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1.1c. Philosophy of Consciousness, Misc (Philosophy of Consciousness, Misc on PhilPapers)

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Becker, Joe (2008). Conceptualizing Mind and Consciousness: Using Constructivist Ideas to Transcend the Physical Bind. Human Development 51 (3):165-189.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophers and scientists seeking to conceptualize consciousness, and subjective experience in particular, have focused on sensation and perception, and have emphasized binding – how a percept holds together. Building on a constructivist approach to conception centered on separistic-holistic complexes incorporating multiple levels of abstraction, the present approach reconceptualizes binding and opens a new path to theorizing the emergence of consciousness. It is proposed that all subjective experience involves multiple levels of abstraction, a central feature of conception. This modifies the prevalent idea of sequential development from sensation through perception to conception. Further, this approach to mind and consciousness links constructivist theory to artistic activity and suggests that conception, subjective experience, aboutness (intentionality), and agency are linked together through separistic-holistic complexes. It also argues for change in the prevailing constructivist view that regards the process of production of new levels of conception as inherently directed towards better fit with the external environment. Copyright © 2008 S. Karger AG, Basel
Burton, Robert G. (2005). A multilevel, interdisciplinary approach to phenomenal consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):531-543.   (Google)
Byrne, Alex; Hilbert, David & Siegel, Susanna (online). Do we see more than we can access?   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2001). Who is blind to blindsight? Psyche 7 (4).   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (unknown). On ``consciousness and the philosophers''. .   (Google)
Abstract: John Searle's review of my book The Conscious Mind appeared in the March 6, 1997 edition of the New York Review of Books. I replied in a letter printed in their May 15, 1997 edition, and Searle's response appeared simultaneously. I set up this web page so that interested people can see my reply to Searle in turn, and to give access to other relevant materials
Chalmers, David J. (unknown). Reply to mulhauser's review of the conscious mind. .   (Google)
Abstract: First, I should clarify the notion of "taking consciousness seriously", which serves as a premise in my work. Mulhauser characterizes this as the assumption that no cognitive theory of consciousness will suffice. The latter assumption would indeed beg some crucial questions, but it is not the assumption that I make. I make an assumption about the problem of consciousness, not about any solution. To quote (p. xii): Throughout the book, I have assumed that consciousness exists, and that to redefine the problem as that of explaining how certain cognitive and behavioral functions are performed is unacceptable. This is what I mean by taking consciousness seriously. That is, the premise is simply that there is a phenomenon to be explained, and that the problems of explaining such functions as discrimination, integration, self monitoring, reportability, and so on do not exhaust all the problems in the vicinity. The deepest problem of consciousness, as I understand it, is not the problem of how all these functions are performed, but rather the problem of explaining how and why all this activity supports states of subjective experience
Chalmers, David J. (1997). Response to Searle. New York Review of Books 44 (8).   (Google)
Abstract: In my book _The Conscious Mind_ , I deny a number of claims that John Searle finds "obvious", and I make some claims that he finds "absurd". But if the mind/body problem has taught us anything, it is that nothing about consciousness is obvious, and that one person's obvious truth is another person's absurdity. So instead of throwing around this sort of language, it is best to examine the claims themselves and the arguments that I give for them, to see whether Searle says anything of substance that touches them
Clark, Andy (2000). Phenomenal immediacy and the doors of sensation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):21-24.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cody, Arthur B. (1994). Hannay's consciousness. Inquiry 37 (1):117-132.   (Google)
Corkum, Phil (2005). Aristotle on consciousness. Newsletters for the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy 5 (1):80-93.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2005). Two steps closer on consciousness. In Brian L. Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: For a solid quarter century Paul Churchland and I have been wheeling around in the space of work on consciousness, and though from up close it may appear that we =ve been rather vehemently opposed to each other =s position, from the bird =s eye view, we are moving in a rather tight spiral within the universe of contested views, both staunch materialists, interested in the same phenomena and the same empirical theories of those phenomena, but differing only over where the main chance lies for progress
