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1.2g. Explaining Consciousness, Misc (Explaining Consciousness, Misc on PhilPapers)

See also:
Tson, M. E. (ms). A Brief Explanation of Consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: This short paper (4 pages) demonstrates how subjective experience, language, and consciousness can be explained in terms of abilities we share with the simplest of creatures, specifically the ability to detect, react to, and associate various aspects of the world.
Brook, Andrew (2005). Making consciousness safe for neuroscience. In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Cheruvalath, Reena & Baiju, (2001). Can consciousness be explained? Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 18 (3):222-226.   (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1996). The rediscovery of light. Journal of Philosophy 93 (5):211-28.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1998). What Should We Expect From a Theory of Consciousness? In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Within the domain of philosophy, it is not unusual to hear the claim that most questions about the nature of consciousness are essentially and absolutely beyond the scope of science, no matter how science may develop in the twenty-first century. Some things, it is pointed out, we shall never _ever_ understand, and consciousness is one of them (Vendler 1994, Swinburne 1994, McGinn 1989, Nagel 1994, Warner 1994). One line of reasoning assumes that consciousness is the manifestation of a distinctly nonphysical thing, and hence has no physical properties that might be explored by techniques suitable to physical things. Dualism, as this view is known, is still to be found among those within the tradition of Kant and Hegel, as well as among some with religious convictions. Surprisingly, however, strenuous foot-dragging is evident even among philosophers of a materialist conviction. Indeed, one might say that it is the philosophical fashion of the 90's to pronounce consciousness unexplainable, and to find the explanatory aspirations of neurobiology to be faintly comic if not rather pitiful. The very word, "reductionism" has come to be used more or less synonymously with "benighted-scientism-run-amok", where scientistm apparently means "applying scientific techniques to domains where they are inapplicable." McGinn, perhaps the most unblushing of the naysayers, insists that we cannot expect even to make any headway on the problem. (p. 114) Ironically perhaps, here we are at a conference in honor of Dr. Herbert Jasper who was a great pioneer in moving neuroscience forward on this problem, and where results will be presented allegedly _showing_ additional progress on the problem. Because I am quite optimistic about future scientific progress on the nature of consciousness, my aim here, as a philosopher, is to address the most popular and influential of the skeptical arguments, and to explain why I find them unconvincing. Thus the overall form of the paper is negative, in the sense that I want to show why a set of naysaying arguments fail..
Clark, Austen (online). How to respond to philosophers on raw feels.   (Google)
Abstract: I address this talk to anyone who believes in the possibility of an informative empirical science about sensory qualities. Potentially this is a large audience. By "sensory quality" I mean those qualities manifest in various sensory experiences: color, taste, smell, touch, pain, and so on. We should include sensory modalities humans do not share, such as electro-reception in fish, echolocation in bats, or the skylight compass in birds. Those pursuing empirical science about this large domain might pursue it in the halls of experimental psychology, psycho-physics, psychometrics, psycho-physiology, sensory physiology, neuroscience, neuro-biology, comparative psychology, neuro-anatomy, and so on and on. These days even molecular genetics has kicked in with some notable recent contributions to the sequencing of genes for photopigments and for olfactory receptors. But to all those investigators in all those halls I bring bad news. Your discipline is _a priori_ impossible. Philosophers whom you do not know have uncovered _a priori_ proofs that empirical investigation which proceeds along the lines currently underway, or which will proceed along lines that are currently _imaginable_, does not, will not, and cannot explain the sensory qualities of experience. Or at least so they say. You might as well give up now
Copenhaver, Rebecca (2006). Is Thomas Reid a mysterian? Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: : Some critics find that Thomas Reid thinks the mind especially problematic, "hid in impenetrable darkness". I disagree. Reid does not hold that mind, more than body, resists explanation by the new science. The physical sciences have made great progress because they were transformed by the Newtonian revolution, and the key transformation was to stop looking for causes. Reid's harsh words are a call for methodological reform, consonant with his lifelong pursuit of a science of mind and also with his frequent (though overlooked) optimism about such a science
Cottrell, Allin (1995). Tertium datur? Reflections on Owen Flanagan's consciousness reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):85-103.   (Google)
