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1.6. Aspects of Consciousness (Aspects of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Bachmann, Talis (1998). Is conscious experience established instantaneously? Commentary on J.g. Taylor. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (2):149-156.   (Google | More links)
Dods, John Bovee (1850). The Philosophy of Electrical Psychology. Da Capo Press.   (Google)

1.6a Self-Consciousness

Agrawal, M. M. (1988). Sartre on pre-reflective consciousness. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research (September-December) 121 (September-December):121-127.   (Google)
Anderson, Michael L. & Perlis, Donald R. (2005). The roots of self-awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):297-333.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we provide an account of the structural underpinnings of self-awareness. We offer both an abstract, logical account
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1975). The first person. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 61 | Google)
Balaban, Oded (1990). Subject and Consciousness: A Philosophical Inquiry Into Self-Consciousness. Rowman & Littlefield.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Title on spine: Subject & consciousness.
Bartlett, Edward T. (1988). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and sensory deprivation. Philosophy Research Archives 13:489-497.   (Google)
Bartlett, Edward T. (1983). The subjectlessness of self-consciousness. Philosophy Research Archives 9:675-682.   (Google)
Bayne, Tim & Pacherie, Elisabeth (forthcoming). Narrators and comparators: The architecture of agentive self-awareness. Synthese.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent’s narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production
Bealer, George (1997). Self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving
Beckermann, Ansgar (2003). Self-consciousness in cognitive systems. Schriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft 31:174-188.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dualism, but he seems at least to have acknowledged the possibility that Descartes might be right on this issue, i.e., that the real self is a _res cogitans_. Maybe this is why talk of
Berm, (2003). 'I'- and explanation: Reply to Garrett. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):432-436.   (Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2001). Nonconceptual self-consciousness and cognitive science. Synthese 129 (1):129-149.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2000). Nonconceptual self-awareness and the paradox of self-consciousness. In Albert Newen & Kai Vogeley (eds.), Selbst und Gehirn. Menschliches Selbstbewusstsein und seine Neurobiologischen Grundlagen. Mentis.   (Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (1999). Precis of The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Psycoloquy 10 (35).   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (1997). Reduction and the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):458-66.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Berm, (2007). Self-consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2002). Sources of self-consciousness: Epistemic and genetic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102:87-107.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (1998). The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 215 | Google | More links)
Bermudez, Jose Luis (2001). The sources of self-consciousness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):87-107.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bickle, John (2003). Empirical evidence for a narrative concept of self. In Gary D. Fireman, T. E. McVay & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), Narrative and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Breeur, Roland (2003). Consciousness and the self. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (4):415-436.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: With his notion of absolute consciousness, Sartre tries to rethink the relation between consciousness and the self. What is the origin of subjectivity in relation to a consciousness that is characterized as impersonal and as a radical lucidity? In this article, I attempt to question that origin and the nature as such of the subject in its relation to a consciousness that in its essence is not yet subjective. On the contrary, it is characterized by a selfpresence that is so radical that it threatens every form of self-knowledge
Brewer, Bill (1992). Self-location and agency. Mind 101 (401):17-34.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We perceive things in the external world as spatially located both with respect to each other and to ourselves, such that they are in principle accessible from where we seem to be. I hear the door bang behind me; I feel the pen on the desk over to my right; and I see you walking beneath the line of pictures, from left to right in front of me. By displaying these spatial relations between its objects and us, the perceivers, perception places us in the perceived world: our world and the world we perceive are one. Clearly this is not achieved by our continually perceiving ourselves along with the things around us, and thus recovering our position with respect to them. Indeed I shall argue that there are serious difficulties with the suggestion that this might be the basic mechanism for perceptual self- location. Furthermore, I shall argue that our existence as an element of the objective order cannot be inferred from the raw given in sense perception. Hence it cannot even be on the right lines as an answer to the question 'What is it for perception to represent its objects as environmental to the subject?', that it should present these objects, along with the perceiving subject himself, or along with something from which his existence in the perceived world could be deduced, in the very same frame so to speak. Nevertheless it yields him an awareness of himself as there in the wings of that scene, genuinely located with respect to the action, yet somehow not normally quite getting onto the stage. And I shall argue here, that perceptual contents succeed in being self-locating in this way in..
Brinkmann, Klaus (2005). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and the modern self. History of the Human Sciences 18 (4):27-48.   (Google)
Brinck, Ingar (1998). Self-identification and self-reference. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6.   (Google)
Abstract: [1] To know who one is, and also know whether one's experiences really belong to oneself, do not normally present any problem. It nevertheless happens that people do not recognise themselves as they walk by a mirror or do not understand that they fit some particular description. But there are situations in which it really seems impossible to be wrong about oneself. Of that, Ludwig Wittgenstein once wrote:
It is possible that, say in an accident, I should feel pain in my arm, see a broken arm at
my side, and think it is mine, when really it is my neighbour's. And I could, looking into
a mirror, mistake a bump on his forehead for one on mine. On the other hand there is
no question of recognising a person when I say I have toothache.... it is as impossible
that in making the statement "I have toothache" I should have mistaken another
person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone
else for me. (1958: 67)
In the passage in which this remark is found, Wittgenstein distinguishes between two kinds of use of "I". The first use, as object, as in "I have broken my arm" or "The wind is blowing in my hair", he holds, involves the recognition of a particular person, and there is the possibility of error as concerns the identity of the person. In the other use, as subject, as in "I think it will rain" or "I am trying to lift my arm", no person is recognised. No mistake can be made about who the subject is
Brook, Andrew (ms). Externalism and the varieties of self-awareness.   (Google)
Abstract: Externalism is the view that some crucial element in the content of our representational states is outside of not just the states whose content they are but even the person who has those states. If so, the contents of such states (and, many hold, the states themselves) do not supervene on anything local to the person whose has them. There are a number of different candidates for what that element is: function (Dretske), causal connection (Putnam, Kripke, Fodor), and social context (Davidson). (Burge has foot in both the causal connection and the social context camps and Dennett fits in here somewhere, too.) This diversity will turn out to be important. The paper starts with Dretske but gets to other varieties of
Brook, Andrew (2001). Kant, self-awareness, and self-reference. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brook, Andrew & DeVidi, R. (eds.) (2001). Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Bryant, Sophie (1897). Variety of extent, degree and unity in self-consciousness. Mind 6 (21):71-89.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, J. (1994). Past, Space, and Self. MIT Press.   (Cited by 129 | Google)
Abstract: In this book John Campbell shows that the general structural features of human thought can be seen as having their source in the distinctive ways in which we...