Dretske, Fred (2001). First person warrant: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 7 (11).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dreyfus, George & Thompson, Evan (2007). Philosophical theories of consciousness: Asian perspectives. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Gale, Richard M. (online). William James on the misery and glory of consciousness.   (Google)
Gertler, Brie (2001). The relationship between phenomenality and intentionality: Comments on Siewert's The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 7 (17).   (Google)
Abstract: Charles Siewert offers a persuasive argument to show that the presence of certain phenomenal features logically suffices for the presence of certain intentional ones. He claims that this shows that (some) phenomenal features are inherently intentional. I argue that he has not established the latter thesis, even if we grant the logical sufficiency claim. For he has not ruled out a rival alternative interpretation of the relevant data, namely, that (some) intentional features are inherently phenomenal
Graham, George & Horgan, Terence E. (1998). Sensations and grain processes. In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Hannay, Alastair (1994). Comments on Honderich, Sprigge, Dreyfus and Rubin, and Elster. Synthese 98 (1):95-112.   (Google | More links)
Harr, (2000). Social construction and consciousness. In Max Velmans (ed.), Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps. Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company..   (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (online). Is there a substantive disagreement here? Reply to Chemero and Cordeiro.   (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (online). The space of reasons vs. the space of inference: Reply to Noe.   (Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (2002). Thinking about Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. SWIF Philosophy of Mind [December 2.   (Google | More links)
Levin, Janet (1997). Consciousness disputed (review of Chalmers, Dretske, and tye). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):91-107.   (Google)
Levine, Joseph (2001). Phenomenal consciousness and the first-person. Psyche 7 (10).   (Google)
Lähteenmäki, Vili (2007). Orders of Consciousness and Forms of Reflexivity in Descartes. In Sara Heinämaa, Vili Lähteenmäki & Pauliina Remes (eds.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer.   (Google)
Lähteenmäki, Vili (2008). The Sphere of Experience in Locke: The Relations Between Reflection, Consciousness, and Ideas. Locke Studies 8 (1):59-100.   (Google)
Livingston, Paul M. (2002). Experience and structure: Philosophical history and the problem of consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 9 (3):15-33.   (Google | More links)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (2002). Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality: Comments on The Significance of Consciousness. Psyche 8 (8).   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: _The Significance of Consciousness_ . Princeton: Princeton University Press. $42.50 hbk. x + 374pp. ISBN: 0691027242. ABSTRACT: I discuss three issues about the relation of phenomenal consciousness, in the sense Siewert isolates, to
Lurz, Robert W. (2001). Taking the first-person approach: Two worries for Siewert's sense of 'consciousness'. Psyche 7 (14).   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (2001). Have we neglected phenomenal consciousness? Psyche 7 (3).   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Charles Siewert's _The Significance of Consciousness_ contends that most philosophers and psychologists who have written about "consciousness" have neglected a crucial type or aspect that Siewert calls "phenomenal consciousness" and tries carefully to define. The present article argues that some philosophers, at least, have not neglected phenomenal consciousness and have offered tenable theories of it
Melnuk, Andrew (2002). Papineau on the intuition of distinctness. SWIF Philosophy of Mind 10.   (Google)
Nagel, Thomas (1993). The mind wins. New York Review of Books, March 4.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2000). On the intrinsic nature of states of consciousness: Further considerations in the light of James's conception. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):139-166.   (Google)
Abstract: How are the states of consciousness intrinsically so that they all qualify as ?feelings? in William James?s generic sense? Only a small, propaedeutic part of what is required to address the intrinsic nature of such states can be accomplished here. I restrict my topic mainly to a certain characteristic that belongs to each of those pulses of mentality that successively make up James?s stream of consciousness. Certain statements of James?s are intended to pick out the variable ?width? belonging to a stream of consciousness as it flows. Attention to this proposed property brings me to a discussion of (a) the unitary character of each of the states of consciousness however complex they may frequently be and (b) how to conceive of their complexity without recourse to a misleading spatial metaphor
