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1.4a.4. Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness (Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Brentano, Franz Clemens (1874). Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge.   (Google)
Brogaard, Berit (ms). Are conscious states conscious in virtue of representing Themselves?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This is an excellent book, one of the best I have read on consciousness in recent years. It is rigorously argued and contains interesting suggestions as to how to solve the mystery of consciousness. Following the standard literature, Uriah Kriegel takes consciousness to be the "what it is like for me"-ness of conscious mental states. This is also what is sometimes called the 'phenomenal character' of conscious mental states. For Kriegel (as for Levine), phenomenal character has two components: qualitative character and subjective character. If I have a red experience, the phenomenal redness of my experience is the qualitative character of my experience, whereas the for-me-ness is the subjective character of the experience. Kriegel states that the qualitative character of conscious mental states is what makes the conscious mental state the kind of conscious experience it is, whereas the for-me-ness of the mental state is what makes the mental state a conscious state in the first place. The mystery of consciousness, he says, does not lie in the qualitative character of experience. According to him, the question of how brain processes can give rise to purely qualitative redness is no harder to answer than that of how physical matter can instantiate colors. The mystery of consciousness lies in the for-me-ness of conscious experience. Kriegel then goes on to give an account of the subjective character of
conscious mental states. He argues that the subjective character of conscious mental states
consists in the state representing itself. It's the self-representational nature of conscious mental
states that makes them conscious. The self-representational nature of conscious mental states is
a kind of peripheral awareness. If I have a red experience, I am focally aware of redness but I
am peripherally aware of the experience itself. Along the way Kriegel rebuts a number of
alternative theories of subjective character: among others, that it is a kind of primitive property
of conscious mental states, and that it is a representation of the conscious mental state by a
higher-order state. I agree with many of Kriegel's arguments against both the naive primitivist
view and the higher-order theoretical approach. My main concerns lie elsewhere. My three
main points of disagreement can be summarized as follows: (1) Assuming that it makes sense to
separate qualitative and subjective character I believe that the qualitative character of conscious
mental states is at least as mysterious as the subjective character. (2) I believe Uriah's theory is
at odds with plausible gradability theories of perception. (3) I am skeptical about the project of
developing a reductive metaphysical theory of consciousness in terms of self-representation.
Brook, Andrew & Raymont, Paul (forthcoming). A Unified Theory of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Brook, Andrew (2006). Kant: A unified representational base for all consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter (2005). Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2000). Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 194 | Google | More links)
Abstract: How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness
Caston, Victor (2002). Aristotle on consciousness. Mind 111 (444):751-815.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive (On the Soul 3.2) has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher-order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to the first issue?the primary focus of this paper?he argues that consciousness is both intrinsic and higher-order, due to its reflexive nature. This, in turn, has consequences for the second issue, where again Aristotle seeks out the middle ground. He is committed against qualia in any strong sense of the term. Yet he also holds that the phenomenal quality of experience is not exhausted by its representational content
Caston, Victor (2006). Comment on Amie Thomasson's "self-awareness and self-knowledge". Psyche 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I raise an objection to Thomasson
Caston, Victor (2004). More on Aristotle on consciousness: Reply to Sisko. Mind 113 (451):523-533.   (Google | More links)
Coventry, Angela & Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Locke on consciousness. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25:221-242.   (Google)
Drummond, John J. (2006). The case(s) of (self-)awareness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Falk, Arthur E. (1995). Consciousness and self-reference. Erkenntnis 43 (2):151-80.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Fasching, Wolfgang (2009). The mineness of experience. Continental Philosophy Review 42 (2):131-148.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization. Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”, but should be conceived of as a dimension , namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences
Ganeri, Jonardon (1999). Self-intimation, memory and personal identity. Journal of Indian Philosophy 27 (5).   (Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2006). Between pure self-referentialism and the (extrinsic) HOT theory of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J. (2007). Representationalism, peripheral awareness, and the transparency of experience. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal consciousness accompanied often (or even always) by inner peripheral (self-)awareness. My criticisms stem from both methodological and phenomenological considerations. In doing so, I offer a diagnosis as to why the fourth thesis has seemed true to so many and also show how the so-called "transparency of experience," frequently invoked by representationalists, is importantly relevant to my diagnosis. Finally, I respond to several objections and to further attempts to show that thesis four is true. What emerges is that if one wishes to hold that some form of self-awareness accompanies all outer-directed conscious states, one is better off holding that such self-awareness is itself unconscious, as is held for example by standard higher-order theories of consciousness.
