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1.4g. Panpsychism (Panpsychism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Armstrong, Susan (2006). For love of matter: A contemporary panpsychism. Environmental Ethics 28 (1):99-102.   (Google)
Arp, Robert (2007). Consciousness and awareness - switched-on rheostats: A response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3):101-106.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I question whether it is completely accurate to think of the philosophical meaning of consciousness as being switched-on or switched-off. It may be that, once consciousness is switched-on, it is then found in degrees in animals we deem conscious. In which case, consciousness is more like a switched-on rheostat, rather than a simple on-off switch. Christian de Quincey (2006) gives a list of what would be considered the marks of consciousness, including 'experience, subjectivity, sentience, feeling, or mentality of any kind'. He also seems to conflate awareness with experience when speaking about the light of consciousness being on. In keeping with de Quincey's desire to get clear about the meaning of consciousness, I will put forward an idea of consciousness as the experience of oneself as a being subject to past, present, and future events, and contrast this idea with a state of awareness. De Quincey claims that 'any entity that is a subject -- that feels its own being -- possesses consciousness'. I want to add to this meaning of consciousness by noting the subject's sense of temporality, so as to further qualify the meaning of consciousness and show how awareness is distinct from consciousness
Basile, Pierfrancesco (2009). Back to Whitehead? Galen Strawson and the Rediscovery of Panpsychism. In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides. Panpsychism in the new millennium. John Benjamins Publishing Company.   (Google)
Beaton, Michael; Bricklin, J.; Charland, Louis C.; Edwards, JCW; Farber, Ilya B.; Faw, Bill; Gennaro, Rocco J.; Kaernbach, C.; Nunn, C. M. H.; Panksepp, Jaak; Prinz, Jesse J.; Ratcliffe, Matthew; Ross, Jacob J.; Murray, S.; Stapp, Henry P. & Watt, Douglas F. (2006). Switched-on consciousness - clarifying what it means - response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.   (Google)
Birch, Charles (1999). Why I became a panexperientialist. Australasian Association for Process Thought.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bishop, Michael A. (2003). Dancing with pixies: Strong artificial intelligence and panpsychism. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Bjelland, Andrew G. (1982). Popper's critique of panpsychism and process proto-mentalism. Modern Schoolman 59 (May):233-43.   (Google)
Butler, Clark W. (1978). Panpsychism: A restatement of the genetic argument. Idealist Studies 8 (January):33-39.   (Google)
Calvert, Ernest Reid (1942). The Panpsychism of James Ward and Charles A. Strong. [Boston].   (Google)
Carruthers, Peter & Schechter, Elizabeth (2006). Can panpsychism bridge the explanatory gap? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):32-39.   (Google | More links)
Casati, Roberto (2003). Qualia domesticated. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.   (Google | More links)
Chalmers, David J. (1996). Is experience ubiquitous? In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Chalmers, David J. (online). What is it like to be a thermostat? (Commentary on Dan Lloyd, "what is it like to be a net?").   (Google)
Abstract: The project that Dan Lloyd has undertaken is admirable and audacious. He has tried to boil down the substrate of information-processing that underlies conscious experience to some very simple elements, in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. Some people will suspect that by considering a model as simple as a connectionist network, Dan has thrown away everything that is interesting about consciousness. Perhaps there is something to that complaint, but I will take a different tack. It seems to me that if we apply his own reasoning, we can see that Dan has not taken things far _enough_. When we have boiled things down to a system as simple as a connectionist network, it seems faint-hearted to stop there, and perhaps a little arbitrary as well. So I will take things further, and ask what seems to be the really interesting question in the vicinity: what is it like to be a thermostat?
