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1.5b. Representationalism (Representationalism on PhilPapers)

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Adams, Frederick R. & Dietrich, Laura A. (2004). Swampman's revenge: Squabbles among the representationalists. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties (and events). Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? Dretske and Tye disagree on this issue. We try to settle the dispute in favor of Dretske's theory (to our own surprise)
Allen-Hermanson, Sean (2008). Insects and the problem of simple minds: Are bees natural zombies? Journal of Philosophy 105 (8).   (Google | More links)
Alston, William P. (2005). Perception and representation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):253-289.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Alter, Torin (2006). Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument? In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism, the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson (1982, 1986) gave the argument its classic formulation. But now he rejects the argument (Jackson 1998b, 2003, chapter 3 of this volume). On his view, it relies on a false conception of sensory experience, which should be replaced with representationalism (also known as intentionalism), the view that phenomenal states are just representational states. And he argues that mental representation is physically explicable
Alter, Torin (2006). Does synesthesia undermine representationalism? Psyche 12 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Does synesthesia undermine representationalism? Gregg Rosenberg (2004) argues that it does. On his view, synesthesia illustrates how phenomenal properties can vary independently of representational properties. So, for example, he argues that sound/color synesthetic experiences show that visual experiences do not always represent spatial properties. I will argue that the representationalist can plausibly answer Rosenberg
Arregui, Jorge V. (1996). On the intentionality of moods: Phenomenology and linguistic analysis. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (3):397-411.   (Google)
Aydede, Murat (2009). Is feeling pain the perception of something? Journal of Philosophy 106 (10).   (Google)
Abstract: According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine the relationship between perceptual views and two (weak and strong) forms of representationalism about experience. I will argue that pains pose very serious problems for strong representationalism as well
Aydede, Murat (2001). Naturalism, introspection, and direct realism about pain. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Abstract: This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism about pain in the tradition of direct realist perceptual theories (e.g., Dretske, Tye) leaves out something crucial about the phenomenology of pain experiences, namely, their affective character. I touch upon the role that introspection plays in such representationalist views, and indicate how it contributes to the source of their trouble vis-à-vis bodily sensations. The paper ends by briefly commenting on the relation between the affective/evaluative component of pain and the hedonic valence of emotions
Bach, Kent (1997). Engineering the mind (review of Dretske 1995, Naturalizing the Mind). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):459-468.   (Google)
Bach, Kent (ms). Engineering the mind.   (Google)
Abstract: No contemporary philosopher has tried harder to demystify the mind than Fred Dretske. But how to demystify it without eviscerating it? Can consciousness be explained? Many philosophers think that no matter how detailed and systematic our knowledge becomes of how the brain works and how it subserves mental functions, there will always remain an "explanatory gap." Call it a brute fact or call it a mystery, trying to explain consciousness, they think, is as futile as trying to explain why there is something rather than nothing. Dretske is not exercised by the explanatory gap-he'd rather exorcise it. He thinks we can get all the explanation we need by understanding what consciousness does. Consciousness is at bottom sensory experience and what it does, essentially, is to represent the world. Explaining consciousness, therefore, comes down to understanding the representational character of experience
Bain, David (2003). Intentionalism and pain. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The pain case can appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory, I argue. After categorising versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an “objectivist” and “non-mentalist” version is the most promising, provided it can withstand two objections: concerning what we say when in pain, and the distinctiveness of the pain case. I rebut these objections, in a way that’s available to both opponents and adherents of the view that experiential content is entirely conceptual. In doing so I illuminate peculiarities of somatosensory perception that should interest even those who take a different view of pain experiences
Bailey, Andrew R. (2007). Representation and a science of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):62-76.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The first part of this paper defends a 'two-factor' approach to mental representation by moving through various choice-points that map out the main peaks in the landscape of philosophical debate about representation. The choice-points considered are: (1) whether representations are conceptual or non-conceptual; (2) given that mental representation is conceptual, whether conscious perceptual representations are analog or digital; (3) given that the content of a representation is the concept it expresses, whether that content is individuated extensionally or intensionally; (4) whether intensional contents are individuated by external or internal conditions; and (5) given that conceptual content is determined externally, whether the possession conditions for concepts are external or internal. The final part of the paper examines the relationship between representation and consciousness, arguing that any account of mental representation, though necessary for a complete account of consciousness, cannot be sufficient for it
Bailey, Andrew R. (2005). What is it like to see a bat? A critique of Dretske's representationalist theory of qualia. Disputatio 1 (18).   (Google)
Beckermann, Ansgar (1995). Visual information processing and phenomenal consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: As far as an adequate understanding of phenomenal consciousness is concerned, representationalist theories of mind which are modelled on the information processing paradigm, are, as much as corresponding neurobiological or functionalist theories, confronted with a series of arguments based on inverted or absent qualia considerations. These considerations display the following pattern: assuming we had complete knowledge about the neural and functional states which subserve the occurrence of phenomenal consciousness, would it not still be conceivable that these neural states (or states with the same causal r
Block, Ned (2005). Bodily sensations as an obstacle for representationism. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Representationism1, as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. (I say 'seem' because in my view, representationists cannot actually handle either type of experience successfully, but I will put that claim to one side here.) I will argue that Michael Tye's (2004) heroic attempt at a representationist theory of pain, although ingenious and enlightening, does not adequately come to terms with the root of this difference
Block, Ned (1990). Inverted earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.   (Cited by 146 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (1998). Is experiencing just representing? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):663-670.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The first problem concerns the famous Swampman who comes into existence as a result of a cosmic accident in which particles from the swamp come together, forming a molecular duplicate of a typical human. Reasonable people can disagree on whether Swampman has intentional contents. Suppose that Swampman marries Swampwoman and they have children. Reasonable people will be inclined to agree that there is something it is like for Swampchild when "words" go through his mind or come out of his mouth. Fred Dretske (1995) claims that if the materialist is to have any theory of intentional content at all, he has no option other than denying it. He is committed to the view that since phenomenal character is a kind of representational content that derives from evolution, the swampchildren have no phenomenal character. Zombiehood is hereditary. (So long as there is no evolution.) If your grandparents are all swamp-people, you are a zombie
Block, Ned (2003). Mental paint. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Abstract: The greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind--maybe even all of philosophy-- divides two perspectives on consciousness. The two perspectives differ on whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of conscious experience that goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the functional. A convenient terminological handle on the dispute is whether there are
Block, Ned (1996). Mental paint and mental latex. Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.   (Cited by 119 | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (1999). Sexism, ageism, racism, and the nature of consciousness. Philosophical Topics 26 (1):39-70.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Abstract: If a philosophical theory led to the conclusion that the red stripes cannot look red to both men and women, both blacks and whites, both young and old, we would be reluctant (to say the least) to accept that philosophical theory. But there is a widespread philosophical view about the nature of conscious experience that, together with some empirical facts, suggests that color experience cannot be veridical for both men and women, both blacks and whites, both young and old
Borst, Clive V. (1970). Perception and intentionality. Mind 79 (January):115-121.   (Google | More links)
Bourget, David (2010). Consciousness is underived intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32-58.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationalists argue that phenomenal states are intentional states of a special kind. This paper offers an account of the kind of intentional state phenomenal states are: I argue that they are underived intentional states. This account of phenomenal states is equivalent to two theses: first, all possible phenomenal states are underived intentional states; second, all possible underived intentional states are phenomenal states. I clarify these claims and argue for each of them. I also address objections which touch on a range of topics, including meaning holism and concept empiricism. I conclude with a brief discussion of the consequences of the proposed view for the project of naturalizing consciousness.
