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1.4j. Idealism (Idealism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Barkin, E. (2003). Relative phenomenalism - toward a more plausible theory of mind. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (8):3-13.   (Google)
Bolender, John (2001). An argument for idealism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (4):37-61.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Bolender, John (1998). Factual phenomenalism: A supervenience theory. Sorites 9 (9):16-31.   (Google)
Church, Ralph W. (1935). On dr. Ewing's neglect of Bradley's theory of internal relations. Journal of Philosophy 32 (10):264-273.   (Google | More links)
Collingwood, R. G. (1924). Speculum Mentis, or, the Map of Knowledge. Greenwood Press.   (Google)
Cowan, Daniel A. (2002). Mind Underlies Spacetime: The Axioms Describing Directly Interconnected Substance and the Model That Explains Away Finiteness. Joseph Pub..   (Google)
D'Oro, Giuseppina (2005). Idealism and the philosophy of mind. Inquiry 48 (5):395-412.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is compatible with the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda
Ewing, A. C. (1935). On dr. Ewing's neglect of Bradley's theory of internal relations: Reply. Journal of Philosophy 32 (10):273.   (Google | More links)
Foster, John (2008). A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: A World for Us aims to refute physical realism and establish in its place a form of idealism. Physical realism, in the sense in which John Foster understands it, takes the physical world to be something whose existence is both logically independent of the human mind and metaphysically fundamental. Foster identifies a number of problems for this realist view, but his main objection is that it does not accord the world the requisite empirical immanence. The form of idealism that he tries to establish in its place rejects the realist view in both its aspects. It takes the world to be something whose existence is ultimately constituted by facts about human sensory experience, or by some richer complex of non-physical facts in which such experiential facts centrally feature. Foster calls this phenomenalistic idealism. He tries to establish a specific version of such phenomenalistic idealism, in which the experiential facts that centrally feature in the constitutive creation of the world are ones that concern the organization of human sensory experience. The basic idea of this version is that, in the context of certain other constitutively relevant factors, this sensory organization creates the physical world by disposing things to appear systematically world-wise at the human empirical viewpoint. Chief among these other relevant factors is the role of God as the one who is responsible for the sensory organization and ordains the system of appearance it yields. It is this that gives the idealistically created world its objectivity and allows it to qualify as a real world
Foster, John A. (1982). The Case for Idealism. Routledge.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Franklin, James (2002). Stove's discovery of the worst argument in the world. Philosophy 77 (4):615-624.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The winning entry in David Stove's Competition to Find the Worst Argument in the World was: “We can know things only as they are related to us/insofar as they fall under our conceptual schemes, etc., so, we cannot know things as they are in themselves.” That argument underpins many recent relativisms, including postmodernism, post-Kuhnian sociological philosophy of science, cultural relativism, sociobiological versions of ethical relativism, and so on. All such arguments have the same form as ‘We have eyes, therefore we cannot see’, and are equally invalid
Greidanus, J. H. (1973). The Psycho-Physical Nature of Reality. Amsterdam,B. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers Maatschappij.   (Google)
Grigg, Rowan (ms). Longing for Integration.   (Google)
Abstract: A lighthearted look at some big themes in metaphysics and epistemology
Guyer, Paul (1983). Kant's intentions in the refutation of idealism. Philosophical Review 92 (3):329-383.   (Google | More links)
Hutto, Daniel D. (1998). An ideal solution to the problems of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (3):328-43.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: This paper distinguishes three conceptual problems that attend philosophical ac- counts of consciousness. The first concerns the problem of properly characterizing the nature of consciousness itself, the second is the problem of making intelligible the relation between consciousness and the
Krishnamurti, J. (1985). Things of the Mind: Dialogues with J. Krishnamurti. Philosophical Library.   (Google)
Lloyd, Peter (online). Berkelian ontology as a fundamental approach to consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: George Berkeley (1685-1753) put forward a doctrine of mental monism, claiming that reality is fundamentally mental, and the physical world is a derived construct. This paper puts forward a defence of this theory, using a version of Berkeley
Lloyd, Peter (online). Berkeley revisited: The hard problem considered easy.   (Google)
Abstract: The philosophical mind-body problem, which Chalmers has named the 'Hard Problem', concerns the nature of the mind and the body. Physicalist approaches have been explored intensively in recent years but have brought us no consensual solution. Dualistic approaches have also been scrutinised since Descartes, but without consensual success. Mentalism has received little attention, yet it offers an elegantly simple solution to the hard problem
Marc-Wogau, Konrad (1968). The argument from illusion and Berkeley's idealism. In C. B. Martin & David M. Armstrong (eds.), Locke and Berkeley. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
McTaggart, John McTaggart Ellis (1900). The Nature of Existence. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Randrup, Axel (ms). Idealist philosophy: What is real? Conscious experience seen as basic to all ontology. An overview.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The idealist attitude followed in this paper is based on the assumption that only conscious experience in the Now is real. Conscious experience in the Now is supposed to be known directly or intuitively, it can not be explained. I think it constitutes t he basis of all ontology. Consciousness is conceived as the total of conscious experience in the Now, the ontology of consciousness is thus derived directly from the basis. The ontology of nature is derived more indirectly from the basis. Science is regar ded as a catalog of selected conscious experiences (observations), acknowledged to be scientific and structured by means of concepts and theories (also regarded as conscious experiences). Material objects are regarded as heuristic concepts constructed fr o m the immediate experiences in the Now and useful for expressing observations within a certain domain with some of their mutual relations. History is also regarded as a construct from conscious experiences in the Now. Concepts of worlds without an ego a re seen to be in harmony with immediate egoless experiences. Worlds including spirituality are conceived as based on immediate spiritual experiences together with other immediate experiences. Idealist or immaterial philosophies have been criticized for im pl ying solipsism or "solipsism of the present moment". This critique is countered by emphasizing the importance of intersubjectivity for science and by introducing the more precise concepts of collective conscious experience and collective conscious expe rie nce across time. Comprehensive evidence supporting the heuristic value of these concepts is related. I conclude that the idealist approach leads to a coherent comprehension of natural science including mind-brain relations, while the mainstream materi alis t approach entails contradictions.and other problems for a coherent understanding. The idealist approach and the notion of collective conscious experience also facilitates cross-cultural studies and the underestanding of intersubjectivity. K
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1983). The Vindication Of Absolute Idealism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Stallknecht, Newton P. (1941). Mind and its environment: Toward a naturalistic idealism. Journal of Philosophy 38 (November):617-622.   (Google | More links)
Stove, D. C. (1991). The Plato Cult and Other Philosophical Follies. B. Blackwell.   (Google)