Clarke, David S. (2002). Panpsychism and the philosophy of Charles Hartshorne. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 16 (3):151-166.   (Google | More links)
Clarke, D. S. (2003). Panpsychism and the Religious Attitude. State University of New York Press.   (Google)
Cobb, John B. & Thorpe, William H. (1977). Some Whiteheadian comments on the discussion. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America.   (Google)
Coleman, Sam (2006). Being realistic - why physicalism may entail panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):40-52.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I first examine two important assumptions underlying the argument that physicalism entails panpsychism. These need unearthing because opponents in the literature distinguish themselves from Strawson in the main by rejecting one or the other. Once they have been stated, and something has been said about the positions that reject them, the onus of argument becomes clear: the assumptions require careful defence. I believe they are true, in fact, but their defence is a large project that cannot begin here. So, in the final section I comment on what follows if they are granted. I agree with Strawson that --broadly -- 'panpsychism' is the direction in which philosophy of mind should be heading; nevertheless, there are certain difficulties in the detail of his position. In light of these I argue for changes to the doctrine, bringing it into line with the slightly
Coleman, Sam (2009). Mind under Matter. In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides. Benjamins.   (Google)
de Quincey, Christian (1994). Consciousness all the way down? An analysis of McGinn's critique of panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):217-229.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
de Quincey, Christian (2002). Radical Nature: Rediscovering the Soul of Matter. Invisible Cities Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
de Quincey, Christian (2006). Switched-on consciousness - clarifying what it means. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 'Consciousness' has been called the 'final frontier' for science, philosophy's 'hard problem', and the greatest mystery in mysticism. It is a central focus in philosophy of mind. Yet confusion abounds about what 'consciousness' means -- even among philosophers, scientists, and mystics who have built careers exploring the mind. Different scholars and different disciplines use the same word to mean very different things. Debates and dialogues on consciousness often run aground because scholars conflate two radically different uses of the term. This paper addresses the problem by elucidating a fundamental distinction between the philosophical and psychological uses of 'consciousness'
Drake, Durant (1919). Panpsychism again. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (16):433-439.   (Google | More links)
Edwards, Jonathan C. W. (2006). How Many People Are There in My Head and in Hers? An Exploration of Single Cell Consciousness. Exeter: Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Edwards, Paul (1967). Panpsychism. In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 5. Collier-Macmillan.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Farleigh, P. (1998). Whitehead's even more dangerous idea. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ford, Lewis S. (1995). Panpsychism and the early history of prehension. Process Studies 24:15-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ford, Marcus P. (1981). William James: Panpsychist and metaphysical realist. Transactions of the Peirce Society 17:158-70.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Franck, Georg (2008). Presence and reality: An option to specify panpsychism ? Mind and Matter 6 (1):123-140.   (Google)
Abstract: Panpsychism is the doctrine that mind is a fundamental feature of the world existing throughout the universe. One problem with panpsychism is that it is a purely theoretical concept so far. For progress towards an operationalization of the idea, this paper suggests to make use of an ontological difference involved in the mind-matter distinction. The mode in which mental phenomena exist is called presence. The mode in which matter and radiation exist is called reality Physical theory disregards presence in both the form of mental presence and the form of the temporal present In contrast to mental presence the temporal present is objective in the perspective of the third person. This relative kind of objectivity waits to be utilized for a hypothesis of how the mental and the physical are interrelated In order to do so this paper translates the mind-matter distinction into the distinction between mental and physical time and addresses the problem that panpsychism tries to attack head-on in these temporal terms. There are in particular , two issues thus getting involved: discussions about a time observable and the quantum Zeno effect
Freeman, Anthony (2006). Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism? Exeter: Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Frisina, Warren G. (1997). Minds, bodies, experience, nature: Is panpsychism really dead? In Pragmatism, Neo-Pragmatism, and Religion. New York: Lang.   (Google)
Gabora, Liane (2002). Amplifying phenomenal information: Toward a fundamental theory of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (8):3-29.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: from non-conscious components by positing that consciousness is a universal primitive. For example, the double aspect theory of information holds that infor- mation has a phenomenal aspect. How then do you get from phenomenal infor- mation to human consciousness? This paper proposes that an entity is conscious to the extent it amplifies information, first by trapping and integrating it through closure, and second by maintaining dynamics at the edge of chaos through simul- taneous processes of divergence and convergence. The origin of life through autocatalytic closure, and the origin of an interconnected worldview through conceptual closure, induced phase transitions in the degree to which informa- tion, and thus consciousness, is locally amplified. Divergence and convergence of cognitive information may involve phenomena observed in light e.g. focusing, interference, and resonance. By making information flow inward- biased, clo- sure shields us from external consciousness; thus the paucity of consciousness may be an illusion
