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1.3g. Mind-Body Problem, General (Mind-Body Problem, General on PhilPapers)

See also:
Aranyosi, István (2010). Powers and the mind–body problem. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):57 – 72.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper proposes a new line of attack on the conceivability argument for mind-body property dualism, based on the causal account of properties, according to which properties have their conditional powers essentially. It is argued that the epistemic possibility of physical but not phenomenal duplicates of actuality is identical to a metaphysical (understood as broadly logical) possibility, but irrelevant for establishing the falsity of physicalism. The proposed attack is in many ways inspired by a standard, broadly Kripkean approach to epistemic and metaphysical modality
Armstrong, David M. (1983). Recent work on the relation of mind and brain. In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bain, Alexander (1883). Mind and body. Mind 8 (31):402-412.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder, Our place in nature: Material persons and theism.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the deepest assumptions of Judaism and its offspring, Christianity, is that there is an important difference between human persons and everything else that exists in Creation. We alone are made in God’s image. We alone are the stewards of the earth. It is said in Genesis that we have “dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.” It is difficult to see how a traditional theist could deny the significance of the difference between human persons and the rest of Creation. We human persons are morally and ontologically special
Balog, Katalin (forthcoming). Acquaintance and the mind-body problem. In Christopher Hill & Simone Gozzano (eds.), Identity Theory. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer while maintaining that qualia themselves are non-physical properties. In this case the non-physical nature of qualia may play no role in accounting for the features of acquaintance. But although the account could be used by a dualist, its existence provides enormous support for physicalism. In particular it provides the makings of a positive refutation (i.e., a refutation by construction) of the conceivability arguments and the Mary argument for dualism.
Beck, Lewis White (1940). The psychophysical as a pseudo-problem. Journal of Philosophy 37 (October):561-71.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Berger, George (1982). The mind-body problem, a psychological approach. Erkenntnis 17 (3).   (Google | More links)
Bielfeldt, Dennis D. (2006). Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation. Zygon 41 (2):487-490.   (Google)
Bissett Pratt, James (1936). The present status of the mind-body problem. Philosophical Review 45 (2):144-166.   (Google | More links)
Blum, Paul Richard (online). Epistemology and Cosmology in Neoplatonism: Is Cognition a Mind-Body-Problem? Paper at Cosmos, Nature, Culture - A Transdisciplinary Conference Metanexus Conference July 18-21, 2009, Phoenix, Arizona. http://www.metanexus.net/conference2009/articles/Default.aspx?id=10790.   (Google)
Bradford Smith, Henry (1922). Mind in the mechanical order. Journal of Philosophy 19 (18):489-493.   (Google | More links)
Broad, C. D. (1925). The Mind and its Place in Nature. Routledge and Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 240 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Bew. van de Tarner lectures, gegeven aan het Trinity College te Cambridge in 1923.
Bruening, William H. (1978). No matter--never mind. Philosophical Investigations 1:43-53.   (Google)
Bruiger, Dan (online). The rise and fall of reality.   (Google)
Butler, Clark W. (1972). The mind-body problem: A nonmaterialistic identity thesis. Idealistic Studies 2 (September):229-48.   (Google)
Campbell, Karlyn K. (1970). Body and Mind. Doubleday.   (Cited by 43 | Google)
Campbell, Keith (1980). Body And Mind, Reprint. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Carrier, Martin & Mittelstrass, J (1991). Mind, Brain, Behavior: The Mind-Body Problem and the Philosophy of Psychology. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Translation of: Geist, Gehirn, Verhalten.
Carington, Whately (1949). Matter, Mind And Meaning. New Haven: Yale University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Carington kindly placed at my disposal, because they seem to me to illustrate some of the main themes of this book.
