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1.4a. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness (Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

1.4a.1 Higher-Order Perception Theories of Consciousness

Lycan, William G. (1995). Consciousness as internal monitoring. Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.   (Cited by 44 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." 1 On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses
Lycan, William G. (2004). The superiority of Hop to HOT. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)

1.4a.2 Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness, Misc

Hellie, Benj (2007). 'There's something it's like' and the structure of consciousness. Philosophical Review 116 (3):441--63.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', in the context of a reply to Eric Lormand's 'The explanatory stopgap'. I argue that Lormand is wrong to think it has a specially perceptual meaning. Rather, it has one of at least four candidate meanings: (a) e is some way as regards its subject; (b) e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; (c) e is some way in the awareness of its subject; (d) e's subject is the "experiencer" of e. I provide additional argumentation for the view in this paper that in the context, 'like this' functions as a predicate variable.
Lycan, William G., A simple point about an alleged objection to higher-order theories of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: For purposes of this paper, a conscious state is a mental state whose subject is directly or at least nonevidentially aware of being in it. (The state does not count as conscious if the subject has only been told about it by a cognitive scientist or psychologist; introspectively would be better, but no one should say that a state is conscious only if its subject actively introspects it.). N.b., this usage is only one among several quite different though of course not competing ones; the phrase has been used in at least two other senses, as by, respectively, Dretske (1993, 1995) and Block (1995).1 My definition is stipulative, but not brutely so; it settles on one thing that is often meant by conscious state cf. a conscious memory, a conscious desire, a conscious intention, a conscious decision. According to higher-order (HO) theories of consciousness in this sense of consciousness, what makes a mental state a conscious one is that it is represented by another of the subject’s mental states, that in virtue of which s/he is aware of it. Some practitioners follow Locke in taking the higher-order state to be quasi-perceptual (Armstrong, 1968, 1980, Lycan 1991, 1996); others say it may be merely a thought about the original state (Rosenthal, 1986, 1990).2 There is an alleged objection to such theories, that originated with Goldman (1993)Error: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMap3 and has since been voiced and discussed by others (Dretske 1995, Stubenberg 1998, Van Gulick 2000, 2005, Gennaro 2005, Kriegel 2009). I say alleged, because
Van Gulick, Robert (2004). Higher-order global states (hogs): An alternative higher-order model of consciousness. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 10 | Google)

1.4a.3 Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness

Rosenthal, David M., Consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse
Rosenthal, David M., The mind and its expression.   (Google)
Abstract: pain' and ┌I think that p┐ express the pain and the thought that p, themselves. The book is most impressive. It is packed with careful argument, and addresses a remarkable range of important issues about the mind. I have very much enjoyed studying it
Aquila, Richard E. (1990). Consciousness as higher-order thoughts: Two objections. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):81-87.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Balog, Katalin (2000). Phenomenal Judgment and the HOT theory: Comments on David Rosenthal’s “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.   (Google)
Abstract: In this commentary I criticize David Rosenthal’s higher order thought theory of consciousness (HOT). This is one of the best articulated philosophical accounts of consciousness available. The theory is, roughly, that a mental state is conscious in virtue of there being another mental state, namely, a thought to the effect that one is in the first state. I argue that this account is open to the objection that it makes “HOT-zombies” possible, i.e., creatures that token higher order mental states, but not the states that the higher order states are about. I discuss why none of the ways to accommodate this problem within HOT leads to viable positions.
Beeckmans, John (2007). Can higher-order representation theories pass scientific muster? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):90-111.   (Google)
Abstract: Higher-order representation (HOR) theories posit that the contents of lower-order brain states enter consciousness when tracked by a higher-order brain state. The nature of higher-order monitoring was examined in light of current scientific knowledge, primarily in experimental perceptual psychology. The most plausible candidate for higher-order state was found to be conceptual short-term memory (CSTM), a buffer memory intimately connected with a semantic engine operating in the medium of the language of thought (LOT). This combination meets many of the requirements of HOR theories, although falling short in some significant respects, most notably the inability of higher- order states to represent more than a small fraction of the information contained in primary states, especially in vision. A possible way round this obstacle is suggested, involving the representation of visual detail by means of ensemble concepts
Bermúdez, José Luis (2000). Consciousness, higher-order thought, and stimulus reinforcement. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):194-195.   (Google)
Abstract: Rolls defends a higher-order thought theory of phenomenal consciousness, mapping the distinction between conscious and non-conscious states onto a distinction between two types of action and corresponding neural pathways. Only one type of action involves higher-order thought and consequently consciousness. This account of consciousness has implausible consequences for the nature of stimulus-reinforcement learning
Block, Ned, Comparing the major theories of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: This article compares the three frameworks for theories of consciousness that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists, the view that consciousness is a biological state of the brain, the global workspace perspective and an account in terms of higher order states. The comparison features the “explanatory gap” (Nagel, 1974; Levine, 1983) the fact that we have no idea why the neural basis of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather than another experience or no experience at all. It is argued that the biological framework handles the explanatory gap better than the global workspace of higher order views. The article does not discuss quantum theories or “panpsychist” accounts according to which consciousness is a feature of the smallest particles of inorganic matter (Chalmers, 1996; Rosenberg, 2004). Nor does it discuss the “representationist” proposals (Tye, 2000; Byrne, 2001a) that are popular among philosophers but not neuroscientists
Block, Ned (ms). Some concepts of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses". Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state
Bremer, Manuel (2008). Peter Carruthers, consciousness: Essays from a higher-order perspective. Minds and Machines 18 (3).   (Google)
Brown, Richard (ms). Consciousness, (higher-order) thoughts, and what it's like.   (Google)
Abstract: We have a vast range of conscious experience; from the taste of our favorite food, to the appearance of our favorite art, to the highs of accomplishing our goals, to the excruciating agony of a broken bone, or loss of a loved one, to wondering what time it is, or thinking about what one has to do to name but a few. Our conscious experience can be by turns exhilarating or frightening or overpowering, or just plain dull. Yet though all of this is common place it is quite mysterious how to fit this phenomenon into the natural world. Or so it seems to many philosophers and scientists, who feel, as Descartes did, that there is no hope of giving a scientific account of how consciousness arises in nature. These philosophers see ‘hard problems’ and ‘explanatory gaps’ that lead them to model consciousness as a non-physical phenomenon that is out of the reach of our scientific theories
Browne, Derek (1999). Carruthers on the deficits of animals. Psyche 5 (23).   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Byrne, Alex (1997). Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts. Philosophical Studies 2 (2):103-29.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness is the subject of many metaphors, and one of the most hardy perennials compares consciousness to a spotlight, illuminating certain mental goings-on, while leaving others to do their work in the dark. One way of elaborating the spotlight metaphor is this: mental events are loaded on to one end of a conveyer belt by the senses, and move with the belt
Byrne, Alex (2004). What phenomenal consciousness is like. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The terminology surrounding the dispute between higher-order and first-order theories of consciousness is piled so high that it sometimes obscures the view. When the debris is cleared away, there is a real prospect
