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Philosophy of Consciousness :: Explaining Consciousness?

1.2a What is it Like?

See also: 1.2b. Subjectivity and Objectivity, 1.2c. The Explanatory Gap, 1.3a. The Knowledge Argument, 3.6e. Perception and Phenomenology.

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1.2b Subjectivity and Objectivity

See also: 1.2a. What is it Like?, 1.3a. The Knowledge Argument, 1.6a. Self-Consciousness, 4.8d. The Self.

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