Abstract: This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is compatible with the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda

Abstract: This paper distinguishes three conceptual problems that attend philosophical ac- counts of consciousness. The first concerns the problem of properly characterizing the nature of consciousness itself, the second is the problem of making intelligible the relation between consciousness and the ‘physical’, and the third is the problem of creating the intellectual space for a shift in philosophical framework that would enable us to deal adequately with the first two problems. It is claimed that physicalism, in both its reductive and non-reductive forms, fails to deal adequately with either the first or second problem. The diagnosis of this failure is connected to the fact that consciousness cannot be treated in its own terms while be- ing simultaneously fitted into an object-based conceptual schema. In light of this, it is pro- posed that a Bradleian version of absolute idealism may provide a metaphysical and epistemological framework which would enable us to recognize the conceptual diversity re- quired to treat conscious phenomena on their own terms without forcing us to abandon natu- ralism

Abstract: The idealist attitude followed in this paper is based on the assumption that only conscious experience in the Now is real. Conscious experience in the Now is supposed to be known directly or intuitively, it can not be explained. I think it constitutes t he basis of all ontology. Consciousness is conceived as the total of conscious experience in the Now, the ontology of consciousness is thus derived directly from the basis. The ontology of nature is derived more indirectly from the basis. Science is regar ded as a catalog of selected conscious experiences (observations), acknowledged to be scientific and structured by means of concepts and theories (also regarded as conscious experiences). Material objects are regarded as heuristic concepts constructed fr o m the immediate experiences in the Now and useful for expressing observations within a certain domain with some of their mutual relations. History is also regarded as a construct from conscious experiences in the Now. Concepts of worlds without an ego a re seen to be in harmony with immediate egoless experiences. Worlds including spirituality are conceived as based on immediate spiritual experiences together with other immediate experiences. Idealist or immaterial philosophies have been criticized for im pl ying solipsism or "solipsism of the present moment". This critique is countered by emphasizing the importance of intersubjectivity for science and by introducing the more precise concepts of collective conscious experience and collective conscious expe rie nce across time. Comprehensive evidence supporting the heuristic value of these concepts is related. I conclude that the idealist approach leads to a coherent comprehension of natural science including mind-brain relations, while the mainstream materi alis t approach entails contradictions.and other problems for a coherent understanding. The idealist approach and the notion of collective conscious experience also facilitates cross-cultural studies and the underestanding of intersubjectivity. K