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1.4. Specific Views on Consciousness (Specific Views on Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Gallagher, Shaun (2001). Book review. The bodily nature of consciousness: Sartre and contemporary philosophy of mind Kathleen Wider. Mind 110 (438).   (Google)
Katsafanas, Paul (2005). Nietzsche's theory of mind: Consciousness and conceptualization. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1–31.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I show that Nietzsche's puzzling and seemingly inconsistent claims about consciousness constitute a coherent and philosophically fruitful theory. Drawing on some ideas from Schopenhauer and F.A. Lange, Nietzsche argues that conscious mental states are mental states with conceptually articulated content, whereas unconscious mental states are mental states with non-conceptually articulated content. Nietzsche's views on concepts imply that conceptually articulated mental states will be superficial and in some cases distorting analogues of non-conceptually articulated mental states. Thus, the claim that conscious states have a conceptual articulation renders comprehensible Nietzsche's claim that consciousness is "superficial" and "falsifying."
Vimal, Ram Lakhan Pandey (2009). Dependent Co-origination and Inherent Existence: Dual-Aspect Framework. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research 1 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Nāgārjuna rejects ‘inherent existence’ or ‘essence’ in favor of co-dependent origination, and that is also why he rejects causality. Causality is a major issue in metaphysical views; for example, one could argue that consciousness causes/affects our brain/behavior/function/matter or vice-versa. My goals are as follows: (i) which entities lack ‘inherent existence’ or ‘essence’ and which ones inherently exist? (ii) Do the entities that lack inherent existence dependently co-arise and hence can we reject causality as in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy? (iii) Do the entities that exist inherently cause entities that lack inherent existence? (iv) Do structure, function, experience, and environment cause each other? And (v) we critically analyze, extend, and examine Nāgārjuna’s philosophy of dependent co-origination (Nāgārjuna & Garfield, 1995)with respect to the dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009c). Our analysis suggests that: (i)All conventional entities lack inherently existence, except subjective experiences (SEs)/proto-experiences (PEs) that are fundamental and irreducible and hence inherently exist. (ii) The entities that lack inherent existence dependently co-arise, and hence causality for them can be rejected but instead conditions (such as efficient, percept-object, immediate, and dominant conditions) might be necessary, as in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy. (iii) It is not clear that SEs that exist inherently cause entities that lack inherent existence, but one could argue that (a) superposed PEs/SEs in the mental aspect of stings or elementary particles might be the motivation for the evolution to form neural-nets to realize a specific SE, and (b) Nāgārjuna’s rejection of causality and ‘relational ontology’ (Caponigro & Prakash, 2009) need to be reconsidered for SEs. For example, the SE redness (redness-bhutatma (Vimal, 2009g)) inherently, independently, and eternally exists; and hence causality may not be rejected and the ‘relational ontology’ may not apply for any such SE. (iv) It is not clear that structure, function, experience, and environment cause each other, but they might be linked via conditions. (v) Furthermore, (a) an entity has double aspect: mental and material aspects, (b) string is a dual-aspect entity that dependently co-arises from string-vacuum or brane, and (c) the dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework is consistent with these premises. For example, PEs/SEs inherently exist and are in superposed form in the mental aspect of (a) string-vacuum and/or brane before Big-Bang, (b) strings, elementary particles (bosons and fermions) and all evolved entities after Big-Bang, and (c) entities before and after Big-Freeze/Big-Crunch or entities in cyclic universe as in the big bounce/quantum-bounce (Loop Quantum Gravity) framework. However, the selection of a specific SE has dependent co-origination (and hence not inherently existent, consistent with Nāgārjuna), i.e., a specific SE occurs in brain when (i) relevant neural-net is formed via neural Darwinism, (ii) the specific SE is selected via matching and selection mechanisms, and (iii) the necessary ingredients ―such as wakefulness, re-entry, attention, working memory, stimulus at above threshold, and neural-net PEs― are satisfied. If this is true, then only experiences (PEs/SEs in superposed form) are inherently existent and other entities have dependent co-origination.

1.4a Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

1.4a.1 Higher-Order Perception Theories of Consciousness

Lycan, William G. (1995). Consciousness as internal monitoring. Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.   (Cited by 44 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." 1 On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses
Lycan, William G. (2004). The superiority of Hop to HOT. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)

1.4a.2 Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, Misc

Hellie, Benj (2007). 'There's something it's like' and the structure of consciousness. Philosophical Review 116 (3):441--63.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', in the context of a reply to Eric Lormand's 'The explanatory stopgap'. I argue that Lormand is wrong to think it has a specially perceptual meaning. Rather, it has one of at least four candidate meanings: (a) e is some way as regards its subject; (b) e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; (c) e is some way in the awareness of its subject; (d) e's subject is the "experiencer" of e. I provide additional argumentation for the view in this paper that in the context, 'like this' functions as a predicate variable.
Lycan, William G., A simple point about an alleged objection to higher-order theories of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: For purposes of this paper, a conscious state is a mental state whose subject is directly or at least nonevidentially aware of being in it. (The state does not count as conscious if the subject has only been told about it by a cognitive scientist or psychologist; introspectively would be better, but no one should say that a state is conscious only if its subject actively introspects it.). N.b., this usage is only one among several quite different though of course not competing ones; the phrase has been used in at least two other senses, as by, respectively, Dretske (1993, 1995) and Block (1995).1 My definition is stipulative, but not brutely so; it settles on one thing that is often meant by conscious state cf. a conscious memory, a conscious desire, a conscious intention, a conscious decision. According to higher-order (HO) theories of consciousness in this sense of consciousness, what makes a mental state a conscious one is that it is represented by another of the subject’s mental states, that in virtue of which s/he is aware of it. Some practitioners follow Locke in taking the higher-order state to be quasi-perceptual (Armstrong, 1968, 1980, Lycan 1991, 1996); others say it may be merely a thought about the original state (Rosenthal, 1986, 1990).2 There is an alleged objection to such theories, that originated with Goldman (1993)Error: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMap3 and has since been voiced and discussed by others (Dretske 1995, Stubenberg 1998, Van Gulick 2000, 2005, Gennaro 2005, Kriegel 2009). I say alleged, because
Van Gulick, Robert (2004). Higher-order global states (hogs): An alternative higher-order model of consciousness. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 10 | Google)