Campbell Manson, Neil (2002). What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):221 – 238.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The fact that we can engage in first-person discourse about our own mental states seems, intuitively, to be bound up with consciousness. David Rosenthal draws upon this intuition in arguing for his higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Rosenthal's argument relies upon the assumption that the truth-conditions for "p" and "I think that p" differ. It is argued here that the truth-conditional schema debars "I think" from playing one of its (expressive) roles and thus is not a good test for what is asserted when "I think" is employed in making an assertoric utterance. The critique of Rosenthal's argument allows us to make explicit the intuitions which shape higher-order representation theories of consciousness in general. Consciousness and first-person mental discourse seem to be connected primarily because consciousness is (and was) an epistemic term, used to denote first-person knowledge of minds. Higher-order thought theories of consciousness draw upon this epistemic notion of consciousness, and because self-knowledge seems to involve higher-order representation, the higher-order theorist can deploy what is in effect an "error theory" about conscious experience disguised as a kind of conceptual analysis of our ordinary concept of a conscious mental state. The conclusion reached is that there is unlikely to be a simple or direct path from considerations about mental discourse to conclusions about the nature of consciousness
Carruthers, Peter (1989). Brute experience. Journal of Philosophy 86 (May):258-269.   (Cited by 44 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (1992). Consciousness and concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66 (66):41-59.   (Cited by 60 | Annotation | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2005). Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2001). Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena. In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Many people argue not. They claim that there is an
Carruthers, Peter (1997). Fragmentary versus reflexive consciousness. Mind and Language 12 (2):181-95.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2004). Hop over FOR, HOT theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Following a short introduction, this chapter begins by contrasting two different forms of higher-order perception (HOP) theory of phenomenal consciousness - inner sense theory versus a dispositionalist kind of higher-order thought (HOT) theory - and by giving a brief statement of the superiority of the latter. Thereafter the chapter considers arguments in support of HOP theories in general. It develops two parallel objections against both first-order representationalist (FOR) theories and actualist forms of HOT theory. First, neither can give an adequate account of the distinctive features of our recognitional concepts of experience. And second, neither can explain why there are some states of the relevant kinds that are phenomenal and some that aren
Carruthers, Peter (2007). Higher-order theories of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (online). Higher-order theories of consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (1996). Language, Thought, and Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 318 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Do we think in natural language? Or is language only for communication? Much recent work in philosophy and cognitive science assumes the latter. In contrast, Peter Carruthers argues that much of human conscious thinking is conducted in the medium of natural language sentences. However, this does not commit him to any sort of Whorfian linguistic relativism, and the view is developed within a framework that is broadly nativist and modularist. His study will be essential reading for all those interested in the nature and significance of natural language, whether they come from philosophy, psychology or linguistics
Carruthers, Peter (1998). Natural theories of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):203-22.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many people have thought that consciousness
Carruthers, Peter (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 194 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness
Carruthers, Peter (2003). Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (online). Precis of Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2000). Replies to critics: Explaining subjectivity. Psyche 6 (3).   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (online). Reply to Seager.   (Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David (2005). The higher-order model of consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.   (Google)
Abstract: All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not
Carruthers, Peter (2005). Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):83-102.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to higher-order thought accounts of phenomenal consciousness it is unlikely that many non-human animals undergo phenomenally conscious experiences. Many people believe that this result would have deep and far-reaching consequences. More specifically, they believe that the absence of phenomenal consciousness from the rest of the animal kingdom must mark a radical and theoretically significant divide between ourselves and other animals, with important implications for comparative psychology. I shall argue that this belief is mistaken. Since phenomenal consciousness might be almost epiphenomenal in its functioning within human cognition, its absence in animals may signify only relatively trivial differences in cognitive architecture. Our temptation to think otherwise arises partly as a side-effect of imaginative identification with animal experiences, and partly from mistaken beliefs concerning the aspects of common-sense psychology that carry the main explanatory burden, whether applied to humans or to non-human animals
Cole, David J. (online). Sense and sentience.   (Google)
Abstract: Surely one of the most interesting problems in the study of mind concerns the nature of sentience. How is it that there are sensations, rather than merely sensings? What is it like to be a bat -- or why is it like anything at all? Why aren't we automata or responding but unfeeling Zombies? How does neural activity give rise to subjective experience? As Leibniz put the problem (Monadology section 17):
_It must be confessed, however, that Perception_ [consciousness?]_, and that which depends upon it, are_
_inexplicable by mechanical means, that is to say, by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a_
_machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perceptions, we could conceive of it as increased_
_in its interior size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a_
_mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another, but never would he find_
_anything to explain Perception._ [Montgomery trans.]
Copenhaver, Rebecca (ms). Reid on consciousness: HOP, HOT or FOR?   (Google | More links)
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Higher-order consciousness and phenomenal space: Reply to Meehan. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Meehan finds fault with a number of my arguments, and proposes that better solutions to the problems I was addressing are available if we adopt a higher-order theory of consciousness. I start with some general remarks on theories of this sort. I connect what I had to say about the A-thesis with different forms of higher-order sense theories, and explain why I ignored higher-order thought theories altogether: there are compelling grounds for thinking they cannot provide a viable account of phenomenal unity in phenomenal terms. Meehan
Dienes, Zoltán (2004). Assumptions of subjective measures of unconscious mental states: Higher order thoughts and bias. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):25-45.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1995). Are experiences conscious? In Fred Dretske (ed.), Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1993). Conscious experience. Mind 102 (406):263-283.   (Cited by 141 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Droege, Paula (online). Consciousness, higher-order theories of. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Droege, Paula (2003). Caging the Beast: A Theory of Sensory Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Dulany, Donelson E. (2004). Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Francescotti, Robert M. (1995). Higher-order thoughts and conscious experience. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):239-254.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: For nearly a decade, David Rosenthal has proposed that a mental state M of a creature C is conscious just in case C has a suitable higher-order thought directed toward M. While this theory has had its share of criticism in recent years, I believe that the real difficulties have been ignored. In this essay, I show that the presence of a higher order is insufficient for conscious experience, even if we suppose that the thought satisfies the constraints that Rosenthal lists (i.e. that it is assertoric in nature, that it is had occurently, and that it is non-inferentially formed). The only way Rosenthal's view could possibly yield sufficient conditions is by requiring that the higher-order thought be suitably causally related to its object. Yet, as I also show, the only causal constraint strong enough to do the job is not only ill-motivated but probably false
Gennaro, Rocco J. (1993). Brute experience and the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Philosophical Papers 22 (1):51-69.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (1996). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 51 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness.