Bourget, David (2010). The representational theory of consciousness. Dissertation, Australian National University   (Google)
Abstract: A satisfactory solution to the problem of consciousness would take the form of a simple yet fully general model which specifies the precise conditions under which any given state of consciousness occurs. Science has uncovered numerous correlations between consciousness and neural activity, but it has not yet come anywhere close to this. We are still looking for the Newtonian laws of consciousness. One of the main difficulties with consciousness is that we lack a language in which to formulate illuminating generalizations about it. Philosophers and scientists talk about "what it’s like", sensations, feelings, and perceptual states such as seeing and hearing. This language does not allow a precise articulation of the internal structures of conscious states and their inter-relations. It is inadequate to capture relations of the kind we are looking for between conscious states and physical states. In this thesis I refine and defend a theory of consciousness which promises to solve this regimentation problem: the representational theory of consciousness. I argue that the representational theory can solve the regimentation problem and smooth out other important obstacles to a fruitful study of consciousness. I also make a case for the theory independently of its payoffs, and I discuss the leading opposing theories at some length. In the rest of this introduction, I will clarify what I mean by "consciousness", provide an initial characterization of the representational theory, and outline my project in more detail
Brewer, Bill (2006). Perception and content. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is close to current orthodoxy that perceptual experience is to be characterized, at least in part, by its representational content, roughly, by the way it represents things as being in the world around the perceiver. Call this basic idea the content view (CV)
Brogaard, Berit (forthcoming). Strong representationalism and centered content. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems: the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to both have and not have certain properties, for example, my bracelet may phenomenally look to be circular-shaped and oval-shaped (and hence non-circular-shaped). So, if strong representationalism is true, then the content of my experience ought to represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. Yet, intuitively, the content of my experience does not represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. The duplication problem is this. On a standard conception of content, spatio-temporally distinct experiences and experiences had by distinct subjects may differ in content despite the fact that they are phenomenally indistinguishable. But this undermines the thesis that phenomenal character determines content. I argue that the two problems can be solved by applying a version of an idea from David Chalmers, which is to recognize the existence of genuinely centered properties in the content of perceptual experience
Brook, Andrew & Raymont, Paul (2006). The representational base of consciousness. Psyche 12 (2).   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Current views of consciousness can be divided by whether the theorist accepts or rejects cognitivism about consciousness. Cognitivism as we understand it is the view that consciousness is just a form of representation or an information-processing property of a system that has representations or perhaps both. Anti-cognitivists deny this, appealing to thought experiments about inverted spectra, zombies and the like to argue that consciousness could change while nothing cognitive or representational changes. Nearly everyone agrees, however, that consciousness has a _representational base._ Whether consciousness _simply is_ representational or cognitive, it at least _requires _representation (and cognition). In an ecumenical spirit, we will focus on this point of agreement and sketch a theory of what this representational base might be. We hope that the result will be a framework useful for investigating consciousness empirically
Burge, Tyler (2003). Qualia and intentional content: Reply to Block. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1991). Vision and intentional content. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Google)
Byrne, Alex (online). Don't PANIC: Tye's intentionalist theory of consciousness. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _Consciousness, Color, and Content_ is a significant contribution to our understanding of consciousness, among other things. I have learned a lot from it, as well as Tye
Byrne, Alex (2001). Intentionalism defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.   (Cited by 75 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex & Tye, Michael (2006). Qualia ain't in the head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head.1 Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia.2
Byrne, Alex (online). Tye on color and the explanatory gap.   (Google)
Abstract: It will not have escaped notice that the defendant in this afternoon
Chalmers, David J. (2004). The representational character of experience. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness and intentionality are perhaps the two central phenomena in the philosophy of mind. Human beings are conscious beings: there is something it is like to be us. Human beings are intentional beings: we represent what is going on in the world.Correspondingly, our specific mental states, such as perceptions and thoughts, very often have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like to be in them. And these mental states very often have intentional content: they serve to represent the world. On the face of it, consciousness and intentionality are intimately connected. Our most important conscious mental states are intentional states: conscious experiences often inform us about the state of the world. And our most important intentional mental states are conscious states: there is often something it is like to represent the external world. It is natural to think that a satisfactory account of consciousness must respect its intentional structure, and that a satisfactory account of intentionality must respect its phenomenological character.With this in mind, it is surprising that in the last few decades, the philosophical study of consciousness and intentionality has often proceeded in two independent streams. This wasnot always the case. In the work of philosophers from Descartes and Locke to Brentano and Husserl, consciousness and intentionality were typically analyzed in a single package. But in the second half of the twentieth century, the dominant tendency was to concentrate on onetopic or the other, and to offer quite separate analyses of the two. On this approach, the connections between consciousness and intentionality receded into the background.In the last few years, this has begun to change. The interface between consciousness and intentionality has received increasing attention on a number of fronts. This attention has focused on such topics as the representational content of perceptual experience, the higherorder representation of conscious states, and the phenomenology of thinking. Two distinct philosophical groups have begun to emerge. One group focuses on ways in which consciousness might be grounded in intentionality. The other group focuses on ways in which intentionality might be grounded in consciousness
Cole, David J. (online). Dretske on naturalizing the mind.   (Google)
Crane, Tim (2007). Intentionalism. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object of a thought is what the thought concerns, or what it is about. Since there cannot be thoughts which are not about anything, or which do not concern anything, there cannot be thoughts without objects. Mental states or events or processes which have objects in this sense are traditionally called ‘intentional,’ and ‘intentionality’ is for this reason the general term for this defining characteristic of thought. Under the heading of ‘thought’ we can include many different kinds of mental apprehension of an object—including relatively temporary episodes of contemplating or scrutinising, as well as persisting states like beliefs and hopes which are not similarly episodic in character. These are all ways of thinking about an object. But even construing ‘thought’ in this broad way, it is clear that not all mental states and events are thoughts: sensations, emotions and perceptual experiences are not thoughts, but they are also paradigmatically mental. Do these mental states and events have objects too? Or are there mental states and events which have no objects? 1 The view that all mental phenomena have objects is sometimes called ‘Brentano’s thesis’ or the thesis that intentionality is the ‘mark’ of the mental.1 Sometimes the name ‘Brentano’s thesis’ is given to certain other views too: for example, to the view that only mental phenomena are intentional, or that all and only mental phenomena are intentional, or that nothing physical is intentional. These views are, however, distinct from the view that all mental phenomena are intentional. For holding that all mental phenomena are intentional does not imply that nothing nonmental is.2 And holding that all mental phenomena are intentional does not imply (pace Dennett 1969) that nothing physical is intentional; since if physicalism were true, then the mental itself would be physical. What I am concerned with here, however, is the idea that all mental states are intentional, regardless of whether anything else is, or whether anything physical is. In recent years there has been considerable debate over whether all mental states are intentional; in particular, over whether all conscious mental states are intentional or entirely intentional..
Crane, Tim (2003). The intentional structure of consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the first is not. And we also occasionally distinguish mental pain (which is normally understood as some kind of emotional distress) from the ‘physical pain’ one feels in one’s body. So what can be meant by saying that pain is a mental state? Of course, it only takes a little reflection shows that this naive view is mistaken. Pain is a state of consciousness, or an event in consciousness, and whether or not all states of mind are conscious, it is indisputable that only minds, or states of mind, are conscious.2 But does the naive view tell us anything about the concept of pain, or the concept of mind? I think it does. In this paper, I shall give reasons for thinking that consciousness is a form of intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’. I shall claim that the consciousness involved in bodily sensations like pain is constituted by the mind’s direction upon the part or region of the body where the sensation feels to be. Given this, it is less surprising that the naive view of pain says what it does: the apparent ‘physicality’ of pain is a consequence of confusing the object of the intentional state—the part of the body in which the pain is felt—with the state of being in pain
Davies, Paul Sheldon (1997). Deflating consciousness: A critical review of Fred Dretske's naturalizing the mind. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):541-550.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Fred Dretske asserts that the conscious or phenomenal experiences associated with our perceptual states—e.g. the qualitative or subjective features involved in visual or auditory states—are identical to properties that things have according to our representations of them. This is Dretske's version of the currently popular representational theory of consciousness . After explicating the core of Dretske's representational thesis, I offer two criticisms. I suggest that Dretske's view fails to apply to a broad range of mental phenomena that have rather distinctive subjective or qualitative features. I also suggest that Dretske's view, in identifying conscious experiences with features of our perceptual states, casts its aim too low. It deflates further than it should and, in consequence, fails to capture what are arguably some of the most important phenomena associated with our conscious lives