Gao, Shan (2003). A possible quantum basis of panpsychism. [Journal (Paginated)] 1 (1):4-9.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We show that consciousness may violate the basic quantum principle, according to which the nonorthogonal quantum states can't be distinguished. This implies that the physical world is not causally closed without consciousness, and consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, thus provides a possible quantum basis for panpsychism
Gao, Shan (2003). A possible quantum basis of panpsychism. Cogprints.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We show that consciousness may violate the basic quantum principle, according to which the nonorthogonal quantum states can't be distinguished. This implies that the physical world is not causally closed without consciousness, and consciousness is a fundamental property of matter, thus provides a possible quantum basis for panpsychism
Gao, Mr Shan (ms). Quantum, consciousness and panpsychism: A solution to the hard problem.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We analyze the results and implications of the combination of quantum and consciousness in terms of the recent QSC analysis. The quantum effect of consciousness is first explored. We show that the consciousness of the observer can help to distinguish the nonorthogonal states under some condition, while the usual physical measuring device without consciousness can’t. The result indicates that the causal efficacies of consciousness do exist when considering the basic quantum process. Based on this conclusion, we demonstrate that consciousness is not reducible or emergent, but a new fundamental property of matter. This provides a quantum basis for panpsychism. Furthermore, we argue that the conscious process is one kind of quantum computation process based on the analysis of consciousness time and combination problem. It is shown that a unified theory of matter and consciousness should include two parts: one is the complete quantum evolution of matter state, which includes the definite nonlinear evolution element introduced by consciousness, and the other is the psychophysical principle or corresponding principle between conscious content and matter state. Lastly, some experimental suggestions are presented to confirm the theoretical analysis of the paper
Goff, Philip (2006). Experiences don't sum. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):53-61.   (Google | More links)
Goff, Philip (2009). Why panpsychism doesn't help us explain consciousness. Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper starts from the assumption that panpsychism is counterintuitive and metaphysically demanding. A number of philosophers, whilst not denying these negative aspects of the view, think that panpsychism has in its favour that it offers a good explanation of consciousness. In opposition to this, the paper argues that panpsychism cannot help us to explain consciousness, at least not the kind of consciousness we have pre-theoretical reason to believe in
Griffin, David Ray (1998). Pantemporalism and panexperientialism. In P. Harris (ed.), The Textures of Time. University of Michigan Press.   (Google)
Griffin, David Ray (1997). Panexperiential physicalism and the mind-body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):248-68.   (Google)
Griffin, David Ray (1998). Unsnarling the World-Knot: Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem. University of California Press.   (Cited by 57 | Google)
Hartshorne, Charles (1977). Physics and psychics: The place of mind in nature. In John B. Cobb & David Ray Griffin (eds.), Mind in Nature. University Press of America.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
Hartshorne, Charles (1978). Panpsychism: Mind as sole reality. Ultim Real Mean 1:115-29.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Heidelberger, Michael & Klohr, Cynthia (2004). Nature From Within: Gustav Theodor Fechner and His Psychophysical Worldview. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Michael Heidelberger's exhaustive exploration of Fechner's writings, in relation to current issues in the field, successfully reestablishes Fechner'...
Holman, Emmett (2008). Panpsychism, physicalism, neutral monism and the Russellian theory of mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (5):48-67.   (Google)
Abstract: As some see it, an impasse has been reached on the mind- body problem between mainstream physicalism and mainstream dualism. So lately another view has been gaining popularity, a view that might be called the 'Russellian theory of mind' (RTM) since it is inspired by some ideas once put forth by Bertrand Russell. Most versions of RTM are panpsychist, but there is at least one version that rejects panpsychism and styles itself as physicalism, and neutral monism is also a possibility. In this paper I will attempt to sort out these different versions with a view to determining which, if any, have a chance of breaking the perceived impasse. The unsurprising conclusion will be that there are a lot of challenges ahead for the RTM theorist. The surprising conclusion will be that it's not clear that pan- psychist RTM holds an advantage over the other versions in this regard
Hut, Piet & Shepard, Roger N. (1996). Turning the "hard problem" upside-down and sideways. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):313-29.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Jackson, Frank (2006). Galen Strawson on panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):62-64.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We make powerful motor cars by suitably assembling items that are not themselves powerful, but we do not do this by 'adding in the power' at the very end of the assembly line; nor, if it comes to that, do we add portions of power along the way. Powerful motor cars are nothing over and above complex arrangements or aggregations of items that are not themselves powerful. The example illustrates the way aggregations can have interesting properties that the items aggregated lack. What can we say of a general kind about what can be made from what by nothing over and above aggregation? I think that this is the key issue that Galen Strawson (2006) puts so
