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1.5g. Consciousness and Content, Misc (Consciousness and Content, Misc on PhilPapers)

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Atran, Scott & Norenzayan, Ara (2004). Why minds create gods: Devotion, deception, death, and arational decision making. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):754-770.   (Google)
Abstract: The evolutionary landscape that canalizes human thought and behavior into religious beliefs and practices includes naturally selected emotions, cognitive modules, and constraints on social interactions. Evolutionary by-products, including metacognitive awareness of death and possibilities for deception, further channel people into religious paths. Religion represents a community's costly commitment to a counterintuitive world of supernatural agents who manage people's existential anxieties. Religious devotion, though not an adaptation, informs all cultures and most people
Barresi, John (2004). Intentionality, consciousness and intentional relations: From constitutive phenomenology to cognitive science. In L. Embree (ed.), Gurwitsch's Relevance for Cognitive Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.   (Google)
Abstract: In this chapter I look closely at the intentionality of consciousness from a naturalistic perspective. I begin with a consideration of Gurwitsch's suggestive ideas about the role of acts of consciousness in constituting both the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I turn next to a discussion of how these ideas relate to my own empirical approach to intentional relations seen from a developmental perspective. This is followed by a discussion of some recent ideas in philosophical cognitive science on the intentionality of consciousness, both with respect to the objects and the subjects of consciousness. I show that these recent trends tend to naturalize intentionality and consciousness in directions compatible with the descriptive aspects of Gurwitsch's constitutive phenomenology
Bayne, Tim, Perceptual experience and the reach of phenomenal content.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, spatial and temporal properties, but does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of an object as a tomato encoded in the phenomenology of perception? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say “no”, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenology say “yes”. This paper clarifies the debate between conservatives and liberals, and provides a case in favour of the liberal position: high-level content can inform perceptual phenomenology
Binns, Peter (1995). Commentary on contentless consciousness. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (1):61-63.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1991). Vision and intentional content. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Google)
Cam, Philip (1984). Consciousness and content-formation. Inquiry 27 (December):381-98.   (Cited by 34 | Google)
Campbell, John (web). Consciousness and reference. In Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Suppose your conscious life were surgically excised, but everything else left intact, what would you miss? In this situation you would not have the slightest idea what was going on. You would have no idea what there is in the world around you; what the grounds are of the potentialities and threats are that you are negotiating. Experience of your surroundings provides you with knowledge of what is there: with your initial base of knowledge of what the things are that you are thinking and talking about. But this connection between consciousness of the objects and properties around you, and knowledge of the references of the basic terms you use, has proven difficult to articulate. The connection cannot be recognized so long as you think of consciousness as a kind of glow with which representations are accompanied or enlivened. It is, though, also possible to think of perceptual experience as fundamentally a relation between the subject and the things experienced; and given such a conception, we can make visible the link between consciousness and reference
Campbell, J. (2002). Reference and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 81 | Google | More links)
Abstract: John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends
Chalmers, David J. (online). Consciousness and cognition.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: *[[I wrote this paper in January of 1990, but did not publish it because I was never entirely happy with it. My ideas on consciousness were in a state of flux, ultimately evolving into those represented in my book _The Conscious Mind_ (Oxford University Press, 1996). I now think that some parts of this paper are unsatisfactory, especially the positive theory outlined at the end, although a successor to that theory is laid out in the book. Nevertheless, I think the paper raises issues that need to be addressed. ]]
Crane, Tim (1997). Galen Strawson on mental reality. Ratio 10 (1):82-90.   (Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1968). Content and Consciousness. Routledge.   (Cited by 351 | Google | More links)
Drummond, John (2008). Moral phenomenology and moral intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term “phenomenology”: a narrow sense (drawn from Nagel) and a broader sense (drawn from Husserl). It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the phenomenal and intentional differences belonging to these experiences. The paper concludes with some reflections on how the focus on the broader sense of “phenomenology” serves to provide a more precise sense of what we might mean by “moral phenomenology.”
Falk, Barrie (1993). Consciousness, cognition, and the phenomenal. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67 (67):55-73.   (Annotation | Google)
Fetzer, James H. (2003). Consciousness and cognition: Semiotic conceptions of bodies and minds. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Fox, Ivan (1989). On the nature and cognitive function of phenomenal content -- part one. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):81-103.   (Annotation | Google)
Georgalis, N. (2006). Representation and the first-person perspective. Synthese 150 (2):281-325.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The orthodox view in the study of representation is that a strictly third-person objective methodology must be employed. The acceptance of this methodology is shown to be a fundamental and debilitating error. Toward this end I defend what I call
Glicksohn, Joseph (1998). States of consciousness and symbolic cognition. Journal of Mind and Behavior 19 (2):105-118.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Greenberg, Jeff; Sullivan, Daniel; Kosloff, Spee & Solomon, Sheldon (2006). Souls do not live by cognitive inclinations alone, but by the desire to exist beyond death as well. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):474-475.   (Google)
Abstract: Bering's analysis is inadequate because it fails to consider past and present adult soul beliefs and the psychological functions they serve. We suggest that a valid folk psychology of souls must consider features of adult soul beliefs, the unique problem engendered by awareness of death, and terror management findings, in addition to cognitive inclinations toward dualistic and teleological thinking
Hart, James G. (1998). Intentionality, phenomenality, and light. In Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Heal, Jane (1998). Consciousness and content. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Katsafanas, Paul (2005). Nietzsche's theory of mind: Consciousness and conceptualization. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1–31.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I show that Nietzsche's puzzling and seemingly inconsistent claims about consciousness constitute a coherent and philosophically fruitful theory. Drawing on some ideas from Schopenhauer and F.A. Lange, Nietzsche argues that conscious mental states are mental states with conceptually articulated content, whereas unconscious mental states are mental states with non-conceptually articulated content. Nietzsche's views on concepts imply that conceptually articulated mental states will be superficial and in some cases distorting analogues of non-conceptually articulated mental states. Thus, the claim that conscious states have a conceptual articulation renders comprehensible Nietzsche's claim that consciousness is "superficial" and "falsifying."