Gerken, Mikkel (2008). Is there a simple argument for higher-order representation theories of awareness consciousness? Erkenntnis 69 (2):243-259.   (Google)
Abstract: William Lycan has articulated “a simple argument” for higher-order representation (HOR) theories of a variety of consciousness sometimes labeled ‘awareness consciousness’ (Lycan, Analysis 61.1, January 3–4, 2001). The purpose of this article is to critically assess the influential argument-strategy of the simple argument. I argue that, as stated, the simple argument fails since it is invalid. Moreover, I argue that an obvious “quick fix” would beg the question against competing same-order representation (SOR) theories of awareness consciousness. I then provide a reconstruction of the argument and argue that although the reconstructed argument deserves consideration, it is also too simple as stated. In particular, it raises several controversial questions about the nature of mental representation. These questions must be addressed before a verdict as to the cogency of the HOR argument-strategy can be reached. But since the questions are controversial, a cogent argument for HOR theories of awareness consciousness is unlikely to be simple
Harman, Gilbert (2006). Self-reflexive thoughts. Philosophical Issues 16:334-345.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Alice has insomnia. She has trouble falling asleep and part of the problem is that she worries about it and realizes that her worrying about it tends to keep from falling asleep. It occurs to her that thinking that she will not be able to fall asleep may be a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Perhaps she even has a thought that might be expressed like this: I am not going to fall asleep because of my having this very thought. This thought (perhaps correctly) attributes to itself the property of keeping her awake
Hill, Christopher S. (2006). Harman on self referential thoughts. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):346-357.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. Moreover, I feel that it is extremely useful. Without deploying it, how could we tell the whole truth about the nature of thoughts?
Hill, Christopher S. (2006). Perceptual consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to itself. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Hofstadter, Douglas R. (2006). What is it like to be a strange loop? In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E.; Tienson, John L. & Graham, George (2006). Internal-world skepticism and mental self-presentation. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Hossack, Keith (2002). Self-knowledge and consciousness. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102 (2):168-181.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Ismael, Jenann (2006). Doublemindedness: A model for a dual content cognitive architecture. Psyche 12 (2).   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The outstanding stumbling blocks to any reductive account of phenomenal consciousness remain the subjectivity of phenomenal properties and cognitive and epistemic gaps that plague the relationship between physical and phenomenal properties. I suggest that a deflationary interpretation of both is available to defenders of self- representational accounts
Janzen, Greg (2006). Phenomenal character as implicit self-awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the more refractory problems in contemporary discussions of consciousness is the problem of determining what a mental state's being conscious consists in. This paper defends the thesis that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has a certain reflexive character, i.e., if and only if it has a structure that includes an awareness (or consciousness) of itself. Since this thesis finds one of its clearest expressions in the work of Brentano, it is his treatment of the thesis on which I initially focus, though I subsequently bring in Sartre where he is required to improve on Brentano, i.e., where he addresses himself to an important point not considered by Brentano. As part of this investigation, the paper also, more specifically, aims to exhibit as perspicuously as possible the relationship between self-awareness and the phenomenal, or 'what-it- is-like', dimension of conscious experience. I attempt to show, in particular, that the phenomenal character of at least perceptual consciousness can be fully explained in terms of self- awareness, i.e., in terms of a low-level or 'implicit' self- awareness that is built into every conscious perceptual state
Janzen, Greg (2005). Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character. Dialogue 44 44:707-733.   (Google)
Kapitan, Tomis (1999). The ubiquity of self-awareness. Grazer Philosophische Studien 57:17-44.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Two claims have been prominent in recent discussions of self-consciousness. One is that first-person reference or first-person thinking is irreducible (the Irreducibility Thesis), and the other is that an awareness of self accompanies all conscious states, at least those through which one refers to something. The latter--here termed the Ubiquity Thesis--has long been associated with philosophers like Fichte, Brentano, and Sartre, though each articulated his own version of the claim. More recently, variants have been defended by Dieter Henrich (1970) and Manfred Frank (1991, 1995a, 1995b). In Frank's words
Kidd, Chad (forthcoming). Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue against the claim recently defended by Josh Weisberg that a certain version of the self-representational approach to phenomenal consciousness cannot avoid a set of problems that have plagued higher-order approaches. These problems arise specifically for theories that allow for higher-order misrepresentation or—in the domain of self-representational theories—self-misrepresentation. In response to Weisberg, I articulate a self-representational theory of phenomenal consciousness according to which it is contingently impossible for self-representations tokened in the context of a conscious mental state to misrepresent their objects. This contingent infallibility allows the theory to both acknowledge the (logical) possibility of self-misrepresentation and avoid the problems of self-misrepresentation. Expanding further on Weisberg’s work, I consider and reveal the shortcomings of three other self-representational models—put forward by Kreigel, Van Gulick, and Gennaro—in order to show that each indicates the need for this sort of infallibility. I then argue that contingent infallibility is in principle acceptable on naturalistic grounds only if we attribute (1) a neo-Fregean kind of directly referring, indexical content to self-representational mental states and (2) a certain ontological structure to the complex conscious mental states of which these indexical self-representations are a part. In these sections I draw on ideas from the work of Perry and Kaplan to articulate the context-dependent semantic structure of inner-representational states
