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1.5c. Phenomenal Intentionality (Phenomenal Intentionality on PhilPapers)

See also:
Albertazzi, Liliana (2007). At the roots of consciousness: Intentional presentations. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):94-114.   (Google)
Abstract: The Author argues for a non-semantic theory of intentionality, i.e. a theory of intentional reference rooted in the perceptive world. Specifically, the paper concerns two aspects of the original theory of intentionality: the structure of intentional objects as appearance (an unfolding spatio-temporal structure endowed with a direction), and the cognitive processes involved in a psychic act at the primary level of cognition. Examples are given from the experimental psychology of vision, with a particular emphasis on the relation between phenomenal space and colour appearances
Richards, T. Brad & Bailey, Andrew R., Phenomenology and intentionality.   (Google)
Abstract: Horgan and Tienson (2002) argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states which is not established by Horgan and Tienson’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the capacity of phenomenology to map onto intentionality in a way that would be appropriate for any determiner of content / fixer of truth conditions
Brandl, Johannes (2009). Intentionality, Information, and Experience. In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction: Between the Mind and the Brain. Ontos Verlag.   (Google)
Braddock, Glenn (2003). The first-person approach and the nature of consciousness. Charles Siewert, the significance of consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2).   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Phenomenality and reference: Reply to Loar. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Farkas, Katalin (2008). Phenomenal intentionality without compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.   (Google)
Abstract: In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow.
Fox, Ivan (1989). On the nature and cognitive function of phenomenal content -- part one. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):81-103.   (Annotation | Google)
Georgalis, Nicholas (2003). The fiction of phenomenal intentionality. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that there is no such thing as ?phenomenal intentionality?. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to ?what it is like? (WIL) to attend on some occasion to one?s intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of ?phenomenal intentionality? fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of phenomenal intentionality is the belief that consciousness must somehow be implicated in intentionality. With this I agree. But because of the asymmetry of application of WIL, the path chosen by advocates of phenomenal intentionality to secure this conclusion cannot succeed. A brief overview of recent philosophy of mind explains the temptation to take this wrong path. Fortunately, there are other routes that implicate consciousness in intentionality. In consequence, though there is no phenomenal intentionality, there is a phenomenology of intentionality
Gertler, Brie (2001). The relationship between phenomenality and intentionality. Psyche 7 (17).   (Google)
Abstract: Charles Siewert offers a persuasive argument to show that the presence of certain phenomenal features logically suffices for the presence of certain intentional ones. He claims that this shows that (some) phenomenal features are inherently intentional. I argue that he has not established the latter thesis, even if we grant the logical sufficiency claim. For he has not ruled out a rival alternative interpretation of the relevant data, namely, that (some) intentional features are inherently phenomenal
Graham, George; Horgan, Terence E. & Tienson, John L. (2007). Consciousness and intentionality. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E.; Tienson, John L. & Graham, George (2004). Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter de Gruyter.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Horgan, Terence M. & Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Phenomenal intentionality meets the extended mind. The Monist 91:347-373.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E. & Tienson, John L. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 52 | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (forthcoming). Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming intentionality is closely tied to consciousness, inasmuch as non- conscious intentionality in some sense depends upon conscious intentionality. Within this alternative framework, the question arises of how to account for unconscious intentionality, and different authors have offered different accounts. In this paper, I compare and contrast four possible accounts of unconscious intentionality, which I call potentialism, inferentialism, eliminativism, and interpretivism. The first three are the leading accounts in the existing literature, while the fourth is my own proposal, which I argue to be superior. I then argue that an upshot of interpretivism is that all unconscious intentionality is ultimately grounded is a specific kind of cognitive phenomenology.
