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Philosophy of Consciousness :: Consciousness and Content :: Representationalism

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Alter, Torin (2006). Does synesthesia undermine representationalism? Psyche 12 (5). (Google | More links)
Bach, Kent (1997). Engineering the mind (review of Dretske 1995, Naturalizing the Mind). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):459-468. (Google)
Bailey, Andrew R. (2007). Representation and a science of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies. Special Issue 14 (1):62-76. (Google | More links)
Bailey, Andrew R. (2005). What is it like to see a bat? A critique of Dretske's representationalist theory of qualia. Disputatio 1 (18). (Google)
Beckermann, Ansgar (1995). Visual information-processing and phenomenal consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (2005). Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links | View replies | View target article(s))
Block, Ned (1990). Inverted earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79. (Cited by 146 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Block, Ned (1998). Is experiencing just representing? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663-670. (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (2003). Mental paint. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. (Cited by 23 | Google | More links | View replies)
Block, Ned (1996). Mental paint and mental latex. Philosophical Issues 7:19-49. (Cited by 119 | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (1999). Sexism, ageism, racism, and the nature of consciousness. Philosophical Topics 26 (1):39-70. (Cited by 25 | Google)
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Byrne, Alex (2001). Intentionalism defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240. (Cited by 75 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (online). Tye on color and the explanatory gap. (Google | View replies | View target article(s))
Chalmers, David J. (2004). The representational character of experience. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Cole, David J. (online). Dretske on naturalizing the mind. (Google)
Crane, Tim (2007). Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Crane, Tim (2003). The intentional structure of consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
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Dretske, Fred (2003). Experience as representation. Philosophical Issues 13:67-82. (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press. (Cited by 674 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (2000). Reply to Lopes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):455-459. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Droege, Paula (2003). Caging the Beast: A Theory of Sensory Consciousness. John Benjamins. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Droege, Paula (manuscript). Second sense: A theory of sensory consciousness. (Google | More links)
Glock, H. J. (2003). Neural representationalism. Facta Philosophica 5 (1):105-129. (Google)
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Harman, Gilbert (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52. (Cited by 245 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Haselager, Pim; de Groot, A. & van Rappard, H. (2003). Representationalism vs. anti-representationalism: A debate for the sake of appearance. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):5-23. (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Hellie, Benj (2002). Consciousness and representationalism. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hellie, Benj (forthcoming). Representationalism. In Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford UP. (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (2006). Harman on self referential thoughts. Noûs 346 (1):346–357. (Google | More links)
Hopkins, James (manuscript). Representation of the inner and the concept of mind. (Google | More links)
Hubbard, Timothy L. (2007). What is mental representation? And how does it relate to consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies. Special Issue 14 (1):37-61. (Google)
Jackson, Frank (1998). Causal roles and higher-order properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):657-661. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Jackson, Frank (2004). Representation and experience. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Jackson, Frank (manuscript). Some reflections on representationalism. (Google)
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Kind, Amy (manuscript). Restrictions on representationalism. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2002). PANIC theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Levi, Don S. (1997). Representation: The eleventh problem of consciousness. Inquiry 40 (4):457-473. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Levine, Joseph M. (2003). Experience and representation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Lloyd, Dan (1997). Consciousness and its discontents. Communication and Cognition 30 (3-4):273-284. (Cited by 1 | Google | Annotation)
Lloyd, Dan (1991). Leaping to conclusions: Connectionism, consciousness, and the computational mind. In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer. (Cited by 9 | Google | Annotation)
Lopes, Dominic M. M. (2000). What is it like to see with your ears? The representational theory of mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):439-453. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press. (Cited by 346 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1998). In defense of the representational theory of qualia. Philosophical Perspectives 12:479-87. (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1996). Layered perceptual representation. Philosophical Issues 7:81-100. (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (online). Representational theories of consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Cited by 10 | Google)
Lycan, William G. (2001). Response to Polger and Flanagan. Minds and Machines 11 (1):127-132. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1996). Replies to Tomberlin, Tye, Stalnaker and Block. Philosophical Issues 7:127-142. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Macpherson, Fiona (2006). Ambiguous figures and the content of experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Macpherson, Fiona (2005). Colour inversion problems for representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Macpherson, Fiona (2003). Novel colours and the content of experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Macpherson, Fiona (1999). Perfect pitch and the content of experience. Philosophy and Anthropology 3 (2). (Google | More links)
Macpherson, Fiona (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, University of Stirling (Google | More links)
Maund, J. Barry (online). Tye on phenomenal character and color. (Cited by 2 | Google | View replies | View target article(s))
McCulloch, Gregory (1993). The very idea of the phenomenological. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:39-57. (Cited by 8 | Google | Annotation)
McIntyre, Ronald (1999). Naturalizing phenomenology? Dretske on qualia. In Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press. (Google)
Miguens, Sofia (2002). Qualia or non epistemic perception: D. Dennett's and F. Dretske's representational theories of consciousness. Agora 21 (2):193-208. (Google)
Neander, Karen (1998). The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for representationalist theories of consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 12:411-34. (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Noordhof, Paul (2001). In pain. Analysis 61 (2):95-97. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)