 %B Revised version in New Ideas in Psychology %V 1 %N %P 213-29 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Rychlak, J. F. %T Four kinds of determinism and "free will": A response to Viney and Crosby %I %D 1994 %B New Ideas in Psychology %V 12 %N %P 143-46 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Rychlak, J. F. %T Is free will a process or a content: Both? neither? Are we free to take a position on this question? %I %D 1994 %B Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 62-72 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Sappington, A. A. %T Recent psychological approaches to the free will versus determinism controversy %I %D 1990 %B Psychological Bulletin %V 108 %N %P 19-29 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. %T Consciousness, free action and the brain %I %D 2000 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 7 %N %P 3-22 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. R. %T Free will as a problem in neurobiology %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy %V 76 %N %P 491-514 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Settle, T. %T How determinism refutes compatibilism %I %D 1993 %B Religious Studies %V 29 %N %P 353-62 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Shatz, D. %T Free will and the structure of motivation %I %D 1985 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 10 %N %P 451-82 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Siderits, M. %T Beyond compatibilism: A Buddhist approach to freedom and determinism %I %D 1987 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 24 %N %P 149-59 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Slife, B. D. %T Free will and time: That "stuck" feeling %I %D 1994 %B Journal of Theoretical and Philsophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 1-12 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Slote, M. A. %T Free will, determinism, and the theory of important criteria %I %D 1969 %B Inquiry %V 12 %N %P 317-38 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Slote, M. %T Understanding free will %I %D 1980 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 77 %N %P 136-51 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Slote, M. %T Selective necessity and the free will problem %I %D 1982 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 74 %N %P 5-24 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Free will, praise and blame %I %D 1963 %B Mind %V 70 %N %P 291-306 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Smilansky, S. %T Is libertarian free will worth wanting? %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 13 %N %P 273-76 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Smilansky, S. %T Van Inwagen on the "obviousness" of libertarian moral responsibility %I %D 1990 %B Analysis %V 50 %N %P 29-33 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Smilansky, S. %T Does the free will debate rest on a mistake? %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Papers %V 22 %N %P 173-88 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Smilansky, S. %T Free Will and Illusion %I Oxford University Press %D 2000 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Smilansky, S. %T Free will: From nature to illusion %I %D 2001 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 101 %N %P 71-95 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Smilansky, S. %T Free will, fundamental dualism,and the centrality of illusion %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Smilansky, S. %T Free will and the mystery of modesty %I %D 2003 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 40 %N %P 105-118 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Smilansky, S. %T Compatibilism: The argument from shallowness %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 115 %N %P 257-82 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Smith, M. %T A theory of freedom and responsibility %I Oxford University Press %D 1997 %B Ethics and Practical Reason %E G. Cullity %E B. Gaut %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Sobel, J. H. %T Puzzles for the Will %I University of Toronto Press %D 1998 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Spence, S. A. %T Free will in the light of neuropsychiatry %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology %V 3 %N %P 75-90 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Stampe, D. W. %A Gibson, M. I. %T Of one's own free will %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 52 %N %P 529-56 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Stone, J. %T Free will as a gift from God %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Studies %V 92 %N %P 257-81 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Strasser, M. %T Frankfurt, Aristotle, and PAP %I %D 1988 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 26 %N %P 235-46 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Strawson, G. %T Freedom and Belief %I Oxford University Press %D 1986 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Strawson, G. %T Consciousness, free will, and the unimportance of determinism %I %D 1989 %B Inquiry %V 32 %N %P 3-27 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Strawson, G. %T The impossibility of moral responsibility %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 75 %N %P 5-24 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Strawson, G. %T The unhelpfulness of determinism %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 60 %N %P 149-56 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Strawson, G. %T The bounds of freedom %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Strawson, G. %T Dreams of final responsibility %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Strawson, P. F. %T Freedom and resentment %I %D 1962 %B Proceedings of the British Academy %V 48 %N %P 1-25 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Stump, E. %T Intellect, will, and the principle of alternative possibilities %I University of Notre Dame Press %D 1990 %B Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy %E M. Beaty %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Stump, E. %T Persons, identification, and freedom %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 183-214 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Stump, E. %T Alternative pssibilities and moral responsibility: The flicker of freedom %I %D 1999 %B Journal of Ethics %V 3 %N %P 299-324 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Stump, E. %A Fischer, J. %T Transfer principles and moral responsibility %I %D 2000 %B Philosopical Perspectives %V 14 %N %P 47-56 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Swanton, C. %T Freedom: A Coherence Theory %I Hackett %D 1992 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Talbott, T. %T On free agency and the concept of power %I %D 1988 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 69 %N %P 241-54 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Taylor, C. %A Dennett, D. C. %T Who's afraid of determinism? Rethinking causes and possibilities %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Thorp, J. %T Free Will: A Defense Against Neurophysiological Determinism %I Routledge %D 1980 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Thornton, M. %T Do We Have Free Will? %I St %D 1990 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Thorp, J. %T Free Will: A Defense against Neurophysiological Determinism %I Routledge %D 1980 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Trusted, J. %T Free Will and Responsibilty %I Oxford University Press %D 1984 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Unger, P. %T Free will and scientifiphicalism %I %D 2002 %B 2002 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A van Inwagen, P. %T A formal approach to the problem of free will and determinism %I %D 1974 %B Theoria %V 24 %N %P 9-22 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A van Inwagen, P. %T The incompatibility of free will and determinism %I %D 1975 %B Philosophical Studies %V 27 %N %P 185-99 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A van Inwagen, P. %T Ability and responsibility %I %D 1978 %B Philosophical Review %V 87 %N %P 201-24 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A van Inwagen, P. %T Compatibilism and the burden of proof %I %D 1980 %B Analysis %V 40 %N %P 98-100 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A van Inwagen, P. %T An Essay on Free Will %I Oxford University Press %D 1983 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A van Inwagen, P. %T When is the will free? %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 3 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A van Inwagen, P. %T Logic and the free will problem %I %D 1990 %B Social Theory and Practice %V 16 %N %P 277-90 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A van Inwagen, P. %T When the will is not free %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 75 %N %P 95-113 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A van Inwagen, P. %T Free will remains a mystery %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 14 %N %P 1-20 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A van Rensselaer Wilson, H. %T Causal discontinuity in fatalism and indeterminism %I %D 1955 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 52 %N %P 134-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Vander-Laan, D. %T A regress argument for restrictive incompatibilism %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 103 %N %P 201-215 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Velmans, M. %T Preconscious free will %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N 12 %P 42-61 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Vesey, G. %T Responsibility and free will %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy %V 24 %N %P 85-100 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Vihvelin, K. %T The modal argument for incompatibilism %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Studies %V 53 %N %P 227-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Vihvelin, K. %T Frrdon, causation, and counterfactuals %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 64 %N %P 161-84 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Vihvelin, K. %T Freedom, foreknowledge, and the principle of alternate possibilities %I %D 2000 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 30 %N %P 1-23 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Vihvelin, K. %T Libertarian compatibilism %I %D 2000 %B Philosopical Perspectives %V 14 %N %P 139-166 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Viney, D. W. %A Crosby, D. A. %T Free will in process perspective %I %D 1994 %B New Ideas in Psychology %V 12 %N %P 129-41 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Waller, B. N. %T Uneven starts and just deserts (fatalism and free will) %I %D 1989 %B Analysis %V 49 %N %P 209-13 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Waller, B. %T Freedom without Responsibility %I Temple University Press %D 1990 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Walter, H. %T Neurophilosophy of Free Will %I MIT Press %D 2001 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Waller, B. %T A metacompatibilist account of free will: Making compatibilists and incompatibilist more compatible %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 112 %N %P 209-224 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Walter, H. %T Neurophilosophy of free will %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook on Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. %T Determinism and moral responsiblity are incompatible %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 24 %N %P 215-26 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. %T Causal determinism and human freedom are incompatible: A new argument for incompatibilism %I %D 2000 %B Philosopical Perspectives %V 14 %N %P 167-180 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Watson, G. %T Free agency %I %D 1975 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 72 %N %P 205-20 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Watson, G. %T Free Will %I Oxford University Press %D 1982 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Watson, G. %T Free action and free will %I %D 1987 %B Mind %V 96 %N %P 154-72 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Wegner, D. %T The Illusion of Conscious Will %I MIT Press %D 2003 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Wegner, D. %T Precis of The Illusion of Conscious Will (and commentaries and reply) %I %D 2004 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 27 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Westcott, M. R. %T Free will: An exercise in metaphysical truth or psychological consequences %I %D 1977 %B Canadian Psychological Review %V 18 %N %P 249-63 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A White, M. %T The Question of Free Will: A Holistic View %I Princeton University Press %D 1993 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Widerker, D. %T On an argument for incompatibilism %I %D 1987 %B Analysis %V 47 %N %P 37-41 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Widerker, D. %T Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle f alternative possibilities %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Review %V 104 %N %P 247-61 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Widerker, D. %T Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities: A further look %I %D 2000 %B Philosopical Perspectives %V 14 %N %P 181-202 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book Section %A Widerker, D. %T Responsibility and Frankfurt-type examples %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B The Oxford Handbook of Free Will %E R. Kane %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Williams, C. %T Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue %I Hackett %D 1980 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Wilton, R. %T Consciousness, Free Will, and the Explanation of Human Behavior %I E %D 2000 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Wolf, S. %T Asymmetrical freedom %I %D 1980 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 77 %N %P 151-66 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Wolf, S. %T The importance of free will %I %D 1981 %B Mind %V 90 %N %P 366-78 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Book %A Wolf, S. %T Freedom within Reason %I Oxford University Press %D 1990 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Yaffe, G. %T Free will and agency at its best %I %D 2000 %B Philosopical Perspectives %V 14 %N %P 203-230 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Zagzebski, L. %T Does libertarian freedom require alternate possibilities? %I %D 2000 %B Philosopical Perspectives %V 14 %N %P 231-248 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Zhu, J. %T Is the conscious will an illusion? %I %D 2004 %B Disputatio %V 16 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Zimmerman, D. %T Hierarchical motivation and the freedom of the will %I %D 1981 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 62 %N %P 354-68 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Zimmerman, D. %T Acts, omissions, and semi-compatibilism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 73 %N %P 209-23 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Zimmerman, D. %T That was then, this is now: Personal history vs. psychological structure in compatibilist theories of autonomy %I %D 2003 %B Nous %V 37 %N %P 638-671 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,free will %U %0 Journal Article %A Alexander, P. %T Other people's experiences %I %D 1959 %B 1959 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Allen, A. H. B. %T Other minds %I %D 1952 %B Mind %V 61 %N %P 328-348 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Ameriks, K. %T Plantinga and other minds %I %D 1973 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 16 %N %P 285-91 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Aune, B. %T The problem of other minds %I %D 1961 %B 1961 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Aune, B. %T Other minds after twenty years %I %D 1986 %B 1986 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Austin, J. %T Other minds %I %D 1946 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 20 %N %P 148-87 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book %A Avramides, A. %T Other Minds %I Routledge %D 2001 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Ayer, A. J. %T One's knowledge of other minds %I %D 1953 %B 1953 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book %A Ayer, A. J. %T The Problem of Knowledge %I Harmondsworth %D 1956 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book %A Baron-Cohen, S. %A Tager-Flusberg, H. %A Cohen, D. J. %T Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism %I Oxford University Press %D 1994 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book Section %A Bilgrami, A. %T Other minds %I Blackwell %D 1994 %B A Companion to Epistemology %E J. Dancy %E E. Sosa %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Bowman, A. %T Knowledge of other minds %I %D 1953 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 50 %N %P 328-32 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book Section %A Buck, R. %T Non-other minds %I Barnes and Noble %D 1962 %B Analytic Philosophy %E R. Butler %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book %A Buford, T. O. %T Essays on Other Minds %I University of Illinois Press %D 1970 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Castaneda, H. %T Criteria, analogy, and knowledge of other minds %I %D 1962 %B 1962 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Chihara, C. %A Fodor, J. %T Operationalism and ordinary language: A critique of Wittgenstein %I %D 1965 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 2 %N %P 281-95 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A de Vignemont, F. %T The co-consciousness hypothesis %I %D 2004 %B Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences %V 3 %N %P 97-114 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Perception and other minds %I %D 1973 %B Nous %V 7 %N %P 34-44 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Duhrssen, A. %T Philosophic alienation and the problem of other minds %I %D 1963 %B 1963 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Engel, M. %T The problem of other minds: a reliable solution %I %D 1993 %B Acta Analytica %V 11 %N %P 87-109 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Everett, T. %T Other voices, other minds %I %D 2000 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 78 %N %P 213-222 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Feigl, H. %T Other minds and the egocentric predicament %I %D 1959 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 56 %N %P 980-87 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Gallagher, K. %T Intersubjective knowledge %I %D 1964 %B 1964 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Gardner, S. %T Other minds and embodiment %I %D 1994 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 94 %N %P 35-52 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Glasgow, W. D. %A Pilkington, G. W. %T Other minds on evidential necessity %I %D 1970 %B Mind %V 79 %N %P 431-35 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Glennan, S. S. %T Computationalism and the problem of other minds %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 375-88 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Goodman, R. %T Cavell and the problem of other minds %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Topics %V 13 %N %P 43-52 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Hacker, P. M. S. %T Other minds and Professor Ayer's concept of a person %I %D 1972 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 32 %N %P 341-354 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Hampshire, S. %T The analogy of feeling %I %D 1952 %B Mind %V 61 %N %P 1-12 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 43-54 %Z On the Total Turing Test (full behavioral equivalence) as a test for mind. -DJC %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book Section %A Heal, J. %T Understanding other minds from inside %I Cambridge University Press %D 1997 %B Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind %E A. O'Hear %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Heal, J. %T Other minds, rationality and analogy %I %D 2000 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement %V 74 %N %P 1-19 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Hoffman, R. %T The problem of other minds - genuine or pseudo? %I %D 1960 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 20 %N %P 503-512 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Hyslop, A. %T Criteria and other minds %I %D 1973 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 51 %N %P 105-14 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Hyslop, A. %T Other minds as theoretical entities %I %D 1976 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 54 %N %P 158-61 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Hyslop, A. %T A multiple case inference and other minds %I %D 1979 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 57 %N %P 330-36 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book %A Hyslop, A. %T Other Minds %I Kluwer %D 1995 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Hyslop, A. %A Jackson, F. C. %T The analogical inference to other minds %I %D 1972 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 9 %N %P 168-76 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Jones, J. R. %T Our knowledge of other persons %I %D 1950 %B Philosophy %V 25 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Jorgensen, J. %T Remarks concerning the concept of mind and the problem of other people's minds %I %D 1949 %B 1949 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Kurthen, M. Moskopp, D. %A Linke, D. B. %A Reuter, B. M. %T The locked-in syndrome and the behaviorist epistemology of other minds %I %D 1991 %B Theoretical Medicine %V 12 %N %P 69-79 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Lenman, J. %T Beliefs about other minds: A pragmatic justification %I %D 1994 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 31 %N %P 223-34 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Levin, M. %T Why we believe in other minds %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 44 %N %P 343-59 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book %A Locke, D. %T Myself and Others: A Study in our Knowledge of Minds %I Oxford University Press %D 1968 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Locke, D. %T Just what is wrong with the argument from analogy? %I %D 1973 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 51 %N %P 153-56 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Maclachlan, D. L. C. %T Strawson and the argument for other minds %I %D 1993 %B Journal of Philosophical Research %V 18 %N %P 149-157 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Malcolm, N. %T Knowledge of other minds %I %D 1958 %B 1958 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, C. %T What is the problem of other minds? %I %D 1984 %B Aristotelian Society Proceedings %V 58 %N %P 119-37 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, M. %T The real problem of others: Cavell, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein on scepticism about other minds %I %D 1998 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 6 %N %P 45-58 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Meiland, J. W. %T Analogy, verification, and other minds %I %D 1966 %B Mind %V 75 %N %P 564-568 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Melnyk, A. %T Inference to the best explanation and other minds %I %D 1994 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 4 %N %P 482-91 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Mellor, W. W. %T Three problems about other minds %I %D 1956 %B Mind %V 65 %N %P 200-217 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book %A Morick, H. %T Wittgenstein and the Problem of Other Minds %I Humanities Press %D 1967 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Narveson, A. H. %T Evidential necessity and other minds %I %D 1966 %B Mind %V 75 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Ostein, P. A. %T God, other minds, and the inference to the best explanation %I %D 1974 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 4 %N %P 149-62 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Pap, A. %T Other minds and the principle of verifiability %I %D 1951 %B Revue Internationale de Philosophie %V 5 %N %P 280-306 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Pargetter, R. %T The scientific inference to other minds %I %D 1984 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 62 %N %P 158-63 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Peacocke, C. %T Consciousness and other minds %I %D 1984 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 58 %N %P 97-117 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Plantinga, A. %T Induction and other minds %I %D 1966 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 19 %N %P 441-61 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book %A Plantinga, A. %T God and Other Minds %I Cornell University Press %D 1967 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Plantinga, A. %T Induction and other minds II %I %D 1968 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 12 %N %P 524-33 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Price, H. H. %T Our evidence for the existence of other minds %I %D 1938 %B Philosophy %V 13 %N %P 425-56 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Roessler, J. %T Joint attention and the problem of other minds. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler, eds) Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book Section %A Russell, B. %T Analogy %I %D 1948 %B Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Sagal, P. %A Borg, G. %T The range principle and the problem of other minds %I %D 1993 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 44 %N %P 477-91 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Shoemaker, S. %T Ziff's other minds %I %D 1965 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 62 %N %P 587-89 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Sikora, R. I. %T The argument from analogy is not an argument for other mnds %I %D 1977 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 14 %N %P 137-41 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Slote, M. %T Induction and other minds %I %D 1966 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 20 %N %P 341-60 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Smythe, T. %T Our knowledge of other minds %I %D 1983 %B Philosophia %V 13 %N %P 35-52 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Sober, E. %T Evolution and the problem of other minds %I %D 2000 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 365-387 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book %A Spencer, W. %T Our Knowledge of Other Minds %I Yale University Press %D 1930 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book Section %A Sprigge, T. L. S. %T Ayer on other minds %I Open Court %D 1992 %B The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer %E L. Hahn %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Stemmer, N. %T The hypothesis of other minds: Is it the best explanation? %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 51 %N %P 109-121 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Temkin, J. %T Wittgenstein on criteria and other minds %I %D 1990 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 28 %N %P 561-93 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Thalberg, I. %T Other times, other places, other minds %I %D 1969 %B Philosophical Studies %V 20 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Thomson, J. F. %T The argument from analogy and the problem of other minds %I %D 1951 %B Mind %V 60 %N %P 336-50 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Weinberg, J. %T Our knowledge of other minds %I %D 1946 %B Philosophical Review %V 60 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Weinzweig, M. %T Our knowledge of other minds: a pseudo-problem? %I %D 1962 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 23 %N %P 250-255 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Wellman, C. %T Our criteria for third-person psychological sentences %I %D 1961 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 58 %N %P 281-93 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Wikforss, A. %T Direct knowledge and other minds. (Plus reply by John McDowell) %I %D 2004 %B Theoria %V 70 %N %P %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Wisdom, J. %T Other minds %I %D 1946 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 20 %N %P 122-47 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Book %A Wisdom, J. %T Other Minds %I University of California Press %D 1968 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Zemach, E. %T Sensations, raw feels, and other minds %I %D 1966 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 20 %N %P 317-40 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Ziff, P. %T The simplicity of other minds %I %D 1965 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 42 %N %P 575-84 %Z %K metaphysics of mind,the problem of other minds %U %0 Journal Article %A Turing, A. %T Computing machinery and intelligence %I %D 1950 %B Mind %V 59 %N %P 433-60 %Z Proposes the Imitation game (Turing test) as a test for intelligence: If a machine can't be told apart from a human in a conversation over a teletype, then that's good enough. With responses to various objections. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Alper, G. %T A psychoanalyst takes the Turing test %I %D 1990 %B Psychoanalytic Review %V 77 %N %P 59-68 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Barresi, J. %T Prospects for the Cyberiad: Certain limits on human self-knowledge in the cybernetic age %I %D 1987 %B Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior %V 17 %N %P 19-46 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T Psychologism and behaviorism %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Review %V 90 %N %P 5-43 %Z A look-up table could pass the Turing test, and surely isn't intelligent. The TT errs in testing behavior and not mechanisms. A nice, thorough paper. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %T Creativity, the Turing test, and the (better) Lovelace test %I %D 2001 %B Minds & Machines %V 11 %N %P 3-27 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %A Bello, P. %A Ferrucci, D. %T Creativity, the Turing test, and the (better) Lovelace test %I %D 2001 %B Minds and Machines %V 11 %N %P 3-27 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, T. %T The Turing test as a novel form of hermeneutics %I %D 1992 %B International Studies in Philosophy %V 24 %N %P 17-31 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Copeland, B. J. %T The Turing test %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 519-539 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Crawford, C. %T Notes on the Turing test %I %D 1994 %B Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery %V 37 %N %P 13-15 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book %A Crockett, L. %T The Turing Test and the Frame Problem: AI's Mistaken Understanding of Intelligence %I Ablex %D 1994 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book Section %A Davidson, D. %T Turing's test %I Oxford University Press %D 1990 %B Modelling the Mind %E K. Said %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Can machines think? %I Harper & Row %D 1984 %B How We Know %E M. Shafto %Z Defending the Turing test as a good test for intelligence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Drozdek, A. %T Descartes' Turing test %I %D 2001 %B Epistemologia %V 24 %N %P 5-29 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Erion, G. J. %T The Cartesian test for automatism %I %D 2001 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 29-39 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A French, R. M. %T Subcognition and the limits of the Turing test %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 53-66 %Z The Turing Test is too hard, as it requires not intelligence but human intelligence. Any machine could be unmasked through careful questioning, but this wouldn't mean that the machine was unintelligent. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A French, R. M. %T Refocusing the debate on the Turing Test: A response %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 59-60 %Z Response to Jacquette 1993. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Gunderson, K. %T The imitation game %I %D 1964 %B Mind %V 73 %N %P 234-45 %Z The Turing test is not broad enough: there's much more to thought than the ability to play the imitation game. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 43-54 %Z On the Total Turing Test (full behavioral equivalence) as a test for mind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Levels of functional equivalence in reverse bioengineering: The Darwinian Turing test for artificial life %I %D 1994 %B Artificial Life %V 1 %N 3 %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Turing on reverse-engineering the mind %I %D 1999 %B 1999 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Hauser, L. %T Reaping the whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's "Other bodies, other minds" %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 219-37 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Hauser, L. %T Look who's moving the goal posts now %I %D 2001 %B Minds and Machines %V 11 %N %P 41-51 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Hayes, P. %A Ford, K. %T Turing test considered harmful %I %D 1995 %B Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence %V 1 %N %P 972-77 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Hofstadter, D. R. %T A coffee-house conversation on the Turing test %I %D 1981 %B 1981 %V %N %P %Z A dialogue on the Turing test. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Who's afraid of the Turing test? %I %D 1993 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 63-74 %Z Defending the Turing test against French 1990. Turing did not intend the test to provide a *necessary* condition for intelligence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T A Turing test conversation %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 231-33 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Karelis, C. %T Reflections on the Turing test %I %D 1986 %B Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior %V 16 %N %P 161-72 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Kugel, P. %T Computing machines can't be intelligent (...and Turing said so) %I %D 2002 %B Minds and Machines %V 12 %N %P 563-579 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Lee, E. T. %T On the Turing test for artificial intelligence %I %D 1996 %B Kybernetes %V 25 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Leiber, J. %T Shanon on the Turing test %I %D 1989 %B 1989 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Leiber, J. %T On Turing's Turing Test and why the matter matters %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 104 %N %P 59-69 %Z Turing's test is neutral about the structure of the machine that passes it, but it must be practical and reliable (thus excluding Searle's and Block's counterexamples). -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Leiber, J. %T Turing and the fragility and insubstantiality of evolutionary explanations: A puzzle about the unity of Alan Turing's work with some larger implications %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 83-94 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Mays, W. %T Can machines think? %I %D 1952 %B Philosophy %V 27 %N %P 148-62 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Michie, D. %T Turing's test and conscious thought %I %D 1993 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 60 %N %P 1-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Millar, P. %T On the point of the Imitation Game %I %D 1973 %B Mind %V 82 %N %P 595-97 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Moor, J. H. %T An analysis of Turing's test %I %D 1976 %B Philosophical Studies %V 30 %N %P 249-257 %Z The basis of the Turing test is not an operational definition of thinking, but rather an inference to the best explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Moor, J. H. %T Explaining computer behavior %I %D 1978 %B Philosophical Studies %V 34 %N %P 325-7 %Z Reply to Stalker 1978: Mechanistic and mentalistic explanations are no more incompatible than program-based and physical explanations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Moor, J. H. %T The status and future of the Turing test %I %D 2001 %B Minds and Machines %V 11 %N %P 77-93 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Oppy, G. %A Dowe, D. %T The Turing test %I %D 2003 %B 2003 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Piccinini, G. %T Turing's rules for the imitation game %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 573-582 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Purthill, R. %T Beating the imitation game %I %D 1971 %B Mind %V 80 %N %P 290-94 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Rankin, T. L. %T The Turing paradigm: A critical assessment %I %D 1987 %B Dialogue %V 29 %N %P 50-55 %Z Some obscure remarks on lying, imitation, and the Turing test. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Richardson, R. C. %T Turing tests for intelligence: Ned Block's defense of psychologism %I %D 1982 %B Philosophical Studies %V 41 %N %P 421-6 %Z A weak argument against Block: input/output function doesn't guarantee a capacity to respond sensibly. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book Section %A Rosenberg, J. %T Conversation and intelligence %I Routledge & Kegan Paul %D 1982 %B Knowledge and Representation %E B. de Gelder %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Sampson, G. %T In defence of Turing %I %D 1973 %B Mind %V 82 %N %P 592-94 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Sato, Y. %A Ikegami, T. %T Undecidability in the imitation game %I %D 2004 %B Minds and Machines %V 14 %N %P 133-43 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Saygin, A. P. %A Cicekli, I. %A Akman V. %T Turing test: 50 years later %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 463-518 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Schweizer, P. %T The truly total Turing Test %I %D 1998 %B Minds and Machines %V 8 %N %P 263-272 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book %A Shieber, S. %T The Turing Test: Verbal Behavior as the Hallmark of Intelligence %I MIT Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Shanon, B. %T A simple comment regarding the Turing test %I %D 1989 %B Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior %V 19 %N %P 249-56 %Z The Turing test presupposes a representational/computational framework for cognition. Not all phenomena can be captured in teletype communication. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Shieber, S. M. %T Lessons from a restricted Turing test %I %D 1994 %B Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery %V 37 %N %P 70-82 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Stalker, D. F. %T Why machines can't think: A reply to James Moor %I %D 1978 %B Philosophical Studies %V 34 %N %P 317-20 %Z Contra Moor 1976: The best explanation of computer behavior is mechanistic, not mentalistic. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterrett, S. G. %T Turing's two tests for intelligence %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 541-559 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Stevenson, J. G. %T On the imitation game %I %D 1976 %B Philosophia %V 6 %N %P 131-33 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Traiger, S. %T Making the right identification in the Turing test %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 561-572 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Waterman, C. %T The Turing test and the argument from analogy for other minds %I %D 1995 %B Southwest Philosophy Review %V 11 %N %P 15-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Watt, S. %T Naive psychology and the inverted Turing test %I %D 1996 %B Psycoloquy %V 7 %N 14 %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Book Section %A Whitby, B. %T The Turing test: AI's biggest blind alley? %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machines and Thought %E P. Millican %E A. Clark %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Zdenek, S. %T Passing Loebner's Turing test: A case of conflicting discourse functions %I %D 2001 %B Minds & Machines %V 11 %N %P 53-76 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the turing test %U %0 Journal Article %A Benacerraf, P. %T God, the Devil, and Godel %I %D 1967 %B Monist %V 51 %N %P 9-32 %Z Discusses and sharpens Lucas's arguments. Argues that the real consequence is that if we are Turing machines, we can't know which. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Bowie, G. %T Lucas' number is finally up %I %D 1982 %B Journal of Philosophy Logic, %V 11 %N %P 279-85 %Z Lucas's very Godelization procedure makes him inconsistent, unless he has an independent way to see if any TM is consistent, which he doesn't. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Boyer, D. %T J. R. Lucas, Kurt Godel, and Fred Astaire %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 33 %N %P 147-59 %Z Remarks on the various ways in which Lucas and a machine might be said to "prove" anything, and the ways in which a machine might simulate Lucas. The argument has all sorts of level confusions, and a bit of circularity. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Chari, C. %T Further comments on minds, machines and Godel %I %D 1963 %B Philosophy %V 38 %N %P 175-8 %Z Can't reduce the lawless creative process to computation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Minds, machines, and mathematics %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 11-20 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Chihara, C. %T On alleged refutations of mechanism using Godel's incompleteness results %I %D 1972 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 64 %N %P 507-26 %Z An analysis of the Lucas/Benacerraf argument. On various senses in which a machine might come to know its own program. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Coder, D. %T Godel's theorem and mechanism %I %D 1969 %B Philosophy %V 44 %N %P 234-7 %Z Only mathematicians understand Godel, so Lucas's argument isn't general; and Turing machines can go wrong. Weak. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T The abilities of men and machines %I %D 1978 %B Brainstorms %Z There is no unique TM which we are -- there could be many. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Edis, T. %T How Godel's theorem supports the possibility of machine intelligence %I %D 1998 %B Minds and Machines %V 8 %N %P 251-262 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Feferman, S. %T Penrose's Godelian argument %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 21-32 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Gaifman, H. %T What Godel's incompleteness result does and does not show %I %D 2000 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 462-471 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A George, F. %T Minds, machines and Godel: Another reply to Mr. Lucas %I %D 1962 %B Philosophy %V 37 %N %P 62-63 %Z Lucas's argument applies only to deductive machines, not inductive ones. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A George, A. %A Velleman, D. J. %T Leveling the playing field between mind and machine: A reply to McCall %I %D 2000 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 456-452 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Good, I. J. %T Human and machine logic %I %D 1967 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 18 %N %P 145-6 %Z Even humans can't Godelize forever. On ordinals and transfinite counting. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Good, I. J. %T Godel's theorem is a red herring %I %D 1969 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 19 %N %P 357-8 %Z Rejoinder to Lucas 1967: the role of consistency; non-constructible ordinals. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Grush, R. %A Churchland, P. %T Gaps in Penrose's toiling %I Ferdinand Schoningh %D 1995 %B Conscious Experience %E T. Metzinger %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanson, W. %T Mechanism and Godel's theorem %I %D 1971 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 22 %N %P 9-16 %Z An analysis of Benacerraf 1967. Benacerraf's "paradox" is illusory; there are no strong consequences of Godel's theorem for mechanism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Hofstadter, D. R. %T Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid %I Basic Books %D 1979 %Z Contra Lucas: we can't Godelize forever; and we're not formal on top level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Hutton, A. %T This Godel is killing me %I %D 1976 %B Philosophia %V 3 %N %P 135-44 %Z Gives a statistical argument to the effect that we cannot know that we are consistent; so the Lucas argument cannot go through. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Irvine, A. D. %T Lucas, Lewis, and mechanism -- one more time %I %D 1983 %B Analysis %V 43 %N %P 94-98 %Z Contra Lewis 1979, Lucas can derive the consistency of M even without the premise that he is M. Hmm. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Godel, Lucas, and mechanical models of mind %I %D 1987 %B Computational Intelligence %V 3 %N %P 57-63 %Z A nice analysis of Lucas's argument and the circumstances under which a machine might prove another's Godel sentences. There's no reason to believe that machines and humans are different here. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Metamathematical criteria for minds and machines %I %D 1987 %B Erkenntnis %V 27 %N %P 1-16 %Z A machine will fail a Turing test if it's asked about Godel sentences. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A King, D. %T Is the human mind a Turing machine? %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 108 %N %P 379-89 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirk, R. %T Mental machinery and Godel %I %D 1986 %B 1986 %V %N %P %Z Lucas's argument fails, as theorems by humans don't correspond to outputs of their formal systems. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Lucas against mechanism %I %D 1969 %B Philosophy %V 44 %N %P 231-3 %Z Lucas needs a rule of inference from sentences to their consistency, yielding Lucas arithmetic. No machine can prove all of Lucas arithmetic, but there's no reason to suppose humans can either, as the rule is infinitary. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Lucas against mechanism II %I %D 1979 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 9 %N %P 373-6 %Z Reply to Lucas 1970: the dialectical argument fails, as the human's output depends on the premise that it is the machine (to derive M's consistency). With a similar premise, the machine itself can do equally well. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Minds, machines and Godel %I %D 1961 %B Philosophy %V 36 %N %P 112-127 %Z Humans can Godelize any given machine, so we're not a machine. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Human and machine logic: a rejoinder %I %D 1967 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 19 %N %P 155-6 %Z Reply to Good 1967: a human can trump any given machine, so the human is not the machine, whether or not the human is superior across the board. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Satan stultified: A rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf %I %D 1968 %B Monist %V 52 %N %P 145-58 %Z Benacerraf 1967 is empty and omega-inconsistent. Reply to arguments based on difficulty of seeing consistency (e.g. Putnam). Fallacious but engaging. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Metamathematics and the philosophy of mind: A rejoinder %I %D 1971 %B Philosophy of Science %V 38 %N %P 310-13 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Mechanism: A rejoinder %I %D 1970 %B Philosophy %V 45 %N %P 149-51 %Z Response to Lewis 1969 and Coder 1969. Lewis misses the dialectical nature of the argument. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Lucas, J. R. %T The Freedom of the Will %I Oxford University Press %D 1970 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T This Godel is killing me: A rejoinder %I %D 1976 %B Philosophia %V 6 %N %P 145-8 %Z Contra Hutton, we know -- even if fallibly -- that we are consistent. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T Lucas against mechanism II: A rejoinder %I %D 1984 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 14 %N %P 189-91 %Z Reply to Lewis 1979. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Lucas, J. R. %T Mind, machines and Godel: A retrospect %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machines and Thought %E P. Millican %E A. Clark %Z Addresses all the counterarguments. Fun. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lyngzeidetson, A. E. %A Solomon, M. K. %T Abstract complexity theory and the mind-machine problem %I %D 1994 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 45 %N %P 549-54 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Lyngzeidetson, A. %T Massively parallel distributed processing and a computationalist foundation for cognitive science %I %D 1990 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 41 %N %P %Z A Connection Machine might escape the Lucas argument. Bizarre. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Martin, J. %A Engleman, K. %T The mind's I has two eyes %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy %V 510 %N %P %Z Contra Hofstadter: Lucas can believe his Whitely sentence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Maudlin, T. %T Between the motion and the act.. %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 40-51 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A McCall, S. %T Can a Turing machine know that the Godel sentence is true? %I %D 1999 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 96 %N %P 525-32 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A McCall, S. %T On "seeing" the truth of the Godel sentence %I %D 2001 %B Facta Philosophica %V 3 %N %P 25-30 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A McCullough, D. %T Can humans escape Godel? %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 57-65 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A McDermott, D. %T [Star] Penrose is wrong %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 66-82 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Nelson, E. %T Mathematics and the mind %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B No Matter, Never Mind %E K. Yasue %E M. Jibu %E T. Senta %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Penrose, R. %T The Emperor's New Mind %I Oxford University Press %D 1989 %Z We are non-algorithmic as we can see Godel sentences of any algorithm. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Penrose, R. %T Precis of The Emperor's New Mind %I %D 1990 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 13 %N %P 643-705 %Z Much debate over the "non-algorithmic insight" in seeing Godel sentences. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Penrose, R. %T Setting the scene: The claim and the issues %I Blackwell %D 1992 %B The Simulation of Human Intelligence %E D. Broadbent %Z An argument from the halting problem to the nonalgorithmicity of mathematical thought. Addresses objections: that the algorithm is unknowable, unsound, everchanging, environmental, or random. New physical laws may be involved. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Penrose, R. %T Shadows of the Mind %I Oxford University Press %D 1994 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Penrose, R. %T Beyond the doubting of a shadow %I %D 1996 %B Psyche %V 2 %N %P 89-129 %Z A reply to Chalmers, Feferman, Maudlin, McDermott, etc. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Piccinini, G. %T Alan Turing and the mathematical objection %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 23-48 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Priest, G. %T Godel's theorem and the mind... again %I Kluwer %D 1994 %B Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind %E M. Michael %E J. O'Leary-Hawthorne %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Putnam, H. %T Reflexive reflections %I %D 1985 %B Erkenntnis %V 22 %N %P 143-153 %Z A generalized Godelian argument: if our prescriptive inductive competence is formalizable, then we could not know that such a formalization is correct. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Raatikainen, P. %T McCall's Godelian argument is invalid %I %D 2002 %B Facta Philosophica %V 4 %N %P 167-69 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Redhead, M. %T Mathematics and the mind %I %D 2004 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Penrose and mathematical ability %I %D 1992 %B Analysis %V 52 %N %P 80-88 %Z Penrose's argument depends on our knowledge of the validity of the algorithm we use, and here he equivocates between conscious and unconscious algorithms. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Schurz, G. %T McCall and Raatikainen on mechanism and incompleteness %I %D 2002 %B Facta Philosophica %V 4 %N %P 171-74 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Slezak, P. %T Godel's theorem and the mind %I %D 1982 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 33 %N %P 41-52 %Z General analysis; Lucas commits type/token error; self-ref paradoxes. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Slezak, P. %T Descartes's diagonal deduction %I %D 1983 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 34 %N %P 13-36 %Z Cogito was a diagonal argument; connection to Godel, Lucas, Minsky, Nagel. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T Godel's theorem, Church's theorem, and mechanism %I %D 1961 %B Synthese %V 13 %N %P 105-10 %Z A machine could escape the Godelian argument by inductively ascertaining its own syntax. With comments on the relevance of ingenuity. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book Section %A Tymoczko, T. %T Why I am not a Turing Machine: Godel's theorem and the philosophy of mind %I Paragon House %D 1991 %B Foundations of Cognitive Science %E J. Garfield %Z Weak defense of Lucas; response to Putnam, Bowie, Dennett. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Wang, H. %T From Mathematics to Philosophy %I London %D 1974 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Webb, J. %T Metamathematics and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1968 %B Philosophy of Science %V 35 %N %P 156-78 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Book %A Webb, J. %T Mechanism, Mentalism and Metamathematics %I Kluwer %D 1980 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Whitely, C. %T Minds, machines and Godel: A reply to Mr. Lucas %I %D 1962 %B Philosophy %V 37 %N %P 61-62 %Z Humans get trapped too: "Lucas cannot consistently assert this formula". -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Yu, Q. %T Consistency, mechanicalness, and the logic of the mind %I %D 1992 %B Synthese %V 90 %N %P 145-79 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, godelian arguments %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. R. %T Minds, brains and programs %I %D 1980 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 3 %N %P 417-57 %Z Implementing a program is not sufficient for mentality, as someone could e.g. implement a "Chinese-speaking" program without understanding Chinese. So strong AI is false, and no program is sufficient for consciousness. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book %A Searle, J. R. %T Minds, Brains and Science %I Harvard University Press %D 1984 %Z Axiomatizes the argument: Syntax isn't sufficient for semantics, programs are syntactic, minds are semantic, so no program is sufficient for mind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Searle, J. R. %T Minds and brains without programs %I Blackwell %D 1987 %B Mindwaves %E C. Blakemore %Z More on the arguments against AI, e.g. the Chinese room and considerations about syntax and semantics. Mind is a high-level physical property of brain. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. R. %T Is the brain's mind a computer program? %I %D 1990 %B Scientific American %V 262 %N 1 %P 26-31 %Z On the status of the Chinese Room argument, ten years on. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Searle, J. R. %T Twenty-one years in the Chinese room %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Adam, A. %T Cyborgs in the Chinese room: Boundaries transgressed and boundaries blurred %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Aleksander, I. %T Neural depictions of "world" and "self": Bringing computational understanding into the Chinese room %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Anderson, D. %T Is the Chinese room the real thing? %I %D 1987 %B Philosophy %V 62 %N %P 389-93 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Boden, M. %T Escaping from the Chinese Room %I %D 1988 %B Computer Models of Mind %Z A procedural account of how computers might have understanding and semantics. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Ben-Yami, H. %T A note on the Chinese room %I %D 1993 %B Synthese %V 95 %N %P 169-72 %Z A fully functional Chinese room is impossible, as it (for instance) could not say what the time is. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Block, N. %T Searle's arguments against cognitive science %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Bringsjord, S. %A Noel, R. %T Real robots and the missing thought-experiment in the Chinese room dialectic %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Bynum, T. W. %T Artificial intelligence, biology, and intentional states %I %D 1985 %B Metaphilosophy %V 16 %N %P 355-77 %Z A chess-playing machine embodied as a robot could have intentional states. Reference requires input/output, computation, and context. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Cam, P. %T Searle on strong AI %I %D 1990 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 103-8 %Z Criticizes Searle's "conclusion" that brains are needed for intentionality, notes that even a homunculus has intentional states. A misinterpretation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Carleton, L. %T Programs, language understanding, and Searle %I %D 1984 %B Synthese %V 59 %N %P 219-30 %Z Arguing against Searle on a number of fronts, somewhat unconvincingly. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Subsymbolic computation and the Chinese Room %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1992 %B The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap %E J. Dinsmore %Z Gives an account of symbolic vs. subsymbolic computation, and argues that the latter is less vulnerable to the Chinese-room intuition, as representations there are not computational tokens. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %A Churchland, P. S. %T Could a machine think? %I %D 1990 %B Scientific American %V 262 %N 1 %P 32-37 %Z Artificial mentality is possible, not through classical AI but through brain-like AI. Argues the syntax/semantics point using an analogy with electromagnetism and luminance. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Cohen, L. J. %T What sorts of machines can understand the symbols they use? %I %D 1986 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 60 %N %P 81-96 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Cole, D. J. %T Thought and thought experiments %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Studies %V 45 %N %P 431-44 %Z Lots of thought experiments like Searle's, against Searle. Searle's argument is like Leibniz's "mill" argument, with similar level confusions. Nice but patchy. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Cole, D. J. %T Artificial intelligence and personal identity %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 88 %N %P 399-417 %Z In the Chinese room, neither the person nor the system understands: a virtual person does. This person isn't the system, just as a normal person isn't a body. Follows from the "Kornese" room, which has two distinct understanders. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Cole, D. J. %T Artificial minds: Cam on Searle %I %D 1991 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 69 %N %P 329-33 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Cole, D. J. %T The causal powers of CPUs %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Copeland, B. J. %T The curious case of the Chinese gym %I %D 1993 %B Synthese %V 95 %N %P 173-86 %Z Advocates the systems reply, and criticizes Searle's "Chinese Gym" response to connectionism: Searle (like those he accuses) confuses a simulation with the thing being simulated. Nice. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Copeland, B. J. %T The Chinese room from a logical point of view %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Coulter, J. %A Sharrock, S. %T The hinterland of the Chinese room %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Fast thinking %I %D 1987 %B The Intentional Stance %Z Argues with Searle on many points. A little weak. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T Searle, programs and functionalism %I %D 1983 %B Nature and System %V 5 %N %P 107-14 %Z The homunculus doesn't have access to the system's intentionality. The syntax/semantics relation is like the neurophysiology/mind relation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Dyer, M. %T Intentionality and computationalism: minds, machines, Searle and Harnad %I %D 1990 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 2 %N %P 303-19 %Z Reply to Searle/Harnad: systems reply, level confusions, etc. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Dyer, M. %T Finding lost minds %I %D 1990 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 2 %N %P 329-39 %Z Reply to Harnad 1990: symbols, other minds, physically embodied algorithms. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Fields, C. %T Double on Searle's Chinese Room %I %D 1984 %B Nature and System %V 6 %N %P 51-54 %Z Double's argument implies that the brain isn't the basis of intentionality. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Fisher, J. %T The wrong stuff: Chinese rooms and the nature of understanding %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 11 %N %P 279-99 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room %I Oxford University Press %D 1991 %B The Nature of Mind %E D. Rosenthal %Z The Chinese room isn't even implementing a Turing machine, because it doesn't use proximal causation. With a reply by Searle. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Globus, G. %T Deconstructing the Chinese room %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 12 %N %P 377-91 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Gozzano, S. %T Consciousness and understanding in the Chinese room %I %D 1995 %B Informatica %V 19 %N %P 653-56 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanna, P. %T Causal powers and cognition %I %D 1985 %B Mind %V 94 %N %P 53-63 %Z Argues that Searle is confused, and underestimates computers. Weak. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Minds, machines and Searle %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 1 %N %P 5-25 %Z Non-symbolic function is necessary for mentality. Trying hard to work out a theory of why the Chinese Room shows what it does. Nice but wrong. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Lost in the hermeneutical hall of mirrors %I %D 1990 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 2 %N %P 321-27 %Z Reply to Dyer 1990: on the differences between real and as-if intentionality. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Harnad, S. %T Minds, machines, and Searle 2: What's right and wrong about the Chinese room argument %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Hauser, L. %T Searle's Chinese box: Debunking the Chinese room argument %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 199-226 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Hauser, L. %T Nixin' goes to China %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Hayes, P. %A Harnad, S. %A Perlis, D. %A Block, N. %T Virtual symposium on virtual mind %I %D 1992 %B Minds and Machines %V 2 %N %P %Z A discussion about the Chinese room, symbol grounding, and so on. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Hofstadter, D. R. %T Reflections on Searle %I , pp %D 1981 %B The Mind's I %E D. Hofstadter %E D. Dennett %Z Searle is committing a level confusion, and understates the complexity of the case. We can move from the CR to a brain (with a demon) by twiddling knobs, and the systems reply should work equally well in both cases. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Searle's intentionality thesis %I %D 1989 %B Synthese %V 80 %N %P 267-75 %Z Searle's view implies that intentional causation is not efficient causation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Adventures in the Chinese Room %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 49 %N %P 605-23 %Z If we had microfunctional correspondence, the CR argument would fail. With points about the status of abstract/biological intentionality. A bit weak. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. R. %T Reply to Jacquette %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 49 %N %P 701-8 %Z Jacquette misses the point of the argument. Also, biological and abstract intentionality are quite compatible. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacquette, D. %T Fear and loathing (and other intentional states) in Searle's Chinese Room %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 3 %N %P 287-304 %Z Reply to Searle on CR, central control, biological intentionality & dualism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Jahren, N. %T Can semantics be syntactic? %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 309-28 %Z Against Rapaport's Korean Room argument -- syntax isn't enough. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A King, D. %T Entering the Chinese room with Castaneda's principle (p) %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy Today %V 45 %N %P 168-174 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Korb, K. %T Searle's AI program %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 3 %N %P 283-96 %Z The Chinese room doesn't succeed as an argument about semantics. At best it might succeed as an argument about consciousness. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T The right stuff %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 349-72 %Z Defends Searle against all kinds of objections. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Melnyk, A. %T Searle's abstract argument against strong AI %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 108 %N %P 391-419 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Moor, J. H. %T The pseudorealization fallacy and the Chinese Room argument %I D %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z Computational systems must also meet performance criteria. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Newton, N. %T Machine understanding and the Chinese Room %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 2 %N %P 207-15 %Z A program can possess intentionality, even if not consciousness. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Obermeier, K. K. %T Wittgenstein on language and artificial intelligence: The Chinese-room thought-experiment revisited %I %D 1983 %B Synthese %V 56 %N %P 339-50 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Penrose, R. %T Consciousness, computation, and the Chinese room %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Pfeifer, K. %T Searle, strong AI, and two ways of sorting cucumbers %I %D 1992 %B Journal of Philosophical Research %V 17 %N %P 347-50 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book %A Preston, J. %A Bishop, M. %T Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Proudfoot, D. %T Wittgenstein's anticipation of the Chinese room %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Rapaport, W. %T Searle's experiments with thought %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy of Science %V 53 %N %P 271-9 %Z Comments on Cole, and some general material on syntax and semantics. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Rey, G. %T What's really going on in Searle's `Chinese Room' %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Studies %V 50 %N %P 169-85 %Z Recommends the systems reply, and a causal account of semantics. Discusses the relevance of wide and narrow notions of content, and the tension between Searle's positive and negative proposals. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Rey, G. %T Searle's misunderstandings of functionalism and strong AI %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Roberts, L. %T Searle's extension of the Chinese Room to connectionist machines %I %D 1990 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 2 %N %P 185-7 %Z In arguing against the relevance of the serial/parallel distinction to mental states, Searle becomes a formalist. A nice point. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Russow, L-M. %T Unlocking the Chinese Room %I %D 1984 %B Nature and System %V 6 %N %P 221-8 %Z Searle's presence in the room destroys the integrity of the system, so that it is no longer a proper implementation of the program. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Seidel, A. %T Searle on the biological basis of cognition %I %D 1988 %B Analysis %V 48 %N %P 26-28 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Seidel, A. %T Chinese Rooms A, B and C %I %D 1989 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 20 %N %P 167-73 %Z A person running the program, with interpretations at hand, would understand. Point-missing. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Sharvy, R. %T Searle on programs and intentionality %I %D 1985 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 11 %N %P 39-54 %Z Argues against Searle, but misses the point for the most part. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Simon, H. A. %A Eisenstadt, S. A. %T A Chinese room that understands %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Sloman, A. %T Did Searle attack Strong Strong AI or Weak Strong AI? %I Chichester %D 1986 %B Artificial Intelligence and its Applications %E Cohn %E Thomas %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Suits, D. %T Out of the Chinese Room %I %D 1989 %B Computing and Philosophy Newsletter %V 4 %N %P 1-7 %Z Story about homunculi within homunculi. Fun. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Taylor, J. G. %T Do virtual actions avoid the Chinese room? %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Teng, N. Y. %T A cognitive analysis of the Chinese room argument %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 313-24 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Thagard, P. %T The emergence of meaning: An escape from Searle's Chinese Room %I %D 1986 %B Behaviorism %V 14 %N %P 139-46 %Z Get semantics computationally via induction and functional roles. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Wakefield, J. %T The Chinese room argument reconsidered: Essentialism, indeterminacy, and strong AI %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 285-319 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Weiss, T. %T Closing the Chinese room %I %D 1990 %B Ratio %V 3 %N %P 165-81 %Z Searle-in-the-room isn't in a position to know about the system's first-person states. Intrinsic intentionality is an incoherent notion. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Book Section %A Wheeler, M. %T Changes in the rules: Computers, dynamic systems, and Searle %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Whitmer, J. M. %T Intentionality, artificial intelligence, and the causal powers of the brain %I %D 1983 %B Auslegung %V 10 %N %P 194-210 %Z Defending Searle's position, with remarks on the "causal powers" argument. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, the chinese room %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, W. %T Machine consciousness: Plausible idea or semantic distortion? %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 11 %N 9 %P 46-56 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Aleksander, I. %A Dunmall, B. %T Axioms and tests for the presence of minimal consciousness in agents I: Preamble %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book %A Angel, L. %T How to Build a Conscious Machine %I Westview Press %D 1989 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Angel, L. %T Am I a computer? %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Arrington, R. %T Machines, consciousness, and thought %I %D 1999 %B Idealistic Studies %V 29 %N %P 231-243 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Barnes, E. %T The causal history of computational activity: Maudlin and Olympia %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 88 %N %P 304-16 %Z Response to Maudlin 1989. True computation needs active, not passive causation, so Maudlin's machine isn't really computing. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Birnbacher, D. %T Artificial consciousness %I Ferdinand Schoningh %D 1995 %B Conscious Experience %E T. Metzinger %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book %A Bringsjord, S. %T What Robots Can and Can't Be %I Kluwer %D 1992 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Bringsjord, S. %T Could, how could we tell if, and should -- androids have inner lives? %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Android Epistemology %E K. M. Ford %E C. Glymour %E P. Hayes %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Buttazzo, G. %T Artificial consciousness: Utopia or real possibility? %I %D 2001 %B Computer %V 34 %N %P 24-30 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Caplain, G. %T Is consciousness a computational property? %I %D 1995 %B Informatica %V 19 %N %P 615-19 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Coles, L. S. %T Engineering machine consciousness %I %D 1993 %B AI Expert %V 8 %N %P 34-41 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Cotterill, R. %T Cyberchild: A Simulation test-bed for consciousness studies %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A D'Aquili, E. G. %A Newberg, A. B. %T Consciousness and the machine %I %D 1996 %B Zygon %V 31 %N %P 235-52 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Danto, A. %T On consciousness in machines %I New York University Press %D 1960 %B Dimensions of Mind %E S. Hook %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T The practical requirements for making a conscious robot %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A %V 349 %N %P 133-46 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Cog: Steps toward consciousness in robots %I Ferdinand Schoningh %D 1995 %B Conscious Experience %E T. Metzinger %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Franklin, S. %T A conscious artifact? %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Glennan, S. S. %T Computationalism and the problem of other minds %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 375-88 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Gunderson, K. %T Robots, consciousness and programmed behaviour %I %D 1968 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 19 %N %P 109-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Gunderson, K. %T Cybernetics and mind-body problems %I %D 1969 %B Inquiry %V 12 %N %P 406-19 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book %A Gunderson, K. %T Mentality and Machines %I Doubleday %D 1971 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Can a machine be conscious? How? %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Hillis, D. %T Can a machine be conscious? %I MIT Press %D 1998 %B Toward a Science of Consciousness II %E S. Hameroff %E A. Kaszniak %E A. Scott %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Holland, O. %A Goodman, R. %T Robots with internal models: A route to machine consciousness? %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirk, R. %T Sentience, causation and some robots %I %D 1986 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 64 %N %P 308-21 %Z One could model brain states with monadic states and appropriate connections. But surely that's not intelligent -- the causation has the wrong form. Nice. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Kitamura, T. %A Tahara, T. %A Asami, K. %T How can a robot have consciousness? %I %D 2000 %B Advanced Robotics %V 14 %N %P 263-275 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Kitamura, T. %T What is the self of a robot? On a consciousness architecture for a mobile robot as a model of human consciousness %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B No Matter, Never Mind %E K. Yasue %E M. Jibu %E T. Senta %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Lucas, J. R. %T A view of one's own (conscious machines) %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Series A %V 349 %N %P 147-52 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Lycan, W. G. %T Qualitative experience in machines %I Blackwell %D 1998 %B How Computers are Changing Philosophy %E T. Bynum %E J. Moor %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Maudlin, T. %T Computation and consciousness %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 86 %N %P 407-32 %Z Computational state is not sufficient for consciousness, as it can be instantiated by a mostly inert object. A nice thought-experiment, raising questions about the relevance of counterfactuals to consciousness. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A McCarthy, J. %T Making robots conscious of their mental states %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machine Intelligence 15 %E S. Muggleton %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A McGinn, C. %T Could a machine be conscious? %I Blackwell %D 1987 %B Mindwaves %E C. Blakemore %E S. Greenfield %Z Of course, as we are machines. But what sort of machines are conscious, and in virtue of what properties? Remarks on artefacts, life, functionalism, and computationalism. So far, we don't know what makes the brain conscious. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Prinz, J. J. %T Level-headed mysterianism and artificial experience %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T On thinking machines and feeling machines %I %D 1967 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 18 %N %P 39-51 %Z Machines can think but can't feel, so aren't persons. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Putnam, H. %T Robots: machines or artificially created life? %I %D 1964 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 61 %N %P 668-91 %Z Various arguments and counter-arguments re machine consciousness and civil liberties. Problems of machine consciousness are analogous to problems of human consciousness. The structural basis of the two may well be the same. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T The mental life of some machines %I Wayne State University Press %D 1967 %B Intentionality, Minds and Perception %E H. Castaneda %Z More on TMs: explaining their psychology via preference functions. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Schlagel, R. %T Why not artificial consciousness or thought? %I %D 1999 %B Minds and Machines %V 9 %N %P 3-28 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Scriven, M. %T The mechanical concept of mind %I %D 1953 %B 1953 %V %N %P %Z To speak of a conscious machine is to commit a semantic mistake. Consciousness presupposes life and non-mechanism. Later retracted. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Sloman, A. %A Chrisley, R. %T Virtual machines and consciousness %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Stubenberg, L. %T What is it like to be Oscar? %I %D 1992 %B Synthese %V 90 %N %P 1-26 %Z Argues that AI systems like Pollock's Oscar needn't be conscious. Blindsight tells us that complex perceptual processing can go on unconsciously. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Thompson, D. %T Can a machine be conscious? %I %D 1965 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 16 %N %P %Z Accepting machine consciousness would have few philosophical consequences, whereas rejecting it would tend to commit one to epiphenomenalism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A van de Vete, D. %T The problem of robot consciousness %I %D 1971 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 32 %N %P 149-65 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Ziff, P. %T The feelings of robots %I %D 1959 %B 1959 %V %N %P %Z Of course robots can't think: they're not alive, so this gives us good reason not to rely on behavior. With replies by J.J.C. Smart, N. Smart. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine consciousness, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %T Cognition is not computation: The argument from irreversibility %I %D 1998 %B 1998 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Burks, A. W. %T Logic, computers, and men %I %D 1973 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 46 %N %P 39-57 %Z Arguing that a finite deterministic automaton can perform all natural human functions. With remarks on the logical organization of computers. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Cohen, L. J. %T Can there be artificial minds? %I %D 1955 %B Analysis %V 16 %N %P 36-41 %Z Subservience to known or knowable rules is incompatible with mentality. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Copeland, B. J. %T Narrow versus wide mechanism: Including a re-examination of Turing's views on the mind-machine issue %I %D 2000 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 97 %N %P 5-33 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Can machines think? %I %D 1985 %B How We Know %Z Defends the Turing Test, among other things. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Machines and the mental %I %D 1985 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 59 %N %P 23-33 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Can intelligence be artificial? %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 71 %N %P 201-16 %Z Intelligence requires not just action or thought, but the governance of action by thought, which requires a history. "Wired-up" systems lack the explanatory connection between thought and action, so are not intelligent. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book %A Dreyfus, H. L. %T What Computers Can't Do %I Harper and Row %D 1972 %Z Computers follow rules, people don't. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Hauser, L. %T Why isn't my pocket calculator a thinking thing? %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 3-10 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Henley, T. B. %T Natural problems and artificial intelligence %I %D 1990 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 43-55 %Z On the philosophical importance of criteria for intelligence. With remarks on Searle, the Turing test, attitudes to AI, and ethical considerations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Kearns, J. T. %T Thinking machines: Some fundamental confusions %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 269-87 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Lanier, J. %T Three objections to the idea of artificial intelligence %I MIT Press %D 1998 %B Toward a Science of Consciousness II %E S. Hameroff %E A. Kaszniak %E A. Scott %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Mackay, D. M. %T Mind-life behavior in artifacts %I %D 1951 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 2 %N %P 105-21 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Mackay, D. M. %T Mentality in machines %I %D 1952 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 26 %N %P 61-86 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Manning, R. C. %T Why Sherlock Holmes can't be replaced by an expert system %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 51 %N %P 19-28 %Z An expert system would lack Holmes' ability to raise the right questions, sort out relevant data, and determine what data are in need of explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Mays, W. %T Can machines think? %I %D 1952 %B Philosophy %V 27 %N %P 148-62 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book Section %A McCarthy, J. %T Ascribing mental qualities to machines %I Humanities Press %D 1979 %B Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence %E M. Ringle %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Negley, G. %T Cybernetics and theories of mind %I %D 1951 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 48 %N %P 574-82 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Preston, B. %T The ontological argument against the mind-machine hypothesis %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 80 %N %P 131-57 %Z Lucas, Searle, and Penrose all fall prey to "dual-description" fallacies. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Proudfoot, D. %T The implications of an externalist theory of rule-following behavior for robot cognition. %I %D 2004 %B Minds and Machines %V 14 %N %P 283-308 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T Can humans think? %I %D 1966 %B 1966 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Rapaport, W. %T Because mere calculating isn't thinking: Comments on Hauser's "Why isn't my pocket calculator a thinking thing?" %I %D 1993 %B Minds and machines %V 3 %N %P 11-20 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Ronald, E. %A Sipper, M. %T Intelligence is not enough: On the socialization of talking machines %I %D 2001 %B Minds and Machines %V 11 %N %P 567-576 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Scriven, M. %T The compleat robot: A prolegomena to androidology %I New York University Press %D 1960 %B Dimensions of Mind %E S. Hook %Z A machine could possess every characteristic of human thought: e.g. freedom, creativity, learning, understanding, perceiving, feeling. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Spilsbury, R. J. %T Mentality in machines %I %D 1952 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 26 %N %P 27-60 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,can machines think?, machine thought, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Why there is no symbol grounding problem? %I %D 1996 %B Representations, Targets, and Attitudes %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T The symbol grounding problem %I %D 1990 %B Physica D %V 42 %N %P 335-346 %Z AI symbols are empty and meaningless. They need to be "grounded" in something, e.g. sensory projection. Maybe connectionism can do the trick? -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Book Section %A Harnad, S. %T Connecting object to symbol in modeling cognition %I Springer-Verlag %D 1992 %B Connectionism in Context %E A. Clark %E R. Lutz %Z On the limitations of symbol systems, and the potential for grounding symbols in sensory icons and categorical perception, e.g. with neural networks. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Kosslyn, S. M. %A Hatfield, G. %T Representation without symbol systems %I %D 1984 %B Social Research %V 51 %N %P 1019-1045 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Book Section %A Harnad, S. %T Symbol grounding and the origin of language %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Book Section %A MacDorman, K. F. %T How to ground symbols adaptively %I John Benjamins %D 1997 %B Two Sciences of Mind %E S. O'Nuillain %E P. McKevitt %E E. MacAogain %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Newell, A. %T Physical symbol systems %I %D 1980 %B Cognitive Science %V 4 %N %P 135-83 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Newell, A. %A Simon, H. A. %T Computer science as empirical inquiry: Symbols and search %I %D 1981 %B Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery %V 19 %N %P 113-26 %Z On computer science, AI, & the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Brain symbols and computationalist explanation %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 25-44 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Sun, R. %T Symbol grounding: a new look at an old idea %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 149-172 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, symbols and symbol systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Tom Swift and his procedural grandmother %I %D 1978 %B Cognition %V 6 %N %P 229-47 %Z Against procedural semantics; it's a rerun of verificationism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Hadley, R. F. %T Truth conditions and procedural semantics %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnson-Laird, P. %T Procedural semantics %I %D 1977 %B Cognition %V 5 %N %P 189-214 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnson-Laird, P. %T What's wrong with Grandma's guide to procedural semantics: A reply to Jerry Fodor %I %D 1978 %B Cognition %V 9 %N %P 249-61 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A McDermott, D. %T Tarskian semantics, or no notation without denotation %I %D 1978 %B Cognitive Science %V 2 %N %P 277-82 %Z On the virtues of denotational semantics for AI. Notation without denotation, as found in many AI systems, leads to castles in the air. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Perlis, D. %T Putting one's foot in one's head -- Part 1: Why %I %D 1991 %B Nous %V 25 %N %P 435-55 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Perlis, D. %T Putting one's foot in one's head -- Part 2: How %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Rapaport, W. J. %T Syntactic semantics: Foundations of computational natural language understanding %I Kluwer %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Rapaport, W. J. %T Understanding understanding: Syntactic semantics and computational cognition %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 49-88 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Smith, B. %T On the semantics of clocks %I Kluwer %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, B. %T The correspondence continuum %I %D 1987 %B CSLI- %V 87 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Wilks, Y. %T Some thoughts on procedural semantics %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1982 %B Strategies for Natural Language Processing %E W. Lehnert %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilks, Y. %T Form and content in semantics %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 329-51 %Z Criticism of McDermott's views on semantics, logic and natural language. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Journal Article %A Winograd, T. %T Moving the semantic fulcrum %I %D 1985 %B Linguistics and Philosophy %V 8 %N %P 91-104 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Woods, W. %T Procedural semantics as a theory of meaning %I Cambridge University Press %D 1981 %B Elements of Discourse Understanding %E A. Joshi %E B. Weber %E I. Sag %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Woods, W. %T Problems in procedural semantics %I Ablex %D 1986 %B Meaning and Cognitive Structure %E Z. Pylyshyn %E W. Demopolous %Z With commentaries by Haugeland, J. D. Fodor. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, computational semantics %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, A. %T In defense of explicit rules %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z Argues that we need explicit rules for flexibility, adaptibility, and representational redescription. With remarks on eliminativism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T Inexplicit information %I University of Arizona Press %D 1986 %B The Representation of Knowledge and Belief %E M. Brand %E R. Harnish %Z On various kinds of representation of knowledge or belief without explicit tokens: control-implicit, domain-implicit, and procedural information. The key distinction is representation vs. execution of a rule. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Two notions of implicit rules %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 153-83 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Connectionism, rule-following, and symbolic manipulation %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z Some rules are learnt so quickly that representation must be explicit. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Connectionism, explicit rules, and symbolic manipulation %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T The `explicit-implicit' distinction %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 219-42 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Book Section %A Kirsh, D. %T When is information explicitly represented? %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Journal Article %A Skokowski, P. G. %T Can computers carry content "inexplicitly"? %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 333-44 %Z Cummins' account of inexplicit information fails, as even "executed" rules must be represented in the system. With remarks on the Chinese room. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, implicit/explicit rules and representations %U %0 Manuscript %A Bechtel, W. %T Yet another revolution: Defusing the dynamical system theorists' attack on mental representations %I %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Journal Article %A Brooks, R. %T Intelligence without representation %I %D 1991 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 47 %N %P 139-159 %Z We don't need explicit representation; the world can do the job instead. Use embodied, complete systems, starting simple and working incrementally. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. and Toribio, J. %T Doing without representing %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 101 %N %P 401-31 %Z A discussion of anti-representationalism in situated robotics and the dynamic systems movement (Brooks, Beer, van Gelder). These arguments appeal to overly simple domains, and a modest notion of representation survives. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Journal Article %A Keijzer, F. A. %T Doing without representations which specify what to do %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 269-302 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirsh, D. %T Today the earwig, tomorrow man? %I %D 1991 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 47 %N %P 161-184 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gelder, T. %T What might cognition be if not computation? %I %D 1995 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 92 %N %P 345-81 %Z Argues for a dynamic-systems conception of the mind that is non-computational and non-representational. Uses an analogy with the Watt steam governor to argue for a new kind of dynamic explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, ai without representation? %U %0 Book Section %A Chrisley, R. L. %T Taking embodiment seriously: Nonconceptual content and robotics %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Android Epistemology %E K. M. Ford %E C. Glymour %E P. Hayes %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Manuscript %A Dietrich, E. %T Computers, intentionality, and the new dualism %I %D 1988 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Dreyfus, H. L. %T A framework for misrepresenting knowledge %I Humanities Press %D 1979 %B Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence %E M. Ringle %Z On the problems with context-free symbolic representation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Fields, C. %T Real machines and virtual intentionality: An experimentalist takes on the problem of representational content %I Academic Press %D 1994 %B Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons %E E. Dietrich %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Semantic engines: An introduction to mind design %I MIT Press %D 1981 %B Mind Design %E J. Haugeland %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Direct representation %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 80 %N %P 305-22 %Z On Searle's critique of computational explanation, contrasted with Gallistel's use thereof. The real issue is computation on indirect vs. direct representations; direct computationalism is an attractive view. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and representation, miscellaneous %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Connectionism and cognitive architecture %I %D 1988 %B Cognition %V 28 %N %P 3-71 %Z Connectionist models can't explain cognitive systematicity and productivity, as their representations lack compositional structure. The allures of connectionism are illusory; it's best used as an implementation strategy. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Aizawa, K. %T Explaining systematicity %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 115-36 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Book Section %A Aizawa, K. %T The role of the systematicity argument in classicism and connectionism %I John Benjamins %D 1997 %B Two Sciences of Mind %E S. O'Nuallain %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Aizawa, K. %T Exhibiting verses explaining systematicity: A reply to Hadley and Hayward %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 39-55 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, M. V. %T Fodor and Pylyshyn on connectionism %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 321-41 %Z Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument is an invalid instance of inference to the best explanation, as there is much to explain than systematicity. Connectionism and classicism may be compatible even without implementation, in any case. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %T Language of thought: The connectionist contribution %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 57-101 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Towards a connectionist cognitive architecture %I %D 1991 %B Mind and Language %V 6 %N %P 252-72 %Z Connectionism can make do with unstructured representations, as long have they have the right causal relations between them. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Connectionism, classical cognitivism, and the relation between cognitive and implementational levels of analysis %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 321-33 %Z Contra Chalmers 1993, F&P's argument doesn't apply at the implementational level. Contra Chater and Oaksford 1990, connectionism can't be purely implementational, but some implementational details can be relevant. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T On Clark on systematicity and connectionism %I %D 1993 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 44 %N %P 37-44 %Z Argues against Clark on holism and the conceptual truth of systematicity. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Compositionality in cognitive models: The real issue %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 78 %N %P 153-62 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Syntactic transformations on distributed representations %I %D 1990 %B Connection Science %V 2 %N %P 53-62 %Z An experimental demonstration that connectionist models can handle structure-sensitive operations in a non-classical way, transforming structured representations of active sentences to passive sentences. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Connectionism and compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn were wrong %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 305-319 %Z Points out a structural flaw in F&P's argument, and traces the problem to a lack of appreciation of distributed representation. With some empirical results on structure sensitive processing, and some remarks on explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Chater, N. %A Oaksford, M. %T Autonomy, implementation and cognitive architecture: A reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn %I %D 1990 %B Cognition %V 34 %N %P 93-107 %Z Implementation can make a difference at the algorithmic level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Christiansen, M. H. %A Chater, N. %T Generalization and connectionist language learning %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 273-87 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T Systematicity %I %D 1996 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 93 %N %P 591-614 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Book Section %A Fetzer, J. H. %T Connectionism and cognition: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn are wrong %I Springer-Verlag %D 1992 %B Connectionism in Context %E A. Clark %E R. Lutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T Connectionism and the problem of systematicity: Why Smolensky's solution doesn't work %I %D 1990 %B Cognition %V 35 %N %P 183-205 %Z Smolensky's weak compositionality is useless; and tensor product architecture can't support systematicity, as nonexistent tokens can't play a causal role. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Connectionism and the problem of systematicity (continued): Why Smolensky's solution still doesn't work %I %D 1997 %B Cognition %V 62 %N %P 109-19 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Garcia-Carpintero, M. %T Two spurious varieties of compositionality %I %D 1996 %B Minds and Machines %V 6 %N %P 159-72 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Garfield, J. %T Mentalese not spoken here: Computation, cognition, and causation %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 413-35 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Guarini, M. %T Tensor products and split-level architecture: Foundational issues in the classicism-connectionism debate %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Cognition, systematicity, and nomic necessity %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 137-53 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Systematicity in connectionist language learning %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 247-72 %Z Argues that existing connectionist models do not achieve an adequate systematicity in learning; they fail to generalize to handle structures with novel constituents. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Systematicity revisited %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 431-44 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %A Hayward, M. B. %T Strong semantic systematicity from Hebbian connectionist learning %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 1-55 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Cognition, systematicity, and nomic necessity %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 137-53 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T Explaining systematicity: A reply to Kenneth Aizawa %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 12 %N %P 571-79 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Hawthorne, J. %T On the compatibility of connectionist and classical models %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 2 %N %P 5-16 %Z Localist connectionist models may not be able to handle structured presentation, but appropriate distributed models can. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Structured representations in connectionist systems? %I %D 1991 %B 1991 %V %N %P %Z A discussion of how connectionism might achieve "effective syntax" without implementing a classical system. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, R. J. %T Three-concept monte: Explanation, implementation, and systematicity %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 101 %N %P 347-63 %Z F&P deal a sucker bet: on their terms, connectionism could never give a a non-implementational explanation of systematicity, as the notions are construed in a manner specific to classical architectures. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, R. J. %T Can connectionists explain systematicity? %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 154-77 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T Systematicity, conceptual truth, and evolution %I %D 1992 %B 1992 %V %N %P %Z Against responses to Fodor and Pylyshyn claiming that cognitive theories needn't explain systematicity. Contra Clark, the conceptual truth of systematicity won't help. Contra others, nor will evolution. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %T The connectionism/classicism battle to win souls %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 71 %N %P %Z Argues that no connectionist model so far has come close to explaining systematicity. Considers the models of Elman, Chalmers, and Smolensky. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Niklasson, L. F. %A van Gelder, T. %T On being systematically connectionist %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 288-302 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Pollack, J. B. %T Recursive distributed representations %I %D 1990 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 46 %N %P 77-105 %Z Develops a connectionist architecture -- recursive auto-associative memory -- that can recursively represent compositional structures in distributed form. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Rowlands, M. %T Connectionism and the language of thought %I %D 1994 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 45 %N %P 485-503 %Z F&P's argument confuses constituent structure with logical/sentential structure. Connectionism is a psychotechtonic project, whereas propositional description is a psychosemantic project. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Schroder, J. %T Knowledge of rules, causal systematicity, and the language of thought %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 117 %N %P 313-330 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Smolensky, P. %T The constituent structure of connectionist mental states %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 137-60 %Z F&P ignore distributed representation and interaction effects. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Smolensky, P. %T Tensor product variable binding and the representation of symbolic structures in connectionist systems %I %D 1990 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 46 %N %P 159-216 %Z Develops a connectionist architecture that represents compositional structures as tensor products of distributed representations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Book Section %A Smolensky, P. %T Connectionism, constituency and the language of thought %I Blackwell %D 1991 %B Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics %E B. Loewer %E G. Rey %Z Connectionism can do compositionality its own way, including both weak compositionality (with context effects) or strong compositionality (via tensor products). -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Book Section %A Smolensky, P. %T Constituent structure and explanation in an integrated connectionist/symbolic cognitive architecture %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation %E C. Macdonald %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gelder, T. %T Compositionality: A connectionist variation on a classical theme %I %D 1990 %B Cognitive Science %V 14 %N %P 355-84 %Z Connectionism can do compositionality functionally. All one needs is the right functional relation between representations; physical concatenation is not necessary. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Book Section %A van Gelder, T. %T Classical questions, radical answers %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z On connectionism as a Kuhnian paradigm shift in cognitive science, with emphasis on the implications of functional compositionality and distributed representations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and compositionality %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Representation and computation in a deflationary assessment of connectionist cognitive science %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 104 %N %P 71-97 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Manuscript %A Clark, A. %T Connectionism, nonconceptual content, and representational redescription %I %D 1989 %Z On some troubles connectionism has with higher-order knowledge. Contrasts Cussins, Karmiloff-Smith on development. Subsymbols without symbols are blind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book %A Clark, A. %T Associative Engines: Connectionism, Concepts, and Representational Change %I MIT Press %D 1993 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %A Karmiloff-Smith, A. %T The cognizer's innards: A psychological and philosophical perspective on the development of thought %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 8 %N %P 487-519 %Z On the importance of representational redescription, and on the limits of connectionist networks in cross-domain knowledge transfer. What does a true believer need, above behavior: conceptual combination, real-world fluency? -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %T The role of representation in connectionist explanation of cognitive capacities %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z Connectionism isn't really radical. There's no new concept of representation or of learning, and cognition can still be the manipulation of semantically structured representations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Cussins, A. %T The connectionist construction of concepts %I Oxford University Press %D 1990 %B The Philosophy of AI %E M. Boden %Z Connectionism builds up concepts from the nonconceptual level. From nonconceptual content (e.g. perceptual experiences) to the emergence of objectivity. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Garzon, F. %T A connectionist defence of the inscrutability thesis %I %D 2000 %B Mind and Language %V 15 %N %P 465-480 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Garzon, F. %T State space semantics and conceptual similarity: reply to Churchland %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 77-96 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Goschke, T. %A Koppelberg, D. %T Connectionism and the semantic content of internal representation %I %D 1990 %B Review of International Philosophy %V 44 %N %P 87-103 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Goschke, T. %A Koppelberg, D. %T The concept of representation and the representation of concepts in connectionist models %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z On correlational semantics and context-dependent representations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Hatfield, G. %T Representation and rule-instantiation in connectionist systems %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z Some remarks on psychology & physiology. Even connectionism uses psychological concepts. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Hatfield, G. %T Representation in perception and cognition: Connectionist affordances %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Haybron, D. M. %T The causal and explanatory role of information stored in connectionist networks %I %D 2000 %B Minds and Machines %V 10 %N %P 361-380 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Laakso, A. %A Cottrell, G. %T Content and cluster analysis: assessing representational similarity in neural systems %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 47-76 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A O'Brien, G. %A Opie, J. %T Notes toward a structuralist theory of mental representation %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Toward a connectionist version of the causal theory of reference %I %D 1989 %B Acta Analytica %V 4 %N %P 71-97 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %T Rethinking distributed representation %I %D 1995 %B Acta Analytica %V 10 %N %P 9-25 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %T Do connectionist representations earn their explanatory keep? %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 34-66 %Z Argues that talk of representations has no explanatory role in connectionist theory, and can be discarded. It can't be understood along the lines of the teleo-informational or classical frameworks. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Schopman, J. %A Shawky, A. %T Remarks on the impact of connectionism on our thinking about concepts %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machines and Thought %E P. Millican %E A. Clark %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Journal Article %A Tye, M. %T Representation in pictorialism and connectionism %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 163-184 %Z Pictorialism isn't compatible with language of thought, but connectionism might be. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A van Gelder, T. %T What is the D in PDP? %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z Argues that distributed representation is best analyzed in terms of superposition of representation, not in terms of extendedness. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, representation in connectionism %U %0 Book Section %A Ramsey, W. %A Stich, S. P. %A Garon, J. %T Connectionism, eliminativism and the future of folk psychology %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z Connectionism implies eliminativism, as connectionist systems do not have functionally discrete contentful states, and folk psychology is committed to functional discreteness of propositional attitudes. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Bickle, J. %T Connectionism, eliminativism, and the semantic view of theories %I %D 1993 %B 1993 %V %N %P %Z Outlines the semantic view of scientific theories, and applies it to the connectionism/eliminativism debate. There's no reason why folk psychology shouldn't be reducible, in a homogeneous or heterogeneous way. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Botterill, G. %T Beliefs, functionally discrete states, and connectionist networks %I %D 1994 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 45 %N %P 899-906 %Z Distinguishes active from dispositional beliefs: the former are realized discretely in activation patterns, the latter nondiscretely in weights, which is all that folk psychology needs. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Clapin, H. %T Connectionism isn't magic %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 167-84 %Z Commentary on Ramsey/Stich/Garon. Connectionism has symbols that interact, and has propositional modularity in processing if not in storage. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Beyond eliminativism %I %D 1989 %B Mind and Language %V 4 %N %P 251-79 %Z Connectionism needn't imply eliminativism, as higher levels may have a causal role, if not causal completeness. Also, it may not tell the whole story. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Connectionist minds %I %D 1990 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 90 %N %P 83-102 %Z Responding to eliminativist challenge via cluster analysis and recurrence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Connectionism, modularity, and tacit knowledge %I %D 1989 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 40 %N %P 541-55 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought. (W. Ramsey, S. Stich, & D. Rumelhart, eds) Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %I %D 1991 %B 1991 %V %N %P %Z Argues that our conception of thought requires causal systematicity, which requires a language of thought. Connectionist systems are not causally systematic, so connectionism leads to eliminativism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Egan, F. %T Folk psychology and cognitive architecture %I %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Science %V 62 %N %P 179-96 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Forster, M. %A Saidel, E. %T Connectionism and the fate of folk psychology %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 437-52 %Z Contra Ramsey, Stich, and Garon, connectionist representations can be seen to be functionally discrete on an appropriate analysis of causal relevance. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A and Tienson, J. %T Connectionism and the commitments of folk psychology %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 127-52 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Brien, G. %T Is connectionism commonsense? %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 165-78 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Leary-Hawthorne, J. %T On the threat of eliminativism %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 74 %N %P 325-46 %Z A dispositional construal of beliefs and desires can distinguish the relevant active states (via counterfactuals) and is compatible with FP, so internals can't threaten FP. With remarks on Davidson, overdetermination, etc. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Place, U. T. %T Eliminative connectionism: Its implications for a return to an empiricist/behaviorist linguistics %I %D 1992 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 21-35 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %T Distributed representation and causal modularity: A rejoinder to Forster and Saidel %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 453-61 %Z Upon examination, the model of Forster and Saidel 1994 does not exhibit features that are both distributed and causally discrete. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Smolensky, P. %T On the projectable predicates of connectionist psychology: A case for belief %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation %E C. Macdonald %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. %A Warfield, T. %T Reply to Clark and Smolensky: Do connectionist minds have beliefs? %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation %E C. Macdonald %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, connectionism and eliminativism %U %0 Book Section %A Adams, F. %A Aizawa, K. %A Fuller, G. %T Rules in programming languages and networks %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1992 %B The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap %E J. Dinsmore %Z The distinction between programming languages and networks is neutral on rule-following, etc, so there's nothing really new about connectionism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Aizawa, K. %T Representations without rules, connectionism, and the syntactic argument %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 101 %N %P 465-92 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %T Is the connectionist-logicist debate one of AI's wonderful red herrings? %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence %V 3 %N %P 319-49 %Z A detailed analysis purporting to show that connectionism and "logicism" are compatible, as Turing machines can do everything a neural network can. Entertaining, but misunderstands subsymbolic processing. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Broadbent, D. %T A question of levels: Comment on McClelland and Rumelhart %I %D 1985 %B Journal of Experimental Psychology: General %V 114 %N %P 189-92 %Z Distributed models are at the implementational, not computational, level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Chandrasekaran, B. %A Goel, A. %A Allemang, D. %T Connectionism and information-processing abstractions %I %D 1988 %B AI Magazine %V 24 %N %P %Z Connectionism won't affect AI too much, as AI is concerned with the information-processing (task) level. With greater modularity, connectionism will look more like traditional AI. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Corbi, J. E. %T Classical and connectionist models: Levels of description %I %D 1993 %B Synthese %V 95 %N %P 141-68 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Dawson, M. R. W. %A Medler, D. A. %A Berkeley, I. S. N. %T PDP networks can provide models that are not mere implementations of classical theories %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 25-40 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T The logical geography of computational approaches: A view from the east pole %I University of Arizona Press %D 1986 %B The Representation of Knowledge and Belief %E M. Brand %E R. Harnish %Z Drawing the battle-lines: High Church Computationalism at the "East Pole", New Connectionism, Zen Holism, etc, at various locations on the "West Coast". With remarks on connectionism, and on AI as thought-experimentation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Mother Nature versus the walking encyclopedia %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z Reiterating the value of connectionism, especially biological plausibility. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book %A Dinsmore, J. %T The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1992 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book Section %A Dyer, M. %T Connectionism versus symbolism in high-level cognition %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book Section %A Garson, J. W. %T What connectionists cannot do: The threat to Classical AI %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z Connectionism and classicism aren't necessarily incompatible on symbolic discreteness, causal role, functional discreteness, constituency, representation of rules. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T No representations without rules: The prospects for a compromise between paradigms in cognitive science %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 25-37 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Cognition without classical architecture %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 100 %N %P 291-306 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Guarini, M. %T A defence of connectionism against the "syntactic" argument %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 128 %N %P 287-317 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Settling into a new paradigm %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 97-113 %Z On connectionism, basketball, and representation without rules. Responses to the "syntactic" and "semantic" arguments against connectionism. Nice. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Representation without rules %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 17 %N %P 147-74 %Z Cognition uses structured representations without high-level rules, and connectionism is better at accounting for this. With remarks on exceptions to psychological laws, and the crisis in traditional AI. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Representations don't need rules: Reply to James Garson %I %D 1994 %B Mind and Language %V 9 %N %P 1-24 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A McClelland, J. L. %A Rumelhart, D. E. %T Levels indeed! A response to Broadbent %I %D 1985 %B Journal of Experimental Psychology: General %V 114 %N %P 193-7 %Z Response to Broadbent 1985: Distributed models are at the algorithmic level. Elucidating the low-level/high-level relation via various analogies. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A McLaughlin, B. P. %A Warfield, F. %T The allure of connectionism reexamined %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 101 %N %P 365-400 %Z Argues that symbolic systems such as decision trees are as good at learning and pattern recognition as connectionist networks, and it is just as plausible that they are implemented in the brain. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Book Section %A Rey, G. %T An explanatory budget for connectionism and eliminativism %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z Challenges connectionism to explain things that the classical approach seems to handle better: the structure, systematicity, causal role, and grain of propositional attitudes, their rational relations, and conceptual stability. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, the connectionist/classical debate %U %0 Journal Article %A Smolensky, P. %T On the proper treatment of connectionism %I %D 1988 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 11 %N %P 1-23 %Z Connectionism offers a complete account at the subsymbolic level, rather than an approximate account at the symbolic level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Berkeley, I. %T What the #$%! is a subsymbol? %I %D 2000 %B Minds and machines %V 10 %N %P 1-14 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Book Section %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Subsymbolic computation and the Chinese Room %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1992 %B The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap %E J. Dinsmore %Z Explicates the distinction between symbolic and subsymbolic computation, and argues that connectionism can better handle the emergence of semantics from syntax, doe to the non-atomic nature of its representations. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Superpositional connectionism: A reply to Marinov %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 271-81 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Book Section %A Hofstadter, D. R. %T Artificial intelligence: Subcognition as computation %I Wiley %D 1983 %B The Study of Information: Interdisciplinary Messages %E F. Machlup %Z AI needs statistical emergence. For real semantics, symbols must be decomposable, complex, autonomous -- i.e. active. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Marinov, M. %T On the spuriousness of the symbolic/subsymbolic distinction %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 253-70 %Z Argues with Smolensky: symbolic systems such as decision trees have all the positive features of neural networks (flexibility, lack of brittleness), and can represent concepts as sets of subconcepts. With a reply by Clark. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosenberg, J. %T Treating connectionism properly: Reflections on Smolensky %I %D 1990 %B Psychological Research %V 52 %N %P %Z Rejects Smolensky's PTC, as the proper interaction of the microscopic and macroscopic levels would take a "miracle". -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Smolensky, P. %T Connectionist AI, symbolic AI, and the brain %I %D 1987 %B AI Review %V 1 %N %P 95-109 %Z On connectionist networks as subsymbolic dynamic systems. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, subsymbolic computation %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Are the new PDP models of cognition cognitivist or associationist? %I %D 1985 %B Behaviorism %V 13 %N %P 53-61 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T What happens to accounts of mind-brain relations if we forgo an architecture of rules and representations? %I %D 1986 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1986 %N %P %Z On the relationship between connectionism, symbol processing, psychology and neuroscience. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Connectionism and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 17-41 %Z Lots of questions about connectionism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Connectionism and rules and representation systems: Are they compatible? %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 1 %N %P 5-16 %Z There's room for both styles within a single mind. The rule-based level needn't be autonomous; the connectionist level plays a role in pattern recognition, concepts, and so on. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %A Abrahamson, A. %T Beyond the exclusively propositional era %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 223-53 %Z An account of the shift from propositions to pattern recognition in the study of cognition: knowing-how, imagery, categorization, connectionism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Bechtel, W. %A Abrahamsen, A. A. %T Connectionism and the future of folk psychology %I SUNY Press %D 1992 %B Minds: Natural and Artificial %E R. Burton %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T The case for connectionism %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 71 %N %P 119-54 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Bickle, J. %T Connectionism, reduction, and multiple realizability %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 29-39 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Bradshaw, D. E. %T Connectionism and the specter of representationalism %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z Argues that connectionism allows for a more plausible epistemology of perception, compatible with direct realism rather than representationalism. With remarks on Fodor and Pylshyn's argument against Gibson. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T On the nature of theories: A neurocomputational perspective %I %D 1989 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 14 %N %P %Z Connectionism will revolutionize our review of scientific theories: >From the deductive-nomological view to descent in weight-space. Some cute analogies. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Churchland, P. M. %T On the nature of explanation: A PDP approach %I %D 1989 %B A Neurocomputational Perspective %Z We achieve explanatory understanding not through the manipulation of propositions but through the activation of prototypes. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Churchland, P. S. %A Sejnowski, T. %T Neural representation and neural computation %I MIT Press %D 1989 %B Neural Connections, Mental Computations %E L. Nadel %Z Implications of connectionism and neuroscience for our concept of mind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book %A Clark, A. %T Microcognition %I MIT Press %D 1989 %Z All kinds of stuff on connectionism and philosophy. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Connectionism, competence and explanation %I %D 1990 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 41 %N %P 195-222 %Z Connectionism separates processing from competence. Instead of hopping down Marr's levels (theory->process), connectionism goes (1) task (2) low-level performance (3) extract theory from process. Cute. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %A Schwarz, G. %T Radical connectionism %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 43-61 %Z On computation and representation in AI and connectionism, and on problems for radical connectionism in reconciling these without denying representation or embracing mystery. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Cummins, R. %A Schwarz, G. %T Connectionism, computation, and cognition %I Kluwer %D 1991 %B Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %E T. Horgan %E J. Tienson %Z Explicates computationalism, and discusses ways in which connectionism might end up non-computational: if causal states cross-classify representational states, or if transitions between representations aren't computable. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T Connectionist and the rationale constraint on cognitive explanations %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 105-25 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %T Connectionism, modularity and tacit knowledge %I %D 1989 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 40 %N %P 541-55 %Z Argues that connectionist networks don't have tacit knowledge of modular theories (as representations lack the appropriate structure, etc.). -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Globus, G. G. %T Derrida and connectionism: Differance in neural nets %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 5 %N %P 183-97 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Hatfield, G. %T Gibsonian representations and connectionist symbol-processing: prospects for unification %I %D 1990 %B Psychological Research %V 52 %N %P 243-52 %Z Gibson is compatible with connectionism. In both, we can have rule-instantiation without rule-following. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind %I Kluwer %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology %I MIT Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %T Connectionism and the philosophical foundations of cognitive science %I %D 1997 %B Metaphilosophy %V 28 %N %P 1-30 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Humphreys, G. W. %T Information-processing systems which embody computational rules: The connectionist approach %I %D 1986 %B Mind and Language %V 1 %N %P 201-12 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Legg, C. R. %T Connectionism and physiological psychology: A marriage made in heaven? %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 1 %N %P 263-78 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Litch, M. %T Computation, connectionism and modelling the mind %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 357-364 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Lloyd, D. %T Parallel distributed processing and cognition: Only connect? %I %D 1989 %B Simple Minds %Z An overview: local/distributed/featural representations; explanation in connectionism (how to avoid big mush); relation to neuroscience; explicit representations of rules vs weight matrices. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Lycan, W. G. %T Homuncular functionalism meets PDP %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %B Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %E W. Ramsey %E S. Stich %E D. Rumelhart %Z On various ways in which connectionism relates to representational homuncular functionalism, e.g. on implementation, eliminativism, and explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book %A Macdonald, C. %T Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation %I Blackwell %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Plunkett, K. %T Connectionism today %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 129 %N %P 185-194 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %A Stich, S. P. %T Connectionism and three levels of nativism %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 177-205 %Z How connectionism bears on the nativism debate. Conclusion: not too much. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book %A Ramsey, W. %A Stich, S. P. %A Rumelhart, D. M. %T Philosophy and Connectionist Theory %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosenberg, J. %T Connectionism and cognition %I %D 1989 %B 1989 %V %N %P %Z Criticism of Churchland's connectionist epistemology. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Sehon, S. %T Connectionism and the causal theory of action explanation %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 511-532 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Shanon, B. %T Are connectionist models cognitive? %I %D 1992 %B 1992 %V %N %P %Z In some senses of "cognitive", yes; in other senses, no. Phenomenological, theoretical, and sociological perspectives. Toward meaning-laden models. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Book Section %A Sterelny, K. %T Connectionism %I %D 1990 %B The Representational Theory of Mind %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Waskan, J. %A Bechtel, W. %T Directions in connectionist research: Tractable computations without syntactically structured representations %I %D 1997 %B Metaphilosophy %V 28 %N %P 31-62 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, philosophy of connectionism, misc. %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Representational trajectories in connectionist learning %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 317-32 %Z On how to get connectionist networks to learn about structured task domains. Concentrates on incremental learning, and other developmental/scaffolding strategies. With remarks on systematicity. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %A Thornton, S. %T Trading spaces: Computation, representation, and the limits of uninformed learning %I %D 1997 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 20 %N %P 57-66 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Manuscript %A Cliff, D. %T Computational neuroethology: A provisional manifesto %I %D 1990 %Z Criticizes connectionism for not being sufficiently rooted in neuroscience, and for not being grounded in the world. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Dawson, M. R. W. %A Schopflocher, D. P. %T Autonomous processing in parallel distributed processing networks %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 5 %N %P 199-219 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Hanson, S. %A Burr, D. %T What connectionist models learn %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z What's new to connectionism is not learning or representation but the way that learning and representation interact. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Kaplan, S. %A Weaver, M. %A French, R. M. %T Active symbols and internal models: Towards a cognitive connectionism %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z Addresses behaviorist/associationist charges. Connectionism needs recurrent circuits to support active symbols. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirsh, D. %T Putting a price on cognition %I %D 1987 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement %V 26 %N %P 119-35 %Z On the importance of variable binding, and why it's hard with connectionism. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Lachter, J. %A Bever, T. %T The relation between linguistic structure and associative theories of language learning %I %D 1988 %B Cognition %V 28 %N %P 195-247 %Z Criticism of connectionist language models. They build in too much. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Mills, S. %T Connectionism, the classical theory of cognition, and the hundred step constraint %I %D 1989 %B Acta Analytica %V 4 %N %P 5-38 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelson, R. %T Philosophical issues in Edelman's neural darwinism %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 1 %N %P 195-208 %Z On the relationship between ND, PDP and AI. All are computational. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Oaksford, M. %A Chater, N. %A Stenning, K. %T Connectionism, classical cognitive science and experimental psychology %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z Connectionism is better at explaining empirical findings about mind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Journal Article %A Pinker, S. %A Prince, A. %T On language and connectionism %I %D 1988 %B Cognition %V 28 %N %P 73-193 %Z Extremely thorough criticism of the R&M past-tense-learning model, with arguments on why connectionism can't handle linguistic rules. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of connectionism, foundational empirical issues %U %0 Manuscript %A Bechtel, W. %T Yet another revolution? Defusing the dynamical system theorists' attack on mental representations %I %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Time and mind %I %D 1998 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 95 %N %P 354-76 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Eliasmith, C. %T The third contender: A critical examination of the dynamicist theory of cognition %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 9 %N %P 441-63 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Eliasmith, C. %T Computation and dynamical models of mind %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 531-41 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Eliasmith, C. %T Moving beyond metaphors: Understanding the mind for what it is %I %D 2003 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 100 %N %P 493-520 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Foss, J. E. %T Introduction to the epistemology of the brain: Indeterminacy, micro-specificity, chaos, and openness %I %D 1992 %B Topoi %V 11 %N %P 45-57 %Z On the brain as a vector-processing system, and the problems raised by indeterminacy, chaos, and so on. With morals for cognitive science. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Freeman, W. %T Nonlinear neurodynamics of intentionality %I %D 1997 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 18 %N %P 291-304 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Chaos and free will %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 365-74 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Cognition poised at the edge of chaos: A complex alternative to a symbolic mind %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 9 %N %P 301-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Syntax in a dynamic brain %I %D 1997 %B Synthese %V 110 %N %P 343-355 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Chaotic emergence and the language of thought %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 303-315 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book Section %A Giunti, M. %T Dynamic models of cognition %I MIT Press %D 1995 %B Mind as Motion %E T. van Gelder %E R. Port %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book %A Giunti, M. %T Computers, Dynamical Systems, and the Mind %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Globus, G. %T Toward a noncomputational cognitive science %I %D 1992 %B Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience %V 4 %N %P 299-310 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Hooker, C. A. %A Christensen, W. D. %T Towards a new science of the mind: Wide content and the metaphysics of organizational properties in nonlinear dynamic models %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 98-109 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Cognitive systems as dynamic systems %I %D 1992 %B Topoi %V 11 %N %P 27-43 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T A nonclassical framework for cognitive science %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 101 %N %P 305-45 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Keijzer, F. A. %A Bem, S. %T Behavioral systems interpreted as autonomous agents and as coupled dynamical systems: A criticism %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 9 %N %P 323-46 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Rockwell, T. %T Attractor spaces as modules: A semi-eliminative reduction of symbolic AI to dynamic systems theory %I %D 2005 %B Minds and Machines %V 15 %N %P 23-55 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Schonbein, W. %T Cognition and the power of continuous dynamical systems %I %D 2005 %B Minds and Machines %V 15 %N %P 57-71 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book Section %A Sloman, A. %T The mind as a control system %I Cambridge University Press %D 1993 %B Philosophy and Cognitive Science %E C. Hookway %E D. Peterson %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book %A van Gelder, T. %A Port, R. %T Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition %I MIT Press %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gelder, T. %T What might cognition be if not computation? %I %D 1995 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 92 %N %P 345-81 %Z Argues for a dynamic-systems conception of the mind that is non-computational and non-representational. Uses an analogy with the Watt steam governor to argue for a new kind of dynamic explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book Section %A van Gelder, T. %T Connectionism, dynamics, and the philosophy of mind %I Pittsburgh University Press %D 1997 %B Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind %E M. Carrier %E P. Machamer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gelder, T. %T The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science %I %D 1998 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 21 %N %P 615-28 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Weiskopf, D. %T The place of time in cognition %I %D 2004 %B The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P 87-105 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,dynamical systems %U %0 Book Section %A Buchanan, B. %T AI as an experimental science %I D %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Book Section %A Bundy, A. %T What kind of field is AI? %I Cambridge University Press %D 1990 %B The Foundations of Artificial Intelligence: A Sourcebook %E D. Partridge %E Y. Wilks %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T AI as philosophy and as psychology %I Humanities Press %D 1978 %B Philosophical Perspectives on Artificial Intelligence %E M. Ringle %Z AI as detailed armchair psychology and as thought-experimental epistemology. Implications for mind: e.g. a solution to the problem of homuncular regress. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Book Section %A Glymour, C. %T AI is philosophy %I D %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, A. %T Is AI an empirical science? %I %D 1989 %B Analysis %V 49 %N %P 56-60 %Z No, AI is an a priori science that uses empirical methods; its status is similar to that of mathematics. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, A. %T Medium AI and experimental science %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 493-5012 %Z On the status of "medium AI", the study of intelligence in computational systems (not just humans). Contra to many, this is not an empirical science, but a combination of (experimental) mathematics and engineering. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Journal Article %A Nakashima, H. %T AI as complex information processing %I %D 1999 %B Minds and Machines %V 9 %N %P 57-80 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the nature of ai %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Levels of description and explanation in cognitive science %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 1-25 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A Cleeremans, A. %A French, R. M. %T From chicken squawking to cognition: Levels of description and the computational approach in psychology %I %D 1996 %B Psychologica Belgica %V 36 %N %P 5-29 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Book %A Foster, C. %T Algorithms, abstraction and implementation %I Academic Press %D 1990 %Z Outlines a theory of the equivalence of algorithms. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Levels of description in nonclassical cognitive science %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy %V 34 %N %P %Z Generalizes Marr's levels to: cognitive state-transitions, mathematical state-transitions, implementation. Discusses these with respect to connectionism, dynamical systems, and computation below the cognitive level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Thesis %A Houng, Y. %T Classicism, connectionism and the concept of level %I %D 1990 %Z On levels of organization vs. levels of analysis. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Book %A Marr, D. %T Vision %I Freeman %D 1982 %Z Defines computational, algorithmic and implementational levels. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A McClamrock, R. %T Marr's three levels: a re-evaluation %I %D 1990 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 185-196 %Z On different kinds of level-shifts: organizational and contextual changes. There are more than three levels available. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A Newell, A. %T The knowledge level %I %D 1982 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 18 %N %P 81-132 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Book Section %A Newell, A. %T The symbol level and the knowledge level %I Ablex %D 1986 %B Meaning and Cognitive Structure %E Z. Pylyshyn %E W. Demopolous %Z With commentaries by Smith, Dennett. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A Peacocke, C. %T Explanation in computational psychology: Language, perception and level 1.5 %I %D 1986 %B Mind and Language %V 1 %N %P 101-23 %Z Psychological explanation is typically somewhere between the computational and algorithmic levels. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Journal Article %A Sticklen, J. %T Problem-solving architectures at the knowledge level %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 1 %N %P 233-247 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, levels of analysis %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Cognitive wheels: The frame problem of AI %I Cambridge University Press %D 1984 %B Minds, Machines and Evolution %E Hookaway %Z General overview. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Dreyfus, H. L. %A Dreyfus, S. %T How to stop worrying about the frame problem even though it's computationally insoluble %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z FP is an artifact of computational explicitness. Contrast human commonsense know-how, with relevance built in. Comparison to expert/novice distinction. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Fetzer, J. H. %T The frame problem: Artificial intelligence meets David Hume %I %D 1990 %B International Journal of Expert Systems %V 3 %N %P 219-232 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Modules, frames, fridgeons, sleeping dogs, and the music of the spheres %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z FP is Hamlet's problem: when to stop thinking. It's equivalent to the general problem of non-demonstrative inference. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T An overview of the frame problem %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z The FP may be a consequence of the explicit/implicit rep distinction. Use "complicit" reps instead, and changes will be carried along intrinsically. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Hayes, P. %T What the frame problem is and isn't %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z FP is a relatively narrow problem, Some, e.g. Fodor, wrongly equate FP with the "Generalized AI Problem". -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Janlert, L. %T Modeling change: The frame problem %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Korb, K. %T The frame problem: An AI fairy tale %I %D 1998 %B Minds and Machines %V 8 %N %P 317-351 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Lormand, E. %T The holorobophobe's dilemma %I Ablex %D 1994 %B The Robot's Dilemma Revisited %E K. Ford %E Z. Pylylshyn %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Lormand, E. %T Framing the frame problem %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 353-74 %Z Criticizes Dennett's, Haugeland's and Fodor's construals of the FP. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A Maloney, J. C. %T In praise of narrow minds %I D %D 1988 %B Aspects of AI %E J. Fetzer %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A McCarthy, J. %A Hayes, P. %T Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence %I Edinburgh University Press %D 1969 %B Machine Intelligence 4 %E Meltzer %E Michie %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book Section %A McDermott, D. %T We've been framed: Or, Why AI is innocent of the frame problem %I Ablex %D 1987 %B The Robot's Dilemma %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z Solve frame problem by using the sleeping-dog strategy -- keeping things fixed unless there's a reason to suppose otherwise. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Murphy, D. %T Folk psychology meets the frame problem %I %D 2001 %B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics %V 32 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Pollock, JL. %T Reasoning about change and persistence: A solution to the frame problem %I %D 1997 %B Nous %V 31 %N %P 143-169 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Book %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T The Robot's Dilemma %I Ablex %D 1987 %Z Lots of papers on the frame problem. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, the frame problem %U %0 Journal Article %A Birnbaum, L. %T Rigor mortis: A response to Nilsson's `Logic and artificial intelligence' %I %D 1991 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 47 %N %P 57-78 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %A French, R. M. %A Hofstadter, D. R. %T High-level perception, representation, and analogy: A critique of AI methodology %I %D 1992 %B 1992 %V %N %P %Z AI must integrate perception and cognition in the interest of flexible representation. Current models ignore perception and the development of representation, but this cannot be separated from later cognitive processes. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T A biological metaphor %I %D 1986 %B Mind and Language %V 1 %N %P 45-64 %Z AI should look at biology. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T The kludge in the machine %I %D 1987 %B Mind and Language %V 2 %N %P 277-300 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Dascal, M. %T Why does language matter to artificial intelligence? %I %D 1992 %B Minds and Machines %V 2 %N %P 145-174 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book Section %A Dreyfus, H. L. %T From micro-worlds to knowledge: AI at an impasse %I MIT Press %D 1981 %B Mind Design %E J. Haugeland %Z Micro-worlds don't test true understanding, and frames and scripts are doomed to leave out too much. Explicit representation can't capture intelligence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Dreyfus, H. L. %A Dreyfus, S. E. %T Making a mind versus modeling the brain: AI at a crossroads %I %D 1988 %B 1988 %V %N %P %Z History of AI (boo) and connectionism (qualified hooray). And Husserl/ Heidegger/Wittgenstein. Quite nice. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Hadley, R. F. %T The many uses of `belief' in AI %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 55-74 %Z Various AI approaches to belief: syntactic, propositional/meaning-based, information, tractability, discoverability, and degree of confidence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Haugeland, J. %T Understanding natural language %I %D 1979 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 76 %N %P 619-32 %Z AI will need holism: interpretational, common-sense, situational, existential. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Kirsh, D. %T Foundations of AI: The big issues %I %D 1991 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 47 %N %P 3-30 %Z Identifying the dividing lines: pre-eminence of knowledge, embodiment, language-like kinematics, role of learning, uniformity of architecture. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Marr, D. %T Artificial intelligence: A personal view %I %D 1977 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 9 %N %P 37-48 %Z AI usually comes up with Type 2 (algorithmic) theories, when Type 1 (info processing) theories might be more useful -- at least if they exist. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book Section %A McDermott, D. %T Artificial intelligence meets natural stupidity %I MIT Press %D 1981 %B Mind Design %E J. Haugeland %Z Problems in AI methodology: wishful mnemonics, oversimplifying natural language concepts, and never implementing programs. Entertaining. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A McDermott, D. %T A critique of pure reason %I %D 1987 %B Computational Intelligence %V 3 %N %P 151-60 %Z Criticism of logicism (i.e. reliance on deduction) in AI. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Nilsson, N. %T Logic and artificial intelligence %I %D 1991 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 47 %N %P 31-56 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book %A Partridge, D. %A Wilks, Y. %T The Foundations of Artificial Intelligence: A Sourcebook %I Cambridge University Press %D 1990 %Z Lots of papers on various aspects of AI methodology. Quite thorough. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Preston, B. %T Heidegger and artificial intelligence %I %D 1993 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 53 %N %P 43-69 %Z On the non-represented background to everyday activity, and environmental interaction in cognition. Criticizes cognitivism, connectionism, looks at Agre/Chapman/Brooks, ethology, anthropology for support. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book Section %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Complexity and the study of artificial and human intelligence %I Humanities Press %D 1979 %B Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence %E M. Ringle %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book %A Ringle, M. %T Philosophical Perspectives in Artificial Intelligence %I Humanities Press %D 1979 %Z 10 papers on philosophy of AI, psychology and knowledge representation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Rationalism, expertise, and the Dreyfuses' critique of AI research %I %D 1991 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 29 %N %P 271-90 %Z Defending limited rationalism: i.e. a theory of intelligence below the conceptual level but above the neuronal level. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,foundational questions in ai, ai methodology %U %0 Book Section %A Agre, P. %T The practical logic of computer work %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, L. %T Feeling fine about the mind %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 57 %N %P 381-87 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Bickhard, M. %T Troubles with computationalism %I Sage Publications %D 1996 %B The Philosophy of Psychology %E W. O'Donahue %E R. Kitchener %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Block, N. %T The computer model of mind %I , Vol %D 1990 %B An Invitation to Cognitive Science %E D. Osherson %E E. Smith %Z Overview of computationalism. Relationship to intentionality, LOT, etc. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Boden, M. %T What is computational psychology? %I %D 1984 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 58 %N %P 17-35 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %T Computation, among other things, is beneath us %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 469-88 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Bringsjord, S. %A Zenzen, M. %T Cognition is not computation: The argument from irreversibility %I %D 1997 %B Synthese %V 113 %N %P 285-320 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Buller, D. J. %T Confirmation and the computational paradigm, or, why do you think they call it artificial intelligence? %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 155-81 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Manuscript %A Chalmers, D. J. %T A computational foundation for the study of cognition %I %D 1994 %Z Argues for theses of computational sufficiency and computational explanation, resting on the fact that computation provides an abstract specification of causal organization. With replies to many anti-computationalist worries. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Clarke, J. %T Turing machines and the mind-body problem %I %D 1972 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 23 %N %P 1-12 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Copeland, J. %T Narrow versus wide mechanism %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T Programs in the explanation of behavior %I %D 1977 %B Philosophy of Science %V 44 %N %P 269-87 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Demopoulos, W. %T On some fundamental distinctions of computationalism %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 79-96 %Z On analog/digital, representational/nonrepresentational, direct/indirect. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Dietrich, E. %T Computationalism %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z What computationalism is, as opposed to computerism & cognitivism. Implies: intentionality isn't special, and we don't make decisions. With commentary. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Dietrich, E. %T Semantics and the computational paradigm in computational psychology %I %D 1989 %B Synthese %V 79 %N %P 119-41 %Z Argues that computational explanation requires the attribution of semantic content. Addresses Stich's arguments against content, and argues that computers are not formal symbol manipulators. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Double, R. %T The computational model of the mind and philosophical functionalism %I %D 1987 %B Behaviorism %V 15 %N %P 131-39 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Dretske, F. %T Machines and the mental %I %D 1985 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 59 %N %P 23-33 %Z Machines can't even add, let alone think, as the symbols they use aren't meaningful to them. They would need real information based on perceptual embodiment, and conceptual capacities, for meaning to play a real role. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Fetzer, J. H. %T Mental algorithms: Are minds computational systems? %I %D 1994 %B Pragmatics and Cognition %V 21 %N %P 1-29 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Computation and reduction %I %D 1978 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 9 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book %A Fodor, J. %T The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology %I MIT Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. W. %T Mice in mirrored mazes and the mind %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 6 %N %P 123-34 %Z Computationalism is false, as it can't distinguish the ability to solve a maxe for the ability to solve it's mirror image. An embodied computational taxonomy is needed, rather than software alone. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Harnad, S. %T Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation; Cognition isn't %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 379-90 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Authentic intentionality %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book %A Horst, S. %T Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality: A Critique of the Computational Theory of Mind %I University of California Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Horst, S. %T Symbols and computation: A critique of the computational theory of mind %I %D 1999 %B Minds and Machines %V 9 %N %P 347-381 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Mellor, D. H. %T What is computational psychology? II %I %D 1984 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 58 %N %P 37-53 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Mellor, D. H. %T How much of the mind is a computer %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Computers, Brains and Minds %E P. Slezak %Z Only belief is computational: rest of mind is not. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelson, R. %T Machine models for cognitive science %I %D 1987 %B 1987 %V %N %P %Z Argues contra Pylyshyn 1984 that finite state automata are good models for cognitive science: they are semantically interpretable and process symbols. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Piccinini, G. %T Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents %I %D 2004 %B 2004 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Piccinini, G. %T Functionalism, computationalism, and mental states %I %D 2004 %B Studies in History and Philosophy of Science %V 35 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book %A Pollock, J. %T How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon %I MIT Press %D 1989 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Computation and cognition: Issues in the foundation of cognitive science %I %D 1980 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 3 %N %P 111-32 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Computation and Cognition %I MIT Press %D 1984 %Z A thorough account of the symbolic/computational view of cognition. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Computational models and empirical constraints %I %D 1978 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 1 %N %P 98-128 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Computing and cognitive science %I MIT Press %D 1989 %B Foundations of Cognitive Science %E M. Posner %Z An overview of the computational view of mind. On symbols, levels, control structures, levels of correspondence for computational models, and empirical methods for determining degrees of equivalence. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Scheutz, M. %T Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press. Scheutz, M. 2002. Computationalism: The next generation %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, S. C. %T Computationalism %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 467-87 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Smith, B. C. %T The foundations of computing %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Sterelny, K. %T Computational functional psychology: problems and prospects %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Computers, Brains and Minds %E P. Slezak %Z Various points on pros and cons of computational psychology. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Tibbetts, P. %T Residual dualism in computational theories of mind %I %D 1996 %B Dialectica %V 50 %N %P 37-52 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computationalism in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Bishop, M. %T Counterfactuals cannot count: A rejoinder to David Chalmers %I %D 2002 %B Consciousness and Cognition %V 11 %N %P 642-52 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Book Section %A Bishop, M. %T Dancing with pixies: Strong artificial intelligence and panpsychism %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Boyle, C. F. %T Computation as an intrinsic property %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 451-67 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T On implementing a computation %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 391-402 %Z Gives an account of what it is for a physical system to implement a computation: the causal structure of the system must mirror the formal structure of the computation. Answers objections by Searle and others. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Chalmers, D. J. %T Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton? %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 108 %N %P 309-33 %Z Argues that Putnam's "proof" that every ordinary open system implements every finite automaton is fallacious. It can be patched up, but an appropriate account of implementation resists these difficulties. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Chrisley, R. L. %T Why everything doesn't realize every computation %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 403-20 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Cleland, C. %T Is the Church-Turing thesis true? %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 283-312 %Z Many physically realized functions can't be computeted by Turing machines: e.g. "mundane procedures" and continuous functions. So the C-T thesis is false of these, and maybe even of number-theoretic functions. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Cleland, C. E. %T Effective procedures and computable functions %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 9-23 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Copeland, B. J. %T What is computation? %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 108 %N %P 335-59 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Endicott, R. P. %T Searle, syntax, and observer-relativity %I %D 1996 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 26 %N %P 101-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Goel, V. %T Notationality and the information processing mind %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 129-166 %Z Adapts Goodman's notational systems to explicate computational information processing. What is/isn't a physical notational system (e.g. LOT, symbol systems, connectionism) and why. How to reconcile notational/mental content? -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T Computationalism %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 105 %N %P 303-17 %Z Pragmatic factors are vital in connecting the theory of computation with empirical theory, and particularly in determining whether a given system counts as performing a given computation. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Syntax, semantics, physics %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence %E J. Preston %E M. Bishop %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Horsten, L. %T The Church-Turing thesis and effective mundane procedures %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 1-8 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Ingarden, R. %T Open systems and consciousness: A philosophical discussion %I %D 2002 %B Open Systems & Information Dynamics %V 9 %N %P 125-151 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A MacLennan, B. %T "Words lie in our way" %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 421-37 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Maclennan, B. %T Transcending Turing computability %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 3-22 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Miscevic, N. %T Computationalism and the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox %I %D 1996 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 96 %N %P 215-29 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Scheutz, M. %T When physical systems realize functions %I %D 1999 %B Minds and Machines %V 9 %N %P 161-196 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Searle, J. R. %T Is the brain a digital computer? %I %D 1990 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 64 %N %P 21-37 %Z Syntax isn't intrinsic to physics, so computational ascriptions are assigned by observer. Syntax has no causal powers. Brain doesn't process information. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Shagrir, O. %T Two dogmas of computationalism %I %D 1997 %B Minds and Machines %V 7 %N %P 321-44 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Stabler, E. %T Kripke on functionalism and automata %I %D 1987 %B Synthese %V 70 %N %P 1-22 %Z Disputes Kripke's argument that there is no objective way of determining when a system computes a given function, due to infinite domains and unreliability. Stipulating normal background conditions is sufficient. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Suber, P. %T What is software? %I %D 1988 %B Journal of Speculative Philosophy %V 2 %N %P 89-119 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Welch, P. D. %T On the possibility, or otherwise, of hypercomputation %I %D 2004 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,computation and physical systems %U %0 Journal Article %A Bergadano, F. %T Machine learning and the foundations of inductive inference %I %D 1993 %B Minds and Machines %V 3 %N %P 31-51 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Beavers, A. F. %T Phenomenology and artificial intelligence %I %D 2002 %B Metaphilosophy %V 33 %N %P 70-82 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Button, G. %A Coulter, J. %A Lee, J. R. E. %A Sharrock, W. %T Computers, Minds, and Conduct %I Polity Press %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, A. %T Artificial intelligence %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Fetzer, J. H. %T Artificial Intelligence: Its Scope and Limits %I Kluwer %D 1990 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Gips, J. %T Toward the ethical robot %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Android Epistemology %E K. M. Ford %E C. Glymour %E P. Hayes %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Haugeland, J. %T Mind Design %I MIT Press %D 1981 %Z 12 papers on the foundations of AI and cognitive science. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Hayes, P. J. %A Ford, K. M. %A Adams-Webber, J. R. %T Human reasoning about artificial intelligence %I %D 1994 %B Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence %V 4 %N %P 247-63 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Krellenstein, M. %T A reply to `Parallel computation and the mind-body problem' %I %D 1987 %B Cognitive Science %V 11 %N %P 155-7 %Z Thagard 1986 is wrong: speed and the like make no fundamental difference. With Thagard's reply: it makes a difference in practice, if not in principle. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Lacey, N. %A Lee, M. %T The epistemological foundations of artificial agents. Minds and Machines 13:339-365. Lee, M. & Lacey, N. 2003. The influence of epistemology on the design of artificial agents %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 367-395 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Moody, T. C. %T Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence %I Prentice-Hall %D 1993 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Preston, B. %T AI, anthropocentrism, and the evolution of "intelligence." %I %D 1991 %B Minds and Machines %V 1 %N %P 259-277 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Robinson, W. S. %T Computers, Minds, and Robots %I Temple University Press %D 1992 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Russell, S. %T Inductive learning by machines %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 64 %N %P 37-64 %Z A nice paper on the relationship between techniques of theory formation from machine learning and philosophical problems of induction and knowledge. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Rychlak, J. F. %T Artificial Intelligence and Human Reason: A Teleological Critique %I Columbia University Press %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Schiaffonati, V. %T A framework for the foundation of the philosophy of artificial intelligence %I %D 2003 %B Minds and Machines %V 13 %N %P 537-552 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Sloman, A. %T The Computer Revolution in Philosophy %I Harvester %D 1978 %Z All about how the computer should change the way we think about the mind. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Sloman, A. %T The irrelevance of Turing machines to artificial intelligence %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Computationalism: New Directions %E M. Scheutz %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Thagard, P. %T Parallel computation and the mind-body problem %I %D 1986 %B Cognitive Science %V 10 %N %P 301-18 %Z Parallelism does make a difference. Some somewhat anti-functionalist points. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Thagard, P. %T Philosophy and machine learning %I %D 1990 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 261-76 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Thagard, P. %T Philosophical and computational models of explanation %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Studies %V 64 %N %P 87-104 %Z A comparison of philosophical and AI approaches to explanation: deductive, statistical, schematic, analogical, causal, and linguistic. -DJC %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book %A Winograd, T. %A Flores, F. %T Understanding Computers and Cognition %I Addison-Wesley %D 1987 %Z %K philosophy of artificial intelligence,philosophy of ai, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Bennett, J. %T Folk-psychological explanations %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B The Future of Folk Psychology %E J. Greenwood %Z On requirements for belief/desire explanations: input/output patterns, the unity condition (i.e. no single associated mechanism), and teleological bases for generalizations, e.g. through evolution or educability. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Bermudez, J. L. %T The domain of folk psychology %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B Minds and Persons %E A. O'Hear %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Blackburn, S. %T Theory, observation, and drama %I %D 1992 %B Mind and Language %V 7 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book %A Bogdan, R. G. %T Mind and Common Sense: Philosophical Essays on Commonsense Psychology %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book %A Bogdan, R. G. %T Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others %I MIT Press %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Botterill, G. %T Folk psychology and theoretical status %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %B Theories of Theories of Mind %E P. Carruthers %E P. Smith %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Folk psychology and the explanation of human behavior %I %D 1988 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 62 %N %P 209-21 %Z Folk psychology is a theory: defense against objections from logicality, softness of laws, practical function, behavior, and simulation. It needn't be a deductive-nomological theory; e.g. it might be based on prototypes. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T From folk psychology to naive psychology %I %D 1987 %B Cognitive Science %V 11 %N %P 139-54 %Z Folk psychology isn't all that bad. It survived evolution after all. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Collins, J. %T Theory of mind, logical form and eliminativism %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 465-490 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Two contrasts: Folk craft vs folk science and belief vs opinion %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B The Future of Folk Psychology %E J. Greenwood %Z FP is craft, not theory. Opinions rather than beliefs are interesting. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book %A Fletcher, G. %T The Scientific Credibility of Folk Psychology %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Fletcher, G. %T Two uses of folk psychology: Implications for psychological science %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 375-88 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Godfrey-Smith, P. %T On folk psychology and mental representation %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldman, A. %T The psychology of folk psychology %I %D 1992 %B 1992 %V %N %P %Z On the psychology of self-ascription of mental states. Functionalism has serious problems, as we don't have direct access to causal roles. Defends a qualia-based account, even for propositional attitudes. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Graham, G. %T The origins of folk psychology %I %D 1987 %B Inquiry %V 30 %N %P 357-79 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Graham, G. %A Horgan, T. %T How to be realistic about folk psychology %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 1 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book %A Greenwood, J. D. %T The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Heal, J. %T Joint attention and understanding the mind. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler, eds) Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Hutto, D. %T The limits of spectatorial folk psychology %I %D 2004 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 548-73 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Knobe, J. %T Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 16 %N %P 309-325 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Knowles, J. %T Is folk psychology different? %I %D 2002 %B Erkenntnis %V 57 %N %P 199-230 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Leon, M. %T The unnaturalness of the mental: The status of folk psychology %I %D 1998 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 36 %N %P 367-92 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Lycan, W. G. %T Folk psychology and its liabilities %I Pittsburgh University Press %D 1997 %B Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind %E M. Carrier %E P. Machamer %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Macdonald, C. %T Theories of mind and 'The commonsense view'. Mind and Language 17:467-488. Maibom, H. 2003. The mindreader and the scientist %I %D 2002 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 296-315 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book %A Malle, B. %T How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction %I MIT Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Margolis, J. %T The autonomy of folk psychology %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B The Future of Folk Psychology %E J. Greenwood %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A McDonough, R. %T A culturalist account of folk psychology %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B The Future of Folk Psychology %E J. Greenwood %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book %A Millar, A. %T Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book %A Morton, A. %T Frames of Mind %I Oxford University Press %D 1980 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Morton, A. %T The inevitability of folk psychology %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B Mind and Common Sense %E R. Bogdan %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Morton, A. %T Folk psychology is not a predictive device %I %D 1996 %B Mind %V 105 %N %P 119-37 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, D. %T Joint attention and common knowledge. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler, eds) Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Pettit, P. %T How the folk understand folk psychology %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 26-38 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Place, U. T. %T Folk psychology from the standpoint of conceptual analysis %I Sage Publications %D 1996 %B The Philosophy of Psychology %E W. O'Donahue %E R. Kitchener %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Pratt, I. %T Encoding psychological knowledge %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %B Machines and Thought %E P. Millican %E A. Clark %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Preston, J. M. %T Folk psychology as theory or practice? The case for eliminative materialism %I %D 1989 %B Inquiry %V 32 %N %P 277-303 %Z Defending the claim that folk psychology is an empirical pre-scientific theory, with its own laws. In a particular, a detailed reply to the criticisms in Wilkes 1984. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Robinson, W. S. %T Mild realism, causation, and folk psychology %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 167-87 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Sehon S. R. %T Natural kind terms and the status of folk psychology %I %D 1997 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 34 %N %P 333-44 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Sharpe, R. %T The very idea of a folk psychology %I %D 1987 %B Inquiry %V 30 %N %P 381-93 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Smith, B. C. %T Does science underwrite our folk psychology? %I Sage Publications %D 1996 %B The Philosophy of Psychology %E W. O'Donahue %E R. Kitchener %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Stemmer, N. %T A behaviorist account to theory and simulation theories of folk psychology %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 29-41 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T Intentional agency and the metarepresentation hypothesis %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 11-28 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %A Ravenscroft, R. %T What is folk psychology? %I %D 1994 %B Cognition %V 50 %N %P 447-68 %Z Distinguishes internal and external accounts of folk psychology (mechanisms vs systematizations), and various versions of each of these. Only some are compatible with eliminativist arguments. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. %A Nichols, S. %T Folk psychology %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book %A Stich, S. P. %T From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science %I MIT Press %D 1983 %Z Beliefs/desires are out, new Syntactic Theory is in. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A von Eckardt, B. %T The empirical naivete in the current philosophical conception of folk psychology %I Pittsburgh University Press %D 1997 %B Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind %E M. Carrier %E P. Machamer %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Weatherall, P. %T What do propositions measure in folk psychology? %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 9 %N %P 365-80 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilkes, K. V. %T Pragmatics in science and theory in common sense %I %D 1984 %B Inquiry %V 27 %N %P 339-61 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilkes, K. V. %T The relationship between scientific psychology and common-sense psychology %I %D 1991 %B Synthese %V 89 %N %P 15-39 %Z Common-sense psychology is no theory at all, and not in competition with scientific psychology. CSP is particular, rich, vague; SP is general, austere, precise. CSP will be neither subsumed nor eliminated by SP. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Book Section %A Wilkes, K. V. %T The long past and the short history %I Cambridge University Press %D 1991 %B Mind and Common Sense %E R. Bogdan %Z Argues that commonsense and scientific psychology are quite distinct in their aims, scope, framework, and nature, but have been confused by philosophy. With support from historical considerations. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the nature of folk psychology %U %0 Journal Article %A Bishop, M. A. %T The theory theory thrice over: The child as scientist, superscientist, or social institution? %I %D 2002 %B Studies in History and Philosophy of Science %V 33 %N %P 121-36 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Falvey, K. %T A natural history of belief %I %D 1999 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 80 %N %P 324-345 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Fine, A. %T Science as child's play: Tales from the crib %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P 534-37 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Glymour, C. %T Android epistemology for babies %I %D 2000 %B Synthese %V 122 %N %P 53-68 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gopnik, A. %T Developing the idea of intentionality: Children's theories of mind %I %D 1990 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 20 %N %P 89-114 %Z On the development of folk-psychological concepts in children. First the appearance/reality distinction, then more complex theories of perception, representation, and belief. Implications for the status of folk psychology. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gopnik, A. %A Wellman, H. %T Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory %I %D 1992 %B Mind and Language %V 7 %N %P 145-71 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gopnik, A. %A Wellman, H. M. %T Why the child's theory of mind really is a theory %I %D 1995 %B 1995 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gopnik, A. %T The scientist as child %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 63 %N %P 485-514 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gopnik, A. and Meltzoff, AN. %T Theories vs. modules: To the max and beyond. A reply to Poulin-Dubois and to Stich and Nichols %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 450-456 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Book Section %A Gopnik, A. %T The theory theory as an alternative to the innateness hypothesis %I Blackwell %D 2003 %B Chomsky and His Critics %E L. Antony %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gordon, R. M. %T Sellars's Rylean ancestors revisited %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 102-114 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Book Section %A Leslie, A. M. %A German, T. P. %T Knowledge and ability in "theory of mind": A one-eyed overview of a debate %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Mental Simulation %E M. Davies %E T. Stone %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Psychophysical and theoretical identifications %I %D 1972 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 50 %N %P 249-58 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwitzgebel, E. %T Theories in children and the rest of us %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 3 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Sellars, W. %T Empiricism and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1956 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 1 %N %P 253-329 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. %A Nichols, S. %T Theory theory to the max %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 421-449 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Book Section %A Zahavi, D. %T The embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to the theory-theory of mind %I John Benjamins %D 2004 %B The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness %E D. Zahavi %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the theory theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Adams, F. %T Empathy, neural imaging and the theory versus simulation debate %I %D 2001 %B Mind & Language %V 16 %N %P 368-392 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Bernier, P. %T From simulation to theory. In (J. Dokic & J %I %D 2002 %B 2002 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Campbell, J. %T Joint attention and simulation %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Child, W. %T Reply to 'Simulation theory and mental concepts' %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Currie, G. %T Visual imagery as the simulation of vision %I %D 1995 %B Mind and Language %V 10 %N %P 25-44 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Currie, G. %T Simulation-theory, theory-theory, and the evidence from autism %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %B Theories of Theories of Mind %E P. Carruthers %E P. Smith %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Currie, G. %A Ravenscroft, I. %T Mental simulation and motor imagery %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 161-80 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T The mental simulation debate %I Ridgeview %D 1992 %B Truth and Rationality %E E. Villanueva %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book %A Davies, M. %A Stone, T. %T Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications %I Blackwell %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %A Stone, T. %T Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Topics %V 29 %N %P 127-73 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Decety, J. %T Neurophysiological evidence for simulation and action %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Dokic, J. %T Reply to 'The scope and limit of mental simulation' %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book %A Dokic, J. %A Proust, J. %T Simulation and Knowledge of Action %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Fuller, G. %T Simulation and psychological concepts %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Mental Simulation %E M. Davies %E T. Stone %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gallagher, S. %T The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction? %I %D 2001 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 8 %N %P 83-108 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gallese, V. %T The 'shared manifold' hypothesis: From mirror neurons to empathy %I %D 2001 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 8 %N %P 33-50 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. %T Simulation and connectionism: What is the connection? %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 16 %N %P 499-515 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Gianfranco, S. %T Reply to 'From simulation to theory' %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldman, A. %T Interpretation psychologized %I %D 1989 %B Mind and Language %V 4 %N %P 161-85 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldman, A. %T In defense of the simulation theory %I %D 1992 %B Mind and Language %V 7 %N %P 104-119 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Goldman, A. %T Simulation and interpersonal utility %I MIT Press %D 1996 %B Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science %E L. May %E M. Friedman %E A. Clark %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldman, A. %T Folk psychology and mental concepts %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 4-25 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Goldman, A. %T Simulation theory and mental concepts %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldman, A. %T The mentalizing folk %I %D 2002 %B Protosociology %V 16 %N %P 7-34 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book %A Goldman, A. %T Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading %I Oxford University Press %D 2006 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gordon, R. M. %T Folk psychology as simulation %I %D 1986 %B Mind and Language %V 1 %N %P 158-71 %Z FP is a strategy for prediction via simulation; an ability, not a theory. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gordon, R. M. %T The simulation theory: objections and misconceptions %I %D 1992 %B Mind and Language %V 7 %N %P 11-34 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Gordon, R. M. %A Barker, J. A. %T Autism and the "theory of mind" debate %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychopathology %E G. Graham %E G. L. Stephens %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Gordon, R. M. %T Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Mental Simulation %E M. Davies %E T. Stone %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Gordon, R. M. %T Sympathy, simulation, and the impartial spectator %I MIT Press %D 1996 %B Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science %E L. May %E M. Friedman %E A. Clark %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Gordon, R. M. %T `Radical' simulationism %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %B Theories of Theories of Mind %E P. Carruthers %E P. Smith %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Greenwood, J. D. %T Simulation, theory-theory and cognitive penetration: No "instance of the fingerpost" %I %D 1999 %B Mind and Language %V 14 %N %P 32-56 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Heal, J. %T Replication and functionalism %I Cambridge University Press %D 1986 %B Language, Mind, and Logic %E J. Butterfield %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Heal, J. %T Simulation vs. theory-theory: What is at issue? %I Oxford University Press %D 1994 %B Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness %E C. Peacocke %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Heal, J. %T How to think about thinking %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Mental Simulation %E M. Davies %E T. Stone %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Heal, J. %T Simulation and cognitive penetrability %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 44-67 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Heal, J. %T Simulation, theory, and content %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %B Theories of Theories of Mind %E P. Carruthers %E P. Smith %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Heal, J. %T Co-cognition and off-line simulation: Two ways of understanding the simulation approach %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 477-498 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Heal, J. %T Other minds, rationality, and analogy %I %D 2000 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 74 %N %P 1-19 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Heal, J. %T Understanding other minds from the inside %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 39-55 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Hoerl, C. %T Reply to 'Neurophysiological evidence for simulation and action' %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Jacob, P. %T The scope and limit of mental simulation %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Jeannerod, M. %A Pacherie, E. %T Agency, simulation and self-identification %I %D 2004 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 113-146 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Kuhberger, A, Perner, J. %A Schulte, M. %A Leingruber, R. %T Choice or no choice: Is the Langer effect evidence against simulation? %I %D 1995 %B Mind and Language %V 10 %N %P 423-36 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A LeBar, M. %T Simulation, theory, and emotion %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 423-434 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Levin, J. %T Folk psychology and the simulationist challenge %I %D 1995 %B Acta Analytica %V 10 %N %P 77-100 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Ludwig, P. %T Reply to 'Can 'radical' simulation theories explain psychological concept acquisition?' In (J. Dokic & J. Proust, eds) Simulation and Knowledge of Action %I %D 2002 %B 2002 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Nichols, S. %A Stich, S. %A Leslie, A. %T Choice effects and the ineffectiveness of simulation %I %D 1995 %B Mind and Language %V 10 %N %P 437-45 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Nichols, S. %A Stich, S. %A Leslie, A. %A Klein, D. %T Varieties of off-line simulation %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %B Theories of Theories of Mind %E P. Carruthers %E P. Smith %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Nichols, S. %A Stich, S. %T Rethinking co-cognition: A reply to Heal %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 499-512 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Pacherie, E. %T Reply to 'Joint attention and simulaton' %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Pelletier, J. %T Reply to 'Varieties of simulation' %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Perner, J. %T The necessity and impossibility of simulation %I Oxford University Press %D 1994 %B Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness %E C. Peacocke %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Perner, J. %T Simulation as explicitation of predication-implicit knowledge about the mind: Arguments for a simulation-theory mix %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %B Theories of Theories of Mind %E P. Carruthers %E P. Smith %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Proust, J. %T Can 'radical' simulation theories explain psychological concept acquisition? %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Pust, J. %T External accounts of folk psychology, eliminativism, and the simulation theory %I %D 1999 %B Mind and Language %V 14 %N %P 113-130 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Ravenscroft, I. %T Simulation, collapse and Humean motivation. Mind and Language 18:162-174. Recanati, F. 2002. Varieties of simulation %I John Benjamins %D 2003 %B Simulation and Knowledge of Action %E J. Dokic %E J. Proust %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Saxe, R. %T Against simulation: The argument from error %I %D 2005 %B Trends in Cognitive Sciences %V 9 %N 4 %P 174-79 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Sharpe, R. A. %T One cheer for the simulation theory %I %D 1997 %B Inquiry %V 40 %N %P 115-31 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %A Nichols, S. %T Folk psychology: simulation or tacit theory? %I %D 1993 %B Mind and Language %V 7 %N %P 35-71 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Stich, S. P. %A Nichols, S. %T Second thoughts on simulation %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Mental Simulation %E M. Davies %E T. Stone %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %A Nichols, S. %T Cognitive penetrability, rationality, and restricted simulation %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 297-326 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Stone, T. %A Davies, M. %T The mental simulation debate: A progress report %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %B Theories of Theories of Mind %E P. Carruthers %E P. Smith %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilkerson, W. S. %T Simulation, theory, and the frame problem: the interpretive moment %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 141-153 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Journal Article %A Wringe, B. %T Simulation, co-cognition, and the attribution of emotional states %I %D 2003 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 11 %N %P 353-374 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, the simulation theory %U %0 Book Section %A Andrews, K. %T Knowing mental states: The asymmetry of psychological prediction and explanation %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives %E Q. Smith %E A. Jokic %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Arkway, A. %T The simulation theory, the theory theory and folk psychological explanation %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Studies %V 98 %N %P 115-137 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Carruthers, P. %T Simulation and self-knowledge: A defence of the theory-theory %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %B Theories of Theories of Mind %E P. Carruthers %E P. Smith %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Book %A Carruthers, P. %A Smith, P. %T Theories of Theories of Mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Cruz, J. L. H. %T Mindreading: Mental state ascription and cognitive architecture %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 323-340 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Currie, G. %T Pretence, pretending, and metarepresenting %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 35-55 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Book %A Davies, M. %A Stone, T. %T Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate %I Blackwell %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Freeman, N. H. %T Theories of mind in collision: Plausibility and authority %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Mental Simulation %E M. Davies %E T. Stone %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Book %A Eilan, N. %A Hoerl, C. %A McCormack, T. %A Roessler, J. %T Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds %I Oxford University Press %D 2005 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Eilan, N. %T Joint attention, communication, and mind. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler, eds) Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Henderson, D. %T Simulation theory versus theory theory: A difference without a difference in explanations %I %D 1996 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 34 %N %P 65-93 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %T All that can be at issue in the theory-theory/simulation debate %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Papers %V 28 %N %P 77-96 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Book %A Nichols, S. %A Stich, S. %T Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Peacocke, C. %T Joint attention: Its nature, reflexivity, and relation to common knowledge %I Oxford University Press %D 2005 %B Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds %E N. Eilan %E C. Hoerl %E T. McCormack %E J. Roessler %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Perner, J. %A Gschaider, A. %A Kuhberger, A. %A Schrofner, S. %T Predicting others through simulation or by theory? A method to decide %I %D 1999 %B Mind and Language %V 14 %N %P 57-79 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Ruffman, T. %T Do children understand the mind by means of a simulation or a theory? Evidence from their understanding of inference %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 388-414 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Scholl, B. J. %A Leslie, A. M. %T Modularity, development and "theory of mind %I %D 1999 %B " Mind and Language %V 14 %N %P 131-153 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,folk psychology and theory of mind, theory of mind, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, L. %T Empty heads? %I %D 2001 %B Mind and Language %V 16 %N %P 193-214 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ariew, A. %T Innateness and canalization %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science Supplement %V 63 %N %P 19-27 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Atherton, M. %A Schwarz, R. %T Linguistic innateness and its evidence %I %D 1974 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 71 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Chomsky, N. %T Recent contributions to the theory of innate ideas %I %D 1967 %B Synthese %V 17 %N %P 2-11 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Chomsky, N. %T Linguistics and philosophy %I New York University Press %D 1969 %B Language and Philosophy %E S. Hook %Z Reply to Putnam 1967: Putnam underestimates complexity of grammar, etc. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Chomsky, N. %T On cognitive capacity %I %D 1975 %B Reflections on Language %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Chomsky, N. %T Discussion of Putnam's comments %I Harvard University Press %D 1980 %B Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky %E M. Piattelli-Palmarini %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Chomsky, N. %A Fodor, J. A. %T The inductivist fallacy %I Harvard University Press %D 1980 %B Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky %E M. Piattelli-Palmarini %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. S. %T Fodor on language learning %I %D 1978 %B Synthese %V 38 %N %P 149-59 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Collins, J. %T Cowie on the poverty of stimulus %I %D 2003 %B Synthese %V 136 %N %P 159-190 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cowie, F. %T The logical problem of language acquisition %I %D 1997 %B Synthese %V 111 %N %P 17-51 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book %A Cowie, F. %T What's Within? %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cowie, F. %T Mad dog nativism %I %D 1998 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 49 %N %P 227-252 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cowie, F. %T On cussing in church: in defense of What's Within? %I %D 2001 %B Mind and Language %V 16 %N %P 231-245 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, D. D. %T Evidence for the innateness of deontic reasoning %I %D 1996 %B Mind and Language %V 11 %N %P 160-90 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A De Rosa, R. %T On Fodor's claim that classical empiricists and rationalists agree on the innateness of ideas %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 240-269 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Harman, G. %T Linguistic competence and empiricism %I New York University Press %D 1969 %B Language and Philosophy %E S. Hook %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %A Bever, T. %A Garrett, M. %T The specificity of language skills %I %D 1974 %B The Psychology of Language %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Doing without What's Within: Fiona Cowie's critique of nativism %I %D 2001 %B Mind %V 110 %N %P 99-148 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Reply to Putnam %I Harvard University Press %D 1980 %B Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky %E M. Piattelli-Palmarini %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T The present status of the innateness controversy %I %D 1981 %B Representations %Z Concepts are undefinable, so primitive, so innate (plus gloss). -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T On the impossibility of acquiring `more powerful' structures %I Harvard University Press %D 1980 %B Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky %E M. Piattelli-Palmarini %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnson, K. %T Gold's theorem and cognitive science %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy of Science %V 70 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Katz, J. %T Innate ideas %I %D 1966 %B The Philosophy of Language %Z Overview; poverty of stimulus, unobservable features => rationalism. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book %A Katz, J. %T Realistic Rationalism %I MIT Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Kaye, L. J. %T Are most of our concepts innate? %I %D 1993 %B Synthese %V 2 %N %P 187-217 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Khalidi, M. A. %T Innateness and domain-specificity %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Studies %V 105 %N %P 191-210 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Khalidi, M. A. %T Nature and nurture in cognition %I %D 2002 %B The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 53 %N %P 251-272 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Laurence, S. %A Margolis, E. %T The poverty of the stimulus argument %I %D 2001 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 52 %N %P 217-276 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Laurence, S. %A Margolis, E. %T Radical concept nativism %I %D 2003 %B Cognition %V 86 %N %P 25-55 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Lidz, J. %A Waxman, S. %T Reaffirming the poverty of the stimulus argument: A reply to the replies %I %D 2004 %B Cognition %V 93 %N %P 157-165 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book %A Marcus, G. %T Birth of the Mind: How a Tiny Number of Genes Creates the Complexity of Human Thought %I Basic Books %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, R. J. %T Cowie's anti-nativism %I %D 2001 %B Mind and Language %V 16 %N %P 215-230 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book %A Mehler, J. %A Fox, R. %T Neonate Cognition: Beyond the Blooming Buzzing Confusion %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1985 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book %A Piattelli-Palmarini, M. %T Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky %I Harvard University Press %D 1980 %Z An excellent collection of papers & responses by Piaget, Chomsky and others. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Piattelli-Palmarini, M. %T The rise of selective theories: A case study and some lessons from immunology %I Ablex %D 1986 %B Language Learning and Concept Acquisition %E W. Demopoulos %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Piattelli-Palmarini, M. %T Evolution, selection, and cognition: From learning to parameter setting in biology and in the study of language %I %D 1989 %B Cognition %V 31 %N %P 1-44 %Z Why learning is selective and not instructive. Biological analogies, linguistic evidence. Dispense with "learning" as a scientific term. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Pitt, D. %T Nativism and the theory of content %I %D 2000 %B Protosociology %V 14 %N %P 222-239 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Putnam, H. %T The `Innateness Hypothesis' and explanatory models in linguistics %I %D 1967 %B Synthese %V 17 %N %P 12-22 %Z Contra nativism: disputes (1) surprising universals (2) explanation of universals (3) ease of learning (4) relevance of IQ-independence. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T What is innate and why %I Harvard University Press %D 1980 %B Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky %E M. Piattelli-Palmarini %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Comments on Chomsky's and Fodor's replies %I Harvard University Press %D 1980 %B Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky %E M. Piattelli-Palmarini %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Quartz, S. %T Innateness and the brain %I %D 2003 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 13-40 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Ramsey, W. %A Stich, S. P. %T Connectionism and three levels of nativism %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 177-205 %Z Identifies minimal nativism vs anti-empiricism vs rationalism. Considers the relevance of connectionist networks. Some nativist arguments may survive. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Samet, J. %T Troubles with Fodor's nativism %I %D 1986 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 10 %N %P 575-594 %Z Concepts can be acquired without being learned by symbol-manipulation. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book Section %A Samet, J. %A Flanagan, O. J. %T Innate representations %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Rerepresentation %E S. Silvers %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sampson, G. %T Linguistic universals as evidence for empiricism %I %D 1978 %B 1978 %V %N %P %Z Explain universals via Popper/Simon empirical model. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Samuels, R. %T What brains won't tell us about the mind: A critique of the neurobiological argument against representational nativism %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 548-570 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Samuels, R. %T Nativism in cognitive science. Mind and Language 17:233-65. Samuels, R. 2004. Innateness in cognitive science %I %D 2002 %B Trends in Cognitive Science %V 8 %N %P 136-141 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwartz, R. %T Is mathematical competence innate? %I %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Science %V 62 %N %P 227-40 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T Fodor's nativism %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Studies %V 55 %N %P 119-41 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Book %A Stich, S. P. %T Innate Ideas %I University of California Press %D 1975 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Between Chomskian rationalism and Popperian empiricism %I %D 1979 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 30 %N %P 329-47 %Z Can take middle ground. Anti-empiricism doesn't imply rationalism. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Viger, C. %T Learning to think: A response to the language of thought argument for innateness %I %D 2005 %B Mind and Language %V 20 %N %P 313-25 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, nativism %U %0 Journal Article %A Appelbaum, I. %T Fodor, modularity, and speech perception %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 317-330 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Book Section %A Arbib, M. %T Modularity, schemas and neurons: A critique of Fodor %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Computers, Brains and Minds %E P. Slezak %Z Against Fodor: modules are smaller, interact strongly, not domain-specific. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Atkinson, A. %A Wheeler, M. %T The grain of domains: The evolutionary-psychological case against domain-general cognition %I %D 2004 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 147-176 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Barrett, H. C. %T Enzymatic computation and cognitive modularity %I %D 2005 %B Mind and Language %V 20 %N %P 259-87 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Bennett, L. J. %T Modularity of mind revisited %I %D 1990 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 41 %N %P 429-36 %Z Remarks on Shanon and Fodor. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Browne, D. %T Cognitive versatility %I %D 1996 %B Minds and Machines %V 6 %N %P 507-23 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Bruner, J. %T On perceptual readiness %I %D 1957 %B Psychological Review %V 65 %N %P 14-21 %Z Overview of the original studies on top-down effects in perception. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Cam, P. %T Modularity, rationality, and higher cognition %I %D 1988 %B Philosophical Studies %V 53 %N %P 279-94 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Cam, P. %T Insularity and the persistence of perceptual illusion %I %D 1990 %B Analysis %V 50 %N %P 231-5 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Book Section %A Carruthers, P. %T Moderately massive modularity %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B Mind and Persons %E A. O'Hear %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Carruthers, P. %T Practical reasoning in a modular mind %I %D 2004 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 259-278 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Chien, A. J. %T Why the mind may not be modular %I %D 1996 %B Minds and Machines %V 6 %N %P 1-32 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Book %A Churchland, P. M. %T Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 1979 %Z Our perception is deeply theory-laden, and potentially very plastic. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor %I %D 1988 %B Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P 167-87 %Z Contra Fodor 1984: observation is theory-laden (built-in or not); supported by neurophysiological evidence; perceptual systems have long-term plasticity. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Collins, J. %T Faculty disputes %I %D 2005 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 503-33 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Collins, J. %T On the input problem for massive modularity %I %D 2005 %B Minds and Machines %V 15 %N %P 1-22 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Currie, G. %A Sterelny, K. %T How to think about the modularity of mind-reading %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 50 %N %P 145-160 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Book %A Currie, G. %A Ravenscroft, I. %T Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A DesAutels, P. %T Two types of theories: The impact of Churchland's perceptual plasticity %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 8 %N %P 25-33 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Book %A Fodor, J. A. %T The Modularity of Mind %I MIT Press %D 1983 %Z Perception happens in informationally encapsulated, domain-specific modules. Central systems aren't encapsulated, and so may be impossible to understand. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Precis of The modularity of mind %I %D 1985 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 8 %N %P 1-42 %Z Summary of MOM (with commentary and reply in the BBS printing). -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T The modularity of mind %I Ablex %D 1986 %B Meaning and Cognitive Structure %E Z. Pylyshyn %Z Informal discussion of modularity. With commentaries by Fahlman, Caplan. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Observation reconsidered %I %D 1984 %B Philosophy of Science %V 51 %N %P 23-43 %Z Argues for an observation/theory distinction, and against belief affecting perception. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T A reply to Churchland's `Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality' %I %D 1988 %B Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P 188-98 %Z Churchland is up the creek without a paddle. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Why should the mind be modular? %I Blackwell %D 1989 %B Reflections on Chomsky %E A. George %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Book %A Garfield, J. %T Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding %I MIT Press %D 1987 %Z A collection of papers on modularity in language and vision. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Gray, R. %T Cognitive modules, synaesthesia and the constitution of psychological natural kinds %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 65-82 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Meyering, T. C. %T Fodor's modularity: A new name for an old dilemma %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 39-62 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Mameli, M. %T Modules and mindreaders %I %D 2002 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 16 %N %P 377-93 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Okasha, S. %T Fodor on cognition, modularity, and adaptationism %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy of Science %V 70 %N %P 68-88 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Olsson, E. %T Coherence and the modularity of mind %I %D 1997 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 75 %N %P 404-11 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Parsell, M. %T Context-sensitive inference, modularity, and the assumption of formal processing %I %D 2005 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 18 %N %P 45-58 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. %T Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception %I %D 1999 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 22 %N %P 341-365 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Rollins, M. %T Deep plasticity: The encoding approach to perceptual change %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy of Science %V 61 %N %P 39-54 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Ross, J. %T Against postulating central systems in the mind %I %D 1990 %B Philosophy of Science %V 57 %N %P 297-312 %Z Fodor's arguments for unencapsulated central systems are no good; AI is possible after all. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Shanon, B. %T Remarks on the modularity of mind %I %D 1988 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 39 %N %P 331-52 %Z Criticism of Fodor. Modularity is dynamic, and can be central. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Turvey, M. T. %A Shaw, R. E. %A Reed, E. S. %A Mace, W. M. %T Ecological laws of perceiving and acting: In Reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn %I %D 1981 %B Cognition %V 9 %N %P 237-304 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Ullman, S. %T Against direct perception %I %D 1980 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 3 %N %P 333-81 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Vaina, L. M. %T What and where in the human visual system: Two hierarchies of visual modules %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 83 %N %P 49-91 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, modularity %U %0 Journal Article %A Ariew, A. %T Natural selection doesn't work that way: Jerry Fodor vs. evolutionary psychology on gradualism and saltationism %I %D 2003 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 478-483 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Atran, S. %T Adaptationism for human cognition: Strong, spurious, or weak? %I %D 2005 %B Mind and Language %V 20 %N %P 39-67 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Atkinson, A. P. %A Wheeler, M. %T The grain of domains: The evolutionary-psychological case against domain-general cognition %I %D 2004 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 147-76 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Atkinson, A. P. %A Wheeler, M. %T Evolutionary psychology's grain problem and the cognitive neuroscience of reasoning %I Psychology Press %D 2003 %B Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate %E D. Over %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Barkow, J. %A Cosmides, L. %A Tooby, J. %T The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Bergstrom, C. %A Godfrey-Smith, P. %T On the evolution of behavioral complexity in individuals and populations %I %D 1998 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 13 %N %P 205-31 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Buller, D. J. %T DeFreuding evolutionary psychology: Adaptation and human motivation %I MIT Press %D 1999 %B Where Biology Meets Philosophy %E V. Hardcastle %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Buller, D. J. %T A guided tour of evolutionary psychology %I %D 2000 %B 2000 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Buller, D. J. %T Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for Human Nature %I MIT Press %D 2005 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Buller, D. J. %T Evolutionary psychology: The emperor's new paradigm %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Buller, D. J. %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: Against promiscuous modularity %I %D 2000 %B Brain and Mind %V 1 %N %P 307-25 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Buss, D. M. %T Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind %I Allyn and Bacon %D 1999 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Calvin, W. %T A Brief History of the Mind: From Apes to Intellect and Beyond %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Cosmides, L. %A Tooby, J. %T From evolution to behavior: Evolutionary psychology as the missing link %I MIT Press %D 1987 %B The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality %E J. Dupre %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Cosmides, L. %A Tooby, J. %T Beyond intuition and instinct blindness: Toward an evolutionary rigorous cognitive science %I %D 1994 %B Cognition %V 50 %N %P 41-77 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, D. D. %A Cummins, R. %T Biological preparedness and evolutionary explanation %I %D 1999 %B Cognition %V 73 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, P. S. %T The conflict of evolutionary psychology %I MIT Press %D 1999 %B Where Biology Meets Psychology %E V. Hardcastle %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Downes, S. %T Some recent developments in evolutionary approaches to the study of human cognition and behavior %I %D 2002 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 16 %N %P 575-94 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Ferguson, S. %T Methodology in evolutionary psychology %I %D 2002 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 17 %N %P 635-50 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Forster, M. %A Shapiro, L. %T Prediction and accommodation in evolutionary psychology %I %D 2000 %B Psychological Inquiry %V 11 %N %P 31-33 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Franks, B. %T The role of "the environment" in cognitive and evolutionary psychology %I %D 2005 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 18 %N %P 59-82 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Gerrans, P. %T The theory of mind module in evolutionary psychology %I %D 2002 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 17 %N %P 305-21 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Godfrey-Smith, P. %T Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Godfrey-Smith, P. %T On the evolution of representational and interpretive capacities %I %D 2002 %B Monist %V 85 %N %P 50-69 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Godfrey-Smith, P. %T Environmental complexity and the evolution of cognition %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 2002 %B The Evolution of Intelligence %E R. Sternberg and J. Kaufman %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Grantham, T. A. %A Nichols, S. %T Evolutionary psychology: Ultimate explanations and Panglossian predictions %I MIT Press %D 1999 %B Where Biology Meets Psychology %E V. Hardcastle %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays %I MIT Press %D 1999 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Humphrey, N. %T The Inner Eye: Social Intelligence in Evolution %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Humphrey, N. %T The Mind Made Flesh: Essays from the Frontiers of Psychology and Evolution %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Levy, N. %T Evolutionary psychology, human universals, and the standard social science model %I %D 2004 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 459-72 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Lloyd, E. A. %T Evolutionary psychology: The burdens or proof %I %D 1999 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 14 %N %P 211-33 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Mameli, M. %T Mindreading, mindshaping, and evolution %I %D 2002 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 16 %N %P 595-626 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Over, D. %T The rationality of evolutionary psychology %I Clarendon %D 2002 %B Reason and Nature %E J. Bermudez and A. Millar %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Pinker, S. %A Bloom, P. %T Natural language and natural selection %I %D 1990 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 13 %N %P 707-27 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Plantinga, A. %T Evolution, epiphenomenalism, reductionism %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 68 %N %P 602-619 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Plotkin, H. %T Evolution and the human mind: How far can we go? %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Evolution, Naturalism and Mind %E D. Walsh %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Radcliffe Richards, J. %T Human Nature after Darwin: A Philosophical Introduction %I Routledge %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Scher, S. J. %A Rauscher, F. %T Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Perspectives %I Kluwer %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Shapiro, L. %A Epstein, W. %T Evolutionary theory meets cognitive psychology: A more selective perspective %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 171-94 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Shapiro, L. %T Mind the adaptation %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Evolution, Naturalism and Mind %E D. Walsh %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Sperber, D. %T Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach %I Oxford: Basil Blackwell %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Sterelny, K. %T Thought in a Hostile World %I Blackwell %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Sterelny, K. %T Darwinian concepts in the philosophy of mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B The Cambridge Companion to Darwin %E J. Hodges %E G. Radick %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Stotz, K. C. %A Griffiths, P. E. %T Dancing in the dark: Evolutionary psychology and the argument from design %I Kluwer %D 2002 %B Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Approaches %E S. Scher %E F. Rauscher %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Tooby, J. %A Cosmides, L. %T Evolutionizing the cognitive sciences: A reply to Shapiro and Epstein %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 195-204 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Walsh, D. M. %T Naturalism, Evolution and the Mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Weber, B. %A Depew, D. %T Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered %I MIT Press %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Wheeler, M. %A Atkinson, A. P. %T Domains, brains and evolution %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Evolution, Naturalism and Mind %E D. Walsh %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, D. S. %A Dietrich, E. %A Clark, A. B. %T On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychology %I %D 2003 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 669-81 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book %A Wright, R. %T The Moral Animal %I Pantheon Books %D 1994 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, evolution of cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Bermudez, J. %T