Kohler, Wolfgang (1929). An old pseudoproblem. Die Naturwissenschaften 17:395-401.   (Google)
Lee, Harold N. (1985). A semiotic-pragmatic theory of consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23:217-228.   (Google)
Loar, Brian (2003). Transparent experience and the availability of qualia. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Maloney, J. Christopher (1986). Sensuous content. Philosophical Papers 15 (November):131-54.   (Google)
Mazis, Glen (2008). Humans, Animals, Machines: Blurring Boundaries. State University of New York.   (Google)
McGinn, Colin (1988). Consciousness and content. Proceedings of the British Academy 74:219-39.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google)
McGinn, Colin (2006). Hard questions - comments on Galen Strawson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):90-99.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I find myself in agreement with almost all of Galen's paper (Strawson, 2006) -- except, that is, for his three main claims. These I take to be: that he has provided a substantive and useful definition of 'physicalism'; that physicalism entails panpsychism; and that panpsychism is a necessary and viable doctrine. But I find much to applaud in the incidentals Galen brings in to defend these three claims, particularly his eloquent and uncompromising rejection of the idea of brute emergence, as well as his dissatisfaction with standard forms of physicalism. I certainly find his paper far more on target than most of the stuff I read on this topic
McIntyre, Ronald & Smith, David Woodruff (1989). Theory of intentionality. In William R. McKenna & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook. University Press of America.   (Google)
Abstract: §1. Intentionality; §2. Husserl's Phenomenological Conception of Intentionality; §3. The Distinction between Content and Object; §4. Husserl's Theory of Content: Noesis and Noema; §5. Noema and Object; §6. The Sensory Content of Perception; §7. The Internal Structure of Noematic Sinne; §8. Noema and Horizon; §9. Horizon and Background Beliefs
Nelkin, Norton (1994). Phenomena and representation. Philosophy of Science 45 (2):527-47.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (1997). Cognitive science and phenomenal consciousness: A dilemma, and how to avoid it. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between a counter-intuitive theory or no theory at all. We offer a way out of this dilemma. We argue that the computational theory of mind doesn't force cognitive scientists to explain consciousness in terms of computational processes, as there is an alternative strategy available: one that focuses on the representational vehicles that encode information in the brain. This alternative approach to consciousness allows us to do justice to the standard intuitions about phenomenal experience, yet remain within the confines of cognitive science
Prado, C. G. (1977). Reference and consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (May):22-26.   (Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (2000). Phenomenal character revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):465-467.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). The phenomenal character of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2).   (Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1981). On the relation between occurrents and contentful mental states. Inquiry 24 (October):353-358.   (Google)
Strawson, Galen (1998). Replies to Noam Chomsky, Pierre Jacob, Michael Smith, and Paul Snowdon. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):461-486.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Strawson, Galen (2003). What is the relation between an experience, the subject of the experience, and the content of the experience? Philosophical Issues 13 (1):279-315.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This version of this paper has been superseded by a substantially revised version in G. Strawson, Real Materialism and Other Essays (OUP 2008) I take 'content' in a natural internalist way to refer to occurrent mental content. I introduce a 'thin' or ‘live’ notion of the subject according to which a subject of experience cannot exist unless there is an experience for it to be the subject of. I then argue, first, that in the case of a particular experience E, its content C, and its (thin) subject S, [C ↔ E ↔ S]; and, second, that the metaphysical fact that underlies this (strong modal) equivalence is in fact identity: [E = S = C]. I suggest that the effort of thought required to grasp this is deeply revealing of the nature of reality. On the way I raise a doubt about the viability of the traditional object/property distinction.
Sullivan, Philip R. (1995). Contentless consciousness and information-processing theories of mind. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 2 (1):51-59.   (Google)
Sundstrom, Par (2002). An argument against spectrum inversion. In Sten Lindstrom & Par Sundstrom (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sundström, Pär (2004). Lessons for Mary. In Marek and Reicher (ed.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society.   (Google)
Thau, Michael (2002). Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 98 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book maintains that our conception of consciousness and cognition begins with and depends upon a few fundamental errors. Thau elucidates these errors by discussing three important philosophical puzzles - Spectrum Inversion, Frege's Puzzle, and Black-and-White Mary - each of which concerns some aspect of either consciousness or cognition. He argues that it has gone unnoticed that each of these puzzles presents the very same problem and, in bringing this commonality to light, the errors in our natural conception of consciousness and cognition are also reviewed
Tye, Michael (2009). Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Mit Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism.