MindPapers: 1.3e. Other Anti-Materialist Arguments

Bealer, George (1994). The rejection of the identity thesis. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell. (Cited by 4 | Google)

Block, Ned (2006). Max Black's objection to mind-body identity. Oxford Review of Metaphysics 3. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

Botterell, Andrew (2003). The property dualism argument against physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242. (Google)

Clapp, Leonard J. (1997). Senses, sensations and brain processes: A criticism of the property dualism argument. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):139-148. (Google)

Double, Richard (1983). Nagel's argument that mental properties are nonphysical. Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22. (Google)

Gertler, Brie (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell. (Google)

Goldstein, Laurence (1980). The reasons of a materialist. Philosophy 55 (April):249-252. (Google)

Hasker, William (2003). How not to be a reductivist. Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2. (Google | More links)

Kelly, J. S. (1989). On neutralizing introspection: The data of sensuous awareness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27:29-53. (Google)

Lahav, Ran (1994). A new challenge for the physicalist: Phenomenal indistinguishabilty. Philosophia 24 (1-2):77-103. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Levine, Joe (2007). Anti-materialist arguments and influential replies. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. (Google)

Lycan, William G. (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell. (Google)

Madell, Geoffrey C. (1988). Mind and Materialism. Edinburgh University Press. (Cited by 10 | Google | Annotation)

Madell, Geoffrey C. (2003). Materialism and the first person. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. (Google)

Maxwell, Nicholas (1968). Understanding sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (August):127-146. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)

McGinn, Colin (2001). What is it not like to be a brain? In P. Van Loocke (ed.), The Physical Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins. (Cited by 1 | Google)

McKinsey, Michael (2005). A refutation of qualia physicalism. In Michael O'Rourke & Corey G. Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. MIT Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Mijuskovic, Ben L. (1976). The simplicity argument versus a materialist theory of consciousness. Philosophy Today 20:292-305. (Google)

Nida-Rumelin, Martine (2004). Phenomenal essentialism: A problem for identity theorists. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis. (Google)

Pautz, Adam (online). Is physicalism simpler than dualism? (Google | More links)

Pautz, Adam (manuscript). The relational structure of sensory consciousness and the mind-body problem. (Google | More links)

Perry, John (2006). Mary and Max and jack and Ned. In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Google)

Perry, John (2004). Précis of knowledge, possibility and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):172-181. (Google)

Perry, John (2004). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):207-229. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

Robinson, Howard M. (1982). Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 25 | Google)

Robinson, Howard M. (1993). Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 15 | Google | Annotation)

Rosenberg, Gregg H. (2004). The argument against physicalism. In Gregg H. Rosenberg (ed.), A Place for Consciousness. Oup. (Google)

Sellars, Roy Wood (1922). Is consciousness physical? Journal of Philosophy 19 (25):690-694. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)

Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1981). Is consciousness physical? The Monist 64 (January):66-90. (Cited by 4 | Google | Annotation)

Smith, A. D. (1993). Non-reductive physicalism? In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 5 | Google | Annotation)

Stoljar, Daniel (2000). Physicalism and the necessary A Posteriori. Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):33-55. (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)

Stoljar, Daniel (forthcoming). The argument from revelation. In Robert Nola & David Braddon Mitchell (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press. (Google)

Walker, Ralph (1996). Transcendental arguments against physicalism. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press. (Google)

White, Stephen L. (2006). A posteriori identities and the requirements of rationality. In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Google)

White, Stephen L. (2002). Why the property dualism argument won't go away. Journal of Philosophy. (Cited by 5 | Google)

Wilson, Jessica M. (2002). Review of Perry's Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness. Philosophical Review 111:598-601. (Google)

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