1.4a.3 Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness

Rosenthal, David M., Consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse
Rosenthal, David M., The mind and its expression.   (Google)
Abstract: pain' and ┌I think that p┐ express the pain and the thought that p, themselves. The book is most impressive. It is packed with careful argument, and addresses a remarkable range of important issues about the mind. I have very much enjoyed studying it
Aquila, Richard E. (1990). Consciousness as higher-order thoughts: Two objections. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):81-87.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Balog, Katalin (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.   (Google)
Abstract: In this commentary I criticize David Rosenthal’s higher order thought theory of consciousness (HOT). This is one of the best articulated philosophical accounts of consciousness available. The theory is, roughly, that a mental state is conscious in virtue of there being another mental state, namely, a thought to the effect that one is in the first state. I argue that this account is open to the objection that it makes “HOT-zombies” possible, i.e., creatures that token higher order mental states, but not the states that the higher order states are about. I discuss why none of the ways to accommodate this problem within HOT leads to viable positions.
Beeckmans, John (2007). Can higher-order representation theories pass scientific muster? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):90-111.   (Google)
Abstract: Higher-order representation (HOR) theories posit that the contents of lower-order brain states enter consciousness when tracked by a higher-order brain state. The nature of higher-order monitoring was examined in light of current scientific knowledge, primarily in experimental perceptual psychology. The most plausible candidate for higher-order state was found to be conceptual short-term memory (CSTM), a buffer memory intimately connected with a semantic engine operating in the medium of the language of thought (LOT). This combination meets many of the requirements of HOR theories, although falling short in some significant respects, most notably the inability of higher- order states to represent more than a small fraction of the information contained in primary states, especially in vision. A possible way round this obstacle is suggested, involving the representation of visual detail by means of ensemble concepts
Bermúdez, José Luis (2000). Consciousness, higher-order thought, and stimulus reinforcement. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):194-195.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls defends a higher-order thought theory of phenomenal consciousness, mapping the distinction between conscious and non-conscious states onto a distinction between two types of action and corresponding neural pathways. Only one type of action involves higher-order thought and consequently consciousness. This account of consciousness has implausible consequences for the nature of stimulus-reinforcement learning
Block, Ned, Comparing the major theories of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: This article compares the three frameworks for theories of consciousness that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists, the view that consciousness is a biological state of the brain, the global workspace perspective and an account in terms of higher order states. The comparison features the “explanatory gap” (Nagel, 1974; Levine, 1983) the fact that we have no idea why the neural basis of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather than another experience or no experience at all. It is argued that the biological framework handles the explanatory gap better than the global workspace of higher order views. The article does not discuss quantum theories or “panpsychist” accounts according to which consciousness is a feature of the smallest particles of inorganic matter (Chalmers, 1996; Rosenberg, 2004). Nor does it discuss the “representationist” proposals (Tye, 2000; Byrne, 2001a) that are popular among philosophers but not neuroscientists
Block, Ned (ms). Some concepts of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses". Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state
Bremer, Manuel (2008). Peter Carruthers, consciousness: Essays from a higher-order perspective. Minds and Machines 18 (3).   (Google)
Brown, Richard (ms). Consciousness, (higher-order) thoughts, and what it's like.   (Google)
Abstract: We have a vast range of conscious experience; from the taste of our favorite food, to the appearance of our favorite art, to the highs of accomplishing our goals, to the excruciating agony of a broken bone, or loss of a loved one, to wondering what time it is, or thinking about what one has to do to name but a few. Our conscious experience can be by turns exhilarating or frightening or overpowering, or just plain dull. Yet though all of this is common place it is quite mysterious how to fit this phenomenon into the natural world. Or so it seems to many philosophers and scientists, who feel, as Descartes did, that there is no hope of giving a scientific account of how consciousness arises in nature. These philosophers see ‘hard problems’ and ‘explanatory gaps’ that lead them to model consciousness as a non-physical phenomenon that is out of the reach of our scientific theories
Browne, Derek (1999). Carruthers on the deficits of animals. Psyche 5 (23).   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Byrne, Alex (1997). Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts. Philosophical Studies 2 (2):103-29.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness is the subject of many metaphors, and one of the most hardy perennials compares consciousness to a spotlight, illuminating certain mental goings-on, while leaving others to do their work in the dark. One way of elaborating the spotlight metaphor is this: mental events are loaded on to one end of a conveyer belt by the senses, and move with the belt
Byrne, Alex (2004). What phenomenal consciousness is like. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The terminology surrounding the dispute between higher-order and first-order theories of consciousness is piled so high that it sometimes obscures the view. When the debris is cleared away, there is a real prospect
Campbell Manson, Neil (2002). What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):221 – 238.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The fact that we can engage in first-person discourse about our own mental states seems, intuitively, to be bound up with consciousness. David Rosenthal draws upon this intuition in arguing for his higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Rosenthal's argument relies upon the assumption that the truth-conditions for "p" and "I think that p" differ. It is argued here that the truth-conditional schema debars "I think" from playing one of its (expressive) roles and thus is not a good test for what is asserted when "I think" is employed in making an assertoric utterance. The critique of Rosenthal's argument allows us to make explicit the intuitions which shape higher-order representation theories of consciousness in general. Consciousness and first-person mental discourse seem to be connected primarily because consciousness is (and was) an epistemic term, used to denote first-person knowledge of minds. Higher-order thought theories of consciousness draw upon this epistemic notion of consciousness, and because self-knowledge seems to involve higher-order representation, the higher-order theorist can deploy what is in effect an "error theory" about conscious experience disguised as a kind of conceptual analysis of our ordinary concept of a conscious mental state. The conclusion reached is that there is unlikely to be a simple or direct path from considerations about mental discourse to conclusions about the nature of consciousness
Carruthers, Peter (1989). Brute experience. Journal of Philosophy 86 (May):258-269.   (Cited by 44 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (1992). Consciousness and concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (66):41-59.   (Cited by 60 | Annotation | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2005). Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2001). Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena. In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an
Carruthers, Peter (1997). Fragmentary versus reflexive consciousness. Mind and Language 12 (2):181-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2004). Hop over FOR, HOT theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Following a short introduction, this chapter begins by contrasting two different forms of higher-order perception (HOP) theory of phenomenal consciousness - inner sense theory versus a dispositionalist kind of higher-order thought (HOT) theory - and by giving a brief statement of the superiority of the latter. Thereafter the chapter considers arguments in support of HOP theories in general. It develops two parallel objections against both first-order representationalist (FOR) theories and actualist forms of HOT theory. First, neither can give an adequate account of the distinctive features of our recognitional concepts of experience. And second, neither can explain why there are some states of the relevant kinds that are phenomenal and some that aren
Carruthers, Peter (2007). Higher-order theories of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (online). Higher-order theories of consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (1996). Language, Thought, and Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 318 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Do we think in natural language? Or is language only for communication? Much recent work in philosophy and cognitive science assumes the latter. In contrast, Peter Carruthers argues that much of human conscious thinking is conducted in the medium of natural language sentences. However, this does not commit him to any sort of Whorfian linguistic relativism, and the view is developed within a framework that is broadly nativist and modularist. His study will be essential reading for all those interested in the nature and significance of natural language, whether they come from philosophy, psychology or linguistics
Carruthers, Peter (1998). Natural theories of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):203-22.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many people have thought that consciousness
Carruthers, Peter (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 194 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness
Carruthers, Peter (2003). Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (online). Precis of Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2000). Replies to critics: Explaining subjectivity. Psyche 6 (3).   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (online). Reply to Seager.   (Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David (2005). The higher-order model of consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.   (Google)
Abstract: All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not
Carruthers, Peter (2005). Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):83-102.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to higher-order thought accounts of phenomenal consciousness it is unlikely that many non-human animals undergo phenomenally conscious experiences. Many people believe that this result would have deep and far-reaching consequences. More specifically, they believe that the absence of phenomenal consciousness from the rest of the animal kingdom must mark a radical and theoretically significant divide between ourselves and other animals, with important implications for comparative psychology. I shall argue that this belief is mistaken. Since phenomenal consciousness might be almost epiphenomenal in its functioning within human cognition, its absence in animals may signify only relatively trivial differences in cognitive architecture. Our temptation to think otherwise arises partly as a side-effect of imaginative identification with animal experiences, and partly from mistaken beliefs concerning the aspects of common-sense psychology that carry the main explanatory burden, whether applied to humans or to non-human animals
Cole, David J. (online). Sense and sentience.   (Google)
Abstract: Surely one of the most interesting problems in the study of mind concerns the nature of sentience. How is it that there are sensations, rather than merely sensings? What is it like to be a bat -- or why is it like anything at all? Why aren't we automata or responding but unfeeling Zombies? How does neural activity give rise to subjective experience? As Leibniz put the problem (Monadology section 17):
_It must be confessed, however, that Perception_ [consciousness?]_, and that which depends upon it, are_
_inexplicable by mechanical means, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a_
_machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perceptions, we could conceive of it as increased_
_in its interior size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a_
_mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find_
_anything to explain Perception._ [Montgomery trans.]
Copenhaver, Rebecca (ms). Reid on consciousness: HOP, HOT or FOR?   (Google | More links)
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Higher-order consciousness and phenomenal space: Reply to Meehan. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Meehan finds fault with a number of my arguments, and proposes that better solutions to the problems I was addressing are available if we adopt a higher-order theory of consciousness. I start with some general remarks on theories of this sort. I connect what I had to say about the A-thesis with different forms of higher-order sense theories, and explain why I ignored higher-order thought theories altogether: there are compelling grounds for thinking they cannot provide a viable account of phenomenal unity in phenomenal terms. Meehan
Dienes, Zoltán (2004). Assumptions of subjective measures of unconscious mental states: Higher order thoughts and bias. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):25-45.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1995). Are experiences conscious? In Fred Dretske (ed.), Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1993). Conscious experience. Mind 102 (406):263-283.   (Cited by 141 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Droege, Paula (online). Consciousness, higher-order theories of. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Droege, Paula (2003). Caging the Beast: A Theory of Sensory Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Dulany, Donelson E. (2004). Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Francescotti, Robert M. (1995). Higher-order thoughts and conscious experience. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):239-254.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: For nearly a decade, David Rosenthal has proposed that a mental state M of a creature C is conscious just in case C has a suitable higher-order thought directed toward M. While this theory has had its share of criticism in recent years, I believe that the real difficulties have been ignored. In this essay, I show that the presence of a higher order is insufficient for conscious experience, even if we suppose that the thought satisfies the constraints that Rosenthal lists (i.e. that it is assertoric in nature, that it is had occurently, and that it is non-inferentially formed). The only way Rosenthal's view could possibly yield sufficient conditions is by requiring that the higher-order thought be suitably causally related to its object. Yet, as I also show, the only causal constraint strong enough to do the job is not only ill-motivated but probably false
Gennaro, Rocco J. (1993). Brute experience and the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Philosophical Papers 22 (1):51-69.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (1996). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 51 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness.
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2000). Fiction, pleasurable tragedy, and the HOT theory of consciousness. Philosophical Papers 29 (2):107-20.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: [Final version in Philosophical Papers, 2000] Much has been made over the past few decades of two related problems in aesthetics. First, the "feeling fiction problem," as I will call it, asks: is it rational to be moved by what happens to fictional characters? How can we care about what happens to people who we know are not real?[i] Second, the so-called "paradox of tragedy" is embodied in the question: Why or how is it that we take pleasure in artworks (e.g. tragedies) which are clearly designed to cause in us such feelings as sadness and fear?[ii] Various solutions to these puzzles have been proposed, but my primary aim is neither to offer a novel solution nor to summarize and critique most of the alternatives.[iii] My focus instead will be on the issue of consciousness and, more specifically, to view these problems from the point of the view of the so-called "higher-order thought theory of consciousness" (the HOT theory). Although some work on these puzzles have raised important questions about the nature of consciousness and "aesthetic experience," no attempt has yet been made to examine them in light of a specific theory
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2004). Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and Levine. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2004). Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. John Benjamin.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2002). Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT theory of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):293-330.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2003). Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):581-586.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In Thinking About Consciousness , David Papineau [2002] presents a criticism of so-called 'actualist HOT theories of consciousness'. The HOT theory, held most notably by David Rosenthal, claims that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of an actual higher-order thought directed at the mental state. Papineau contends that actualist HOT theory faces an awkward problem in relation to higher-order memory judgements; for example, that the theory cannot explain how one could later recall an earlier experience that was not introspected. He argues that, on the HOT theory, we are even left with the absurd conclusion that the consciousness of, say, an earlier visual experience might even depend on the later act of memory. I show that Papineau's criticism of actualist HOT theory not only fails, but also that it seriously mischaracterizes and underestimates the theory. In particular, Papineau badly conflates the crucial difference between an introspective state (i.e., where a conscious HOT is directed at a mental state) and an outer-directed first-order conscious state (i.e., a case where one has a nonconscious HOT)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2005). The HOT theory of consciousness: Between a rock and a hard place. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):3-21.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The so-called 'higher-order thought' (HOT) theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at it (Rosenthal, 1986; 1990; 1993; 2002; 2004; Gennaro, 1996; 2004). The HOT theory has been or could be attacked from two apparently opposite directions. On the one hand, there is what Stubenberg (1998) has called 'the problem of the rock' which, if successful, would show that the HOT theory proves too much. On the other hand, it might also be alleged that the HOT theory does not or cannot address the so-called 'hard problem' of phenomenal consciousness. If so, then the HOT theory would prove too little. We might say, then, that the HOT theory is arguably between a rock and a hard place. In this paper, I critically examine these objections and defend the HOT theory against them. In doing so, I hope to show that the HOT theory, or at least some version of it, neither proves too little nor too much, but is just right. I also show that these two objections are really just two sides of the same coin, and that the HOT theory is immune from David Chalmers' (1995; 1996) criticisms of other attempted reductionist accounts of consciousness
Gennaro, Rocco J., Visual agnosia and higher- order thought theory.   (Google)
Abstract: In general, the idea is that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation (HOR). A mental state M becomes conscious when there is a HOR of M. A HOR is a “meta-psychological” state, i.e. a mental state directed at another mental state. So, for example, my desire to do a good powerpoint presentation becomes conscious when I am (non-inferentially) “aware” of the desire. Intuitively, it seems that conscious states, as opposed to unconscious ones, are mental states that I am “aware of” in some sense
Gerken, Mikkel (2008). Is there a simple argument for higher-order representation theories of awareness consciousness? Erkenntnis 69 (2):243-259.   (Google)
Abstract: William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation (SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I then provide a reconstruction of the argument and argue that although the reconstructed argument deserves consideration, it is also too simple as stated. In particular, it raises several controversial questions about the nature of mental representation. These questions must be addressed before a verdict as to the cogency of the HOR argument-strategy can be reached. But since the questions are controversial, a cogent argument for HOR theories of awareness consciousness is unlikely to be simple
Gois, Isabel (2010). A dilemma for higher-order theories of consciousness. Philosophia 38 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail to give an account of what they set out to explain: what is distinctive of ‘conscious’ phenomena
Guzeldere, Guven (1996). Consciousness and the introspective link principle. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
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Abstract: I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be a nonintentional "acquaintance".
Jacob, Pierre (1996). State consciousness revisited. Acta Analytica 11 (16):29-54.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jamieson, Dale W. & Bekoff, Marc (1992). Carruthers on nonconscious experience. Analysis 52 (1):23-28.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
Jehle, David & Kriegel, Uriah (2006). An argument against dispositionalist HOT. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we present a two-stage argument against Peter Carruthers' theory of phenomenal consciousness. The first stage shows that Carruthers' main argument against first-order representational theories of phenomenal consciousness applies with equal force against his own theory. The second stage shows that if Carruthers can escape his own argument against first-order theories, it will come at the cost of wedding his theory to certain unwelcome implausibilities. discusses Carruthers' argument against first-order representationalism. presents Carruthers' theory of consciousness. presents our argument against Carruthers' theory. sums up
Kobes, Bernard W. (1997). Metacognition and consciousness: Review essay of Janet Metcalfe and Arthur P. shimamura (eds), Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):93-102.   (Google)
Abstract: The field of metacognition, richly sampled in the book under review, is recognized as an important and growing branch of psychology. However, the field stands in need of a general theory that (1) provides a unified framework for understanding the variety of metacognitive processes, (2) articulates the relation between metacognition and consciousness, and (3) tells us something about the form of meta-level representations and their relations to object-level representations. It is argued that the higher-order thought theory of consciousness supplies us with the rudiments of a theory that meets these desiderata and integrates the principal findings reported in this collection
Kobes, Bernard W. (1995). Telic higher-order thoughts and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness. Consciousness & Cognition 16:897-912.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles. Synthese 134 (3):477-504.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is the peculiar self- awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. According to a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinct representation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-order content. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by M itself or by a differ- ent state. While the Neo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it is often felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the Neo- Brentanian and Higher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that the Neo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima facie preferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory.
Kriegel, Uriah (2002). Consciousness, permanent self-awareness, and higher-order monitoring. Dialogue 41 (3):517-540.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lagerspetz, Olli (2002). In the industry. Inquiry 45 (4):541-559.   (Google | More links)
Liang, Caleb & Lane, Timothy (2008). Higher-Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation. The Southern Journal of Philosophy:69-98.   (Google)
Lau, Hakwan (ms). A higher order bayesian decision theory of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: It is usually taken as given that consciousness involves superior or more elaborate forms of information processing. Contemporary models equate consciousness with global processing, system complexity, or depth or stability of computation. This is in stark contrast with the powerful philosophical intuition that being conscious is more than just having the ability to compute. I argue that it is also incompatible with current empirical findings. I present a model that is free from the strong assumption that consciousness predicts superior performance. The model is based on Bayesian decision theory, of which signal detection theory is a special case. It reflects the fact that the capacity for perceptual decisions is fundamentally limited by the presence and amount of noise in the system. To optimize performance, one therefore needs to set decision criteria that are based on the behaviour, i.e. the probability distributions, of the internal signals. One important realization is that the knowledge of how our internal signals behave statistically has to be learned over time. Essentially, we are doing statistics on our own brain. This ‘higherorder’ learning, however, may err, and this impairs our ability to set and maintain optimal criteria for perceptual decisions, which I argue is central to perception consciousness. I outline three possibilities of how conscious perception might be affected by failures of ‘higher-order’ representation. These all imply that one can have a dissociation between consciousness and performance. This model readily explains blindsight and hallucinations in formal terms, and is beginning to receive direct empirical support. I end by discussing some philosophical implications of the model
Liang, Caleb & Lane, Timothy (2009). Higher-order thought and pathological self: The case of somatoparaphrenia. Analysis 69 (4).   (Google)
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Lurz, Robert W. (2000). A defense of first-order representationalist theories of mental-state consciousness. Psyche 6 (1).   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Lurz, Robert W. (2003). Advancing the debate between HOT and FO accounts of consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:23-44.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lurz, Robert W. (2001). Begging the question: A reply to Lycan. Analysis 61 (272):313-318.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Lurz, Robert W. (2004). Either FOR or HOR: A false dichotomy. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Lurz, Robert W. (2003). Neither hot nor cold: An alternative account of consciousness. Psyche 8 (1).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1999). A response to Carruthers' Natural Theories of Consciousness. Psyche 5 (11).   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: I have very little disagreement with Carruthers' article, for our views are very similar. I think he is terminologically a bit hard on Michael Tye. I think that in invoking Swampman he is in danger of conflating teleological theories of representation with etiological theories of teleology. In response to his criticism of my own higher-order experience (HOE) view, I argue that there is good reason to believe that we human beings sport as great a degree of computational complexity as is needed for HOEs. If other animals do not exhibit a comparable degree, we should deny that they have "phenomenal-consciousness" in the strong sense of that term
Lycan, William G. (2001). A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness. Analysis 61 (269):3-4.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1995). Consciousness as internal monitoring. Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.   (Cited by 44 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." 1 On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses
Lycan, William G. & Ryder, Z. (2003). The loneliness of the long-distance truck-driver. Analysis 63 (2):132-36.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (2004). The superiority of Hop to HOT. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Mandik, Pete (2009). Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):5-36.   (Google)
Abstract: Higher-Order Representational theories of consciousness — HORs — primarily seek to explain a mental state’s being conscious in terms of the mental state’s being represented by another mental state. First-Order Representational theories of consciousness — FORs — primarily seek to explain a property’s being phenomenal in terms of the property being represented in experience. Despite differences in both explanans and explananda, HORs and FORs share a reliance on there being such a property as being represented. In this paper I develop an argument — the Unicorn Argument — against both HORs and FORs. The core of the Unicorn is that since there are mental rep- resentations of things that do not exist, there cannot be any such prop- erty as being represented, and thus no such property with which to identify either being conscious or being phenomenal.
Mandik, Pete (ms). Ch 3. beware the unicorn: Consciousness, intentionality, and inexistence.   (Google)
Abstract: 0. Introduction As mentioned in chapter 0, HORs seek to explain a mental state’s being conscious in terms of the mental state’s being represented by another mental state and FORs seek to explain a property’s being phenomenal in terms of the property of being represented in experience. Despite differences in both explanans and explananda, HORs and FORs share a reliance on there being such a property as being represented. In this chapter I develop an argument—the Unicorn Argument—against both HORs and FORs. The gist of the Unicorn is that since there are mental representations of things that do not exist, there cannot be any such property as being represented upon which to erect a theory of consciousness. While I think many varieties of HORs and FORs are vulnerable to the Unicorn, in this chapter I target just a few exemplars: David Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Thought theory (HOT) and the FORs developed by Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Although HORs and FORs were discussed in previous chapters, insufficient detail has been given so far to make it clear how HOT will be vulnerable to the Unicorn. In section 1 I spell out HOT, emphasizing its main motivations and its reliance on the notion of being represented
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Matey, Jennifer (2006). Two HOTS to handle: The concept of state consciousness in the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):151-175.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory is one of the most widely argued for of the higher-order accounts of consciousness. I argue that Rosenthal vacillates between two models of the HOT theory. First, I argue that these models employ different concepts of 'state consciousness'; the two concepts each refer to mental state tokens, but in virtue of different properties. In one model, the concept of 'state consciousness' is more consistent with how the term is typically used, both by philosophers and scientists, and in commonsense usage. This model, however, also has its problems. In the second part of the paper, I develop a modified version of Rosenthal's transitivity principle, thereby avoiding some complications that stem from the original transitivity principle. I suggest that Rosenthal occasionally employs this modified model himself, and that the inconsistency identified in the first section of this paper might really reflect Rosenthal's vacillation between these two versions of the transitivity principle. I offer one explanation for how this equivocation may have occurred. These two versions would result if articulations of the transitivity principle employed the term 'mental state' inconsistently, to refer on some occasions merely to mental state types, and on others, to tokened mental states. I conclude by arguing, contrary to Rosenthal and others, that the theory is not incompatible with view that conscious states are uniquely casual efficacious
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Abstract: This paper bridges art history and consciousness studies and investigates the network of gazes and frames in Las Meninas and how this engages with a system of higher-order thoughts and reflexive operations.
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Natsoulas, Thomas (1993). What is wrong with the appendage theory of consciousness? Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):137-54.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: The present article distinguishes three kinds of accounts of direct (reflective) awareness (i.e. awareness of one's mental occurrences causally unmediated by any other mental occurrence): mental-eye theory, self-intimational theory and appendage theory. These aim to explain the same phenomenon, though each proposes that direct (reflective) awareness occurs in a fundamentally different way. Also, I address a crucial problem that appendage theory must solve: how does a direct (reflective) awareness succeed in being awareness specifically of the particular mental-occurrence instance that is its object? Appendage theory is singled out for this attention because psychologists, as they embark on their renewed study of consciousness, are most likely to be attracted by appendage theory for their explanation of direct (reflective) awareness
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Abstract: Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the explicit/implicit knowledge distinction is still a fair way off
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Pharoah, Mark (ms). Enhancing dispositional higher-order thought theory.   (Google)
Abstract: Through the utilization of a descriptive illustration and detailed referencing of Carruthers (2000), a comparison of Hierarchical Systems theory (Pharoah, 2007) with Dispositional Higher-Order Thought theory identifies and reinforces their complementary status. However, this also determines some key distinctions, particularly with regard to the conclusions each make regarding the mentality of animals and the autistic, and regarding the moral consequences of these conclusions.
Prinz, Jesse J. (2000). A neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):243-59.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the widely held belief that sensation precedes perception will all be found wanting. The theory will also be used to illustrate and defend a methodology that fills the gulf between functionalists who ignore the brain and neural reductionists who repudiate functionalism
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Abstract: One kind of substantial critique which has been raised by several philosophers against the so called higher order perception theory (HOP), advocated for mainly by William Lycan, concerns the combination of two important claims: (i) that qualia are wide contents of perceptual experiences, and (ii) that the subject becomes aware of what the world is like (to her) by perceiving her own experiences of the world. In what sense could we possibly watch our own mental states if they are representations whose content and qualitative character is determined by factors that are external to the mind? Here I will do my best in order to understand this claim
Rey, Georges (2000). Role, not content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):224-230.   (Google)
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Robinson, William S. (2004). A few thoughts too many? In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Rolls, Edmund T. (2007). The affective neuroscience of consciousness: Higher order syntactic thoughts, dual routes to emotion and action, and consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1997). Apperception, sensation, and dissociability. Mind and Language 2 (2):206-23.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent writing on consciousness has increasingly stressed ways in which the terms
Rosenthal, David M. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 166 | Annotation | Google)
Rosenthal, David, Commentaries.   (Google)
Abstract: But there is another reason, equally important. We distinguish among thoughts, feelings, and sensations by virtue of their characteristic representational properties. In particular, we describe thoughts and emotions in terms of the things they are about and how they represent those things. And we characterize sensations by reference to their qualitative properties and the things..
Rosenthal, David M., Consciousness (.   (Google)
Abstract: (1) Most commonly these terms are used to describe people. People and other creatures are conscious if they are awake and responsive to sensory stimulation. Because this is a property of creatures, we can call it creature consciousness. An individual lacks such consciousness if it is asleep, in a coma, anesthetized, and so forth. Creature consciousness demands a mainly biological explanation, as against an explanation in mainly psychological terms
Rosenthal, David (web). Concepts and definitions of consciousness. In P W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Google)
Abstract: in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009
Rosenthal, David M. (2002). Consciousness and higher-order thought. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input
Rosenthal, David (ms). Consciousness and intrinsic higher-order content.   (Google)
Abstract: PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness
Rosenthal, David M. (1998). Consciousness and metacognition. In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (2000). Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments. Consciousness And Cognition 9 (2):203-214.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state
Rosenthal, David M. (2000). Consciousness, interpretation, and consciousness. Protosociology 14:67-84.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2002). Explaining Consciousness. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
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Rosenthal, David (2010). Expressing one's mind. Acta Analytica 25 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Remarks such as ‘I am in pain’ and ‘I think that it’s raining’ are puzzling, since they seem to literally describe oneself as being in pain or having a particular thought, but their conditions of use tend to coincide with unequivocal expressions of pain or of that thought. This led Wittgenstein, among others, to treat such remarks as expressing, rather than as reporting, one’s mental states. Though such expressivism is widely recognized as untenable, Bar-On has recently advanced a neo-expressivist view, on which such remarks exhibit characteristics of both expressions of mental states and reports of those states. I argue against any attempt to see such remarks as both reporting and expressing the same mental states, and that a correct account rests on distinguishing the truth conditions of such remarks from their conditions of use
Rosenthal, David M. (2002). How many kinds of consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1993). Higher-order thoughts and the appendage theory of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):155-66.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: Theories of what it is for a mental state to be conscious must answer two questions. We must say how we're conscious of our conscious mental states. And we must explain why we seem to be conscious of them in a way that's immediate. Thomas Natsoulas (1993) distinguishes three strategies for explaining what it is for mental states to be conscious. I show that the differences among those strategies are due to the divergent answers they give to the foregoing questions. Natsoulas finds most promising the strategy that amounts to the higher-order-thought hypothesis that I've defended elsewhere. But he raises a difficulty for it, which he thinks probably can be met only by modifying that strategy. I argue that this is unnecessary. The difficulty is a special case of a general question, the answer to which is independent of any issues about consciousness. So it's no part of a theory of consciousness to address the problem, much less solve it. Moreover, the difficulty seems to have intuitive force only given the picture that underlies the other two explanatory strategies, which both Natsoulas and I reject
Rosenthal, David & Weisberg, Josh (online). Higher-order theories of consciousness.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2000). Metacognition and higher-order thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought (HOT) hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis
Rosenthal, David M. (1993). Multiple drafts and higher-order thoughts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):911-18.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1995). Multiple drafts and the facts of the matter. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1995). Moore's paradox and consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:313-33.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1997). Perceptual and cognitive models of consciousness. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 45.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1997). Phenomenal consciousness and what it's like. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 20 (1):64-65.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: be realized. Whatever gets access to phenomenal awareness (to consciousness and P-consciousness are almost always present or P-consciousness as described by Block) is represented within this absent together.
Rosenthal, David (online). Reflections on five questions: Autobiographical and disciplinary.   (Google)
Abstract: in Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions, ed. Patrick Grim, New York and London: Automatic Press, forthcoming
Rosenthal, David (online). “Replies to Galen Strawson and Ned Block.   (Google)
Abstract: (not intended for publication), Replies to Strawson and Block in Colloquium at the CUNY Graduate Center, December 13, 2006
Rosenthal, David M. (1994). State consciousness and transitive consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (3):355-63.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2004). Subjective character and reflexive content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191-198.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry
Rosenthal, David M. (online). State consciousness and what it's like.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2005). Sensory qualities, consciousness, and perception. In Consciousness and Mind. Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1986). Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.   (Cited by 215 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (2002). The higher-order model of consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.   (Google)
Abstract: All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not
Rosenthal, David M. (1991). The independence of consciousness and sensory quality. Philosophical Issues 1:15-36.   (Cited by 42 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David (online). The mind and its expression.   (Google)
Abstract: MS., for an Eastern Division APA Author-Meets-Critics Session on Dorit Bar-On, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Baltimore, December 2007
Rosenthal, David M. (1993). Thinking that one thinks. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.   (Cited by 111 | Annotation | Google)
Rosenthal, David, V. consciousness, interpretation, and higher-order-thought.   (Google)
Abstract: Few contemporary researchers in psychology, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences have any doubt about whether mental phenomena occur without being conscious. There is extensive and convincing clinical and experimental evidence for the existence of thoughts, desires, and related mental states that aren’t conscious. We characterize thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, hopes, and many other mental states in terms of the things they are about and, more fully, in terms of their content, as captured by a sentence nominalization, such as a clause beginning with the word ‘that’. The philosophical literature follows Franz Brentano’s adaptation of Thomist terminology in referring to all such states as intentional states. But there is another type of mental phenomena, which lack intentionality and whose mental nature consists instead of some qualitative feature. These states include bodily sensations, such as aches and pains, and perceptual states, such as visual sensations of color and tactile sensations of heat and cold. And these states all exhibit some mental quality or another, such as the mental quality distinctive of pain or the mental quality of red or blue.1 And even theorists who acknowledge that intentional states can and do occur without being conscious have sometimes insisted that qualitative states cannot. There is, according to these theorists, nothing to a state’s being qualitative or exhibiting some mental quality unless that state is conscious – unless it is, as we might metaphorically say, “lighted up”. It’s striking that Freud himself seems to have adopted this double standard toward the two types of mental state. In his metapsychological paper, “The Unconscious”, for example, he writes that “all the categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions, and so forth, can be applied to [unconscious mental occurrences]” (Freud 1915e, p. 168). But he seems here to have in..
Rosenthal, David (2004). Varieties of higher-order theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1990). Why are verbally expressed thoughts conscious? Bielefeld Report.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Rowlands, Mark (2001). Consciousness and higher-order thoughts. Mind and Language 16 (3):290-310.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Saha, Sukharanjan (2003). Inner sense and 'higher order consciousness': An indian perspective. In Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.   (Google)
Saidel, Eric (1999). Consciousness without awareness? Psyche 5 (16).   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Sainsbury, Mark (1991). Is there higher-order vagueness? Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):167-182.   (Google | More links)
Schroder, Jurgen (2001). Higher-order thought and naturalist accounts of consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):27-46.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Seager, William E. (2004). A cold look at HOT theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Seager, William E. (online). Dispositions and consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (1994). Dretske on HOT theories of consciousness. Analysis 54 (4):270-76.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Seager, William E. (1999). HOT theory: The mentalistic reduction of consciousness. In Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment. Routledge.   (Google)
Seager, William E. (ms). On dispositional HOT theories of consciousness.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Higher Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness contend that consciousness can be explicated in terms of a relation between mental states of different
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (1999). Saving the phenomenal. Psyche 5 (35).   (Google)
Stoerig, Petra (1997). Phenomenal vision and apperception: Evidence from blindsight. Mind and Language 2 (2):224-37.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Stone, Jim (2001). What is it like to have an unconscious mental state? Philosophical Studies 104 (2):179-202.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Van Gulick, Robert (2000). Is the higher order of linguistic thought model of feeling adequate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):218-219.   (Google)
Abstract: Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motivational states
Veres, Zoltan (2008). Hiding within representation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (9):131-135.   (Google)
Abstract: The 'playful affirmation', as Uziel Awret calls it, turns into a joyful affirmation of a theoretical challenge in a philosophical space set up by the many questions concerning the nature of consciousness. This is especially because the 'Las Meninas and the search for self-representation' (Awret, this volume) has been written in the spirit of an interplay between different modes and approaches, and also the different philosophical traditions, for dealing with the 'enigma' it presents. Bringing Velasquez's Las Meninas into the bigger picture of consciousness studies means a change in methodological perspective. Not only does it support the idea so dear to the tradition of phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics of claiming back the truth value for the experience of work of art, but the author also succeeds in showing the relevance of this 'truth' to recent theoretical approaches to problems of representationalism and self-representation (like those of David Rosenthal, Robert Van Gulick, Bruce Mangan and Uriah Kriegel, for example)
Weisberg, Josh (1999). Active, thin, and HOT: An actualist response to Carruthers' dispositionalist HOT view. Psyche 5 (6).   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Carruthers proposes that for a mental state to be conscious (state consciousness), it must be present in a
Weisberg, Josh (2008). Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor. Synthese 160 (2):161-181.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy
Weisberg, Josh (forthcoming). Misrepresenting consciousness. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: An important objection to the “higher-order” theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the particular extrinsic characterization of the HO theory, the “transitivity principle,” against its intrinsic rivals, thereby showing that the misrepresentation objection conclusively falls short
Weisberg, Josh (2001). The appearance of unity: A higher-order interpretation of the unity of consciousness. Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Conference of The.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: subjective appearance of unity, but respects unity can be adequately dealt with by the theory. I the actual and potential disunity of the brain will close by briefly considering some worries about processes that underwrite consciousness. eliminativism that often accompany discussions of unity and consciousness
Wright, Wayne (2005). Distracted drivers and unattended experience. Synthese 144 (1):41-68.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consider the much-discussed case of the distracted driver, who is alleged to successfully navigate his car for miles despite being completely oblivious to his visual states. Perhaps he is deeply engrossed in the music playing over the radio or in philosophical reflection, and as a result he goes about unaware of the scene unfolding before him on the road. That the distracted driver has visual experiences of which he is not aware is a possibility that first-order representationalists (FOR) happily accept, but higher-order representationalists (HOR) steadfastly deny. HOR claims that perceptual states become conscious only as the object of higher-order states; perceptual states are not intrinsically conscious. According to HOR, since the driver is supposed to be completely distracted by other cognitive tasks, he cannot form higher-order representations of his visual states, with the result that those states are disqualified as experiences.1 HOR theories have come in two flavors, those that claim that the relevant higher-order representations are thought-like (HOT) and those that that rely on an inner perception-like mechanism that is directed toward one