Chapman Brown, Harold (1933). Mind--an event in physical nature. Philosophical Review 42 (2):130-155.   (Google | More links)
Chalmers, David J. (unknown). The first person and third person views (part I). .   (Google)
Abstract: Intro to what "first person" and "third person" mean. (outline the probs of the first person) (convenience of third person vs absoluteness of first person) (explain terminology) Dominance of third person, reasons. (embarassment with first person) (division of reactions) (natural selection - those who can make the most noise) (analogy with behaviourism) Reductionism, hard line and soft line Appropriation of first person terms by reductionists
Cheng, Charles L. Y. (ed.) (1975). Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. Hawaii University Press.   (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1978). Is there a mind-body problem? Philosophic Exchange 2:25-34.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Claxton, Guy (2003). The mind-body problem--who cares? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):35-37.   (Google | More links)
Cooper, W. E. (1977). Beyond materialism and back again. Dialogue 16 (June-July):191-206.   (Google)
Crane, Tim (2000). Dualism, monism, physicalism. Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85.   (Google)
Abstract: Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism. It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism, but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science. A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both of the following senses: it must identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena (ontological reduction) or it must give an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms (explanatory or conceptual reduction). There is little reason to call a view which is not reductive in either of these senses “physicalism”. If reduction is rejected, then a non-physicalist form of monism is still available, which may be called “emergentism”
Patterson, Sarah & Crane, Tim (eds.) (2000). History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This collection of new essays put the debates on the mind-body problem into historical context. The discussions range from Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes to the origins of the qualia and intentionality
Drake, Durant (1929). Beyond monism and dualism. Journal of Philosophy 26 (15):402-407.   (Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1994). Mind and brain. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Duniho, Fergus (1991). The Mind/Body Problem and its Solution. Dissertation, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute   (Google)
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (2009). Consciousness makes a difference: A reluctant dualist’s confession. In A. Batthyany & A. C. Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious: Selected Papers on Consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper’s outline is as follows. In sections 1-3 I give an exposi¬tion of the Mind-Body Problem, with emphasis on what I believe to be the heart of the problem, namely, the Percepts-Qualia Nonidentity and its incompatibility with the Physical Closure Paradigm. In 4 I present the “Qualia Inaction Postulate” underlying all non-interactionist theo¬ries that seek to resolve the above problem. Against this convenient postulate I propose in section 5 the “Bafflement Ar¬gument,” which is this paper's main thesis. Sections 6-11 critically dis¬cuss attempts to dismiss the Bafflement Argument by the “Baf¬flement=Mis¬perception Equation.” Section 12 offers a refutation of all such attempts in the form of a concise “Asymmetry Proof.” Section 13 points out the bearing of the Bafflement Argument on the evolutionary role of consciousness while section 14 acknowledges the price that has to be paid for it in terms of basic physical principles. Section 15 summarizes the paper, pointing out the inescapability of interactionist dualism.
Fahrenberg, Jochen & Cheetham, Marcus (2000). The mind-body problem as seen by students of different disciplines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5):47-59.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Fehr, Fred S. (1991). Mind and body: An apparent perceptual error. Journal of Mind and Behavior 12 (3):393-405.   (Google)
Feigl, Herbert (1934). Logical analysis of the psychophysical problem. Philosophy of Science 1 (4):420-45.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Fingelkurts, Andrew A.; Fingelkurts, Alexander A. & Neves, Carlos F. H. (2010). Emergentist Monism, Biological Realism, Operations and Brain-Mind Problem. Physics of Life Reviews 7 (2):264-268.   (Google)
Abstract: We would like to thank all the commentators who responded to our target review paper for their thought-provoking ideas and for their initially positive characterization of our theorizing. Our position provoked a broad range of reactions, from enthusiastic support to some kind of opposition. Regardless of the type of the response, one common factor appears to be the plausibility of a presented attempt to apply insights from physics, biology (neuroscience), and phenomenology of mind to form a unified theoretical framework of Operational Architectonics of brain-mind functioning.
Findlay, J. N. (1972). Psyche And Cerebrum. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1981). The mind-body problem. Scientific American 244:114-25.   (Cited by 60 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Foss, Jeffrey E. (1987). Is the mind-body problem empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (September):505-32.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (1996). Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem. Indianapolis: Hackett.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Topics include immortality; materlialism; Descartes's 'Divisibility Argument' for dualism; the Argument from introspection'; the problems with...