Deutsch, Max (2005). Intentionalism and intransitivity. Synthese 144 (1):1-22.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue in this paper that the existence of sorites series of color patches – series of color patches arranged so that the patches on each end look different in color though no two adjacent patches do – shows that the relation of same phenomenal charac­ter as is not a transitive relation. I then argue that the intransitivity of same phenomenal character as conflicts with certain versions of intentionalism, the view that an experiences phenomenal character is exhausted, or fully determined by its intentional content. Lastly, I consider various objections to the arguments and reply to them
Dilworth, John B. (2007). Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve _indeterminate _perceptual content, but a _double content_ (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it concludes with an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of information in indeterminacy cases
Dorsch, Fabian, Transparency and imagining seeing.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the most powerful arguments against intentionalism and in favour of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences has been formulated by M. G. F. Martin in his paper The Transparency of Experience. The overall structure of this argument may be stated in the form of a triad of claims which are jointly inconsistent
Dretske, Fred (2003). Experience as representation. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):67-82.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 674 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
Dretske, Fred (2000). Reply to Lopes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):455-459.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Droege, Paula (2003). Caging the Beast: A Theory of Sensory Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Droege, Paula (ms). Second sense: A theory of sensory consciousness.   (Google)
Earle, David C. (1998). On the roles of consciousness and representations in visual science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):757-758.   (Google)
Abstract: It is argued that there is a role for the representational conception of vision, and that this is compatible with the task-level account advocated by Pessoa et al. However, the role of representations must be understood independently of our conscious experience of vision
Ellis, Jonathan (2010). Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism. Philosophical Studies 147 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I argue that recent work on phenomenal concepts reveals that, contrary to appearances, this standard conjunction of externalism about content and internalism about phenomenal character is ultimately untenable on other models of phenomenal character as well, including even “qualia realism.” This would be significant for a number of reasons. The first is patent: it would undermine a primary objection to representationalism. The fact that representationalism is incompatible with the conjunction would be no serious problem for representationalism if no other plausible model of phenomenal character is compatible with it. The second is that the many philosophers who embrace the conjunction would be forced to abandon one of the two views; externalism would be true either of both content and phenomenal character, or of neither. Likewise, those philosophers who have taken a stance on only one of the two internalism/externalism debates would have to be seen as thereby committed to a particular stance on the other. The third reason stems from the fact that qualia realism typically goes hand in hand with internalism about phenomenal character. To the extent that it does, my argument would reveal that qualia realism is itself in tension with externalism about content. This would perhaps be the most surprising result of all
Gamble, Denise (1997). P-consciousness presentation/a-consciousness representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):149-150.   (Google)
Abstract: P-Consciousness (P) is to be understood in terms of an immediate fluctuating continuum that is a presentation of raw experiential matter against which A-consciousness (A) acts to objectify, impose form or make determinate “thinkable” contents. A representationalises P but P is not itself representational, at least in terms of some concepts of “representation.” Block's arguments fall short of establishing that P is representational and, given the sort of cognitive science assumptions he is working with, he is unable to account for the aspect of phenomenal content that he thinks goes beyond “representational” content. BBS discussion reveals the need for greater analysis and justification for a representationalist thesis of P
Gilman, Daniel (1997). Consciousness and mental representation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):150-151.   (Google)
Abstract: Block (1995t) has argued for a noncognitive and non- representational notion of phenomenal consciousness, but his putative examples of this phenomenon are conspicuous in their representational and functional properties while they do not clearly possess other phenomenal properties
Glock, H. J. (2003). Neural representationalism. Facta Philosophica 5 (1):105-129.   (Google)
Gray, Richard (2003). Tye's representationalism: Feeling the heat? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):245-256.   (Google)
Abstract: According to Tyes PANIC theory of consciousness, perceptualstates of creatures which are related to a disjunction ofexternal contents will fail to represent sensorily, andthereby fail to be conscious states. In this paper I arguethat heat perception, a form of perception neglected in therecent literature, serves as a counterexample to Tyesradical externalist claim. Having laid out Tyes `absentqualia scenario, the PANIC theory from which it derivesand the case of heat perception as a counterexample, Idefend the putative counterexample against three possibleresponses: (1) that heat perception represents general(i.e. non-disjunctive) intrinsic properties of objects,(2) that heat perception represents the non-specific heatenergy that is transferred between a subjects body andanother body and (3) that heat perception exclusivelyrepresents heat properties of the subjects own body
Gunderson, Keith (1972). Content and Consciousness. And the Mind-Body Problem.   (Google)
Guzeldere, Guven & Aydede, Murat (2000). On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):151-153.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded unless the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. However, this depends on establishing the existence of "phenomenal properties" that, according to Block, are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block fails to make a case for the existence of P-consciousness so long as he fails to make a case for the existence of phenomenal properties _so construed_ . We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties
Guzeldere, Guven & Aydede, Murat (1997). On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties. [Journal (Paginated)].   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This is a commentary on Block' article article, "On a Confusion About a Concept of Consciousness," BBS (1995) 18:2. We argue that BlockÕs charge of fallacy remains ungrounded unless the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. How-ever, this depends on establishing the existence of "phenomenal properties" that, according to Block, are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block fails to make a case for the existence of P-consciousness so long as he fails to make a case for the existence of phenomenal properties so construed. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties
Güzeldere, Güven & Aydede, Murat (1997). On the relation between phenomenal and representational properties. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):151-153.   (Google)
Abstract: We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded so long as the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. This, in turn, depends on establishing the existence of “phenomenal properties” that are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block leaves this fundamental thesis unsubstantiated. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties
Hall, Richard J. (2008). If it itches, scratch! Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):525 – 535.   (Google)
Abstract: Many bodily sensations are connected quite closely with specific actions: itches with scratching, for example, and hunger with eating. Indeed, these connections have the feel of conceptual connections. With the exception of D. M. Armstrong, philosophers have largely neglected this aspect of bodily sensations. In this paper, I propose a theory of bodily sensations that explains these connections. The theory ascribes intentional content to bodily sensations but not, strictly speaking, representational content. Rather, the content of these sensations is an imperative: in the case of itches, 'Scratch!' The view avoids non-intentional qualia and hence accords with what could be called, generalizing Lycan slightly, the 'hegemony of intentionality'
Harman, Gilbert (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.   (Cited by 245 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Haselager, Pim; de Groot, A. & van Rappard, H. (2003). Representationalism vs. anti-representationalism: A debate for the sake of appearance. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):5-23.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent years the cognitive science community has witnessed the rise of a new, dynamical approach to cognition. This approach entails a framework in which cognition and behavior are taken to result from complex dynamical interactions between brain, body, and environment. The advent of the dynamical approach is grounded in a dissatisfaction with the classical computational view of cognition. A particularly strong claim has been that cognitive systems do not rely on internal representations and computations. Focusing on this claim, we take as a starting point a question recently raised by Cliff and Noble: " if evolution did produce a design that used internal representations, how would we recognize it?" (Knowledge-based vision and simple visual machines, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences, 352 , 1165-1175, 1997). We will argue that cognitive science lacks a proper operationalization of the notion of representation, and therefore is unable to fruitfully discuss whether a particular system has representations or not. A basic method to detect representations in a physical system, grounded in isomorphism, turns out to be quite unconstrained. We will look at a practical example of this problem by examining the debate on whether or not van Gelder's (What might cognition be, if not computation? Journal of Philosophy, 92 , 345-381, 1995) controversial example of the Watt Governor is representational. We will conclude that cognitive science, as of yet, has no empirically applicable means to answer Cliff and Noble's question unequivocally. This makes the recent representationalism vs. anti-representationalism debate a debate for the sake of appearance
Hellie, Benj (2002). Consciousness and representationalism. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hellie, Benj (2001). Presence to the Mind: Issues in the Intentional Theory of Consciousness. Dissertation, Princeton University   (Google)
Hellie, Benj (2009). Representationalism. In Patrick Wilken, Tim Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford UP.   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (2006). Harman on self referential thoughts. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):346-357.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. Moreover, I feel that it is extremely useful. Without deploying it, how could we tell the whole truth about the nature of thoughts?