Campbell, J. (1995). The body image and self-consciousness. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: in N. Eilan, A. Marcel and J. Bermudez (eds.), The Body and the Self (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1995), 29-42
Canfield, John V. (1990). The Looking-Glass Self: An Examination of Self-Awareness. Praeger.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Carruthers, Glenn (forthcoming). A problem for Wegner and colleagues' model of the sense of agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.   (Google)
Abstract: The sense of agency, that is the sense that one is the agent of one’s bodily actions, is one component of our self-consciousness. Recently, Wegner and colleagues have developed a model of the causal history of this sense. Their model takes it that the sense of agency is elicited for an action when one infers that one or other of one’s mental states caused that action. In their terms, the sense of agency is elicited by the inference to apparent mental state causation. Here, I argue that this model is inconsistent with data from developmental psychology that suggests children can identify the agent behind an action without being capable of understanding the relationship between their intentions and actions. Furthermore, I argue that this model is inconsistent with the preserved sense of agency in autism. In general, the problem is that there are cases where subjects can experience themselves as the agent behind their actions despite lacking the resources to make the inference to apparent mental state causation
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen. Consciousness and Cognition 18:515 - 520.   (Google)
Abstract: Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model they attempt to show that one of the standard models (the comparator model) fails to explain the sense of agency and that their model offers a more general account than is aimed at by the standard model. Here I offer comment on both parts of this argument. I offer an alternative reading of some of the data they use to argue against the comparator model. I argue that contrary to Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s reading the case of G.L. supports rather than contradicts the comparator model. Next I suggest how the comparator model can differentiate failures of action attribution in patients suffering parietal lobe lesions and delusions of alien control. I also argue that the apparently unexpected phenomenon of ‘‘hyperassociation” is predicted by the comparator model. Finally I suggest that as it stands Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s model is not well specified enough to explain deficits in the sense of agency associated with delusions of thought insertion. Thus they have not met their second argumentative burden of showing how their model is more general than the comparator model.
Carruthers, Glenn (forthcoming). The case for the comparator model as an explanation of the sense of agency and its breakdowns. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator model needs case-by-case adjustment to deal with problematic data. In response to this, the multifactorial weighting model of Synofzik and colleagues is introduced. Although this model is incomplete, it is more naturally constrained by the cases that are problematic for the comparator model. However, this model may be untestable. I conclude that currently the comparator model approach has stronger support than the multifactorial weighting model approach.
Castaneda, Hector-Neri (1966). 'He': A study in the logic of self-consciousness. Ratio 8 (December):130-57.   (Cited by 113 | Google)
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Cassam, Quassim (1997). Self and World. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Self and World is an exploration of the nature of self-awareness. Cassam rejects the widespread view that the self eludes introspection, and argues that consciousness of our thoughts and experiences involves a sense of our thinking, experiencing selves as shaped, solid, and located physical objects in a world of such objects. This clear, original, and challenging treatment of one of the deepest of intellectual problems will demand the attention of all philosophers and cognitive scientists who are concerned with the self
Castaneda, Hector-Neri (1989). The reflexivity of self-consciousness: Sameness/identity, data for artificial intelligence. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):27-58.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cassam, Quassim (1995). Transcendental Self-Consciousness. In P. Kumar (ed.), The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson. Indian Council for Philosophical Research.   (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1965). Notes on the awareness of the self. The Monist 49 (January):28-35.   (Google)
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1969). On the observability of the self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (September):7-21.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Christofidou, Andrea (2000). Self-consciousness and the double immunity. Philosophy 75 (294):539-570.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through misascription, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-ascription of bodily states are, at best, circumstantially immune to error through misidentification relative to
Church, Jennifer (1990). Judgment, self-consciousness, and object-independence. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):51-60.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Clark, Romane L. (1988). Self knowledge and self consciousness: Thoughts about oneself. Topoi 7 (March):47-55.   (Google | More links)
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen 2008. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):515-520.   (Google)
Abstract: Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model they attempt to show that one of the standard models (the comparator model) fails to explain the sense of agency and that their model offers a more general account than is aimed at by the standard model. Here I offer comment on both parts of this argument. I offer an alternative reading of some of the data they use to argue against the comparator model. I argue that contrary to Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s reading the case of G.L. supports rather than contradicts the comparator model. Next I suggest how the comparator model can differentiate failures of action attribution in patients suffering parietal lobe lesions and delusions of alien control. I also argue that the apparently unexpected phenomenon of “hyperassociation” is predicted by the comparator model. Finally I suggest that as it stands Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s model is not well specified enough to explain deficits in the sense of agency associated with delusions of thought insertion. Thus they have not met their second argumentative burden of showing how their model is more general than the comparator model.
Cunningham, G. Watts (1911). Self-consciousness and consciousness of self. Mind 20 (80):530-537.   (Google | More links)
Delius, Harald (1981). Self-Awareness: A Semantical Inquiry. Beck.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1992). The self as a center of narrative gravity. In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole & D. L. Johnson (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is a self? I will try to answer this question by developing an analogy with something much simpler, something which is nowhere near as puzzling as a self, but has some properties in common with selves. What I have in mind is the center of gravity of an object. This is a well-behaved concept in Newtonian physics. But a center of gravity is not an atom or a subatomic particle or any other physical item in the world. It has no mass; it has no color; it has no physical properties at all, except for spatio-temporal location. It is a fine example of what Hans Reichenbach would call an abstractum. It is a purely abstract object. It is, if you like , a theorist's fiction. It is not one of the real things in the universe in addition to the atoms. But it is a fiction that has nicely defined, well delineated and well behaved role within physics
Dodd, James (2001). On Dan Zahavi's self-awareness and alterity. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 23 (1):191-198.   (Google)
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Eilan, Naomi M. (ms). Self-location, consciousness, and attention.   (Google)
Abstract: ‘Like the shadow of one’s own head, [the referent of one’s ‘I’ thoughts] will not wait to be jumped on. And yet it is never very far ahead; indeed, sometimes it does not seem to be ahead of the pursuer at all. It evades capture by lodging itself in the very inside of the muscles of the pursuer. It is too near even to be within arm’s reach.’(C of M 177-89)
Ezcurdia, Maite (2001). Thinking about myself. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Abstract: In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization. Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”, but should be conceived of as a dimension , namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences
Frank, Manfred (2002). Self-consciousness and self-knowledge: On some difficulties with the reduction of subjectivity. Constellations 9 (3):390-408.   (Google | More links)
Frith, U. & Happe, F. (1999). Theory of mind and self-consciousness: What is it like to be autistic? Mind and Language 14 (1):1-22.   (Cited by 59 | Google | More links)
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Abstract: Recent studies in developmental psychology have found evidence to suggest that there exists an innate system that accounts for the possibilities of early infant imitation and the existence of phantom limbs in cases of congenital absence of limbs. These results challenge traditional assumptions about the status and development of the body schema and body image, and about the nature of the translation process between perceptual experience and motor ability
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Garrett, Brian J. (2003). Bermudez on self-consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):96-101.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
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Abstract: This interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness.
