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Philosophy of Consciousness :: Materialism and Dualism :: Mind-Body Problem, General

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Aldrich, Virgil C. & Feigl, Herbert (1935). Spatial location and the psycho-physical problem. Philosophy of Science 2 (2):256-261. (Google | More links)
Aranyosi, Istvan A. (online). Powers and the mind-body problem. (Google)
Abstract: The most discussed arguments for mental-physical property dualism in recent years have been the so-called conceivability arguments. Recently, the most sophisticated champion of such arguments has been David Chalmers. His recipe for such an argument goes like this.1 Take two actual truths, P and Q, such that most of us have the intuition that ‘P → Q’ is not _a priori_, and so ‘P & ¬Q’ is conceivable. Then argue
Armstrong, David M. (1983). Recent work on the relation of mind and brain. In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. The Hague: Nijhoff. (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Berger, George (1982). The mind-body problem, a psychological approach. Erkenntnis 17 (3). (Google | More links)
Bielfeldt, Dennis D. (2006). Mind in a physical world: An essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation. Zygon 41 (2):487-490. (Google)
Bissett Pratt, James (1936). The present status of the mind-body problem. Philosophical Review 45 (2):144-166. (Google)
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Butler, Clark W. (1972). The mind-body problem: A nonmaterialistic identity thesis. Idealistic Studies 2 (September):229-48. (Google)
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Carrier, Martin & Mittelstrass, Jürgen (1991). Mind, Brain, Behavior: The Mind-Body Problem and the Philosophy of Psychology. De Gruyter. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Chapman Brown, Harold (1933). Mind--an event in physical nature. Philosophical Review 42 (2):130-155. (Google)
Cheng, Charles L. Y. (ed.) (1975). Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-Body Problem. Hawaii University Press. (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1978). Is there a mind-body problem? Philosophic Exchange 2:25-34. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Claxton, Guy (2003). The mind-body problem--who cares? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):35-37. (Google | More links)
Cooper, W. E. (1977). Beyond materialism and back again. Dialogue 16 (June-July):191-206. (Google)
Crane, Tim (2000). Dualism, monism, physicalism. Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85. (Google)
Crane, Tim & Patterson, Sarah A. (eds.) (2000). History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Drake, Durant (1929). Beyond monism and dualism. Journal of Philosophy 26 (15):402-407. (Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1994). Mind and brain. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell. (Cited by 3 | Google)
Duniho, Fergus (1991). The Mind/Body Problem and its Solution. Dissertation, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (Google)
Fahrenberg, Jochen & Cheetham, Marcus (2000). The mind-body problem as seen by students of different disciplines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5):47-59. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Fehr, Fred S. (1991). Mind and body: An apparent perceptual error. Journal of Mind and Behavior 12 (3):393-405. (Google)
Feigl, Herbert (1934). Logical analysis of the psychophysical problem. Philosophy of Science 1 (4):420-45. (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Feigl, Herbert (1934). Logical analysis of the psychophysical problem: A contribution of the new positivism. Philosophy of Science 1 (4):420-445. (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Findlay, J. N. (1972). Psyche And Cerebrum. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1981). The mind-body problem. Scientific American 244:114-25. (Cited by 60 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Foss, Jeffrey E. (1987). Is the mind-body problem empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (September):505-32. (Cited by 1 | Google | Annotation)
Gendlin, Eugene T. (2000). The 'mind'/'body' problem and first-person process: Three types of concepts. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization--An Anthology. Amsterdam: J Benjamins. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gendlin, Eugene T. (2000). The 'mind'/'body' problem and first-person process. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization--An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (1996). Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem. Indianapolis: Hackett. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gillett, Grant R. (1985). Brain, mind and soul. Zygon 20 (December):425-434. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gohnert, Herbert G. (1974). The logico-linguistic mind-brain problem and a proposed step towards its solution. Philosophy of Science 41 (March):1-14. (Google)
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Graham, George (1999). Mind, brain, world. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (3):223-225. (Google)
Hanna, Robert & Thompson, Evan (2003). The mind-body-body problem. Theoria Et Historia Scientiarum 7:24-44. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ∗ We gratefully acknowledge the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona, Tucson, which provided a grant for the support of this work. E.T. is also supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. 1 See David Woodruff Smith, “Mind and Body,” in _The Cambridge Companion to Husserl_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 323-393, at p. 358. 2 Thomas Nagel, “The Psychophysical Nexus,” in Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke (eds.), _New Essays _ _on the A Priori_ (Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 433-471, at p. 434
Harnad, Stevan (online). Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on consciousness: The mind/body problem is the feeling/function problem. (Google | More links)
Abstract: Why, oh why do we keep conflating this question, which is about the uncertainty of sensory information, with the much more profound and pertinent one, which is about the functional explicability and causal role of feeling?