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2000). Fiction, pleasurable tragedy, and the HOT theory of consciousness. Philosophical Papers 29 (2):107-20.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: [Final version in Philosophical Papers, 2000] Much has been made over the past few decades of two related problems in aesthetics. First, the "feeling fiction problem," as I will call it, asks: is it rational to be moved by what happens to fictional characters? How can we care about what happens to people who we know are not real?[i] Second, the so-called "paradox of tragedy" is embodied in the question: Why or how is it that we take pleasure in artworks (e.g. tragedies) which are clearly designed to cause in us such feelings as sadness and fear?[ii] Various solutions to these puzzles have been proposed, but my primary aim is neither to offer a novel solution nor to summarize and critique most of the alternatives.[iii] My focus instead will be on the issue of consciousness and, more specifically, to view these problems from the point of the view of the so-called "higher-order thought theory of consciousness" (the HOT theory). Although some work on these puzzles have raised important questions about the nature of consciousness and "aesthetic experience," no attempt has yet been made to examine them in light of a specific theory
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2004). Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and Levine. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2004). Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. John Benjamin.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2002). Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT theory of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):293-330.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2003). Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):581-586.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In Thinking About Consciousness , David Papineau [2002] presents a criticism of so-called 'actualist HOT theories of consciousness'. The HOT theory, held most notably by David Rosenthal, claims that the best explanation for what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of an actual higher-order thought directed at the mental state. Papineau contends that actualist HOT theory faces an awkward problem in relation to higher-order memory judgements; for example, that the theory cannot explain how one could later recall an earlier experience that was not introspected. He argues that, on the HOT theory, we are even left with the absurd conclusion that the consciousness of, say, an earlier visual experience might even depend on the later act of memory. I show that Papineau's criticism of actualist HOT theory not only fails, but also that it seriously mischaracterizes and underestimates the theory. In particular, Papineau badly conflates the crucial difference between an introspective state (i.e., where a conscious HOT is directed at a mental state) and an outer-directed first-order conscious state (i.e., a case where one has a nonconscious HOT)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2005). The HOT theory of consciousness: Between a rock and a hard place. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):3-21.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The so-called 'higher-order thought' (HOT) theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at it (Rosenthal, 1986; 1990; 1993; 2002; 2004; Gennaro, 1996; 2004). The HOT theory has been or could be attacked from two apparently opposite directions. On the one hand, there is what Stubenberg (1998) has called 'the problem of the rock' which, if successful, would show that the HOT theory proves too much. On the other hand, it might also be alleged that the HOT theory does not or cannot address the so-called 'hard problem' of phenomenal consciousness. If so, then the HOT theory would prove too little. We might say, then, that the HOT theory is arguably between a rock and a hard place. In this paper, I critically examine these objections and defend the HOT theory against them. In doing so, I hope to show that the HOT theory, or at least some version of it, neither proves too little nor too much, but is just right. I also show that these two objections are really just two sides of the same coin, and that the HOT theory is immune from David Chalmers' (1995; 1996) criticisms of other attempted reductionist accounts of consciousness
Gennaro, Rocco J., Visual agnosia and higher- order thought theory.   (Google)
Abstract: In general, the idea is that what makes a mental state conscious is that it is the object of some kind of higher-order representation (HOR). A mental state M becomes conscious when there is a HOR of M. A HOR is a “meta-psychological” state, i.e. a mental state directed at another mental state. So, for example, my desire to do a good powerpoint presentation becomes conscious when I am (non-inferentially) “aware” of the desire. Intuitively, it seems that conscious states, as opposed to unconscious ones, are mental states that I am “aware of” in some sense
Gerken, Mikkel (2008). Is there a simple argument for higher-order representation theories of awareness consciousness? Erkenntnis 69 (2):243-259.   (Google)
Abstract: William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation (SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I then provide a reconstruction of the argument and argue that although the reconstructed argument deserves consideration, it is also too simple as stated. In particular, it raises several controversial questions about the nature of mental representation. These questions must be addressed before a verdict as to the cogency of the HOR argument-strategy can be reached. But since the questions are controversial, a cogent argument for HOR theories of awareness consciousness is unlikely to be simple
Gois, Isabel (2010). A dilemma for higher-order theories of consciousness. Philosophia 38 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail to give an account of what they set out to explain: what is distinctive of ‘conscious’ phenomena
Guzeldere, Guven (1996). Consciousness and the introspective link principle. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Guzeldere, Guven (1995). Is consciousness the perception of what passes in one's own mind? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 42 | Annotation | Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2004). HOT theories of consciousness: More sad tales of philosophical intuitions gone astray. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Hellie, Benj (2007). Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be a nonintentional "acquaintance".
Jacob, Pierre (1996). State consciousness revisited. Acta Analytica 11 (16):29-54.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jamieson, Dale W. & Bekoff, Marc (1992). Carruthers on nonconscious experience. Analysis 52 (1):23-28.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
Jehle, David & Kriegel, Uriah (2006). An argument against dispositionalist HOT. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we present a two-stage argument against Peter Carruthers' theory of phenomenal consciousness. The first stage shows that Carruthers' main argument against first-order representational theories of phenomenal consciousness applies with equal force against his own theory. The second stage shows that if Carruthers can escape his own argument against first-order theories, it will come at the cost of wedding his theory to certain unwelcome implausibilities. discusses Carruthers' argument against first-order representationalism. presents Carruthers' theory of consciousness. presents our argument against Carruthers' theory. sums up
Kobes, Bernard W. (1997). Metacognition and consciousness: Review essay of Janet Metcalfe and Arthur P. shimamura (eds), Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):93-102.   (Google)
Abstract: The field of metacognition, richly sampled in the book under review, is recognized as an important and growing branch of psychology. However, the field stands in need of a general theory that (1) provides a unified framework for understanding the variety of metacognitive processes, (2) articulates the relation between metacognition and consciousness, and (3) tells us something about the form of meta-level representations and their relations to object-level representations. It is argued that the higher-order thought theory of consciousness supplies us with the rudiments of a theory that meets these desiderata and integrates the principal findings reported in this collection
Kobes, Bernard W. (1995). Telic higher-order thoughts and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness. Consciousness & Cognition 16:897-912.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles. Synthese 134 (3):477-504.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is the peculiar self- awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. According to a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinct representation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-order content. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by M itself or by a differ- ent state. While the Neo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it is often felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the Neo- Brentanian and Higher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that the Neo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima facie preferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory.
