Javascript Menu by
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
click here for help on how to search

1.3c. Kripke's Modal Argument (Kripke's Modal Argument on PhilPapers)

See also:
Barnette, R. L. (1977). Kripke's pains. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15:3-14.   (Annotation | Google)
Bayne, Steven R. (1988). Kripke's cartesian argument. Philosophia 18 (July):265-270.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Bealer, George (1994). Mental properties. Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208.   (Cited by 21 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity thesis, but also the metaphysical possibility of disembodiment
Bealer, George (2004). The origins of modal error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility and various kinds of epistemic possibility - turns out to be comparatively easy to untangle and poses little threat to intuition-driven philosophical investigation. The second source is the local (i.e., temporary) misunderstanding of one's concepts (as opposed to outright Burgean misunderstanding). This pathology may be understood on analogy with a patient who is given a clean bill of health at his annual check-up, despite his having a cold at the time of the check-up: although the patient's health is locally (temporarily) disrupted, his overall health is sufficiently good to enable him to overcome the cold without external intervention. Even when our understanding of certain pivotal concepts has lapsed locally, our larger body of intuitions is sufficiently reliable to allow us, without intervention, to ferret out the modal errors resulting from this lapse of understanding by means of dialectic and/or a process of a priori reflection. This source of modal error, and our capacity to overcome it, has wide-ranging implications for philosophical method - including, in particular, its promise for disarming skepticism about the classical method of intuition-driven investigation itself. Indeed, it is shown that skeptical accounts of modal error (e.g., the accounts given by Hill, Levin, and several others) are ultimately self-defeating
Blum, Alex (1989). Bayne on Kripke. Philosophia 19 (4):455-456.   (Google | More links)
Blumenfeld, J-B. (1975). Kripke's refutation of materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (April):151-6.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Boyd, Robert (1980). Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol 1.   (Cited by 43 | Annotation | Google)
Byrne, Alex (2007). Possibility and imagination. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):125–144.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives
Carney, James D. (1975). Kripke and materialism. Philosophical Studies 27 (April):279-282.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Carney, James D. & von Bretzel, P. (1973). Modern materialism and essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (May):78-81.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Double, Richard (1981). On a Wittgensteinian objection to Kripke's dualism argument. Philosophy Research Archives 1414.   (Google)
Double, Richard (1976). The inconclusiveness of Kripke's argument against the identity theory. Auslegung 3 (June):156-65.   (Google)
Feldman, Fred (1980). Identity, necessity, and events. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Feldman, Fred (1973). Kripke's argument against materialism. Philosophical Studies 24 (November):416-19.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Feldman, Fred (1974). Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):665-76.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Gjelsvik, Olav (1988). A Kripkean objection to Kripke's arguments against the identity-theories. Inquiry 30 (December):435-50.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Hanks, Peter, Conceiving of pain.   (Google)
Abstract: Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-body identity thesis is by now familiar (Kripke 1980): 1. It is possible for there to be pain without C-fiber stimulation, and vice versa.1 2. If pain = C-fiber stimulation, then it is not possible for there to be pain without..
Hill, Christopher S. (1981). Why cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity thesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):254-65.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Holman, Emmett L. (1988). Qualia, Kripkean arguments, and subjectivity. Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-29.   (Annotation | Google)
Jackson, Frank (1980). A note on physicalism and heat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (March):26-34.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Jacquette, Dale (1987). Kripke and the mind-body problem. Dialectica 41:293-300.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kripke, Saul A. (1971). Identity and necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press.   (Cited by 136 | Annotation | Google)
Kripke, Saul A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 2621 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Leplin, Jarrett (1979). Theoretical identification and the mind-body problem. Philosophia 8 (October):673-88.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Levin, Michael E. (1975). Kripke's argument against the identity thesis. Journal of Philosophy 72 (March):149-67.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Levin, Michael E. (1995). Tortuous dualism. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):313-22.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Ludwig, Pascal (ms). Kripke's conceivability argument reconsidered.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1987). Functionalism and essence. In William G. Lycan (ed.), Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Lycan, William G. (1974). Kripke and the materialists. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):677-89.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Malcolm, Norman (1980). Kripke on heat and sensations of heat. Philosophical Investigations 3:12-20.   (Google)
Maxwell, Grover (1979). Rigid designators and mind-brain identity. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google)
McGinn, Colin (1977). Anomalous monism and Kripke's cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2 (January):78-80.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
McGinn, Colin (1978). Reply to Woodfield's identity theories and the argument from epistemic counterparts. Analysis 38 (June):144-146.   (Google)
McMullen, C. (1984). An argument against the identity theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65:277-87.   (Annotation | Google)
Merrell, Don A. (2006). Theoretical identity, reference fixing, and Boyd's defense of type materialism. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google | More links)
Merrell, Don A. (2005). Token physicalism is not immune to Kripke's essentialist anti-physicalist argument. Philosophia 32 (1-4):383-388.   (Google | More links)
Mucciolo, Laurence F. (1975). On Kripke's argument against the identity thesis. Philosophia 5 (October):499-506.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Nogaret, T.; Robertson, C. & Rodney, D. (2007). Atomic-scale plasticity in the presence of Frank loops. Philosophical Magazine 87 (6):945-966.   (Google)
Papineau, David (2007). Kripke's proof is ad hominem not two-dimensional. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Identity theorists make claims like ‘pain = C-fibre stimulation’. These claims must be necessary if true, given that terms like ‘pain’ and ‘C-fibre stimulation’ are rigid. Yet there is no doubt that such claims appear contingent. It certainly seems that there could have been C-fibre stimulation without pains or vice versa. So identity theorists owe us an explanation of why such claims should appear contingent if they are in fact necessary
Papineau, David (online). Kripke's proof that we are all intuitive dualists.   (Google)
Perry, John (2001). The modal argument. In Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Polger, Thomas W. (online). Kripke and the illusion of contingent identity.   (Google | More links)
Rocca Della, M. (1993). Kripke's essentialist arguments against the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):101-112.   (Annotation | Google)
Sher, George A. (1977). Kripke, cartesian intuitions, and materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7:227-38.   (Annotation | Google)
Taylor, Paul (1983). McGinn, token physicalism, and a rejoinder of Woodfield. Analysis 43 (March):80-83.   (Google)
Woodfield, Andrew (1978). Identity theories and the argument from epistemic counterparts. Analysis 38 (June):140-3.   (Annotation | Google)
Woodfield, Andrew (1978). Rejoinder to McGinn. Analysis 38 (October):201-203.   (Google)
Wright, C. (2002). The conceivability of naturalism. In Tamar S. Gendler (ed.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)