Nelkin, Dana K. (2001). Phenomenal consciousness and intentionality. Psyche 7 (13).   (Google)
Abstract: Siewert identifies a special kind of conscious experience, phenomenal consciousness, that is the sort of consciousness missing in a variety of cases of blindsight. He then argues that phenomenal consciousness has been neglected by students of consciousness when it should not be. According to Siewert, the neglect is based at least in part on two false assumptions: (i) phenomenal features are not intentional and (ii) phenomenal character is restricted to sensory experience. By identifying an essential tension in Siewert's characterization of phenomenal consciousness, I argue that his case for denying (i) and (ii) is at best incomplete
Noe, Alva (ms). Perception, action, and nonconceptual content.   (Google)
Abstract: profile deforms as we move about it. As perceivers we are masters of the patterns of sensorimotor contingency that shape our perceptual interaction with the world. We expect changes in such things as apparent size, shape and color to occur as we actively explore the environment. In encountering perspective-dependent changes of this sort, we learn how things are quite apart form our particular perspective. Our possession of these skills is constitutive of our ability to see (and generally to perceive). This is confirmed by the fact that we can disrupt a person
Papineau, David (2003). Reply to Kirk and Melnyk. SWIF Philosophy of Mind 9.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I am lucky to have two such penetrating commentators as Robert Kirk and Andrew Melnyk. It is also fortunate that they come at me from different directions, and so cover different aspects of my book. Robert Kirk has doubts about the overall structure of my enterprise, and in particular about my central commitment to a distinctive species of phenomenal concepts. Andrew Melnyk, by contrast, offers no objections to my general brand of materialism. Instead he focuses specifically on my discussion of the anti-materialist 'intuition of distinctness', raising questions about my attempt to explain this intuition away, and offering alternative suggestions of his own
Piccinini, Gualtiero (2007). The Ontology of Creature Consciousness: A Challenge for Philosophy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):103-104.   (Google)
Abstract: I appeal to Merker's theory to motivate a hypothesis about the ontology of consciousness: Creature consciousness is (at least partially) constitutive of phenomenal consciousness. Rather than elaborating theories of phenomenal consciousness couched solely in terms of state consciousness, as philosophers are fond of doing, a correct approach to phenomenal consciousness should begin with an account of creature consciousness.
Robbins, Philip (2008). Consciousness and the social mind. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2):15-23.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David (web). Phenomenological overflow and cognitive access. Behavioral and Brain Sciences.   (Google)
Seager, William E. (2001). Consciousness, value and functionalism. Psyche 7 (20).   (Google)
Siewert, Charles (2004). Replies. Psyche.   (Google)
Smith, A. D. (2001). O'Shaughnessy's consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):532-539.   (Google | More links)
Sundstrom, Par (2006). Review of Papineau's Thinking About Consciousness. Theoria 76 (1).   (Google)
Sundström, Pär (2005). Wittgenstein, consciousness, and the mind. Sorites 16 (December):6-22.   (Google | More links)
Sytsma, Justin (2009). Phenomenological obviousness and the new science of consciousness. Philosophy of Science 76 (5).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Is phenomenal consciousness a problem for the brain sciences? An increasing number of researchers hold not only that it is but that its very existence is a deep mystery. That this problematic phenomenon exists is generally taken for granted: It is asserted that phenomenal consciousness is just phenomenologically obvious. In contrast, I hold that there is no such phenomenon and, thus, that it does not pose a problem for the brain sciences. For this denial to be plausible, however, I need to show that phenomenal consciousness is not phenomenologically obvious. That is the goal of this article. †To contact the author, please write to: 1414 Simona Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15201; e‐mail:
Thomas, Alan (1997). Kant, McDowell and the theory of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):283-305.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper examines some of the central arguments of John McDowell's Mind and World, particularly his treatment of the Kantian themes of the spontaneity of thought and of the nature of self-consciousness. It is argued that in so far as McDowell departs from Kant, his position becomes less plausible in three respects. First, the space of reason is identified with the space of responsible and critical freedom in a way that runs together issues about synthesis below the level of concepts and at the level of complete judgements. This leads to the unwarranted exclusion of animal minds from the space of reasons. Second, McDowell draws no essential distinction between apperception and inner sense, a distinction which is important to a defensible Kantian view and to the very idea of a sui generis transcendental knowledge of the mind that is consistent with Kant's critical principles. McDowell does not take into account some of Kant's developed arguments about the inherently reflective nature of consciousness which is interpreted as an adverbial theory of the nature of conscious experience, a mode of being in a mental state (so neither an intrinsic nor extrinsic property of it). Third, McDowell endorses a standard treatment of Kant's approach to the mind in which a merely formal account of mind needs to be anchored outside consciousness on the physical body. The arguments for this conclusion, both in Mind and World and in related work by Bermudez and Hurley, is shown to be very inconclusive as a criticism of Kant. The capacity to self-ascribe thoughts that are already conscious shows, but does not say, a truth about the unity of our conscious experience that does not require further anchoring on a physical body; at that stage of the Critique Kant is describing conditions for conscious experience in general, not the conscious experience of spatio-temporally located makers of judgements. The alleged lacuna in Kant's arguments is no lacuna at all
Thomas, Nigel (ms). The study of imagination as an approach to consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: The concept of consciousness appears to have had little currency before the 17th century. Not only did philosophers before Descartes fail to worry about how consciousness fitted into the natural world, they did not even claim to be conscious. If we are conscious, however, we must assume that they were too, and it hardly seems plausible that they could have been unaware of it. In fact, when the mind was discussed in former ages, both before and within the work of Descartes, the concept of imagination filled most (not all) of the key conceptual roles that consciousness fills today. Although it was not considered uniquely problematic, in the way that consciousness is, imagination continued to be used in these ways long after the Cartesian revolution. It was both the mental arena where thinking took place - where ideas (images) had their being and their interaction - and, implicitly, the power whereby the deliverances of the material sense organs were integrated and rendered meaningful (and, thereby, rendered 'mental'). This suggests that the study of the imagination (in the relevant senses) ought to have a considerable bearing on the study of consciousness, and it may even provide a way to outflank the notorious 'hard problem' that seems to stand in the way of a direct scientific assault on consciousness itself
Tranchina, Michael, Freedom and Spirituality.   (Google)
Abstract: This essay explores the phenomenon of spirituality by delineating of the rise of free will as a product of a reflective consciousness synthesized from conditioned responses resulting from external demands.
Uzgalis, William (2008). Review of Barry Dainton, The Phenomenal Self. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (12).   (Google)
Velmans, Prof Max (2009). Psychophysical nature. In Cogprints.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain. The chapter examines each of these relationships and positions them within a dual-aspect, reflexive model of how consciousness relates to the brain and external world. The chapter goes on to provide grounds for viewing mind and nature as fundamentally psychophysical, and examines similar views as well as differences in previously unpublished writings of Wolfgang Pauli, one of the founders of quantum mechanics
Vosgerau, Gottfried (2009). Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness: From Basic Self-Representation to Self-Related Cognition. Dissertation, Ruhr-Universität Bochum   (Google)
Abstract: One oft the most fascinating abilities of humans is the ability to become conscious of the own physical and mental states. In this systematic investigation of self-consciousness, a representational theory is developed that is able to distinguish between different levels of self-consciousness. The most basic levels are already present in such simple animals as ants. From these basic forms, which are also relevant for adult human self-consciousness, high-level self-consciousness including self-knowledge can arise. Thereby, the theory is not only able to integrate developmental considerations but also to sharply distinguish different aspects of the complex phenomenon self-consciousness. Pathological breakdowns of these different aspects, as they can be found in schizophrenia, are explained by specific impairments on different levels of self-representation. In this way, the work shows that a naturalistic theory of self-consciousness is possible, if the analysis starts with very simple and basic mechanisms instead of starting on the »top of the iceberg«.
Witmer, D. Gene (2001). Experience, appearance, and hidden features. Psyche 7 (9).   (Google)