Rationality and psychological explanation without language %I Clarendon %D 2002 %B Reason and Nature %E J. Bermudez and A. Millar %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T Imagining objects and imagining experiences %I %D 2002 %B Mind and Language %V 17 %N %P 426-455 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Biro, J. %A Ludwig, K. %T Are there more than minimal a priori limits on irrationality? %I %D 1994 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 72 %N %P 89-102 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book Section %A Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. %T The rational analysis of human cognition %I Clarendon %D 2002 %B Reason and Nature %E J. Bermudez and A. Millar %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Cherniak, C. %T Minimal Rationality %I MIT Press %D 1986 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Cherniak, C. %T Minimal rationality %I %D 1981 %B Mind %V 90 %N %P 161-83 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Cherniak, C. %T Rationality and the structure of memory %I %D 1983 %B Synthese %V 57 %N %P 163-86 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Cohen, L. J. %T On the psychology of prediction: Whose is the fallacy? %I %D 1979 %B Cognition %V 7 %N %P 385-407 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Cohen, L. J. %T Whose is the fallacy? A rejoinder to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky %I %D 1980 %B Cognition %V 8 %N %P 89-92 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Cohen, L. J. %T Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated? %I %D 1981 %B 1981 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Cohen, L. J. %T The Dialogue of Reason %I Cambridge University Press %D 1986 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Cook, K. S. %A Levi, M. %T The Limits of Rationality %I University of Chicago Press %D 1990 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Davidson, D. %T Incoherence and irrationality %I %D 1985 %B Dialectica %V 39 %N %P 345-54 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Davidson, D. %T Could there be a science of rationality? %I %D 1995 %B International Journal of Philosophical Studies %V 3 %N %P 1-16 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Feldman, R. %T Rationality, reliability, and natural selection %I %D 1988 %B Philosophy of Science %V 55 %N %P 218-27 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Fetzer, J. H. %T Evolution, rationality and testability %I %D 1990 %B Synthese %V 82 %N %P 423-39 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Gardner, S. %T Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis %I Cambridge University Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book Section %A Gibbard, A. %T Normative explanations: Invoking rationality to explain happenings %I Clarendon %D 2002 %B Reason and Nature %E J. Bermudez and A. Millar %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Harman, G. %T Change in View %I MIT Press %D 1986 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Holt, L. %T Rationality is still hard work: Some further notes on the disruptive effects of deliberation %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 12 %N %P 215-219 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Kahneman, D. %A Slovic, P. %A Tversky, A. %T Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases %I Cambridge University Press %D 1982 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Kahneman, D. %A Tversky, A. %T On the interpretation of intuitive probability: A reply to Jonathan Cohen %I %D 1979 %B Cognition %V 7 %N %P 409-11 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Kelly, T. %T The rationality of belief and other propositional attitudes %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 110 %N %P 163-96 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book Section %A Levi, I. %T Commitment and change of view %I Clarendon %D 2002 %B Reason and Nature %E J. Bermudez and A. Millar %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book Section %A Lowe, E. %T The rational and the real: Some doubts about the programme of 'Rational analysis' %I Clarendon %D 2002 %B Reason and Nature %E J. Bermudez and A. Millar %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Manktelow, K. %A Over, D. %T Reasoning and rationality %I %D 1987 %B Mind and Language %V 2 %N %P 199-219 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book Section %A Matthen, M. %T Human rationality and the unique origin constraint %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Functions %E A. Ariew %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Mele, A. R. %T Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control %I Oxford University Press %D 1987 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Millar, A. %T Rationality and higher-order intentionality %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy Supplement %V 49 %N %P 179-198 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Nisbett, R. %A Ross, L. %T Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment %I Prentice-Hall %D 1980 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Nozick, R. %T The Nature of Rationality %I Princeton University Press %D 1993 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Papineau, D. %T The Roots of Reason: Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution, and Probability %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Reiner, R. %T Arguments against the possibility of perfect rationality %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 373-89 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Rust, J. %T Delusions, irrationality, and cognitive science %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Searle, J. %T Rationality in Action %I MIT Press %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Scholl, B. J. %T Reasoning, rationality, and architectural resolution %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 10 %N %P 451-470 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Scott-Kakures, D. %T Self-deception and internal irrationality %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 31-56 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Sober, E. %T The evolution of rationality %I %D 1981 %B Synthese %V 46 %N %P 95-120 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Sosa, E. %A Galloway, D. %T Man the rational animal? %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 122 %N %P 165-78 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Stein, E. %T Rationality and reflective equilibrium %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 99 %N %P 137-72 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book %A Stein, E. %T Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science %I Oxford University Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Could man be an irrational animal? %I %D 1985 %B Synthese %V 64 %N %P 115-35 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Book Section %A Wason, P. %T Reasoning %I Penguin %D 1966 %B New Horizons in Psychology %E Foss %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, rationality %U %0 Journal Article %A Agre, P. %T Computation and embodied agency %I %D 1995 %B Informatica %V 19 %N %P 527-35 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Ballard, D. %T Animate vision %I %D 1991 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 48 %N %P 57-86 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Beer, R. %T A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction %I %D 1995 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 72 %N %P 173-215 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book %A Bermudez, J. L. %A Marcel, A. %A Eilan, N. %T The Body and the Self %I MIT Press %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Buckley, J. %A Hall, L. %T Self-knowledge and embodiment %I %D 1999 %B Southwest Philosophy Review %V 15 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book Section %A Cassam, Q. %T Introspection and bodily self-ascription %I MIT Press %D 1995 %B The Body and the Self %E J. Bermudez %E A. Marcel %E N. Eilan %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Cassam, Q. %T Representing bodies %I %D 2002 %B Ratio %V 15 %N %P 315-334 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book Section %A Chrisley, R. L. %T Taking embodiment seriously: Nonconceptual content and robotics %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Android Epistemology %E K. M. Ford %E C. Glymour %E P. Hayes %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Being there: Why implementation matters to cognitive science %I %D 1987 %B AI Review %V 1 %N %P 231-44 %Z On the importance of embodiment of systems in cognition. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Moving minds: Situating content in the service of real-time success %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 89-104 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book %A Clark, A. %T Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again %I MIT Press %D 1997 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, A. %T Embodiment and the philosophy of mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 1997 %B Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind %E A. O'Hear %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %A Chalmers, D. J. %T The extended mind %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 7-19 %Z Advocates a sort of "active externalism", based on the role of the environment in actively driving cognition. Beliefs can extend into an agent's immediate environment (e.g. a notebook) in this way. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T Reasons, robots and the extended mind %I %D 2001 %B Mind and Language %V 16 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, A. %T Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence. Oxford University Press. Clark, A. 2004. Embodiment and the philosophy of mind %I John Benjamins %D 2003 %B Mind and Causality %E A. Peruzzi %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Cussins, A. %T Content, embodiment, and objectivity: The theory of cognitive trails %I %D 1992 %B Mind %V 101 %N %P 651-88 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book %A Gibson, J. J. %T The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception %I Houghton Mifflin %D 1979 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book Section %A Haugeland, J. %T Mind embodied and embedded %I Academia Sinica %D 1993 %B Mind and Cognition:1993 International Symposium %E Y. Houng %E J. Ho %Z Argues that the mind is not just embedded but intimately intermingled with the world. With some systems-theoretic arguments arguing against a determinate interface. Mind is not an inner realm. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book %A Hendriks-Jansen, H. %T Catching Ourselves in the Act: Situated Activity, Interactive Emergence, Evolution, and Human Thought %I MIT Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book %A Hutchins, E. %T Cognition in the Wild %I MIT Press %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book %A Johnson, M. L. %T The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason %I University of Chicago Press %D 1987 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnson, M. L. %T Incarnate mind %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 533-45 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Loren, L. A. %A Dietrich, E. %T Merleau-Ponty, embodied cognition, and the problem of intentionality %I %D 1997 %B Cybernetics and Systems %V 28 %N %P 345-58 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Losonsky, M. %T Emdedded systems vs. individualism %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P 357-71 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book %A McClamrock, R. %T Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World %I University of Chicago Press %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosenschein, S. J. %A Kaelbling, L. P. %T A situated view of representation and control %I %D 1995 %B Artificial Intelligence %V 73 %N %P 149-73 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book Section %A van Gelder, T. %T The distinction between mind and cognition %I Academia Sinica %D 1993 %B Mind and Cognition: 1993 International Symposium %E Y. Houng %E J. Ho %Z Argues against the contemporary "Cartesian" view of mind as an ontologically homogeneous inner representational realm that causes behavior, arguing for a holistic embodied view instead. Mind is therefore safe from elimination. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book %A Varela, F. %A Thompson, E. %A Rosch, E. %T The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience %I MIT Press %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Vera, A. H. %A Simon, H. A. %T Situated action: A symbolic interpretation %I %D 1993 %B Cognitive Science %V 17 %N %P 7-48 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Wells, A. %T Situated action, symbol systems and universal computation %I %D 1996 %B Minds & Machines %V 6 %N %P 33-46 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilkerson, W. S. %T From bodily motions to bodily intentions: the perception of bodily activity %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 12 %N %P 61-77 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Journal Article %A Zhang, J. %A Norman, D. %T Representations in distributed cognitive tasks %I %D 1994 %B Cognitive Science %V 18 %N %P 87-122 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, embodiment %U %0 Book Section %A Allen, C. %T Animal cognition and animal minds %I Pittsburgh University Press %D 1997 %B Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind %E M. Carrier %E P. Machamer %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Allen, C. %T Animal concepts revisited: the use of self-monitoring as an empirical approach %I %D 1999 %B Erkenntnis %V 51 %N %P 537-544 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Allen, C. %T Is anyone a cognitive ethologist? %I %D 2004 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 589-607 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Allen, C. %A Bekoff, M. %T On aims and methods of cognitive ethology %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1992 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Allen, C. %A Bekoff, M. %T Cognitive ethology and the intentionality of animal behavior %I %D 1995 %B Mind and Language %V 10 %N %P 313-328 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Allen, C. %A Bekoff, M. %T Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology %I MIT Press %D 1997 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Allen, C. %A Hauser, M. %T Concept attribution in nonhuman animals: Theoretical and methodological problems in ascribing complex mental processes %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy of Science %V 58 %N %P 221-40 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Bateson, P. P. G. %A Klopfer, P. H. %T Perspectives in Ethology, Volume 9: Human Understanding and Animal Awareness %I Plenum Press %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Beer, C. G. %T Conceptual issues in cognitive ethology %I %D 1992 %B Advances in the Study of Behavior %V 21 %N %P 69-109 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Bekoff, M. %A Jamieson, D. %T Readings in Animal Cognition %I MIT Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Bekoff, M. %T Social cognition: Exchanging and sharing information on the run %I %D 1999 %B Erkenntnis %V 51 %N %P 617-632 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Bermudez, J. L. %T Thinking Without Words %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Bermudez, J. L. %T Ascribing thoughts to non-linguistic creatures %I %D 2003 %B Facta Philosophica %V 5 %N %P 313-34 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Cheney, D. L. %A Seyfarth, R. M. %T How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species %I University of Chicago Press %D 1990 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Clark, S. R. L. %T The description and evaluation of animal emotion %I Blackwell %D 1987 %B Mindwaves %E C. Blakemore %E S. Greenfield %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Cockburn, D. %T Human beings and giant squids (on ascribing human sensations and emotions to non-human creatures) %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy %V 69 %N %P 135-50 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Crisp, R. %T Evolution and psychological unity %I MIT Press %D 1996 %B Readings in Animal Cognition %E M. Bekoff %E D. Jamieson %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Davidson, D. %T Rational animals %I %D 1982 %B Dialectica %V 36 %N %P 317-28 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Dawkins, M. S. %T Minding and mattering %I Blackwell %D 1987 %B Mindwaves %E C. Blakemore %E S. Greenfield %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Dawkins, M. S. %T From an animal's point of view: Motivation, fitness, and animal welfare %I %D 1990 %B 1990 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The `Panglossian paradigm' defended %I %D 1983 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 6 %N %P 343-90 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Cognitive ethology: Hunting for bargains or a wild goose chase? %I Unwin Hyman %D 1989 %B Goals, No-Goals and Own Goals %E Montefiore %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Do animals have beliefs? %I MIT Press %D 1995 %B Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science %E H. Roitblat %E J. Meyer %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Dennett, D. C. %T Kinds of Minds %I Basic Books %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Dreckmann, F. %T Animal beliefs and their contents %I %D 1999 %B Erkenntnis %V 51 %N %P 597-615 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Dupre, J. %T The mental lives of nonhuman animals %I MIT Press %D 1996 %B Readings in Animal Cognition %E M. Bekoff %E D. Jamieson %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Fellows, R. %T Animal belief %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy %V 75 %N %P 587-599 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Gaita, R. %T Animal thoughts %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 15 %N %P 227-44 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Gauker, C. %T How to learn language like a chimpanzee %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 139-46 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Glock, H. %T Animals, thoughts and concepts %I %D 2000 %B Synthese %V 123 %N %P 35-104 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Gould, J. L. %A Gould, C. G. %T The insect mind: Physics or metaphysics? %I Springer-Verlag %D 1982 %B Animal Mind -- Human Mind %E D. Griffin %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Gould, J. L. %A Gould, C. G. %T The Animal Mind %I Scientific American Library %D 1994 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Griffin, D. R. %T Animal Mind -- Human Mind %I Springer-Verlag %D 1982 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Griffin, D. R. %T Animal Thinking %I Harvard University Press %D 1984 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Griffin, D. R. %T Animal Minds %I University of Chicago Press %D 1992 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Harrison, P. %T Do animals feel pain? %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy %V 66 %N %P 25-40 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %T Speechless brutes %I %D 1982 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 42 %N %P 400-406 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Hendrichs, H. %T Different roots of human intentionality in mammalian mentality %I %D 1999 %B Erkenntnis %V 51 %N %P 649-668 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Hurley, S. %T Animal action in the space of reasons %I %D 2003 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 231-256 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Lloyd, E. %T Kanzi, evolution, and language %I %D 2004 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 577-88 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Malcolm, N. %T Thoughtless brutes %I %D 1973 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 46 %N %P 5-20 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelson, J. %T Do animals propositionally know? Do they propositionally believe? %I %D 1983 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 20 %N %P 149-60 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Povinelli, D. %T Folk Physics for Apes: The Chimpanzee's Theory of How the World Works %I Oxford University Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Povinelli, D. %A Vonk, J. %T We don't need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee's mind %I %D 2004 %B Mind and Language %V 19 %N %P 1-28 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Premack, D. %A Woodruff, G. %T Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? %I %D 1978 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 4 %N %P 515-629 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Premack, D. %T Gavagai! or the Future History of the Animal Language Controversy %I MIT Press %D 1986 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Proust, J. %T Mind, space and objectivity in non-human animals %I %D 1999 %B Erkenntnis %V 51 %N %P 545-562 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Radner, D. %T Directed action and animal communication %I %D 1993 %B Ration %V 6 %N %P 135-54 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Radner, D. %T Mind and function in animal communication %I %D 1999 %B Erkenntnis %V 51 %N %P 633-648 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Ristau, C. A. %T Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Roberts, R. C. %T Propositions and animal emotion %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy %V 71 %N %P 147-56 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Routley, R. %T Alleged problems in attributing beliefs, and intentionality, to animals %I %D 1982 %B Inquiry %V 24 %N %P 385-417 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. %A Rumbaugh, D. M. %A Boysen, S. %T Do apes use language? %I %D 1980 %B American Scientist %V 68 %N %P 49-61 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Savage-Rumbaugh, S. %A Brakke, K. E. %T Animal language: Methodological and interpretative issues %I MIT Press %D 1996 %B Readings in Animal Cognition %E C. Allen %E D. Jamison %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book %A Sebeok, T. A. %A Umiker-Sebeok, J. %T Speaking of Apes: A Critical Anthology of Two-Way Communication with Man %I Plenum Press %D 1980 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Smit, H. %T Are animal displays bodily movements or manifestations of the mind? %I %D 1995 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 13-19 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Sober, E. %T The principle of conservatism in cognitive ethology %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Evolution, Naturalism and Mind %E D. Walsh %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Sorabji, R. %T Animal minds %I %D 1992 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 31 %N %P 1-18 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Stephan, A. %T Are animals capable of concepts? %I %D 1999 %B Erkenntnis %V 51 %N %P 583-596 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Sterelny, K. %T Animals and individualism %I University of British Columbia Press %D 1990 %B Information, Language and Cognition %E P. Hanson %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T Basic minds %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 251-70 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Stich, S. P. %T Do animals have beliefs? %I %D 1978 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 57 %N %P 15-28 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Whiten, A. %T Theory of mind in non-verbal apes: Conceptual issues and the critical experiments %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Evolution, Naturalism and Mind %E D. Walsh %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Book Section %A Wilder, H. %T Interpretative cognitive ethology %I MIT Press %D 1996 %B Readings in Animal Cognition %E C. Allen %E D. Jamison %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilson, M. D. %T Animal ideas %I %D 1995 %B Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association %V 69 %N %P 7-25 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, animal cognition %U %0 Journal Article %A Adshead, G. %T Psychopaths and other-regarding beliefs %I %D 1999 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology %V 99 %N %P 41-44 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Bayne, T. %A Pacherie, E. %T Bottom-up or top-down: Campbell's rationalist account of monothematic delusions %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, %V 11 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Bayne, T. %A Pacherie, E. %T In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions %I %D 2005 %B Mind and Language %V 20 %N %P 163-88 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book %A Bentall, R. %T Madness Explained %I Allen Lane %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Bermudez, J. L. %T Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders %I %D 2001 %B Mind & Language, %V 16 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Berrios, G. %T Delusions as 'wrong beliefs': A conceptual history %I %D 1991 %B British Journal of Psychiatry, %V 159 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Bortolotti, L. %T Delusions and the background of rationality %I %D 2005 %B Mind and Language %V 20 %N %P 189-208 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, J. %T Schizophrenia, the space of reasons and thinking as a motor process %I %D 1999 %B Monist %V 82 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, J. %T Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, %V 8 %N %P 89-100 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Canali, S. %T On the concept of the psychological %I %D 2004 %B Topoi %V 23 %N %P 177-86 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book %A Coltheart, M. %A Davies, M. %T Pathologies of Belief %I Blackwell %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book %A Chung, M. %A Fulford, K. %A Graham, G. %T The Philosophical Understanding of Schizophrenia %I Oxford University Press %D 2005 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Currie, G. %A Jureidini, J. %T Delusion, rationality, empathy %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology %V 8 %N %P 159-62 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %A Coltheart, M. %A Langdon, R. and Breen, N. %T Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology %V 8 %N %P 133-58 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Davies, M. %A Davies, A. A. %A Coltheart, M. %T Anosognosia and the two-factor theory of delusions %I %D 2005 %B Mind and Language %V 20 %N %P 241-57 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book Section %A Fulford, K. W. M. %T Value, illness, and failure of action: Framework for a philosophical psychopathology of delusions %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychopathology %E G. Graham %E L. Stephens %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book Section %A Fulford, K. W. M. %T Mind and madness: New directions in the philosophy of psychiatry %I Cambridge University Press %D 1995 %B Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry %E A. Griffiths %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Gerrans, P. %T A one-stage explanation of the Cotard delusion %I %D 2002 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology %V 9 %N %P 47-53 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Gerrans, P. %T Nativism and neuroconstructivism in the explanation of Williams syndrome %I %D 2003 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 41-52 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Gold, I. %A Hohwy, J. %T Rationality and schizophrenic delusion %I %D 2000 %B Mind and Language %V 15 %N %P 146-167 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book %A Graham, G, %A Stephens, L. %T Philosophical Psychopathology %I MIT Press %D 1994 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book Section %A Graham, G. %A Stephens, L. %T An introduction to philosophical psychopathology: Its nature, scope, and emergence %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychopathology %E G. Graham %E L. Stephens %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book %A Griffiths, A. %T Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry %I Cambridge University Press %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book Section %A Grunbaum, A. %T The placebo concept in medicine and psychiatry %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychopathology %E G. Graham %E L. Stephens %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book %A Hirstein, W. %T Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation %I MIT Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Hohwy, J. %A Rosenberg, R. %T Unusual experiences, reality testing and delusions of alien control %I %D 2005 %B Mind and Language %V 20 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Klee, R. %T Why some delusions are necessarily inexplicable beliefs %I %D 2004 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology %V 11 %N %P 25-34 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Langdon, R. %A Coltheart, M. %T The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions %I %D 2000 %B Mind and Language %V 15 %N %P 183-216 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Maher, B. %T Anomalous experience in everyday life: Its significance for psychopathology %I %D 1999 %B Monist %V 82 %N %P 547-70 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Maher, B. %T Schizophrenia, aberrant utterance and delusions of control: The disconnection of speech and thought, and the connection of experience and belief %I %D 2003 %B Mind and Language %V 18 %N %P 1-22 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Maibom, H. L. %T Moral unreason: The case of psychopathy %I %D 2005 %B Mind and Language %V 20 %N %P 237-57 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book %A Murphy, D. %T Psychiatry in the Scientific Image %I MIT Press %D 2005 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book %A Oltmanns, T. F. %A Maher, B. A. %T Delusional Beliefs %I John Wiley %D 1988 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book Section %A Papineau, D. %T Mind, health, and biological purpose %I Cambridge University Press %D 1995 %B Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychiatry %E A. Griffiths %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Parnas, J. %T Belief and pathology of self-awareness: A phenomenological contribution to the classification of delusions %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 11 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book Section %A Poland, J. %A von Eckardt, B. %A Spaulding, W. %T Problems with the DSM approach to classifying psychopathology %I MIT Press %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychopathology %E G. Graham %E L. Stephens %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book %A Radden, J. %T The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Sass, L. %T Affectivity in schizophrenia: A phenomenological view %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 11 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Stephens, G. L. %A Graham, G. %T Reconceiving delusions %I %D 2004 %B International Review of Psychiatry, %V 16 %N %P 236-241 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Book Section %A Stephens, G. L. %A Graham, G. %T The delusional stance %I Oxford University Press %D 2005 %B The Philosophical Understanding of Schizophrenia %E M. Chung %E K. Fulford and G. Graham %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Stone, T. %A Young, A. %T Delusions and brain injury: The philosophy and psychology of belief %I %D 1997 %B Mind and Language %V 12 %N %P 327-64 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Young, A. W. %T Delusions %I %D 1999 %B Monist %V 82 %N %P 571-589 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,issues in cognitive science, psychopathology %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %T An analysis of pleasure vis-a-vis pain %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 61 %N %P 537-570 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %T Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain %I %D 2001 %B Consciousness and Emotion %V 2 %N %P 29-73 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Aydede, M. %A Guzeldere, G. %T Some foundational problems in the scientific study of pain %I %D 2002 %B Philosophy of Science Supplement %V 69 %N %P 265-83 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Book %A Aydede, M. %T Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study %I MIT Press %D 2005 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Book Section %A Aydede, M. %T A critical and quasi-historical essay on theories of pain %I MIT Press %D 2005 %B Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study %E M. Aydede %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Bain, D. %T Intentionalism and pain %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 53 %N %P 502-523 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Beardman, S. %T The choice between current and retrospective evaluations of pain. 13:97-110. :dez, J. L. 2001: Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders %I %D 2000 %B Mind & Language, %V 16 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Blum, A. %T A note on pleasure %I %D 1991 %B Journal of Value Inquiry %V 25 %N %P 367-70 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Chapman, C. R. %A Nakakura, Y. %A Chapman, C. N. %T Pain and folk theory %I %D 2000 %B Brain and Mind %V 1 %N %P 209-222 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Conee, E. %T A defense of pain %I %D 1984 %B Philosophical Studies %V 46 %N %P 239-48 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Book %A Cowan, J. %T Pleasure and Pain: A Study in Philosophical Psychology %I Macmillan %D 1968 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Dartnall, T. %T The pain problem %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 95-102 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Why you can't make a computer that feels pain %I %D 1978 %B Synthese %V 38 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Douglas, G. %T Why pains are not mental objects %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Studies b %V 91 %N %P 127-148 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Edwards, R. %T Do pleasures and pains differ qualitatively? %I %D 1975 %B Journal of Value Inquiry %V 9 %N %P 270-81 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Garfield, J. L. %T Pain deproblematized %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 14 %N %P 103-7 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Gillett, G. %T The neurophilosophy of pain %I %D 1991 %B Philosophy %V 66 %N %P 191-206 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldstein, I. %T Why people prefer pleasure to pain %I %D 1980 %B Philosophy %V 55 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldstein, I. %T Pleasure and pain: unconditional intrinsic values %I %D 1989 %B 1989 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Goldstein, I. %T Intersubjective properties by which we specify pain, pleasure, and other kinds of mental states %I %D 1999 %B 1999 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Graham, G. %A Stephens, G. %T Minding your P's and Q's: Pain and sensible qualities %I %D 1987 %B Nous %V 21 %N %P 395-405 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Grahek, N. %T Objective and subjective aspects of pain %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 249-66 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Grahek, N. %T The sensory dimension of pain %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 79 %N %P 167-84 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Gustafson, D. %T Belief in pain %I %D 1995 %B Consciousness and Cognition %V 4 %N %P 323-45 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Gustafson, D. %T On the supposed utility of a folk theory of pain %I %D 2000 %B Brain and Mind %V 1 %N %P 223-228 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Hall, R. J. %T Are pains necessarily unpleasant? %I %D 1989 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 49 %N %P 643-59 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T When a pain is not %I %D 1997 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 94 %N %P 381-409 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Book %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T The Myth of Pain %I MIT Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Book Section %A Hill, C. %T Ouch! An essay on pain %I John Benjamins %D 2004 %B Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology %E R. Gennaro %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Hyman, J. %T Pains and places %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy %V 78 %N %P 5-24 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Johannson, I. %T Species and dimensions of pleasure %I %D 2001 %B Metaphysica %V 2 %N 2 %P 39-72 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Kaufman, R. %T Is the concept of pain incoherent? %I %D 1985 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 23 %N %P 279-84 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Langsam, H. %T Why pains are mental objects %I %D 1995 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 6 %N %P 303-13 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Moller, D. %T Parfit on pains, pleasures, and the time of their occurrence %I %D 2002 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 31 %N %P 67-82 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Momeyer, R. %T Is pleasure a sensation? %I %D 1975 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 36 %N %P 113-21 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Morris, K. J. %T Pain, injury, and first/third-person asymmetry %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 125-56 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Book Section %A Nakamura, Y. %A Chapman, C. %T Constructing pain: How pain hurts %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B No Matter, Never Mind %E K. Yasue %E M. Jibu %E T. Senta %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelkin, N. %T Pains and pain sensations %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 83 %N %P 129-48 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Nelkin, N. %T Reconsidering pain %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 325-43 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Newton, N. %T On viewing pain as a secondary quality %I %D 1989 %B Nous %V 23 %N %P 569-98 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Olivier, A. %T When pain becomes unreal %I %D 2002 %B Philosophy Today %V 2 %N %P 113-131 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Olivier, A. %T When pains are mental objects %I %D 2003 %B Philosophical Studies %V 115 %N %P 33-53 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Pitcher, G. %T The awfulness of pain %I %D 1970 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 48 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Pitcher, G. %T Pain perception %I %D 1970 %B Philosophical Review %V 74 %N %P 368-93 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Puccetti, R. %T Is pain necessary? %I %D 1975 %B Philosophy %V 50 %N %P 259-69 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Quinn, W. %T Pleasure -- disposition or episode? %I %D 1968 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 28 %N %P 578-86 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Rachels, S. %T Is unpleasantness intrinsic to unpleasant experiences? %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Studies %V 99 %N %P 187-210 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Rachlin, H. %T Pain and behavior %I %D 1985 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 8 %N %P 43-83 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Resnik, D. %T Pain as a folk psychological concept: A clinical perspective %I %D 2000 %B Brain and Mind %V 1 %N %P 193-207 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Book Section %A Sagawa, Y. %A Sawai, H. %A Sakai, N. %T A hypothesis concerning a relationship between pleasantness and unpleasantness %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B No Matter, Never Mind %E K. Yasue %E M. Jibu %E T. Senta %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Sufka, K. J. %A Lynch, M. P. %T Sensations and pain processes %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 13 %N %P 299-311 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Tye, M. %T A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 223-39 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Williams, B. %T Pleasure and belief %I %D 1959 %B 1959 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, pain and pleasure %U %0 Journal Article %A Addis, L. %T The ontology of emotion %I %D 1995 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 33 %N %P 261-78 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Adolphs, R. %T 'Edison' & 'Russell': Definitions versus inventions in the analysis of emotion %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Who Needs Emotions %E J. Fellous %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Alanen, L. %T What are emotions about? %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 67 %N %P 311-354 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Arbib, M. %T Beware the passionate robot %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Who Needs Emotions %E J. Fellous %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Arregui, J. V. %T On the intentionality of moods: Phenomenology and linguistic analysis %I %D 1996 %B American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly %V 70 %N %P 397-411 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Badcock, C. %T Emotion verses reason as a genetic conflict %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality %E D. Evans %E P. Cruse %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Baier, A. %T What emotions are about %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 4 %N %P 1-29 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Baier, A. %T Feelings that matter %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Beauregard, M. %T Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain %I John Benjamins %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Bedford, E. %T Emotions %I %D 1957 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 57 %N %P 281-304 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Ben-Ze'ev, A. %T The nature of emotions %I %D 1987 %B Philosophical Studies %V 52 %N %P 393-409 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Ben-Ze'ev, A. %T Describing the emotions %I %D 1990 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 3 %N %P 305-17 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Ben-Ze'ev, A. %T Emotional and moral evaluations %I %D 1992 %B Metaphilosophy %V 23 %N %P 214-29 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Ben-Ze'ev, A. %T The logic of emotions %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B Philosophy and the Emotions %E A. Hatimoysis %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Ben-Ze'ev, A. %T Emotion as a subtle mental mode %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Blackburn, S. %T Ruling Passions %I Oxford University Press %D 1998 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Borges, M. %T What can Kant teach us about emotions %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 101 %N %P 140-158 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Breazeal, C. %A Brooks, R. %T Robot emotions: A functional perspective %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Who Needs Emotions %E J. Fellous %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Broad, C. D. %T Emotion and sentiment %I %D 1971 %B Critical Essays in Moral Theory %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Calhoun, C. %T Subjectivity and emotion %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Charland, L. C. %T Feeling and representing: Computational theory and the modularity of affect %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 105 %N %P 273-301 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Charland, L. C. %T Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A representational proposal %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 555-579 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Charland, L. C. %T The natural kind status of emotion %I %D 2002 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 53 %N %P 511-37 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A D'Arms, J. %A Jacobson, D. %T The moralistic fallacy: On the "appropriateness" of emotions %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 61 %N %P 65-90 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Damasio, A. %T Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain %I Putnam %D 1994 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Damasio, A. %T The Feeling of what Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness %I Harcourt Brace and Co %D 1999 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Davis, W. %T A theory of happiness %I %D 1981 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 18 %N %P 111-20 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Deigh, J. %T Cognitivism in the theory of emotions %I %D 1994 %B Ethics %V 104 %N %P 824-54 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Deigh, J. %T Primitive emotions %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A DeLancey, C. %T Emotion and the function of consciousness %I %D 1996 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 3 %N %P 492-99 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A DeLancey, C. %T Emotion and the computational theory of mind %I John Benjamins %D 1997 %B Two