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1.1a. Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works (Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works on PhilPapers)

See also:
Armstrong, David M. & Malcolm, Norman (1984). Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 110 | Google)
Barlingay, S. S. (1976). Awareness. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 4 (October):83-96.   (Google)
Block, Ned (forthcoming). Consciousness. In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
Block, Ned (2003). Philosophical issues about consciousness. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.   (Google)
Block, Ned; Flanagan, Owen J. & Guzeldere, Guven (eds.) (1997). The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press.   (Cited by 116 | Annotation | Google)
Block, Ned (2007). Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Catalano, Joseph S. (2000). Thinking Matter: Consciousness From Aristotle to Putnam and Sartre. Routledge.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Chalmers, David J. (2003). Consciousness and its place in nature. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 49 | Google | More links)
Chatterjee, Amita (ed.) (2003). Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1999). Precis of The Conscious Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):435-438.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Chalmers, David J. (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2089 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. & Churchland, Patricia S. (2003). Recent work on consciousness: Philosophical, theoretical, and empirical. In Naoyuki Osaka (ed.), Neural Basis of Consciousness. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Corkum, Phil (forthcoming). Attention, Perception and Thought in Aristotle. Dialogue.   (Google)
Davies, Martin & Humphreys, Glyn W. (1993). Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Blackwell.   (Cited by 26 | Annotation | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2001). Consciousness: How much is that in real money? In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Dittrich, W. H. (1999). More mysteries about consciousness? Book review of Davies & Humphreys on consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This commentary is a plea to re-read after five years one, as it seems, almost forgotten book which has nevertheless clearly influenced the development of empirical approaches to consciousness. The book provides an illuminating look at the early period to the modern revival of consciousness research. Its subtitle 'Psychological and Philosophical Essays' describes the book's range precisely. Early attempts to disect the mystery of consciousness and many themes that are still preoccupying modern consciousness research are covered. While some areas of research have been progressed, theoretical views have not changed dramatically, and this book still seems a good guide to embark on a mysterious journey when exploring consciousness
Flanagan, Owen J. (1991). Consciousness. In Owen J. Flanagan (ed.), The Science of the Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. & Guzeldere, Guven (1997). Consciousness: A philosophical tour. In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. (1992). Consciousness Reconsidered. MIT Press.   (Cited by 413 | Annotation | Google)
Foss, Jeffrey E. (2000). Science and the Riddle of Consciousness: A Solution. Kluwer Academic Publishers.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Abstract: The questions examined in the book speak directly to neuroscientists, computer scientists, psychologists, and philosophers.
Gennaro, Rocco J. (online). Consciousness. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Gray, Jeffrey A. (1995). Consciousness: What is the problem and how should it be addressed? Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1):5-9.   (Google)
Gray, Richard (2003). Recent work on consciousness. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):101-107.   (Google)
Gregory, Richard L. (1988). Consciousness in science and philosophy: Conscience and con-science. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Guzeldere, Guven (1995). Consciousness: What it is, how to study it, what to learn from its history. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (1):30-51.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Guzeldere, Guven (1995). Problems of consciousness: A perspective on contemporary issues, current debates. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:112-43.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Hannay, Alastair (1990). Human Consciousness. Routledge.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Hannay, Alastair (1987). The claims of consciousness: A critical survey. Inquiry 30 (December):395-434.   (Google)
Heinämaa, Sara; Lähteenmäki, Vili & Remes, Pauliina (2007). Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer.   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (2009). Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This book provides a comprehensive and novel theory of consciousness. In clear and non-technical language, Christopher Hill provides interrelated accounts of six main forms of consciousness - agent consciousness, propositional consciousness (consciousness that), introspective consciousness, relational consciousness (consciousness of), experiential consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness. He develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, showing in detail how it can be used to undercut dualistic accounts of mental states. In addition he offers original and stimulating discussions of a range of psychological phenomena, including visual awareness, pain, emotional qualia, and introspection. His important book will interest a wide readership of students and scholars in philosophy of mind and cognitive science
Honderich, Ted (2004). On Consciousness. Edinburgh University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 296 | Google | More links)
Hurley, Susan L. (online). Precis of Consciousness in Action.   (Google)
Jackson, Frank (2005). Consciousness. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press New York.   (Google)
Jackendoff, Ray S. (1987). Consciousness and the Computational Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 612 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Jarvilehto, Timo (online). New directions for consciousness research?   (Google)
