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1.3e. Other Anti-Materialist Arguments (Other Anti-Materialist Arguments on PhilPapers)

See also:
Bealer, George (1994). The rejection of the identity thesis. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Block, Ned (2006). Max Black's objection to mind-body identity. Oxford Review of Metaphysics 3.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: considered an objection (Objection 3) that he says he thought was first put to him by Max Black. He says
Botterell, Andrew (2003). The property dualism argument against physicalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.   (Google)
Clapp, Leonard J. (1997). Senses, sensations and brain processes: A criticism of the property dualism argument. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):139-148.   (Google)
Double, Richard (1983). Nagel's argument that mental properties are nonphysical. Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22.   (Google)
Göcke, Benedikt Paul (2008). Physicalism quaerens intellectum. Philosophical Forum 39 (4):463-468.   (Google)
Gertler, Brie (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell.   (Google)
Goldstein, Irwin (1994). Identifying mental states: A celebrated hypothesis refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
Goldstein, Laurence (1980). The reasons of a materialist. Philosophy 55 (April):249-252.   (Google)
Hasker, William (2003). How not to be a reductivist. Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2.   (Google | More links)
Kelly, J. S. (1989). On neutralizing introspection: The data of sensuous awareness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27:29-53.   (Google)
Lahav, Ran (1994). A new challenge for the physicalist: Phenomenal indistinguishabilty. Philosophia 24 (1-2):77-103.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Levine, Joe (2007). Anti-materialist arguments and influential replies. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell.   (Google)
Madell, Geoffrey C. (1988). Mind and Materialism. Edinburgh University Press.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Madell, Geoffrey C. (2003). Materialism and the first person. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Maxwell, Nicholas (1968). Understanding sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 46 (August):127-146.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
McGinn, Colin (2001). What is it not like to be a brain? In P. Van Loocke (ed.), The Physical Nature of Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
McKinsey, Michael (2005). A refutation of qualia physicalism. In Michael O'Rourke & Corey G. Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Mijuskovic, Ben L. (1976). The simplicity argument versus a materialist theory of consciousness. Philosophy Today 20:292-305.   (Google)
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (2004). Phenomenal essentialism: A problem for identity theorists. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis.   (Google)
Pautz, Adam (2010). A Simple View of Consciousness. In Bealer and Koons (ed.), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford.   (Google)
Abstract: Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
Pautz, Adam (forthcoming). Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake? Philosophical Issues 20.   (Google)
Abstract: Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intentionality.
Pautz, Adam (online). Is physicalism simpler than dualism?   (Google)
Abstract: The problems with Physicalism that have most exercised its defenders are
Pautz, Adam (ms). The relational structure of sensory consciousness and the mind-body problem.   (Google)
Abstract: I am going to develop an argument against Physicalism concerning qualitative mental properties. Unlike most arguments against Physicalism, it is not based on the usual a priori considerations, such as what Mary learns when she comes out of her black and white room or the apparent conceivability of Zombies. Rather, it is based on two broadly a posteriori premises about the structure of experience and its physical basis
Perry, John (2006). Mary and Max and jack and Ned. In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Perry, John (2004). Pr. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):172-181.   (Google | More links)
Perry, John (2004). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):207-229.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Robinson, Howard M. (1982). Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Robinson, Howard M. (ed.) (1993). Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: Physicalism has, over the past twenty years, become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring out its inadequacies in dealing with thought, intentionality, abstract objects, (such as numbers), and principles of both theoretical and practical reason; even its ability to cope with the physical world itself is called into question. Both strong "reductionist" versions and weaker "supervenience" theories are discussed and found to face different but equally formidable obstacles. Contributors include George Bealer, Peter Forrest, John Foster, Grant Gillett, Bob Hale, Michael Lockwood, George Myro, Nicholas Nathan, David Smith, Steven Wagner, Ralph Walker, and Richard Warner
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (2004). The argument against physicalism. In Gregg H. Rosenberg (ed.), A Place for Consciousness. Oup.   (Google)
Sellars, Roy Wood (1922). Is consciousness physical? Journal of Philosophy 19 (25):690-694.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1981). Is consciousness physical? The Monist 64 (January):66-90.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Smith, A. D. (1993). Non-reductive physicalism? In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Stoljar, Daniel (2000). Physicalism and the necessary A Posteriori. Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):33-55.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Stoljar, Daniel (forthcoming). The argument from revelation. In Robert Nola & David Braddon Mitchell (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction The story of Canberra, the capital of Australia, is roughly as follows. In 1901, when what is called
Sturgeon, Scott (1999). Conceptual gaps and odd possibilities. Mind 108 (430):377-380.   (Google | More links)
Velmans, Max (1998). Goodbye to reductionism: Complementary first and third-person approaches to consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This chapter argues that dualist vs. reductionist debates adopt an implicit description of consciousness that does not resemble ordinary experience. If one adopts an accurate description of conscious phenomenology along with an understanding of the fundamental differences between correlation, causation and ontological identity, reductionism cannot succeed. However the alternative is not a dualism that places consciousness beyond science. Rather, it is a nonreductionist science of consciousness.
Walker, Ralph (1996). Transcendental arguments against physicalism. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
White, Stephen L. (2002). Why the property dualism argument won't go away. Journal of Philosophy.   (Cited by 5 | Google)