MindPapers: 1.3c. Kripke's Modal Argument

Barnette, R. L. (1977). Kripke's pains. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15:3-14. (Google | Annotation)

Bayne, Steven R. (1988). Kripke's cartesian argument. Philosophia 18 (July):265-270. (Google | More links | Annotation)

Bealer, George (1994). Mental properties. Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208. (Cited by 21 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Bealer, George (2004). The origins of modal error. Dialectica 58 (1):11-42. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)

Blum, Alex (1989). Bayne on Kripke. Philosophia 19 (4):455-456. (Google | More links)

Blumenfeld, J-B. (1975). Kripke's refutation of materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (April):151-6. (Google | More links | Annotation)

Boyd, Robert (1980). Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol 1. (Cited by 43 | Google | Annotation)

Byrne, Alex (2007). Possibility and imagination. Philosophical Perspectives. (Google)

Carney, James D. (1975). Kripke and materialism. Philosophical Studies 27 (April):279-282. (Cited by 2 | Google | Annotation)

Carney, James D. & von Bretzel, P. (1973). Modern materialism and essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (May):78-81. (Google | More links | Annotation)

Double, Richard (1981). On a Wittgensteinian objection to Kripke's dualism argument. Philosophy Research Archives 1414. (Google)

Double, Richard (1976). The inconclusiveness of Kripke's argument against the identity theory. Auslegung 3 (June):156-65. (Google)

Feldman, Fred (1980). Identity, necessity, and events. In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. , Vol. (Cited by 4 | Google | Annotation)

Feldman, Fred (1973). Kripke's argument against materialism. Philosophical Studies 24 (November):416-19. (Cited by 3 | Google | Annotation)

Feldman, Fred (1974). Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):665-76. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Gjelsvik, Olav (1988). A Kripkean objection to Kripke's arguments against the identity-theories. Inquiry 30 (December):435-50. (Cited by 1 | Google | Annotation)

Hill, Christopher S. (1981). Why cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity thesis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):254-65. (Google | More links | Annotation)

Holman, Emmett L. (1988). Qualia, Kripkean arguments, and subjectivity. Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-29. (Google | Annotation)

Jackson, Frank (1980). A note on physicalism and heat. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (March):26-34. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Jacquette, Dale (1987). Kripke and the mind-body problem. Dialectica 41:293-300. (Cited by 1 | Google | Annotation)

Kripke, Saul A. (1971). Identity and necessity. In Milton K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation. New York University Press. (Cited by 136 | Google | Annotation)

Kripke, Saul A. (1972). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press. (Cited by 2621 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Leplin, Jarrett (1979). Theoretical identification and the mind-body problem. Philosophia 8 (October):673-88. (Google | More links | Annotation)

Levin, Michael E. (1975). Kripke's argument against the identity thesis. Journal of Philosophy 72 (March):149-67. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Levin, Michael E. (1995). Tortuous dualism. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):313-22. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Ludwig, Pascal (manuscript). Kripke's conceivability argument reconsidered. (Google | More links)

Lycan, William G. (1987). Functionalism and essence. In William G. Lycan (ed.), Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google | Annotation)

Lycan, William G. (1974). Kripke and the materialists. Journal of Philosophy 71 (October):677-89. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Malcolm, Norman (1980). Kripke on heat and sensations of heat. Philosophical Investigations 3:12-20. (Google)

Maxwell, Grover (1979). Rigid designators and mind-brain identity. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9. (Cited by 20 | Google | Annotation)

McGinn, Colin (1977). Anomalous monism and Kripke's cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2 (January):78-80. (Cited by 11 | Google | Annotation)

McGinn, Colin (1978). Reply to Woodfield's identity theories and the argument from epistemic counterparts. Analysis 38 (June):144-146. (Google)

McMullen, C. (1984). An argument against the identity theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65:277-87. (Google | Annotation)

Merrell, Don A. (2006). Theoretical identity, reference fixing, and Boyd's defense of type materialism. Philosophia 34 (2). (Google | More links)

Merrell, Don A. (2005). Token physicalism is not immune to Kripke's essentialist anti-physicalist argument. Philosophia 32 (1-4):383-388. (Google | More links)

Mucciolo, Laurence F. (1975). On Kripke's argument against the identity thesis. Philosophia 5 (October):499-506. (Google | More links | Annotation)

Nogaret, T.; Robertson, C. & Rodney, D. (2007). Atomic-scale plasticity in the presence of Frank loops. Philosophical Magazine 87 (6):945-966. (Google)

Papineau, David (online). Kripke's proof that we are all intuitive dualists. (Google)

Perry, John (2001). The modal argument. In Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)

Polger, Thomas W. (online). Kripke and the illusion of contingent identity. (Google | More links)

Rocca Della, M. (1993). Kripke's essentialist arguments against the identity theory. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):101-112. (Google | Annotation)

Sher, George A. (1977). Kripke, cartesian intuitions, and materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7:227-38. (Google | Annotation)

Taylor, Paul (1983). McGinn, token physicalism, and a rejoinder of Woodfield. Analysis 43 (March):80-83. (Google)

Woodfield, Andrew (1978). Identity theories and the argument from epistemic counterparts. Analysis 38 (June):140-3. (Google | Annotation)

Woodfield, Andrew (1978). Rejoinder to McGinn. Analysis 38 (October):201-203. (Google)

Wright, C. (2002). The conceivability of naturalism. In Tamar S.ó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

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