Hopkins, James (ms). Representation of the inner and the concept of mind.   (Google)
Abstract: Three philosophical problems -- the problem of the external world, the problem of other minds, and the problem of consciousness -- seem rooted in the way we conceive experience. We tend to think of our experiences as having a nature which is radically distinct from that of the world which they present to us. This emerges in a series of oppositions as between experience and the world, which we can set out as follows
Hubbard, Timothy L. (2007). What is mental representation? And how does it relate to consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):37-61.   (Google)
Abstract: The relationship between mental representation and consciousness is considered. What it means to 'represent', and several types of representation (e.g., analogue, digital, spatial, linguistic, mathematical), are described. Concepts relevant to mental representation in general (e.g., multiple levels of processing, structure/process differences, mapping) and in specific domains (e.g., mental imagery, linguistic/propositional theories, production systems, connectionism, dynamics) are discussed. Similarities (e.g., using distinctions between different forms of representation to predict different forms of consciousness, parallels between digital architectures of the brain and connectionist models) and dissociations (e.g., insensitivity to gaps in subjective experience, explicit memory/implicit memory, automatic processing/controlled processing, blindsight, neglect, prediction/ explanation) of mental representation and consciousness are discussed. It is concluded that representational systems are separable from consciousness systems, and that mental representation appears necessary but not sufficient for consciousness. Considerations for future research on correspondences between representation and consciousness are suggested
Jackson, Frank (2007). Colour for representationalists. Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):169--85.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Redness is the property that makes things look red in normal circumstances. That seems obvious enough. But then colour is whatever property does that job: a certain reflectance profile as it might be. Redness is the property something is represented to have when it looks red. That seems obvious enough. But looking red does not represent that which looks red as having a certain reflectance profile. What should we say about this antinomy and how does our answer impact on the contest between realism and subjectivism about colour? I address the issues through the lens of a representationalist position on colour experience
Jackson, Frank (1998). Causal roles and higher-order properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):657-661.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Jacovides, Michael (ms). Do experiences represent?   (Google)
Jackson, Frank (2004). Representation and experience. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Jackson, Frank (ms). Some reflections on representationalism.   (Google)
Jackson, Frank (2006). The knowledge argument, diaphanousness, representationalism. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Jagnow, René (2009). How representationalism can account for the phenomenal significance of illumination. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I defend a representationalist account of the phenomenal character of color experiences. Representationalism, the thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on a certain kind of representational content, so-called phenomenal content, has been developed primarily in two different ways, as Russellian and Fregean representationalism. While the proponents of Russellian and Fregean representationalism differ with respect to what they take the contents of color experiences to be, they typically agree that colors are exhaustively characterized by the three dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation, and lightness. I argue that a viable version of representationalism needs to renounce this restriction to three dimensions and consider illumination to be a genuine phenomenal dimension of color. My argument for this thesis falls into two parts. I first consider the phenomenon of color constancy in order to show that neither Russellian nor Fregean representationalism can do justice to the phenomenal significance of local illumination. I subsequently formulate a version of representationalism that accounts for illumination by taking it as a phenomenal dimension of color
Jakab, Zoltán (2006). Metameric surfaces: The ultimate case against color physicalism and representational theories of phenomenal consciousness. Dialectica 60 (3):283-306.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Janzen, Greg (2008). Intentionalism and change blindness. Philosophia 36 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:  According to reductive intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is constituted by the experience's intentional (or representational) content. In this article I attempt to show that a phenomenon in visual perception called change blindness poses a problem for this doctrine. Specifically, I argue that phenomenal character is not sensitive, as it should be if reductive intentionalism is correct, to fine-grained variations in content. The standard anti-intentionalist strategy is to adduce putative cases in which phenomenal character varies despite sameness of content. This paper explores an alternative antiintentionalist tack, arguing, by way of a specific example involving change blindness, that content can vary despite sameness of phenomenal character
Janzen, Greg (2006). The representational theory of phenomenal character: A phenomenological critique. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321--339.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to a currently popular approach to the analysis of phenomenal character mandates that the phenomenal character of an experience is entirely determined by, and is in fact identical with, the experience
John, James (2005). Representationism, phenomenism, and the intuitive view. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):159-184.   (Google)
John, James (2005). Representationism, Phenomenism, and the Intuitive View. Philosophical topics 33:159-184.   (Google)
Kalderon, Mark Eli (forthcoming). Color Illusion. Nous.   (Google)
Abstract: As standardly conceived,an illusion is an experience of an object o appearing F where o is not in fact F. Paradigm examples of color illusion, however, do not fit this pattern. A diagnosis of this uncovers different sense of appearance talk that is the basis of a dilemma for the standard conception. The dilemma is only a challenge. But if the challenge cannot be met, then any conception of experience, such as representationalism, that is committed to the standard conception is false. Perhaps surprisingly, naïve realism provides a better account of color illusion.
Kennedy, Matthew (2009). Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recently representationalists have cited a phenomenon known as the transparency of experience in arguments against the qualia theory. Representationalists take transparency to support their theory and to work against the qualia theory. In this paper I argue that representationalist assessment of the philosophical importance of transparency is incorrect. The true beneficiary of transparency is another theory, naïve realism. Transparency militates against qualia and the representationalist theory of experience. I describe the transparency phenomenon, and I use my description to argue for naïve realism and against representationalism and the qualia theory. I also examine the relationship between phenomenological study and phenomenal character, and discuss the results in connection with the argument from hallucination
Kind, Amy (2007). Restrictions on representationalism. Philosophical Studies 134:405-427.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to representationalism, the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states supervenes on the intentional content of such states. Strong representationalism makes a further claim: the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states _consists in_ the intentional content of such states. Although strong representationalism has greatly increased in popularity over the last decade, I find the view deeply implausible. In what follows, I will attempt to argue against strong representationalism by a two-step argument. First, I suggest that strong representationalism must be _unrestricted_ in order to serve as an adequate theory of qualia, i.e., it must apply to all qualitative mental states. Second, I present considerations to show that an unrestricted form of strong representationalism is problematic
Kind, Amy (2003). What's so transparent about transparency? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will suggest, there is reason to believe that experience is not transparent in the way that representationalism requires. Although there is a sense in which experience can be said to be transparent, transparency in this sense does not give us any particular motivation for representationalism—or at least, not the pure or strong representationalism that it is usually invoked to support
Kriegel, Uriah (2002). Phenomenal content. Erkenntnis 57 (2):175-198.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2002). PANIC theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Michael Tye has recently argued that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences is "one and the same as" (1) Poised (2) Abstract (3) Non-conceptual (4) Intentional Content (PANIC). Tye argues extensively that PANIC Theory accounts for differences in phenomenal character in representational terms. But another task of a theory of phenomenal consciousness is to account for the difference between those mental states that have phenomenal character at all and those that do not. By going through each of the four qualifiers of PANIC, we argue that PANIC Theory fails to account for this difference in genuinely representational terms. We suggest, furthermore, that the reasons it fails are likely to be endemic to all representational theories of phenomenal consciousness
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2004). Some arguments against intentionalism. Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Recently, many have argued that phenomenal content supervenes on representational content; i.e. that the phenomenal character of an experience is wholly determined (metaphysically, not causally) by the representational content of that experience. This paper it identifies many counter-examples to intentionalism. Further, this paper shows that, if intentionalism were correct, that would require that an untenable form of representational atomism also be correct. Our argument works both against the idea that phenomenal content supervenes on “conceptual” content and also against the idea that it supervenes on “non-conceptual” content. It is also shown that the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content has been wrongly conceived as distinction between different kinds of information: in fact, it is a distinction between ways of packaging information that is, in itself, neither conceptual or non-conceptual
LeGrand, Dorothy (2005). Transparently oneself: Commentary on Metzinger's Being No-One. Psyche 11 (5).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Different points of Metzinger's position makes it a peculiar form of representationalism: (1) his distinction between intentional and phenomenal content, in relation to the internalism/externalism divide; (2) the notion of transparency defined at a phenomenal and not epistemic level, together with (3) the felt inwardness of experience. The distinction between reflexive and pre-reflexive phenomenal internality will allow me to reconsider Metzinger's theory of the self and to propose an alternative conception that I will describe both at an epistemic and a phenomenal level
Levine, Joseph (1997). Are qualia just representations? Mind and Language 12:101-13.   (Google)
Levine, Joseph (2003). Experience and representation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Levi, Don S. (1997). Representation: The eleventh problem of consciousness. Inquiry 40 (4):457-473.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (2008). Secondary Qualities: Where Consciousness and Intentionality Meet. Monist 91 (2).   (Google)
Lloyd, Dan (1997). Consciousness and its discontents. Communication and Cognition 30 (3-4):273-284.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Lloyd, Dan (1991). Leaping to conclusions: Connectionism, consciousness, and the computational mind. In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Lomas, Dennis (1998). Representational theory emerges unscathed. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):764-765.   (Google)
Abstract: Representationalism emerges unscathed from Pessoa et al.'s attack. They fail to undermine a key reason for its influence: it has the theoretical resources to explain many illusory visual experiences such as illusory contours and features. Furthermore, in attempting to undermine representationalism, the authors seem to erect an unduly inflated distinction between neural accounts of perception and personal-level accounts of perception
Lopes, Dominic M. M. (2000). What is it like to see with your ears? The representational theory of mind. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):439-453.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Luccio, Riccardo (2003). Isomorphism and representationalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4):418-419.   (Google)
Abstract: Lehar tries to build a computational theory that succeeds in offering the same computational model for both phenomenal experience and visual processing. However, the vision that Lehar has about isomorphism in Gestalttheorie as representational, is not adequate. The main limit of Lehar's model derives from this misunderstanding of the relation between phenomenal and physiological levels
Lurz, Robert W. (2000). A defense of first-order representationalist theories of mental-state consciousness. Psyche 6 (1).   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Lycan, William G. (1996). Consciousness and Experience. MIT Press.   (Cited by 346 | Google)
Lycan, William G. (1998). In defense of the representational theory of qualia. Philosophical Perspectives 12:479-87.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1998). In defense of the representational theory of qualia (replies to Neander, Rey, and tye). Philosophical Perspectives 12.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1996). Layered perceptual representation. Philosophical Issues 7:81-100.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1987). Phenomenal objects: A backhanded defense. Philosophical Perspectives 3:513-26.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (online). Representational theories of consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The idea of representation has been central in discussions of intentionality for many years. But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind, particularly in theories of consciousness. Indeed, there are now multiple representational theories of consciousness, corresponding to different uses of the term "conscious," each attempting to explain the corresponding phenomenon in terms of representation. More cautiously, each theory attempts to explain its target phenomenon in terms of _intentionality_, and assumes that intentionality is representation
Lycan, William G. (2001). Response to Polger and Flanagan. Minds and Machines 11 (1):127-132.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1996). Replies to Tomberlin, Tye, Stalnaker and Block. Philosophical Issues 7:127-142.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Macpherson, Fiona (2006). Ambiguous figures and the content of experience. Noûs 40 (1):82-117.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counter-example to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judge- ments to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position
Macpherson, Fiona (2005). Colour inversion problems for representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more damaging to externalist representationalist views than have been previously thought. More specifically, I argue that representationalists who endorse externalism about experiential content either have to become internalists about the content of propositional attitudes or they have to adopt a novel variety of externalism about the content of propositional attitudes. This novel type of propositional attitude externalism is investigated. It can be seen that adopting it forces one to reject Putnam
Macpherson, Fiona (2003). Novel colours and the content of experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation
Macpherson, Fiona (1999). Perfect pitch and the content of experience. Philosophy and Anthropology 3 (2).   (Google | More links)
Macpherson, Fiona (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, University of Stirling   (Google | More links)
Mandik, Pete (2009). Beware of the unicorn: Consciousness as being represented and other things that don't exist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (1):5-36.   (Google)
Abstract: Higher-Order Representational theories of consciousness — HORs — primarily seek to explain a mental state’s being conscious in terms of the mental state’s being represented by another mental state. First-Order Representational theories of consciousness — FORs — primarily seek to explain a property’s being phenomenal in terms of the property being represented in experience. Despite differences in both explanans and explananda, HORs and FORs share a reliance on there being such a property as being represented. In this paper I develop an argument — the Unicorn Argument — against both HORs and FORs. The core of the Unicorn is that since there are mental rep- resentations of things that do not exist, there cannot be any such prop- erty as being represented, and thus no such property with which to identify either being conscious or being phenomenal.