Gennaro, Rocco J. (1992). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and episodic memory. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):333-47.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: My aim in this paper is to show that consciousness entails self-consciousness by focusing on the relationship between consciousness and memory. More specifically, I addreess the following questions: (1) does consciousness require episodic memory?; and (2) does episodic memory require self-consciousness? With the aid of some Kantian considerations and recent empirical data, it is argued that consciousness does require episodic memory. This is done after defining episodic memory and distinguishing it from other types of memory. An affirmative answer to (2) is also warranted especially in the light of the issues raised in answering (1). I claim that 'consciousness entails self-consciousness' is thereby shown via the route through episodic memory, i.e. via affirmative answers to (1) and (2). My aim is to revive this Kantian thesis and to bring together current psychological research on amnesia with traditional philosophical perspectives on consciousness and memory
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Abstract: In recent philosophy of mind, it is often assumed that consciousness and self-consciousness are two separate phenomena. In this paper, I argue that this is not quite right. The argument proceeds in two phases. First, I draw a distinction between (i) being self-conscious of a thought that p and (ii) self-consciously thinking that p. I call the former transitive self-consciousness and the latter intransitive self-consciousness. I then argue that consciousness does depend on intransitive self-consciousness, and that the common reasons for denying the dependence of consciousness upon self-consciousness apply only to transitive self-consciousness
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Abstract: Different points of Metzinger's position makes it a peculiar form of representationalism: (1) his distinction between intentional and phenomenal content, in relation to the internalism/externalism divide; (2) the notion of transparency defined at a phenomenal and not epistemic level, together with (3) the felt inwardness of experience. The distinction between reflexive and pre-reflexive phenomenal internality will allow me to reconsider Metzinger's theory of the self and to propose an alternative conception that I will describe both at an epistemic and a phenomenal level
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Abstract: I set out to trace the history of a distinctive conception of self-consciousness -- from its first formulation in the 3rd century BC, through its reception among Roman philosophers around the 1st century AD, and finally to its fate in Enlightenment thought of the 18th century. I use this history to clarify and defend an idea that figured centrally in the history of philosophy, but which has recently come under sustained attack: the idea that human beings are in some very fundamental way self- conscious beings, and that our self-consciousness serves as a kind of foundation or transcendental condition for our other cognitive capacities. Obviously, given the scale of these ambitions, the presentation here should be considered at best a sketch. It is intended not to settle any matters, but at least to bring back into view a line of argument that has been covered over by more recent developments
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Abstract: This paper takes an evolutionary approach to what we are, namely autopoietic systems with a first person perspective on our surroundings and ourselves. This in contrast with Thomas Metzinger
Meijsing, Monica (2000). Self-consciousness and the body. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):34-50.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Traditionally, what we are conscious of in self-consciousness is something non-corporeal. But anti-Cartesian philosophers argue that the self is as much corporeal as it is mental. Because we have the sense of proprioception, a kind of body awareness, we are immediately aware of ourselves as bodies in physical space. In this debate the case histories of patients who have lost their sense of proprioception are clearly relevant. These patients do retain an awareness of themselves as corporeal beings, although they hardly feel their bodies (they have normal sensation in the head, but from the neck downwards only sensations of pain and temperature, and of fatigue and deep touch). They can initiate movements, and with the help of visual feedback learn to control them. It is shown that the traditional view of the self as immaterial is not supported by these cases. But the argument against this view has to be amended. It relies too much on bodily sensations, and misses the importance of active self-movement
Menant, Christophe (ms). Evolution and mirror neurons. An introduction to the nature of self-consciousness (2005).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Self-consciousness is a product of evolution. Few people today disagree with the evolutionary history of humans. But the nature of self-consciousness is still to be explained, and the story of evolution has rarely been used as a framework for studies on consciousness during the 20th century. This last point may be due to the fact that modern study of consciousness came up at a time where dominant philosophical movements were not in favor of evolutionist theories (Cunningham 1996). Research on consciousness based on Phenomenology or on Analytic Philosophy has been mostly taking the characteristics of humans as starting points. Relatively little has been done with bottom-up approaches, using performances of animals as a simpler starting point to understand the generation of consciousness through evolution. But this status may be changing, thanks to new tools coming from recent discoveries in neurology. The discovery of mirror neurons about ten years ago (Gallese et al. 1996, Rizzolatti et al. 1996) has allowed the built up of new conceptual tools for the understanding of intersubjectivity within humans and non human primates (Gallese 2001, Hurley 2005). Studies in these fields are still in progress, with discussions on the level of applicability of this natural intersubjectivity to non human primates (Decety and Chaminade 2003). We think that these subject/conspecific mental relations made possible by mirror neurons can open new paths for the understanding of the nature of self-consciousness via an evolutionist bottom-up approach. We propose here a scenario for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution by a specific analysis of two steps of evolution: first step from simple living elements to non human primates comparable to chimpanzees, and second step from these non human primates to humans. We identify these two steps as representing the evolution from basic animal awareness to body self-awareness, and from body self-awareness to self-consciousness. (we consider that today non human primates are comparable to what were pre-human primates). We position body self-awareness as corresponding to the performance of mirror self recognition as identified with chimpanzees and orangutans (Gallup). We propose to detail and understand the content of this body self-awareness through a specific evolutionist build up process using the performances of mirror neurons and group life. We address the evolutionary step from body self-awareness to self-consciousness by complementing the recently proposed approach where self-consciousness is presented as a by-product of body self-awareness amplification via a positive feedback loop resulting of anxiety limitation (Menant 2004). The scenario introduced here for the build up of self-consciousness through evolution leaves open the question about the nature of phenomenal-consciousness (Block 2002). We plan to address this question later on with the help of the scenario made available here
Menant, Christophe, Evolution of representations and intersubjectivity as sources of the self. An introduction to the nature of self-consciousness (2006).   (Google)
Abstract: It is agreed by most people that self-consciousness is the result of an evolutionary process, and that representations may have played an important role in that process. We would like to propose here that some evolutionary stages can highlight links existing between representations and the notion of self, opening a possible path to the nature of self-consciousness. Our starting point is to focus on representations as usage oriented items for the subject that carries them. These representations are about elements of the environment including conspecifics, and can also represent parts of the subject without refering to a notion of self (we introduce the notion of "auto-representation" that does not carry the notion of self-representation). Next step uses the performance of intersubjectivity (mirror neurons level in evolution) where a subject has the capability to mentally simulate the observed action of a conspecific (Gallese 2001). We propose that this intersubjectivity allows the subject to identify his auto-representation with the representations of his conspecifics, and so to consider his auto-representation as existing in the environment. We show how this evolutionary stage can introduce a notion of self-representation for a subject, opening a road to self-conciousness and to self. This evolutionary approach to the self via self- representation is close to the current theory of the self linked to representations and simulations (Metzinger 2003). We use a scenario about how evolution has brought the performance of self-representation to self-consciousness. We develop a process describing how the anxiety increase resulting from identification with endangered or suffering conspecifics may have called for the development of tools to limit this anxiety (empathy, imitation, language), and how these tools have accelerated the evolutionary process through a positive feedback on intersubjectivity (Menant 2004, 2005). We finish by summarizing the points addressed, and propose some possible continuations
