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1.3d. Arguments from Disembodiment (Arguments from Disembodiment on PhilPapers)

See also:
Almog, J. (2005). 'What am I?' Descartes and the mind-body problem - reply. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):717-734.   (Google)
Alston, William P. & Smythe, Thomas W. (1994). Swinburne's argument for dualism. Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):127-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Blose, B. L. (1981). Materialism and disembodied minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (September):59-74.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Burwood, Stephen (2008). The apparent truth of dualism and the uncanny body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: It has been suggested that our experiences of embodiment in general appear to constitute an experiential ground for dualist philosophy and that this is particularly so with experiences of dissociation, in which one feels estranged from one’s body. Thus, Drew Leder argues that these play “a crucial role in encouraging and supporting Cartesian dualism” as they “seem to support the doctrine of an immaterial mind trapped inside an alien body”. In this paper I argue that as dualism does not capture the character of such experiences there is not even an apparent separation of self and body revealed here and that one’s body is experienced as uncanny rather than alien. The general relationship between our philosophical theorizing and the phenomenology of lived experience is also considered
Carrier, L. (1974). Definitions and disembodied minds. Personalist Forum 55:334-43.   (Google)
Cole, David J. & Foelber, F. (1984). Contingent materialism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65:74-85.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Corcoran, Kevin J. (1998). Persons and bodies. Faith and Philosophy 15 (3):324-340.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Englebretsen, George F. (1972). Armstrong on disembodied minds. Dialogue 11 (December):576-579.   (Google)
Englebretsen, George F. (1974). More on disembodied minds. Philosophical Papers 3 (May):48-50.   (Google)
Estes, David (2006). Evidence for early dualism and a more direct path to afterlife beliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):470-+.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Ample evidence for dualism in early childhood already exists. Young children have explicit knowledge of the distinction between mental and physical phenomena, which provides the foundation for a rapidly developing theory of mind. Belief in psychological immortality might then follow naturally from this mentalistic conception of human existence and thus require no organized cognitive system dedicated to producing it
Everitt, Nicholas (2000). Substance dualism and disembodied existence. Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):333-347.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gillett, Grant R. (1986). Disembodied persons. Philosophy 61 (July):377-386.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Goetz, Stewart C. (2001). Modal dualism: A critique. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Goff, Philip (2010). Ghosts and sparse properties: Why physicalists have more to fear from ghosts than zombies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):119-139.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Zombies are bodies without minds: creatures that are physically identical to actual human beings, but which have no conscious experience. Much of the consciousness literature focuses on considering how threatening philosophical reflection on such creatures is to physicalism. There is not much attention given to the converse possibility, the possibility of minds without bodies, that is, creatures who are conscious but whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. We can call such a ‘purely conscious’ creature a ghost
Hart, William D. (1988). The Engines of the Soul. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Hocutt, Max O. (1974). Armstrong and Strawson on 'disembodied existence'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (September):46-59.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jaeger, Robert A. (1978). Brain/body dualism. Philosophical Studies 34 (November):427-435.   (Google | More links)
Jones, J. (2004). Cartesian conceivings. Metaphysica 5 (1):135-50.   (Google)
Lewy, C. (1943). Is the notion of disembodied existence self-contradictory? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 43:59-78.   (Google)
Long, Douglas C. (1969). Descartes' argument for mind-body dualism. Philosophical Forum 1:259-273.   (Google)
Abstract: [p. 259] After establishing his own existence by the Cogito argument, Descartes inquires into the nature of the self that he claims to know with certainty to exist. He concludes that he is a res cogitans, an unextended entity whose essence is to be conscious. Although a considerable amount of critical effort has been expended in attempts to show how he thought he could move to this important conclusion, his reasoning has remained quite unconvincing. In particular, his critics have insisted, and I think quite rightly, that his claim to be "entirely and absolutely distinct"[i] from his body is not justified by the reasoning which he offers in its support.[ii] Nevertheless, I also believe that the proffered criticisms of Descartes
Long, Douglas C. (1977). Disembodied existence, physicalism, and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Studies 31 (May):307-316.   (Google | More links)
Merricks, Trenton (1994). A new objection to A Priori arguments for dualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1):81-85.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Odegard, Douglas (1970). Disembodied existence and central state materialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (August):256-60.   (Google | More links)
Pecnjak, D. (1995). Remarks on disembodied existence. Acta Analytica 10 (13):209-13.   (Google)
Plantinga, Alvin (2006). Against materialism. Faith and Philosophy 23 (1):3-32.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1983). On an argument for dualism. In Carl A. Ginet & Sydney Shoemaker (eds.), Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Smart, Brian J. (1971). Can disembodied persons be spatially located? Analysis 31 (March):133-138.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Smythe, Thomas W. (1989). Disembodied minds and personal identity. Philosophy Research Archives 14:415-423.   (Google)
Spieler, David A. (1974). Central state materialism, dualism, and disembodied existence. Personalist 55:354-355.   (Google)
Strawson, Galen (2006). Panpsychism? Reply to commentators with a celebration of Descartes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):184-280.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Stump, Eleonore & Kretzmann, Norman (1996). An objection to Swinburne's argument for dualism. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):405-412.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Swinburne, Richard (1997). The modal argument for substance dualism. In The Evolution of the Soul. (Revised Edition).   (Google)
Taliaferro, Charles (1986). A modal argument for dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24:95-108.   (Google)
Taliaferro, Charles (1997). Possibilities in the philosophy of mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):127-37.   (Google | More links)
Tidman, Paul (1994). Conceivability as a test for possibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (4):297-309.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Tye, Michael (1983). On the possibility of disembodied existence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):275-282.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
van Cleve, James (1983). Conceivability and the cartesian argument for dualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):35-45.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Yablo, Stephen (1993). Is conceivability a guide to possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.   (Cited by 66 | Google | More links)
Zimmerman, D. (1991). Two cartesian arguments for the simplicity of the soul. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (July):127-37.   (Cited by 3 | Google)