1.4a.4 Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness

Brentano, Franz Clemens (1874). Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge.   (Google)
Brogaard, Berit (ms). Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing Themselves?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This is an excellent book, one of the best I have read on consciousness in recent years. It is rigorously argued and contains interesting suggestions as to how to solve the mystery of consciousness. Following the standard literature, Uriah Kriegel takes consciousness to be the "what it is like for me"-ness of conscious mental states. This is also what is sometimes called the 'phenomenal character' of conscious mental states. For Kriegel (as for Levine), phenomenal character has two components: qualitative character and subjective character. If I have a red experience, the phenomenal redness of my experience is the qualitative character of my experience, whereas the for-me-ness is the subjective character of the experience. Kriegel states that the qualitative character of conscious mental states is what makes the conscious mental state the kind of conscious experience it is, whereas the for-me-ness of the mental state is what makes the mental state a conscious state in the first place. The mystery of consciousness, he says, does not lie in the qualitative character of experience. According to him, the question of how brain processes can give rise to purely qualitative redness is no harder to answer than that of how physical matter can instantiate colors. The mystery of consciousness lies in the for-me-ness of conscious experience. Kriegel then goes on to give an account of the subjective character of
conscious mental states. He argues that the subjective character of conscious mental states
consists in the state representing itself. It's the self-representational nature of conscious mental
states that makes them conscious. The self-representational nature of conscious mental states is
a kind of peripheral awareness. If I have a red experience, I am focally aware of redness but I
am peripherally aware of the experience itself. Along the way Kriegel rebuts a number of
alternative theories of subjective character: among others, that it is a kind of primitive property
of conscious mental states, and that it is a representation of the conscious mental state by a
higher-order state. I agree with many of Kriegel's arguments against both the naive primitivist
view and the higher-order theoretical approach. My main concerns lie elsewhere. My three
main points of disagreement can be summarized as follows: (1) Assuming that it makes sense to
separate qualitative and subjective character I believe that the qualitative character of conscious
mental states is at least as mysterious as the subjective character. (2) I believe Uriah's theory is
at odds with plausible gradability theories of perception. (3) I am skeptical about the project of
developing a reductive metaphysical theory of consciousness in terms of self-representation.
Brook, Andrew & Raymont, Paul (forthcoming). A Unified Theory of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Brook, Andrew (2006). Kant: A unified representational base for all consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2005). Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 194 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness
Caston, Victor (2002). Aristotle on consciousness. Mind 111 (444):751-815.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive (On the Soul 3.2) has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher-order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to the first issue?the primary focus of this paper?he argues that consciousness is both intrinsic and higher-order, due to its reflexive nature. This, in turn, has consequences for the second issue, where again Aristotle seeks out the middle ground. He is committed against qualia in any strong sense of the term. Yet he also holds that the phenomenal quality of experience is not exhausted by its representational content
Caston, Victor (2006). Comment on Amie Thomasson's "self-awareness and self-knowledge". Psyche 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I raise an objection to Thomasson
Caston, Victor (2004). More on Aristotle on consciousness: Reply to Sisko. Mind 113 (451):523-533.   (Google | More links)
Coventry, Angela & Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Locke on consciousness. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25:221-242.   (Google)
Drummond, John J. (2006). The case(s) of (self-)awareness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Falk, Arthur E. (1995). Consciousness and self-reference. Erkenntnis 43 (2):151-80.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Fasching, Wolfgang (2009). The mineness of experience. Continental Philosophy Review 42 (2):131-148.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization. Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”, but should be conceived of as a dimension , namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences
Ganeri, Jonardon (1999). Self-intimation, memory and personal identity. Journal of Indian Philosophy 27 (5).   (Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2006). Between pure self-referentialism and the (extrinsic) HOT theory of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2007). Representationalism, peripheral awareness, and the transparency of experience. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal consciousness accompanied often (or even always) by inner peripheral (self-)awareness. My criticisms stem from both methodological and phenomenological considerations. In doing so, I offer a diagnosis as to why the fourth thesis has seemed true to so many and also show how the so-called "transparency of experience," frequently invoked by representationalists, is importantly relevant to my diagnosis. Finally, I respond to several objections and to further attempts to show that thesis four is true. What emerges is that if one wishes to hold that some form of self-awareness accompanies all outer-directed conscious states, one is better off holding that such self-awareness is itself unconscious, as is held for example by standard higher-order theories of consciousness.
Gerken, Mikkel (2008). Is there a simple argument for higher-order representation theories of awareness consciousness? Erkenntnis 69 (2):243-259.   (Google)
Abstract: William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation (SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I then provide a reconstruction of the argument and argue that although the reconstructed argument deserves consideration, it is also too simple as stated. In particular, it raises several controversial questions about the nature of mental representation. These questions must be addressed before a verdict as to the cogency of the HOR argument-strategy can be reached. But since the questions are controversial, a cogent argument for HOR theories of awareness consciousness is unlikely to be simple
Harman, Gilbert (2006). Self-reflexive thoughts. Philosophical Issues 16:334-345.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Alice has insomnia. She has trouble falling asleep and part of the problem is that she worries about it and realizes that her worrying about it tends to keep from falling asleep. It occurs to her that thinking that she will not be able to fall asleep may be a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Perhaps she even has a thought that might be expressed like this: I am not going to fall asleep because of my having this very thought. This thought (perhaps correctly) attributes to itself the property of keeping her awake
Hill, Christopher S. (2006). Harman on self referential thoughts. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):346-357.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. Moreover, I feel that it is extremely useful. Without deploying it, how could we tell the whole truth about the nature of thoughts?
Hill, Christopher S. (2006). Perceptual consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to itself. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Hofstadter, Douglas R. (2006). What is it like to be a strange loop? In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E.; Tienson, John L. & Graham, George (2006). Internal-world skepticism and mental self-presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Hossack, Keith (2002). Self-knowledge and consciousness. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102 (2):168-181.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Ismael, Jenann (2006). Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture. Psyche 12 (2).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self- representational accounts
Janzen, Greg (2006). Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the more refractory problems in contemporary discussions of consciousness is the problem of determining what a mental state's being conscious consists in. This paper defends the thesis that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has a certain reflexive character, i.e., if and only if it has a structure that includes an awareness (or consciousness) of itself. Since this thesis finds one of its clearest expressions in the work of Brentano, it is his treatment of the thesis on which I initially focus, though I subsequently bring in Sartre where he is required to improve on Brentano, i.e., where he addresses himself to an important point not considered by Brentano. As part of this investigation, the paper also, more specifically, aims to exhibit as perspicuously as possible the relationship between self-awareness and the phenomenal, or 'what-it- is-like', dimension of conscious experience. I attempt to show, in particular, that the phenomenal character of at least perceptual consciousness can be fully explained in terms of self- awareness, i.e., in terms of a low-level or 'implicit' self- awareness that is built into every conscious perceptual state
Janzen, Greg (2005). Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character. Dialogue 44 44:707-733.   (Google)
Kapitan, Tomis (1999). The ubiquity of self-awareness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 57:17-44.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Two claims have been prominent in recent discussions of self-consciousness. One is that first-person reference or first-person thinking is irreducible (the Irreducibility Thesis), and the other is that an awareness of self accompanies all conscious states, at least those through which one refers to something. The latter--here termed the Ubiquity Thesis--has long been associated with philosophers like Fichte, Brentano, and Sartre, though each articulated his own version of the claim. More recently, variants have been defended by Dieter Henrich (1970) and Manfred Frank (1991, 1995a, 1995b). In Frank's words
Kidd, Chad (forthcoming). Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2) a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure of inner-representational states
Kobes, Bernard W. (1995). Telic higher-order thoughts and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness. Consciousness & Cognition 16:897-912.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue for a specific account of consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness. According to this account, a mental state is conscious (i.e., intransitively self-conscious) iff it represents its own occurrence. The argument is a ?modernizing? modification of an older argument due to Aristotle and Brentano
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles. Synthese 134 (3):477-504.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is the peculiar self- awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. According to a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinct representation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-order content. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by M itself or by a differ- ent state. While the Neo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it is often felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the Neo- Brentanian and Higher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that the Neo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima facie preferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory.
Kriegel, Uriah (2002). Consciousness, permanent self-awareness, and higher-order monitoring. Dialogue 41 (3):517-540.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Intrinsic theory and the content of inner awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):169-196.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2004). Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief. Erkenntnis 61 (1):99-121.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2005). Naturalizing subjective character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract. When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this "bluish way it is like for me": (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth
Kriegel, Uriah (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71:23-57.   (Google)
Abstract: When I have an experience of the blue sky, there is a bluish it is like for me to have the experience. There are two components to this “bluish way it is like for me”: the bluish component, which I call qualitative character; and the for-me component, which I call subjective character. The paper examines six options for naturalizing subjective character.
Horgan, Terry & Kriegel, Uriah (2007). Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, self- knowledge has also encountered its share of skeptics – philosophers who refuse to accord it any descriptive, let alone normative, distinction. In this paper, we argue that there is at least one _species_ of self-knowledge that is different from, and better than, other knowledge. It is a specific kind of knowledge of one’s concurrent phenomenal experiences. Call knowledge of one’s own phenomenal experiences _phenomenal knowledge_. Our claim is that some (though not all) phenomenal knowledge is different from, and better than, non-phenomenal knowledge. In other
Kriegel, Uriah (forthcoming). Precis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a Precis of my book _Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory_. It does the usual.
Kriegel, Uriah (2009). Self-representationalism and phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism
Williford, Kenneth W. & Kriegel, Uriah (eds.) (2006). Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (forthcoming). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the self-representational theory of consciousness – self- representationalism for short – a mental state is phenomenally conscious when, and only when, it represents itself in the right way. In this paper, I consider how self- representationalism might address the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties. I open with a presentation of self- representationalism and the case for it (§1). I then present what I take to be the most promising self-representational approach to the explanatory gap (§2). That approach is threatened, however, by an objection to self-representationalism, due to Levine, which I call the just more representation objection (§3). I close with a discussion of how the self-representationalist might approach the objection (§4).
Kriegel, Uriah (2006). The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the promising approaches to the problem of consciousness has been the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory, a mental state M of a subject S is conscious iff S has another mental state, M*, such that M* is an appropriate representation of M. Recently, several philosophers have developed a Higher-Order Monitoring theory with a twist. The twist is that M and M* are construed as entertaining some kind of constitutive relation, rather than being logically independent of each other. We may call this the Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. In this paper, I discuss the nature of the Same-Order Monitoring Theory and argue for its superiority over the more traditional Higher-Order Monitoring Theory
Kriegel, Uriah (2009). Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The self-representational theory of consciousness -- Conceptual preliminaries -- A representational account of qualitative character -- A self-representational account of subjective character -- Self-representationalism and the phenomenology of consciousness -- Self-representationalism and the ontology of consciousness -- Self-representationalism and the science of consciousness -- Self-representationalism and the reduction of consciousness -- Appendix: phenomenal consciousness and subjective consciousness.
Legrand, Dorothée (2009). Two senses for 'givenness of consciousness'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):89-94.   (Google)
Abstract: The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree, however about which modes of givenness are involved
Lehrer, Keith (1996). Consciousness. In Alfred Schramm (ed.), Philosophie in Osterreich. Vienna: Verlag Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lehrer, Keith (1997). Evaluation and consciousness. In Keith Lehrer (ed.), Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, and Autonomy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Lehrer, Keith (2004). Representation in painting and in consciousness. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):1-14.   (Google | More links)
Lehrer, Keith (1996). Skepticism, lucid content, and the metamental loop. In A. Clark, Jesus Ezquerro & J. M. Larrazabal (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Kluwer.   (Google)
Lehrer, Keith (2002). Self-presentation, representation, and the self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):412-430.   (Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (2006). Conscious awareness and (self-)representation. In Kenneth Williford & Uriah Kriegel (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. The Mit Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Lurz, Robert W. (2006). Conscious beliefs and desires: A same-order approach. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Lyyra, Pessi (2009). Two senses for 'givenness of consciousness'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.   (Google)
Abstract: A number of theories of consciousness define consciousness by the folk-intuition that consciousness is somehow aware of, or ‘given’ to itself. I attempt to undermine this intuition on phenomenological, conceptual and psychological grounds. An alternative, first-order theory of consciousness, however, faces the task of explaining the possibility of self-awareness for consciousness, as well as the everyday intuition supporting it. I propose that another, weaker kind of givenness, ‘givenness as availability’, is up to both of these tasks, and is therefore sufficient and suitable for first-order theories of consciousness
MacKenzie, Matthew D. (2007). The illumination of consciousness: Approaches to self-awareness in the indian and western traditions. Philosophy East and West 57 (1):40-62.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: : Philosophers in the Indian and Western traditions have developed and defended a range of sophisticated accounts of self-awareness. Here, four of these accounts are examined, and the arguments for them are assessed. Theories of self-awareness developed in the two traditions under consideration fall into two broad categories: reflectionist or other-illumination theories and reflexivist or self-illumination theories. Having assessed the main arguments for these theories, it is argued here that while neither reflectionist nor reflexivist theories are adequate as traditionally formulated and defended, the approaches examined here give important insights for the development of amore adequate contemporary account of self-awareness
Mijuskovic, Ben L. (1978). Brentano's theory of consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (March):315-324.   (Google | More links)
Mills, Frederick B. (2006). Intrinsic awareness in Sartre. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):1-16.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1989). An examination of four objections to self-intimating states of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10:63-116.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1988). Is any state of consciousness self-intimating? Journal of Mind and Behavior 9:167-203.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1996). The case for intrinsic theory: II. An examination of a conception of consciousness 'subscript 4' as intrinsic, necessary, and concomitant. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (4):369-390.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2006). The case for intrinsic theory: XIII. The role of the qualitative in a modal account of inner awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):319-350.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2006). The case for intrinsic theory: XII. Inner awareness conceived of as a modal character of conscious experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (3-4):183-214.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2004). The case for intrinsic theory IX . further discussion of an equivocal remembrance account. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):7-32.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2004). The case for intrinsic theory XI: A disagreement regarding the kind of feature inner awareness is. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):187-211.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2003). The case for intrinsic theory VIII: The experiential in acquiring knowledge firsthand of one's experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (3-4):289-316.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1999). The case for intrinsic theory IV: An argument from how conscious mental-occurrence instances seem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (3):257-276.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2001). The case for intrinsic theory V: Some arguments from James's varieties. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (1):41-67.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1996). The case for intrinsic theory: I. An introduction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1998). The case for intrinsic theory: III. Intrinsic inner awareness and the problem of straightforward objectivation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (1):1-19.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Olivier, Abraham (2003). When pains are mental objects. Philosophical Studies 115 (1):33-53.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In Why pains are not mental objects (1998) Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of experiencebecome a mental object. I shall finally argue that, thoughextreme pains cannot serve as paradigm cases, they do showthe general importance of taking pain states to be objects
Pasquerella, L. (2002). Phenomenology and intentional acts of sensing in Brentano. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40:269-279.   (Google)
Perrett, Roy W. (2003). Intentionality and self-awareness. Ratio 16 (3):222-235.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Prado, C. G. (1978). Reflexive consciousness. Dialogue 17:134-137.   (Google)
Raymont, Paul (online). From HOTs to self-representing states.   (Google)
Abstract: After briefly summarizing David Rosenthal
Rosenthal, David (ms). Consciousness and intrinsic higher-order content.   (Google)
Abstract: PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness
Rosenthal, David (2004). Varieties of higher-order theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Rutte, Heiner (1987). On the problem of inner perception. Topoi 6 (March):19-23.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Seager, William (2006). Is self-representation necessary for consciousness? Psyche 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to generate consciousness, but they do assert that they are necessary, at least in the sense that self-representation provides the most plausible mechanism for generating conscious mental states. I argue that a first-order approach to consciousness is equally capable of accounting for the putative features of consciousness which are supposed to favor the self-representational account. If nothing is gained the simplicity of the first-order theory counts in its favor. I also advance a speculative proposal that we are never aware of any distinctively mental attributes of our own states of consciousness except via an independent act of reflective conceptualization, although this goes rather farther than the first-order theory strictly requires
Sisko, John (2004). Reflexive awareness does belong to the main function of perception: Reply to Victor Caston. Mind 113 (451):513-521.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Smith, David Woodruff (2005). Consciousness with reflexive content. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smith, David Woodruff (2004). Return to consciousness. In David Woodruff Smith (ed.), Mind World: Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Smith, David Woodruff (1989). The Circle of Acquaintaince. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Smith, David Woodruff (1986). The structure of (self-)consciousness. Topoi 5 (September):149-156.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Textor, Mark (2006). Brentano (and some neo-brentanians) on inner consciousness. Dialectica 60 (4):411-432.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Thomasson, Amie L. (2000). After Brentano: A one-level theory of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):190-210.   (Google | More links)
Thompson, Brad J. (2006). Comments on Ismael's "double-mindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture?". Psyche 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Two general worries are raised for the dual content approach to consciousness as presented by Ismael in
Van Gulick, Robert (2004). Higher-order global states (hogs): An alternative higher-order model of consciousness. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
van Gulick, Robert (2000). Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awareness. Philosophical Topics 28:275-305.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Van Gulick, Robert (2006). Mirror, mirror -- is that all? In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different ways or respects, and to varying degrees. Thus the real questions of linkage must be posed more specifically. We need to ask not whether the two are bound in general, but whether and how being conscious in some specific sense and degree relates to some particular sort of self-awareness. Only those more specific questions are likely to have fully determinate answers
Weisberg, Josh (2008). Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor. Synthese 160 (2):161-181.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy
Weisberg, Josh (forthcoming). Misrepresenting consciousness. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: An important objection to the “higher-order” theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the particular extrinsic characterization of the HO theory, the “transitivity principle,” against its intrinsic rivals, thereby showing that the misrepresentation objection conclusively falls short
Wider, Kathleen (2006). Emotion and self-consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Wider, Kathleen (1993). Sartre and the long distance truck driver: The reflexivity of consciousness. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 24 (3):232-249.   (Google)
Williford, Kenneth Wayne, The structure of self-consciousness: A phenomenological and philosophical investigation.   (Google)
Williford, Kenneth (2006). The self-representational structure of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Williford, Kenneth (2006). Zahavi versus Brentano: A rejoinder. Psyche 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Dan Zahavi has argued persuasively that some versions of self- representationalism are implausible on phenomenological and dialectical grounds: they fail to make sense of primitive self-knowledge and lead to an infinite regress. Zahavi proposes an alternative view of ubiquitous prereflective self-consciousness
Zahavi, Dan (2004). Back to Brentano? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):66-87.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a (neo-)Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis - cussed. It will be argued that it can con trib ute impor tant insights to our under - stand ing of the rela tion between con scious ness and self-aware ness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some prob lems, and that it will ulti mately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the look out for prom is ing alter na tives to the higher-order the o ries, than to return all the way to Brentano
Zahavi, Dan (2006). Thinking about consciousness: Phenomenological perspectives. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zahavi, Dan (2006). Two takes on a one-level account of consciousness. Psyche 12 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differences