Menant, Christophe (ms). Evolution of representations. From basic life to self-representation and self-consciousness (2006).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The notion of representation is at the foundation of cognitive sciences and is used in theories of mind and consciousness. Other notions like ‘embodiment’, 'intentionality‘, 'guidance theory' or ‘biosemantics’ have been associated to the notion of representation to introduce its functional aspect. We would like to propose here that a conception of 'usage related' representation eases its positioning in an evolutionary context, and opens new areas of investigation toward self-representation and self-consciousness. The subject is presented in five parts:Following an overall presentation, the first part introduces a usage related representation as being an information managed by a system submitted to a constraint that has to be satisfied. We consider that such a system can generate a meaningful information by comparing its constraint to a received information (Menant 2003). We define a representation as being made of the received information and of the meaningful information. Such approach allows groundings in and out for the representation relatively to the system. The second part introduces the two types of representations we want to focus on for living organisms: representations of conspecifics and auto-representation, the latter being defined without using a notion of self-representation. Both types of representations have existed for our pre-human ancestors which can be compared to today great apes.In the third part, we use the performance of intersubjectivity as identified in group life with the presence of mirror neurons in the organisms. Mirror neurons have been discovered in the 90‘s (Rizzolatti & al.1996, Gallese & al.1996). The level of intersubjectivity that can be attributed to non human primates as related to mirror neurons is currently a subject of debate (Decety 2003). We consider that a limited intersubjectivity between pre-human primates made possible a merger of both types of representations. The fourth part proposes that such a merger of representations feeds the auto-representation with the meanings associated to the representations of conspecifics, namely the meanings associated to an entity perceived as existing in the environment. We propose that auto-representation carrying these new meanings makes up the first elements of self-representation. Intersubjectivity has allowed auto-representation to evolve into self-representation, avoiding the homunculus risk. The fifth part is a continuation to other presentations (Menant 2004, 2005) about possible evolution of self-representation into self-consciousness. We propose that identification with suffering or endangered conspecifics has increased anxiety, and that the tools used to limit this anxiety (development of empathy, imitation, language and group life) have provided a positive feedback on intersubjectivity and created an evolutionary engine for the organism. Other outcomes have also been possible. Such approach roots consciousness in emotions. The evolutionary scenario proposed here does not introduce explicitly the question of phenomenal consciousness (Block 1995). This question is to be addressed later with the help of this scenario.The conclusion lists the points introduced here with their possible continuations
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Abstract: " In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of...
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Metzinger, Thomas (2005). Precis: Being No-One. Psyche 11 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: This is a short sketch of some central ideas developed in my recent book _Being No One_ (BNO hereafter). A more systematic summary, which focuses on short answers to a set of specific, individual questions is already contained _in _the book, namely as BNO section 8.2. Here, I deliberately and completely exclude all work related to semantically differentiating and empirically constraining the philosophical concept of a "quale" (mostly Chapter 2, 3 & 8), all proposals regarding conceptual foundations for the overall theory (2 & 5), all of the neurophenomenological case-studies used to test and refine it (4 & 7), and all remarks of a more general or methodological character (1 & 8). In particular, the present Pr
Metzinger, Thomas (2006). Reply to ghin: Self-sustainment on the level of global availability. Psyche 12 (4).   (Google)
Abstract: Of all the current philosophical attempts to rescue the concept of “self” by working out a weaker version, one that does not imply an ontological substance or an individual in the metaphysical sense, Marcello Ghin’s is clearly my favorite. His reconstruction of the original theory is absolutely accurate and without any major misunderstandings. Enriching the concept of a “SMT-system” with the notions of “autocatalysis” and “self- sustainment,” and adding the intriguing idea that we are systems reflecting these processes on a new level of complexity, namely with the help of an integrated PSM on the level of conscious experience, seems the way to go if one wants to keep the concept of “self.” I have great difficulties in writing a reply to Ghin’s commentary, simply because I agree with so much in it. Let us see where his approach leads us
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Abstract: This is a brief and accessible English summary of the "Self-model Theory of Subjectivity" (SMT), which is only available as German book in this archive. It introduces two new theoretical entities, the "phenomenal self-model" (PSM) and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality-relation" PMIR. A representationalist analysis of the phenomenal first-person persepctive is offered. This is a revised version, including two pictures
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Abstract: I thank Tsakiris and Fotopoulou for their insightful commentary on my target article. In particular I welcome the opportunity to revisit how the online/offline representation of the body distinction is drawn. Tsakiris and Fotopoulou raise three major points of concern with my model. First they argue that the sense of embodiment is not sufficient for self recognition. Second they show that the relationship between online and offline representations of the body cannot be the simple ‘serial construction’ relationship I advocate in the target article. Third they claim that my model makes a false prediction. I agree with the first two lines of criticism. As to the first I will clarify and tone down the claims made about the role of the sense of embodiment in self recognition tasks. However, I will argue that the sense of embodiment is measured in van den Bos and Jeannerod’s study. I strongly welcome the second line of criticism Tsakiris and Fotopoulou offer. I will add some reasons to agree that the ‘serial construction’ account of the relationship between online and offline representations cannot be true. I maintain, however, that this does not affect the central thesis of target article, namely that it is an offline representation of the body that underlies the sense of embodiment. Finally, I will defend the model by arguing that it does not make the false prediction Tsakiris and Fotopoulou attribute to it.
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Abstract: This paper argues that there are two compelling intuitions about conscious experience, the absorption intuition and the ubiquity intuition. The former is the claim that conscious experience consists in intentional absorption in its objects; the latter is the claim that conscious experience ubiquitously exhibits a sense that the mental subject is conscious that she is so conscious. These two intuitions are in tension with each other and it seems no single theory of consciousness can respect both. Drawing on the early work of Sartre, particularly in The Transcendence of the Ego, I argue that an adverbial theory of consciousness comes closest to doing so: it explains the first intuition and respects the phenomenon that the second intuition is supposed to capture. It emerges, therefore, as the theory of consciousness that is the most explanatory overall. The argument of this paper proceeds as follows. The first section describes the distinctive features of an adverbial approach to consciousness. The second describes the first intuition that conscious experience is typically absorbed in the objects of conscious thought whereas the third describes the intuition that our conscious experience is ubiquitously self- aware. I then turn to an examination to a range of views, influenced by Brentano, that try to reconcile these intuitions and argue that none of them succeed. I conclude with a description of how an adverbialism influenced by Sartre
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Abstract: The sense of embodiment is vital for self recognition. An examination of anosognosia for hemiplegia—the inability to recognise that one is paralysed down one side of one’s body—suggests the existence of ‘online’ and ‘offline’ representations of the body. Online representations of the body are representations of the body as it is currently, are newly constructed moment by moment and are directly “plugged into” current perception of the body. In contrast, offline representations of the body are representations of what the body is usually like, are relatively stable and are constructed from online representations. This distinction is supported by an analysis of phantom limb—the feeling that an amputated limb is still present—phenomena. Initially it seems that the sense of embodiment may arise from either of these types of representation; however, an integrated representation of the body seems to be required. It is suggested information from vision and emotions is involved in generating these representations. A lack of access to online representations of the body does not necessarily lead to a loss in the sense of embodiment. An integrated offline representation of the body could account for the sense of embodiment and perform the functions attributed to this sense.