Abstract: Owen Flanagan's arguments concerning qualia constitute an intermediate position between Dennett's “disqualification” of qualia and the thesis that qualia represent an insurmountable obstacle to constructive naturalism. This middle ground is potentially attractive, but it is shown to have serious problems. This is brought out via consideration of several classic areas of dispute connected with qualia, including the inverted spectrum, Frank Jackson's thought experiment, Hindsight, and epiphenomenalism. An attempt is made to formulate the basis for a less vulnerable variant on the “middle ground”
DeLancey, Craig (2007). Phenomenal experience and the measure of information. Erkenntnis 66 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper defends the hypothesis that phenomenal experiences may be very complex information states. This can explain some of our most perplexing anti-physicalist intuitions about phenomenal experience. The approach is to describe some basic facts about information in such a way as to make clear the essential oversight involved, by way illustrating how various intuitive arguments against physicalism (such as Frank Jackson
de Weg, Henk bij (ms). Explaining consciousness and the duality of method.   (Google)
Abstract: In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since our purposes are different according to the perspective we take, each perspective has a set of leading questions of its own. This makes that the first-person perspective is an approach of consciousness that is substantially different from the third-person perspective, and that one cannot be reduced to the other. These perspectives are independent, although complementary approaches of the mind.
Elpidorou, Andreas (2010). Alva noë: Out of our heads: Why you are not your brain, and other lessons from the biology of consciousness. Minds and Machines 20 (1).   (Google)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A. & Neves, Carlos F. H. (2010). Natural World Physical, Brain Operational, and Mind Phenomenal Space-Time. Physics of Life Reviews 7 (2):195-249.   (Google)
Abstract: Concepts of space and time are widely developed in physics. However, there is a considerable lack of biologically plausible theoretical frameworks that can demonstrate how space and time dimensions are implemented in the activity of the most complex life-system – the brain with a mind. Brain activity is organized both temporally and spatially, thus representing space-time in the brain. Critical analysis of recent research on the space-time organization of the brain’s activity pointed to the existence of so-called operational space-time in the brain. This space-time is limited to the execution of brain operations of differing complexity. During each such brain operation a particular short-term spatio-temporal pattern of integrated activity of different brain areas emerges within related operational space-time. At the same time, to have a fully functional human brain one needs to have a subjective mental experience. Current research on the subjective mental experience offers detailed analysis of space-time organization of the mind. According to this research, subjective mental experience (subjective virtual world) has definitive spatial and temporal properties similar to many physical phenomena. Based on systematic review of the propositions and tenets of brain and mind space-time descriptions, our aim in this review essay is to explore the relations between the two. To be precise, we would like to discuss the hypothesis that via the brain operational space-time the mind subjective space-time is connected to otherwise distant physical space-time reality.
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1993). The naturalists versus the skeptics: The debate over a scientific understanding of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 14 (1):27-50.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1996). The why of consciousness: A non-issue for materialists. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):7-13.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Hesslow, Germund (1996). Will neuroscience explain consciousness? Journal of Theoretical Biology 171 (7-8):29-39.   (Cited by 20 | Google)
Horst, Steven (2005). Modeling, localization and the explanation of phenomenal properties: Philosophy and the cognitive sciences at the beginning of the millennium. Synthese 147 (3):477-513.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Case studies in the psychophysics, modeling and localization of human vision are presented as an example of
Humphrey, Nicholas (2002). Thinking about feeling. In G. Richard (ed.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Janew, Claus (2009). Omnipresent Consciousness and Free Will. In How Consciousness Creates Reality. CreateSpace.   (Google)
Abstract: This article is not an attempt to explain consciousness in terms basically of quantum physics or neuro-biology. Instead I should like to place the term "Consciousness" on a broader footing. I shall therefore proceed from everyday reality, precisely where we experience ourselves as conscious beings. I shall use the term in such a general way as to resolve the question whether only a human being enjoys consciousness, or even a thermostat. Whilst the difference is considerable, it is not fundamental. Every effect exists in the perception of a consciousness. I elaborate on its freedom of choice, in my view the most important source of creativity, in a similarly general way. The problems associated with a really conscious decision do not disappear by mixing determination with a touch of coincidence. Both must enter into a higher unity. In so doing it will emerge that a certain degree of freedom of choice is just as omnipresent as consciousness - an inherent part of reality itself.

O'Regan, J. Kevin; Myin, Erik & No, (2005). Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of "corporality" and "alerting capacity". Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4:369-385.   (Google)
Abstract: How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do
Kirk, Robert E. (1995). How is consciousness possible? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Kurthen, M. Moskopp (1995). On the prospects of a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Lazarov, Georgi (online). Materialism and the problem of consciousness: The aesthesionomic approach.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Lockwood, Michael (1998). The Enigma of Sentience. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Maxwell, Nicholas (2000). The mind-body problem and explanatory dualism. Philosophy 75 (291):49-71.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Maxwell, Nicholas (2002). Three philosophical problems about consciousness. Ethical Record 107 (4):3-11.   (Google)
Mills, Frederick B. (2001). A spinozist approach to the conceptual gap in consciousness studies. Journal Of Mind And Behavior 22 (1):91-101.   (Google)
Montero, Barbara (2004). Consciousness is puzzling but not paradoxical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):213-226.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Moody, Todd C. (2003). Consciousness and complexity. Progress in Information, Complexity, and Design 2 (3).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Moody, Todd (2007). Naturalism and the problem of consciousness. Pluralist 2 (1):72-83.   (Google)
Morris, A. C. (1998). Commentary on ''cortical activity and the explanatory gap''. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):193-195.   (Google | More links)
Musacchio, J. M. (2005). Why do qualia and the mind seem nonphysical? Synthese 147 (3):425-460.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this article, I discuss several of the factors that jeopardize our understanding of the nature of qualitative experiences and the mind. I incorporate the view from neuroscience to clarify the na
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (1997). Is the naturalization of qualitative experience possible or sensible? In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.   (Google)
Nikolic, D. (1998). Commentary on ''cortical activity and the explanatory gap'' by John G. Taylor. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):196-201.   (Google | More links)
Nixon, Gregory (2010). Hollows of Memory: From Individual Consciousness to Panexperientialism and Beyond. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research (3):213-401.   (Google)
Abstract: Preface/Introduction

The question under discussion is metaphysical and truly elemental. It emerges in two aspects – how did we come to be conscious of our own existence, and, as a deeper corollary, do existence and awareness necessitate each other? I am bold enough to explore these questions and I invite you to come along; I make no claim to have discovered absolute answers. However, I do believe I have created here a compelling interpretation. You’ll have to judge for yourself.

What follows is the presentation of three essays I have worked on over the past several years seeing publication for the first time. “Hollows of Experience” was written first as an invited chapter for a collection on the ontology of consciousness. However, when cuts became necessary, my chapter got the knife. Its length has prohibited it from publication in any print journal. “Myth and Mind” was written next as a journal article, but as my involvement with it grew so did its length, so it has also idled on my websty awaiting its call. “From Panexperiential-ism to Conscious Experience” was written most recently, but it is the only one to have been available to the public elsewhere than my own website. Under the name, “The Continuum of Experience”, it was Target Article #95 on the recently closed Karl Jaspers Forum (for discussion purposes only).

I have put them in a different sequence here, for reasons of logical sense. Up first, “Panexperientialism” deals with an idea difficult for many to accept, namely that conscious experience is a particular mode of symbolically reflected experience that is largely unique to our species. However, I aver that experienced sensation in itself (as found, for example, in autonomic sensory response systems) goes “all the way down” into nature, and thus the title, panexperientialism.

Understanding this idea is helpful to dealing with the focus on language in Part I of “Hollows”, next, since here speech and general symbolic interaction in general are found to be the catalysts for the creation of our consciously experienced world (our “lived reality”). In Part II, however, I explore how experienced sensations must be coeval with existence, and, with even greater temerity, how all this sensational existence might have arisen within some literally inconceivable background of awareness-in-itself that yet has a dynamism that occasionally breaks into existence as experiential events and entities. (The latter may sound wacky, but physicists and cosmologists are themselves attempting to come to terms with that which seethes with vast potential energy in what they refer to as the quantum vacuum.)