Gendlin, Eugene T. (2000). The 'mind'/'body' problem and first-person process: Three types of concepts. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization--An Anthology. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gillett, Grant R. (1985). Brain, mind and soul. Zygon 20 (December):425-434.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Gohnert, Herbert G. (1974). The logico-linguistic mind-brain problem and a proposed step towards its solution. Philosophy of Science 41 (March):1-14.   (Google | More links)
Golightly, Cornelius L. (1952). Mind-body, causation and correlation. Philosophy of Science 19 (July):225-227.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Graham, George (1999). Mind, brain, world. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (3):223-225.   (Google)
Hanna, Robert & Thompson, Evan (2003). The mind-body-body problem. Theoria Et Historia Scientiarum 7:24-44.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: ? We gratefully acknowledge the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona, Tucson, which provided a grant for the support of this work. E.T. is also supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. 1 See David Woodruff Smith,
Harnad, Stevan (online). Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on consciousness: The mind/body problem is the feeling/function problem.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Why, oh why do we keep conflating this question, which is about the uncertainty of sensory information, with the much more profound and pertinent one, which is about the functional explicability and causal role of feeling?
_Kant: How is it possible for something even to be a thought (of mine)? What are the conditions for the_
_possibility of experience (veridical or illusory) at all?_
That's not the right question either. The right question is not even an epistemic one, about "thought" or "knowledge" (whether veridical, illusory, or otherwise) but an "aesthesiogenic" one: How and why are there any feelings at all?
Harnad, Stevan (online). There is only one mind/body problem.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In our century a Frege/Brentano wedge has gradually been driven into the mind/body problem so deeply that it appears to have split it into two: The problem of "qualia" and the problem of "intentionality." Both problems use similar intuition pumps: For qualia, we imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect, but it lacks subjective experiences; it is mindless. For intentionality, we again imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect but its "thoughts" lack "aboutness"; they are meaningless. I will try to show that there is a way to re-unify the mind/body problem by grounding the "language of thought" (symbols) in our perceptual categorization capacity. The model is bottom-up and hybrid symbolic/nonsymbolic
Heil, John (1994). Minds and bodies. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Henle, Robert J. (1951). Mind Life and Body. Ny: Macmillan.   (Google)
Holmes, S. J. (1942). The two sides of reality. Philosophical Review 51 (July):383-396.   (Google | More links)
Honderich, Ted (1989). Mind and Brain. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Humphrey, Nicholas (2000). How to solve the mind-body problem. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):5-20.   (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Humphrey, Nicholas (2000). In reply [reply to commentaries on "how to solve the mind-body problem"]. Humphrey, Nicholas (2000) in Reply [Reply to Commentaries on "How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem"]. [Journal (Paginated)] 7 (4):98-112.   (Google | More links)
Hut, Piet & van Fraassen, Bas (1997). Elements of reality: A dialogue. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (2).   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Jones, Mostyn W. (forthcoming). How to make mind-brain relations clear. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The mind-body problem arises because all theories about mind-brain connections are too deeply obscure to gain general acceptance. This essay suggests a clear, simple, mind-brain solution that avoids all these perennial obscurities. (1) It does so, first of all, by reworking Strawson and Stoljar’s views. They argue that while minds differ from observable brains, minds can still be what brains are physically like behind the appearances created by our outer senses. This could avoid many obscurities. But to clearly do so, it must first clear up its own deep obscurity about what brains are like behind appearances, and how they create the mind’s privacy, unity and qualia – all of which observable brains lack. (2) This can ultimately be done with a clear, simple assumption: our consciousness is the physical substance that certain brain events consist of beyond appearances. For example, the distinctive electrochemistry in nociceptor ion channels wholly consists of pain. This rejects that pain