Kim, Jaegwon (1999). Physicalism and panexperientialism: Response to David Ray Griffin. Process Studies 28 (1-2):28-34.   (Google)
Kind, Amy (2006). Panexperientialism, cognition, and the nature of experience. Psyche 12 (5).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: i>: This paper explores the plausibility of panexperientialism by an examination of Gregg Rosenberg
Macpherson, Fiona (2006). Property dualism and the merits of solutions to the mind-body problem: A reply to Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):72-89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view on the mind much like one plausible interpretation of Locke's position. Strawson's use of terminology cloaks this fact and he does not himself explicitly recognize it in his paper. In the second section, I outline some of Strawson's assumptions that he uses in arguing for his position. I comment on the plausibility of his position concerning the relation of the mind to the body compared with mainstream physicalism and various forms of dualism. Before embarking on the two main sections, in the remainder of this introduction, I very briefly sketch Strawson's view
Madell, Goeffrey (2007). Timothy Sprigge and panpsychism. In Pierfrancesco Basile & Leemon B. McHenry (eds.), Consciousness, Reality and Value: Essays in Honour of T.L.S. Sprigge. Ontos.   (Google)
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McKitrick, Jennifer (2006). Rosenberg on causation. Psyche 12 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper is an explication and critique of a new theory of causation found in part II of Gregg Rosenberg's _A Place for Consciousness._ According to Rosenberg's Theory of Causal significance, causation constrains indeterminate possibilities, and according to his Carrier Theory, physical properties are dispositions which have phenomenal properties as their causal bases. This author finds Rosenberg's metaphysics excessively speculative, with disappointing implications for the place of consciousness in the natural world
Montague, William P. (1905). Panpsychism and monism. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (23):626-629.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Nagasawa, Yujin (2006). A place for protoconsciousness? Psyche 12 (5).   (Google | More links)
Nagel, Thomas (1979). Panpsychism. In Thomas Nagel (ed.), Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google)
Neunhäuserer, Jörg (ms). Panmentalism.   (Google)
Abstract: In this short note we develop an unorthodox panmentalistic and libertarian dualism. Especially we skech a mental-physikal law of free will. Our aim is to to provoke the contemporary scentific common-sense.
Nimtz, Christian & Schutte, M. (2003). On physicalism, physical properties, and panpsychism. Dialectica 57 (4):413-22.   (Google | More links)
Nixon, Gregory (2010). From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research (3):216-233.   (Google)
Abstract: When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could become conscious of itself, I aim here to demonstrate that the terms experience and consciousness are not interchangeable. Experience is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down, but I see non-conscious experience as based mainly in momentary sensations, relational between bodies or systems, and probably common throughout the natural world. If this continuum of experience — from non-conscious, to conscious, to self-transcending awareness — can be understood and accepted, radical constructivism (the “outside” world as a construct of experience) will gain a firmer foundation, panexperientialism (a living universe) may gain credibility, and psi will find its medium.
Papineau, David (2006). Comments on Galen Strawson: Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):100-109.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Galen Strawson (2006) thinks it is 'obviously' false that 'the terms of physics can fully capture the nature or essence of experience' (p. 4). He also describes this view as 'crazy' (p. 7). I think that he has been carried away by first impressions. It is certainly true that 'physicSalism', as he dubs this view, is strongly counterintuitive. But at the same time there are compelling arguments in its favour. I think that these arguments are sound and that the contrary intuitions are misbegotten. In the first two sections of my remarks I would like to spend a little time defending physicSalism, or 'straightforward' physicalism, as I shall call it ('S' for 'straightforward', if you like). I realize that the main topic of Strawson's paper is panpsychism rather than his rejection of straightforward physicalism. But the latter is relevant as his arguments for panpsychism depend on his rejection of straightforward physicalism, in ways I shall explain below
Pearce, David (online). Naturalistic panpsychism.   (Google)
Polger, Thomas W. (2006). A place for dogs and trees? Psyche 12 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Rosenberg does not provide arguments for some crucial premises in his argument against physicalism. In particular, he gives no independent argument to show that physicalists must accept the entry-by-entailment thesis. The arguments provided establish weaker premises than those that are needed. As a consequence, Rosenberg
Popper, Karl R. (1977). Some remarks on panpsychism and epiphenomenalism. Dialectica 31:177-86.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Rey, Georges (2006). Better to study human than world psychology - commentary on Galen Strawson's Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):110-116.   (Google)