Kobes, Bernard W. (1995). Telic higher-order thoughts and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Perspectives 9:291-312.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2007). A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness. Consciousness & Cognition 16:897-912.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: b>. One major problem many hypotheses regarding the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) face is what we might call “the why question”: _why _would this particular neural feature, rather than another, correlate with consciousness? The purpose of the present paper is to develop an NCC hypothesis that answers this question. The proposed hypothesis is inspired by the Cross-Order Integration (COI) theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness arises from the functional integration of a first-order representation of an external stimulus and a second-order representation of that first-order representation. The proposal comes in two steps. The first step concerns the “general shape” of the NCC and can be directly derived from COI theory. The second step is a concrete hypothesis that can be arrived at by combining the general shape with empirical considerations
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):103-132.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The word ?consciousness? is notoriously ambiguous. This is mainly because it is not a term of art, but a mundane word we all use quite frequently, for different purposes and in different everyday contexts. In this paper, I discuss consciousness in one specific sense of the word. To avoid the ambiguities, I introduce a term of art ? intransitive self-consciousness ? and suggest that this form of self-consciousness is an essential component of the folk notion of consciousness. I then argue for a specific account of consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness. According to this account, a mental state is conscious (i.e., intransitively self-conscious) iff it represents its own occurrence. The argument is a ?modernizing? modification of an older argument due to Aristotle and Brentano
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles. Synthese 134 (3):477-504.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is the peculiar self- awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. According to a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinct representation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-order content. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by M itself or by a differ- ent state. While the Neo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it is often felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the Neo- Brentanian and Higher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that the Neo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima facie preferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory.
Kriegel, Uriah (2002). Consciousness, permanent self-awareness, and higher-order monitoring. Dialogue 41 (3):517-540.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Intrinsic theory and the content of inner awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):169-196.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2004). Moore's paradox and the structure of conscious belief. Erkenntnis 61 (1):99-121.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2005). Naturalizing subjective character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Abstract. When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this "bluish way it is like for me": (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for-me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for-me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for-me-ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth
Kriegel, Uriah (2005). Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71:23-57.   (Google)
Abstract: When I have an experience of the blue sky, there is a bluish it is like for me to have the experience. There are two components to this “bluish way it is like for me”: the bluish component, which I call qualitative character; and the for-me component, which I call subjective character. The paper examines six options for naturalizing subjective character.
Horgan, Terry & Kriegel, Uriah (2007). Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, self- knowledge has also encountered its share of skeptics – philosophers who refuse to accord it any descriptive, let alone normative, distinction. In this paper, we argue that there is at least one _species_ of self-knowledge that is different from, and better than, other knowledge. It is a specific kind of knowledge of one’s concurrent phenomenal experiences. Call knowledge of one’s own phenomenal experiences _phenomenal knowledge_. Our claim is that some (though not all) phenomenal knowledge is different from, and better than, non-phenomenal knowledge. In other
Kriegel, Uriah (forthcoming). Precis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a Precis of my book _Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory_. It does the usual.
Kriegel, Uriah (2009). Self-representationalism and phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state M is phenomenally conscious just in case M represents itself in the appropriate way. Proponents of self-representationalism seem to think that the phenomenology of ordinary conscious experience is on their side, but opponents seem to think the opposite. In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism
Williford, Kenneth W. & Kriegel, Uriah (eds.) (2006). Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (forthcoming). Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. In J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the self-representational theory of consciousness – self- representationalism for short – a mental state is phenomenally conscious when, and only when, it represents itself in the right way. In this paper, I consider how self- representationalism might address the alleged explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties. I open with a presentation of self- representationalism and the case for it (§1). I then present what I take to be the most promising self-representational approach to the explanatory gap (§2). That approach is threatened, however, by an objection to self-representationalism, due to Levine, which I call the just more representation objection (§3). I close with a discussion of how the self-representationalist might approach the objection (§4).