Jaynes, Julian (1982). The problem of consciousness. In H. Mifflin (ed.), The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.   (Google)
Josephson, B. D. & Ramachandran, V. S. (eds.) (1980). Consciousness and the Physical World: Edited Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary Symposium on Consciousness Held at the University of Cambridge in January 1978. Pergamon Press.   (Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (1994). Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 48 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2006). Theories of consciousness. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.   (Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2006). Philosophical theories of consciousness: Contemporary western perspectives. In Morris Moscovitch, Evan Thompson & P. Zelazo (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Levine, Joseph (1997). Recent work on consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):379-404.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Livingston, Paul M. (2004). Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The problem of explaining consciousness today depends on the meaning of language: the ordinary language of consciousness in which we define and express our sensations, thoughts, dreams and memories. Paul Livingston argues that this contemporary problem arises from a quest that developed over the twentieth century, and that historical analysis provides new resources for understanding and resolving it. Accordingly, Livingston traces the application of characteristic practices of analytic philosophy to problems about the relationship of experience to linguistic meaning
Lloyd, Dan (2004). Radiant Cool: A Novel Theory of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Lormand, Eric (1996). Consciousness. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Lormand, Eric (online). Steps toward a science of consciousness?   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1987). Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 187 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press.   (Cited by 346 | Google)
McGinn, Colin (2004). Consciousness and Its Objects. Oxford University Press University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Colin McGinn presents his latest work on consciousness in ten interlinked papers, four of them previously unpublished. He extends and deepens his controversial solution to the mind-body problem, defending the view that consciousness is both ontologically unproblematic and epistemologically impenetrable. He also investigates the basis of our knowledge that there is a mind-body problem, and the bearing of this on attempted solutions. McGinn goes on to discuss the status of first-person authority, the possibility of atomism with respect to consciousness, extreme dualism, and the role of non-existent objects in constituting intentionality. He argues that traditional claims about our knowledge of our own mind and of the external world can be inverted; that atomism about the conscious mind might turn out to be true; that dualism is more credible the more extreme it is; and that all intentionality involves non-existent objects. These are all surprising positions, but he contends that what the philosophy of mind needs now is 'methodological radicalism' - a willingness to consider new and seemingly extravagant ideas
Metzinger, Thomas (ed.) (1995). Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 66 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: The contributions to this book are original articles, representing a cross-section of current philosophical work on consciousness and thereby allowing students and readers from other disciplines to acquaint themselves with the very latest debate, so that they can then pursue their own research interests more effectively. The volume includes a bibliography on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science and brain research, covering the last 25 years and consisting of over 1000 entries in 18 thematic sections, compiled by David Chalmers and Thomas Metzinger
Metzinger, Thomas (1985). The problem of consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Minsky, Marvin L. (2006). Consciousness. In Marvin L. Minsky (ed.), The Emotion Machine. Simon & Schuster.   (Google)
Murata, Junichi (1997). Consciousness and the mind-body problem. In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), Cognition, Computation, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Nelkin, Norton (1996). Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book offers a comprehensive and broadly rationalist theory of the mind which continually tests itself against experimental results and clinical data. Taking issue with Empiricists who believe that all knowledge arises from experience and that perception is a non-cognitive state, Norton Nelkin argues that perception is cognitive, constructive, and proposition-like. Further, as against Externalists who believe that our thoughts have meaning only insofar as they advert to the world outside our minds, he argues that meaning is determined 'in the head'. Finally, he offers an account of how we acquire some of our most basic concepts, including the concept of the self and that of other minds
O'Shaughnessy, Brian (2000). Consciousness and the World. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Brian O'Shaughnessy puts forward a bold and original theory of consciousness, one of the most fascinating but puzzling aspects of human existence. He analyzes consciousness into purely psychological constituents, according pre-eminence to epistemological properties. The result is an integrated picture of the conscious mind in its natural physical setting
Papineau, David (2000). Introducing Consciousness. Totem Books.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Papineau, David (2002). Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 101 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The relation between subjective consciousness and the physical brain is widely regarded as the last mystery facing science. Papineau argues that consciousness seems mysterious not because of any hidden essence, but only because we think about it in a special way. He exposes the resulting potential for confusion, and shows that much scientific study of consciousness is misconceived
