MindPapers: 1.5c. Phenomenal Intentionality

Albertazzi, Liliana (2007). At the roots of consciousness: Intentional presentations. Journal of Consciousness Studies. Special Issue 14 (1):94-114. (Google)

Abstract: The Author argues for a non-semantic theory of intentionality, i.e. a theory of intentional reference rooted in the perceptive world. Specifically, the paper concerns two aspects of the original theory of intentionality: the structure of intentional objects as appearance (an unfolding spatio-temporal structure endowed with a direction), and the cognitive processes involved in a psychic act at the primary level of cognition. Examples are given from the experimental psychology of vision, with a particular emphasis on the relation between phenomenal space and colour appearances

Burge, Tyler (2003). Phenomenality and reference: Reply to Loar. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. (Google)

Farkas, Katalin (2008). Phenomenal intentionality without compromise. The Monist 91 (2). (Google)

Georgalis, Nicholas (2003). The fiction of phenomenal intentionality. Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):243-256. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Abstract: This paper argues that there is no such thing as phenomenal intentionality. The arguments used by its advocates rely upon an appeal to what it is like (WIL) to attend on some occasion to ones intentional state. I argue that there is an important asymmetry in the application of the WIL phenomenon to sensory and intentional states. Advocates of phenomenal intentionality fail to recognize this, but this asymmetry undermines their arguments for phenomenal intentionality. The broader issue driving the advocacy of phenomenal intentionality is the belief that consciousness must somehow be implicated in intentionality. With this I agree. But because of the asymmetry of application of WIL, the path chosen by advocates of phenomenal intentionality to secure this conclusion cannot succeed. A brief overview of recent philosophy of mind explains the temptation to take this wrong path. Fortunately, there are other routes that implicate consciousness in intentionality. In consequence, though there is no phenomenal intentionality, there is a phenomenology of intentionality

Graham, George; Horgan, Terence E. & Tienson, John L. (2007). Consciousness and intentionality. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. (Google)

Horgan, Terence E.; Tienson, John L. & Graham, George (2004). Phenomenal intentionality and the brain in a vat. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. Walter de Gruyter. (Cited by 12 | Google)

Horgan, Terence E. & Tienson, John L. (2002). The intentionality of phenomenology and the phenomenology of intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 52 | Google)

Horgan, Terence M. & Kriegel, Uriah (forthcoming). Phenomenal intentionality meets the extended mind. The Monist 91. (Google)

Kriegel, Uriah (2007). Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21:307-340. (Google)

Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness? Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)

Abstract: It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, however, I am quite attachedto a naturalist approach to intentionality. Itwill turn out to be somewhat difficult toreconcile naturalism with the notion thatintentionality is dependent upon consciousness,although, perhaps surprisingly, I will arguethat McGinn's case for such dependence iscompatible with naturalism

Kriegel, Uriah (2002). Phenomenal content. Erkenntnis 57 (2):175-198. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)

Kriegel, Uriah (manuscript). The intentionality of conscious experience and mind-relative content. (Google)

Loar, Brian (2003). Phenomenal intentionality as the basis of mental content. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. (Cited by 18 | Google)

Meehan, Douglas B. (2002). Qualitative character and sensory representations. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):630-641. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Miller, George H. (1999). How phenomenological content determines the intentional object. Husserl Studies 16 (1):1-24. (Google | More links)

Pautz, Adam (forthcoming). The interdependence of phenomenology and intentionality. The Monist. (Google)

Abstract: forthcoming in The Monist. I address a second issue that arises once we accept intentionalism: can intentionalists accept the claim of Horgan and Tienson (among others) that phenomenology is in some sense prior to intentionality? And should they?

Pitt, David (manuscript). Intentional psychologism. (Google)

Pitt, David (2004). The phenomenology of cognition, or, what is it like to think that P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36. (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)

Potrc, Matjaz (2002). Intentionality of phenomenology in Brentano. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40:231-267. (Google)

Shoemaker, Sydney (2001). Introspection and phenomenal character. Philosophical Topics 28 (2). (Cited by 30 | Google)

Thompson, Brad J. (2003). Shoemaker on phenomenal content. Philosophical Studies 135 (3). (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

Abstract: In a series of papers and lectures, Sydney Shoemaker has developed a sophisticated Russellian theory of phenomenal content (1994, 2000, 2001, 2003). It has as its central motivation two considerations. One is the possibility of spectrum-inversion without illusion. The other is the transparency of experience

Urkia, Igor Aristegi (2006). Intentionality. Problems of the philosophy of mind. Dialectica 60 (4):505-508. (Google)

Wilson, Robert A. (2003). Intentionality and phenomenology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):413-431. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

1.5c	Phenomenal Intentionality [23]

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