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Philosophy of Consciousness :: Consciousness and Content :: Phenomenal Concepts

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Alter, Torin & Walter, Sven (eds.) (2006). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
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Carruthers, Peter (2003). Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336. (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter & Veillet, Benedicte (2007). The phenomenal concept strategy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Chalmers, David J. (2006). Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Chalmers, David J. (2003). The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 44 | Google | More links)
Crane, Tim (2005). Papineau on phenomenal concepts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):155-162. (Google | More links)
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Horgan, Terence E. & Tienson, John L. (2001). Deconstructing new wave materialism. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)
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Levin, Janet (2006). What is a phenomenal concept? In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Google)
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Loar, Brian (2003). Qualia, properties, modality. Philosophical Issues 1:113-29. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Ludwig, Pascal (manuscript). A descriptivist theory of phenomenal concepts. (Google | More links)
Macdonald, C. (2004). Mary meets Molyneux: The explanatory gap and the individuation of phenomenal concepts. Noûs 38 (3):503-24. (Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2001). In defense of new wave materialism: A response to Horgan and Tienson. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 14 | Google)
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Papineau, David (2006). Phenomenal and perceptual concepts. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Prinz, Jesse (2007). Mental pointing: Phenomenal knowledge without concepts. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10). (Google | More links)
Raffman, Diana (1995). On the persistence of phenomenology. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 53 | Google | Annotation)
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Yablo, Stephen (manuscript). Grokking pain. (Google)

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(c) David Chalmers and David Bourget 2007
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