MindPapers: 1.2f. Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment

Blackburn, Simon (2000). Critical notice of Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):119 – 124. (Google)

Block, Ned & Stalnaker, Robert (1999). Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap. Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46. (Cited by 119 | Google | More links)

Bloomfield, Paul (2005). Let's be realistic about serious metaphysics. Synthese 144 (1):69-90. (Google)

Byrne, Alex (1999). Cosmic hermeneutics. Philosophical Perspectives. (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)

Carruthers, Peter (2004). Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-174. (Cited by 10 | Google)

Chalmers, David J. & Jackson, Frank (2001). Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation. Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61. (Cited by 86 | Google | More links)

Abstract: Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes (Chalmers 1996; Jackson 1994, 1998). Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no (Block and Stalnaker 1999)

Crane, Tim (online). Cosmic hermeneutics vs emergence: The challenge of the explanatory gap. (Google)

Dowell, Janice (online). A priori entailment and conceptual analysis: Making room for type-c physicalism. (Google)

Dowell, Janice (manuscript). Serious metaphysics and the vindication of explanatory reductions. (Cited by 3 | Google)

Gertler, Brie (2002). Explanatory reduction, conceptual analysis, and conceivability arguments about the mind. Noûs 36 (1):22-49. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)

Hornsby, Jennifer (2006). Physicalism, conceptual analysis, and acts of faith. In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Worlds & Conditionals: Essays in Honour of Frank Jackson. Oup. (Google)

Jackson, Frank (2007). A priori physicalism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)

Jackson, Frank (2003). From h2o to water: The relevance to A Priori passage. In Hallvard Lillehammer, Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics. Routledge. (Google)

Jackson, Frank (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 508 | Google | More links)

Jackson, Frank (1994). Finding the Mind in the Natural World. In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. (Cited by 27 | Google | Annotation)

Jackson, Frank (2006). On ensuring that physicalism is not a dual attribute theory in sheep's clothing. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):227-249. (Google)

Abstract: Physicalists are committed to the determination without remainder of the psychological by the physical, but are they committed to this determination being a priori? This paper distinguishes this question understood de dicto from this question understood de re, argues that understood de re the answer is yes in a way that leaves open the answer to the question understood de dicto

Jackson, Frank (2001). Responses. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):653-664. (Google)

Jackson, Frank (2005). The Case for a Priori Physicalism. In Christian Nimtz & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Philosophy-Science -Scientific Philosophy, Main Lectures and Colloquia of GAP 5, Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy. Mentis. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Levin, Janet (2002). Is conceptual analysis needed for the reduction of qualitative states? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):571-591. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

Lycan, William G. (online). Serious metaphysics: Frank Jackson's defense of conceptual analysis. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Abstract: According to Stich and Weinberg (2001, p. 637), Frank Jackson’s From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998a) “is, by a long shot, the most sophisticated defense of the use of conceptual analysis in philosophy that has ever been offered.” I agree. But the book is also very difficult. In this paper I shall work my way through its three main chapters, trying to clarify its basic notions and its argument, and taking issue where I see fit. 1. Serious metaphysics and the “location problem”

As Jackson uses the phrase, “serious metaphysics” is the attempt to give
a comprehensive account of some subject-matter—the mind, the semantic, or, most
ambitiously, everything—in terms of a limited number of more or less basic notions….

Serious metaphysics…seeks comprehension in terms of a more or less limited number of ingredients, or anyway a smaller list [of kinds of things] than we started with. (pp. 4-5) The particular smaller list of privileged ingredients that interests Jackson is that provided by science, broadly speaking. His central example (p. 6) is that of explicating the psychological in terms of “the kinds of properties and relations needed to give a complete account of things like…tables, chairs, mountains, and the like,” meaning, I assume, chemical, physical and microphysical properties and relations

Marras, Ausonio (2005). Consciousness and reduction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):335-361. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

Abstract: among them Joseph Levine, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson and Jaegwon Kimhave claimed that there are conceptual grounds sufficient for ruling out the possibility of a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Their claim assumes a functional model of reduction (regarded by Kim as an alternative to the traditional Nagelian model) which requires an a priori entailment from the facts in the reduction base to the phenomena to be explained. The aim of this paper is to show that this is an unreasonable requirementa requirement that no reductive explanation in science should be expected to satisfy. I argue that the functional model is not substantively different from the Nagelian model properly understood, and that the question whether consciousness is reductively explainablein a sense involving property identifications or in some weaker sense compatible with Nagelian reductionis a fundamentally empirical question, not one that can be settled on conceptual grounds alone. Introduction Kim's critique of the Nagelian model of reduction The functional model of reduction Is consciousness reducible? Psychophysical reduction: concluding remarks

McLaughlin, Brian P. (2007). On the limits of A Priori physicalism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)

Polger, Thomas W. (manuscript). H2o, 'water', and transparent reduction. (Google | More links)

Abstract: Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics? Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker hold that they do not. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson hold that they do. In this paper I argue that Chalmers’ and Jackson’s critique of Block and Stalnaker crucially hinges on a reductio argument, and that the reductio can be defused. I conclude that the counterexamples given by Block and Stalnaker are cogent. If I am right, then we have no reason to accept Chalmers’ and Jackson’s contentions that physicalism requires a priori, transparent, reductive explanations of all facts in terms of microphysical facts. This conclusion has consequences for C&J’s argument that conceptual analysis is essential to philosophical methodology

Schroeter, Laura (2006). Against A Priori reductions. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):562-586. (Google | More links)

Abstract: From Plato down to the logical empiricists, philosophers assumed that all empirical knowledge must rest on apriori semantic foundations. According to this philosophical tradition, empirical knowledge is possible only if the subject has an implicit apriori understanding of what it is her words and concepts refer to. You can’t know that Makybe Diva is a horse unless you implicitly know what it takes to count as a horse. It’s only in the late 20^th century that the apriority of semantic facts came in for serious challenge by philosophers like Quine, Putnam, and Kripke. As these theorists pointed out, the traditional apriorist thesis conflicts with our best commonsense and scientific epistemology. Ultimately, it’s biological and evolutionary theorizing that should tell us exactly what it takes to be a horse – not our empirically naïve preconceptions about horses. Scientific identity claims were seen as a paradigm of how empirical theorizing informs our understanding of the referents of our words and concepts

Witmer, D. Gene (2001). Conceptual analysis, circularity, and the commitments of physicalism. Acta Analytica 16 (26):119-133. (Cited by 3 | Google)

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