“Myth and Mind” was put third since it deals with a major lacuna in “Hollows” – that presumed prehistoric period when members of our species made the painful crossing of the symbolic threshold into the beginnings of cultural consciousness. Speech plays a central role here, too, but I look more at narrative structures from the dawn of self-awareness when ritual and myth became vital to human survival. Why would fantastic stories and bizarre rituals be necessary? I speculate that growing foresight led to the unavoidable realization of certain mortality, from which, in turn, emerged the secondary realization that we were now alive. In contrast to our yet-to-come death, we have life here and now, and by ritually identifying with a symbolically expanded mythic, i.e., sacred, reality, we may continue to live on after bodily death, just as our ancestors and loved ones must also do. Language and mythmaking are necessary to avoid mortal despair and they remain at the core of human consciousness.

As Ernst Cassirer (1944) has noted, language and myth are “twin creatures”, both metaphoric webs over a reality we can never wholly comprehend. We live in the symbolic and construct our works of imagination and wars of conquest to make life meaningful, to feel immortal, and to sense that we ourselves participate in a reality greater than ourselves. No doubt we do, but this does not mean our culturally constructed self-identities survive the death of our bodies, and it does not imply that our symbolic concepts can ever indicate the ultimate truth. We simply must symbolize an extended reality that was sacred to our ancestors: “Is it not our way, as illusory as it may be, to force continuance on our world and our life in the face of their inevitable ending? Are we not compelled to extend those imagi-nary horizons as far as we can despite the terror and the sometime joy their extension incites? Is their closure not a form of death?” (Crapanzano, p. 210)

Of course, this leaves me in the uncomfortable position of being forced to admit that this venture of mine must inevitably be another attempt at meaningful mythmaking. But what else could it be? This is certainly not a scientific proof though it is indeed an academically rigorous exploration. (Just try to count the citations!) I hope the reader will judge my thesis on the basis of its coherence, the sense of meaning it evokes, my intellectual responsibility, and, finally, the engagement it inspires. If you have read my expositions and found yourself immersed in the timeless questions I here call forth, I would call these writings successful (even if you violently disagree with my answers).

I am very grateful to Huping Hu for granting me this special issue of JCER in which to present my ideas in some detail. He has patiently dealt with my exuberant approach and allowed the many changes I kept coming up with right until the final publication date. I also wish to thank the many potential commentators who politely replied to my invitation, and, even more, I thank those who made time to write actual commentaries.


Cassirer, E. (1944). An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Hu-man Culture. New Haven/London: Yale UP.

Crapanzano, V. (2004). Imaginative Horizons: An Essay in Literary-Philosophical Anthropology. Chicago: U of Chicago Press.

Gregory M. Nixon

University of Northern British Columbia

Prince George, British Columbia, Canada




Preface/Introduction 213

From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience:

The Continuum of Experience 216

Hollows of Experience 234

Myth and Mind:

The Origin of Human Consciousness in the Discovery of the Sacred 289

Nixon, Gregory (2010). Myth and Mind: The Origin of Consciousness in the Discovery of the Sacred. journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research (3):289-337.   (Google)
Abstract: By accepting that the formal structure of human language is the key to understanding the uniquity of human culture and consciousness and by further accepting the late appearance of such language amongst the Cro-Magnon, I am free to focus on the causes that led to such an unprecedented threshold crossing. In the complex of causes that led to human being, I look to scholarship in linguistics, mythology, anthropology, paleontology, and to creation myths themselves for an answer. I conclude that prehumans underwent an existential crisis, i.e., the realization of certain mortality, that could be borne only by the discovery-creation of the larger realm of symbolic consciousness once experienced as the sacred (but today we know it as "the world" – as opposed to our immediate natural environment and that of other animals). Thus, although we, the human species, are but one species among innumerable others, we differ in kind, not degree. This quality is our symbolically enabled self-consciousness, the fortress of cultural identity that empowers but also imprisons awareness.
O'Regan, J. Kevin; Myin, Erik & No, (2005). Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of 'corporality' and 'alerting capacity'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do not. We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do
Schilhab, T. S. S. (1998). Comments on ''cortical activity and the explanatory gap''. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):212-213.   (Google | More links)
Mensch, James R. (2000). An objective phenomenology: Husserl sees colors. Journal of Philosophical Research 25 (January):231-60.   (Google)
Abstract: David Chalmers expresses a general consensus when he writes that
Smith, D. J. (1998). Commentary on ''cortical activity and the explanatory gap'' by J. G. Taylor. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):214-215.   (Google)
Strawson, Galen (1999). Realistic Materialist Monism. In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & D. Chalmers (eds.), Towards a Science of Consciousness III.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Short version of 'Real materialism', given at Tucson III Conference, 1998. (1) physicalism is true (2) the qualitative character of experience is real, as most naively understood ... so (3) the qualitative character of experience (considered specifically as such) is wholly physical. ‘How can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical?’ To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley and Russell and others observe) to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that consciousness is wholly physical.
Sytsma, Justin & Machery, Edouard (2009). How to study folk intuitions about phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):21 – 35.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The assumption that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is pretheoretical is often found in the philosophical debates on consciousness. Unfortunately, this assumption has not received the kind of empirical attention that it deserves. We suspect that this is in part due to difficulties that arise in attempting to test folk intuitions about consciousness. In this article we elucidate and defend a key methodological principle for this work. We draw this principle out by considering recent experimental work on the topic by Joshua Knobe and Jesse Prinz (2008). We charge that their studies do not establish that the folk have a concept of phenomenal consciousness in part because they compare group agents to individuals . The problem is that group agents and individuals differ in some significant ways in terms of functional organization and behavior. We propose that future experiments should establish that ordinary people are disposed to ascribe different mental states to entities that are given behaviorally and functionally equivalent descriptions
Taylor, John G. (1998). Cortical activity and the explanatory gap. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):109-48.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: An exploration is given of neural network features now being uncovered in cortical processing which begins to go a little way to help bridge the ''Explanatory Gap'' between phenomenal consciousness and correlated brain activity. A survey of properties suggested as being possessed by phenomenal consciousness leads to a set of criteria to be required of the correlated neural activity. Various neural styles of processing are reviewed and those fitting the criteria are selected for further analysis. One particular processing style, in which semiautonomous and long-lasting cortical activity ''bubbles'' are created by input, is selected as being the most appropriate. Further experimental criteria are used to help narrow the possible neural styles involved. This leads to a class of neural models underpinning phenomenal consciousness and to a related set of testable predictions
Tson, M. E. (ms). From Dust to Descartes: A Mechanical and Evolutionary Explanation of Consciousness and Self-Awareness.   (Google)
Abstract: Beginning with physical reactions as simple and mechanical as rust, From Dust to Descartes goes step by evolutionary step to explore how the most remarkable and personal aspects of consciousness have arisen, how our awareness of the world of ourselves differs from that of other species, and whether machines could ever become self-aware. Part I addresses a newborn’s innate abilities. Part II shows how with these and experience, we can form expectations about the world. Parts III concentrates on the essential role that others play in the formation of self-awareness. Part IV then explores what follows from this explanation of human consciousness, touching on topics such as free will, personality, intelligence, and color perception which are often associated with self-awareness and the philosophy of mind.
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Vasilyev, Vadim V. (2006). Brain and consciousness: Exits from the labyrinth. Social Sciences 37 (2):51-66.   (Google)
Velmans, Max (2007). The co-evolution of matter and consciousness. Velmans, Prof Max (2007) the Co-Evolution of Matter and Consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)] 44 (2):273-282.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Theories about the evolution of consciousness relate in an intimate way to theories about the distribution of consciousness, which range from the view that only human beings are conscious to the view that all matter is in some sense conscious. Broadly speaking, such theories can be classified into discontinuity theories and continuity theories. Discontinuity theories propose that consciousness emerged only when material forms reached a given stage of evolution, but propose different criteria for the stage at which this occurred. Continuity theories argue that in some primal form, consciousness always accompanies matter and as matter evolved in form and complexity consciousness co-evolved, for example into the forms that we now recognise in human beings. Given our limited knowledge of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of human consciousness in human brains, all options remain open. On balance however continuity theory appears to be more elegant than discontinuity theory
Wright, Wayne (web). Why naturalize consciousness? Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):583-607.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper examines the relevance of philosophical work on consciousness to its scientific study. Of particular concern is the debate over whether consciousness can be naturalized, which is typically taken to have consequences for the prospects for its scientific investigation. It is not at all clear that philosophers of consciousness have properly identified and evaluated the assumptions about scientific activity made by both naturalization and anti- naturalization projects. I argue that there is good reason to think that some of the assumptions about physicalism and explanation made by the parties to the debate are open to serious doubt. Thus this paper is an invitation for those inquiring into whether consciousness can be naturalized to more carefully consider the expected payoff of such efforts