Kriegel, Uriah (2010). Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20.   (Google)
Abstract: One of the most enduring elements of Davidson’s legacy is the idea that intentionality is inherently normative. The normativity of intentionality means different things to different people and in different contexts, however. A subsidiary goal of this paper is to get clear on the sense in which Davidson means the thesis that intentionality is inherently normative. The central goal of the paper is to consider whether the thesis is true, in light of recent work on intentionality that insists on an intimate connection between intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. According to several recent authors, there is a kind of intentionality – “phenomenal intentionality” – that is fully constituted by the phenomenal character of conscious experiences. I will argue that although Davidson’s thesis, when correctly understood, is compelling for most intentionality, it is false of phenomenal intentionality. I start, in §1, with an explication of the notion of phenomenal intentionality; in §2, I elucidate Davidson’s thesis and his case for it; in §3, I argue that the case does not extend to phenomenal intentionality; I close, in §4, with some objections and replies.
Kriegel, Uriah (2007). Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving (first) an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and (second) the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation (all intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality). The solution is correspondingly two-part: we can consciously represent Bigfoot because consciously representing Bigfoot does not involve bearing a relation to Bigfoot, but rather instantiating a certain non-relational (“adverbial”) property of representing Bigfoot-wise; and we can non-consciously represent Bigfoot because non-consciously representing Bigfoot does not involve bearing a relation to Bigfoot, but rather bearing a relation to conscious representations of Bigfoot
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness? Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, however, I am quite attachedto a naturalist approach to intentionality. Itwill turn out to be somewhat difficult toreconcile naturalism with the notion thatintentionality is dependent upon consciousness,although, perhaps surprisingly, I will arguethat McGinn's case for such dependence iscompatible with naturalism
Kriegel, Uriah (2002). Phenomenal content. Erkenntnis 57 (2):175-198.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2008). The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise
Kriegel, Uriah (ms). The intentionality of conscious experience and mind-relative content.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a paper I wrote at the end of my first year in grad school. I'm not sure why it's online and don't remember what I say in it. Just thought I'd mention...
Kriegel, Uriah & Horgan, Terry (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In T. Horgan & U. Kriegel (eds.), Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: We review some of the work already done around the notion of phenomenal intentionality and propose a way of turning this body of work into a self-conscious research program for understanding intentionality.
Loar, Brian (2003). Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Lycan, William (2008). Phenomenal intentionalities. American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):233-252.   (Google)
Abstract: There is now a considerable literature that goes under the heading of “phenomenal intentionality.” But it features a number of distinct issues. What they have in common is the claim that intentionality bears a closer relation to phenomenology than had previously been recognized. There is a basic thesis, which is controversial, and there are further arguments attempting to draw more exciting morals from the basic thesis. My purpose in this paper is to survey these issues, see what may be at stake, and adjudicate
Meehan, Douglas B. (2002). Qualitative character and sensory representations. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):630-641.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Meixner, Uwe (2006). Classical intentionality. Erkenntnis 65 (1):25-45.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it is argued that the classical conception is more satisfactory than the two modern ones, not only regarding phenomenal adequacy, but also on the grounds of epistemological considerations. In the second part, the paper argues that classical intentionality is not naturalizable, that is, physicalizable. Since classical intentionality exists (in the experiences that display it), the non-naturalizability of classical intentionality implies psychophysical dualism
Menary, Richard (2009). Intentionality and Consciousness. In William Banks (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.   (Google)
Abstract: Intentionality is usually defined as the directedness of the mind toward something other than itself. My desire for a cold beer is directed at the cold beer in front of me. Much of consciousness is intentional, my conscious experiences are usually directed at something. However, conscious experiences typically have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like for me to see the deep blue of the Pacific Ocean and to feel the warm water lapping over my feet, and to smell the briny breeze. An important question to answer concerning the relationship between intentionality and consciousness is whether all conscious states are intentional? Another question concerns the explanatory priority of intentionality and phenomenal character: Can phenomenal character be explained in terms of intentionality? Or is it the case that intentionality should be understood in terms of phenomenology? Philosophers from the analytic, phenomenological, and naturalistic traditions have all made important contributions to our understanding of intentionality and consciousness. Some philosophers, such as Dretske, think that our phenomenology is intentionally structured. Others, such as Horgan and Tienson think that intentionality is fundamentally determined by our phenomenology. This looks like an impasse; however it may well be resolved by a combination of contemporary accounts of representation combined with an embodied phenomenology.
