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Philosophy of Consciousness :: Consciousness and Content

1.5a Consciousness and Intentionality

See also: 1.5b. Representationalism, 1.5c. Phenomenal Intentionality, 1.5d. Conscious Thought, 1.5e. Internalism and Externalism about Experience, 1.5g. Consciousness and Content, Misc, 2.4. The Status of Intentionality.

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1.5b Representationalism

See also: 1.4a. Higher-Order Thought Approaches, 1.4b. Self-Representational Approaches, 1.5e. Internalism and Externalism about Experience, 2.5. Representation, 3.1c. Intentionalism, 3.3. The Contents of Perception, 3.8a. Illusion and Hallucination, 3.8b. Transparency.

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Bailey, Andrew R. (2005). What is it like to see a bat? A critique of Dretske's representationalist theory of qualia. Disputatio 1 (18). (Google)
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