Sciences of Mind %E S. O'Nuillain %E P. McKevitt %E E. MacAogain %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A DeLancey, C. %T Real emotions %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 467-487 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A DeLancey, C. %T Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about the Mind and Artificial Intelligence %I Oxford University Press %D 2001 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A de Sousa, R. %T The rationality of emotions %I %D 1979 %B 1979 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A de Sousa, R. %T The Rationality of Emotion %I MIT Press %D 1987 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A de Sousa, R. %T Emotional truth %I %D 2002 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 76 %N %P 247-63 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A de Sousa, R. %T Emotions: What I know, what I'd like to think I know, and what I'd like to think %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Elster, J. %T Emotion and action %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Evans, D. %T The search hypothesis of emotions %I %D 2002 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 53 %N %P 497-509 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Evans, D. %A Cruse, P. %T Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Fellous, J. %T Who Needs Emotions: The Brain meets the Robot %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Frank, R. %T Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions %I Norton %D 1988 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Frijda, N. H. %T The Emotions %I Cambridge University Press %D 1986 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Frijda, N. %T Emotions and motivational states %I %D 2002 %B European Review of Philosophy %V 5 %N %P 11-32 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Goldie, P. %T The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration %I Oxford University Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Goldie, P. %T Emotion, reason, and virtue %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality %E D. Evans %E P. Cruse %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Goldie, P. %T Emotion, feeling, and knowledge of the world %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Gordon, R. M. %T The aboutness of emotions %I %D 1974 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 27 %N %P 11-36 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Gordon, R. M. %T The passivity of emotions %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Review %V 95 %N %P 339-60 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Gordon, R. M. %T The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy %I Cambridge University Press %D 1987 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Green, O. %T The Emotions: A Philosophical Theory %I Kluwer %D 1992 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Greenspan, P. S. %T Emotions and Reasons: An Enquiry into Emotional Justification %I Routledge %D 1988 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Greenspan, P. S. %T Emotions, rationality, and mind-body %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Griffiths, P. E. %T Folk, functional and neurochemical aspects of mood %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 2 %N %P 17-32 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Griffiths, P. E. %T What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories %I University of Chicago Press %D 1997 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Griffiths, P. E. %T Emotions %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Griffiths, P. E. %T Basic emotions, complex emotions, Machiavellian emotions %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B Philosophy and the Emotions %E A. Hatimoysis %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Griffiths, P. E. %T Toward a "Machiavellian" theory of emotional appraisal %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality %E D. Evans %E P. Cruse %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Griffiths, P. E. %T Is emotion a natural kind? %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Gunther, Y. %T Emotion and force %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Essays on Nonconceptual Content %E Y. Gunther %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Gunther, Y. %T The phenomenology and intentionality of emotion %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Studies %V 117 %N %P 43-55 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. %T Emotions and narrative selves %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology %V 10 %N %P 353-356 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Hatzimoysis, A. %T Philosophy and the Emotions %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Hatzimoysis, A. %T Emotional feelings and intentionalism %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B Philosophy and the Emotions %E A. Hatimoysis %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Haybron, D. M. %T Happiness and pleasure %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 62 %N %P 501-528 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Helm, B. W. %T The Significance of Emotions %I American Philosophical Quarterly 31:319-31 %D 1994 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Irani, K. S. %A Myers, G. %T Emotion: Philosophical Studies %I Haven %D 1983 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Ivet, P. %T Emotions, revision, and the explanation of emotional action %I %D 2002 %B European Review of Philosophy %V 5 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A James, W. %T What is an emotion? %I %D 1884 %B Mind %V 19 %N %P 188-204 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Kovach, A. %A De Lancey, C. %T On emotions and the explanation of behavior %I %D 2005 %B Nous %V 39 %N %P 106-22 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Kriegel, U. %T Emotional content %I %D 2002 %B Consciousness and Emotion %V 3 %N %P 213-230 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Lemaire, S. %T From emotions to desires %I %D 2002 %B European Review of Philosophy %V 5 %N %P 109-136 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Letwin, O. %T Ethics, Emotion, and the Unity of the Self %I Croom Helm %D 1987 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Livet, P. %T Emotions, revision, and the explanation of actions %I %D 2002 %B European Review of Philosophy %V 5 %N %P 93-108 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Lormand, E. %T Toward a theory of moods %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Studies %V 47 %N %P 385-407 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Lyons, W. %T Emotions and behavior %I %D 1978 %B 1978 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Lyons, W. %T Emotion %I Cambridge University Press %D 1980 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Mameli, M. %T The role of emotions in ecological and practical rationality %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality %E D. Evans %E P. Cruse %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Marks, J. %T A theory of emotion %I %D 1982 %B Philosophical Studies %V 42 %N %P 227-42 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A McCullagh, C. B. %T The rationality of emotions and of emotional behavior %I %D 1990 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 68 %N %P 44-58 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Morreal, J. %T Humor and emotion %I %D 1983 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 20 %N %P 297-304 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Nash, R. A. %T Cognitive theories of emotion %I %D 1989 %B Nous %V 23 %N %P 481-504 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Neu, J. %T Emotion, Thought, and Therapy %I Cambridge University Press %D 1971 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Neu, J. %T A Tear is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion %I Oxford University Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Neu, J. %T Emotions and freedom %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Nussbaum, M. %T Love's Knowledge %I Oxford University Press %D 1990 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Nussbaum, M. %T Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Nussbaum, M. %T Emotions as judgments of value and importance %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Nussbaum, C. %T Another look at functionalism and the emotions %I %D 2003 %B Brain and Mind %V 4 %N %P 353-383 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Pacherie, E. %T The role of emotions in the explanation of action %I %D 2002 %B European Review of Philosophy %V 5 %N %P 53-92 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Parkinson, B. %T Unpicking reasonable emotions %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality %E D. Evans %E P. Cruse %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Pickard, H. %T Emotions and the problem of other minds %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B Philosophy and the Emotions %E A. Hatimoysis %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Prinz, J. J. %T Consciousness, computation, and emotion %I John Benjamins %D 2002 %B Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain %E S. Moore %E M. Oaksford %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Prinz, J. J. %T Emotions, psychosemantics, and embodied appraisals %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B Philosophy and the Emotions %E A. Hatimoysis %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Prinz, J. J. %T Which emotions are basic? %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality %E D. Evans %E P. Cruse %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Prinz, J. J. %T Embodied emotions %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Prinz, J. J. %T Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Pugmire, D. %T Real emotion %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 54 %N %P 105-22 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Rey, G. %T Functionalism and the emotions. In (A. Rorty, ed), Explaining Emotions %I %D 1980 %B 1980 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Roberts, R. C. %T Feeling one's emotions and knowing oneself %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Studies %V 77 %N %P 319-38 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Robinson, J. %T Emotion: Biological fact or social construction %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Rolls, E. %T What are emotions, why do we have emotions, and what is their computational basis in the brain? %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Who Needs Emotions %E J. Fellous %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Rorty, A. O. %T Explaining emotions %I %D 1978 %B 1978 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Rorty, A. O. %T Explaining Emotions %I University of California Press %D 1980 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Rorty, A. O. %T Enough already with "theories of the emotions" %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Rosenthal, D. M. %T Emotions and the self %I Haven %D 1983 %B Emotion: Philosophical Studies %E K. Irani %E G. Myers %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Salmela, M. %T Intentionality and feeling. A Sketch for a two-level account of emotional affectivity %I %D 2002 %B Philosophia %V 3 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Seager, W. %T Emotional introspection %I %D 2002 %B Consciousness and Cognition %V 11 %N %P 666-687 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Sizer, L. %T Towards a computational theory of mood %I %D 2000 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 51 %N %P 743-770 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Solomon, R. C. %T Emotion and choice %I %D 1973 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 17 %N %P 20-41 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Solomon, R. C. %T The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotions %I Doubleday %D 1984 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Solomon, R. C. %T The philosophy of emotions %I Guilford Press %D 1999 %B Handbook of Emotions %E M. Lewis %E J. Haviland-Jones %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Solomon, R. C. %T Emotions, thoughts, and feelings: What is a "cognitive theory of the emotions and does it neglect affectivity? %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B Philosophy and the Emotions %E A. Hatimoysis %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Solomon, R. C. %T Emotions, thoughts, and feelings: Emotions as ngagements with the world %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Solomon, R. C. %T Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Spicer, F. %T Emotional behaviour and the scope of belief-desire explanation %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality %E D. Evans %E P. Cruse %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Sripada, C. S. %A Stich, S. P. %T Evolution, culture, and the irrationality of the emotions %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality %E D. Evans %E P. Cruse %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Stocker, M. %T Some considerations about intellectual desire and emotions %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %B Thinking about Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions %E R. Solomon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Tappolet, C. %T Long-term emotions and emotional experiences in the explanation of actions %I %D 2002 %B European Review of Philosophy %V 5 %N %P 151-161 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Taylor, G. %T Justifying the emotions %I %D 1975 %B 1975 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Thagard, P. %T How molecules matter to mental computation %I %D 2002 %B Philosophy of Science %V 69 %N %P 497-518 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Thalberg, I. %T Emotion and thought %I %D 1964 %B 1964 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Westphal, M. %A Bonanno, G. %T Emotion self-regulation %I John Benjamins %D 2004 %B Consciousness, Emotional Self-Regulation and the Brain %E S. Moore %E M. Oaksford %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilkinson, S. %T Is 'normal grief' a mental disorder? %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 50 %N %P 289-305 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Wilson, J. R. S. %T Emotion and Object %I Cambridge University Press %D 1972 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book %A Wollheim, R. %T On the Emotions %I Yale University Press %D 1999 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Book Section %A Wollheim, R. %T Emotions and their philosophy of mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %B Philosophy and the Emotions %E A. Hatimoysis %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, emotions %U %0 Journal Article %A Ayer, A. %T Professor Malcolm on dreams %I %D 1960 %B 1960 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Chappell, V. C. %T The concept of dreaming %I %D 1963 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 13 %N %P 193-213 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Chihara, C. %T What dreams are made of %I %D 1965 %B Theoria %V 31 %N %P 145-58 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Curley, E. M. %T Dreaming and conceptual revision %I %D 1975 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 53 %N %P 119-41 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Are dreams experiences? %I %D 1976 %B Philosophical Review %V 73 %N %P 151-71 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Book %A Dunlop, C. E. M. %T Philosophical Essays on Dreaming %I Cornell University Press %D 1977 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Dunlop, C. E. M. %T Belief in dreams %I %D 1978 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 56 %N %P 61-64 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Dunlop, C. E. M. %T Dreams, skepticism, and scientific research %I %D 1978 %B Philosophia %V 8 %N %P 355-65 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Emmett, K. %T Oneiric experiences %I %D 1978 %B Philosophical Studies %V 34 %N %P 445-50 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Flanagan, O. %T Deconstructing dreams: The spandrels of sleep %I %D 1995 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 92 %N %P 5-27 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Book Section %A Flanagan, O. %T Self-expression in sleep: Neuroscience and dreams %I %D 1996 %B Self-Expressions %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Book %A Flanagan, O. %T Dreaming Souls: Sleep, Dreams, and the Evolution of the Conscious Mind %I Oxford University Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Goguen, J. %T Musical qualia, context, time and emotion %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 11 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Hobson, J. %T Sleep and dream suppression following a lateral medullary infarct: A first-person account %I %D 2002 %B Consciousness and Cognition %V 11 %N %P 377-390 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Hunter, J. %T Some questions about dreaming %I %D 1971 %B Mind %V 80 %N %P 70-92 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Hunter, J. %T The difference between dreaming and being awake %I %D 1983 %B Mind %V 92 %N %P 80-93 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Landesman, C. %T Dreams: Two types of explanation %I %D 1964 %B Philosophical Studies %V 15 %N %P 17-23 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Book %A Malcolm, N. %T Dreaming %I Routledge and Kegan Paul %D 1962 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Mannison, D. S. %T Dreaming an impossible dream %I %D 1975 %B Canadian Journal of Philosophy %V 4 %N %P 663-75 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Matthews, G. B. %T On being immoral in a dream %I %D 1981 %B Philosophy %V 56 %N %P 47-64 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Book Section %A Putnam, H. %T Dreaming and `depth grammar' %I Oxford University Press %D 1962 %B Analytical Philosophy: First Series %E R. Butler %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Revonsuo, A. %A Tarkko, K. %T Binding in dreams: The bizarreness of dream images and the unity of consciousness %I %D 2002 %B Journal of Consciousness Studies %V 9 %N %P 3-24 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Schroeder, S. %T The concept of dreaming: On three theses by Malcolm %I %D 1997 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 20 %N %P 15-38 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Seligman, M. %A Yellen, A. %T What is a dream? %I %D 1987 %B Behavior Research and Therapy %V 25 %N %P 1-24 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Shanon, B. %T Descartes' puzzle -- An organismic approach %I %D 1983 %B Cognition and Brain Theory %V 6 %N %P 185-95 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Siegler, F. A. %T Remembering dreams %I %D 1967 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 17 %N %P 14-24 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Watt, D. %T Commentary on Professor Hobson's first-person account of a lateral medullary stroke (CVA): Affirmative action for the brainstem in consciousness studies? %I %D 2002 %B Consciousness and Cognition %V 11 %N %P 391-395 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, dreams %U %0 Journal Article %A Arcaya, J. M. %T Memory and temporality: A phenomenological alternative %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 2 %N %P 101-110 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Baier, A. %T Mixing memory and desire %I %D 1976 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 13 %N %P 213-20 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Ben-Zeev, A. %T Two approaches to memory %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 9 %N %P 288-301 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Bergson, H. %T Matter and memory %I %D 1991 %B 1991 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Memory and persons %I %D 2004 %B Philosophical Review %V 112 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book Section %A Campbell, J. %T The realism of memory %I Oxford University Press %D 1997 %B Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett %E R. Heck %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Campbell, J. %T The structure of time in autobiographical memory %I %D 1997 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 5 %N %P 105-17 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Cascardi, A. J. %T Remembering %I %D 1984 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 38 %N %P 275-302 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book %A Casey, E. S. %T Remembering: A Phenomenological Study %I Indiana University Press %D 1987 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Cherniak, C. %T Rationality and the structure of human memory %I %D 1983 %B Synthese %V 57 %N %P 163-86 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book Section %A Deutscher, M. %T Remembering "Remembering" %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Identity, Cause, and Mind %E J. Heil %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book Section %A Dokic, Jerome, %T Is memory purely preservative? %I Oxford University Press %D 2001 %B Time and Memory %E C. Hoerl %E . T. McCormack %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Earle, W. %T Memory %I %D 1956 %B Review of Metaphysics %V 10 %N %P 3-27 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Furlong, E. J. %T Memory %I %D 1948 %B Mind %V 57 %N %P 16-44 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book %A Furlong, E. J. %T A Study in Memory: A Philosophical Essay %I Nelson %D 1951 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Furlong, E. J. %T The empiricist theory of memory %I %D 1956 %B Mind %V 65 %N %P 542-47 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Gennaro, R. J. %T Consciousness, self-consciousness, and episodic memory %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 5 %N %P 333-47 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Haight, D. %A Haight, M. %T Time, memory, and self-remembering %I %D 1989 %B Journal of Speculative Philosophy %V 3 %N %P 1-11 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Hoerl, C. %T Memory, amnesia, and the past %I %D 1999 %B Mind and Language %V 14 %N %P 227-51 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Hoerl, C. %A McCormack, T. %T Joint reminiscing as attention to the past. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler, eds) Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds %I %D 2005 %B 2005 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book %A Hoerl, C. %A McCormack, T %T Time and Memory: Philosophical Perspectives %I Oxford University Press %D 2001 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Holland, R. F. %T The empiricist theory of memory %I %D 1954 %B Mind %V 63 %N %P 464-86 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Judson, L. %T Russell on memory %I %D 1988 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 88 %N %P 65-82 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Kurtzman, H. S. %T Modern conceptions of memory %I %D 1983 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 44 %N %P 1-20 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Lawlor, K. %T Memory, anaphora, and content preservation %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 109 %N %P 97-119 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book %A Locke, D. %T Memory %I Macmillan %D 1971 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book Section %A Malcolm, N. %T A definition of factual memory %I %D 1963 %B Knowledge and Certainty %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Malcolm, N. %T Memory and representation %I %D 1970 %B Nous %V 4 %N %P 59-71 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book %A Malcolm, N. %T Memory and Mind %I Cornell University Press %D 1977 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Martin, C. B. %A Deutscher, M. %T Remembering %I %D 1966 %B Philosophical Revire %V 75 %N %P 161-96 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Martin, M. G. F. %T Perception, concepts, and memory %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Review %V 101 %N %P 745-63 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book Section %A Martin, M. G. F. %T Out of the past: Episodic recall as retained acquaintance %I Oxford University Press %D 2001 %B Time and Memory %E C. Hoerl %E T. McCormack %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book Section %A Munsat, S. %T Memory and causality %I Reidel %D 1979 %B Body, Mind, and Method %E D. Gustafson %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Naylor, A. %T In defense of a nontraditional theory of memory %I %D 1985 %B Monist %V 62 %N %P 136-50 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, D. %T A Lockean theory of memory experience %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 56 %N %P 319-32 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, D. %T The authority of memory %I %D 1999 %B European Journal of Philosophy %V 7 %N %P 312-29 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Perkins, R. K. %T Russell on memory %I %D 1973 %B Mind %V 82 %N %P 600-1 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Rakover, S. %T In defense of memory viewed as stored mental representation %I %D 1983 %B Behaviorism %V 11 %N %P 53-62 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Rosen, D. A. %T An argument for the logical notion of a memory trace %I %D 1975 %B Philosophy of Science %V 42 %N %P 1-10 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Rundle, B. %T Memory and causation %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Investigations %V 9 %N %P 302-7 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Rychlak, J. F. %T Memory: A logical learning account %I %D 1996 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 17 %N %P 229-50 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Sanders, J. T. %T Experience, memory, and intelligence %I %D 1985 %B Monist %V 68 %N %P 507-21 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Schectman, M. %T The truth about memory %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 3-18 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Shope, R. K. %T Remembering, knowledge, and memory traces %I %D 1973 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 33 %N %P 303-22 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Squires, R. %T Memory unchained %I %D 1969 %B Philosophical Review %V 78 %N %P 178-96 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Stern, D. G. %T Models of memory: Wittgenstein and cognitive science %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 4 %N %P 203-18 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book %A Sutton, J. %T Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism %I Cambridge University Press %D 1998 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Sutton, J. %T Memory %I %D 2003 %B 2003 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book Section %A Sutton, J. %T Representation, reduction, and interdisciplinarity in the sciences of memory %I Elsevier %D 2004 %B Representation in Mind %E H. Clapin %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Urmson, J. O. %T Memory and imagination %I %D 1971 %B Mind %V 80 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Book %A Warnock, M. %T Memory %I Faber %D 1987 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Wilcox, S. %A Katz, S. %T A direct realist alternative to the traditional conception of memory %I %D 1981 %B Behaviorism %V 9 %N %P 227-40 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Zemach, E. %T Memory: What it is, and what is cannot possibly be %I %D 1983 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 44 %N %P 31-44 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, memory %U %0 Journal Article %A Anderson, J. R. %T Arguments concerning representations for mental imagery %I %D 1978 %B Psychological Review %V 85 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Audi, R. %T The ontological status of mental images %I %D 1978 %B Inquiry %V 21 %N %P 348-61 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Blachowicz, J. %T Analog representation beyond mental imagery %I %D 1997 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 94 %N %P 55-84 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Block, N. %T Imagery %I MIT Press %D 1981 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T Mental pictures and cognitive science %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Review %V 93 %N %P 499-542 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Block, N. %T The photographic fallacy in the debate about mental imagery %I %D 1983 %B Nous %V 17 %N %P 651-62 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Brown, R. %A Herrstein, R. %T Icons and images %I MIT Press %D 1981 %B Imagery %E N. Block %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Cam, P. %T Propositions about images %I %D 1987 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 48 %N %P 335-8 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Campbell, J. %T Berkeley's puzzle %I MIT Press %D 2002 %B Conceivability and Possibility %E T. Gendler %E J. Hawthorne %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Candlish, S. %T Mental images and pictorial properties %I %D 1975 %B Mind %V 84 %N %P 260-2 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Casey, E. S. %T Imagination, fantasy, hallucination, and memory %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Imagination and its Pathologies %E J. Philips %E J. Morley %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Chambers, D. %A Reisberg, D. %T Can mental images be ambiguous? %I %D 1985 %B ' Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance %V 11 %N %P 317-28 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Chambers, D. %A Reisberg, D. %T What an image depicts depends on what an image means %I %D 1992 %B Cognitive Psychology %V 24 %N %P 145-74 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Church, J. %T Depression, depth, and the imagination %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Imagination and its Pathologies %E J. Philips %E J. Morley %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Currie, G. %T Imagination as simulation: Aesthetics meets cognitive science %I Blackwell %D 1995 %B Mental Simulation %E M. Davies %E T. Stone %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Currie, G. %T Imagination, delusion and hallucinations %I Blackwell %D 2000 %B Pathologies of Belief %E M. Coltheart %E M. Davies %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Currie, G. %T Desire in imagination %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %B Conceivability and Possibility %E T. Gendler %E J. Hawthorne %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Currie, G. %T Imagination as motivation %I %D 2002 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 102 %N %P 201-16 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Currie, G. %A Ravenscroft, I. %T Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology %I Oxford University Press %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T Two approaches to mental images %I %D 1978 %B Brainstorms %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Dennett, D. C. %T The nature of images and the introspective trap %I %D 1968 %B Content and Consciousness %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Farah, M. J. %T Is visual imagery really visual: Some overlooked evidence from neuropsychology %I %D 1988 %B Psychological Review %V 95 %N %P 307-17 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Finke, R. A. %T Principles of Mental Imagery %I MIT Press %D 1989 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Fodor, J. A. %T Imagistic representation %I %D 1975 %B The Language of Thought %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Glasgow, J. I. %T The imagery debate revisited: A computational perspective %I %D 1993 %B Computational Intelligence %V 9 %N %P 310-33 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Hannay, A. %T Mental Images: A Defense %I Allen & Unwin %D 1971 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Hannay, A. %T To see a mental image %I %D 1973 %B Mind %V 82 %N %P 161-262 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Joyce, P. %T Imagining experiences correctly %I %D 2003 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 103 %N %P 361-370 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Kind, A. %T Putting the image back in imagination %I %D 2001 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 62 %N %P 85-110 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Kosslyn, S. M. %A Pomerantz, J. %T Imagery, propositions and the form of internal representations %I %D 1977 %B Cognitive Psychology %V 9 %N %P 52-76 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Kosslyn, S. M. %T The medium and the message in mental imagery: A theory %I MIT Press %D 1981 %B Imagery %E N. Block %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Kosslyn, S. M. %A Pinker, S. %A Schwartz, S. %A Smith, G. %T On the demystification of mental imagery %I %D 1979 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 2 %N %P 535-81 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Kosslyn, S. M. %T Image and Mind %I Harvard University Press %D 1980 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Kosslyn, S. M. %T Image and Brain: The Resolution of the Imagery Debate %I MIT Press %D 1994 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Maloney, J. C. %T Mental images and cognitive theory %I %D 1984 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 21 %N %P 237-47 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A McGinn, C. %T Mindsight: Image, Dram, Meaning %I Harvard University Press %D 2005 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Morris, P. E. %A Hampson, P. J. %T Imagery and Consciousness %I Academic Press %D 1983 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Mortensen, C. %T Mental images: Should cognitive science learn from neurophysiology? %I Kluwer %D 1989 %B Computers, Brains and Minds %E P. Slezak %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Nichols, S. %T Imagination and the puzzles of iteration %I %D 2002 %B Analysis %V 63 %N %P 182-87 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Nichols, S. %T Imagining and believing: The promise of a single code %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism %V 62 %N %P 129-39 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Noordhof, P. %T Imagining objects and imagining experiences %I %D 2002 %B Mind and Language %V 17 %N %P 426-455 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A O'Brien, L. %T Imagination and the motivational role of belief %I %D 2005 %B Analysis %V 65 %N %P 55-62 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Philips, J. %A Morley, J. %T Imagination and its Pathologies %I MIT Press %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T What the mind's eye tells the mind's brain: A critique of mental imagery %I %D 1973 %B Psych Bull %V 80 %N %P 1-24 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T Imagery and artificial intelligence %I University of Minnesota Press %D 1978 %B Perception and Cognition %E W. Savage %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T The imagery debate: Analog media vs. tacit knowledge %I %D 1981 %B Psychological Review %V 88 %N %P 16-45 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Pylyshyn, Z. %T Mental imagery: In search of a theory %I %D 2002 %B The Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 25 %N %P 157-182 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Reisberg, D. %A Chambers, D. %T Neither pictures nor propositions: What can we learn from a mental image? %I %D 1991 %B Canadian Journal of Psychology %V 45 %N %P 336-52 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Rey, G. %T What are mental images? %I , Vol %D 1981 %B Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology %E N. Block %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Richardson, A. %T Mental Imagery %I Routledge %D 1969 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Rollins, M. %T Mental Imagery: On the Limits of Cognitive Science %I Yale University Press %D 1989 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Russow, L. %T Dennett, mental images and images in context %I %D 1985 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 45 %N %P 581-94 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Schwartz, R. %T Imagery: There is more to it than meets the eye %I %D 1980 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1980 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Shepard, R. %A Cooper, L. %T Mental Images and their Transformations %I MIT Press %D 1982 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Shier, D. %T How can pictures be propositions? %I %D 1997 %B Ratio %V 10 %N %P 65-75 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Sterelny, K. %T The imagery debate %I %D 1986 %B Philosophy of Science %V 53 %N %P 560-83 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Stevenson, L. %T Twelve conceptions of imagination %I %D 2003 %B British Journal of Aesthetics %V 43 %N %P 238-59 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Manuscript %A Thomas, N. J. T. %T Are theories of imagination theories of imagery %I %D 1997 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Tye, M. %T The debate about mental imagery %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 81 %N %P 678-91 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Tye, M. %T The picture theory of images %I %D 1988 %B 1988 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book %A Tye, M. %T The Imagery Debate %I %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Woody, M. J. %T The unconscious as a hermeneutic myth: A defense of the imagination %I MIT Press %D 2003 %B Imagination and its Pathologies %E J. Philips %E J. Morley %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Journal Article %A Wright, E. %T Inspecting images %I %D 1983 %B Philosophy %V 58 %N %P 57-72 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, imagery and imagination %U %0 Book Section %A Armstrong, D. M. %T Colour realism and the argument from microscopes %I Humanities Press %D 1969 %B Contemporary Philosophy in Australia %E R. Brown %E C. Rollins %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Arstila, V. %T True colors, false theories %I %D 2003 %B Australian Journal of Philosophy %V 81 %N %P 41-61 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Averill, E. W. %T Color and the anthropocentric problem %I %D 1985 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 82 %N %P 281-303 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Averill, E. W. %T The relational nature of color %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Review %V 101 %N %P 551-88 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Bigelow, J. Collins, J. %A Pargetter, R. %T Colouring in the world %I %D 1990 %B Mind %V 99 %N %P 279-88 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %A Velleman, J. D. %T Color as a secondary quality %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 81-103 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %A Velleman, J. D. %T Physicalist theories of color %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Review %V 100 %N %P 67-106 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Boghossian, P. %T Seeking the real %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 108 %N %P 223-38 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book Section %A Broackes, J. %T The autonomy of colour %I Oxford University Press %D 1992 %B Reduction, Explanation, and Realism %E D. Charles %E K. Lennon %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Broackes, J. %T The Nature of Colour %I Routledge %D 1997 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Byrne, A. %A Hilbert, D. R. %T Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color %I MIT Press %D 1997 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Byrne, A. %A Hilbert, D. R. %T Readings on Color, Volume 2: The Science of Color %I MIT Press %D 1997 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book Section %A Byrne, A. %A Hilbert, D. R. %T Colors and reflectances %I MIT Press %D 1997 %B Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color %E A. Byrne %E D. R. Hilbert %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Byrne, A. %A Hilbert, D. R. %T Hardin, Tye, and color physicalism %I %D 2004 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 101 %N %P 37-43 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Byrne, A. %T Do colors look like dispositions? Reply to Langsam and others %I %D 2001 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 51 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Byrne, A. %T Yes, Virginia, lemons are yellow %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 108 %N %P 213-22 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book Section %A Byrne, A. %T Color and similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66:641-665. Campbell, J. 1993. A simple view of colour %I Oxford University Press %D 2003 %B Reality, Representation, and Projection %E J. Haldane %E C. Wright %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book Section %A Campbell, K. %T Colours %I Humanities Press %D 1969 %B Contemporary Philosophy in Australia %E R. Brown %E C. Rollins %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book Section %A Campbell, K. %T The implications of Land's theory of colour vision %I , Vol %D 1982 %B Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science %E L. Cohen %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book Section %A Campbell, K. %T David Armstrong and realism about colour %I Cambridge University Press %D 1993 %B Ontology, Causality, and Mind %E J. Bacon %E K. Campbell %E L. Reinhardt %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Clark, A. %T True theories, false colors %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science Supplement %V 63 %N %P 143-50 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Cohen, J. %T Color: A functionalist approach. Philosophical Studies 113:1-42. Cohen, J. 2003. On the structural properties of the colors %I %D 2003 %B Australian Journal of Philosophy %V 81 %N %P 78-95 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A De Anna, G. %T The simple view of colour and the reference of perceptual terms %I %D 2002 %B Philosophy %V 77 %N %P 87-108 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Dedrick, D. %T Objectivism and the evolutionary value of color vision %I %D 1995 %B Dialogue %V 34 %N %P 35-44 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Dedrick, D. %T Can color be reduced to anything? %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science Supplement %V 3 %N %P 134-42 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Edwards, J. %T A reply to De Anna on the simple view of colour %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy %V 78 %N %P 99-114 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Ellis, J. %T Colour irrealism and the formation of colour concepts %I %D 2005 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 83 %N %P 53-73 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Foster, D. %T Does colour constancy exist? %I %D 2003 %B Trends in Cognitive Science %V 7 %N %P 439-443 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Foti, V. M. %T The dimension of color %I %D 1990 %B International Studies in Philosophy %V 22 %N %P 13-28 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Gilbert, P. %T Westphal and Wittgenstein on white %I %D 1987 %B Mind %V 76 %N %P 399-403 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Gilbert, P. %T Reflections on white: A rejoinder to Westphal %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 423-6 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Gold, I. %T On Lewis on naming the colours %I %D 1999 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 77 %N %P 365-370 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Gold, I. %T Dispositions and the central problem of color %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 93 %N %P 21-44 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hall, R. J. %T The evolution of color vision without colors %I %D 1996 %B Philosophy of Science Supplement %V 63 %N %P 125-33 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardin, C. L. %T Colors, normal observers and standard conditions %I %D 1983 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 80 %N %P 806-13 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardin, C. L. %T A new look at color %I %D 1984 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 21 %N %P 125-33 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardin, C. L. %T Are scientific objects colored? %I %D 1984 %B Mind %V 93 %N %P 491-500 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardin, C. L. %T The resemblances of colors %I %D 1985 %B Philosophical Studies %V 48 %N %P 35-47 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardin, C. L. %T Frank talk about the colors of sense-data %I %D 1985 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 63 %N %P 485-93 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Hardin, C. L. %T Color for Philosophers %I Hackett %D 1988 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardin, C. L. %T Phenomenal colors and sorites %I %D 1988 %B Nous %V 22 %N %P 213-34 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardin, C. L. %T Could white be green? %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 390 %N %P 285-8 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardin, C. L. %T Idle colors and busy spectra %I %D 1989 %B Analysis %V 49 %N %P 47-8 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book Section %A Hardin, C. L. %T Color and illusion %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Mind and Cognition %E W. Lycan %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardin, C. L. %T van Brakel and the not-so-naked emperor %I %D 1993 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 