1.4b Dennett's Functionalism

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Akins, Kathleen (1996). Lost the plot? Reconstructing Dennett's multiple drafts theory of consciousness. Mind and Language 11 (1):1-43.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Akins, Kathleen (1996). Ships in the night: Churchland and Ramachandran on Dennett's theory of consciousness. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Antony, Michael V. (2002). Toward an ontological interpretation of Dennett's theory of consciousness. Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-370.   (Google | More links)
Arbib, Michael A. (1972). Consciousness: The secondary role of language. Journal of Philosophy 64 (5):579-591.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Barresi, John & Christie, John R. (2002). Using illusory line motion to differentiate misrepresentation (stalinesque) and misremembering (orwellian) accounts of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):347-365.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has been suggested that the difference between misremembering (Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated (Dennett, 1991). According to an Orwellian account a briefly presented stimulus is seen and then forgotten; whereas, by a Stalinesque account it is never seen. At the same time, Dennett suggested a method for assessing whether an individual is conscious of something. An experiment was conducted which used the suggested method for assessing consciousness to look at Stalinesque and Orwellian distinctions. A visual illusion, illusory line motion, was presented and participants were requested to make judgments that reflected what they were aware of. The participants were able to make responses indicating that they were aware of the actual stimulus in some conditions, but only of the illusion in others. This finding supports a claim that the difference between the Orwellian and Stalinesque accounts may be empirically observable, and that both types of events may occur depending on task and stimulus parameters
Bloomfield, Paul (1998). Dennett's misrememberings. Philosophia 26 (1-2):207-218.   (Google | More links)
Block, Ned (1995). What is Dennett's theory a theory of? Philosophical Topics 22:23-40.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Abstract: A convenient locus of discussion is provided by Dennett
Bricke, John (1985). Consciousness and Dennett's intentionalist net. Philosophical Studies 48 (September):249-56.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Bricke, John (1984). Dennett's eliminative arguments. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):413-29.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Bringsjord, Selmer (online). Explaining phi without Dennett's exotica: Good ol' computation suffices.   (Google | More links)
Brook, Andrew (2000). Judgments and drafts eight years later. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Now that some years have passed, how does this picture of consciousness look? On the one hand, Dennett's work has vastly expanded the range of options for thinking about conscious experiences and conscious subjects. On the other hand, I suspect that the implications of his picture have been oversold (perhaps more by others than by Dennett himself). The rhetoric of _CE_ is radical in places but I do not sure that the actual implications for commonsense views of Seemings and Subjects are nearly as radical
Brook, Andrew (online). The appearance of things.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: These two contributions have had different fates. The attack on _qualia_ and related fantasies has been enormously influential, in part because it follows in a long line of scepticism about the traditional ways of thinking about this topic, a tradition including, among philosophers, the later Wittgenstein, Dennett's teacher Gilbert Ryle, John Austin and Wilfrid Sellars. Psychologists such as Tony Marcel and Bernard Baars and medical neuroscientists such as Marcel Kinsbourne are examples of leading researchers whose work is done in the light of Dennett's critique. Indeed, one can hardly pick up any leading journal of consciousness studies such as the _Journal of Consciousness Studies_ or _Consciousness and_ _Cognition_ without finding Dennett's name mentioned somewhere. The influence has not been easily won and the ground is still contested. Ringing rejections of Dennett's arguments still appear and he answers them in papers with ferocious titles such as 'The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies' (1995a). Thought experiments still appear purporting to show that _qualia_ are remarkable, in fact utterly extraordinary phenomena. Such rear-guard actions notwithstanding,. many consciousness researchers are now convinced that deep incoherencies lie buried in the traditional notion of conscious states
Carman, Taylor (2007). Dennett on seeming. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Carr, David (1998). Phenomenology and fiction in Dennett. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (3):331-344.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Consciousness Explained and other works, Daniel Dennett uses the concept of phenomenology (along with his variant, called heterophenomenology) in almost complete disregard of the work of Husserl and his successors in German and French philosophy. Yet it can be argued that many of the most important ideas of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and others (and not just the idea of intentionality) reappear in Dennett's work in only slightly altered form. In this article I try to show this in two ways, first by talking in a general way about Dennett's phenomenology, and second by examining his treatment of the concept of the self. In both cases I argue that Dennett should have read his Husserl and Merleau-Ponty more carefully, since in the end his (hetero-) phenomenology is methodologically incoherent and suffers from something like a weakness of will. This emerges especially in his use of the notion of fiction
Churchland, Paul M. (2002). Catching Consciousness in a Recurrent Net. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett: Contemporary Philosophy in Focus. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1999). Densmore and Dennett on virtual machines and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):763-767.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. & Ramachandran, Vilayanur S. (1993). Filling in: Why Dennett is wrong. In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 93 | Annotation | Google)
Clark, Stephen R. L. (1993). Minds, memes, and rhetoric. Inquiry 36 (1-2):3-16.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Crooks, Mark (2003). Phenomenology in absentia: Dennett's philosophy of mind. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Crooks, Mark (2004). The last philosophical behaviorist: Content and consciousness explained away. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):50-121.   (Google)
Dahlbom, B. (ed.) (1995). Dennett and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2001). Are we explaining consciousness yet? Cognition 79 (1):221-37.   (Cited by 72 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1968). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.   (Cited by 351 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Penguin.   (Cited by 3274 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27
Dennett, Daniel C. (1993). Caveat emptor. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (12-13):48-57.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: What I find particularly valuable in the juxtaposition of these three essays on my book is the triangulation made possible by their different versions of much the same story. I present my view as a product of cognitive science, but all three express worries that it may involve some sort of ominous backsliding towards the evils of behaviorism. I agree with Baars and McGovern when they suggest that philosophy has had some baleful influences on psychology during this century. Logical positivism at its best was full of subtle softenings, but behaviorist psychologists bought the tabloid version, and sold it to their students in large quantities. George Miller's account of those dreary days is not an exaggeration, and the effects still linger in some quarters. (Philosophers are often amused--but they should really be disconcerted--to note that the only living, preaching logical positivists today are to be found in psychology departments.)
Dennett, Daniel C. & Kinsbourne, Marcel (1992). Escape from the cartesian theater. Reply to commentaries on Time and the Observer: The Where and When of Consciousness in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:183-247.   (Google)
Abstract: Damasio remarks, it "informs virtually all research on mind and brain, explicitly or implicitly." Indeed, serial information processing models generally run this risk (Kinsbourne, 1985). The commentaries provide a wealth of confirming instances of the seductive power of this idea. Our sternest critics Block, Farah, Libet, and Treisman) adopt fairly standard Cartesian positions; more interesting are those commentators who take themselves to be mainly in agreement with us, but who express reservations or offer support with arguments that betray a continuing allegiance to one or another tenet of the view we sought to discredit
Dennett, Daniel C. (1995). Get real. Philosophical Topics 22.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There could be no more gratifying response to a philosopher's work than such a bounty of challenging, high-quality essays. I have learned a great deal from them, and hope that other readers will be as delighted as I have been by the insights gathered here. One thing I have learned is just how much hard work I had left for others to do, by underestimating the degree of explicit formulation of theses and arguments that is actually required to bring these issues into optimal focus. These essays cover my work from top to bottom. Just about every nook and cranny is probed and tested in ways I could never do for myself. The essays thus highlight the areas of weakest exposition of my views; they also show the weak points of the views themselves--and suggest repairs, which I am sometimes happy to accept, but not always, since there are a few cases in which one critic deftly disarms another, sight unseen. I will be fascinated to learn how the individual authors react to each other's essays, since they side with me on different points, and disagree about what is still in need of revision or repair
Dennett, Daniel C. (1995). Is Perception the "Leading Edge" of Memory? In A. Spafadora (ed.), Iride: Luoghi Della Memoria E Dell'oblio.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Daniel C. Dennett
Is Perception the 'Leading Edge' of Memory?
Consciousness appears to us to consist of a sequence of contentful items, arranged in a sequence, the so-called "stream of consciousness," in which each item in turn bursts quite suddenly into consciousness and thereby enters memory, perhaps only briefly to be remembered, and then forgotten. I think that hidden in this comfortable and largely innocent picture of consciousness is a deep and seductive mistake. I intend to expose and elucidate that mistake, and describe an alternative vision
Dennett, Daniel C. (1993). Living on the edge. Inquiry 36 (1-2):135-59.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: In a survey of issues in philosophy of mind some years ago, I observed that "it is widely granted these days that dualism is not a serious view to contend with, but rather a cliff over which to push one's opponents." (Dennett, 1978, p.252) That was true enough, and I for one certainly didn't deplore the fact, but this rich array of essays tackling my book amply demonstrates that a cliff examined with care is better than a cliff ignored. And, as I have noted in my discussion of the blind spot and other gaps, you really can't perceive an edge unless you represent both sides of it. So one of the virtues of this gathering of essays is that it permits both friend and foe alike to take a good hard look at dualism, as represented by those who are tempted by it, those who can imagine no alternative to it, and those who, like me, still find it to be--in a word--hopeless
Dennett, Daniel C. & Kinsbourne, Marcel (1995). Multiple drafts: An eternal golden braid? Reply to Glicksohn and Salter. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):810-11.   (Google)
Abstract: We have learned that the issues we raised are very difficult to think about clearly, and what "works" for one thinker falls flat for another, and leads yet another astray. So it is particularly useful to get these re-expressions of points we have tried to make. Both commentaries help by proposing further details for the Multiple Drafts Model, and asking good questions. They either directly clarify, or force us to clarify, our own account. They also both demonstrate how hard it is for even sympathetic commentators always to avoid the very habits of thought the Multiple Drafts Model was designed to combat. While acknowledging and expanding on their positive contributions, we must sound a few relatively minor alarms
Dennett, Daniel C. (1979). On the absence of phenomenology. In Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind, and Method. Kluwer.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1993). Precis of Consciousness Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):889-931.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1978). Reply to Arbib and Gunderson. In Brainstorms. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1994). Self-portrait. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: In my opinion, the two main topics in the philosophy of mind are content and consciousness. As the title of my first book, _Content and Consciousness_ (1969) suggested, that is the order in which they must be addressed: first, a theory of content or intentionality--a phenomenon more fundamental than consciousness--and then, building on that foundation, a theory of consciousness. Over the years I have found myself recapitulating this basic structure twice, partly in order to respond to various philosophical objections, but more importantly, because my research on foundational issues in cognitive science led me into different aspects of the problems. The articles in the first half of
Dennett, Daniel C. (2005). Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in ...
Dennett, Daniel C. (1996). Seeing is believing--or is it? In Kathleen Akins (ed.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We would all like to have a good theory of perception. Such a theory would account for all the known phenomena and predict novel phenomena, explaining everything in terms of processes occurring in nervous systems in accordance with the principles and laws already established by science: the principles of optics, physics, biochemistry, and the like. Such a theory might come to exist without our ever having to answer the awkward "philosophical" question that arises
Dennett, Daniel C. (1978). Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9.   (Cited by 43 | Annotation | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. & Kinsbourne, Marcel (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:183-201.   (Cited by 394 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274
Dennett, Daniel C. (1988). The Evolution of Consciousness. In J. Brockman (ed.), The Reality Club, Vol. III. Prentice-Hall.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1994). Tiptoeing Past the Covered Wagons. In U. Neisser & David A. Jopling (eds.), The Conceptual Self in Context: Culture, Experience, Self-Understanding. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: David Carr complains, in "Dennett Explained, or The Wheel Reinvents Dennett," (Report #26), that I have ignored deconstructionism and Phenomenology. This charge is in some regards correct and in others not. Briefly, here is how my own encounters with these fields have looked to me
Densmore, Shannon & Dennett, Daniel C. (1999). The virtues of virtual machines. Philosophy and Phenemenological Research 59 (3):747-61.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Paul Churchland's book (hereafter ER)is an entertaining and instructive advertisement for a "neurocomputational" vision of how the brain (and mind) works. While we agree with its general thrust, and commend its lucid pedagogy on a host of difficult topics, we note that such pedagogy often exploits artificially heightened contrast, and sometimes the result is a misleading caricature instead of a helpful simplification. In particular, Churchland is eager to contrast the explanation of consciousness that can be accomplished by his "aspiring new structural and dynamic cognitive prototype: recurrent PDP networks" (p.266) with what strikes him as the retrograde introduction by Dennett of a virtual von Neumannesque machine--a "failed prototype"--as the key element in an explanation of human consciousness (in
_Consciousness_
_Explained_, 1991, hereafter, CE). We will try to show that by oversimplifying Dennett's alternative, he has taken a potential supplement to his own view--a much needed supplement--and transformed it in his imagination into a subversive threat. In part 1, we will expose and correct the mistaken contrasts. In part 2, we will compare the performance of the two views on Churchland's list of seven features of consciousness any theory must account for, showing that Dennett's account provides more than Churchland has recognized, and indeed offers answers to key questions that Churchland's account is powerless to address. At that point, Churchland's project and Dennett's could be seen to collaborate in a useful division of labor instead of being in mortal combat, were it not for what appears to be a fairly major disagreement about consciousness in non-human animals. Part 3 briefly examines this issue. It may be due to a misunderstanding, which when cleared up might restore the happy prospect of unification
Derksen, Anthony A. (2005). Dennett's rhetorical strategies in Consciousness Explained. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (1):29-48.   (Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1995). Differences that make no difference. Philosophical Topics 22:41-57.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google)
Fellows, Roger & O'Hear, Anthony (1993). Consciousness avoided. Inquiry 36 (1 & 2):73 – 91.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Foster, John A. (1993). Dennett's rejection of dualism. Inquiry 36 (1-2):17-31.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Freeman, Anthony (2006). A Daniel come to judgement? Dennett and the revisioning of transpersonal theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (3):95-109.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Transpersonal psychology first emerged as an academic discipline in the 1960s and has subsequently broadened into a range of transpersonal studies. Jorge Ferrer (2002) has called for a 'revisioning' of transpersonal theory, dethroning inner experience from its dominant role in defining and validating spiritual reality. In the current paradigm he detects a lingering Cartesianism, which subtly entrenches the very subject-object divide that transpersonalists seek to overcome. This paper outlines the development and current shape of the transpersonal movement, compares Ferrer's epistemology with the heterophenomenology of Daniel Dennett, and speculates on the integration of the latter into transpersonal theory
Gunderson, Keith (1972). Content and Consciousness. And the Mind-Body Problem.   (Google)
Gunderson, Keith (1972). Content and consciousness and the mind-body problem. Journal of Philosophy 64 (5):591-604.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Holt, D. Lynn (1999). Metaphor, history, consciousness: From Locke to Dennett. Philosophical Forum 30 (3):187-200.   (Google | More links)
Hutto, Daniel D. (1995). Consciousness demystified: A Wittgensteinian critique of Dennett. The Monist 78 (4):464-79.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Jackson, Frank (1993). Appendix a (for philosophers). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):897-901.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Jarrett, Greg (1999). Conspiracy theories of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 96 (1):45-58.   (Google | More links)
Johnsen, Bredo C. (1997). Dennett on qualia and consciousness: A critique. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):47-82.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (1993). "The best set of tools"? Dennett's metaphors and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):335-43.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Lloyd, Dan (2000). Popping the thought balloon. In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many recovering dualists find that the old Cartesian demons are hard to exorcise. Dual substance abuse manifests itself not only as metaphysical dualism, but as a pervasive epistemological framework that creates an unhealthy codependent relationship between scientific realism and phenomenology. Daniel Dennett has led philosophers to recognize many of the symptoms of creeping crypto Cartesianism. In this paper, I try to take Dennett to the limit: Descartes lives on, I argue, in the very heart of cognitive science, in the concept of representation. I outline a five-step program for overcoming this lingering, fundamental, allegiance to Cartesianism, and discuss Dennett's own progress along this path
Lockwood, Michael (1993). Dennett's mind. Inquiry 36 (1-2):59-72.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
MacDorman, Karl F. (2004). Extending the medium hypothesis: The Dennett-Mangan controversy and beyond. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):237-257.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Mangan, Bruce (1993). Dennett, consciousness, and the sorrows of functionalism. Consciousness and Cognition 2:1-17.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Marbach, Eduard (1988). How to study consciousness phenomenologically or quite a lot comes to mind. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 19 (October):252-268.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
McCauley, Robert N. (1993). Why the blind can't lead the blind: Dennett on the blind spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 2:155-64.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
McGinn, Colin (1995). Consciousness evaded: Comments on Dennett. Philosophical Perspectives 9:241-49.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Nicolson, Stewart (1995). Illusions of consciousness. Dialogue 34 (4):769-775.   (Google)
Nikolinakos, Drakon (2000). Dennett on qualia: The case of pain, smell and taste. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):505 – 522.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Dennett has maintained that a careful examination of our intuitive notion of qualia reveals that it is a confused notion, that it is advisable to accept that experience does not have the properties designated by it and that it is best to eliminate it. Because most scientists share this notion of qualia, the major line of attack of his project becomes that of raising objections against the ability of science to answer some basic questions about qualia. I try to show that science appeals to qualia and that it in fact adheres to a notion of qualia different from the one that Dennett has attributed to it. It is argued that qualia are amenable to scientific investigation and that this is the reason why science contributes toward the clarification of the notion of qualia. I also try to show that Dennett's skepticism about the abilities of science in answering questions posited by one of his thought experiments is unwarranted. I conclude that we need not accept Dennett's eliminativism about qualia
Nixon, Greg (1999). A hermeneutic objection: Language and the inner view. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):257-269.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (1999). A defense of cartesian materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):939-63.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in _Consciousness Explained _is to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of _Cartesian materialism_: the idea that conscious experience is a _process of presentation_ realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Our response is quite different. We believe that, once properly formulated, Cartesian materialism is no straw man. Rather, it is an attractive hypothesis about the relationship between the computational architecture of the brain and phenomenal consciousness, and hence one that is worthy of further exploration. Consequently, our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett
Puccetti, Roland (1993). Dennett on the split-brain. Psycoloquy 4 (52).   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In "Consciousness Explained," Dennett (1991) denies that split-brain humans have double consciousness: he describes the experiments as "anecdotal." In attempting to replace the Cartesian Theatre of the Mind" with his own "Multiple Drafts" view of consciousness, Dennett rejects the notion of the mind as a countable thing in favour of its being a mere "abstraction." His criticisms of the standard interpretation of the split-brain data are analyzed here and each is found to be open to objections. There exist people who have survived left ["dominant"] cerebral hemispherectomy; by Dennett's criteria, they would not have minds
Rakover, Sam S. (1994). Consciousness explained?: A commentary on Dennett's Consciousness Explained. International Studies in Philosophy 26 (2):97-99.   (Google)
Rey, Georges (1995). Dennett's unrealistic psychology. Philosophical Topics 22:259-89.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Robinson, William S. (1972). Dennett's analysis of awareness. Philosophical Studies 23 (April):147-52.   (Google | More links)
Robinson, William S. (1994). Orwell, stalin, and determinate qualia. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (2):151-64.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Rockwell, Teed (1996). Awareness, mental phenomena, and consciousness: A synthesis of Dennett and Rosenthal. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):463-76.   (Google)
Rorty, Richard (1982). Comments on Dennett's how to study human consciousness empirically. Synthese 53 (November):181-187.   (Google)
Rorty, Richard (1972). Dennett on awareness. Philosophical Studies 23 (April):153-62.   (Google | More links)
Rosenthal, D. (2000). Content, interpretation, and consciousness. Protosociology 14:67-84.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ross, Don (1994). Dennett's conceptual reform. Behavior and Philosophy 22 (1):41-52.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1994). First-person operationalism and mental taxonomy. Philosophical Topics 22:319-349.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1993). Multiple drafts and higher-order thoughts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):911-18.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1995). Multiple drafts and the facts of the matter. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1995). Content meets consciousness. Philosophical Topics 22:1-22.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ruz, M.; Tudela, P. & Acero, Juan J. (2002). Consciousness explained by Dennett: A critical review from a cognitive neuroscience point of view. Theoria 17:81-112.   (Google)
Schneider, Susan (2007). Daniel Dennett on the nature of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most influential philosophical voices in the consciousness studies community is that of Daniel Dennett. Outside of consciousness studies, Dennett is well-known for his work on numerous topics, such as intentionality, artificial intelligence, free will, evolutionary theory, and the basis of religious experience. (Dennett, 1984, 1987, 1995c, 2005) In 1991, just as researchers and philosophers were beginning to turn more attention to the nature of consciousness, Dennett authored his Consciousness Explained. Consciousness Explained aimed to develop both a theory of consciousness and a powerful critique of the then mainstream view of the nature of consciousness, which Dennett called,
Seager, William E. (1999). Dennett, part I and II. In Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment. Routledge.   (Google)
Seager, William E. (1993). Verification, skepticism, and consciousness. Inquiry 36 (1-2):113-133.   (Annotation | Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1993). Lovely and suspect ideas. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):903-908.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Siewert, Charles (1993). What Dennett can't imagine and why. Inquiry 36 (1-2):93-112.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1993). Is Dennett a disillusioned zimbo? Inquiry 36 (1-2):33-57.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Thompson, David L. (2003). Are there really appearances? Dennett and Husserl on seemings and presence. In Richard Feist & William Sweet (eds.), Husserl and Stein. The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.   (Google)
Todd, S. J. (2006). Unmasking multiple drafts. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):477-494.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Any theoretician constructing a serious model of consciousness should carefully assess the details of empirical data generated in the neurosciences and psychology. A failure to account for those details may cast doubt on the adequacy of that model. This paper presents a case in point. Dennett and Kinsbourne's (Dennett, D., & Kinsbourne, M. (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15, 183-243) assault on the materialist version of the Cartesian Theater model of the mind relies significantly on the superiority of their Multiple Drafts model of consciousness as an explanation of the phenomenon of metacontrast. However, their description of metacontrast is, in important ways, inadequate. The result is that their explanation of how the Multiple Drafts model handles this phenomenon fails to account for the actual data. In this paper I offer a more complete description of metacontrast, show how Dennett and Kinsbourne's explanation fails, and argue that there are good theoretical reasons for choosing the so-called Stalinesque model over the so-called Orwellian model
Toribio, Josefa (1993). Why there still has to be a theory of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 2:28-47.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Tye, Michael (1993). Reflections on Dennett and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):891-6.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Vaden, Tere (2001). Qualifying qualia through the skyhook test. Inquiry 44 (2):149-170.   (Google)
van Gulick, Robert (1995). Dennett, drafts, and phenomenal realism. Philosophical Topics 22:443-55.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Volkov, Dmirty B. (online). The moving target: Multiple drafts or fame in brain?   (Google)
Voorhees, Burton (2000). Dennett and the deep blue sea. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (3):53-69.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Wright, Edmond L. (2006). Dennett as illusionist. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.   (Google)
Wuketits, Franz M. (1994). Consciousness explained -- or explained away? Acta Analytica 9 (12):55-64.   (Google)

