Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
updated 2008-05-09
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
click here for help on how to search

Philosophy of Consciousness :: Explaining Consciousness? :: Explaining Consciousness, Misc

Brook, Andrew (2005). Making consciousness safe for neuroscience. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press. (Google | More links)
Cheruvalath, Reena & Baiju (2001). Can consciousness be explained? Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 18 (3):222-226. (Google)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1998). What Should We Expect From a Theory of Consciousness? In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. (1996). The rediscovery of light. Journal of Philosophy 93 (5):211-28. (Cited by 17 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Clark, Austen (online). How to respond to philosophers on raw feels. (Google)
Cottrell, Allin (1995). Tertium datur? Reflections on Owen Flanagan's consciousness reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):85-103. (Google)
DeLancey, Craig (2007). Phenomenal experience and the measure of information. Erkenntnis 66 (3). (Google | More links)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1993). The naturalists versus the skeptics: The debate over a scientific understanding of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (1):27-50. (Cited by 7 | Google | Annotation)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1996). The why of consciousness: A non-issue for materialists. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):7-13. (Cited by 11 | Google | Annotation)
Hesslow, Germund (1996). Will neuroscience explain consciousness? Journal of Theoretical Biology 171 (7-8):29-39. (Cited by 20 | Google)
Horst, Steven (2005). Modeling, localization and the explanation of phenomenal properties: Philosophy and the cognitive sciences at the beginning of the millennium. Synthese 147 (3):477-513. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Humphrey, Nicholas (2002). Thinking about feeling. In G. Richard (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Kevin O'Regan, J.; Myin, Erik & Noë, Alva (2005). Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of "corporality" and "alerting capacity". Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 444 (4):4. (Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (1995). How is consciousness possible? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Kurthen, M. Moskopp (1995). On the prospects of a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Lazarov, Georgi (online). Materialism and the problem of consciousness: The aesthesionomic approach. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Lockwood, Michael (1998). The Enigma of Sentience. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Maxwell, Nicholas (2000). The mind-body problem and explanatory dualism. Philosophy 75 (291):49-71. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Maxwell, Nicholas (2002). Three philosophical problems about consciousness. Ethical Record 107 (4):3-11. (Google)
Mensch, James R. (2000). An objective phenomenology: Husserl sees colors. Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (January):231-60. (Google)
Mills, Frederick B. (2001). A spinozist approach to the conceptual gap in consciousness studies. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 22 (1):91-101. (Google)
Montero, Barbara (2004). Consciousness is puzzling but not paradoxical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):213-226. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Moody, Todd (2007). Naturalism and the problem of consciousness. Pluralist 2 (1):72-83. (Google)
Moody, Todd C. (2003). Consciousness and complexity. Progress in Information, Complexity, and Design 2 (3). (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Morris, A. C. (1998). Commentary on ''cortical activity and the explanatory gap''. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):193-195. (Google | More links)
Musacchio, J. M. (2005). Why do qualia and the mind seem nonphysical? Synthese 147 (3):425-460. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (1997). Is the naturalization of qualitative experience possible or sensible? In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press. (Google)
Nikolic, D. (1998). Commentary on ''cortical activity and the explanatory gap'' by John G. Taylor. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):196-201. (Google | More links)
O'Regan, J. Kevin; Myin, Erik & Noë, Alva (2005). Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of 'corporality' and 'alerting capacity'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Schilhab, T. S. S. (1998). Comments on ''cortical activity and the explanatory gap''. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):212-213. (Google | More links)
Smith, D. J. (1998). Commentary on ''cortical activity and the explanatory gap'' by J. G. Taylor. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):214-215. (Google)
Taylor, John G. (1998). Cortical activity and the explanatory gap. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):109-48. (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
van Gulick, Robert (1993). Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos? In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell. (Cited by 51 | Google | Annotation)
van Gulick, Robert (1995). What would count as explaining consciousness? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. (Cited by 14 | Google | Annotation)
Vasilyev, Vadim V. (2006). Brain and consciousness: Exits from the labyrinth. Social Sciences 37 (2):51-66. (Google)
Wright, Wayne (web). Why naturalize consciousness? Southern Journal of Philosophy. (Google)

36 displayed