44 %N %P 137-50 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardin, C. L. %T A green thought in a green shade %I %D 2004 %B 2004 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Harvey, J. %T Challenging the obvious: The logic of color concepts %I %D 1992 %B Philosophia %V 21 %N %P 277-94 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Harvey, J. %T Colour-dispositionalism and its recent critics %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 61 %N %P 137-156 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hazen, A. P. %T On naming the colours %I %D 1999 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 77 %N %P 224-231 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Hilbert, D. R. %T Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism %I CSLI Press %D 1987 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Hilbert, D. R. %T What is color vision? %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 68 %N %P 351-70 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Holman, E. L. %T Color eliminativism and color experience %I %D 2002 %B Pacific Philosophical Quareterly %V 83 %N %P 38-56 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %T The primary quality view of color %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 10 %N %P 199-219 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %T Colour, disjunctions, programming %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 86-88 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Jackson, F. %A Pargetter, R. %T An objectivist's guide to subjectivism about color %I %D 1987 %B Revue Internationale de Philosophie %V 41 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Jacovides, M. %T Cambridge changes of color %I %D 2000 %B Pacific Philosophical Quarterly %V 81 %N %P 142-164 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Johnston, M. %T How to speak of the colors %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 68 %N %P 221-263 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Kliewer, G. %T Neutral color concepts %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Studies %V 91 %N %P 21-41 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Kraut, R. %T The objectivity of color and the color of objectivity %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Studies %V 3 %N %P 265-87 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Langsam, H. %T Why colours do look like dispositions %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 50 %N %P 68-75 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Landesman, C. %T Color and Consciousness: An Essay in Metaphysics %I Temple University Press %D 1989 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Leon, M. %T Colour wars: Dividing the spoils %I %D 2002 %B Philosophy %V 77 %N %P 175-192 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Levin, J. %T Dispositional theories of color and the claims of common sense %I %D 2000 %B Philosophical Studies %V 100 %N %P 151-174 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Lewis, D. %T Naming the colours %I %D 1997 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 75 %N %P 325-42 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Maund, J. B. %T Colour: A case for conceptual fission %I %D 1981 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 59 %N %P 308-22 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Maund, J. B. %T The nature of color %I %D 1991 %B History of Philosophy Quarterly %V 8 %N %P 253-63 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Maund, J. B. %T Colours: Their Nature and Representation %I Cambridge University Press %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Mausfeld, R. %T Color Perception: Mind and the Physical World %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A McFarland, D. %A Miller, A. %T Jackson on colour as a primary quality %I %D 1998 %B Analysis %V 58 %N %P 76-85 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A McFarland, D. %A Miller, A. %T Disjunctions, programming and the Australian view of colour %I %D 2000 %B Analysis %V 60 %N %P 209-212 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A McGilvray, J. A. %T To color %I %D 1983 %B Synthese %V 54 %N %P 37-70 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A McGilvray, J. A. %T Constant colors in the head %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 100 %N %P 197-239 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, C. %T Another look at color %I %D 1996 %B Journal of Philoophy %V 93 %N %P 537-53 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, M. %T Westphal on the physical basis of color incompatibility %I %D 1991 %B Analysis %V 4 %N %P 218-22 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A McGinn, M. %T On two recent accounts of color %I %D 1991 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 41 %N %P 316-24 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Miller, A. %T The missing-explanation argument revisited %I %D 2001 %B Analysis %V 61 %N %P 76-86 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Montgomery, R. %T The indeterminacy of color vision %I %D 1996 %B Synthese %V 106 %N %P 167-203 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Myin, E. %T Color and the duplication assumption %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 129 %N %P 61-77 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book Section %A Nida-Rumelin, M. %T The character of color predicates: A phenomenalist view %I CSLI Press %D 1997 %B Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes %E M. Anduschus %E A. Newen %E W. Kunne %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Persson, S. %T Colours with a Humean face %I %D 2003 %B Philosophia %V 4 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Ross, P. W. %T The appearance and nature of color %I %D 1999 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 37 %N %P 227-252 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Ross, P. %T The relativity of color %I %D 2000 %B Synthese %V 123 %N %P 105-130 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Sinnott-Armstrong, W. %T A light theory of color %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 110 %N %P 267-284 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book Section %A Smart, J. J. C. %T On some criticisms of a physicalist theory of colors %I University Press of Hawaii %D 1975 %B Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem %E C. Cheng %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Smart, J. J. C. %T `Looks red' and dangerous talk %I %D 1995 %B Philosophy %V 70 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book Section %A Smith, M. A. %T Color, transparency, mind-independence %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Reality, Representation, and Projection %E J. Haldane %E C. Wright %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, P. %T Subjectivity and colour vision %I %D 1987 %B Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society %V 61 %N %P 245-81 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Spackman, J. %T Color, relativism, and realism %I %D 2002 %B Philosophical Studies %V 108 %N %P 251-88 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book Section %A Spohn, W. %T The character of color predicates: A materialist view %I CSLI Press %D 1997 %B Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes %E M. Anduschus %E A. Newen %E W. Kunne %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Strawson, G. %T Red and `red' %I %D 1989 %B Synthese %V 78 %N %P 193-232 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Stroud, B. %T The Quest for Reality: Subjectivism and the Metaphysics of Colour %I Oxford University Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Stroud-Drinkwater, C. %T The naive theory of color %I %D 1994 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 54 %N %P 345-54 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Thompson, E. %A Palacios, A. %A Varela, F. J. %T Ways of coloring %I %D 1992 %B 1992 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Thompson, E. %T Colour vision, evolution, and perceptual content %I %D 1995 %B Synthese %V 104 %N %P 1-32 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Thompson, E. %T Colour Vision %I Routledge %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Tolliver, J. T. %T Interior colors %I %D 1996 %B Philosophical Topics %V 22 %N %P 411-41 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Tye, M. %T Consciousness, Color, and Content %I MIT Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Watkins, M. %T Do animals see colors? An anthropocentrist's guide to animals, the color blind, and far away places %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Studies %V 94 %N %P 189-209 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Watkins, M. %T Seeing red: The metaphysics of colours without the physics %I %D 2005 %B Australasian Journal of Philosophy %V 83 %N %P 33-52 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Webster, W. R. %T Wavelength theory of color strikes back: The return of the physical %I %D 2002 %B Synthese %V 132 %N %P 303-34 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Webster, W. R. %T Revelation and transparency in colour vision refuted: A case of mind/brain identity and another bridge over the explanatory gap %I %D 2003 %B Synthese %V 133 %N %P 419-39 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Westphal, J. %T Brown: Remarks on color %I %D 1982 %B Inquiry %V 25 %N %P 417-33 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Westphal, J. %T White %I %D 1986 %B Mind %V 95 %N %P 310-28 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Westphal, J. %T Black %I %D 1989 %B Mind %V 98 %N %P 585-9 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Westphal, J. %T Colour: A Philosophical Introduction %I Blackwell %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Whitmyer, VG. %T Ecological color %I %D 1999 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 12 %N %P 197-214 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Book %A Wittgenstein, L. %T Remarks on Colour %I University of California Press %D 1977 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Wright, W. %T A dilemma for Jackson and Pargetter's account of color %I %D 2003 %B Southern Journal of Philosophy %V 41 %N %P 125-42 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,aspects of mind, color %U %0 Journal Article %A Antony, L. %T Law and order in psychology %I %D 1995 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 9 %N %P 429-46 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Braithwaite, M. %T Causal laws in psychology %I %D 1949 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 23 %N %P 45-60 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 19-34 %Z Ceteris paribus means that every realizing state has completing conditions. Even absolute exceptions are OK, as long as they're not across-the-board. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T Making mind matter more %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Topics %V 17 %N %P 59-79 %Z Non-strict psychological laws are compatible with the (nomologically sufficient) causal responsibility of mental properties. So there's no need for epiphobia. With comments on the relation between laws and mechanisms. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Horgan, T. %A Tienson, J. %T Soft laws %I %D 1990 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 15 %N %P %Z Argues that any laws in intentional psychology have ineliminable same-level exceptions; the Kuhnian crisis in cognitive science gives evidence for this. But ceteris paribus laws provide perfectly good theoretical explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Lycan, W. G. %T Psychological laws %I %D 1981 %B Philosophical Topics %V 12 %N %P 9-38 %Z A functionalist defense against anomalous monism. Psychofunctional laws and psychological laws, though not psychophysical laws, may exist. Rebutting arguments from rationality, indeterminism, intensionality, etc. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Mace, C. A. %T Causal laws in psychology %I %D 1949 %B Aristotelian Society Supplement %V 23 %N %P 61-68 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Marcello, G. %T Horgan and Tienson on ceteris paribus laws %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy of Science %V 67 %N %P 301-315 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Mott, P. %T Fodor and ceteris paribus laws %I %D 1992 %B Mind %V 101 %N %P 335-46 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Pietroski, P. %A Rey, G. %T When other things aren't equal: Saving ceteris paribus laws from vacuity %I %D 1995 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 46 %N %P 81-110 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Schiffer, S. %T Ceteris paribus laws %I %D 1991 %B Mind %V 100 %N %P 1-17 %Z There are no ceteris paribus laws, as there's no satisfactory way to cash the "unless" cause. But psychology doesn't need laws, anyway. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Silverberg, A. %T Psychological laws and nonmonotonic logic %I %D 1996 %B Erkenntnis %V 44 %N %P 199-224 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Silverberg, A. %T Psychological laws %I %D 2003 %B Erkenntnis %V 58 %N %P 275-302 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Warfield, T. A. %T Folk-psychological ceteris-paribus laws %I %D 1993 %B Philosophical Studies %V 71 %N %P 99-112 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, psychological laws %U %0 Journal Article %A Cummins, R. %T The internal manual model of psychological explanation %I %D 1982 %B Cognition and Brain Theory %V 5 %N %P 257-68 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Book %A Cummins, R. %T The Nature of Psychological Explanation %I MIT Press %D 1983 %Z Psychological explanation is typically via functional analysis, not causal subsumption. On interpretation, computation, and an analysis of cognition and intentionality. With remarks on Dretske, Searle, Titchener, Hull, Freud. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Book %A Fodor, J. A. %T Psychological Explanation %I Random House %D 1968 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %T The appeal to tacit knowledge in psychological explanation %I %D 1968 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 65 %N %P 627-40 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Franks, B. %T On explanation in cognitive science: Competence, idealization, and the failure of the classical cascade %I %D 1995 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 46 %N %P 475-502 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Gilman, D. %T Optimization and simplicity: Marr's theory of vision and biological explanation %I %D 1993 %B Synthese %V 107 %N %P 293-323 %Z Contra Kitcher 1988, much of Marr's theory doesn't depend on optimization; in any case, optimization isn't so bad. With remarks on interdisciplinarity. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Heil, J. %T Formalism and psychological explanation %I %D 1986 %B Journal of Mind and Behavior %V 7 %N %P 1-10 %Z On the tension between formal explanation and representational explanation. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Kim, J. %T Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Perspectives %V 3 %N %P 77-108 %Z Discusses the principle: there cannot be two independent explanations of the same phenomena. With application to purposive explanation of behavior, theory reduction, and eliminativism, and a discussion of explanatory realism. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Kim, J. %T Explanatory exclusion and the problem of mental causation %I Blackwell %D 1990 %B Information, Semantics, and Epistemology %E E. Villanueva %Z On the problems posed by explanatory exclusion, and possible solutions. With focus on the problems as they arise for Dretske's and Davidson's theories. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Knight, D. %T A poetics of psychological explanation %I %D 1997 %B Metaphilosophy %V 28 %N %P 63-80 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Book Section %A Millikan, R. G. %T Explanation in biopsychology %I Oxford University Press %D 1993 %B Mental Causation %E J. Heil %E A. Mele %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Montgomery, R. %T Explanation and evaluation in cognitive science %I %D 1995 %B Philosophy of Science %V 62 %N %P 261-82 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Montgomery, R. %T Grades of explanation in cognitive science %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 114 %N %P 463-495 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Morris, M. %T Causes of behavior %I %D 1986 %B Philosophical Quarterly %V 36 %N %P 123-44 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Moser, P. %T Naturalism and psychological explanation %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 63-84 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Owens, J. %T Psychological explanation and causal deviancy %I %D 1998 %B Synthese %V 115 %N %P 143-169 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Sober, E. %T Psychologism %I %D 1978 %B Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior %V 8 %N %P 165-91 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, explanation in cognitive science %U %0 Journal Article %A Avison, M. J. %T Functional brain mapping: What is it good for? Absolutely nothing %I %D 2002 %B Brain and Mind %V 3 %N %P 367-73 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T A bridge between cognitive science and neuroscience: The functional architecture of mind %I %D 1983 %B Philosophical Studies %V 44 %N %P 319-30 %Z Arguing for the notion of functional architecture as a bridge whereby neural components can be components of cognitive processes. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Bechtel, W. %T Cognitive neuroscienec: Relating neural mechanisms and cognition %I University of Pittsburgh Press %D 2001 %B Theory and Method in the Neurosciences %E P. Machamer %E P. McLaughlin %E R. Grush %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Bechtel, W. %T Decomposing and localizing vision: An exemplar for cognitive neuroscience %I Blackwell %D 2001 %B Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader %E W. Bechtel %E P. Mandik %E J. Mundale %E and R. Stufflebeam %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Bechtel, W. %A Stufflebeam, R. %T Epistemic issues in procuring evidence about the brain: The importance of research instruments and techniques %I Blackwell %D 2001 %B Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader %E W. Bechtel %E P. Mandik %E J. Mundale %E and R. Stufflebeam %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Decomposing the mind-brain: A long-term pursuit %I %D 2002 %B Brain and Mind %V 3 %N %P 229-42 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Bechtel, W. %T Aligning multiple research techniques in cognitive neuroscience: Why is it important? %I %D 2002 %B Philosophy of Science %V 69 %N %P 548-558 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book %A Bechtel, W. %A Mandik, P. %A Mundale, J. %A and Stufflebeam, R. S. %T Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader %I Blackwell %D 2001 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Bogen, J. %T Functional imaging evidence: Some epistemic hotspots %I University of Pittsburgh Press %D 2001 %B Theory and Method in the Neurosciences %E P. Machamer %E P. McLaughlin %E R. Grush %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Bub, J. %T Testing models of cognition through the analysis of brain-damaged patients %I %D 1994 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 45 %N %P 837-55 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Butler, K. %T Neural constraints in cognitive science %I %D 1994 %B Minds and Machines %V 4 %N %P 129-62 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book %A Changeux, J. %A Ricoeur, P. %T What Makes Us Think? A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain %I Princeton %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Cherniak, C. %T Meta-neuroanatomy: The myth of the unbounded mind/brain. In (E %I %D 1991 %B 1991 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Cherniak, C. %T Philosophy and computational neuroanatomy %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Studies %V 73 %N %P 89-107 %Z Argues that we can understand the brain under the hypothesis that it is optimized to "save wire", due to bounded resources: organization predicts placement. With remarks on the relation between cognitive and neural levels. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. M. %T Some reductive strategies in cognitive neurobiology %I %D 1986 %B Mind %V 95 %N %P 279-309 %Z Some cute examples of neurophysiological reductions using state-spaces. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book %A Churchland, P. M. %T The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain %I MIT Press %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. S. %T A perspective on mind-brain research %I %D 1980 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 77 %N %P 185-207 %Z The brain can tell us a lot about the mind. With examples. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. S. %T Mind-brain reduction: New light from philosophy of science %I %D 1982 %B Neuroscience %V 7 %N %P 1041-7 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book %A Churchland, P. S. %T Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain %I MIT Press %D 1986 %Z All about neuroscience, philosophy and prospects for their interaction. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Churchland, P. S. %A Sejnowski, T. %T Neural representation and neural computation %I MIT Press %D 1989 %B Neural Connections, Mental Computations %E L. Nadel %Z About how neuroscience and connectionism affect our conception of mind. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Churchland, P. S. %T Epistemology in the age of neuroscience %I %D 1987 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 84 %N %P 546-53 %Z On paradigm shifts, biology, evolution, connectionism, etc. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book %A Churchland, P. S. %T Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy %I MIT Press %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book %A Clark, A. %T Psychological Models and Neural Mechanisms: An Examination of Reductionism in Psychology %I Oxford University Press %D 1980 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Craver, C. F %A Darden, L. %T Discovering mechanisms in neurobiology: The case of spatial memory. In (P. K. Machamer, R. Grush, and P %I %D 2001 %B 2001 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Craver, C. F. %T Interlevel experiments and multilevel mechanisms in the neuroscience of memory %I %D 2002 %B Philosophy of Science Supplemental Volume %V 69 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Craver, C. F. %T The making of a memory mechanism %I %D 2003 %B Journal of the History of Biology %V 36 %N %P 153-95 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Cruse, H. %T The explanatory power and limits of simulation models in the neurosciences %I University of Pittsburgh Press %D 2001 %B Theory and Method in the Neurosciences %E P. Machamer %E P. McLaughlin %E R. Grush %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Daugman, J. G. %T Brain metaphor and brain theory %I Blackwell %D 2001 %B Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader %E W. Bechtel %E P. Mandik %E J. Mundale %E and R. Stufflebeam %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Garson, J. %T The introduction of information into neurobiology %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy of Science %V 70 %N %P 926-936 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Glymour, C. %T On the methods of cognitive neuropsychology %I %D 1994 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 45 %N %P 815-35 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Grush, R. %T The semantic challenge to computational neuroscience %I University of Pittsburgh Press %D 2001 %B Theory and Method in the Neurosciences %E P. Machamer %E P. McLaughlin %E R. Grush %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Grush, R. %T In defense of some "Cartesian" assumption concerning the brain and its operation %I %D 2003 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 53-92 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %T Reduction, explanatory extension, and the mind/brain sciences %I %D 1992 %B Philosophy of Science %V 59 %N %P 408-28 %Z The relationship between psychology and neuroscience is best characterized not by reduction but by explanatory extension, where each field is enriched by the other. With a number of examples from recent empirical work. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Hardcastle, V. G. %A Stewart, C. M. %T Theory structure in neuroscience %I University of Pittsburgh Press %D 2001 %B Theory and Method in the Neurosciences %E P. Machamer %E P. McLaughlin %E R. Grush %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %A Stewart, C. M. %T What do brain data really show? %I %D 2002 %B Philosophy of Science %V 69 %N %P 572-582 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Hardcastle, V. G. %A Stewart, C. M. %T Neuroscience and the art of single-cell recordings %I %D 2004 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 18 %N %P 195-208 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Hatfield, G. %T Neurophilosophy meets psychology: Reduction, autonomy, and empirical constraints %I %D 1988 %B Cognitive Neuropsychology %V 5 %N %P 723-46 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Hatfield, G. %T Mental functions as constraints on neurophysiology: Biology and psychology of vision. In (V. Hardcastle, ed) Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays %I %D 1999 %B 1999 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Hatfield, G. %T The brain's 'new' science: Psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy of Science %V 67 %N %P 388-404 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Keeley, B. %T Fixing content and function in neurobiological systems: The neuroethology of electroreception %I %D 1999 %B Biology and Philosophy %V 14 %N %P 395-430 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Keeley, B. %T Neuroethology and the philosophy of cognitive science %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy of Science %V 60 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Klagge, J. C. %T Wittgenstein and neuroscience %I %D 1989 %B Synthese %V 78 %N %P 319-43 %Z Wittgenstein wouldn't have liked the Churchlands, as neuro might be chaos, and too much neuro might undermine our self-conception nihilistically. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Kobes, B. %T On a model for psycho-neural coevolution %I %D 1991 %B Behavior and Philosophy %V 19 %N %P 1-17 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Lloyd, D. %T Terra cognita: From functional neuroimaging to the map of the mind %I %D 2000 %B Brain and Mind %V 1 %N %P 93-116 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Lloyd, D. %T Studying the mind from the inside out %I %D 2002 %B Brain and Mind %V 3 %N %P 243-59 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book %A Machamer, P. %A McLaughlin, P. %A Grush, R. %T Theory and Method in the Neurosciences %I University of Pittsburgh Press %D 2001 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Madell, G. %T Neurophilosophy: A principled skeptic's response %I %D 1986 %B 1986 %V %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Manier, E. %T Problems in the development of cognitive neuroscience: Effective communication between scientific domains %I %D 1986 %B Philosophy of Science Association %V 1986 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A McCauley, R. %T Intertheoretic relations and the future of psychology %I %D 1986 %B Philosophy of Science %V 53 %N %P 179-99 %Z Incommensurable theories don't necessarily require elimination, if their relationship is synchronic/interlevel, rather than diachronic/intralevel. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Mucciolo, L. %T The identity thesis and neuropsychology %I %D 1974 %B Nous %V 8 %N %P 327-42 %Z Argues contra Fodor and Block that neurological equipotentiality doesn't refute type materialism. Mental states may not be anatomically defined neural states, but they may be more abstract neural holograms. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Mundale, J. %A Bechtel, W. %T Integrating neuroscience, psychology, and evolutionary biology through a teleological conception of function %I %D 1996 %B Minds and Machines %V 6 %N %P 481-505 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Mundale, J. %T Neuroanatomical foundations of cognition: Connecting the neuronal level with the study of higher brain areas %I Blackwell %D 2001 %B Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader %E W. Bechtel %E P. Mandik %E J. Mundale %E and R. Stufflebeam %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Mundale, J. %T Concepts of localization: Balkanization in the brain %I %D 2002 %B Brain and Mind %V 3 %N %P 313-30 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Northoff, G. %T "Brain-paradox" and "embeddment": Do we need a "philosophy of the brain"? %I %D 2001 %B Brain and Mind %V 195 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book %A Northoff, G. %T Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem %I John Benjamins %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Ravenscroft, I. %T Neuroscience and the mind %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 132-137 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Revonsuo, A. %T On the nature of explanation in the neurosciences %I University of Pittsburgh wPress %D 2001 %B Theory and Method in the Neurosciences %E P. Machamer %E P. McLaughlin %E R. Grush %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Rockwell, W. T. %T On what the mind is identical with %I %D 1994 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 7 %N %P 307-23 %Z Argues that the mind is not identical with the brain -- at the very least, it's the central nervous system, and perhaps more. "Brain" does not denote a natural kind in neurophysiology. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Schutter, D. %A van Honk, J. %A Panksepp, J. %T Introducing transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and its property of causal inference in investigating brain-function relationships %I %D 2004 %B Synthese %V 141 %N %P 155-73 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Smith, A. %T Brain-mind philosophy %I %D 1986 %B Inquiry %V 29 %N %P 203-15 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Skarda, S. %T Explaining behavior: Bringing the brain back in %I %D 1986 %B Inquiry %V 29 %N %P 187-201 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Stoljar, D. %A Gold, S. %T On biological and cognitive neuroscience %I %D 1998 %B Mind and Language %V 13 %N %P 110-31 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Stone, T. %A Davies, M. %T Cognitive neuropsychology and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1993 %B British Journal for the Philosophy of Science %V 44 %N %P 589-622 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Stufflebeam, R. S. %A Bechtel, W. %T PET: Exploring the myth and the method %I %D 1997 %B Philsophy of Science %V 64 %N %P 95-106 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Stufflebeam, R. S. %T Brain matters: A case against representations in the brain %I Blackwell %D 2001 %B Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader %E W. Bechtel %E P. Mandik %E J. Mundale %E and R. Stufflebeam %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Tibbetts, P. %T The concept of voluntary motor control in the recent neuroscientific literature %I %D 2004 %B Synthese %V 141 %N %P 247-76 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book %A Uttal, W. R. %T The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain %I MIT Press %D 2001 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A Uttal, W. R. %T Functional brain mapping: What is it good for? Plenty, but not everything %I %D 2002 %B Brain and Mind %V 3 %N %P 375-79 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A van Orden, G. C. %T Functional neuroimages fail to discover pieces of mind in the parts of the brain %I %D 1997 %B Philosophy of Science Supplement %V 64 %N %P 85-94 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Journal Article %A von Eckardt, B. %T Cognitive psychology and principled skepticism %I %D 1984 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 81 %N %P 67-88 %Z Cognitive psychology can transmogrify itself, who needs neuroscience? -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of neuroscience %U %0 Book Section %A Aizawa, K. %T Cognitive architecture %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Bealer, G. %T The boundary between philosophy and cognitive science %I %D 1987 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 86 %N %P 553-55 %Z Philosophy is autonomous: empirical considerations can't affect it. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A Bermudez, J. %T Philosophy of Psychology %I Routledge %D 2005 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Bickle, J. %T Philosophy of mind and the sciences %I Blackwell %D 2002 %B Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind %E S. Stich %E T. Warfield %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Boden, M. %T The philosopgt of cognitive science %I Cambridge University Press %D 2001 %B Philosophy at the New Millenium %E A. O'Hear %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A Bogdan, R. %T Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others %I MIT Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Chater, N. %A Vitanyi, P. %T Simplicity: A unifying principle in cognitive science? %I %D 2003 %B Trends in Cognitive Science %V 7 %N %P 19-22 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Tacit knowledge and the structure of thought and language %I Blackwell %D 1986 %B Meaning and Interpretation %E C. Travis %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Davies, M. %T Tacit knowledge and subdoxastic states %I Blackwell %D 1989 %B Reflections on Chomsky %E A. George %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A Dupuy, J. %T The Mechanization of the Mind: On the Origins of Cognitive Science %I Princeton University Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A Erneling, C. %T The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Feest, U. %T Functional analysis and the autonomy of psychology %I %D 2003 %B Philosophy of Science %V 70 %N %P 937-948 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A Fetzer, J. H. %T Philosophy and Cognitive Science %I Paragon House %D 1991 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A Flanagan, O. J. %T The Science of the Mind %I MIT Press %D 1984 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Fodor, J. A. %A Pylyshyn, Z. W. %T How direct is visual perception?: Some reflections on Gibson's `ecological approach' %I %D 1981 %B Cognition %V 9 %N %P 139-96 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A Fodor, J. %T In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind %I MIT Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A Hardcastle, V. %T How to Build a Theory in Cognitive Science %I SUNY Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book Section %A Harnad, S. %T Neoconstructivism: A unifying constraint for cognitive science %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1982 %B Language, Mind, and Brain %E T. Simon %E R. Scholes %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Hatfield, G. %T Psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science: Reflections on the history and philosophy of experimental psychology %I %D 2002 %B Mind and Language %V 17 %N %P 207-232 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Haugeland, J. %T The nature and plausibility of cognitivism %I %D 1978 %B Behavioral and Brain Sciences %V 1 %N %P 215-26 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Hooker, C. A. %T The information-processing approach to the brain-mind and its philosophical ramifications %I %D 1975 %B Philosophy and Phenomenological Research %V 36 %N %P 1-15 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Keeley, B. %T Neuroethology and the philosophy of cognitive science %I %D 2000 %B Philosophy of Science %V 67 %N %P 404-418 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Kukla, A. %T Non-empirical issues in psychology %I %D 1989 %B American Psychologist %V 44 %N %P 485-94 %Z On the role of non-empirical advances in psychology: e.g. in theory construction, coherence analysis, conceptual innovation, with the aid of logically necessary truths and the contingent/pragmatic a priori. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A Lloyd, D. %T Simple Minds %I MIT Press %D 1989 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A O'Nuillain, S. %T The Search for Mind: A New Foundation for Cognitive Science %I Ablex %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A O'Nuillain, S. %A McKevitt, P. %A MacAogain, E. %T Two Sciences of Mind %I John Benjamins %D 1997 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Pickering, M. %A Chater, N. %T Why cognitive science is not formalized folk psychology %I %D 1995 %B Minds and Machines %V 5 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Pinker, S. %T So how does the mind work? [With response by Fodor and reply %I %D 2005 %B ] Mind and Language %V 20 %N %P 1-38 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Preston, B. %T Behaviorism and mentalism: Is there a third alternative? %I %D 1994 %B Synthese %V 100 %N %P 167-96 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A Vacariu, G. %A Terhesiu, D. %A Vacariu, M. %T Toward a very idea of representation %I %D 2001 %B Synthese %V 129 %N %P 275-295 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Journal Article %A van Gelder, T. %T The roles of philosophy in cognitive science %I %D 1998 %B Philosophical Psychology %V 11 %N %P 117-36 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A von Eckardt, B. %T What is Cognitive Science? %I MIT Press %D 1993 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of psychology, general, philosophy of cognitive science, misc %U %0 Book %A Armstrong, D. %T The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction %I Westview Press %D 1999 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Baker, L. R. %T Recent work in the philosophy of mind %I %D 1989 %B Philosophical Books %V 30 %N %P 1-9 %Z A general overview. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Baldwin, M. %T Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology %I Westview %D 1998 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Bealer, G. %T The logical status of mind %I %D 1986 %B Midwest Studies in Philosophy %V 10 %N %P %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Bechtel, W. %T Philosophy of Mind: An Overview for Cognitive Science %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1988 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Boden, M. %T The Creative Mind %I Routledge %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Braddon-Mitchell, D. %A Jackson, F. %T Philosophy of Mind and Cognition %I Blackwell %D 1997 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Burge, T. %T Philosophy of language and mind: 1950-1990 %I %D 1992 %B Philosophical Review %V 100 %N %P 3-52 %Z An overview of the last 40 years of the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, covering many issues and trends. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Carruthers, P. %T Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind %I SUNY Press %D 1986 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Carruthers, P. %T The Nature of Mind %I Routledge %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Churchland, P. M. %T Matter and Consciousness %I MIT Press %D 1984 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Crane, T. %T Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind %I Oxford University Press %D 2001 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Crane, T. %T The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines, and Mental Representation %I Routledge %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Cunningham, S. %T What Is a Mind?: An Integrative Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind %I Hackett %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Dennett, D. C. %T Current issues in the philosophy of mind %I %D 1978 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 15 %N %P 249-261 %Z An overview of everything, circa 1978: logical behaviorism, functionalism, the identity theory, qualia, meaning, and so on, with bibliography. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Dodwell, P. %T Brave New Mind: A Thoughtful Inquiry into the Nature and Meaning of Mental Life %I Oxford University Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Graham, G. %T Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction %I Blackwell %D 1993 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Guttenplan, S. %T Mind's Landscape: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind %I Blackwell Publishers %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book Section %A Haldane, J. J. %T Analytical philosophy and the nature of mind: Time for another rebirth? %I Blackwell %D 1994 %B The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate %E R. Warner %E T. Szubka %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Haldane, J. %T The state and fate of contemporary philosophy of mind %I %D 2000 %B American Philosophical Quarterly %V 37 %N %P 301-21 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Hannay, B. %T Subjectivity and Reduction: An Introduction to the Mind-Body Problem %I Westview Press %D 1994 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book Section %A Harman, G. %T Some philosophical issues in cognitive science %I MIT Press %D 1989 %B Foundations of Cognitive Science %E M. Posner %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Heal, J. %T Mind, Reason, and Imagination: Selected Essays in Philosophy of Mind and Language %I Cambridge University Press %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Heil, J. %T Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Hornsby, J. %T Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind %I Harvard University Press %D 2001 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Kim, J. %T Philosophy of Mind %I Westview Press %D 1996 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Lowe, E. J. %T An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind %I Cambridge University Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Lycan, W. G. %T Mind and Cognition: An Anthology, 2nd edition %I Blackwell %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Maslin, K. T. %T An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind %I Blackwell %D 2001 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Maund, B. %T Perception %I Acumen %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A McCullock, G. %T The Life of the Mind %I Routledge %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A McGinn, C. %T The Character of Mind %I Oxford University Press %D 1982 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Noe, A. %A Thompson, E. %T Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception %I MIT Press %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A O'Connor, T. %A Robb, D. %T Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings %I Routledge %D 2003 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Peruzzi, A. %T Mind and Causality %I John Benjamins %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Phillips, H. %T Vicissitudes of the I: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind %I Prentice-Hall %D 1995 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Putnam, H. %T The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World %I Columbia University Press %D 2000 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Quine, W. V. %T States of mind %I %D 1985 %B Journal of Philosophy %V 82 %N %P 5-8 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Rey, G. %T Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: A Contentiously Classical Approach %I Blackwell %D 1997 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Rorty, R. %T Contemporary philosophy of mind %I %D 1982 %B Synthese %V 53 %N %P 323-48 %Z In praise of the "Ryle-Dennett" tradition, and the elimination of dualism from the philosophy of mind. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book Section %A Rorty, R. %T Consciousness, intentionality, and pragmatism %I Lawrence Erlbaum %D 1993 %B Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind %E S. Christensen %E D. Turner %Z A pragmatist perspective on the recent history of the philosophy of mind, focusing on consciousness, intentionality, and mental representation, and on debates between Fodor, Dennett, Searle, Putnam, and Davidson. -DJC %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Searle, J. %T Mind: A Brief Introduction %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Journal Article %A Sellars, W. %T Empiricism and the philosophy of mind %I %D 1956 %B Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science %V 1 %N %P 253-329 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Shaffer, J. A. %T Philosophy of Mind %I Prentice-Hall %D 1964 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Shoemaker, S. %T Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays %I Oxford University Press %D 2004 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Smith, N. ed. %T Reading McDowell: On Mind and World %I Routledge %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Smith, P. %A Jones, O. %T The Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction %I Cambridge University Press %D 1986 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Sprague, E. %T Persons and their Minds: A Philosophical Investigation %I Westview Press %D 1999 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U %0 Book %A Szasz, T. %T The Meaning of Mind: Language, Morality, and Neuroscience %I Syracuse University Press %D 2002 %Z %K philosophy of psychology,philosophy of mind, general %U