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Philosophy of Consciousness :: Consciousness :: Consciousness, Miscellaneous

See also:
Burton, Robert G. (2005). A multilevel, interdisciplinary approach to phenomenal consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):531-543. (Google)
Byrne, Alex; Hilbert, David & Siegel, Susanna (online). Do we see more than we can access? (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2001). Who is blind to blindsight? Psyche 7 (4). (Google | View target article(s))
Chalmers, David J. (1997). Response to Searle. New York Review of Books 44 (8). (Google | View target article(s))
Clark, Andy (2000). Phenomenal immediacy and the doors of sensation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):21-24. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cody, Arthur B. (1994). Hannay's consciousness. Inquiry 37 (1):117-132. (Google)
Corkum, Phil (2004). Aristotle on consciousness. Newsletters for the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy 5 (1):1-14. (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2005). Two steps closer on consciousness. In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (2001). First person warrant: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 7 (11). (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | View replies | View target article(s))
Dreyfus, George & Thompson, Evan (2007). Philosophical theories of consciousness: Asian perspectives. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge. (Google)
Gale, Richard M. (online). William James on the misery and glory of consciousness. (Google)
Gertler, Brie (online). Critical study of Daniel Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness. (Google)
Gertler, Brie (2001). The relationship between phenomenality and intentionality: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 7 (17). (Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Graham, George & Horgan, Terence E. (1998). Sensations and grain processes. In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins. (Cited by 4 | Google)
Hannay, Alastair (1994). Comments on Honderich, Sprigge, Dreyfus and Rubin, and Elster. Synthese 98 (1):95-112. (Google | More links)
Harré, Rom (2000). Social construction and consciousness. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company.. (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (online). Is there a substantive disagreement here? Reply to Chemero and Cordeiro. (Google | View target article(s))
Hurley, Susan L. (online). The space of reasons vs. the space of inference: Reply to Noe. (Google | View target article(s))
Kirk, Robert E. (2002). Thinking about Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. SWIF Philosophy of Mind [December 2. (Google | More links | View replies | View target article(s))
Levin, Janet (1997). Consciousness disputed (review of Chalmers, Dretske, and tye). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):91-107. (Google)
Levine, Joseph M. (2001). Phenomenal consciousness and the first-person. Psyche 7 (10). (Google | View target article(s))
Livingston, Paul M. (2002). Experience and structure: Philosophical history and the problem of consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 9 (3):15-33. (Google | More links)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (2002). Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality: Comments on The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 8 (8). (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | View target article(s))
Lurz, Robert W. (2001). Taking the first-person approach: Two worries for Siewert's sense of 'consciousness'. Psyche 7 (14). (Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Lycan, William G. (2001). Have we neglected phenomenal consciousness? Psyche 7 (3). (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | View replies | View target article(s))
Melnuk, Andrew (2002). Papineau on the intuition of distinctness. SWIF Philosophy of Mind 10. (Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Nagel, Thomas (1993). The mind wins. New York Review of Books, March 4. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2000). On the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness: Further considerations in the light of James's conception. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):139-166. (Google)
Nelkin, Dana K. (2001). Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. Psyche 7 (13). (Google | More links | View replies | View target article(s))
Noë, Alva (online). Perception, action, and nonconceptual content. (Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Papineau, David (2003). Reply to Kirk and Melnyk. SWIF Philosophy of Mind 9. (Google | More links | View target article(s))
Rosenthal, David (web). Phenomenological overflow and cognitive access. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. (Google)
Seager, William E. (2001). Consciousness, value and functionalism. Psyche 7 (20). (Google | More links | View replies | View target article(s))
Siewert, Charles (2004). Replies. Psyche. (Google | View target article(s))
Smith, A. D. (2001). O'Shaughnessy's consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):532-539. (Google | More links)
Sundstrom, Par (2006). Review of Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. Theoria 76 (1). (Google | View target article(s))
Sundström, Pär (2005). Wittgenstein, consciousness, and the mind. Sorites 16 (December):6-22. (Google | More links)
Thomas, Alan (1997). Kant, McDowell and the theory of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):283-305. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Witmer, D. Gene (2001). Experience, appearance, and hidden features. Psyche 7 (9). (Google | View replies | View target article(s))

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