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1.4f. Dualism about Consciousness (Dualism about Consciousness on PhilPapers)

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Aranyosi, Istvan A. (2005). Type-A Dualism: A Novel Theory of the Mental-Physical Nexus. Dissertation, Central European University   (Google)
Banerjee, R.; Bhattacharya, A.; Genc, A. & Arora, B. M. (2006). Structure of twins in gaas nanowires grown by the vapour-liquid-solid process. Philosophical Magazine Letters 86 (12):807-816.   (Google | More links)
Bennett, Karen (ms). 1. dualism.   (Google)
Abstract: Dualists think that not all the facts are physical facts. They think that there are facts about phenomenal consciousness2 that cannot be explained in purely physical terms—facts about what it’s like to see red, what it’s like to feel sandpaper, what it’s like to run 10 miles when it’s 15° F out, and so on. These phenomenal facts are genuine ‘extras’, not fixed by the physical facts and the physical laws. To use the standard metaphor: even after God settled the physical facts and laws, he had more work to do to put the phenomenal facts in place. Some dualists think that the additional work involves the creation of a special kind of nonphysical substance. More common these days are dualists who think that the additional work merely involves the creation and positioning of special nonphysical properties, and that is the only form of dualism that I will be explicitly concerned with here. The property dualist’s claim is that phenomenal properties, or at least protophenomenal properties, are among the basic furniture of the world
Bennett, Karen (ms). Why I am not a dualist.   (Google)
Birkett, Kirsten (2006). Conscious objections: God and the consciousness debates. Zygon 41 (2):249-266.   (Google | More links)
Bricke, John (1973). The attribute theory of mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (December):226-237.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Chakraborti, Chhanda (2002). Metaphysics of consciousness, and David Chalmers's property dualism. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):59-84.   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (2007). Naturalistic dualism. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dietrich, Eric (1999). Fodor's gloom, or what does it mean that dualism seems true? Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 11 (2):145-152.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Any time you have philosophers working on a problem, you know you’ve got troubles. If a question has attracted the attention of the philosophers that means that either it is intractably difficult with convolutions and labyrinthine difficulties that would make other researchers blanch, or that it is just flat out impossible to solve. Impossible problems masquerade as intractable problems until someone either proves the problem is impossible (which can only happen in mathematics), or someone shows all solutions to the problem violate laws of physics (like the perpetual motion machine, for example), or until enough people fail so that declaring defeat is a reasonable move. The problem of consciousness is prototypical of this latter case. Indeed, one might say that it is the Platonic ideal of such a problem. The mere fact that philosophers wrestle with the problem of consciousness should be regarded by psychologists of all stripes as extremely bad news. If the philosophers can’t make any headway, psychologists are doomed
Dilley, Frank B. (2004). Taking consciousness seriously: A defense of cartesian dualism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (3):135-153.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Eccles, John C. (1987). Brain and mind: Two or one? In Colin Blakemore & Susan A. Greenfield (eds.), Mindwaves. Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Foster, John A. (1989). A defense of dualism. In J. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Göcke, Benedikt Paul (2009). From Physicalism to Theological Idealism. In Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.), Gehirne und Personen. ontos.   (Google)
Abstract: In the first part elements and entailments of an adequate thesis of physicalism are presented. In the second part an argument against these is elaborated. Based on this argument a thesis of theological idealism is sketched.
Goldstein, Irwin (1996). Ontology, epistemology, and private ostensive definition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):137-147.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: People see five kinds of views in epistemology and ontology as hinging on there being words a person can learn only by private ostensive definitions, through direct acquaintance with his own sensations: skepticism about other minds, 2. skepticism about an external world, 3. foundationalism, 4. dualism, and 5. phenomenalism. People think Wittgenstein refuted these views by showing, they believe, no word is learnable only by private ostensive definition. I defend these five views from Wittgenstein’s attack.