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van Gulick, Robert (1988). A functionalist plea for self-consciousness. Philosophical Review 97 (April):149-88.   (Cited by 31 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Varela, Francisco G. (1971). Self-consciousness: Adaptation or epiphenomenon? Stud Gen 24:426-39.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Walker, Kendrick W. (1976). Armstrong's analysis of self-awareness. Personalist 57:395-402.   (Google)
Weisberg, Josh (2003). Being all that we can be: Review of Metzinger's Being No-One. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Weisberg, Josh (2006). Consciousness constrained: A commentary on being no one. Psyche 12 (1):***.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ABSTRCT: In this commentary, I criticize Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach to fixing the explanandum of a theory of consciousness and I offer a commonsense alternative in its place. I then re-evaluate Metzinger's multi-faceted working concept of consciousness, and argue for a shift away from the notion of "global availability" and towards the notio ns of "perspectivalness" and "transparency." This serves to highlight the role of Metzinger's "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR) in explaining consciousness, and it helps to locate Metzinger's theory in relation to other naturalistic theories of
Weisberg, Josh (2005). Consciousness constrained: Commentary on Metzinger. Psyche 11 (5).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ABSTRCT: In this commentary, I criticize Metzinger's interdisciplinary approach to fixing the explanandum of a theory of consciousness and I offer a commonsense alternative in its place. I then re-evaluate Metzinger's multi-faceted working concept of consciousness, and argue for a shift away from the notion of "global availability" and towards the notio ns of "perspectivalness" and "transparency." This serves to highlight the role of Metzinger's "phenomenal model of the intentionality relation" (PMIR) in explaining consciousness, and it helps to locate Metzinger's theory in relation to other naturalistic theories of
White, Stephen L. (1987). What is it like to be a homunculus? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (June):148-74.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Wider, Kathleen (2006). Emotion and self-consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Winfield, Richard D. (2006). Self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Review of Metaphysics 59 (4):757-779.   (Google)
Zahavi, Dan & Parnas, Josef (2002). Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theory. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 35 | Google)
Zahavi, Dan (2000). Self and consciousness. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Zahavi, Dan (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Zweig, M. B. (1968). On self-consciousness and a taxonomy of action. The Monist 52 (July):439-451.   (Google)

1.6b The Unity of Consciousness

Alter, Torin (ms). What do split-brain cases show about the unity of consciousness?   (Google)
Abstract: The startling empirical data that concern us here are well known. Severing the corpus callosum produces a kind of mental bifurcation (Sperry 1968). In one experiment, a garlic smell is presented to a patient
Arnold, Felix (1905). The unity of mental life. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (18):487-493.   (Google | More links)
Bach, Kent (1988). Critical notice. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.   (Google)
Abstract: As philosophical topics go, self-deception has something for everyone. It raises basic questions about the nature of belief and the relation of belief to thought, desire, and the will. It provokes further questions on such topics as reasoning, attention, self-knowledge, the unity of the self, intentional action, motivation, self-esteem, psychic defenses, the unconscious, personal character, and interpersonal relations. There are two basic questions about self-deception itself, which each take a familiar philosophical form: What is it? How is it possible? These questions have both an analytic and a psychological side. Is self-deception, as its name suggests, literally a case of lying to oneself? If not, how different can it be from other-deception and still deserve its name? Psychologically, what processes does self-deception involve and how is it motivated?
Baldner, Kent (1996). Subjectivity and the unity of the world. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):333-346.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Baumann, Peter (2007). Experiencing things together: What is the problem? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how
Bayne, Timothy J. (2001). Co-consciousness: Review of Barry Dainton's Stream of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:79-92.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2005). Divided brains and unified phenomenology: A review essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to apply his account of the unity of consciousness to the split-brain syndrome. I provide a critical evaluation of Tye's account of the unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome
Bayne, Tim (2007). Hypnosis and the unity of consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Hypnosis appears to generate unusual—and sometimes even astonishing—changes in the contents of consciousness. Hypnotic subjects report perceiving things that are not there, they report not perceiving things that are there, and they report unusual alterations in the phenomenology of agency. In addition to apparent alterations in the contents of consciousness, hypnosis also appears to involve alterations in the structure of consciousness. According to many theorists—most notably Hilgard—hypnosis demonstrates that the unity of consciousness is an illusion (Hilgard 1977)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2004). Self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):219-236.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness has a number of puzzling features. One such feature is its unity: the experiences and other conscious states that one has at a particular time seem to occur together in a certain way. I am currently enjoying visual experiences of my computer screen, auditory experiences of bird-song, olfactory experiences of coffee, and tactile experiences of feeling the ground beneath my feet. Conjoined with these perceptual experiences are proprioceptive experiences, experiences of agency, affective and emotional experiences, and conscious thoughts of various kinds. These experiences are unified in a variety of ways, but the kind of unity that I’m interested in here concerns their phenomenal character. Take just two of these experiences: the sound of bird-song and the smell of coffee. There is something it is like to have the auditory experience, there is something it is like to have the olfactory experience, and there is something it is like to have both the auditory and olfactory experiences together. These two experiences occur as parts or components or aspects of a larger, more complex experience. And what holds of these two experiences seems to hold – at least in normal contexts – of all of one’s simultaneous experiences: they seem to be subsumed by a single, maximal experience.2 We could think of this maximal experience as an experiential perspective on the world. What it is like to be me right now is (or involves) an extremely complex conscious state that subsumes the various simpler experiences that I outlined above (seeing my computer screen, hearing bird-song, smelling coffee, and so on). I will follow recent literature in using the term “co-consciousness” for the relation that a set of conscious states bear to each other when they have a complex phenomenology (Bayne and Chalmers 2003; Dainton 2000; Hurley 1998; Lockwood 1989)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2000). The unity of consciousness: Clarification and defence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):248-254.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Bayne, Tim (2008). The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome. Journal of Philosophy 105 (6).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the lens of the split-brain syndrome is not a new one—such projects date back to Nagel’s seminal paper on the topic—the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of the issues
Bayne, Tim, The unity of consciousness: A cartography.   (Google)
Abstract: theorists insist that consciousness is essentially unified. Other theorists assert that the unity of consciousness is an illusion, and that consciousness is often, if not invariably, disunified. Unfortunately, it is rare for proponents of either side of the debate to explain what the unity of consciousness might involve. What would it mean for consciousness to be unified? In this chapter I provide a brief cartography of the unity of consciousness. In the next section I introduce a number of unity relations that can hold between conscious states, and in the following sections I show how these unity relations can be used to construct various conceptions of the unity of consciousness—what I call unity theses. These unity theses provide us with a set of reference points by means of which we can orient discussions of the (dis)unity of consciousness
Bayne, Timothy J. (forthcoming). Unified phenomenology and divided brains: Critical notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.   (Google)
Bayne, Timothy J. & Chalmers, David J. (2003). What is the unity of consciousness? In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing birds, and could experience the singing birds without the red book. But at the same time, the experiences seem to be tied together in a deep way. They seem to be unified, by being aspects of a single encompassing state of consciousness