is a brain property: instead it’s a brain substance that occupies space in brains, and exerts forces by which it’s indirectly detectable via EEGs. (3) This assumption is justified because treating pains as physical substances avoids the perennial obscurities in mind-body theories. For example, this ‘clear physicalism’ avoids the obscure nonphysical pain of dualism and its spinoffs. Pain is instead an electrochemical substance. It isn’t private because it’s hidden in nonphysical minds, but instead because it’s just indirectly detected in the physical world in ways that leave its real nature hidden. (4) Clear physicalism also avoids puzzling reductions of private pains into more fundamental terms of observable brain activity. Instead pain is a hidden, private substance underlying this observable activity. Also, pain is fundamental in itself, for it’s what some brain activity fundamentally consists of. This also avoids reductive idealist claims that the world just exists in the mind. They yield obscure views on why we see a world that isn’t really out there. (5) Clear physicalism also avoids obscure claims that pain is information processing which is realizable in multiple hardwares (not just in electrochemistry). Molecular neuroscience now casts doubt on multiple realization. Also, it’s puzzling how abstract information gets ‘realized’ in brains and affects brains (compare ancient quandries on how universals get embodied in matter). A related idea is that of supervenient properties in nonreductive physicalism. They involve obscure overdetermination and emergent consciousness. Clear physicalism avoids all this. Pain isn’t an abstract property obscurely related to brains – it’s simply a substance in brains. (6) Clear physicalism also avoids problems in neuroscience. Neuroscience explains the mind’s unity in problematic ways using synchrony, attention, etc.. Clear physicalism explains unity in terms of intense neuroelectrical activity reaching continually along brain circuits as a conscious whole. This fits evidence that just highly active, highly connected circuits are fully conscious. Neuroscience also has problems explaining how qualia are actually encoded by brains, and how to get from these abstract codes to actual pain, fear, etc.. Clear physicalism explains qualia electrochemically, using growing evidence that both sensory and emotional qualia correlate with very specific electrical channels in neural receptors. Multiple-realization advocates overlook this important evidence. (7) Clear physicalism thus bridges the mind-brain gulf by showing how brains can possess the mind’s qualia, unity and privacy – and how minds can possess features of brain activity like occupying space and exerting forces. This unorthodox nonreductive physicalism may be where physicalism leads to when stripped of all its reductive and nonreductive obscurities. It offers a clear, simple mind-body solution by just filling in what neuroscience is silent about, namely, what brain matter is like behind perceptions of it.
Kim, Jaegwon (2003). Logical positivism and the mind-body problem. In Logical Empiricism: Historical & Contemporary Perspectives. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (2001). Mental causation and consciousness: The two mind-body problems for the physicalist. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1997). The mind-body problem: Taking stock after forty years. Philosophical Perspectives 11:185-207.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (2004). The mind-body problem at century's turn. In The Future for Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1998). The mind-body problem after fifty years. In Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
King, Peter (2005). Why isn't the mind-body problem medieval? In Peter King (ed.), Forming the Mind. Springer-Verlag.   (Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (2003). Mind and Body. Acumen.   (Google | More links)
Kneale, M. (1950). What is the mind-body problem? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:105-22.   (Google)
Kniffin, KM (2006). Show me the status: Money as a kind of currency. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):188-+.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Currencies that are recognized as money cannot be easily distinguished from alternative currencies such as status. Numerous examples demonstrate the need for status to be recognized as a motivator alongside, at least, money. Lea & Webley (L&W) acknowledge the roles of status; however, a closer focus is warranted. (Published OnlineApril52006)
Kohler, Wolfgang (1960). The mind-body problem. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press.   (Google)
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Maxwell, Nicholas (2001). The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: This book tackles the problem of how we can understand our human world embedded in the physical universe in such a way that justice is done both to the richness...