Miller, George H. (1999). How phenomenological content determines the intentional object. Husserl Studies 16 (1):1-24.   (Google | More links)
Montague, Michelle (2009). The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.   (Google)
Abstract: My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this paper, I argue for the sui generis approach
Pautz, Adam (2008). The interdependence of phenomenology and intentionality. The Monist 91 (2):250-272.   (Google)
Abstract: I address a second issue that arises once we accept intentionalism: can intentionalists accept the claim of Horgan and Tienson (among others) that phenomenology is in some sense prior to intentionality? And should they?
Pitt, David (2009). Intentional psychologism. Philosophical Studies 146 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the past few years, a number of philosophers (notably, Siewert, C. (The significance of consciousness. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Horgan and Tienson (Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 520–533); Pitt 2004) have maintained the following three theses: (1) there is a distinctive sort of phenomenology characteristic of conscious thought, as opposed to other sorts of conscious mental states; (2) different conscious thoughts have different phenomenologies; and (3) thoughts with the same phenomenology have the same intentional content. The last of these three claims is open to at least two different interpretations. It might mean that the phenomenology of a thought expresses its intentional content, where intentional content is understood as propositional, and propositions are understood as mind-and language-independent abstract entities (such as sets of possible worlds, functions from possible worlds to truth-values, structured n-tuples of objects and properties, etc.). And it might mean that the phenomenology of a thought is its intentional content—that is, that the phenomenology of a thought, like the phenomenology of a sensation, constitutes its content. The second sort of view is a kind of psychologism. Psychologistic views hold that one or another sort of thing—numbers, sentences, propositions, etc.—that we can think or know about is in fact a kind of mental thing. Since Frege, psychologism has been in bad repute among analytic philosophers. It is widely held that Frege showed that such views are untenable, since, among other things, they subjectivize what is in fact objective, and, hence, relativize such things as consistency and truth to the peculiarities of human psychology. The purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the thesis that intentional mental content is phenomenological (what I call “intentional psychologism”) and to try to reach a conclusion about whether it yields a tenable view of mind, thought and meaning. I believe the thesis is not so obviously wrong as it will strike many philosophers of mind and language. In fact, it can be defended against the standard objections to psychologism, and it can provide the basis for a novel and interesting account of mentality
Pitt, David (2004). The phenomenology of cognition, or, what is it like to think that P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Potrc, Matjaz (2002). Intentionality of phenomenology in Brentano. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40:231-267.   (Google)
Shani, Itay (2008). Against Consciousness Chauvinism. Monist 91 (2).   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (2001). Introspection and phenomenal character. Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: […] One view I hold about the nature of phenomenal character, which is also a view about the relation between phenomenal character and the introspective belief about it, is that phenomenal character is “self intimating.” This means that it is of the essence of a state’s having a certain phenomenal character that this issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware of that character, or does so if the subject reflects. Part of my aim is to give an account which makes it intelligible that this should be so. A more substantive view I hold about phenomenal character is that a perceptual state’s having a certain phenomenal character is a matter of its having a certain sort of representational content. This much I hold in common with a number of recent writers, including Gil Harman, Michael Tye, Bill Lycan, and Fred Dretske. But representationalism about phenomenal character often goes with the rejection of “qualia,” and with the rejection of the possibility of spectrum inversion and other sorts of “qualia invesion.” My version of representationalism embraces what other versions reject. It assigns an essential role to qualia, and accepts the possibility of qualia inversion. A central aim of the present paper is to present a version of this view which is free of the defects I now see in my earlier versions of it
Thompson, Brad J. (2007). Shoemaker on phenomenal content. Philosophical Studies 135 (3):307--334.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In a series of papers and lectures, Sydney Shoemaker has developed a sophisticated Russellian theory of phenomenal content (1994, 2000, 2001, 2003). It has as its central motivation two considerations. One is the possibility of spectrum-inversion without illusion. The other is the transparency of experience
Urkia, Igor Aristegi (2006). Intentionality. Problems of the philosophy of mind. Dialectica 60 (4):505-508.   (Google)
Wilson, Robert A. (2003). Intentionality and phenomenology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):413-431.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)