Papineau, David (2003). Theories of consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Perry, John (2001). Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 72 | Google | More links)
Prather, Alfred G. B. (2005). Philosophy Theory and Structure of Consciousness (Part I and Part II). Kearney: Morris Publ.   (Google)
Raymont, Paul (ms). Conscious Unity.   (Google)
Revonsuo, Antti & Kamppinen, Matti (eds.) (1994). Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Abstract: Consciousness seems to be an enigmatic phenomenon: it is difficult to imagine how our perceptions of the world and our inner thoughts, sensations and feelings could be related to the immensely complicated biological organ we call the brain. This volume presents the thoughts of some of the leading philosophers and cognitive scientists who have recently participated in the discussion of the status of consciousness in science. The focus of inquiry is the question: "Is it possible to incorporate consciousness into science?" Philosophers have suggested different alternatives -- some think that consciousness should be altogether eliminated from science because it is not a real phenomenon, others that consciousness is a real, higher-level physical or neurobiological phenomenon, and still others that consciousness is fundamentally mysterious and beyond the reach of science. At the same time, however, several models or theories of the role of conscious processing in the brain have been developed in the more empirical cognitive sciences. It has been suggested that non-conscious processes must be sharply separated from conscious ones, and that the necessity of this distinction is manifested in the curious behavior of certain brain-damaged patients. This book demonstrates the dialogue between philosophical and empirical points of view. The writers present alternative solutions to the brain-consciousness problem and they discuss how the unification of biological and psychological sciences could thus become feasible. Covering a large ground, this book shows how the philosophical and empirical problems are closely interconnected. From this interdisciplinary exploration emerges the conviction that consciousness can and should be a natural part of our scientific world view
Robinson, William S. (2004). Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: William S. Robinson has for many years written insightfully about the mind-body problem. In Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness he focuses on sensory experience (eg, pain, afterimages) and perception qualities such as colors, sounds and odors to present a dualistic view of the mind, called Qualitative Event Realism, that goes against the dominant materialist views. This theory is relevant to the development of a science of consciousness which is now being pursued not only by philosophers but by researchers in psychology and the brain sciences. This provocative book will interest students and professionals who work in the philosophy of mind and will also have cross-disciplinary appeal in cognitive psychology and the brain sciences
Rogers, A. K. (1920). Some recent theories of consciousness. Mind 29 (115):294-312.   (Google | More links)
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (2004). A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there be a credible alternative? In one classic example, philosophers ask whether we can ever know what is it is like for bats to sense the world using sonar. It seems obvious to many that any amount of information about a bat's physical structure and information processing leaves us guessing about the central questions concerning the character of its experience. A Place for Consciousness begins with reflections on the existence of this gap. Is it just a psychological shortcoming in our merely human understanding of the physical world? Is it a trivial consequence of the simple fact that we just cannot be bats? Or does it mean there really are facts about consciousness over and above the physical facts? If so, what does consciousness do? Why does it exist? Rosenberg sorts out these problems, especially those centering on the causal role of consciousness. He introduces a new paradigm called Liberal Naturalism for thinking about what causation is, about the natural world, and about how to create a detailed model to go along with the new paradigm. Arguing that experience is part of the categorical foundations of causality, he shows that within this new paradigm there is a place for something essentially like consciousness in all its traditional mysterious respects. A striking feature of Liberal Naturalism is that its central tenets are motivated independently of the mind-body problem, by analyzing causation itself. Because of this approach, when consciousness shows up in the picture it is not introduced in an ad hoc way, and its most puzzling features can be explained from first principles. Ultimately, Rosenberg's final solution gives consciousness a causally important role without supposing either that it is physical or that it interacts with the physical
Rosenthal, David M. (2002). Consciousness and the mind. Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (July):227-251.   (Google)
Rowlands, Mark (2001). The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In The Nature of Consciousness, Mark Rowlands develops an innovative and radical account of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, one that has significant consequences for attempts to find a place for it in the natural order. The most significant feature of consciousness is its dual nature: consciousness can be both the directing of awareness and that upon which awareness is directed. Rowlands offers a clear and philosophically insightful discussion of the main positions in this fast-moving debate, and argues that the phenomenal aspects of conscious experience are aspects that exist only in the directing of experience towards non-phenomenal objects, a theory that undermines reductive attempts to explain consciousness in terms of what is not conscious. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in the philosophy of mind and language, psychology, and cognitive science
Sahu, Gopal (2002). Multi-disciplinary research on consciousness: What philosophy can do. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (1):179-186.   (Google)