McCabe, Gordon (ms). Structural realism and the mind.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper considers whether, and how, the mind can be incorporated into structural realism. Section 1 begins with some definitions, and briefly reviews the main problems which beset structural realism. The existence of the mind is proffered as an additional problem, to which the rest of the paper is devoted. Three different philosophies of the mind are analysed, beginning with eliminative materialism, which is briefly reviewed in Section 2. The identity theory of the mind-brain relationship is critically analysed in Section 3, and the notions of supervenience and emergentism are defined. In Section 4, the functionalist approach to the mind-brain relationship is introduced, and two specific functionalist approaches---the representational theory of the mind, and connectionism---are defined and appraised. It is argued that these approaches enable structural realism to be extended to include the mind. It is also argued that structural realism can be applied to the unconscious mind, and the paper concludes with the proposal that the distinction between epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism is also valid in the case of the mind
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Moravia, Sergio & Staton, Scott (1995). The Enigma of the Mind: The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sergio Moravia's The Enigma of the Mind (originally published in Italian as L'enigma della mente) offers a broad and lucid critical and historical survey of one of the fundamental debates in the philosophy of mind - the relationship of mind and body. This problem continues to raise deep questions concerning the nature of man. The book has two central aims. First, Professor Moravia sketches the major recent contributions to the mind/body problem from philosophers of mind. Having established this framework Professor Moravia pursues his second aim - the articulation of a particular interpretation of the mental and the mind-body problem. The book's detailed and systematic treatment of this fundamental philosophical issue make it ideal for upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. It should also prove provocative reading for psychologists and cognitive scientists
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Abstract: I. The Mind-Body Problem after Kripke This essay will explore an approach to the mind-body problem that is distinct both from dualism and from the sort of conceptual reduction of the mental to the physical that proceeds via causal behaviorist or functionalist analysis of mental concepts. The essential element of the approach is that it takes the subjective phenomenological features of conscious experience to be perfectly real and not reducible to anything else--but nevertheless holds that their systematic relations to neurophysiology are not contingent but necessary
Nagel, Thomas (2000). The psychophysical nexus. In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I. The Mind-Body Problem after Kripke This essay will explore an approach to the mind-body problem that is distinct both from dualism and from the sort of conceptual reduction of the mental to the physical that proceeds via causal behaviorist or functionalist analysis of mental concepts. The essential element of the approach is that it takes the subjective phenomenological features of conscious experience to be perfectly real and not reducible to anything else--but nevertheless holds that their systematic relations to neurophysiology are not contingent but necessary
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Abstract: The phenomenon of action in which the mind moves the body has puzzled philosophers over the centuries. In this new edition of a classic work of analytical philosophy, Brian O'Shaughnessy investigates bodily action and attempts to resolve some of the main problems. His expanded and updated discussion examines the scope of the will and the conditions in which it makes contact with the body, and investigates the epistemology of the body. He sheds light upon the strangely intimate relation of awareness in which we stand to our own bodies, doing so partly through appeal to the concept of the body-image. The result is a new and strengthened emphasis on the vitally important function of the bodily will as a transparently intelligible bridge between mind and body, and the proposal of a dual aspect theory of the will.
Perkins, Steven (2005). An orthodox Christian look at the mind-body problem. Quodlibet 7 (2).   (Google)
Polanyi, Michael (1969). On body and mind. New Scholasticism 43:195-204.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Popper, Karl R.; Lindahl, B. Ingemar B. & Arhem, P. (1993). A discussion of the mind-brain problem. Theoretical Medicine 14 (2):167-180.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper Popper formulates and discusses a new aspect of the theory of mind. This theory is partly based on his earlier developed interactionistic theory. It takes as its point of departure the observation that mind and physical forces have several properties in common, at least the following six: both are (i) located, (ii) unextended, (iii) incorporeal, (iv) capable of acting on bodies, (v) dependent upon body, (vi) capable of being influenced by bodies. Other properties such as intensity and extension in time may be added. It is argued that a fuller understanding of the nature of forces is essential for the analysis of the mind-brain problem. The relative autonomy and indeterministic nature of mind is stressed. Indeterminism is treated in relation to a theorem of Hadamard. The computer theory of mind and the Turing test are criticized. Finally the evolution of mind is discussed
Pratt, James B. (1936). The present status of the mind-body problem. Philosophical Review 65 (2):144-56.   (Google | More links)
Pribam, Karl H. (1979). Transcending the mind/brain problem. Zygon 14 (June):103-124.   (Google)
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