1.4c Searle's Biological Naturalism

Armstrong, David M. (1991). Searle's neo-cartesian theory of consciousness. Philosophical Issues 1:67-71.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Beards, Andrew (1994). John Searle and human consciousness. Heythrop Journal 35 (3):281-295.   (Google | More links)
Burton, Robert G. (1995). Searle on rediscovering the mind. Man and World 28 (2):163-174.   (Google)
Code, Alan D. (1991). Aristotle, Searle, and the mind-body problem. In Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Collins, Corbin (1997). Searle on consciousness and dualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):15-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this article, I examine and criticize John Searle's account of the relation between mind and body. Searle rejects dualism and argues that the traditional mind-body problem has a 'simple solution': mental phenomena are both caused by biological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. More precisely, mental states and events are macro-properties of neurons in much the same way that solidity and liquidity are macro-properties of molecules. However, Searle also maintains that the mental is 'ontologically irreducible' to the physical, a view which follows from his understanding of the status and nature of consciousness. Consciousness is essential to the mind; subjectivity is essential to consciousness; and no purely objective, physical description of consciousness could ever capture or explain its essentially subjective character. None the less, Searle maintains that irreducibility is a 'trivial' result of our 'definitional practices' and is entirely compatible with his theory. I contend that this latter claim is based on an equivocation: Searle's conclusion only seems to follow because he alters and trivializes what philosophers ordinarily mean by 'reduction'. I also maintain that Searle's position is reductionist in the ordinary, nontrivial sense. For this reason, his theory fails to accommodate the subjective character of consciousness and fails to solve the traditional mind-body problem. Finally, I briefly discuss Searle's claim that he is not an epiphenomenalist, and argue that given the assumptions of his view there is no interesting causal role for consciousness in the physical world
Corcoran, Kevin J. (2001). The trouble with Searle's biological naturalism. Erkenntnis 55 (3):307-324.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1993). Review of Searle, the rediscovery of the mind. [Journal (Paginated)] 90 (4):93-205.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Everyone agrees that consciousness is a very special phenomenon, unique in several ways, but there is scant agreement on just how special it is, and whether or not an explanation of it can be accommodated within normal science. John Searle's view, defended with passion in this book, is highly idiosyncratic: what is special about consciousness is its "subjective ontology," but normal science can accommodate subjective ontology alongside (not within) its otherwise objective ontology. Once we clear away some widespread confusions about what science requires, and dismiss the misbegotten field of cognitive science that has been engendered by those confusions, the subjective ontology of the mind, he claims, will lose its aura of unacceptable mystery
Garrett, Brian J. (1995). Non-reductionism and John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):209-215.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hershfield, Jeffrey (1997). Searle's regimen for rediscovering the mind. Dialogue 36 (2):361-374.   (Google)
Hodgson, David (1994). Why Searle has not rediscovered the mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):264-274.   (Google)
Honderich, Ted (1995). Consciousness, neural functionalism, real subjectivity. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):369-381.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Honderich, Ted (2001). Mind the guff. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (4):62-78.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (I) John Searle's conception of consciousness in the 'Mind the Gap' issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies remains short on content, no advance on either materialism or traditional dualism. Still, it is sufficiently contentful to be self-contradictory. And so his Biological Subjectivity on Two Levels, like materialism and dualism, needs replacing by a radically different conception of consciousness -- such as Consciousness as Existence. (II) From his idea that we can discover 'gaps', seeming absences of causal circumstances, in our experience of deciding and acting, Searle is led to the positing of a self and to mysterious causing. (III) In fact philosophers of determinism and freedom over three centuries have concerned themselves with what are now termed 'gaps'. Searle's advance is a useful terminological one. Compatibilist philosophers of freedom, contrary to what is said, have not missed any point at all. A successor to both Compatibilism and Incompatibilism is needed. (IV) Searle's previous account of deciding and acting in Biological Subjectivity on Two Levels does indeed fail because of its epiphenomenalism. (V) The culmination of his paper, his preferred hypothesis now about deciding and acting, is that down-up causation is true of it but not left-right causation. Quantum Theory as often interpreted doesn't work down-up but does work left-right. The hypothesis is entirely in the tradition of the Incompatibilist and Libertarian philosophers of determinism and freedom, whom Searle has joined, but is factually incredible
Jacquette, Dale (2002). Searle's antireductionism. Facta Philosophica 4:143-66.   (Google)
Kenyon, Timothy A. (1998). Searle rediscovers what was not lost. Dialogue 37 (1):117-130.   (Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1995). Mental causation in Searle's biological naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):189-194.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Moreland, James P. (1998). Searle's biological naturalism and the argument from consciousness. Faith and Philosophy 15 (1):68-91.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1991). Ontological subjectivity. Journal of Mind and Behavior 175:175-200.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Northoff, Georg & Musholt, K. (2006). How can Searle avoid property dualism? Epistemic-ontological inference and autoepistemic limitation. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):589-605.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Searle suggests biological naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain problem that escapes traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism. We reconstruct Searle's argument and demonstrate that it needs additional support to represent a position truly located between dualism and materialism. The aim of our paper is to provide such an additional argument. We introduce the concept of "autoepistemic limitation" that describes our principal inability to directly experience our own brain as a brain from the first-person perspective. The neglect of the autoepistemic limitation leads to inferences from epistemic properties to ontological features - we call this "epistemic-ontological inference." Searle attempts to avoid such epistemic-ontological inference but does not provide a sufficient argument. Once the autoepistemic limitation is considered, epistemic-ontological inference can be avoided. As a consequence, one can escape traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism
Novotny, Daniel D. (2007). Searle on the unity of the world. Axiomathes 17 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true
Ofsti, Audun (1994). Searle, Leibniz and 'the first person': A note on the epilogue of intentionality. In Analyomen 1. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Olafson, Frederick A. (1994). Brain dualism. Inquiry 37 (2):253-265.   (Google)
Page, Sam (2004). Searle's realism deconstructed. Philosophical Forum 35 (3):249-274.   (Google | More links)
Palmer, Daniel E. (1998). Searle on consciousness: Or how not to be a physicalist. Ratio 11 (2):159-169.   (Google | More links)
Reber, Arthur S. (1997). Caterpillars and consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):437-49.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: The dominant position in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) is computationalism where the operative principle is that cognition in general and consciousness in particular can be captured by identification of the proper set of computations. This position has been attacked from several angles, most effectively, in my opinion, by John Searle in his now famous Chinese Room thought experiment. I critique this Searlean perspective on the grounds that, while it is probably correct in its essentials, it does not go far enough. Quite simply, it runs afoul of the problem of emergentism. The proffered solution to this problem is that consciousness (or very rudimentary forms of it) needs to be viewed as an inherent property of organic form. While this recasting of the problem solves the emergentist dilemma it opens up a number of other issues. However, the new problems, unlike the old, appear in principle to be amenable to scientific analysis
Sabat, (1999). Consciousness, emergence and naturalism. Teorema 18 (1):139-153.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Searle, John R. (2007). Biological naturalism. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Searle, John R. (2002). Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the most important and influential philosophers of the last 30 years, John Searle has been concerned throughout his career with a single overarching question: how can we have a unified and theoretically satisfactory account of ourselves and of our relations to other people and to the natural world? In other words, how can we reconcile our common-sense conception of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world that we believe comprises brute, unconscious, mindless, meaningless, mute physical particles in fields of force? The essays in this collection are all related to the broad overarching issue that unites the diverse strands of Searle's work. Gathering in an accessible manner essays available only in relatively obscure books and journals, this collection will be of particular value to professionals and upper-level students in philosophy as well as to Searle's more extended audience in such fields as psychology and linguistics
Searle, John R. (2000). Mental causation, conscious and unconscious: A reply to Anthonie Meijers. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):171-177.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Searle, John R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1413 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: The title of The Rediscovery of the Mind suggests the question "When was the mind lost?" Since most people may not be aware that it ever was lost, we must also then ask "Who lost it?" It was lost, of course, only by philosophers, by certain philosophers. This passed unnoticed by society at large. The "rediscovery" is also likely to pass unnoticed. But has the mind been rediscovered by the same philosophers who "lost" it? Probably not. John Searle is an analytic philosopher, with some of the same notions as the positivists and behaviorists who rejected consciousness and "lost" the mind in the first place, but he also does not sound like the kind of reductionist who would have joined that crowd. His views, indeed, are sensible enough, and some of his insights so important, that it is a shame to find his thought profoundly limited by some of the same mistakes and prejudices that ruined philosophy, and not just philosophy of mind, under the influence of those positivists and behaviorists. There is enough of genuine value in his treatment, that it can easily be taken up and, with relatively slight modification, added to what is of permanent value in the history of philosophy
Searle, John R. (2002). Why I am not a property dualist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):57-64.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I have argued in a number of writings[1] that the philosophical part (though not the neurobiological part) of the traditional mind-body problem has a fairly simple and obvious solution: All of our mental phenomena are caused by lower level neuronal processes in the brain and are themselves realized in the brain as higher level, or system, features. The form of causation is
Sinari, Ramakant (2001). Reflections on John Searle's philosophy of consciousness. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 18 (3):91-106.   (Google)
Stoutland, Frederick M. (1994). Searle's consciousness: A review of John Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind. Philosophical Books 35 (4):245-254.   (Google)
Taliaferro, Charles (2005). The give and take of biological naturalism: John Searle and the case for dualism. Philosophia Christi 7 (2):447-462.   (Google)
Warfield, Ted A. (1999). Searle's causal powers. Analysis 59 (1):29-32.   (Google | More links)
Weitze, Marc-Denis (1997). Searle, Edelman und die evolution Des bewusstseins: Mit neurobiologischen argumenten. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)