Kriegel, Uriah (2002). Consciousness, permanent self-awareness, and higher-order monitoring. Dialogue 41 (3):517-540.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lagerspetz, Olli (2002). In the industry. Inquiry 45 (4):541-559.   (Google | More links)
Liang, Caleb & Lane, Timothy (2008). Higher-Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation. The Southern Journal of Philosophy:69-98.   (Google)
Lau, Hakwan (ms). A higher order bayesian decision theory of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: It is usually taken as given that consciousness involves superior or more elaborate forms of information processing. Contemporary models equate consciousness with global processing, system complexity, or depth or stability of computation. This is in stark contrast with the powerful philosophical intuition that being conscious is more than just having the ability to compute. I argue that it is also incompatible with current empirical findings. I present a model that is free from the strong assumption that consciousness predicts superior performance. The model is based on Bayesian decision theory, of which signal detection theory is a special case. It reflects the fact that the capacity for perceptual decisions is fundamentally limited by the presence and amount of noise in the system. To optimize performance, one therefore needs to set decision criteria that are based on the behaviour, i.e. the probability distributions, of the internal signals. One important realization is that the knowledge of how our internal signals behave statistically has to be learned over time. Essentially, we are doing statistics on our own brain. This ‘higherorder’ learning, however, may err, and this impairs our ability to set and maintain optimal criteria for perceptual decisions, which I argue is central to perception consciousness. I outline three possibilities of how conscious perception might be affected by failures of ‘higher-order’ representation. These all imply that one can have a dissociation between consciousness and performance. This model readily explains blindsight and hallucinations in formal terms, and is beginning to receive direct empirical support. I end by discussing some philosophical implications of the model
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Lurz, Robert W. (2004). Either FOR or HOR: A false dichotomy. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Google)
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Lycan, William G. (1999). A response to Carruthers' Natural Theories of Consciousness. Psyche 5 (11).   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: I have very little disagreement with Carruthers' article, for our views are very similar. I think he is terminologically a bit hard on Michael Tye. I think that in invoking Swampman he is in danger of conflating teleological theories of representation with etiological theories of teleology. In response to his criticism of my own higher-order experience (HOE) view, I argue that there is good reason to believe that we human beings sport as great a degree of computational complexity as is needed for HOEs. If other animals do not exhibit a comparable degree, we should deny that they have "phenomenal-consciousness" in the strong sense of that term
Lycan, William G. (2001). A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness. Analysis 61 (269):3-4.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1995). Consciousness as internal monitoring. Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.   (Cited by 44 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." 1 On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses
Lycan, William G. & Ryder, Z. (2003). The loneliness of the long-distance truck-driver. Analysis 63 (2):132-36.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (2004). The superiority of Hop to HOT. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Mandik, Pete (2009). Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):5-36.   (Google)
Abstract: Higher-Order Representational theories of consciousness — HORs — primarily seek to explain a mental state’s being conscious in terms of the mental state’s being represented by another mental state. First-Order Representational theories of consciousness — FORs — primarily seek to explain a property’s being phenomenal in terms of the property being represented in experience. Despite differences in both explanans and explananda, HORs and FORs share a reliance on there being such a property as being represented. In this paper I develop an argument — the Unicorn Argument — against both HORs and FORs. The core of the Unicorn is that since there are mental rep- resentations of things that do not exist, there cannot be any such prop- erty as being represented, and thus no such property with which to identify either being conscious or being phenomenal.
Mandik, Pete (ms). Ch 3. beware the unicorn: Consciousness, intentionality, and inexistence.   (Google)
Abstract: 0. Introduction As mentioned in chapter 0, HORs seek to explain a mental state’s being conscious in terms of the mental state’s being represented by another mental state and FORs seek to explain a property’s being phenomenal in terms of the property of being represented in experience. Despite differences in both explanans and explananda, HORs and FORs share a reliance on there being such a property as being represented. In this chapter I develop an argument—the Unicorn Argument—against both HORs and FORs. The gist of the Unicorn is that since there are mental representations of things that do not exist, there cannot be any such property as being represented upon which to erect a theory of consciousness. While I think many varieties of HORs and FORs are vulnerable to the Unicorn, in this chapter I target just a few exemplars: David Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Thought theory (HOT) and the FORs developed by Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Although HORs and FORs were discussed in previous chapters, insufficient detail has been given so far to make it clear how HOT will be vulnerable to the Unicorn. In section 1 I spell out HOT, emphasizing its main motivations and its reliance on the notion of being represented
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Abstract: David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory is one of the most widely argued for of the higher-order accounts of consciousness. I argue that Rosenthal vacillates between two models of the HOT theory. First, I argue that these models employ different concepts of 'state consciousness'; the two concepts each refer to mental state tokens, but in virtue of different properties. In one model, the concept of 'state consciousness' is more consistent with how the term is typically used, both by philosophers and scientists, and in commonsense usage. This model, however, also has its problems. In the second part of the paper, I develop a modified version of Rosenthal's transitivity principle, thereby avoiding some complications that stem from the original transitivity principle. I suggest that Rosenthal occasionally employs this modified model himself, and that the inconsistency identified in the first section of this paper might really reflect Rosenthal's vacillation between these two versions of the transitivity principle. I offer one explanation for how this equivocation may have occurred. These two versions would result if articulations of the transitivity principle employed the term 'mental state' inconsistently, to refer on some occasions merely to mental state types, and on others, to tokened mental states. I conclude by arguing, contrary to Rosenthal and others, that the theory is not incompatible with view that conscious states are uniquely casual efficacious
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Abstract: This paper bridges art history and consciousness studies and investigates the network of gazes and frames in Las Meninas and how this engages with a system of higher-order thoughts and reflexive operations.
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Natsoulas, Thomas (1993). What is wrong with the appendage theory of consciousness? Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):137-54.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: The present article distinguishes three kinds of accounts of direct (reflective) awareness (i.e. awareness of one's mental occurrences causally unmediated by any other mental occurrence): mental-eye theory, self-intimational theory and appendage theory. These aim to explain the same phenomenon, though each proposes that direct (reflective) awareness occurs in a fundamentally different way. Also, I address a crucial problem that appendage theory must solve: how does a direct (reflective) awareness succeed in being awareness specifically of the particular mental-occurrence instance that is its object? Appendage theory is singled out for this attention because psychologists, as they embark on their renewed study of consciousness, are most likely to be attracted by appendage theory for their explanation of direct (reflective) awareness
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Abstract: Dienes & Perner offer us a theory of explicit and implicit knowledge that promises to systematise a large and diverse body of research in cognitive psychology. Their advertised strategy is to unpack this distinction in terms of explicit and implicit representation. But when one digs deeper one finds the “Higher-Order Thought” theory of consciousness doing much of the work. This reduces both the plausibility and usefulness of their account. We think their strategy is broadly correct, but that consensus on the explicit/implicit knowledge distinction is still a fair way off
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Pharoah, Mark (ms). Enhancing dispositional higher-order thought theory.   (Google)
Abstract: Through the utilization of a descriptive illustration and detailed referencing of Carruthers (2000), a comparison of Hierarchical Systems theory (Pharoah, 2007) with Dispositional Higher-Order Thought theory identifies and reinforces their complementary status. However, this also determines some key distinctions, particularly with regard to the conclusions each make regarding the mentality of animals and the autistic, and regarding the moral consequences of these conclusions.