Sayre, Kenneth M. (1969). Consciousness: A Philosophic Study of Minds and Machines. Random House.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Seager, William E. (2007). A brief history of the philosophical problem of consciousness. In P.D. Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Searle, John R. (2000). Consciousness. Intellectica 31:85-110.   (Cited by 76 | Google | More links)
Searle, John R. (1987). Consciousness and the philosophers. New York Review of Books 44 (4).   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Seager, William E. (1999). Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment. Routledge.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Theories of Consciousness provides an introduction to a variety of approaches to consciousness, questions the nature of consciousness, and contributes to current debates about whether a scientific understanding of consciousness is possible. While discussing key figures including Descartes, Fodor, Dennett and Chalmers, the book incorporates identity theories, representational theories, intentionality, externalism and new information-based theories
Searle, John R. (1993). The problem of consciousness. Social Research 60 (1):3-16.   (Cited by 29 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: The most important scientific discovery of the present era will come when someone -- or some group -- discovers the answer to the following question: How exactly do neurobiological processes in the brain cause consciousness? This is the most important question facing us in the biological sciences, yet it is frequently evaded, and frequently misunderstood when not evaded. In order to clear the way for an understanding of this problem. I am going to begin to answer four questions: 1. What is consciousness? 2. What is the relation of consciousness to the brain? 3. What are some of the features that an empirical theory of consciousness should try to explain? 4. What are some common mistakes to avoid?
Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine (1998). Consciousness: A natural history. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (3):260-94.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Siewert, Charles (2000). Precis of The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 6 (12).   (Google)
Siewert, Charles (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 159 | Google | More links)
Abstract: "This is a marvelous book, full of subtle, thoughtful, and original argument.
Smith, Quentin & Jokic, Aleksandar (eds.) (2003). Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Consciousness is perhaps the most puzzling problem we humans face in trying to understand ourselves. Here, eighteen essays offer new angles on the subject. The contributors, who include many of the leading figures in philosophy of mind, discuss such central topics as intentionality, phenomenal content, and the relevance of quantum mechanics to the study of consciousness
Stoljar, Daniel (2006). Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ignorance and Imagination advances a novel way to resolve the central philosophical problem about the mind: how it is that consciousness or experience fits into a larger naturalistic picture of the world. The correct response to the problem, Stoljar argues, is not to posit a realm of experience distinct from the physical, nor to deny the reality of phenomenal experience, nor even to rethink our understanding of consciousness and the language we use to talk about it. Instead, we should view the problem itself as a consequence of our ignorance of the relevant physical facts. Stoljar shows that this change of orientation is well motivated historically, empirically, and philosophically, and that it has none of the side effects it is sometimes thought to have. The result is a philosophical perspective on the mind that has a number of far-reaching consequences: for consciousness studies, for our place in nature, and for the way we think about the relationship between philosophy and science
Strawson, Galen (1994). Mental Reality. MIT Press.   (Cited by 121 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Introduction -- A default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism -- The linguistic argument -- Materialism and monism -- A comment on reduction -- The impossibility of an objective phenomenology -- Asymmetry and reduction -- Equal-status monism -- Panpsychism -- The inescapability of metaphysics -- Agnostic materialism, part 2 -- Ignorance -- Sensory spaces -- Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration -- The hard part of the mind-body problem -- Neutral monism and agnostic monism -- A comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on -- Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism -- Mentalism -- Strict or pure process idealism -- Active-principle idealism -- Stuff idealism -- Immaterialism -- The positions restated -- The dualist options -- Frege's thesis -- Objections to pure process idealism -- The problem of mental dispositions -- Mental -- Shared abilities -- The sorting ability -- The definition of mental being -- Mental phenomena -- The view that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena -- Natural intentionality -- E/c intentionality -- The experienceless -- Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects -- Experience, purely experiential content, and n/c intentionality -- Concepts in nature -- Intentionality and experience -- Summary with problem -- Pain and pain -- The neo-behaviorist view -- A linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior -- A challenge -- The Sirians -- N.N. Novel -- An objection to the Sirians -- The Betelgeuzians -- The point of the Sirians -- Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain -- Unpleasantness and qualitative character -- The weather watchers -- The rooting story -- What is it like to be a weather watcher? -- The aptitudes of mental states -- The argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space -- The argument from the conditions for language ability -- The argument from the nature of desire -- Desire and affect -- The argument from the phenomenology of desire -- Behavior -- A hopeless definition -- Difficulties -- Other-observability -- Neo-behaviorism -- The concept of mind.