_Kant: How is it possible for something even to be a thought (of mine)? What are the conditions for the_
_possibility of experience (veridical or illusory) at all?_
That's not the right question either. The right question is not even an epistemic one, about "thought" or "knowledge" (whether veridical, illusory, or otherwise) but an "aesthesiogenic" one: How and why are there any feelings at all?
Harnad, Stevan (online). There is only one mind/body problem. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In our century a Frege/Brentano wedge has gradually been driven into the mind/body problem so deeply that it appears to have split it into two: The problem of "qualia" and the problem of "intentionality." Both problems use similar intuition pumps: For qualia, we imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect, but it lacks subjective experiences; it is mindless. For intentionality, we again imagine a robot that is indistinguishable from us in every objective respect but its "thoughts" lack "aboutness"; they are meaningless. I will try to show that there is a way to re-unify the mind/body problem by grounding the "language of thought" (symbols) in our perceptual categorization capacity. The model is bottom-up and hybrid symbolic/nonsymbolic
Heil, John (1994). Minds and bodies. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell. (Google)
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Honderich, Ted (1989). Mind and Brain. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Humphrey, Nicholas (2000). How to solve the mind-body problem. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):5-20. (Cited by 46 | Google | More links)
Humphrey, Nicholas (2000). In reply (reply to commentaries on "how to solve the mind-body problem"). Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):98-112. (Google | More links)
Hut, Piet & van Fraassen, Bas (1997). Elements of reality: A dialogue. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (2). (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (2003). Logical positivism and the mind-body problem. In Logical Empiricism: Historical & Contemporary Perspectives. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. (Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (2001). Mental causation and consciousness: The two mind-body problems for the physicalist. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1997). The mind-body problem: Taking stock after forty years. Philosophical Perspectives 11:185-207. (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (2004). The mind-body problem at century's turn. In The Future for Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1998). The mind-body problem after fifty years. In Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google)
King, Peter (2005). Why isn't the mind-body problem medieval? In Peter King (ed.), Forming the Mind. Springer-Verlag. (Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (2003). Mind and Body. Acumen. (Google | More links)
Kneale, M. (1950). What is the mind-body problem? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:105-22. (Google)
Kniffin, KM (2006). Show me the status: Money as a kind of currency. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):188-+. (Google | More links)
Kohler, Wolfgang (1960). The mind-body problem. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press. (Google)
Kraemer, Eric Russert (1979). The mind-body problem reconsidered: A reply to Davis. Journal of Thought 14 (April):109-113. (Google)
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2004). A quasi-materialist, quasi-dualist solution to the mind-body problem. Kriterion 45 (109):81-135. (Google | More links)
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2001). Materialism, causation, and the mind-body problem. Prima Philosophia 14 (1):69-90. (Google)
Kuiper, John (1954). Roy wood Sellars on the mind-body problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (September):48-64. (Google | More links)
Levin, Michael E. (1979). Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Lewis, Harry A. (1963). Mind and body. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:1-22. (Google)
Lockwood, Michael (1989). Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 115 | Google | Annotation)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (2002). Mind/body problem I. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)
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Lycan, William G. (2002). Mind/body problem II. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)
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Macnamara, John (1994). The mind-body problem and contemporary psychology. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell. (Google)
Martin, Michael (1971). The body-mind problem and neurophysiological reduction. Theoria 37:1-14. (Google)
Matson, Wallace I. (1966). Why isn't the mind-body problem ancient? In Paul K. Feyerabend & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. University of Minnesota Press. (Cited by 10 | Google)
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Maxwell, Nicholas (2001). The Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield. (Cited by 11 | Google)
McCabe, Gordon (manuscript). Structural realism and the mind. (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper considers whether, and how, the mind can be incorporated into structural realism. Section 1 begins with some definitions, and briefly reviews the main problems which beset structural realism. The existence of the mind is proffered as an additional problem, to which the rest of the paper is devoted. Three different philosophies of the mind are analysed, beginning with eliminative materialism, which is briefly reviewed in Section 2. The identity theory of the mind-brain relationship is critically analysed in Section 3, and the notions of supervenience and emergentism are defined. In Section 4, the functionalist approach to the mind-brain relationship is introduced, and two specific functionalist approaches---the representational theory of the mind, and connectionism---are defined and appraised. It is argued that these approaches enable structural realism to be extended to include the mind. It is also argued that structural realism can be applied to the unconscious mind, and the paper concludes with the proposal that the distinction between epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism is also valid in the case of the mind
McGinn, Colin (2001). How not to solve the mind-body problem. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
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Moravia, Sergio & Staton, Scott (1995). The Enigma of the Mind: The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
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Nagel, Thomas (2001). The psychophysical nexus. In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I. The Mind-Body Problem after Kripke This essay will explore an approach to the mind-body problem that is distinct both from dualism and from the sort of conceptual reduction of the mental to the physical that proceeds via causal behaviorist or functionalist analysis of mental concepts. The essential element of the approach is that it takes the subjective phenomenological features of conscious experience to be perfectly real and not reducible to anything