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Abstract: This paper develops an empirically motivated theory of visual consciousness. It begins by outlining neuropsychological support for Jackendoff's (1987) hypothesis that visual consciousness involves mental representations at an intermediate level of processing. It then supplements that hypothesis with the further requirement that attention, which can come under the direction of high level representations, is also necessary for consciousness. The resulting theory is shown to have a number of philosophical consequences. If correct, higher-order thought accounts, the multiple drafts account, and the widely held belief that sensation precedes perception will all be found wanting. The theory will also be used to illustrate and defend a methodology that fills the gulf between functionalists who ignore the brain and neural reductionists who repudiate functionalism
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Abstract: One kind of substantial critique which has been raised by several philosophers against the so called higher order perception theory (HOP), advocated for mainly by William Lycan, concerns the combination of two important claims: (i) that qualia are wide contents of perceptual experiences, and (ii) that the subject becomes aware of what the world is like (to her) by perceiving her own experiences of the world. In what sense could we possibly watch our own mental states if they are representations whose content and qualitative character is determined by factors that are external to the mind? Here I will do my best in order to understand this claim
Rey, Georges (2000). Role, not content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):224-230.   (Google)
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Robinson, William S. (2004). A few thoughts too many? In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Rolls, Edmund T. (2007). The affective neuroscience of consciousness: Higher order syntactic thoughts, dual routes to emotion and action, and consciousness. In Philip David Zelazo, Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1997). Apperception, sensation, and dissociability. Mind and Language 2 (2):206-23.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent writing on consciousness has increasingly stressed ways in which the terms
Rosenthal, David M. (1997). A theory of consciousness. In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 166 | Annotation | Google)
Rosenthal, David, Commentaries.   (Google)
Abstract: But there is another reason, equally important. We distinguish among thoughts, feelings, and sensations by virtue of their characteristic representational properties. In particular, we describe thoughts and emotions in terms of the things they are about and how they represent those things. And we characterize sensations by reference to their qualitative properties and the things..
Rosenthal, David M., Consciousness (.   (Google)
Abstract: (1) Most commonly these terms are used to describe people. People and other creatures are conscious if they are awake and responsive to sensory stimulation. Because this is a property of creatures, we can call it creature consciousness. An individual lacks such consciousness if it is asleep, in a coma, anesthetized, and so forth. Creature consciousness demands a mainly biological explanation, as against an explanation in mainly psychological terms
Rosenthal, David (web). Concepts and definitions of consciousness. In P W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Google)
Abstract: in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009
Rosenthal, David M. (2002). Consciousness and higher-order thought. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input
Rosenthal, David (ms). Consciousness and intrinsic higher-order content.   (Google)
Abstract: PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness
Rosenthal, David M. (1998). Consciousness and metacognition. In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (2000). Consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments. Consciousness And Cognition 9 (2):203-214.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state
Rosenthal, David M. (2000). Consciousness, interpretation, and consciousness. Protosociology 14:67-84.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2002). Explaining Consciousness. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
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Rosenthal, David (2010). Expressing one's mind. Acta Analytica 25 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Remarks such as ‘I am in pain’ and ‘I think that it’s raining’ are puzzling, since they seem to literally describe oneself as being in pain or having a particular thought, but their conditions of use tend to coincide with unequivocal expressions of pain or of that thought. This led Wittgenstein, among others, to treat such remarks as expressing, rather than as reporting, one’s mental states. Though such expressivism is widely recognized as untenable, Bar-On has recently advanced a neo-expressivist view, on which such remarks exhibit characteristics of both expressions of mental states and reports of those states. I argue against any attempt to see such remarks as both reporting and expressing the same mental states, and that a correct account rests on distinguishing the truth conditions of such remarks from their conditions of use
Rosenthal, David M. (2002). How many kinds of consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1993). Higher-order thoughts and the appendage theory of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):155-66.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: Theories of what it is for a mental state to be conscious must answer two questions. We must say how we're conscious of our conscious mental states. And we must explain why we seem to be conscious of them in a way that's immediate. Thomas Natsoulas (1993) distinguishes three strategies for explaining what it is for mental states to be conscious. I show that the differences among those strategies are due to the divergent answers they give to the foregoing questions. Natsoulas finds most promising the strategy that amounts to the higher-order-thought hypothesis that I've defended elsewhere. But he raises a difficulty for it, which he thinks probably can be met only by modifying that strategy. I argue that this is unnecessary. The difficulty is a special case of a general question, the answer to which is independent of any issues about consciousness. So it's no part of a theory of consciousness to address the problem, much less solve it. Moreover, the difficulty seems to have intuitive force only given the picture that underlies the other two explanatory strategies, which both Natsoulas and I reject
Rosenthal, David & Weisberg, Josh (online). Higher-order theories of consciousness.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2000). Metacognition and higher-order thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought (HOT) hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis
Rosenthal, David M. (1993). Multiple drafts and higher-order thoughts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):911-18.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1995). Multiple drafts and the facts of the matter. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1995). Moore's paradox and consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 9:313-33.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1997). Perceptual and cognitive models of consciousness. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 45.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (1997). Phenomenal consciousness and what it's like. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 20 (1):64-65.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: be realized. Whatever gets access to phenomenal awareness (to consciousness and P-consciousness are almost always present or P-consciousness as described by Block) is represented within this absent together.