Beahrs, J. O. (1983). Co-consciousness: A common denominator in hypnosis, multiple personality, and normalcy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 26:100-13.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Beahrs, J. O. (1982). Unity and Multiplicity: Multilevel Consciousness of Self in Hypnosis, Psychiatric Disorder, and Mental Health. Brunner/Mazel.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
Brook, Andrew & Raymont, Paul (forthcoming). A Unified Theory of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Brotherston, Bruce W. (1933). Immediate empiricism and unity. Journal of Philosophy 30 (6):141-149.   (Google | More links)
Brooks, Eugene M. (2005). Multiplicity of consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 24 (3):271-280.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brooks, D. H. M. (1985). Strawson, Hume, and the unity of consciousness. Mind 94 (October):583-86.   (Google | More links)
Brook, Andrew (2000). The unity of consciousness. Consciousness And Cognition 9 (2).   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Brooks, D. H. M. (1995). The Unity of the Mind. St Martin's Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Brook, Andrew (2002). Unified consciousness and the self. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Brook, Andrew (1998). Unified consciousness and the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):583-591.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: I am in virtually complete sympathy with Galen Strawson's conclusions in 'The Self'. He takes a careful, measured approach to a topic that lends itself all too easily to speculation and intellectual extravaganzas. The results he achieves are for the most part balanced and plausible. I even have a lot of sympathy with his claim that a memory-produced sense of continuity across time is less central to selfhood than many philosophers think, though I will argue that he goes too far in the opposite direction
Brook, Andrew (1997). Unity of consciousness and other mental unities. In Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Ablex Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Though there has been a huge resurgence of interest in consciousness in the past decade, little attention has been paid to what the philosopher Immanuel Kant and others call the unity of consciousness. The unity of consciousness takes different forms, as we will see, but the general idea is that each of us is aware of many things in the world at the same time, and often many of one's own mental states and of oneself as their single common subject, too
Cassam, Quassim (1989). Kant and reductionism. Review of Metaphysics 43 (September):72-106.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cleeremans, Axel (ed.) (2003). The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2003). Conscious unity, emotion, dreaming, and the solution of the hard problem. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (1995). On the unity of conscious experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):290-311.   (Cited by 75 | Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (2007). Coming together: The unity of conscious experience. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Higher-order consciousness and phenomenal space: Reply to Meehan. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Meehan finds fault with a number of my arguments, and proposes that better solutions to the problems I was addressing are available if we adopt a higher-order theory of consciousness. I start with some general remarks on theories of this sort. I connect what I had to say about the A-thesis with different forms of higher-order sense theories, and explain why I ignored higher-order thought theories altogether: there are compelling grounds for thinking they cannot provide a viable account of phenomenal unity in phenomenal terms. Meehan
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Precis of Stream of Consciousness. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: That our ordinary everyday experience exhibits both unity and continuity is uncontroversial, and on the face of it utterly unmysterious. At any moment we have some conscious awareness of both the world about us, as revealed through our perceptual experiences, and our own inner states
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Replies to commentators. Psyche.   (Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Stream of Consciousness is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness
Revonsuo, Antti (2003). The contents of phenomenal consciousness: One relation to rule them all and in the unity bind them. Psyche 9 (8).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Unity and introspectibility: Reply to Gilmore. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Gilmore concentrates on two arguments which I took to undermine the claim that introspectibility is necessary for co-consciousness: the
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Unity in the void: Reply to Revonsuo. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: While agreeing with me on many issues, Revonsuo rejects my claim that phenomenal states could be co-conscious without being spatially related (in experience). In defence of my claim I described a thought-experiment in which
Deweese-Boyd, Ian (online). Self-deception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Virtually every aspect of the current philosophical discussion of self-deception is a matter of controversy including its definition and paradigmatic cases. We may say generally, however, that self-deception is the acquisition and maintenance of a belief (or, at least, the avowal of that belief) in the face of strong evidence to the contrary motivated by desires or emotions favoring the acquisition and retention of that belief. Beyond this, philosophers divide over whether this action is intentional or not, whether self-deceivers recognize the belief being acquired is unwarranted on the available evidence, whether self-deceivers are morally responsible for their self-deception, and whether self-deception is morally problematic (and if it is in what ways and under what circumstances). The discussion of self-deception and its associated puzzles gives us insight into the ways in which motivation affects belief acquisition and retention. And yet insofar as self-deception represents an obstacle to self-knowledge, which has potentially serious moral implications, self-deception is more than an interesting philosophical puzzle. It is a problem of particular concern for moral development, since self-deception can make us strangers to ourselves and blind to our own moral failings
Eccles, John C. (1985). The Brain and the Unity of Conscious Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Edwards, Jonathan C. W. (2005). Is consciousness only a property of individual cells? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):60-76.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We perceive colour, shape, sound and touch 'bound together' in a single experience. The following arguments about this binding phenomenon are raised: (1) The individual signals passing from neurone to neurone are not bound together, whether as elements of information or physically. (2) Within a single cell, binding in terms of bringing together of information is potentially feasible. A physical substrate may also be available. (3) It is therefore proposed that a bound conscious experience must be a property of an individual cell, not of a group of cells. Since it is unlikely that one specific neurone is conscious, it is suggested that every neurone has a version of our consciousness, or at least some form of sentience. However absurd this may seem it appears to be consistent with the available evidence; arguably the only explanation that is. It probably does not alter the way we should expect to experience the world, but may help to explain the ways we seem to differ from digital computers and some of the paradoxes seen in mental illness. It predicts non-digital features of intracellular computation, for which there is already evidence, and which should be open to further experimental exploration. The arguments given may well prove flawed or the conclusion biologically or physically untenable, but the idea is raised for discussion not least because a formal demonstration that it is invalid may help to identify more fruitful avenues
Ellis, Ralph D. & Newton, Natika (2005). The unity of consciousness: An enactivist approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):225-280.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Feinberg, Todd E. (2000). The nested hierarchy of consciousness: A neurobiological solution to the problem of mental unity. Neurocase 6 (2):75-81.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fox, Ivan (1985). The individualization of consciousness. Philosophical Topics 13 (3):119-43.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Sync-ing in the stream of experience sync-ing in the stream of experience: Time-consciousness in broad, Husserl, and Dainton. Psyche 9 (10).   (Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J.; Herrmann, Douglas J. & Sarapata, Michael (2006). Aspects of the unity of consciousness and everyday memory failures. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):372-385.   (Google | More links)
Gilmore, Cody S. (2003). The introspectibility thesis. Psyche 9 (5).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to what Barry Dainton calls the 'Strong Introspectibility thesis', it is a necessary truth that mental states S and S* are co-conscious (experienced together) if and only if they are 'jointly introspectible', i.e., if and only if it is possible for there to be some single state of introspective awareness that represents both S and S*. Dainton offers two arguments for the conclusion that joint introspectibility is unnecessary for co-consciousness. In these comments I attempt to show, first, that Dainton's arguments fail, and, second, that joint introspectibility is actually insufficient for co-consciousness. (As to whether it is also unnecessary, I take no stance.)