1.4d Functionalism about Consciousness

Antony, Michael V. (1994). Against functionalist theories of consciousness. Mind and Language 9 (2):105-23.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Bode, Boyd H. (1918). Consciousness as behavior. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (17):449-453.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dilworth, John (2007). Conscious perceptual experience as representational self-prompting. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.   (Google)
Abstract: Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 (2007), pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. Their function is that of imperatively prompting the perceiver herself to do something (hence
Gregg, John (ms). Functionalism: Can't we just say that consciousness depends on the higher-level organization of a given system?   (Google)
Levin, Janet (1991). Analytic functionalism and the reduction of phenomenal states. Philosophical Studies 61 (March):211-38.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Lormand, Eric (2000). Comments on "a neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):260-266.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Macpherson, Fiona (2007). Synaesthesia. In Mario de Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Kleuwer.   (Google | More links)
Mangan, Bruce (1998). Against functionalism: Consciousness as an information-bearing medium. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Marcel, Anthony J. (2000). On a neurofunctional theory of visual consciousness: Commentary on J. Prinz. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):267-273.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Marcel, Anthony J. (1988). Phenomenal experience and functionalism. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Google)
Myin, Erik (1998). Holism, functionalism and visual awareness. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):3-19.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Norris, Orland O. (1929). A behaviorist account of consciousness. II: Its qualitative aspect. Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):57-67.   (Google | More links)
Perlis, Donald R. (1995). Consciousness and complexity: The cognitive Quest. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 14:309-21.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2005). A neurofunctional theory of consciousness. Cognition and the Brain.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Reading the philosophical literature on consciousness, one might get the idea that there is just one problem in consciousness studies, the hard problem. That would be a mistake. There are other problems; some are more tractable, but none are easy, and all interesting. The literature on the hard problem gives the impression that we have made little progress. Consciousness is just an excuse to work and re-work familiar positions on the mind-body problem. But progress is being made elsewhere. Researchers are moving towards increasingly specific accounts of the neural basis of conscious experience. These efforts will leave some questions unanswered, but they are no less significant for that
Prinz, Jesse J. (2000). A reply to Marcel. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):279-287.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse J. (2000). A reply to Lormand. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):274-278.   (Google | More links)
Schweizer, Paul (1996). Physicalism, functionalism, and conscious thought. Minds and Machines 6 (1):61-87.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1993). Functionalism and consciousness. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
van Gulick, Robert (1988). A functionalist plea for self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (April):149-88.   (Cited by 31 | Annotation | Google | More links)

1.4e Eliminativism about Consciousness

Allport, A. (1988). What concept of consciousness? In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 47 | Google)
Braddock, Glenn (2002). Eliminativism and indeterminate consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):37-54.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of Daniel Dennett's most sophisticated arguments for his eliminativism about phenomenological properties centers around the color phi phenomenon. He attempts to show that there is no phenomenological fact of the matter concerning the phenomenon of apparent motion because it is impossible to decide between two competing explanations. I argue that the two explanations considered by Dennett are both based on the assumption that a realist account of the phenomenon must include a neat mapping between phenomenological time and objective time. Since this assumption is false, Dennett's argument is unsuccessful. Like most eliminativist arguments, Dennett's arguments may indicate that the subjective character of experience is different from how it is often described, but this leaves plenty of room for alternative models of consciousness
Churchland, Paul M. (1992). Activation vectors versus propositional attitudes: How the brain represents reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):419-424.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1983). Consciousness: The transmutation of a concept. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):80-95.   (Cited by 38 | Annotation | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1976). Are dreams experiences? Philosophical Review 73 (April):151-71.   (Cited by 21 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1979). The onus re experiences: A reply to Emmett. Philosophical Studies 35 (April):315-318.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Nikolinakos, Drakon (1994). General anesthesia, consciousness, and the skeptical challenge. Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):88-104.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Park Frost, Eliott (1913). The belief in consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 10 (26):716-719.   (Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (1986). A question about consciousness. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google)
Rey, Georges (1982). A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness. In Richard J. Davidson, Sophie Schwartz & D. H. Shapiro (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Regulation, Vol. 3. New York: Plenum.   (Cited by 22 | Annotation | Google)
Rey, Georges (1995). Toward a projectivist account of conscious experience. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
Rivas, Titus & van Dongen, Hein (2001). Exit epiphenomenalism: The demolition of a refuge. Revista de Filosofia 57.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (online). Epiphenomenalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Ross, Alf (1941). On the illusion of consciousness. Theoria 7:171-202.   (Google)
Schneider, Susan (2007). Daniel Dennett on the nature of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most influential philosophical voices in the consciousness studies community is that of Daniel Dennett. Outside of consciousness studies, Dennett is well-known for his work on numerous topics, such as intentionality, artificial intelligence, free will, evolutionary theory, and the basis of religious experience. (Dennett, 1984, 1987, 1995c, 2005) In 1991, just as researchers and philosophers were beginning to turn more attention to the nature of consciousness, Dennett authored his Consciousness Explained. Consciousness Explained aimed to develop both a theory of consciousness and a powerful critique of the then mainstream view of the nature of consciousness, which Dennett called,
Smith, David Woodruff (1987). Rey Cogitans: The Unquestionability of Consciousness. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer.   (Annotation | Google)
Sundström, Pär (2008). A somewhat eliminativist proposal about phenomenal consciousness. In Hieke and Leitgeb (ed.), Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.   (Google)
Tienson, John L. (1987). Brains are not conscious. Philosophical Papers 16 (November):187-93.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1984). Is consciousness important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1995). Losing consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Williams, Donald C. (1959). Mind as a matter of fact. Review of Metaphysics 13 (December):205-25.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Williams, Donald C. (1934). Scientific method and the existence of consciousness. Psychological Review 41:461-79.   (Google)
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1988). Yishi, duh, um and consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google)

1.4f Dualism about Consciousness

Aranyosi, Istvan A. (2005). Type-A Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus. Dissertation, Central European University   (Google)
Banerjee, R.; Bhattacharya, A.; Genc, A. & Arora, B. M. (2006). Structure of twins in gaas nanowires grown by the vapour-liquid-solid process. Philosophical Magazine Letters 86 (12):807-816.   (Google | More links)
Bennett, Karen (ms). 1. dualism.   (Google)
Abstract: Dualists think that not all the facts are physical facts. They think that there are facts about phenomenal consciousness2 that cannot be explained in purely physical terms—facts about what it’s like to see red, what it’s like to feel sandpaper, what it’s like to run 10 miles when it’s 15° F out, and so on. These phenomenal facts are genuine ‘extras’, not fixed by the physical facts and the physical laws. To use the standard metaphor: even after God settled the physical facts and laws, he had more work to do to put the phenomenal facts in place. Some dualists think that the additional work involves the creation of a special kind of nonphysical substance. More common these days are dualists who think that the additional work merely involves the creation and positioning of special nonphysical properties, and that is the only form of dualism that I will be explicitly concerned with here. The property dualist’s claim is that phenomenal properties, or at least protophenomenal properties, are among the basic furniture of the world
Bennett, Karen (ms). Why I am not a dualist.   (Google)
Birkett, Kirsten (2006). Conscious objections: God and the consciousness debates. Zygon 41 (2):249-266.   (Google | More links)
Bricke, John (1973). The attribute theory of mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (December):226-237.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Chakraborti, Chhanda (2002). Metaphysics of consciousness, and David Chalmers's property dualism. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):59-84.   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (2007). Naturalistic dualism. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dietrich, Eric (1999). Fodor's gloom, or what does it mean that dualism seems true? Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 11 (2):145-152.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Any time you have philosophers working on a problem, you know you’ve got troubles. If a question has attracted the attention of the philosophers that means that either it is intractably difficult with convolutions and labyrinthine difficulties that would make other researchers blanch, or that it is just flat out impossible to solve. Impossible problems masquerade as intractable problems until someone either proves the problem is impossible (which can only happen in mathematics), or someone shows all solutions to the problem violate laws of physics (like the perpetual motion machine, for example), or until enough people fail so that declaring defeat is a reasonable move. The problem of consciousness is prototypical of this latter case. Indeed, one might say that it is the Platonic ideal of such a problem. The mere fact that philosophers wrestle with the problem of consciousness should be regarded by psychologists of all stripes as extremely bad news. If the philosophers can’t make any headway, psychologists are doomed
Dilley, Frank B. (2004). Taking consciousness seriously: A defense of cartesian dualism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (3):135-153.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Eccles, John C. (1987). Brain and mind: Two or one? In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Foster, John A. (1989). A defense of dualism. In J. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Göcke, Benedikt Paul (2009). From Physicalism to Theological Idealism. In Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.), Gehirne und Personen. ontos.   (Google)
Abstract: In the first part elements and entailments of an adequate thesis of physicalism are presented. In the second part an argument against these is elaborated. Based on this argument a thesis of theological idealism is sketched.
Goldstein, Irwin (1996). Ontology, epistemology, and private ostensive definition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
Grigg, Rowan (ms). Longing for Integration.   (Google)
Abstract: A lighthearted look at some big themes in metaphysics and epistemology
Honderich, Ted (1981). Nomological dualism: Reply to four critics. Inquiry 24 (December):419-438.   (Google)
Abstract: Three theses about the mind, when conjoined with a certain understanding of lawlike connection, escape the objection that they constitute an epiphenomenalism and so conflict with our conviction of the efficacy of the mental. Certain alternatives to the given picture of the mind, one of them an Identity Theory, are in various respects less defensible. The given picture can be defended against considerations deriving from a contextual conception of the mental, and from an elaborated objection having to do with the holism of the mental. The Identity Theory mentioned above appears to be inconsistent, and a further picture of the mind, with very different presuppositions, has the disability among others that it does not provide for mental efficacy. Also, the presuppositions raise great problems
Honderich, Ted (1981). Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24 (October):277-303.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Kind, Amy (2005). The irreducibility of consciousness. Disputatio 1 (19).   (Google)
Lahav, Ran & Shanks, N. (1992). How to be a scientifically respectable 'property dualist'. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):211-32.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Latham, Noa (1998). Chalmers on the addition of consciousness to the physical world. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):71-97.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (2005). Uwe Meixner, the two sides of being: A reassessment of psycho-physical dualism, paderborn, mentis, 2004, 486 pp. ISBN: 3-89785-376-. Erkenntnis 62 (2).   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (2007). Recent naturalistic dualisms. In E. Meyers, R. Styers & A. Lange (eds.), Light Against Darkness: Dualism in Ancient Mediterranean Religion and the Contemporary World. Brill Academic Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper is about a certain family of philosophical positions on the mind-body problem. The positions are dualist, but only in a minimal sense of that term employed by philosophers: according to the positions in question, mental entities are immaterial and distinct from all physical things
Macpherson, Fiona (2006). Property dualism and the merits of solutions to the mind-body problem: A reply to Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):72-89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view on the mind much like one plausible interpretation of Locke's position. Strawson's use of terminology cloaks this fact and he does not himself explicitly recognize it in his paper. In the second section, I outline some of Strawson's assumptions that he uses in arguing for his position. I comment on the plausibility of his position concerning the relation of the mind to the body compared with mainstream physicalism and various forms of dualism. Before embarking on the two main sections, in the remainder of this introduction, I very briefly sketch Strawson's view
McGinn, Colin (1993). Consciousness and cosmology: Hyperdualism ventilated. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Meixner, Uwe (2004). The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psychophysical Dualism. Mentis.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Molenaar, Peter C. M. (2006). Psychophysical dualism from the point of view of a working psychologist. Erkenntnis 65 (1):47-69.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive neuroscience constitutes the third phase of development of the field of cognitive psychophysiology since it was established about half a century ago. A critical historical overview is given of this development, focusing on recurring problems that keep frustrating great expectations. It is argued that psychology has to regain its independent status with respect to cognitive neuroscience and should take psychophysical dualism seriously. A constructive quantum physical model for psychophysical interaction is presented, based on a new stochastic interpretation of the quantum potential in the de Broglie
Pauen, Michael (2000). Painless pain: Property dualism and the causal role of phenomenal consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):51-64.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Ross, Don (2005). Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism: The Irrelevance of the Mind-Body Problem to the Scientific Study of Consciousness. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rosenberg, Jay F. (1988). On not knowing what or who one is: Reflections on the intelligibility of dualism. Topoi 7 (March):57-63.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Smook, Roger (1988). Egoicity and twins. Dialogue 27:277-86.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smythies, J. R. & Beloff, John (eds.) (1989). The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1994). Consciousness. Synthese 98 (1):73-93.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Steinberg, Jesse R. & Steinberg, Alan M. (2007). Disembodied minds and the problem of identification and individuation. Philosophia 35 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   We consider and reject a variety of attempts to provide a ground for identifying and differentiating disembodied minds. Until such a ground is provided, we must withhold inclusion of disembodied minds from our picture of the world
Strong, Charles A. (1934). A plea for substantialism in psychology. Journal of Philosophy 31 (12):309-328.   (Google | More links)
Taliaferro, Charles (1996). Consciousness and the Mind of God. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book defends a nonmaterialistic view of persons and subjectivity and the intelligibility of thinking of God as a nonphysical, spiritual reality.
Taliaferro, Charles (2001). Emergentism and consciousness: Going beyond property dualism. In Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Vendler, Zeno (1994). The ineffable soul. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
von Wright, Georg Henrik (1994). On mind and matter. Journal of Theoretical Biology 171:101-10.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Weslake, Brad, Review of understanding phenomenal consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent philosophy of mind, epiphenomenalism—that strain of dualism according to which the mind is caused by the body but does not cause the body in turn—has undergone something of a renaissance. Contemporary epiphenomenalists bear only partial resemblance to their more extravagantly metaphysical ancestors, however. Traditional epiphenomenalists thought that (at least) two sorts of mental properties were epiphenomenal—intentional properties such as the meaning or representational content of the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires and so on); and conscious properties such as awareness and the qualitative nature of experience. Contemporary epiphenomenalists, on the other hand, are largely sanguine about the prospects for intentionality to be brought within the purview of a physicalist worldview; what forces their dualism is one particular feature of consciousness—what irks them are qualia, the..
Wetherick, Norman E. (1992). Velmans on consciousness, brain and the physical world. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):159-161.   (Cited by 1 | Google)