Rosenthal, David (online). Reflections on five questions: Autobiographical and disciplinary.   (Google)
Abstract: in Mind and Consciousness: Five Questions, ed. Patrick Grim, New York and London: Automatic Press, forthcoming
Rosenthal, David (online). “Replies to Galen Strawson and Ned Block.   (Google)
Abstract: (not intended for publication), Replies to Strawson and Block in Colloquium at the CUNY Graduate Center, December 13, 2006
Rosenthal, David M. (1994). State consciousness and transitive consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (3):355-63.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
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Abstract: I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry
Rosenthal, David M. (online). State consciousness and what it's like.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
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Rosenthal, David M. (2002). The higher-order model of consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.   (Google)
Abstract: All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not
Rosenthal, David M. (1991). The independence of consciousness and sensory quality. Philosophical Issues 1:15-36.   (Cited by 42 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David (online). The mind and its expression.   (Google)
Abstract: MS., for an Eastern Division APA Author-Meets-Critics Session on Dorit Bar-On, Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge, Baltimore, December 2007
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Abstract: Few contemporary researchers in psychology, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences have any doubt about whether mental phenomena occur without being conscious. There is extensive and convincing clinical and experimental evidence for the existence of thoughts, desires, and related mental states that aren’t conscious. We characterize thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, hopes, and many other mental states in terms of the things they are about and, more fully, in terms of their content, as captured by a sentence nominalization, such as a clause beginning with the word ‘that’. The philosophical literature follows Franz Brentano’s adaptation of Thomist terminology in referring to all such states as intentional states. But there is another type of mental phenomena, which lack intentionality and whose mental nature consists instead of some qualitative feature. These states include bodily sensations, such as aches and pains, and perceptual states, such as visual sensations of color and tactile sensations of heat and cold. And these states all exhibit some mental quality or another, such as the mental quality distinctive of pain or the mental quality of red or blue.1 And even theorists who acknowledge that intentional states can and do occur without being conscious have sometimes insisted that qualitative states cannot. There is, according to these theorists, nothing to a state’s being qualitative or exhibiting some mental quality unless that state is conscious – unless it is, as we might metaphorically say, “lighted up”. It’s striking that Freud himself seems to have adopted this double standard toward the two types of mental state. In his metapsychological paper, “The Unconscious”, for example, he writes that “all the categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions, and so forth, can be applied to [unconscious mental occurrences]” (Freud 1915e, p. 168). But he seems here to have in..
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Abstract: Higher Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness contend that consciousness can be explicated in terms of a relation between mental states of different
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Van Gulick, Robert (2000). Is the higher order of linguistic thought model of feeling adequate? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):218-219.   (Google)
Abstract: Despite its explanatory value, the “higher order linguistic thought” model comes up short as an account of the felt aspect of motivational states
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Abstract: The 'playful affirmation', as Uziel Awret calls it, turns into a joyful affirmation of a theoretical challenge in a philosophical space set up by the many questions concerning the nature of consciousness. This is especially because the 'Las Meninas and the search for self-representation' (Awret, this volume) has been written in the spirit of an interplay between different modes and approaches, and also the different philosophical traditions, for dealing with the 'enigma' it presents. Bringing Velasquez's Las Meninas into the bigger picture of consciousness studies means a change in methodological perspective. Not only does it support the idea so dear to the tradition of phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics of claiming back the truth value for the experience of work of art, but the author also succeeds in showing the relevance of this 'truth' to recent theoretical approaches to problems of representationalism and self-representation (like those of David Rosenthal, Robert Van Gulick, Bruce Mangan and Uriah Kriegel, for example)
Weisberg, Josh (1999). Active, thin, and HOT: An actualist response to Carruthers' dispositionalist HOT view. Psyche 5 (6).   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Carruthers proposes that for a mental state to be conscious (state consciousness), it must be present in a
Weisberg, Josh (2008). Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor. Synthese 160 (2):161-181.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy
Weisberg, Josh (forthcoming). Misrepresenting consciousness. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: An important objection to the “higher-order” theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the particular extrinsic characterization of the HO theory, the “transitivity principle,” against its intrinsic rivals, thereby showing that the misrepresentation objection conclusively falls short
Weisberg, Josh (2001). The appearance of unity: A higher-order interpretation of the unity of consciousness. Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Conference of The.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: subjective appearance of unity, but respects unity can be adequately dealt with by the theory. I the actual and potential disunity of the brain will close by briefly considering some worries about processes that underwrite consciousness. eliminativism that often accompany discussions of unity and consciousness
Wright, Wayne (2005). Distracted drivers and unattended experience. Synthese 144 (1):41-68.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consider the much-discussed case of the distracted driver, who is alleged to successfully navigate his car for miles despite being completely oblivious to his visual states. Perhaps he is deeply engrossed in the music playing over the radio or in philosophical reflection, and as a result he goes about unaware of the scene unfolding before him on the road. That the distracted driver has visual experiences of which he is not aware is a possibility that first-order representationalists (FOR) happily accept, but higher-order representationalists (HOR) steadfastly deny. HOR claims that perceptual states become conscious only as the object of higher-order states; perceptual states are not intrinsically conscious. According to HOR, since the driver is supposed to be completely distracted by other cognitive tasks, he cannot form higher-order representations of his visual states, with the result that those states are disqualified as experiences.1 HOR theories have come in two flavors, those that claim that the relevant higher-order representations are thought-like (HOT) and those that that rely on an inner perception-like mechanism that is directed toward one

1.4a.4 Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness

Brentano, Franz Clemens (1874). Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge.   (Google)
Brogaard, Berit (ms). Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing Themselves?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This is an excellent book, one of the best I have read on consciousness in recent years. It is rigorously argued and contains interesting suggestions as to how to solve the mystery of consciousness. Following the standard literature, Uriah Kriegel takes consciousness to be the "what it is like for me"-ness of conscious mental states. This is also what is sometimes called the 'phenomenal character' of conscious mental states. For Kriegel (as for Levine), phenomenal character has two components: qualitative character and subjective character. If I have a red experience, the phenomenal redness of my experience is the qualitative character of my experience, whereas the for-me-ness is the subjective character of the experience. Kriegel states that the qualitative character of conscious mental states is what makes the conscious mental state the kind of conscious experience it is, whereas the for-me-ness of the mental state is what makes the mental state a conscious state in the first place. The mystery of consciousness, he says, does not lie in the qualitative character of experience. According to him, the question of how brain processes can give rise to purely qualitative redness is no harder to answer than that of how physical matter can instantiate colors. The mystery of consciousness lies in the for-me-ness of conscious experience. Kriegel then goes on to give an account of the subjective character of
conscious mental states. He argues that the subjective character of conscious mental states
consists in the state representing itself. It's the self-representational nature of conscious mental
states that makes them conscious. The self-representational nature of conscious mental states is
a kind of peripheral awareness. If I have a red experience, I am focally aware of redness but I
am peripherally aware of the experience itself. Along the way Kriegel rebuts a number of
alternative theories of subjective character: among others, that it is a kind of primitive property
of conscious mental states, and that it is a representation of the conscious mental state by a
higher-order state. I agree with many of Kriegel's arguments against both the naive primitivist
view and the higher-order theoretical approach. My main concerns lie elsewhere. My three
main points of disagreement can be summarized as follows: (1) Assuming that it makes sense to
separate qualitative and subjective character I believe that the qualitative character of conscious
mental states is at least as mysterious as the subjective character. (2) I believe Uriah's theory is
at odds with plausible gradability theories of perception. (3) I am skeptical about the project of
developing a reductive metaphysical theory of consciousness in terms of self-representation.