Hamlyn, David W. (1996). The unity of the senses and self-consciousness. In D.W. Hamlyn (ed.), Understanding Perception: The Concept and its Conditions. Avebury Press.   (Google)
Hasker, William (2009). Persons and the unity of consciousness. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (1991). Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal space. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hughes, Bret Alan (online). The functioning hypothesis of consciousness.   (Google)
Humphrey, N. (2000). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)] 67 (4):1059-1066.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What unites the many selves that constitute the human mind? How is the self-binding problem solved? I argue that separate selves come to belong together as one Self as a result of their dynamic participation in creating a single life, rather as the members of an orchestra come to belong together as a result of their jointly creating a single work of music
Humphrey, Nicholas (ms). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness. Social research, 67, no. 4, 32-39, 2000.   (Google)
Abstract: I am looking at my baby son, as he thrashes around in his crib, two arms flailing, hands grasping randomly, legs kicking the air, head and eyes turning this way and that, a smile followed by a grimace crossing his face. . . And I’m wondering: what is it like to be him? What is he feeling now? What kind of experience is he having of himself?
Hurley, Susan L. (2003). Action and the unity of consciousness. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (2003). Action, the unity of consciousness, and vehicle externalism. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1996). Myth upon myth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:253-260.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1994). Unity and objectivity. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Unity, neuropsychology, and action. In Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Janew, Claus (2009). Omnipresent Consciousness and Free Will. In How Consciousness Creates Reality. CreateSpace.   (Google)
Abstract: This article is not an attempt to explain consciousness in terms basically of quantum physics or neuro-biology. Instead I should like to place the term "Consciousness" on a broader footing. I shall therefore proceed from everyday reality, precisely where we experience ourselves as conscious beings. I shall use the term in such a general way as to resolve the question whether only a human being enjoys consciousness, or even a thermostat. Whilst the difference is considerable, it is not fundamental. Every effect exists in the perception of a consciousness. I elaborate on its freedom of choice, in my view the most important source of creativity, in a similarly general way. The problems associated with a really conscious decision do not disappear by mixing determination with a touch of coincidence. Both must enter into a higher unity. In so doing it will emerge that a certain degree of freedom of choice is just as omnipresent as consciousness - an inherent part of reality itself.





























Kennett, Jeanette & Matthews, Steve (2003). The unity and disunity of agency. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):308-312.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Effective agency, according to contemporary Kantians, requires a unity of purpose both at a time, in order that we may eliminate conflict among our motives, and over time, because many of the things we do form part of longer-term projects and make sense only in the light of these projects and life plans. Call this the unity of agency thesis. This thesis can be regarded as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity and indeed on accounts of what it is to have the life of a person in the broad, rather than narrowly biological sense. It is also a fundamental condition of social life that persons within society fulfill a range of longitudinal roles: parenthood is one such obvious example, as are teachers, health professionals, engineers, artists, and many others. The fulfillment of these and other valuable social roles requires that agents have the capacity to rationally conceive of themselves as engaged in these roles and subject to the demands of them. To be unable to fulfill any such longitudinal social roles is to have a life deficient in value. The unity of agency is thus, we argue, something we rationally strive for, and something to be morally promoted. Psychiatric states that undermine the unity of agency are morally and rationally disvaluable. Using the example of dissociation, we explain how one such state may have this undermining or disruptive effect on the unity of agency. The therapeutic ends for psychiatry in conditions involving such states are thus seen more globally as the restoration of effective agency, that is, unified agency.