Grigg, Rowan (ms). Longing for Integration.   (Google)
Abstract: A lighthearted look at some big themes in metaphysics and epistemology
Honderich, Ted (1981). Nomological dualism: Reply to four critics. Inquiry 24 (December):419-438.   (Google)
Abstract: Three theses about the mind, when conjoined with a certain understanding of lawlike connection, escape the objection that they constitute an epiphenomenalism and so conflict with our conviction of the efficacy of the mental. Certain alternatives to the given picture of the mind, one of them an Identity Theory, are in various respects less defensible. The given picture can be defended against considerations deriving from a contextual conception of the mental, and from an elaborated objection having to do with the holism of the mental. The Identity Theory mentioned above appears to be inconsistent, and a further picture of the mind, with very different presuppositions, has the disability among others that it does not provide for mental efficacy. Also, the presuppositions raise great problems
Honderich, Ted (1981). Psychophysical law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24 (October):277-303.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Kind, Amy (2005). The irreducibility of consciousness. Disputatio 1 (19).   (Google)
Lahav, Ran & Shanks, N. (1992). How to be a scientifically respectable 'property dualist'. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):211-32.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Latham, Noa (1998). Chalmers on the addition of consciousness to the physical world. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):71-97.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Lowe, E. J. (2005). Uwe Meixner, the two sides of being: A reassessment of psycho-physical dualism, paderborn, mentis, 2004, 486 pp. ISBN: 3-89785-376-. Erkenntnis 62 (2).   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (2007). Recent naturalistic dualisms. In E. Meyers, R. Styers & A. Lange (eds.), Light Against Darkness: Dualism in Ancient Mediterranean Religion and the Contemporary World. Brill Academic Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper is about a certain family of philosophical positions on the mind-body problem. The positions are dualist, but only in a minimal sense of that term employed by philosophers: according to the positions in question, mental entities are immaterial and distinct from all physical things
Macpherson, Fiona (2006). Property dualism and the merits of solutions to the mind-body problem: A reply to Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):72-89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view on the mind much like one plausible interpretation of Locke's position. Strawson's use of terminology cloaks this fact and he does not himself explicitly recognize it in his paper. In the second section, I outline some of Strawson's assumptions that he uses in arguing for his position. I comment on the plausibility of his position concerning the relation of the mind to the body compared with mainstream physicalism and various forms of dualism. Before embarking on the two main sections, in the remainder of this introduction, I very briefly sketch Strawson's view
McGinn, Colin (1993). Consciousness and cosmology: Hyperdualism ventilated. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Meixner, Uwe (2004). The Two Sides of Being: A Reassessment of Psychophysical Dualism. Mentis.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Molenaar, Peter C. M. (2006). Psychophysical dualism from the point of view of a working psychologist. Erkenntnis 65 (1):47-69.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Cognitive neuroscience constitutes the third phase of development of the field of cognitive psychophysiology since it was established about half a century ago. A critical historical overview is given of this development, focusing on recurring problems that keep frustrating great expectations. It is argued that psychology has to regain its independent status with respect to cognitive neuroscience and should take psychophysical dualism seriously. A constructive quantum physical model for psychophysical interaction is presented, based on a new stochastic interpretation of the quantum potential in the de Broglie
Pauen, Michael (2000). Painless pain: Property dualism and the causal role of phenomenal consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1):51-64.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Ross, Don (2005). Chalmers's Naturalistic Dualism: The Irrelevance of the Mind-Body Problem to the Scientific Study of Consciousness. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rosenberg, Jay F. (1988). On not knowing what or who one is: Reflections on the intelligibility of dualism. Topoi 7 (March):57-63.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Smook, Roger (1988). Egoicity and twins. Dialogue 27:277-86.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Smythies, J. R. & Beloff, John (eds.) (1989). The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1994). Consciousness. Synthese 98 (1):73-93.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Steinberg, Jesse R. & Steinberg, Alan M. (2007). Disembodied minds and the problem of identification and individuation. Philosophia 35 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   We consider and reject a variety of attempts to provide a ground for identifying and differentiating disembodied minds. Until such a ground is provided, we must withhold inclusion of disembodied minds from our picture of the world
Strong, Charles A. (1934). A plea for substantialism in psychology. Journal of Philosophy 31 (12):309-328.   (Google | More links)
Taliaferro, Charles (1996). Consciousness and the Mind of God. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book defends a nonmaterialistic view of persons and subjectivity and the intelligibility of thinking of God as a nonphysical, spiritual reality.
Taliaferro, Charles (2001). Emergentism and consciousness: Going beyond property dualism. In Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Weslake, Brad, Review of understanding phenomenal consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent philosophy of mind, epiphenomenalism—that strain of dualism according to which the mind is caused by the body but does not cause the body in turn—has undergone something of a renaissance. Contemporary epiphenomenalists bear only partial resemblance to their more extravagantly metaphysical ancestors, however. Traditional epiphenomenalists thought that (at least) two sorts of mental properties were epiphenomenal—intentional properties such as the meaning or representational content of the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires and so on); and conscious properties such as awareness and the qualitative nature of experience. Contemporary epiphenomenalists, on the other hand, are largely sanguine about the prospects for intentionality to be brought within the purview of a physicalist worldview; what forces their dualism is one particular feature of consciousness—what irks them are qualia, the..
Wetherick, Norman E. (1992). Velmans on consciousness, brain and the physical world. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):159-161.   (Cited by 1 | Google)