Brook, Andrew & Raymont, Paul (forthcoming). A Unified Theory of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Brook, Andrew (2006). Kant: A unified representational base for all consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2005). Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 194 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness
Caston, Victor (2002). Aristotle on consciousness. Mind 111 (444):751-815.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive (On the Soul 3.2) has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher-order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to the first issue?the primary focus of this paper?he argues that consciousness is both intrinsic and higher-order, due to its reflexive nature. This, in turn, has consequences for the second issue, where again Aristotle seeks out the middle ground. He is committed against qualia in any strong sense of the term. Yet he also holds that the phenomenal quality of experience is not exhausted by its representational content
Caston, Victor (2006). Comment on Amie Thomasson's "self-awareness and self-knowledge". Psyche 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I raise an objection to Thomasson
Caston, Victor (2004). More on Aristotle on consciousness: Reply to Sisko. Mind 113 (451):523-533.   (Google | More links)
Coventry, Angela & Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Locke on consciousness. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25:221-242.   (Google)
Drummond, John J. (2006). The case(s) of (self-)awareness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Falk, Arthur E. (1995). Consciousness and self-reference. Erkenntnis 43 (2):151-80.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Fasching, Wolfgang (2009). The mineness of experience. Continental Philosophy Review 42 (2):131-148.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization. Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”, but should be conceived of as a dimension , namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences
Ganeri, Jonardon (1999). Self-intimation, memory and personal identity. Journal of Indian Philosophy 27 (5).   (Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2006). Between pure self-referentialism and the (extrinsic) HOT theory of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2007). Representationalism, peripheral awareness, and the transparency of experience. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal consciousness accompanied often (or even always) by inner peripheral (self-)awareness. My criticisms stem from both methodological and phenomenological considerations. In doing so, I offer a diagnosis as to why the fourth thesis has seemed true to so many and also show how the so-called "transparency of experience," frequently invoked by representationalists, is importantly relevant to my diagnosis. Finally, I respond to several objections and to further attempts to show that thesis four is true. What emerges is that if one wishes to hold that some form of self-awareness accompanies all outer-directed conscious states, one is better off holding that such self-awareness is itself unconscious, as is held for example by standard higher-order theories of consciousness.
Gerken, Mikkel (2008). Is there a simple argument for higher-order representation theories of awareness consciousness? Erkenntnis 69 (2):243-259.   (Google)
Abstract: William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation (SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I then provide a reconstruction of the argument and argue that although the reconstructed argument deserves consideration, it is also too simple as stated. In particular, it raises several controversial questions about the nature of mental representation. These questions must be addressed before a verdict as to the cogency of the HOR argument-strategy can be reached. But since the questions are controversial, a cogent argument for HOR theories of awareness consciousness is unlikely to be simple
Harman, Gilbert (2006). Self-reflexive thoughts. Philosophical Issues 16:334-345.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Alice has insomnia. She has trouble falling asleep and part of the problem is that she worries about it and realizes that her worrying about it tends to keep from falling asleep. It occurs to her that thinking that she will not be able to fall asleep may be a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Perhaps she even has a thought that might be expressed like this: I am not going to fall asleep because of my having this very thought. This thought (perhaps correctly) attributes to itself the property of keeping her awake
Hill, Christopher S. (2006). Harman on self referential thoughts. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):346-357.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. Moreover, I feel that it is extremely useful. Without deploying it, how could we tell the whole truth about the nature of thoughts?
Hill, Christopher S. (2006). Perceptual consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to itself. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Hofstadter, Douglas R. (2006). What is it like to be a strange loop? In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E.; Tienson, John L. & Graham, George (2006). Internal-world skepticism and mental self-presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Hossack, Keith (2002). Self-knowledge and consciousness. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102 (2):168-181.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Ismael, Jenann (2006). Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture. Psyche 12 (2).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self- representational accounts
Janzen, Greg (2006). Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the more refractory problems in contemporary discussions of consciousness is the problem of determining what a mental state's being conscious consists in. This paper defends the thesis that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has a certain reflexive character, i.e., if and only if it has a structure that includes an awareness (or consciousness) of itself. Since this thesis finds one of its clearest expressions in the work of Brentano, it is his treatment of the thesis on which I initially focus, though I subsequently bring in Sartre where he is required to improve on Brentano, i.e., where he addresses himself to an important point not considered by Brentano. As part of this investigation, the paper also, more specifically, aims to exhibit as perspicuously as possible the relationship between self-awareness and the phenomenal, or 'what-it- is-like', dimension of conscious experience. I attempt to show, in particular, that the phenomenal character of at least perceptual consciousness can be fully explained in terms of self- awareness, i.e., in terms of a low-level or 'implicit' self- awareness that is built into every conscious perceptual state
Janzen, Greg (2005). Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character. Dialogue 44 44:707-733.   (Google)
Kapitan, Tomis (1999). The ubiquity of self-awareness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 57:17-44.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Two claims have been prominent in recent discussions of self-consciousness. One is that first-person reference or first-person thinking is irreducible (the Irreducibility Thesis), and the other is that an awareness of self accompanies all conscious states, at least those through which one refers to something. The latter--here termed the Ubiquity Thesis--has long been associated with philosophers like Fichte, Brentano, and Sartre, though each articulated his own version of the claim. More recently, variants have been defended by Dieter Henrich (1970) and Manfred Frank (1991, 1995a, 1995b). In Frank's words
Kidd, Chad (forthcoming). Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2) a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure of inner-representational states
Kobes, Bernard W. (1995). Telic higher-order thoughts and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness. Consciousness & Cognition 16:897-912.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue for a specific account of consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness. According to this account, a mental state is conscious (i.e., intransitively self-conscious) iff it represents its own occurrence. The argument is a ?modernizing? modification of an older argument due to Aristotle and Brentano
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles. Synthese 134 (3):477-504.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is the peculiar self- awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. According to a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinct representation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-order content. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by M itself or by a differ- ent state. While the Neo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it is often felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the Neo- Brentanian and Higher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that the Neo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima facie preferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory.