1.4g Panpsychism

Armstrong, Susan (2006). For love of matter: A contemporary panpsychism. Environmental Ethics 28 (1):99-102.   (Google)
Arp, Robert (2007). Consciousness and awareness - switched-on rheostats: A response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):101-106.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I question whether it is completely accurate to think of the philosophical meaning of consciousness as being switched-on or switched-off. It may be that, once consciousness is switched-on, it is then found in degrees in animals we deem conscious. In which case, consciousness is more like a switched-on rheostat, rather than a simple on-off switch. Christian de Quincey (2006) gives a list of what would be considered the marks of consciousness, including 'experience, subjectivity, sentience, feeling, or mentality of any kind'. He also seems to conflate awareness with experience when speaking about the light of consciousness being on. In keeping with de Quincey's desire to get clear about the meaning of consciousness, I will put forward an idea of consciousness as the experience of oneself as a being subject to past, present, and future events, and contrast this idea with a state of awareness. De Quincey claims that 'any entity that is a subject -- that feels its own being -- possesses consciousness'. I want to add to this meaning of consciousness by noting the subject's sense of temporality, so as to further qualify the meaning of consciousness and show how awareness is distinct from consciousness
Basile, Pierfrancesco (2009). Back to Whitehead? Galen Strawson and the Rediscovery of Panpsychism. In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides. Panpsychism in the new millennium. John Benjamins Publishing Company.   (Google)
Beaton, Michael; Bricklin, J.; Charland, Louis C.; Edwards, JCW; Farber, Ilya B.; Faw, Bill; Gennaro, Rocco J.; Kaernbach, C.; Nunn, C. M. H.; Panksepp, Jaak; Prinz, Jesse J.; Ratcliffe, Matthew; Ross, Jacob J.; Murray, S.; Stapp, Henry P. & Watt, Douglas F. (2006). Switched-on consciousness - clarifying what it means - response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.   (Google)
Birch, Charles (1999). Why I became a panexperientialist. Australasian Association for Process Thought.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bishop, Michael A. (2003). Dancing with pixies: Strong artificial intelligence and panpsychism. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Bjelland, Andrew G. (1982). Popper's critique of panpsychism and process proto-mentalism. Modern Schoolman 59 (May):233-43.   (Google)
Butler, Clark W. (1978). Panpsychism: A restatement of the genetic argument. Idealist Studies 8 (January):33-39.   (Google)
Calvert, Ernest Reid (1942). The Panpsychism of James Ward and Charles A. Strong. [Boston].   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter & Schechter, Elizabeth (2006). Can panpsychism bridge the explanatory gap? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):32-39.   (Google | More links)
Casati, Roberto (2003). Qualia domesticated. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.   (Google | More links)
Chalmers, David J. (1996). Is experience ubiquitous? In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Chalmers, David J. (online). What is it like to be a thermostat? (Commentary on Dan Lloyd, "what is it like to be a net?").   (Google)
Abstract: The project that Dan Lloyd has undertaken is admirable and audacious. He has tried to boil down the substrate of information-processing that underlies conscious experience to some very simple elements, in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. Some people will suspect that by considering a model as simple as a connectionist network, Dan has thrown away everything that is interesting about consciousness. Perhaps there is something to that complaint, but I will take a different tack. It seems to me that if we apply his own reasoning, we can see that Dan has not taken things far _enough_. When we have boiled things down to a system as simple as a connectionist network, it seems faint-hearted to stop there, and perhaps a little arbitrary as well. So I will take things further, and ask what seems to be the really interesting question in the vicinity: what is it like to be a thermostat?
Clarke, David S. (2002). Panpsychism and the philosophy of Charles Hartshorne. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (3):151-166.   (Google | More links)
Clarke, D. S. (2003). Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude. State University of New York Press.   (Google)
Cobb, John B. & Thorpe, William H. (1977). Some Whiteheadian comments on the discussion. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America.   (Google)
Coleman, Sam (2006). Being realistic - why physicalism may entail panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):40-52.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I first examine two important assumptions underlying the argument that physicalism entails panpsychism. These need unearthing because opponents in the literature distinguish themselves from Strawson in the main by rejecting one or the other. Once they have been stated, and something has been said about the positions that reject them, the onus of argument becomes clear: the assumptions require careful defence. I believe they are true, in fact, but their defence is a large project that cannot begin here. So, in the final section I comment on what follows if they are granted. I agree with Strawson that --broadly -- 'panpsychism' is the direction in which philosophy of mind should be heading; nevertheless, there are certain difficulties in the detail of his position. In light of these I argue for changes to the doctrine, bringing it into line with the slightly
Coleman, Sam (2009). Mind under Matter. In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides. Benjamins.   (Google)
de Quincey, Christian (1994). Consciousness all the way down? An analysis of McGinn's critique of panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):217-229.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
de Quincey, Christian (2002). Radical Nature: Rediscovering the Soul of Matter. Invisible Cities Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
de Quincey, Christian (2006). Switched-on consciousness - clarifying what it means. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 'Consciousness' has been called the 'final frontier' for science, philosophy's 'hard problem', and the greatest mystery in mysticism. It is a central focus in philosophy of mind. Yet confusion abounds about what 'consciousness' means -- even among philosophers, scientists, and mystics who have built careers exploring the mind. Different scholars and different disciplines use the same word to mean very different things. Debates and dialogues on consciousness often run aground because scholars conflate two radically different uses of the term. This paper addresses the problem by elucidating a fundamental distinction between the philosophical and psychological uses of 'consciousness'
Drake, Durant (1919). Panpsychism again. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (16):433-439.   (Google | More links)
Edwards, Jonathan C. W. (2006). How Many People Are There in My Head and in Hers? An Exploration of Single Cell Consciousness. Exeter: Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Edwards, Paul (1967). Panpsychism. In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 5. Collier-Macmillan.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Farleigh, P. (1998). Whitehead's even more dangerous idea. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ford, Lewis S. (1995). Panpsychism and the early history of prehension. Process Studies 24:15-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ford, Marcus P. (1981). William James: Panpsychist and metaphysical realist. Transactions of the Peirce Society 17:158-70.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Franck, Georg (2008). Presence and reality: An option to specify panpsychism ? Mind and Matter 6 (1):123-140.   (Google)
Abstract: Panpsychism is the doctrine that mind is a fundamental feature of the world existing throughout the universe. One problem with panpsychism is that it is a purely theoretical concept so far. For progress towards an operationalization of the idea, this paper suggests to make use of an ontological difference involved in the mind-matter distinction. The mode in which mental phenomena exist is called presence. The mode in which matter and radiation exist is called reality Physical theory disregards presence in both the form of mental presence and the form of the temporal present In contrast to mental presence the temporal present is objective in the perspective of the third person. This relative kind of objectivity waits to be utilized for a hypothesis of how the mental and the physical are interrelated In order to do so this paper translates the mind-matter distinction into the distinction between mental and physical time and addresses the problem that panpsychism tries to attack head-on in these temporal terms. There are in particular , two issues thus getting involved: discussions about a time observable and the quantum Zeno effect
Freeman, Anthony (2006). Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism? Exeter: Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Frisina, Warren G. (1997). Minds, bodies, experience, nature: Is panpsychism really dead? In Pragmatism, Neo-Pragmatism, and Religion. New York: Lang.   (Google)
Gabora, Liane (2002). Amplifying phenomenal information: Toward a fundamental theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):3-29.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: from non-conscious components by positing that consciousness is a universal primitive. For example, the double aspect theory of information holds that infor- mation has a phenomenal aspect. How then do you get from phenomenal infor- mation to human consciousness? This paper proposes that an entity is conscious to the extent it amplifies information, first by trapping and integrating it through closure, and second by maintaining dynamics at the edge of chaos through simul- taneous processes of divergence and convergence. The origin of life through autocatalytic closure, and the origin of an interconnected worldview through conceptual closure, induced phase transitions in the degree to which informa- tion, and thus consciousness, is locally amplified. Divergence and convergence of cognitive information may involve phenomena observed in light e.g. focusing, interference, and resonance. By making information flow inward- biased, clo- sure shields us from external consciousness; thus the paucity of consciousness may be an illusion
Gao, Shan (2003). A possible quantum basis of panpsychism. [Journal (Paginated)] 1 (1):4-9.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We show that consciousness may violate the basic quantum principle, according to which the nonorthogonal quantum states can't be distinguished. This implies that the physical world is not causally closed without consciousness, and consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, thus provides a possible quantum basis for panpsychism
Gao, Shan (2003). A possible quantum basis of panpsychism. Cogprints.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We show that consciousness may violate the basic quantum principle, according to which the nonorthogonal quantum states can't be distinguished. This implies that the physical world is not causally closed without consciousness, and consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, thus provides a possible quantum basis for panpsychism
Gao, Mr Shan (ms). Quantum, consciousness and panpsychism: A solution to the hard problem.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We analyze the results and implications of the combination of quantum and consciousness in terms of the recent QSC analysis. The quantum effect of consciousness is first explored. We show that the consciousness of the observer can help to distinguish the nonorthogonal states under some condition, while the usual physical measuring device without consciousness can’t. The result indicates that the causal efficacies of consciousness do exist when considering the basic quantum process. Based on this conclusion, we demonstrate that consciousness is not reducible or emergent, but a new fundamental property of matter. This provides a quantum basis for panpsychism. Furthermore, we argue that the conscious process is one kind of quantum computation process based on the analysis of consciousness time and combination problem. It is shown that a unified theory of matter and consciousness should include two parts: one is the complete quantum evolution of matter state, which includes the definite nonlinear evolution element introduced by consciousness, and the other is the psychophysical principle or corresponding principle between conscious content and matter state. Lastly, some experimental suggestions are presented to confirm the theoretical analysis of the paper
Goff, Philip (2006). Experiences don't sum. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):53-61.   (Google | More links)
Goff, Philip (2009). Why panpsychism doesn't help us explain consciousness. Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in
Griffin, David Ray (1998). Pantemporalism and panexperientialism. In P. Harris (ed.), The Textures of Time. University of Michigan Press.   (Google)
Griffin, David Ray (1997). Panexperiential physicalism and the mind-body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):248-68.   (Google)
Griffin, David Ray (1998). Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem. University of California Press.   (Cited by 57 | Google)
Hartshorne, Charles (1977). Physics and psychics: The place of mind in nature. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
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Heidelberger, Michael & Klohr, Cynthia (2004). Nature From Within: Gustav Theodor Fechner and His Psychophysical Worldview. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
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Holman, Emmett (2008). Panpsychism, physicalism, neutral monism and the Russellian theory of mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):48-67.   (Google)
Abstract: As some see it, an impasse has been reached on the mind- body problem between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism. So lately another view has been gaining popularity, a view that might be called the 'Russellian theory of mind' (RTM) since it is inspired by some ideas once put forth by Bertrand Russell. Most versions of RTM are panpsychist, but there is at least one version that rejects panpsychism and styles itself as physicalism, and neutral monism is also a possibility. In this paper I will attempt to sort out these different versions with a view to determining which, if any, have a chance of breaking the perceived impasse. The unsurprising conclusion will be that there are a lot of challenges ahead for the RTM theorist. The surprising conclusion will be that it's not clear that pan- psychist RTM holds an advantage over the other versions in this regard
Hut, Piet & Shepard, Roger N. (1996). Turning the "hard problem" upside-down and sideways. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):313-29.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Jackson, Frank (2006). Galen Strawson on panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):62-64.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We make powerful motor cars by suitably assembling items that are not themselves powerful, but we do not do this by 'adding in the power' at the very end of the assembly line; nor, if it comes to that, do we add portions of power along the way. Powerful motor cars are nothing over and above complex arrangements or aggregations of items that are not themselves powerful. The example illustrates the way aggregations can have interesting properties that the items aggregated lack. What can we say of a general kind about what can be made from what by nothing over and above aggregation? I think that this is the key issue that Galen Strawson (2006) puts so
Kim, Jaegwon (1999). Physicalism and panexperientialism: Response to David Ray Griffin. Process Studies 28 (1-2):28-34.   (Google)
Kind, Amy (2006). Panexperientialism, cognition, and the nature of experience. Psyche 12 (5).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: i>: This paper explores the plausibility of panexperientialism by an examination of Gregg Rosenberg
Macpherson, Fiona (2006). Property dualism and the merits of solutions to the mind-body problem: A reply to Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):72-89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view on the mind much like one plausible interpretation of Locke's position. Strawson's use of terminology cloaks this fact and he does not himself explicitly recognize it in his paper. In the second section, I outline some of Strawson's assumptions that he uses in arguing for his position. I comment on the plausibility of his position concerning the relation of the mind to the body compared with mainstream physicalism and various forms of dualism. Before embarking on the two main sections, in the remainder of this introduction, I very briefly sketch Strawson's view
Madell, Goeffrey (2007). Timothy Sprigge and panpsychism. In Pierfrancesco Basile & Leemon B. McHenry (eds.), Consciousness, Reality and Value: Essays in Honour of T.L.S. Sprigge. Ontos.   (Google)
Mander, W. J. (2007). David Skrbina: Panpsychism in the west. Faith and Philosophy 24 (2):239-241.   (Google)
McHenry, Leemon B. (1995). Whitehead's panpsychism as the subjectivity of prehension. Process Studies 24:1-14.   (Google)
McKitrick, Jennifer (2006). Rosenberg on causation. Psyche 12 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper is an explication and critique of a new theory of causation found in part II of Gregg Rosenberg's _A Place for Consciousness._ According to Rosenberg's Theory of Causal significance, causation constrains indeterminate possibilities, and according to his Carrier Theory, physical properties are dispositions which have phenomenal properties as their causal bases. This author finds Rosenberg's metaphysics excessively speculative, with disappointing implications for the place of consciousness in the natural world
Montague, William P. (1905). Panpsychism and monism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (23):626-629.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Nagasawa, Yujin (2006). A place for protoconsciousness? Psyche 12 (5).   (Google | More links)
Nagel, Thomas (1979). Panpsychism. In Thomas Nagel (ed.), Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google)
Neunhäuserer, Jörg (ms). Panmentalism.   (Google)
Abstract: In this short note we develop an unorthodox panmentalistic and libertarian dualism. Especially we skech a mental-physikal law of free will. Our aim is to to provoke the contemporary scentific common-sense.
Nimtz, Christian & Schutte, M. (2003). On physicalism, physical properties, and panpsychism. Dialectica 57 (4):413-22.   (Google | More links)
Nixon, Gregory (2010). From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research (3):216-233.   (Google)
Abstract: When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could become conscious of itself, I aim here to demonstrate that the terms experience and consciousness are not interchangeable. Experience is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down, but I see non-conscious experience as based mainly in momentary sensations, relational between bodies or systems, and probably common throughout the natural world. If this continuum of experience — from non-conscious, to conscious, to self-transcending awareness — can be understood and accepted, radical constructivism (the “outside” world as a construct of experience) will gain a firmer foundation, panexperientialism (a living universe) may gain credibility, and psi will find its medium.
Papineau, David (2006). Comments on Galen Strawson: Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):100-109.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Galen Strawson (2006) thinks it is 'obviously' false that 'the terms of physics can fully capture the nature or essence of experience' (p. 4). He also describes this view as 'crazy' (p. 7). I think that he has been carried away by first impressions. It is certainly true that 'physicSalism', as he dubs this view, is strongly counterintuitive. But at the same time there are compelling arguments in its favour. I think that these arguments are sound and that the contrary intuitions are misbegotten. In the first two sections of my remarks I would like to spend a little time defending physicSalism, or 'straightforward' physicalism, as I shall call it ('S' for 'straightforward', if you like). I realize that the main topic of Strawson's paper is panpsychism rather than his rejection of straightforward physicalism. But the latter is relevant as his arguments for panpsychism depend on his rejection of straightforward physicalism, in ways I shall explain below
Pearce, David (online). Naturalistic panpsychism.   (Google)
Polger, Thomas W. (2006). A place for dogs and trees? Psyche 12 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Rosenberg does not provide arguments for some crucial premises in his argument against physicalism. In particular, he gives no independent argument to show that physicalists must accept the entry-by-entailment thesis. The arguments provided establish weaker premises than those that are needed. As a consequence, Rosenberg
Popper, Karl R. (1977). Some remarks on panpsychism and epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 31:177-86.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Prince, Morton (1904). The identification of mind and matter. Philosophical Review 13 (4):444-451.   (Google | More links)
Rensch, Bernhard (1977). Argument for panpsychist identism. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America.   (Google)
Rey, Georges (2006). Better to study human than world psychology - commentary on Galen Strawson's Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):110-116.   (Google)
Robinson, Elmo A. (1949). Animism as a world hypothesis. Philosophical Review 58 (January):53-63.   (Google | More links)
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (2004). A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there be a credible alternative? In one classic example, philosophers ask whether we can ever know what is it is like for bats to sense the world using sonar. It seems obvious to many that any amount of information about a bat's physical structure and information processing leaves us guessing about the central questions concerning the character of its experience. A Place for Consciousness begins with reflections on the existence of this gap. Is it just a psychological shortcoming in our merely human understanding of the physical world? Is it a trivial consequence of the simple fact that we just cannot be bats? Or does it mean there really are facts about consciousness over and above the physical facts? If so, what does consciousness do? Why does it exist? Rosenberg sorts out these problems, especially those centering on the causal role of consciousness. He introduces a new paradigm called Liberal Naturalism for thinking about what causation is, about the natural world, and about how to create a detailed model to go along with the new paradigm. Arguing that experience is part of the categorical foundations of causality, he shows that within this new paradigm there is a place for something essentially like consciousness in all its traditional mysterious respects. A striking feature of Liberal Naturalism is that its central tenets are motivated independently of the mind-body problem, by analyzing causation itself. Because of this approach, when consciousness shows up in the picture it is not introduced in an ad hoc way, and its most puzzling features can be explained from first principles. Ultimately, Rosenberg's final solution gives consciousness a causally important role without supposing either that it is physical or that it interacts with the physical
Rosenthal, David M. (2006). Experience and the physical. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):117-28.   (Google | More links)
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (2004). On the possibility of panexperientialism. In Gregg H. Rosenberg (ed.), A Place for Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (1996). Rethinking nature: A hard problem within the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):76-88.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Rudd, Anthony (2006). Panpsychism in the west. Review of Metaphysics 60 (2):422-424.   (Google)
Salter, William M. (1922). Panpsychism and freedom. Philosophical Review 31 (3):285-287.   (Google | More links)
Schütte, Christian Nimtz/Michael (2003). Notes and discussions. On physicalism, physical properties, and panpsychism. Dialectica 57 (4):413–422.   (Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (1995). Consciousness, information, and panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2:272-88.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google)
Seager, William E. (online). Panpsychism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 1 Non-reductive physicalists deny that there is any explanation of mentality in purely physical terms, but do not deny that the mental is entirely determined by and constituted out of underlying physical structures. There are important issues about the stability of such a view which teeters on the edge of explanatory reductionism on the one side and dualism on the other (see Kim 1998). 2 Save perhaps for eliminative materialism (see Churchland 1981 for a classic exposition). In fact, however, while
Seager, William E. (2006). Rosenberg, reducibility and consciousness. Psyche.   (Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (2006). The 'intrinsic nature' argument for panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):129-145.   (Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (ms). Whitehead and the revival (?) Of panpsychism.   (Google)
Sellars, Roy Wood (1960). Panpsychism or evolutionary materialism. Philosophy of Science 27 (October):329-49.   (Google | More links)
Sevush, Steven (ms). Single-neuron theory of consciousness.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: By most accounts, the mind arises from the integrated activity of large populations of neurons distributed across multiple brain regions. A contrasting model is presented in the present paper that places the mind/brain interface not at the whole brain level but at the level of single neurons. Specifically, it is proposed that each neuron in the nervous system is independently conscious, with conscious content corresponding to the spatial pattern of a portion of that neuron's dendritic electrical activity. For most neurons, such as those in the hypothalamus or posterior sensory cortices, the conscious activity would be assumed to be simple and unable to directly affect the organism's macroscopic conscious behavior. For a subpopulation of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in the lateral prefrontal cortices, however, an arrangement is proposed to be present such that, at any given moment: i) the spatial pattern of electrical activity in a portion of the dendritic tree of each neuron in the subpopulation individually manifests a complexity and diversity sufficient to account for the complexity and diversity of conscious experience; ii) the dendritic trees of the neurons in the subpopulation all contain similar spatial electrical patterns; iii) the spatial electrical pattern in the dendritic tree of each neuron interacts nonlinearly with the remaining ambient dendritic electrical activity to determine the neuron's overall axonal response; iv) the dendritic spatial pattern is reexpressed at the population level by the spatial pattern exhibited by a synchronously firing subgroup of the conscious neurons, thereby providing a mechanism by which conscious activity at the neuronal level can influence overall behavior. The resulting scheme is one in which conscious behavior appears to be the product of a single macroscopic mind, but is actually the integrated output of a chorus of minds, each associated with a different neuron
Sharpe, R. A. (1989). Dennett's journey towards panpsychism. Inquiry 32 (2):233-40.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shepherd, John J. (1974). Panpsychism and parsimony. Process Studies 4:3-10.   (Google)
Shields, George W. (2001). Physicalist panexperientialism and the mind-body problem. American Journal of Theology and Philosophy 22 (2):133-154.   (Google)
Skrbina, David (2006). Beyond Descartes: Panpsychism revisited. Axiomathes 16 (4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: For some two millennia, Western civilization has predominantly viewed mind and consciousness as the private domain of the human species. Some have been willing to extend these qualities to certain animals. And there has been a small but very significant minority of philosophers who have argued that the processes of mind are universal in extent, and resident in all material things
Skrbina, David (ed.) (2009). Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium. John Benjamins Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: other distinct subjects is famously difficult (see James 1890: 1.160-161; Goff 2006) but I cannot avoid the difficulty in the way Coleman can (2006:48—50), ...
Skrbina, David (2003). Panpsychism as an underlying theme in western philosophy: A survey paper. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (3):4-46.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Skrbina, David (online). Panpsychism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Skrbina, David (2005). Panpsychism in the West. MIT Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Skrbina argues that panpsychism is long overdue for detailed treatment, and with this book he proposes to add impetus to the discussion of panpsychism in...
Skrbina, David (2006). Realistic panpsychism - commentary on Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):151-157.   (Google | More links)
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1998). Panpsychism. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1983). The vindication of panpsychism. In T. L. S. Sprigge (ed.), The Vindication of Absolute Idealism. Edinburgh University Press.   (Google)
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Strawson, Galen (2006). Panpsychism? Reply to commentators with a celebration of Descartes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):184-280.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Strawson, Galen (2006). Realistic monism - why physicalism entails panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):3-31.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
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van Cleve, James (1990). Mind-dust or magic? Panpsychism versus emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:215-226.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Van Cleve, James (1990). Mind--dust or magic? Panpsychism versus emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:215-226.   (Google | More links)
Various, (2006). Peer commentary: Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):13-36.   (Google)
Abstract: Short commentaries on Christian de Quincey' paper by Michael Beaton, Jonathan Bricklin, Louis Charland, Jonathan Edwards, Ilya Farber, Bill Faw, Rocco Gennaro, Christian Kaernbach, Chris Nunn, Jaak Panksepp, Jesse Prinz, Matthew Ratcliffe, J. Andrew Ross, Murray Shanahan, Henry Stapp, Douglas Watt
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Wright, Sewall (1953). Gene and organism. American Naturalist 87 (832):5-18.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Wright, Sewall (1977). Panpsychism and science. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America.   (Cited by 9 | Google)