Kriegel, Uriah (2006). The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the promising approaches to the problem of consciousness has been the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring Theory, a mental state M of a subject S is conscious iff S has another mental state, M*, such that M* is an appropriate representation of M. Recently, several philosophers have developed a Higher-Order Monitoring theory with a twist. The twist is that M and M* are construed as entertaining some kind of constitutive relation, rather than being logically independent of each other. We may call this the Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. In this paper, I discuss the nature of the Same-Order Monitoring Theory and argue for its superiority over the more traditional Higher-Order Monitoring Theory
Kriegel, Uriah (2009). Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The self-representational theory of consciousness -- Conceptual preliminaries -- A representational account of qualitative character -- A self-representational account of subjective character -- Self-representationalism and the phenomenology of consciousness -- Self-representationalism and the ontology of consciousness -- Self-representationalism and the science of consciousness -- Self-representationalism and the reduction of consciousness -- Appendix: phenomenal consciousness and subjective consciousness.
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Abstract: The notion of ‘givenness of consciousness’ needs further elucidation. On the one hand, I agree with Lyyra (this volume) that one sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’ is not enough to account for consciousness and self-consciousness. On the other hand, I will argue that Lyyra’s paper is problematic precisely because he fails to consider one basic sense for ‘givenness of consciousness’. Lyyra and I thus agree that there must be (at least) two senses for ‘givenness of consciousness’; we disagree, however about which modes of givenness are involved
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Abstract: After briefly summarizing David Rosenthal
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Abstract: PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness
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Abstract: Brook and Raymont do not assert that self-representing representations are sufficient to generate consciousness, but they do assert that they are necessary, at least in the sense that self-representation provides the most plausible mechanism for generating conscious mental states. I argue that a first-order approach to consciousness is equally capable of accounting for the putative features of consciousness which are supposed to favor the self-representational account. If nothing is gained the simplicity of the first-order theory counts in its favor. I also advance a speculative proposal that we are never aware of any distinctively mental attributes of our own states of consciousness except via an independent act of reflective conceptualization, although this goes rather farther than the first-order theory strictly requires
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Abstract: Two general worries are raised for the dual content approach to consciousness as presented by Ismael in
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Van Gulick, Robert (2006). Mirror, mirror -- is that all? In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: Consciousness and self-awareness seem intuitively linked, but how they intertwine is less than clear. Must one be self-aware in order to be consciousness? Indeed, is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness? Or perhaps it is the other way round: Is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? Discerning their connections is complicated by the fact that both the main relata themselves admit of many diverse forms and levels. One might be conscious or self- aware in many different ways or respects, and to varying degrees. Thus the real questions of linkage must be posed more specifically. We need to ask not whether the two are bound in general, but whether and how being conscious in some specific sense and degree relates to some particular sort of self-awareness. Only those more specific questions are likely to have fully determinate answers
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Abstract: The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them--the theory 'divides the phenomenal labor' in an illicit fashion. This 'failure of intimacy' is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy
Weisberg, Josh (forthcoming). Misrepresenting consciousness. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: An important objection to the “higher-order” theory of consciousness turns on the possibility of higher-order misrepresentation. I argue that the objection fails because it illicitly assumes a characterization of consciousness explicitly rejected by HO theory. This in turn raises the question of what justifies an initial characterization of the data a theory of consciousness must explain. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic characterizations of consciousness, and I propose several desiderata a successful characterization of consciousness must meet. I then defend the particular extrinsic characterization of the HO theory, the “transitivity principle,” against its intrinsic rivals, thereby showing that the misrepresentation objection conclusively falls short
Wider, Kathleen (2006). Emotion and self-consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
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Williford, Kenneth (2006). The self-representational structure of consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Williford, Kenneth (2006). Zahavi versus Brentano: A rejoinder. Psyche 12 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Dan Zahavi has argued persuasively that some versions of self- representationalism are implausible on phenomenological and dialectical grounds: they fail to make sense of primitive self-knowledge and lead to an infinite regress. Zahavi proposes an alternative view of ubiquitous prereflective self-consciousness
Zahavi, Dan (2004). Back to Brentano? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):66-87.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a (neo-)Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis - cussed. It will be argued that it can con trib ute impor tant insights to our under - stand ing of the rela tion between con scious ness and self-aware ness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some prob lems, and that it will ulti mately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the look out for prom is ing alter na tives to the higher-order the o ries, than to return all the way to Brentano
Zahavi, Dan (2006). Thinking about consciousness: Phenomenological perspectives. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Zahavi, Dan (2006). Two takes on a one-level account of consciousness. Psyche 12 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differences