Mandik, Pete (1999). Qualia, space, and control. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space
Marcus, Eric (2006). Intentionalism and the imaginability of the inverted spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to which the representational content of an experience fixes what it
Maund, J. Barry (online). Tye on phenomenal character and color.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
McCulloch, Gregory (1993). The very idea of the phenomenological. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:39-57.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
McIntyre, Ronald (1999). Naturalizing phenomenology? Dretske on qualia. In Ronald McIntyre (ed.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in Naturalizing Phenomenology: Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, ed. by Jean Petitot et al. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 429-439
Metzinger, Thomas (2004). The subjectivity of subjective experience: A representationalist analysis of the first-person perspective. Networks.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into the theoretical model as it grows and becomes more refined. This paper makes an attempt at sketching the outlines of such a theory, offering a representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person perspective. Three phenomenal target properties are centrally relevant:
Miguens, Sofia (2002). Qualia or non epistemic perception: D. Dennett's and F. Dretske's representational theories of consciousness. Agora 21 (2):193-208.   (Google)
Millar, Boyd (2010). Peacocke's trees. Synthese 174 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: In Sense and Content , Christopher Peacocke points out that two equally-sized trees at different distances from the perceiver are normally represented to be the same size, despite the fact that in a certain sense the nearer tree looks bigger ; he concludes on the basis of this observation that visual experiences possess irreducibly phenomenal properties. This argument has received the most attention of all of Peacocke’s arguments for separatism—the view that the intentional and phenomenal properties of experiences are independent of one another. However, despite its notoriety, the argument is widely misunderstood and underappreciated. I argue that once the structure of the argument is clarified and the replies that have been offered are considered closely, one must conclude that the trees argument is successful
Neander, Karen (1998). The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for representationalist theories of consciousness. Philosophical Perspectives 12:411-34.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Nickel, Bernhard (2006). Against intentionalism. Philosophical Studies.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to super?cially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (1983), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke
Noordhof, Paul (2001). In pain. Analysis 61 (2):95-97.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: When I feel a pain in my leg, how should we understand the
Noordhof, Paul (2002). More in pain. Analysis 62 (2):153-154.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
O'Dea, John (2006). Representationalism, supervenience, and the cross-modal problem. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):285-95.   (Google)
Abstract: The representational theory of phenomenal experience is often stated in terms of a supervenience thesis: Byrne recently characterises it as the thesis that “there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content”, while according to Tye, “[a]t a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character.” Consequently, much of the debate over whether representationalism is true centres on purported counter-examples – that is to say, purported failures of supervenience. The refutation of putative counter-examples has been, it seems to me, by and large successful. But there is a certain class of these for which the representationalist response has been something less than completely convincing. These are the cross-modality cases. I will explain what I mean, and then argue that the response in question is not only unconvincing but actually undermines the representationalist position.
O'Dea, John (2008). Transparency and the unity of experience. In E. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: If we assume that the operation of each sense modality constitutes a different experience – a visual experience, an auditory experience, etc – we are faced with the problem of how those distinct experiences come together to form a unified perceptual encounter with the world. Michael Tye has recently argued that the best way to get around this problem is to deny altogether that there are such things as purely visual (and so forth) experiences. Here I aim to show not simply that Tye’s proposed solution fails, but that its failure is highly instructive because it allows us to see that the transparency thesis, which lies at the heart of the case against qualia, and of most representationalist theories of experience, is more problematic than is often supposed
O'Dea, John (forthcoming). A Proprioceptive Account of the Senses. In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. OUP.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationalist theories of sensory experience are often thought to be vulnerable to the existence of apparently non-representational differences between experiences in different sensory modalities. Seeing and hearing seem to differ in their qualia, quite apart from what they represent. The origin of this idea is perhaps Grice’s argument, in “Some Remarks on the Senses,” that the senses are distinguished by “introspectible character.” In this chapter I take the Representationalist side by putting forward an account of sense modalities which is consistent with that view and yet pays due regard to the intuition behind Grice’s argument. Employing J.J. Gibson’s distinction between exploratory and performatory behaviour, I point to a proprioceptive element in perceptual experience, and identify this as crucial in any account of what makes a particular way of perceiving a sense modality.
Pace, Michael (2007). Blurred vision and the transparency of experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):328–354.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper considers an objection to intentionalism (the view that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on intentional content) based on the phenomenology of blurred vision. Several intentionalists, including Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, and Timothy Crane, have proposed intentionalist explanations of blurred vision phenomenology. I argue that their proposals fail and propose a solution of my own that, I contend, is the only promising explanation consistent with intentionalism. The solution, however, comes at a cost for intentionalists; it involves rejecting the "transparency of experience", a doctrine that has been the basis for the central argument in favor of intentionalism
Pacherie, (1999). Leibhaftigkeit and representational theories of perception. In Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Pacherie, Elisabeth (1999). Qualia and representations. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution.   (Google | More links)
Parnas, Josef & Zahavi, Dan (1998). Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):687-705.   (Google)
Pautz, Adam (2006). Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism. Noûs 40 (2):205-240.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Pautz, Adam (online). Tracking intentionalism and optimal conditions: A reply to Byrne and Tye.   (Google)
Abstract: In the mid-nineties, Fred Dretske, William Lycan and Michael Tye published books defending an ambitious new reductive program. The program came in two stages. The first was to defend Intentionalism. The second was to reduce the secondary qualities to external physical properties and then to explain sensory representation in terms of tracking under optimal conditions or biological function. The old reductive program was internalist: the idea used to be that we could reduce experiences to brain states. The new reductive program is externalist
Phillips, Ian (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. Dissertation, Oxford University   (Google)
Abstract: Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti -Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties
Pitson, A. E. (1986). The new representationalism. Philosophical Papers 15 (August):41-49.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Platchias, Dimitris (2008). Representationalism, symmetrical supervenience and identity. Philosophia 37 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to some representationalists (M. Tye, Ten problems of consciousness, MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA, 1995; W.G. Lycan, Consciousness and experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1996; F. Dretske, Naturalising the mind, MIT Press, Massachusetts, USA 1995), qualia are identical to external environmental states or features. When one perceives a red rose for instance, one is visually representing the actual redness of the rose. The represented redness of the rose is the actual redness of the rose itself. Thus redness is not a property of one’s experience but an externally constituted property of the perceived physical object. In this sense, qualia are out there, in the external world. Here, I argue that the main representationalist arguments to this effect, if successful, establish no more than a symmetrical supervenience relation between representational content and qualia, and that a supervenience relation alone (albeit symmetrical) doesn’t suffice for identity. This supervenience thesis between qualia and representational content leaves open the question as to the essential nature of qualia
Polger, Thomas W. & Flanagan, Owen J. (2001). A decade of teleofunctionalism: Lycan's consciousness and consciousness and experience. Minds and Machines 11 (1):113-126.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Pouresmail, Yasser (ms). A Representational Account of the Ineffability of Consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Pouresmail, Yasser (ms). Phombie and the Transparency Thesis.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I will deal with the possibility conditions of transparency thesis (TT). I shall argue that TT is itself a feature of our phenomenology, thus, it doesn't entail an externalist account of qualia. I will make my point by devising two different scenarios in one of which, those relevant features are missing, and in the second one, those relevant features are available. In the first case, I will argue, TT does not work, and in the second one, it works but without there being a represented content in the environment. Thereby I will show that TT is itself grounded in some pure phenomenological features and by no means indicates that phenomenology is constituted by the representational character of experience.