Strong, Charles A. (1912). The nature of consciousness III. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (22):589-603.   (Google | More links)
Strong, Charles A. (1912). The nature of consciousness I. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (20):533-544.   (Google | More links)
Strong, Charles A. (1912). The nature of consciousness II. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (21):561-573.   (Google | More links)
Sturgeon, Scott (2000). Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and Nature. Routledge.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The mind-body problem continues to be the focus of many of our philosophical concerns. Matters of Mind tackles how the problem has spanned and how it has changed from the earlier theories of reducing aboutness to empirical cases for physicalism. The theories of perception, property explanation, content and knowledge, reliabilism and the problem of zombies and ghosts are all carefully assessed
Sutherland, Keith (1998). The mirror of consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):235-244.   (Google)
Thompson, Evan (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Thompson, Evan & Zahavi, Dan (2007). Philosophical theories of consciousness: Continental perspectives. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Tson, M. E. (ms). From Dust to Descartes: A Mechanical and Evolutionary Explanation of Consciousness and Self-Awareness.   (Google)
Abstract: Beginning with physical reactions as simple and mechanical as rust, From Dust to Descartes goes step by evolutionary step to explore how the most remarkable and personal aspects of consciousness have arisen, how our awareness of the world of ourselves differs from that of other species, and whether machines could ever become self-aware. Part I addresses a newborn’s innate abilities. Part II shows how with these and experience, we can form expectations about the world. Parts III concentrates on the essential role that others play in the formation of self-awareness. Part IV then explores what follows from this explanation of human consciousness, touching on topics such as free will, personality, intelligence, and color perception which are often associated with self-awareness and the philosophy of mind.
Tye, Michael (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.   (Cited by 213 | Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (2007). Philosophical problems of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Tye, Michael (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 538 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Tye's book develops a persuasive and, in many respects, original argument for the view that the qualitative side of our mental life is representational in...
van Gulick, Robert (online). Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Velmans, Max (2001). A natural account of phenomenal consciousness. Communication and Cognition 34 (1):39-59.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Physicalists commonly argue that conscious experiences are nothing more than states of the brain, and that conscious qualia are observer-independent, physical properties of the external world. Although this assumes the 'mantle of science,' it routinely ignores the findings of science, for example in sensory physiology, perception, psychophysics, neuropsychology and comparative psychology. Consequently, although physicalism aims to naturalise consciousness, it gives an unnatural account of it. It is possible, however, to develop a natural, nonreductive, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and the physical world. This paper introduces such a model and how it construes the nature of conscious experience. Within this model the physical world as perceived (the phenomenal world) is viewed as part of conscious experience not apart from it. While in everyday life we treat this phenomenal world as if it is the "physical world", it is really just one biologically useful representation of what the world is like that may differ in many respects from the world described by physics. How the world as perceived relates to the world as described by physics can be investigated by normal science (e.g. through the study of sensory physiology, psychophysics and so on). This model of consciousness appears to be consistent with both third-person evidence of how the brain works and with first-person evidence of what it is like to have a given experience. According to the reflexive model, conscious experiences are really how they seem
Velmans, Max & Schneider, Susan (eds.) (2007). The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: With fifty-five peer reviewed chapters written by the leading authors in the field, The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness is the most extensive and comprehensive survey of the study of consciousness available today. Provides a variety of philosophical and scientific perspectives that create a breadth of understanding of the topic Topics include the origins and extent of consciousness, different consciousness experiences, such as meditation and drug-induced states, and the neuroscience of consciousness
Villaneuva, E. (ed.) (1991). Consciousness: Philosophical Issues. Ridgeview.   (Annotation | Google)
Weisberg, Josh (2007). The Problem of Consciousness: Mental Appearance and Mental Reality. Dissertation, The City University of New York   (Google)
Abstract: of (from Philosophy Dissertations Online)
Woodbridge, Frederick J. E. (1936). The problem of consciousness again. Journal of Philosophy 33 (21):561-568.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)