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Rosenberg, Gregg H. (2004). A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there be a credible alternative? In one classic example, philosophers ask whether we can ever know what is it is like for bats to sense the world using sonar. It seems obvious to many that any amount of information about a bat's physical structure and information processing leaves us guessing about the central questions concerning the character of its experience. A Place for Consciousness begins with reflections on the existence of this gap. Is it just a psychological shortcoming in our merely human understanding of the physical world? Is it a trivial consequence of the simple fact that we just cannot be bats? Or does it mean there really are facts about consciousness over and above the physical facts? If so, what does consciousness do? Why does it exist? Rosenberg sorts out these problems, especially those centering on the causal role of consciousness. He introduces a new paradigm called Liberal Naturalism for thinking about what causation is, about the natural world, and about how to create a detailed model to go along with the new paradigm. Arguing that experience is part of the categorical foundations of causality, he shows that within this new paradigm there is a place for something essentially like consciousness in all its traditional mysterious respects. A striking feature of Liberal Naturalism is that its central tenets are motivated independently of the mind-body problem, by analyzing causation itself. Because of this approach, when consciousness shows up in the picture it is not introduced in an ad hoc way, and its most puzzling features can be explained from first principles. Ultimately, Rosenberg's final solution gives consciousness a causally important role without supposing either that it is physical or that it interacts with the physical
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Rosenberg, Gregg H. (2004). On the possibility of panexperientialism. In Gregg H. Rosenberg (ed.), A Place for Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (1996). Rethinking nature: A hard problem within the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):76-88.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
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Abstract: 1 Non-reductive physicalists deny that there is any explanation of mentality in purely physical terms, but do not deny that the mental is entirely determined by and constituted out of underlying physical structures. There are important issues about the stability of such a view which teeters on the edge of explanatory reductionism on the one side and dualism on the other (see Kim 1998). 2 Save perhaps for eliminative materialism (see Churchland 1981 for a classic exposition). In fact, however, while
Seager, William E. (2006). Rosenberg, reducibility and consciousness. Psyche.   (Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (2006). The 'intrinsic nature' argument for panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):129-145.   (Google | More links)
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Abstract: By most accounts, the mind arises from the integrated activity of large populations of neurons distributed across multiple brain regions. A contrasting model is presented in the present paper that places the mind/brain interface not at the whole brain level but at the level of single neurons. Specifically, it is proposed that each neuron in the nervous system is independently conscious, with conscious content corresponding to the spatial pattern of a portion of that neuron's dendritic electrical activity. For most neurons, such as those in the hypothalamus or posterior sensory cortices, the conscious activity would be assumed to be simple and unable to directly affect the organism's macroscopic conscious behavior. For a subpopulation of layer 5 pyramidal neurons in the lateral prefrontal cortices, however, an arrangement is proposed to be present such that, at any given moment: i) the spatial pattern of electrical activity in a portion of the dendritic tree of each neuron in the subpopulation individually manifests a complexity and diversity sufficient to account for the complexity and diversity of conscious experience; ii) the dendritic trees of the neurons in the subpopulation all contain similar spatial electrical patterns; iii) the spatial electrical pattern in the dendritic tree of each neuron interacts nonlinearly with the remaining ambient dendritic electrical activity to determine the neuron's overall axonal response; iv) the dendritic spatial pattern is reexpressed at the population level by the spatial pattern exhibited by a synchronously firing subgroup of the conscious neurons, thereby providing a mechanism by which conscious activity at the neuronal level can influence overall behavior. The resulting scheme is one in which conscious behavior appears to be the product of a single macroscopic mind, but is actually the integrated output of a chorus of minds, each associated with a different neuron
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Abstract: For some two millennia, Western civilization has predominantly viewed mind and consciousness as the private domain of the human species. Some have been willing to extend these qualities to certain animals. And there has been a small but very significant minority of philosophers who have argued that the processes of mind are universal in extent, and resident in all material things
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Abstract: other distinct subjects is famously difficult (see James 1890: 1.160-161; Goff 2006) but I cannot avoid the difficulty in the way Coleman can (2006:48—50), ...
Skrbina, David (2003). Panpsychism as an underlying theme in western philosophy: A survey paper. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (3):4-46.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Skrbina, David (online). Panpsychism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Skrbina, David (2005). Panpsychism in the West. MIT Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Skrbina argues that panpsychism is long overdue for detailed treatment, and with this book he proposes to add impetus to the discussion of panpsychism in...
Skrbina, David (2006). Realistic panpsychism - commentary on Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):151-157.   (Google | More links)
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