Prosser, Simon (forthcoming). The two-dimensional content of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 136:319--349.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker
Radner, Daisie (1976). Representationalism in Arnauld's act theory of perception. Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (1).   (Google)
Raftopoulos, Athanassios & Müller, Vincent C. (2006). The phenomenal content of experience. Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a type of awareness called phenomenal awareness constitute the phenomenal content of experience. The phenomenal content of perception contains the existence of objects as separate things that persist in time and time, spatiotemporal information, and information regarding relative spatial relations, motion, surface properties, shape, size, orientation, color, and their functional properties
Raymont, Paul (online). Some experienced qualities belong to the experience.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, a criticism of representationalist views of consciousness is developed. These views are often supported by an appeal to a transparency thesis about conscious states, according to which an experience does not itself possess the qualities of which it makes one conscious. The experience makes one conscious of these qualities by representing them, not by instantiating them. Against this, it is argued that some of the properties of which one is conscious are had by the conscious state itself. Only by adopting this view can we account for certain perceptual incompatibilities, such as the fact that one cannot see a stick as being both bent and not bent. This sort of experience is impossible because it would require that an experience have, and not just represent, incompatible features
Rey, Georges (2004). A deflated intentionalist alternative to Clark's unexplanatory metaphysics. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):519-540.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionalism, but I see no reason for him to resist a properly deflated version of it that I sketch. Moreover, such intentionalism seems to me to stand a better chance than Clark's reliance on properties in explaining the peculiar ways in which experience appears to us that so concern the qualiaphile
Rey, Georges (1998). A narrow representationalist account of qualitative experience. Philosophical Perspectives 12:435-58.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (1991). Sensations in a language of thought. Philosophical Issues 1:73-112.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (1993). Sensational sentences. In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Blackwell.   (Cited by 22 | Annotation | Google)
Rinofner-Kreidl, Sonja (2004). Representationalism and beyond: A phenomenological critique of Thomas Metzinger's self-model theory. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):88-108.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (1998). Intrinsic qualities of experience: Surviving Harman's critique. Erkenntnis 47 (3):285-309.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Gilbert Harman (1990) seeks to defend psychophysical functionalism by articulating a representationalist view of the qualities of experience. The negative side of the present paper argues that the resources of this representationalist view are insufficient to ground the evident distinction between perception and (mere) thought. This failure makes the view unable to support the uses to which Harman wishes to put it. Several rescuing moves by other representationalists are considered, but none is found successful. Part of the difficulty in Harman's (...) work is that he does not adequately specify the view he rejects. The positive aim of the present paper is to provide a robust intrinsic quality account of experience that offers advantages in comparison with Harman's view, and that plainly does not fall to any of the arguments he advances
Ryder, Dan (ms). The autonomic nervous system and Dretske on phenomenal consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Schroer, Robert (2009). Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism? Philosophical Papers 39 (1):93-110.   (Google)
Abstract: : Although Externalism is widely accepted as a thesis about belief, as a thesis about experience it is both controversial and unpopular. One potential explanation of this difference involves the phenomenality of perceptual experience—perhaps there is something about how perceptual experiences seem that straightforwardly speaks against Externalist accounts of their individuation conditions. In this paper, I investigate this idea by exploring the role that the phenomenality of color experience plays in a prominent argument against Phenomenal Externalism: Ned Block’s Inverted Earth Argument. In the course of carrying out this investigation, I will show that challenging Phenomenal Externalism on phenomenological grounds is not as straightforward a task as it is commonly assumed to be.
Schroer, Robert (2004). Environmental representationalists on afterimages and phosphenes: Putting our best foot forward. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):531-546.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Environmental representationalism is the position that phenomenal differences between visual experiences are determined by the representational claims those experiences make about the surrounding environment. Afterimage and phosphene experiences are an important and widely cited objection to this position. In this paper, I defend environmental representationalism from this objection. In particular, I point out several ways in which typical environmental representationalist accounts of these experiences are lacking while developing a more satisfying account which focuses on how the visual system generates its representations as well as on several of the unique temporally-extended features of afterimage/phosphene experiences.
Schroer, Robert (2002). Matching sensible qualities: A skeleton in the closet for representationalism. Philosophical Studies 107 (3):259-73.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The intransitivity of matching sensible qualities of color is a threat not only to the sense-data theory, but to all realist theories of sensible qualities, including the current leading realist theory: representationalism. I save representationalism from this threat by way of a novel yet empirically plausible hypothesis about the introspective classification of sensible qualities of color. I argue that due to limitations of the visual system's ability to extract fine-grained information about color from the environment, introspective classification of sensible qualities of color is sensitive to features of context. I finish by arguing for the superiority of my solution over two alternative solutions: one by Nelson Goodman, the other by C.L. Hardin.
Schroer, Robert (2002). Seeing it all clearly: The real story on blurry vision. American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):297-301.   (Google)
Abstract: Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience supervenes upon its representational content. The phenomenon of blurry vision is thought to raise a difficulty for this position. More specifically, it is alleged that representationalists cannot account for the phenomenal difference between clearly seeing an indistinct edge and blurrily seeing a distinct edge solely in terms of represented features of the surrounding environment. I defend representationalism from this objection by offering a novel account of the phenomenal difference between these two kinds of cases.
Schellenberg, Susanna (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.
Scott, Michael (2007). Distinguishing the senses. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):257 – 262.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Seeing, hearing and touching are phenomenally different, even if we are detecting the same spatial properties with each sense. This presents a prima facie problem for intentionalism, the theory that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. The paper reviews some attempts to resolve this problem, and then looks in detail at Peter Carruthers' recent proposal that the senses can be individuated by the way in which they represent spatial properties and incorporate time. This proposal is shown to be ineffective in distinguishing auditory from either visual or tactual perception, and substantial classes of visual and tactual perceptions are found that the posited spatial and temporal features fail to individuate
Seager, William E. (1997). Critical notice of Fred Dretske's Naturalizing the Mind. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):83-109.   (Google)
Seager, William E. & Bourget, David (2007). Representationalism about consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Abstract: A representationalist-friendly introduction to representationalism which covers a number of central problems and objections.
Seager, William E. (1999). Representational theories of consciousness, parts I and II. In William E. Seager (ed.), Theories of Consciousness: An Introduction and Assessment. Routledge.   (Google)
Seager, William E. (online). Some awkwardness in poised content?   (Google)
Seager, William E. (2003). Tye on consciousness: Time to panic? Philosophical Studies 113 (3):237-247.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (ms). Content, color, and character I: Against standard representationalism.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (ms). Content, color, and character II: A better sort of representationalism.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney, Content, character and color I: Against standard representationalism.   (Google)
Abstract: The words “content” and “character” in my title refer to the representational content and phenomenal character of color experiences. So my topic concerns the nature of our experience of color. But I will, of course, be talking about colors as well as color experience. Let me set the stage by mentioning some things, some more controversial than others, that I will be taking for granted. I assume, to begin with, that objects in the world have colors, and have them independently of being perceived to have them, and independently even of there being creatures capable of perceiving them. I think, and this of course sets me apart from the many color irrealists among philosophers and color scientists, that any reasonable semantics for color terms, and any reasonable account of the reference of color concepts, should yield the result that colors are properties of external things that are realized in certain of their physical properties, namely those responsible for their reflecting or emitting the light whose impact on our retinas is involved in causing our color perceptions. This brings me to a further assumption that I shall be making, namely the truth of physicalism. I take physicalism to be the thesis that all properties of things either are or are realized in basic physical properties, where basic physical properties are the properties that underlie the behavior and causal powers of inanimate things. There are two ways in which the commitment to physicalism will figure in my discussion. First, I assume that colors are physically realized properties. Second, I assume that color experiences are physically realized. These two commitments frame the problem I am discussing – how can colors be properties realized in the microphysical properties of things, and how can color experience be so realized? I don’t think there is any generally accepted account of what it is for a property to be “realized in” other properties. For those who think, as I do, that properties are individuated by their causal features, it should seem plausible to say that property P realizes property Q just in case the forward looking causal features of Q are a subset of the forward looking causal features of P, and the backward looking....
