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1.5d. Conscious Thought (Conscious Thought on PhilPapers)

See also:
Baars, Bernard J. & McGovern, Katharine A. (2000). Consciousness cannot be limited to sensory qualities: Some empirical counterexamples. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 2 (1):11-13.   (Google)
Brown, Richard (2007). The mark of the mental. Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):117-124.   (Google)
Abstract: In the Standard Model of the Mind currently employed in cognitive science we have corresponding to thought and sense two distinct kinds of properties: intentional and qualitative. On the one hand we have qualitative states, which are generally agreed to be those states which there is ‘something that it is like’ for the subject that has them; I will say that these states have a quality. On the other hand we have intentional states, which have the property of being about something, called intentionality, and which lack a quality. There is nothing that it is like to have intentional states. According to the Standard Model all mental phenomena have one or another, or both, of these properties. There are some mental phenomena that are purely qualitative (perhaps sensations and their sensory qualities) and some that are purely intentional (thoughts) and still others that are a mix of both (perceptions and emotions). Of course, there are those who resist the Standard Model, drawn as they are to the siren song of a single mark of the mental
Carruthers, Peter (2006). Conscious experience versus conscious thought. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Are there different constraints on theories of conscious experience as against theories of conscious propositional thought? Is what is problematic or puzzling about each of these phenomena of the same, or of different, types? And to what extent is it plausible to think that either or both conscious experience and conscious thought involve some sort of selfreference? In pursuing these questions I shall also explore the prospects for a defensible form of eliminativism concerning conscious thinking, one that would leave the reality of conscious experience untouched. In the end, I shall argue that while there might be no such thing as conscious judging or conscious wanting, there is (or may well be) such a thing as conscious generic thinking
Carruthers, Peter (1998). Conscious thinking: Language or elimination? Mind and Language 13 (4):457-476.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Do we conduct our conscious propositional thinking in natural language? Or is such language only peripherally related to human conscious thought-processes? In this paper I shall present a partial defence of the former view, by arguing that the only real alternative is eliminativism about conscious propositional thinking. Following some introductory remarks, I shall state the argument for this conclusion, and show how that conclusion can be true. Thereafter I shall defend each of the three main premises in turn
Coates, Paul (1987). Swinburne on thought and consciousness. Philosophical Studies 52 (September):227-238.   (Google | More links)
Cole, David J. (1994). Thought and qualia. Minds and Machines 4 (3):283-302.   (Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1968). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.   (Cited by 351 | Google | More links)
Gillett, Grant R. (1987). The generality constraint and conscious thought. Analysis 47 (January):20-24.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goldman, A. (1993). The psychology of folk psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16:15-28.   (Cited by 135 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: The central mission of cognitive science is to reveal the real nature of the mind, however familiar or foreign that nature may be to naive preconceptions. The existence of naive conceptions is also important, however. Prescientific thought and language contain concepts of the mental, and these concepts deserve attention from cognitive science. Just as scientific psychology studies folk physics (McCloskey 1983, Hayes 1985), viz., the common understanding (or misunderstanding) of physical phenomena, so it must study folk psychology, the common understanding of mental states. This subfield of scientific psychology is what I mean by the phrase 'the psychology of folk psychology'
Hookway, Christopher (1981). Conscious belief and deliberation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75:75-89.   (Google)
Jacob, Pierre (1998). What is the phenomenology of thought? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):443-448.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Klausen, Sørenarnow H. (2008). The phenomenology of propositional attitudes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility that propositional attitudes may be transparent, just like sensations and emotions are commonly held to be: there may be no appropriate way of describing their phenomenal character apart from describing the properties and objects they represent
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Nathan, N. M. L. (1982). Conscious belief. Analysis 42 (March):90-93.   (Google)
Nelkin, Norton (1989). Propositional attitudes and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (March):413-30.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (2007). Phenomenal content and the richness and determinacy of colour experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):112-131.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (2005). Thoughts without distinctive non-imagistic phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):534-561.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2002). Conscious and unconscious intentionality in practical realism. MeQRiMa Rivista Di Analisi Testo Letterario E Figurativo 5:130-135.   (Google)
