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Philosophy of Consciousness :: Specific Views on Consciousness :: Higher-Order Thought Approaches

See also:
Allen, Colin (online). Evolving phenomenal consciousness. (Google | More links | View replies | View target article(s))
Aquila, Richard E. (1990). Consciousness as higher-order thoughts: Two objections. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):81-87. (Cited by 6 | Google | Annotation)
Balog, Katalin (2000). Comments on David Rosenthal's "consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219. (Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (online). Commentary on Carruthers' Phenomenal Consciousness. (Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Bermudez, Jose Luis (online). Properties, first-order representationalism and reinforcement: Reply to Carruthers. (Google | View target article(s))
Browne, Derek (1999). Carruthers on the deficits of animals. Psyche 5 (23). (Cited by 4 | Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Byrne, Alex (2001). Review of Phenomenal Consciousness, by Peter Carruthers. Mind 110:1057-62. (Google)
Byrne, Alex (1997). Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts. Philosophical Studies 2 (2):103-29. (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (2004). What phenomenal consciousness is like. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Campbell Manson, Neil (2002). What does language tell us about consciousness? First-person mental discourse and higher-order thought theories of consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):221 – 238. (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (1989). Brute experience. Journal of Philosophy 258 (May):258-269. (Cited by 44 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Carruthers, Peter (1992). Consciousness and concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement 66 (66):41-59. (Cited by 60 | Google | Annotation)
Carruthers, Peter (2005). Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2001). Consciousness: Explaining the phenomena. In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (1997). Fragmentary versus reflexive consciousness. Mind and Language 12 (2):181-95. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2004). Hop over FOR, HOT theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2007). Higher-order theories of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Carruthers, Peter (1996). Language, Thought, and Consciousness. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 318 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (1998). Natural theories of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):203-22. (Cited by 27 | Google | More links | View replies)
Carruthers, Peter (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 194 | Google | More links | View replies)
Carruthers, Peter (online). Precis of Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. (Google | View replies)
Carruthers, Peter (2000). Replies to critics: Explaining subjectivity. Psyche 6 (3). (Cited by 4 | Google | View target article(s))
Carruthers, Peter (online). Reply to Colin Allen. (Google | More links | View target article(s))
Carruthers, Peter (online). Reply to josé Luis bermúdez. (Google | More links | View replies | View target article(s))
Carruthers, Peter (online). Reply to Joe Levine. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links | View target article(s))
Carruthers, Peter (online). Reply to Seager. (Google | More links | View target article(s))
Cavalieri, Paola & Miller, Harlan B. (1999). Automata, receptacles, and selves. Psyche 5 (24). (Cited by 2 | Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Cole, David J. (online). Sense and sentience. (Google)
Copenhaver, Rebecca (online). Reid on consciousness: Hop, HOT or FOR? (Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1995). Are experiences conscious? In Fred Dretske (ed.), Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press. (Google | Annotation)
Dretske, Fred (1993). Conscious experience. Mind 102 (406):263-283. (Cited by 141 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Dulany, Donelson E. (2004). Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Google)
Francescotti, Robert M. (1995). Higher-order thoughts and conscious experience. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):239-254. (Cited by 4 | Google | Annotation)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (1993). Brute experience and the higher-order thought theory of consciousness. Philosophical Papers 22 (1):51-69. (Cited by 6 | Google | Annotation)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (1996). Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. John Benjamins. (Cited by 51 | Google | More links)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2000). Fiction, pleasurable tragedy, and the HOT theory of consciousness. Philosophical Papers 29 (2):107-20. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2004). Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation: A reply to Carruthers and Levine. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (ed.) (2004). Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.. (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2004). Higher-order theories of consciousness: An overview. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. John Benjamin. (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2004). Higher-order theories of consciousness. In Rocco J Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2002). Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT theory of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):293-330. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2003). Papineau on the actualist HOT theory of consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):581-586. (Google | More links)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2005). The HOT theory of consciousness: Between a rock and a hard place. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):3-21. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Guzeldere, Guven (1996). Consciousness and the introspective link principle. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press. (Google)
Guzeldere, Guven (1995). Is consciousness the perception of what passes in one's own mind? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 42 | Google | Annotation)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2004). HOT theories of consciousness: More sad tales of philosophical intuitions gone astray. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Google)
Hellie, Benj (2007). Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance. Philosophical Studies 134 (3). (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Jacob, Pierre (1996). State consciousness revisited. Acta Analytica 11 (16):29-54. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jamieson, Dale W. & Bekoff, Marc (1992). Carruthers on nonconscious experience. Analysis 52 (1):23-28. (Cited by 12 | Google | Annotation)
Jehle, D. & Kriegel, Uriah (2006). An argument against dispositionalist HOT. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):463-476. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Krause, Mark A. & Burghardt, Gordon M. (1999). Access to another mind: Naturalistic theories require naturalistic data. Psyche 5 (32). (Cited by 2 | Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Lagerspetz, Olli (2002). In the industry. Inquiry 45 (4):541-559. (Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph M. (online). Commentary on Carruthers' Phenomenal Consciousness. (Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Lurz, Robert W. (2000). A defense of first-order representationalist theories of mental-state consciousness. Psyche 6 (1). (Cited by 3 | Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Lurz, Robert W. (2003). Advancing the debate between HOT and FO accounts of consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:23-44. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lurz, Robert W. (2001). Begging the question: A reply to Lycan. Analysis 61 (4):313-318. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Lurz, Robert W. (2004). Either FOR or HOR: A false dichotomy. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. (Google)
Lurz, Robert W. (2003). Neither hot nor cold: An alternative account of consciousness. Psyche 8 (1). (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1999). A response to Carruthers' Natural Theories of Consciousness. Psyche 5 (11). (Cited by 4 | Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Lycan, William G. (2001). A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness. Analysis 61 (1):3-4. (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1995). Consciousness as internal monitoring. Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14. (Cited by 44 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Lycan, William G. & Ryder, Z. (2003). The loneliness of the long-distance truck-driver. Analysis 63 (2):132-36. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)