1.4h Russellian Monism

Banks, Erik C. (2010). Neutral Monism Reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Should neutral monism be reconsidered? Classic NM (Mach James Russell) is examined first, and its fundamental theses identified. The second half of the paper looks at recent contemporary variants.
Banks, Erik C. (online). Russell's Hypothesis and the New Physicalism. Proceedings of the Ohio Phil. Association 2009.   (Google)
Abstract: A 2009 conference paper about Russell's enhanced physicalism: physical structural relations of matter instantiated by qualities with "intrinsic character." Russell's hypothesis leads many to panpsychism or protophenomenalism via a line-of-descent argument, but there is a way to break the line of descent, making sensation qualities separate higher order structural dispositions, if they are instantiated by the right kind of ground-level dispositional qualities.
Blackburn, Simon W. (1990). Filling in space. Analysis 50 (2):62-5.   (Cited by 30 | Annotation | Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1996). The metaphysics of information. In The Conscious Mind.   (Annotation | Google)
Demopolous, W. & Friedman, Michael (1989). The concept of structure in Russell's The Analysis of Matter. In C. Wade Savage & C. Anthony Anderson (eds.), Rereading Russell: Essays in Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology. University of Minnesota Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Feigl, Herbert (1975). Russell and Schlick: A remarkable agreement on a monistic solution of the mind-body problem. Erkenntnis 9 (May):11-34.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Feigl, Herbert (1971). Some crucial issues of mind-body monism. Synthese 22 (May):295-312.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Feigl, Herbert (1958). The 'mental' and the 'physical'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:370-497.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Feigl, Herbert (1960). The mind-body problem: Not a pseudo-problem. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Feser, Edward (1998). Can phenomenal qualities exist unperceived? Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):405-14.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Foster, John A. (1991). Lockwood's hypothesis. In John A. Foster (ed.), The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge.   (Annotation | Google)
Freeman, Anthony (2006). Special issue on realistic monism - editorial introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):1-2.   (Google)
Hohwy, Jakob (2005). Explanation and two conceptions of the physical. Erkenntnis 62 (1):71-89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Any position that promises genuine progress on the mind-body problem deserves attention. Recently, Daniel Stoljar has identified a physicalist version of Russells notion of neutral monism; he elegantly argues that with this type of physicalism it is possible to disambiguate on the notion of physicalism in such a way that the problem is resolved. The further issue then arises of whether we have reason to believe that this type of physicalism is in fact true. Ultimately, one needs to argue for this position by inference to the best explanation, and I show that this new type of physicalism does not hold promise of more explanatory prowess than its relevant rivals, and that, whether it is better than its rivals or not, it is doubtful whether it would furnish us with genuine explanations of the phenomenal at all
Holman, Emmett L. (1986). Maxwell and materialism. Synthese 66 (March):505-14.   (Google | More links)
Jones, Mostyn W. (forthcoming). How to make mind-brain relations clear. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The mind-body problem arises because all theories about mind-brain connections are too deeply obscure to gain general acceptance. This essay suggests a clear, simple, mind-brain solution that avoids all these perennial obscurities. (1) It does so, first of all, by reworking Strawson and Stoljar’s views. They argue that while minds differ from observable brains, minds can still be what brains are physically like behind the appearances created by our outer senses. This could avoid many obscurities. But to clearly do so, it must first clear up its own deep obscurity about what brains are like behind appearances, and how they create the mind’s privacy, unity and qualia – all of which observable brains lack. (2) This can ultimately be done with a clear, simple assumption: our consciousness is the physical substance that certain brain events consist of beyond appearances. For example, the distinctive electrochemistry in nociceptor ion channels wholly consists of pain. This rejects that pain is a brain property: instead it’s a brain substance that occupies space in brains, and exerts forces by which it’s indirectly detectable via EEGs. (3) This assumption is justified because treating pains as physical substances avoids the perennial obscurities in mind-body theories. For example, this ‘clear physicalism’ avoids the obscure nonphysical pain of dualism and its spinoffs. Pain is instead an electrochemical substance. It isn’t private because it’s hidden in nonphysical minds, but instead because it’s just indirectly detected in the physical world in ways that leave its real nature hidden. (4) Clear physicalism also avoids puzzling reductions of private pains into more fundamental terms of observable brain activity. Instead pain is a hidden, private substance underlying this observable activity. Also, pain is fundamental in itself, for it’s what some brain activity fundamentally consists of. This also avoids reductive idealist claims that the world just exists in the mind. They yield obscure views on why we see a world that isn’t really out there. (5) Clear physicalism also avoids obscure claims that pain is information processing which is realizable in multiple hardwares (not just in electrochemistry). Molecular neuroscience now casts doubt on multiple realization. Also, it’s puzzling how abstract information gets ‘realized’ in brains and affects brains (compare ancient quandries on how universals get embodied in matter). A related idea is that of supervenient properties in nonreductive physicalism. They involve obscure overdetermination and emergent consciousness. Clear physicalism avoids all this. Pain isn’t an abstract property obscurely related to brains – it’s simply a substance in brains. (6) Clear physicalism also avoids problems in neuroscience. Neuroscience explains the mind’s unity in problematic ways using synchrony, attention, etc.. Clear physicalism explains unity in terms of intense neuroelectrical activity reaching continually along brain circuits as a conscious whole. This fits evidence that just highly active, highly connected circuits are fully conscious. Neuroscience also has problems explaining how qualia are actually encoded by brains, and how to get from these abstract codes to actual pain, fear, etc.. Clear physicalism explains qualia electrochemically, using growing evidence that both sensory and emotional qualia correlate with very specific electrical channels in neural receptors. Multiple-realization advocates overlook this important evidence. (7) Clear physicalism thus bridges the mind-brain gulf by showing how brains can possess the mind’s qualia, unity and privacy – and how minds can possess features of brain activity like occupying space and exerting forces. This unorthodox nonreductive physicalism may be where physicalism leads to when stripped of all its reductive and nonreductive obscurities. It offers a clear, simple mind-body solution by just filling in what neuroscience is silent about, namely, what brain matter is like behind perceptions of it.
Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Review of D. Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86:515-519.   (Google)
Lockwood, Michael (1989). Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 115 | Annotation | Google)
Lockwood, Michael (1993). The grain problem. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Annotation | Google)
Lockwood, Michael (1998). Unsensed phenomenal qualities: A defence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):415-18.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Maxwell, Grover (1979). Rigid designators and mind-brain identity. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google)
Maxwell, Grover (1971). Structural realism and the meaning of theoretical terms. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4:181-192.   (Cited by 54 | Google)
Maxwell, Grover (1978). Unity of consciousness and mind-brain identity. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Mind and Brain. Paragon House.   (Google)
Newman, M. H. A. (1928). Mr. Russell's causal theory of perception. Mind 5 (146):26-43.   (Cited by 39 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Robinson, Howard M. (1982). Matter: Turning the tables. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (2004). A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there be a credible alternative? In one classic example, philosophers ask whether we can ever know what is it is like for bats to sense the world using sonar. It seems obvious to many that any amount of information about a bat's physical structure and information processing leaves us guessing about the central questions concerning the character of its experience. A Place for Consciousness begins with reflections on the existence of this gap. Is it just a psychological shortcoming in our merely human understanding of the physical world? Is it a trivial consequence of the simple fact that we just cannot be bats? Or does it mean there really are facts about consciousness over and above the physical facts? If so, what does consciousness do? Why does it exist? Rosenberg sorts out these problems, especially those centering on the causal role of consciousness. He introduces a new paradigm called Liberal Naturalism for thinking about what causation is, about the natural world, and about how to create a detailed model to go along with the new paradigm. Arguing that experience is part of the categorical foundations of causality, he shows that within this new paradigm there is a place for something essentially like consciousness in all its traditional mysterious respects. A striking feature of Liberal Naturalism is that its central tenets are motivated independently of the mind-body problem, by analyzing causation itself. Because of this approach, when consciousness shows up in the picture it is not introduced in an ad hoc way, and its most puzzling features can be explained from first principles. Ultimately, Rosenberg's final solution gives consciousness a causally important role without supposing either that it is physical or that it interacts with the physical
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (1999). On the Intrinsic Nature of the Physical. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In its original context Hawking was writing about the significance of physics for questions about God's existence and responsibility for creation. I am co-opting the sentiment for another purpose, though. As stated Hawking could equally be directing the question at concerns about the seemingly abstract information physics conveys about the world, and the full body of facts contained in the substance of the world. Would even a complete and adequate physics tell us all the general facts about the stuff the world is made of? In this chapter I am going to argue that the answer is "no." I am also going to argue that the missing facts are like the kinds of facts we can use to cross the explanatory gap. I am going to argue, in short, that we have reasons to re-enchant matter that are independent of the mind-body problem. In a recent anthology on consciousness (1997) G
Russell, Bertrand (1927). The Analysis of Matter. London: Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 138 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: "The Analysis of Matter" is one of the earliest and best philosophical studies of the new physics of relativity and quantum mechanics.
Schlick, M. (1925). General Theory of Knowledge. La Salle: Open Court.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
Abstract: The book expounds most of the doctrines that would later be identified with the classical period of the Vienna Circle.
Stoljar, Daniel (2006). Comments on Galen Strawson - 'realistic monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):170-176.   (Google | More links)
Stoljar, Daniel (forthcoming). Strawson's realistic monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: There is at least one element in Strawson
Stoljar, Daniel (2001). Two conceptions of the physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-81.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception
Strawson, Galen (2003). Realistic materialism. In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Strawson, Galen (2003). Real materialism. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell Publishing.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Stubenberg, Leopold (1997). Austria vs. australia: Two versions of the identity theory. In Keith Lehrer & Johann Christian Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy, Past and Present. Kluwer.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Stubenberg, Leopold (1998). Consciousness and Qualia. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 73 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness and Qualia is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc.
Stubenberg, Leopold (1996). The place of qualia in the world of science. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Unger, Peter K. (1998). The mystery of the physical and the matter of qualities. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):75–99.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For some fifty years now, nearly all work in mainstream analytic philosophy has made no serious attempt to understand the _nature of_ _physical reality,_ even though most analytic philosophers take this to be all of reality, or nearly all. While we've worried much about the nature of our own experiences and thoughts and languages, we've worried little about the nature of the vast physical world that, as we ourselves believe, has them all as only a small part

1.4i Neutral Monism

Ahmed, Mafizuddin (1989). Bertrand Russell's Neutral Monism. Mittal Publications.   (Google)
Banks, Erik C. (2003). Ernst Mach's World Elements. Kluwer.   (Google)
Abstract: A consideration of Mach's elements, his philosophy of neutral monism, and philosophy of physics, especially space and time, much of it based on unpublished writings from the Nachlass and other original sources. The historical connection between Mach and logical positivism is shown to be superficial at best, and Mach's elements are shown to be mind independent natural qualities (world-elements) with dynamic force, not limited to human sensations.
Banks, Erik C. (2010). Neutral Monism Reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Should neutral monism be reconsidered? Classic NM (Mach James Russell) is examined first, and its fundamental theses identified. The second half of the paper looks at recent contemporary variants.
Banks, Erik C. (online). Russell's Hypothesis and the New Physicalism. Proceedings of the Ohio Phil. Association 2009.   (Google)
Abstract: A 2009 conference paper about Russell's enhanced physicalism: physical structural relations of matter instantiated by qualities with "intrinsic character." Russell's hypothesis leads many to panpsychism or protophenomenalism via a line-of-descent argument, but there is a way to break the line of descent, making sensation qualities separate higher order structural dispositions, if they are instantiated by the right kind of ground-level dispositional qualities.
Bhattacharya, Manjulekha (1972). Ernst Mach: Neutral monism. Studi Internazionali Di Filosofia 4:145-182.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bode, Boyd H. (1905). 'Pure experience' and the external world. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (5):128-133.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bode, Boyd H. (1905). The concept of pure experience. Philosophical Review 14 (6):684-695.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1911). Experience as pure and consciousness as meaning. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 8 (19):511-525.   (Google | More links)
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1907). Pure experience and reality: A reassertion. Philosophical Review 16 (4):422-424.   (Google | More links)
Cooper, W. E. (1990). William James's theory of mind. Journal of the History of Philosophy (October) 571 (October):571-593.   (Google)
Drabinski, John E. (1993). Radical empiricism and phenomenology: Philosophy and the pure stuff of experience. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 7 (3):226-242.   (Google)
Hamilton, Andy (1990). Ernst Mach and the elimination of subjectivity. Ratio 3 (2):117-135.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Holman, Emmett (2008). Panpsychism, physicalism, neutral monism and the Russellian theory of mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):48-67.   (Google)
Abstract: As some see it, an impasse has been reached on the mind- body problem between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism. So lately another view has been gaining popularity, a view that might be called the 'Russellian theory of mind' (RTM) since it is inspired by some ideas once put forth by Bertrand Russell. Most versions of RTM are panpsychist, but there is at least one version that rejects panpsychism and styles itself as physicalism, and neutral monism is also a possibility. In this paper I will attempt to sort out these different versions with a view to determining which, if any, have a chance of breaking the perceived impasse. The unsurprising conclusion will be that there are a lot of challenges ahead for the RTM theorist. The surprising conclusion will be that it's not clear that pan- psychist RTM holds an advantage over the other versions in this regard
James, William (1904). A world of pure experience. Journal of Philosophy Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (21):533-543.   (Cited by 36 | Google | More links)
James, William (1904). A world of pure experience. II. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 1 (21):561-570.   (Google | More links)
James, William & Perry, Ralph Barton (eds.) (1996). Essays in Radical Empiricism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.   (Cited by 158 | Google | More links)
Abstract: William James believed that events could not be catalogued simply as a series of facts, but had to be considered through the lens of experience.
James, William (1905). How two minds can know one thing. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (7):176-181.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Lockwood, Michael (1981). What was Russell's neutral monism? Midwest Studes in Philosophy 6:143-58.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Lowe, Victor (1942). William James' Pluralistic Metaphysics of Experience. In Victor Lowe (ed.), In Commemoration Of William James: 1842-1942. Columbia University Press.   (Google)
Moller, Mark S. (2001). James, perception and the Miller-Bode objections. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 37 (4):609-626.   (Google)
Persson, Ingmar (2006). Consciousness as existence as a form of neutral monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):128-146.   (Google)
Abstract: I shall here raise and attempt to answer -- given the constraints of space, rather dogmatically -- some fundamental questions as regards the fertile and far-reaching doctrine Ted Honderich has in the past called Consciousness as Existence
Persson, Ingmar (1985). The Primacy of Perception: Towards a Neutral Monism. C.W.K. Gleerup.   (Google)
Seigfried, Charlene H. (1992). William James's concrete analysis of experience. The Monist 75 (4):538-550.   (Google)
Sellars, Roy Wood (1907). The nature of experience. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (1):14-18.   (Google | More links)
Stubenberg, Leopold (online). Neutral monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Taylor, Eugene & Wozniak, Robert H. (1996). Pure experience: The response to William James. In E.I. Taylor & R.H. Wozniak (eds.), Pure Experience: The Response to William James. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: The radical empiricism of William James was first formally presented in his seminal papers of 1904, 'Does Consciousness Exist?' and 'A World of Pure Experience'. In James's view, pure experience was to serve as the source for psychology's primary data and radical empiricism was to launch an effective critique of experimentalism in psychology, a critique from which the problem of experimentalism within science could be addressed more broadly. This collection of papers presents James's formal statements on radical empiricism and a representative sample of contemporary responses from psychologists and philosophers. With only a few exceptions, these responses indicate just how badly James was misread - psychologists ignoring the heart of James's message and philosophers transforming James's metaphysics into something quite unintelligible to the emerging generation of experimental psychologists
Tully, Robert (1988). Russell's neutral monism. Russell 8:209-224.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Tully, R. E. (1993). Three studies of Russell's neutral monism. Russell 13 (1):5-35.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Velmans, Prof Max (2007). Reflexive monism. [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 15 (2):5-50.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Reflexive monism is, in essence, an ancient view of how consciousness relates to the material world that has, in recent decades, been resurrected in modern form. In this paper I discuss how some of its basic features differ from both dualism and variants of physicalist and functionalist reductionism, focusing on those aspects of the theory that challenge deeply rooted presuppositions in current Western thought. I pay particular attention to the ontological status and seeming “out-thereness” of the phenomenal world and to how the “phenomenal world” relates to the “physical world”, the “world itself”, and processing in the brain. In order to place the theory within the context of current thought and debate, I address questions that have been raised about reflexive monism in recent commentaries and also evaluate competing accounts of the same issues offered by “transparency theory” and by “biological naturalism”. I argue that, of the competing views on offer, reflexive monism most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense
Wood, Joanne A. (1994). Lighthouse bodies: The neutral monism of Virginia Woolf and Bertrand Russell. Journal of the History of Ideas 55 (3):483-502.   (Google | More links)

1.4k Specific Views on Consciousness, Misc

Garvey, James (2006). Consciousness and absence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):44-60.   (Google)
Haraldsen, Robert E. (online). Mind, Matter and Extreme Relativistic Aberration -ERA. Mind and Matter - a scientific approach.   (Google)
Abstract: On consciousness and the flow of spacetime with emphasis on Relativity, Quantum Mechanics and extra dimensions from the perspective of extreme relativistic aberration - ERA From the deepest levels of eternal consciousness we are shaped into an illusive subjective world of inherited collective projections built on phenomenological interactions, obeying solely the realm of purely abstract mathematics.
Haraldsen, Robert E. (ms). The Flow of the Oscillating Universe.   (Google)
Abstract: A deeper understanding of the dynamics of consciousness, not only in the trivial sense of immaterial psychological relations, but as the prerequisite of the universe itself, may lead to an understanding of gravitation. The following argument acknowledges theories of higher dimensions, such as string-M-theory as important descriptive models along with the embedded theories of quantum mechanics and an expanded relativity theory. It is also presumed that the unexploited consequence of special relativity; extreme relativistic aberration , will turn out to be one of the most important keys to a better understanding of the overall unity.