Shoemaker, Sydney, Content, character, and color II: A better kind of representationalism.   (Google)
Abstract: From now on I will assume that it is possible in principle for there to be cases of spectrum inversion in which the invertees are equally good perceivers of the colors. What I want to show next is that while allowing this possibility is incompatible with standard representationalism, it requires acceptance of a different version of representationalism. Consider the standard way of describing a case of spectrum inversion. Returning to Jack and Jill, we say that red things look to Jack the way green things look to Jill, blue things look to Jack the way yellow things look to Jill, and so on. Of course, we might also express this by saying that the phenomenal character of Jack’s experience of red things is like the phenomenal character of Jill’s experience of green things, and so on. Or by saying that “what it is like” for Jack to see red things is “what it is like” for Jill to see green things, and so on. But “phenomenal character” is philosophical jargon, and “what it is like” is on its way to being that. We need to be able cash these locutions in terms that we are sure we understand. And I think that the best way of doing that is in terms of how things look. Now the sense in which red things look different to Jack and Jill cannot be that they look to have different colors in the epistemic sense. We can suppose that both perceive red things as being red, and therefore that to both red things look red in the epistemic sense. Nor can it be the comparative sense – to each, we can suppose, red things look like standard red things under standard conditions. The remaining sense of “looks” is supposed to be the phenomenal sense. Now those who employ this notion typically speak of things as looking red, blue, yellow, etc., in the phenomenal sense. But if Jack and Jill are both accurate perceivers of the colors of things, it can’t be that the difference in how things look to them is a difference in what colors things look to them, even if “looks” is used in the phenomenal sense..
Shoemaker, Sydney (1991). Qualia and consciousness. Mind 100 (399):507-24.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1998). Two cheers for representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):671-678.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Soldati, Gianfranco, Intentionalism and phenomenal error.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we shall address some issues concerning the relation between the content and the nature of perceptual experience. More precisely, we shall ask whether the claim that perceptual experiences are by nature relational implies that they cannot be intentional. As we shall see, much depends in this respect on the way one understands the possibility for one to be wrong about the phenomenal nature of one’s own experience. We shall argue that once this very possibility is properly understood, the metaphysical claim that perceptual experiences are relational is compatible with the view that they are intentional. Before presenting the argument, we should try to articulate some elements of an intentionalist approach concerning the role of experience in our relation to ourselves and to our environment. The picture should offer a motivation for the arguments that follow. more about illusions etc (see Clatilde’s comments)
Dorsch, Fabian & Soldati, Gianfranco, Intentionalism, experiential and phenomenal error.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper we shall address some issues concerning the relation between the content and the nature of perceptual experiences. More precisely, we shall ask whether the claim that perceptual experiences are by nature relational implies that they cannot be intentional. As we shall see, much depends in this respect on the way one understands the possibility for one to be wrong about the phenomenal nature of one’s own experience. We shall describe and distinguish a series of errors that can occur in our introspective access to our perceptual experiences. We shall argue that once the nature of these different kinds of error are properly understood, the metaphysical claim that perceptual experiences are relational can be seen to be compatible with the view that they are intentional. Before presenting the argument, we should try to articulate some elements of an intentionalist approach concerning the role of experience in our relation to ourselves and to our environment. The picture should offer a motivation for the arguments that follow
Speaks, Jeff (2010). Attention and intentionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many alleged counter-examples to intentionalism, the thesis that the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of a given sense modality supervenes on the contents of experiences of that modality, can be avoided by adopting a liberal view of the sorts of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. I argue that there is a class of counter-examples to intentionalism, based on shifts in attention, which avoids this response. A necessary connection between the contents and phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences can be preserved by distinguishing perceptual phenomenology from the phenomenology of attention; but even if this distinction is viable, these cases put pressure on the thesis that phenomenal character can, in general, be explained in terms of mental representation
Speaks, Jeff (forthcoming). Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: Even if spectrum inversion of various sorts is possible, spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is not. So spectrum inversion does not pose a challenge for the intentionalist thesis that, necessarily, within a given sense modality, if two experiences are alike with respect to content, they are also alike with respect to their phenomenal character. On the contrary, reflection on variants of standard cases of spectrum inversion provides a strong argument for intentionalism. Depending on one's views about the possibility of various other sorts of spectrum inversion, the impossibility of spectrum inversion without difference in representation can also be used as an argument against a wide variety of reductive theories of mental representation.
Speaks, Jeff (2009). Transparency, intentionalism, and the nature of perceptual content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond to these worries by arguing that Russellianism is consistent with intentionalism, that their conjunction is consistent with both internalism about phenomenology and externalism about perceptual content, and that the resulting view receives independent support from the relationship between hallucination and thought.
Stalnaker, Robert (1996). On a defense of the hegemony of representation. Philosophical Issues 7:101-108.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Stecker, Robert A. (2006). Moderate actual intentionalism defended. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 64 (4):429-438.   (Google | More links)
Stoljar, Daniel (2007). Consequences of intentionalism. Erkenntnis (Special Issue) 66 (1-2):247--70.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Most of the recent discussion in philosophy of mind concerning intentionalism
Stoljar, Daniel (2004). The argument from diaphanousness. In M. Escurdia, Robert J. Stainton & Christopher D. Viger (eds.), Language, Mind and World: Special Issue of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. University of Alberta Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction In ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, G.E.Moore observed that, "when we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous" (1922; p.25). Many philosophers, but Gilbert Harman (1990, 1996) in particular, have suggested that this observation forms the basis of an argument against qualia, usually called the argument from diaphanousness or transparency.1 But even its friends concede that it is none too clear what the argument from diaphanousness—as I will call it—is (Tye 2000; p.45).2 The purpose of this paper is to formulate the argument, and to assess its merits. My conclusion will be that qualia realists have little to fear from the argument—provided both qualia and diaphanousness are properly understood
Stoljar, Daniel (1996). What what it's like isn't like. Analysis 56 (4):281-83.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Switankowsky, Irene (1999). Dretske on naturalizing experience. Dialogue 38 (3):561-566.   (Google)
Thompson, Brad J. (2006). Color constancy and Russellian representationalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationalism, the view that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content, has attracted a wide following in recent years. Most representationalists have also endorsed what I call 'standard Russellianism'. According to standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. I argue that standard Russellianism conflicts with the everyday experience of colour constancy. Due to colour constancy, standard Russellianism is unable to simultaneously give a proper account of the phenomenal content of colour experience and do justice to its phenomenology
Thomas, Nigel, Consciousness, color, and content.   (Google)
Abstract: For some reason I never received the printer's proofs for this review before it was published. As a consequence, several typographical errors occur in the version published in Minds and Machines , and one of them is serious. Several lines of my original text (about 140 words) were lost from one paragraph. What is worse, it appears that the paragraph was then copy edited so that it is no longer obvious that text is missing, except for the fact that the argument no longer makes any sense! In this online version, text, punctuation etc. that I have found to be missing or incorrectly printed in the published version appears in..