Kriegel, Uriah (2002). Consciousness, permanent self-awareness, and higher-order monitoring. Dialogue 41 (3):517-540.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Intrinsic theory and the content of inner awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):169-196.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2004). Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief. Erkenntnis 61 (1):99-121.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2005). Naturalizing subjective character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract. When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this "bluish way it is like for me": (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth
Kriegel, Uriah (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71:23-57.   (Google)
Abstract: When I have an experience of the blue sky, there is a bluish it is like for me to have the experience. There are two components to this “bluish way it is like for me”: the bluish component, which I call qualitative character; and the for-me component, which I call subjective character. The paper examines six options for naturalizing subjective character.
Horgan, Terry & Kriegel, Uriah (2007). Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, self- knowledge has also encountered its share of skeptics – philosophers who refuse to accord it any descriptive, let alone normative, distinction. In this paper, we argue that there is at least one _species_ of self-knowledge that is different from, and better than, other knowledge. It is a specific kind of knowledge of one’s concurrent phenomenal experiences. Call knowledge of one’s own phenomenal experiences _phenomenal knowledge_. Our claim is that some (though not all) phenomenal knowledge is different from, and better than, non-phenomenal knowledge. In other
Kriegel, Uriah (forthcoming). Precis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a Precis of my book _Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory_. It does the usual.
Kriegel, Uriah (2009). Self-representationalism and phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism
Williford, Kenneth W. & Kriegel, Uriah (eds.) (2006). Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (forthcoming). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the self-representational theory of consciousness – self- representationalism for short – a mental state is phenomenally conscious when, and only when, it represents itself in the right way. In this paper, I consider how self- representationalism might address the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties. I open with a presentation of self- representationalism and the case for it (§1). I then present what I take to be the most promising self-representational approach to the explanatory gap (§2). That approach is threatened, however, by an objection to self-representationalism, due to Levine, which I call the just more representation objection (§3). I close with a discussion of how the self-representationalist might approach the objection (§4).
Kriegel, Uriah (2006). The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the promising approaches to the problem of consciousness has been the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory, a mental state M of a subject S is conscious iff S has another mental state, M*, such that M* is an appropriate representation of M. Recently, several philosophers have developed a Higher-Order Monitoring theory with a twist. The twist is that M and M* are construed as entertaining some kind of constitutive relation, rather than being logically independent of each other. We may call this the Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. In this paper, I discuss the nature of the Same-Order Monitoring Theory and argue for its superiority over the more traditional Higher-Order Monitoring Theory
Kriegel, Uriah (2009). Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The self-representational theory of consciousness -- Conceptual preliminaries -- A representational account of qualitative character -- A self-representational account of subjective character -- Self-representationalism and the phenomenology of consciousness -- Self-representationalism and the ontology of consciousness -- Self-representationalism and the science of consciousness -- Self-representationalism and the reduction of consciousness -- Appendix: phenomenal consciousness and subjective consciousness.
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Natsoulas, Thomas (2004). The case for intrinsic theory XI: A disagreement regarding the kind of feature inner awareness is. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (3):187-211.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2003). The case for intrinsic theory VIII: The experiential in acquiring knowledge firsthand of one's experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (3-4):289-316.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1999). The case for intrinsic theory IV: An argument from how conscious mental-occurrence instances seem. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (3):257-276.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (2001). The case for intrinsic theory V: Some arguments from James's varieties. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (1):41-67.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1996). The case for intrinsic theory: I. An introduction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 17 (3):267-286.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
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Olivier, Abraham (2003). When pains are mental objects. Philosophical Studies 115 (1):33-53.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In Why pains are not mental objects (1998) Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of experiencebecome a mental object. I shall finally argue that, thoughextreme pains cannot serve as paradigm cases, they do showthe general importance of taking pain states to be objects
Pasquerella, L. (2002). Phenomenology and intentional acts of sensing in Brentano. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40:269-279.   (Google)
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Raymont, Paul (online). From HOTs to self-representing states.   (Google)
Abstract: After briefly summarizing David Rosenthal
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Abstract: PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness
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Seager, William (2006). Is self-representation necessary for consciousness? Psyche 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to generate consciousness, but they do assert that they are necessary, at least in the sense that self-representation provides the most plausible mechanism for generating conscious mental states. I argue that a first-order approach to consciousness is equally capable of accounting for the putative features of consciousness which are supposed to favor the self-representational account. If nothing is gained the simplicity of the first-order theory counts in its favor. I also advance a speculative proposal that we are never aware of any distinctively mental attributes of our own states of consciousness except via an independent act of reflective conceptualization, although this goes rather farther than the first-order theory strictly requires
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Smith, David Woodruff (2005). Consciousness with reflexive content. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Thomasson, Amie L. (2000). After Brentano: A one-level theory of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):190-210.   (Google | More links)
Thompson, Brad J. (2006). Comments on Ismael's "double-mindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture?". Psyche 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Two general worries are raised for the dual content approach to consciousness as presented by Ismael in
Van Gulick, Robert (2004). Higher-order global states (hogs): An alternative higher-order model of consciousness. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
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Van Gulick, Robert (2006). Mirror, mirror -- is that all? In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different ways or respects, and to varying degrees. Thus the real questions of linkage must be posed more specifically. We need to ask not whether the two are bound in general, but whether and how being conscious in some specific sense and degree relates to some particular sort of self-awareness. Only those more specific questions are likely to have fully determinate answers
Weisberg, Josh (2008). Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor. Synthese 160 (2):161-181.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy
Weisberg, Josh (forthcoming). Misrepresenting consciousness. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: An important objection to the “higher-order” theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the particular extrinsic characterization of the HO theory, the “transitivity principle,” against its intrinsic rivals, thereby showing that the misrepresentation objection conclusively falls short
Wider, Kathleen (2006). Emotion and self-consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
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Williford, Kenneth Wayne, The structure of self-consciousness: A phenomenological and philosophical investigation.   (Google)
Williford, Kenneth (2006). The self-representational structure of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Williford, Kenneth (2006). Zahavi versus Brentano: A rejoinder. Psyche 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Dan Zahavi has argued persuasively that some versions of self- representationalism are implausible on phenomenological and dialectical grounds: they fail to make sense of primitive self-knowledge and lead to an infinite regress. Zahavi proposes an alternative view of ubiquitous prereflective self-consciousness
Zahavi, Dan (2004). Back to Brentano? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):66-87.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a (neo-)Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis - cussed. It will be argued that it can con trib ute impor tant insights to our under - stand ing of the rela tion between con scious ness and self-aware ness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some prob lems, and that it will ulti mately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the look out for prom is ing alter na tives to the higher-order the o ries, than to return all the way to Brentano
Zahavi, Dan (2006). Thinking about consciousness: Phenomenological perspectives. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zahavi, Dan (2006). Two takes on a one-level account of consciousness. Psyche 12 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differences