Ten Hoor, Marten (1934). Thought as awareness and thought as behavior. Journal of Philosophy 31 (20):533-543.   (Google | More links)
Wallis, Charles (2008). Consciousness, context, and know-how. Synthese 160 (1).   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I criticize the most significant recent examples of the practical knowledge analysis of knowledge-how in the philosophical literature: David Carr [1979, Mind, 88, 394–409; 1981a, American Philosophical Quarterly, 18, 53–61; 1981b, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 15(1), 87–96] and Stanley & Williamson [2001, Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411–444]. I stress the importance of know-how in our contemporary understanding of the mind, and offer the beginnings of a treatment of know-how capable of providing insight in to the use of know-how in contemporary cognitive science. Specifically, I claim that Carr’s necessary conditions for know-how fail to capture the distinction he himself draws between ability and knowing-how. Moreover, Carr ties knowing-how to conscious intent, and to an explicit knowledge of procedural rules. I argue that both moves are mistakes, which together render Carr’s theory an inadequate account both of common ascriptions of knowledge-how and of widely accepted ascriptions of knowledge-how within explanations in cognitive science. Finally, I note that Carr’s conditions fail to capture intuitions (heshares) regarding the ascription of know-how to persons lacking ability. I then consider the position advocated by Stanley & Williamson (2001), which seems avoid Carr’s commitments to conscious intent and explicit knowledge while still maintaining that “knowledge-how is simply a species of knowledge-that" (Stanley & Williamson, 2001, p. 411). I argue that Stanley and Williamson’s attempt to frame a reductionist view that avoids consciously occurrent beliefs during exercises of knowledge-how and explicit knowledge of procedural rules is both empirically implausible and explanatorily vacuous. In criticizing these theories I challenge the presuppositions of the most pervasive response to Ryle in the philosophic literature, what might be described as “the received view." I also establish several facts about knowing-how. First, neither conscious intent nor explicit representation (much less conscious representation) of procedural rules are necessary for knowing-how given the theory of cognition current in cognitive science. I argue that the discussed analyses fail to capture the necessary conditions for knowledge-how because know-how requires the instantiation of an ability and of the capacities necessary for exploiting an ability—not conscious awareness of purpose or explicit knowledge of rules. Second, one must understand knowledge-how as task-specific, i.e., as presupposing certain underlying conditions. Conceiving of know-how as task-specific allows one to understand ascriptions of know-how in the absence of ability as counterfactual ascriptions based upon underlying competence
Wilkes, Kathleen V. (1981). Conscious belief and deliberation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:91-107.   (Google)
Williams, John N. (2006). Moore's paradox and conscious belief. Philosophical Studies 127 (3):383-414.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: For Moore, it is a paradox that although I would be absurd in asserting that (it is raining but I don
Worley, Sara (1997). Belief and consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55.   (Annotation | Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that we should not ascribe beliefs and desires to subjects like zombies or (present day) computers which do not have phenomenal consciousness. In order to ascribe beliefs, we must distinguish between personal and subpersonal content. There may be states in my brain which represent the array of light intensities on my retina, but these states are not beliefs, because they are merely subpersonal. I argue that we cannot distinguish between personal and subpersonal content without reference to phenomenal consciousness. I argue for this by examining two attempts to account for belief without reference to phenomenal consciousness, functionalism and Dennett's patterns of behavior theory, and showing that they both fail. In the course of the arguments that these attempts fail, I develop some positive reasons for believing that phenomenal consciousness is indeed necessary
Wu, Wayne (forthcoming). What is Conscious Attention? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.   (Google)
Abstract: Perceptual attention is essential to both thought and agency, for there is arguably no demonstrative thought or bodily action without it. Psychologists and philosophers since William James have taken attention to be a ubiquitous and distinctive form of consciousness, one that leaves a characteristic mark on perceptual experience. As a process of selecting specific perceptual inputs, attention influences the way things perceptually appear. It may then seem that it is a specific feature of perceptual representation that constitutes what it is like to consciously attend to an object. In fact conscious attention is more complicated. In what follows, I argue that the phenomenology of conscious attention to what is perceived involves not just a way of perceptually locking on to a specific object. It necessarily involves a way of cognitively locking on to it as well.