Thompson, Brad J. (2008). Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra. Synthese 160 (2):203-213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of (...) Standard Russellianism is to hold that spectrum inversion without illusion is conceivable but not in fact possible. I argue that this response fails. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent mind-independent physical properties
Thomas, Nigel J. T. (2003). Michael Tye, consciousness, color, and content, representation and mind series, cambridge, ma/london: A Bradford book, MIT press, 2000, XIII + 198 pp., $29.95 (cloth), ISBN 0-262-20129-. Minds and Machines 13 (3).   (Google)
Thomasson, Amie (2008). Phenomenal consciousness and the phenomenal world. Monist 91 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: One-level accounts of consciousness have become increasingly popular (Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Siewert 1998, Thomasson 2000 and 2005, Lurz 2006, McGinn, this volume). By a ‘onelevel’ account I mean an account according to which consciousness is fundamentally a matter of awareness of a world —and does not require awareness of our own minds, mental states, or the phenomenal character of these. As Fred Dretske puts it “Experiences and beliefs are conscious, not because you are conscious of them, but because, so to speak, you are conscious with them”
Thompson, Brad J. (2008). Representationalism and the argument from hallucination. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Phenomenal character is determined by representational content, which both hallucinatory and veridical experiences can share. But in the case of veridical experience, unlike hallucination, the external objects of experience literally have the properties one is aware of in experience. The representationalist can accept the common factor assumption without having to introduce sensory intermediaries between the mind and the world, thus securing a form of direct realism
Thompson, Evan (2008). Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery. Synthese 160 (3):203--213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the properties of experience are the external properties represented by experience, is an inadequate account of conscious experience
Thompson, Brad J. (2007). Shoemaker on phenomenal content. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):307--334.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In a series of papers and lectures, Sydney Shoemaker has developed a sophisticated Russellian theory of phenomenal content (1994, 2000, 2001, 2003). It has as its central motivation two considerations. One is the possibility of spectrum-inversion without illusion. The other is the transparency of experience
Thompson, Brad (2003). The Nature of Phenomenal Content. Dissertation, University of Arizona   (Google)
Thompson, Brad J. (2010). The spatial content of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.   (Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (2005). Another look at representationalism and pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Tye, Michael (1995). A representational theory of pains and their phenomenal character. Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.   (Cited by 30 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (2003). Blurry images, double vision, and other oddities: New problems for representationalism? In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Tye, Michael (2003). Consciousness, color, and content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3).   (Google)
Tye, Michael (2005). In defense of representationalism: Reply to commentaries. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Tye, Michael (1998). Inverted earth, swampman, and representationalism. Philosophical Perspectives 12:459-78.   (Google)
Tye, Michael (1996). Orgasms again. Philosophical Issues 7:51-54.   (Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (2003). On the virtue of being poised: Reply to Seager. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):275-280.   (Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (online). Phenomenal character and color - reply to Maund.   (Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (1996). Perceptual experience is a many-layered thing. Philosophical Issues 7:117-126.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (1998). Pr. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):649-656.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (online). Precis of Color, Content, and Consciousness.   (Google)
Tye, Michael (1993). Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum. Noûs 27 (2):159-183.   (Cited by 21 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (2002). Representationalism and the transparency of experience. Noûs 36 (1):137-51.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same as representational content that meets certain further conditions. One very important motivation for this theory is the so-called ? transparency of experience.? The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the appeal to transparency more carefully than has been done hithertofore, to make some remarks about the introspective awareness of experience in light of this appeal, and to consider one problem case for transparency at some length, that of blurry vision. Along the way, I shall also address some of the remarks Stephen Leeds makes in his essay on transparency
Tye, Michael (1998). Reply to Block, Jackson, and Shoemaker on Ten Problems of Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3).   (Google)
Tye, Michael (1998). Response to discussants. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):679-687.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (forthcoming). Representationalist theories of consciousness. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: This essay surveys representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness as well as the major arguments for them. It also takes up two major objections. The essay is divided into five sections. Section I offers some introductory remarks on phenomenal consciousness. Section II presents the classic view of phenomenal consciousness to which representationalists are opposed. Section III canvasses various versions of representationalism about consciousness. Section IV lays out the main arguments for the representationalist stance. The final section addresses the two objections
Tye, Michael (ms). The experience of emotion: An intentionalist theory.   (Google)
Abstract: The experience of emotion is a fundamental part of human consciousness. Think, for example, of how different our conscious lives would be without such experiences as joy, anger, fear, disgust, pity, anxiety, and embarrassment. It is uncontroversial that these experiences typically have an intentional content. Anger, for example, is normally directed at someone or something. One may feel angry at one=s stock broker for provid- ing bad advice or angry with the cleaning lady for dropping the vase. But it is not un- controversial that emotional experiences are always intentional. John Searle, for exam- ple, remarks, AMany conscious states are not Intentional, e.g., a sudden sense of elation . . .@ (1983, p. 2). Moreover, many animals experience emotions and it is natural to sup- pose that such emotions lack the sophistication of beliefs or thoughts. When a dog ex- periences delight in seeing its master after an absence of several days, the suggestion that at least part of the dog=s experience of delight is a belief (or thought) that its master has returned home seems to import into the experience something that at best is associ- ated with it and perhaps is not really a state to which the dog is subject at all. And even in the case of human beings, emotional experience often does not seem to involve thought. Consider the experience of disgust, to take one obvious example.1 Nor is a sali- ent belief required. One may have a strong fear of spiders and yet not believe that spi- ders typically pose any risk to humans. But if emotional experiences need not involve beliefs or thoughts, then just how are they intentional?2..
Tye, Michael (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 538 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Tye's book develops a persuasive and, in many respects, original argument for the view that the qualitative side of our mental life is representational in...
Tye, Michael (online). To PANIC or not to PANIC? -Reply to Byrne.   (Google)
Tye, Michael (2003). The PANIC theory: Reply to Byrne. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):287-290.   (Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (2002). Visual qualia and visual content revisited. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is _like_ for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philoso- phers often use the term 'qualia' to refer to the introspectively accessible properties of experiences that characterize what it is like to have them. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is very difficult to deny that there are qualia. There is another, more restricted use of the term
Tye, Michael (1992). Visual qualia and visual content. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google)
Tye, Michael (1994). What what it's like is really like. Analyst 1 (4).   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Tye, Michael (1995). What "what it is like" is like. Analysis 55.   (Annotation | Google)
Tye, Michael (2007). Intentionalism and the argument from no common content. Philosophical Perspectives 21:589-613.   (Google)
Abstract: Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. I do not experience the table by experiencing some- thing else over and above the table and its facing surface. I see the facing surface of the table directly
Vinueza, Adam (2000). Sensations and the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I discuss two forms of the thesis that to have a sensation is to token a sentence in a language of thought-what I call, following Georges Rey, the sensational sentences thesis. One form of the thesis is a version of standard functionalism, while the other is a version of the increasingly popular thesis that for a sensation to have qualia is for it to have a certain kind of intentional content-that is, intentionalism. I defend the basic idea behind the sensational sentences thesis, and argue that the intentionalist version is either false or collapses into the standard functionalist thesis
Wager, A. (1999). The extra qualia problem: Synaesthesia and representationism. Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):263-281.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationism is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Synaesthesia is a condition in which the phenomenal character of the experience produced in a subject by stimulation of one sensory modality contains elements characteristic of a second, unstimulated sensory modality. After reviewing some of the recent psychological literature on synaesthesia and one of the leading versions of representationism, I argue that cases of synaesthesia, as instances of what I call the extra qualia problem, are counterexamples to externalist versions of representationism
Warfield, Ted A. (1999). Against representational theories of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):66-69.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Wright, Edmond L. (1990). New representationalism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 20 (1):65-92.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Wright, Edmond L. (ed.) (1993). New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception. Ashgate.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Wright, Wayne (2003). Projectivist representationalism and color. Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper proposes a subjectivist approach to color within the framework of an externalist form of representationalism about phenomenal consciousness. Motivations are presented for accepting both representationalism and color subjectivism, and an argument is offered against the case made by Michael Tye on behalf of the claim that colors are objective, physical properties of objects. In the face of the considerable difficulties associated with finding a workable realist theory of color, the alternative account of color experience set out, projectivist representationalism, claims that the color properties we encounter in experience exist only in the representational contents of our experiences. Color experiences are caused by the physical structure of objects, but objects are never actually colored and color experiences systematically misrepresent objects as colored. However, despite being an error theory of color, projectivist representationalism does not do violence to our everyday use and understanding of color concepts and terms, nor does it undermine the role of color experience in aiding the perceiving subject in navigating through the world
Wright, Wayne (online). Transparency and aspects.   (Google)
Abstract: Strong Representationalism (SR) claims that the phenomenal character of experience is a certain kind of representational content. Furthermore, SR theorists often maintain that the phenomenal qualities of experience just are properties of the objects of experience, represented in experience.1 Another claim held by SR theorists, often cited as a reason for embracing their view, is that experience is transparent. Transparency is the phenomenon of introspection of your experience revealing nothing but the objects, properties, and relations that your experience is an experience of. In this note, I will raise a problem for SR based on its apparent difficulty in accounting for representation under an aspect at the level of phenomenal appearances. I will then discuss and briefly criticize Michael Tye’s proposed response to this sort of concern. I conclude by offering my own reply to the problem. What follows focuses on pain experience, but there is no barrier to extending these comments to certain other forms of experience, both sensory and perceptual
Wright, Wayne (online). Tye, tree-rings, and representation.   (Google)
Abstract: In a recent book, [1] Michael Tye has offered a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness. As Tye himself admits, part of his account involves arguing for a position which has traditionally received little support; he contends that _all_ experiences and feelings have representational
Wu, Wayne (forthcoming). What is Conscious Attention? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: Perceptual attention is essential to both thought and agency, for there is arguably no demonstrative thought or bodily action without it. Psychologists and philosophers since William James have taken attention to be a ubiquitous and distinctive form of consciousness, one that leaves a characteristic mark on perceptual experience. As a process of selecting specific perceptual inputs, attention influences the way things perceptually appear. It may then seem that it is a specific feature of perceptual representation that constitutes what it is like to consciously attend to an object. In fact conscious attention is more complicated. In what follows, I argue that the phenomenology of conscious attention to what is perceived involves not just a way of perceptually locking on to a specific object. It necessarily involves a way of cognitively locking on to it as well.
Zahavi, Dan & Parnas, Josef (2002). Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 35 | Google)