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1.4h. Russellian Monism (Russellian Monism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Banks, Erik C. (2010). Neutral Monism Reconsidered. Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Should neutral monism be reconsidered? Classic NM (Mach James Russell) is examined first, and its fundamental theses identified. The second half of the paper looks at recent contemporary variants.
Banks, Erik C. (online). Russell's Hypothesis and the New Physicalism. Proceedings of the Ohio Phil. Association 2009.   (Google)
Abstract: A 2009 conference paper about Russell's enhanced physicalism: physical structural relations of matter instantiated by qualities with "intrinsic character." Russell's hypothesis leads many to panpsychism or protophenomenalism via a line-of-descent argument, but there is a way to break the line of descent, making sensation qualities separate higher order structural dispositions, if they are instantiated by the right kind of ground-level dispositional qualities.
Blackburn, Simon W. (1990). Filling in space. Analysis 50 (2):62-5.   (Cited by 30 | Annotation | Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1996). The metaphysics of information. In The Conscious Mind.   (Annotation | Google)
Demopolous, W. & Friedman, Michael (1989). The concept of structure in Russell's The Analysis of Matter. In C. Wade Savage & C. Anthony Anderson (eds.), Rereading Russell: Essays in Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology. University of Minnesota Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Feigl, Herbert (1975). Russell and Schlick: A remarkable agreement on a monistic solution of the mind-body problem. Erkenntnis 9 (May):11-34.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Feigl, Herbert (1971). Some crucial issues of mind-body monism. Synthese 22 (May):295-312.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Feigl, Herbert (1958). The 'mental' and the 'physical'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2:370-497.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Feigl, Herbert (1960). The mind-body problem: Not a pseudo-problem. In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Feser, Edward (1998). Can phenomenal qualities exist unperceived? Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):405-14.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Foster, John A. (1991). Lockwood's hypothesis. In John A. Foster (ed.), The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge.   (Annotation | Google)
Freeman, Anthony (2006). Special issue on realistic monism - editorial introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):1-2.   (Google)
Hohwy, Jakob (2005). Explanation and two conceptions of the physical. Erkenntnis 62 (1):71-89.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Any position that promises genuine progress on the mind-body problem deserves attention. Recently, Daniel Stoljar has identified a physicalist version of Russells notion of neutral monism; he elegantly argues that with this type of physicalism it is possible to disambiguate on the notion of physicalism in such a way that the problem is resolved. The further issue then arises of whether we have reason to believe that this type of physicalism is in fact true. Ultimately, one needs to argue for this position by inference to the best explanation, and I show that this new type of physicalism does not hold promise of more explanatory prowess than its relevant rivals, and that, whether it is better than its rivals or not, it is doubtful whether it would furnish us with genuine explanations of the phenomenal at all
Holman, Emmett L. (1986). Maxwell and materialism. Synthese 66 (March):505-14.   (Google | More links)
Jones, Mostyn W. (forthcoming). How to make mind-brain relations clear. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The mind-body problem arises because all theories about mind-brain connections are too deeply obscure to gain general acceptance. This essay suggests a clear, simple, mind-brain solution that avoids all these perennial obscurities. (1) It does so, first of all, by reworking Strawson and Stoljar’s views. They argue that while minds differ from observable brains, minds can still be what brains are physically like behind the appearances created by our outer senses. This could avoid many obscurities. But to clearly do so, it must first clear up its own deep obscurity about what brains are like behind appearances, and how they create the mind’s privacy, unity and qualia – all of which observable brains lack. (2) This can ultimately be done with a clear, simple assumption: our consciousness is the physical substance that certain brain events consist of beyond appearances. For example, the distinctive electrochemistry in nociceptor ion channels wholly consists of pain. This rejects that pain is a brain property: instead it’s a brain substance that occupies space in brains, and exerts forces by which it’s indirectly detectable via EEGs. (3) This assumption is justified because treating pains as physical substances avoids the perennial obscurities in mind-body theories. For example, this ‘clear physicalism’ avoids the obscure nonphysical pain of dualism and its spinoffs. Pain is instead an electrochemical substance. It isn’t private because it’s hidden in nonphysical minds, but instead because it’s just indirectly detected in the physical world in ways that leave its real nature hidden. (4) Clear physicalism also avoids puzzling reductions of private pains into more fundamental terms of observable brain activity. Instead pain is a hidden, private substance underlying this observable activity. Also, pain is fundamental in itself, for it’s what some brain activity fundamentally consists of. This also avoids reductive idealist claims that the world just exists in the mind. They yield obscure views on why we see a world that isn’t really out there. (5) Clear physicalism also avoids obscure claims that pain is information processing which is realizable in multiple hardwares (not just in electrochemistry). Molecular neuroscience now casts doubt on multiple realization. Also, it’s puzzling how abstract information gets ‘realized’ in brains and affects brains (compare ancient quandries on how universals get embodied in matter). A related idea is that of supervenient properties in nonreductive physicalism. They involve obscure overdetermination and emergent consciousness. Clear physicalism avoids all this. Pain isn’t an abstract property obscurely related to brains – it’s simply a substance in brains. (6) Clear physicalism also avoids problems in neuroscience. Neuroscience explains the mind’s unity in problematic ways using synchrony, attention, etc.. Clear physicalism explains unity in terms of intense neuroelectrical activity reaching continually along brain circuits as a conscious whole. This fits evidence that just highly active, highly connected circuits are fully conscious. Neuroscience also has problems explaining how qualia are actually encoded by brains, and how to get from these abstract codes to actual pain, fear, etc.. Clear physicalism explains qualia electrochemically, using growing evidence that both sensory and emotional qualia correlate with very specific electrical channels in neural receptors. Multiple-realization advocates overlook this important evidence. (7) Clear physicalism thus bridges the mind-brain gulf by showing how brains can possess the mind’s qualia, unity and privacy – and how minds can possess features of brain activity like occupying space and exerting forces. This unorthodox nonreductive physicalism may be where physicalism leads to when stripped of all its reductive and nonreductive obscurities. It offers a clear, simple mind-body solution by just filling in what neuroscience is silent about, namely, what brain matter is like behind perceptions of it.
Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Review of D. Stoljar, Ignorance and Imagination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86:515-519.   (Google)
Lockwood, Michael (1989). Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 115 | Annotation | Google)
Lockwood, Michael (1993). The grain problem. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Annotation | Google)
Lockwood, Michael (1998). Unsensed phenomenal qualities: A defence. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4):415-18.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Maxwell, Grover (1979). Rigid designators and mind-brain identity. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google)
Maxwell, Grover (1971). Structural realism and the meaning of theoretical terms. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4:181-192.   (Cited by 54 | Google)
Maxwell, Grover (1978). Unity of consciousness and mind-brain identity. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Mind and Brain. Paragon House.   (Google)
Newman, M. H. A. (1928). Mr. Russell's causal theory of perception. Mind 5 (146):26-43.   (Cited by 39 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Robinson, Howard M. (1982). Matter: Turning the tables. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Matter and Sense: A Critique of Contemporary Materialism. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (2004). A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 43 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What place does consciousness have in the natural world? If we reject materialism, could there be a credible alternative? In one classic example, philosophers ask whether we can ever know what is it is like for bats to sense the world using sonar. It seems obvious to many that any amount of information about a bat's physical structure and information processing leaves us guessing about the central questions concerning the character of its experience. A Place for Consciousness begins with reflections on the existence of this gap. Is it just a psychological shortcoming in our merely human understanding of the physical world? Is it a trivial consequence of the simple fact that we just cannot be bats? Or does it mean there really are facts about consciousness over and above the physical facts? If so, what does consciousness do? Why does it exist? Rosenberg sorts out these problems, especially those centering on the causal role of consciousness. He introduces a new paradigm called Liberal Naturalism for thinking about what causation is, about the natural world, and about how to create a detailed model to go along with the new paradigm. Arguing that experience is part of the categorical foundations of causality, he shows that within this new paradigm there is a place for something essentially like consciousness in all its traditional mysterious respects. A striking feature of Liberal Naturalism is that its central tenets are motivated independently of the mind-body problem, by analyzing causation itself. Because of this approach, when consciousness shows up in the picture it is not introduced in an ad hoc way, and its most puzzling features can be explained from first principles. Ultimately, Rosenberg's final solution gives consciousness a causally important role without supposing either that it is physical or that it interacts with the physical
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (1999). On the Intrinsic Nature of the Physical. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: In its original context Hawking was writing about the significance of physics for questions about God's existence and responsibility for creation. I am co-opting the sentiment for another purpose, though. As stated Hawking could equally be directing the question at concerns about the seemingly abstract information physics conveys about the world, and the full body of facts contained in the substance of the world. Would even a complete and adequate physics tell us all the general facts about the stuff the world is made of? In this chapter I am going to argue that the answer is "no." I am also going to argue that the missing facts are like the kinds of facts we can use to cross the explanatory gap. I am going to argue, in short, that we have reasons to re-enchant matter that are independent of the mind-body problem. In a recent anthology on consciousness (1997) G
Russell, Bertrand (1927). The Analysis of Matter. London: Kegan Paul.   (Cited by 138 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: "The Analysis of Matter" is one of the earliest and best philosophical studies of the new physics of relativity and quantum mechanics.
Schlick, M. (1925). General Theory of Knowledge. La Salle: Open Court.   (Cited by 28 | Google)
Abstract: The book expounds most of the doctrines that would later be identified with the classical period of the Vienna Circle.
Stoljar, Daniel (2006). Comments on Galen Strawson - 'realistic monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):170-176.   (Google | More links)
Stoljar, Daniel (forthcoming). Strawson's realistic monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: There is at least one element in Strawson
Stoljar, Daniel (2001). Two conceptions of the physical. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-81.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The debate over physicalism in philosophy of mind can be seen as concerning an inconsistent tetrad of theses: (1) if physicalism is true, a priori physicalism is true; (2) a priori physicalism is false; (3) if physicalism is false, epiphenomenalism is true; (4) epiphenomenalism is false. This paper argues that one may resolve the debate by distinguishing two conceptions of the physical: on the theory-based conception
Strawson, Galen (2003). Realistic materialism. In Louise M. Antony & Norbert Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Strawson, Galen (2003). Real materialism. In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell Publishing.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Stubenberg, Leopold (1997). Austria vs. australia: Two versions of the identity theory. In Keith Lehrer & Johann Christian Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy, Past and Present. Kluwer.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Stubenberg, Leopold (1998). Consciousness and Qualia. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 73 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness and Qualia is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc.
Stubenberg, Leopold (1996). The place of qualia in the world of science. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Unger, Peter K. (1998). The mystery of the physical and the matter of qualities. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22 (1):75–99.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: For some fifty years now, nearly all work in mainstream analytic philosophy has made no serious attempt to understand the _nature of_ _physical reality,_ even though most analytic philosophers take this to be all of reality, or nearly all. While we've worried much about the nature of our own experiences and thoughts and languages, we've worried little about the nature of the vast physical world that, as we ourselves believe, has them all as only a small part