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1.2e. Cognitive Closure (Cognitive Closure on PhilPapers)

See also:
Allen, Sophie R. (online). A space oddity: McGinn on consciousness and space.   (Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. & Beroukhim, E. (2003). McGinn on consciousness and the mind-body problem. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Dauer, Francis W. (2001). McGinn's materialism and epiphenomenalism. Analysis 61 (2):136-139.   (Google | More links)
Davies, W. M. (1999). Sir William Mitchell and the "new mysterianism". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):253-73.   (Google | More links)
de Leon, David (1995). The limits of thought and the mind-body problem. Lund University Cognitive Studies 42.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper gives an account of Colin McGinn's essay: "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?". McGinn's answer to his own essay title is that the problem is forever beyond us due to the particular nature of our cognitive abilities.The present author offers a number of criticisms of the arguments which support this conclusion
Dietrich, Eric & Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2004). Sisyphus's Boulder: Consciousness and the Limits of the Knowable. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Sisyphus's Boulder, Eric Dietrich and Valerie Hardcastle argue that we will never get such a theory because consciousness has an essential property that...
Garcia, Robert K. (2000). Minds sans miracles: Colin McGinn's naturalized mysterianism. Philosophia Christi 2 (2):227-242.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Garvey, J. C. (1997). What does McGinn think we cannot know? Analysis 57 (3):196-201.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hanson, Philip P. (1993). McGinn's cognitive closure. Dialogue 32 (3):579-85.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Jäger, Christoph (online). Skepticism, information, and closure.   (Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (1991). Why shouldn't we be able to solve the mind-body problem? Analysis 51 (January):17-23.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Kraemer, Eric Russert (2006). Moral mysterianism. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):69-77.   (Google)
Krellenstein, Marc F. (1995). Unsolvable problems, visual imagery, and explanatory satisfaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 16 (3):235-54.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It has been suggested that certain problems may be unsolvable because of the mind's cognitive structure, but we may wonder what problems, and exactly why. The ultimate origin of the universe and the mind-body problem seem to be two such problems. As to why, Colin McGinn has argued that the mind-body problem is unsolvable because any theoretical concepts about the brain will be observation-based and unable to connect to unobservable subjective experience. McGinn's argument suggests a requirement of imagability -- an observation basis -- for physical causal explanation that cannot be met for either of these problems. Acausal descriptions may be possible but not the causal analyses that provide the greatest explanatory satisfaction, a psychological phenomenon that seems tied to the strength of the underlying observation basis but is affected by other factors as well
Kriegel, Uriah (2004). The new mysterianism and the thesis of cognitive closure. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):177-191.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The paper discusses Colin McGinn’s mysterianist approach to the phenomenon of consciousness. According to McGinn, consciousness is, in and of itself, a fully natural phenomenon, but we humans are just cognitively closed to it, meaning that we cannot in principle understand its nature. I argue that, on a proper conception of the relation between an intellectual problem and its solution, we may well not know what the solution is to a problem we understand, or we may not understand exactly what the problem is, but it is incoherent to suppose that we cannot understand what would count as a solution to a problem we can and do understand. The argument appeals to certain accepted assumption in the logic of questions, developed in the early sixties, mainly by Stahl. I close with a general characterization of mysterianism as such, and formulate a form of mysterianism which is in some sense more optimistic and in another more pessimistic than McGinn’s
Kukla, Andr (1995). Mystery, mind, and materialism. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):255-64.   (Google)
Abstract: McGinn claims that (1) there is nothing “inherently mysterious” about consciousness, even though (2) we will never be able to understand it. The first claim is no more than a rhetorical flourish. The second may be read either as a claim (1) that we are unable to construct an explanatory theory of consciousness, or (2) that any such theory must strike us as unintelligible, in the sense in which quantum mechanics is sometimes said to be unintelligible. On the first reading, McGinn's argument is based on a false premiss (the “homogeneity constraint"). On the second reading, it suffers from the shortcoming that the central notion of intelligibility is too obscure to permit any definite conclusion. I close with a brief discussion of the contemporary tendency to reject non-physicalist approaches to consciousness on a priori grounds
McDonough, Richard M. (1992). The last stand of mechanism. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 6 (3):206-25.   (Google)
McGinn, Colin (1995). Consciousness and space. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
McGinn, Colin (1991). Consciousness and the natural order. In The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Annotation | Google)
McGinn, Colin (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66.   (Cited by 138 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McGinn, Colin (1993). Problems in Philosophy. Blackwell.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
McGinn, Colin (1991). The hidden structure of consciousness. In The Problem of Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
McGinn, Colin (1999). The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. Basic Books.   (Cited by 61 | Google | More links)
McGinn, Colin (1991). The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Toward a Resolution. Blackwell.   (Cited by 185 | Annotation | Google)
McGinn, Colin (2003). What constitutes the mind-body problem. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):148-62.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Megill, Jason L. (2005). Locke's mysterianism: On the unsolvability of the mind-body problem. Locke Studies 5:119-147.   (Google)
Murphy, Peter (2006). A strategy for assessing closure (epistemic closure principle). Erkenntnis 65 (3):365-383.   (Google)
P, (2005). Mysteries and scandals: Transcendental naturalism and the future of philosophy. Critica 37 (110):35-52.   (Google)
Rowlands, Mark (2007). Mysterianism. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Sacks, Mark (1994). Cognitive closure and the limits of understanding. Ratio 7 (1):26-42.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Taliaferro, Charles (1999). Mysterious flames in philosophy of mind. Philosophia Christi 1 (2):21-31.   (Google)
Whitely, C. H. (1990). McGinn on the mind-body problem. Mind 99 (394):289.   (Google | More links)
Worley, Sara (2000). What is property p, anyway? Analysis 60 (1):58-62.   (Google | More links)