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Kim, Chin-Tai (1971). Cartesian dualism and the unity of a mind. Mind 80 (July):337-353.   (Google | More links)
Kobes, Bernard W. (2005). Review of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Psyche 11 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Consciousness has been defined as that annoying period between naps, and this grumpy definition may not be wholly facetious, if Michael Tye's latest book is right. Tye's main goal here is to develop a theory of the phenomenal unity of experience at a time, and its diachronic analog, the moment-to-moment continuity of one's experiential stream from the time one wakes up to the time consciousness lapses
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LaRock, Eric (2007). Intrinsic perspectives, object feature binding, and visual consciousness. Theory and Psychology 17 (6):799-09.   (Google | More links)
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Montecucco, Nitamo Federico (2006). Coherence, brain evolution, and the unity of consciousness: The evolution of planetary consciousness in the light of brain coherence research. World Futures 62 (1 & 2):127 – 133.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The law of coherence helps us understand the physical force behind the increasing complexity of the evolutionary process, from quanta, to cells, to self-awareness and collective consciousness. The coherent electromagnetic field is the inner glue of every system, the "intelligent" energy-information communication that assures a cooperative and synergic behavior to all the components of the system, as a whole, allowing harmonious evolution and unity of consciousness. Neuropsychological experiments show that the different brain areas communicate with more or less coherence according to different states of consciousness: high values are correlated with states of psychophysical integrity and well-being, whereas low values with states of conflict and depression. If we expand isomorphically these brain discoveries, we will have four main general states of coherence: from disgregation to unity, which represents an important element, in the General System Theory, to differentiate between inanimate and animate system, and to understand how billions cells become a single living organism, and then how billions of human beings could eventually generate planetary consciousness. In this light the resolution of the global ecosystem crisis implicates human transformation from a low to a highly coherent state of consciousness. The key to the entire process seems to be the coherent nature of consciousness
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Nagel, Thomas (1971). Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness. Synthese 22 (May):396-413.   (Cited by 62 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1984). Concerning the unity of consciousness: I. Varieties of Conscious Unity. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 3:281-303.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1986). Concerning the unity of consciousness: . William James on personal conscious unity. Imagination, Cognition And Personality 5:21-30.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1979). The unity of consciousness. Behaviorism 7:45-63.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Nikolinakos, Drakon (2004). Anosognosia and the unity of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 119 (3):315-342.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Oaklander, L. Nathan (1987). Parfit, circularity, and the unity of consciousness. Mind 96 (October):525-29.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Oakley, David A. & Eames, L. C. (1986). The plurality of consciousness. In David A. Oakley (ed.), Mind and Brain. Methuen.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (2000). Disunity defended: A reply to Bayne. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):255-263.   (Google)
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O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (2003). The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self. In A.S. David & T. T. J. Kircher (eds.), The Self and Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I look out the window and I think that the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool, but the
thoughts of Eammon Andrews come into my mind
O'Dea, John (2008). Transparency and the unity of experience. In E. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: If we assume that the operation of each sense modality constitutes a different experience – a visual experience, an auditory experience, etc – we are faced with the problem of how those distinct experiences come together to form a unified perceptual encounter with the world. Michael Tye has recently argued that the best way to get around this problem is to deny altogether that there are such things as purely visual (and so forth) experiences. Here I aim to show not simply that Tye’s proposed solution fails, but that its failure is highly instructive because it allows us to see that the transparency thesis, which lies at the heart of the case against qualia, and of most representationalist theories of experience, is more problematic than is often supposed
O'Shaughnessy, Brian (1992). The diversity and unity of action and perception. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Peterson, Charles W. (2003). Unity of consciousness in Schlick. Dialogue 45 (2-3):57-60.   (Google)
Picard, Maurice (1921). The unity of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 18 (13):347-357.   (Google | More links)
Pincock, Christopher (web). Accounting for the unity of experience in Dilthey, Rickert, Bradley and ward. In U. Feest (ed.), Historical Perspectives on Erkl. Max Planck Institute for the History of Science.   (Google)
Abstract: Forthcoming in U. Feest (ed.), Historical Perspectives on Erkl
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Radden, Jennifer (1998). Pathologically divided minds, synchronic unity and models of self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):658-672.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Revonsuo, Antti (1999). Binding and the phenomenal unity of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):173-85.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The binding problem is frequently discussed in consciousness research. However, it is by no means clear what the problem is supposed to be and how exactly it relates to consciousness. In the present paper the nature of the binding problem is clarified by distinguishing between different formulations of the problem. Some of them make no mention of consciousness, whereas others are directly related to aspects of phenomenal experience. Certain formulations of the binding problem are closely connected to the classical philosophical problem of the unity of consciousness and the currently fashionable search for the neural correlates of consciousness. Nonetheless, only a part of the current empirical research on binding is directly relevant to the study of consciousness. The main message of the present paper is that the science of consciousness needs to establish a clear theoretical view of the relation between binding and consciousness and to encourage further empirical work that builds on such a theoretical foundation
Revonsuo, Antti & Tarkko, K. (2002). Binding in dreams: The bizarreness of dream images and the unity of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (7):3-24.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Rossman, Neil I. (1991). Consciousness: Separation and Integration. SUNY Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rosenberg, Jay F. (1997). Kantian schemata and the unity of perception. In Language and Thought. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (1998). The boundary problem for phenomenal individuals. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness: The First Tucson Discussions and Debates (Complex Adaptive Systems). MIT Press.   (Google)
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (2004). The boundary problem for experiencing subjects. In A Place for Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
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Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1902). The unity of process in consciousness. Mind 11 (44):470-502.   (Google | More links)
Schrader, Warren (online). A unity of consciousness argument against causal emergence.   (Google)
Schleichert, Hubert (1985). On the concept of unity of consciousness. Synthese 64 (September):411-20.   (Google | More links)
Schachter, Josef (2002). Pierre Bayle, matter, and the unity of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):241-266.   (Google)
Shand, Alexander F. (1888). The unity of consciousness. Mind 13 (50):231-243.   (Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (2003). Consciousness and co-consciousness. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Shrader, Warren (2006). The unity of consciousness: Trouble for the materialist or the emergent dualist? Faith and Philosophy 23 (1):33-44.   (Google)
Abstract: As part of his case for emergent dualism, William Hasker proffers a _unity-of-_ _consciousness_ (UOC) argument against materialism. I formalize the argument and show how the warrant for two of its premises accrues from the warrant one assigns to two distinct theses about unified conscious experience. I then argue that though both unity theses are plausible, the materialist has little to fear from Hasker
Shrader, Warren (ms). What is the unity of consciousness argument?   (Google)
Stevenson, Leslie F. (2000). Synthetic unities of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):281-306.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Tinnin, Louis (1990). Mental unity, altered states of consciousness, and dissociation. Dissociation 3:154-59.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Tomy, C. A. (2003). An argument for the unity of consciousness. In Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.   (Google)
Tye, Michael (2007). The problem of common sensibles. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities. Kluwer.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In _On The Soul_ (425a-b), Aristotle drew a distinction between those qualities that are perceptible only via a single sense and those that are perceptible by more than one. The latter qualities he called
Varela, F. & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neural synchrony and the unity of mind: A neurophenomenological perspective. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
von der Malsburg, Christoph (1997). The coherence definition of consciousness. In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I will focus in this essay on a riddle that in my view is central to the consciousness issue: How does the mind or brain create the unity we perceive out of the diversity that we know is there? I contend this is a technical issue, not a philosophical one, although its resolution will have profound philosophical repercussions, and although we have at present little more than the philosophical method to attack it
Ward, Andrew (1980). Materialism and the unity of consciousness. Analysis 40 (June):144-46.   (Google)
Watkins, J. W. N. (1982). A basic difficulty in the mind-brain identity hypothesis. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Mind and Brain. Paragon House.   (Google)
Weisberg, Josh (2001). The appearance of unity: A higher-order interpretation of the unity of consciousness. Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Conference of The.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: subjective appearance of unity, but respects unity can be adequately dealt with by the theory. I the actual and potential disunity of the brain will close by briefly considering some worries about processes that underwrite consciousness. eliminativism that often accompany discussions of unity and consciousness
Weiner, Scott E. (2003). Unity of agency and volition: Some personal reflections. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):369-372.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Zeki, Semir (2003). The disunity of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (5):214-218.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)

1.6c Homogeneity of Consciousness

15 / 16 entries displayed

Byrne, Alex (2005). Knowing our minds. Boston Review.   (Google)
Abstract: ancient Greek temple at Delphi and is quoted approvingly by Socrates in the _First_
Clark, Austen (1989). The particulate instantiation of homogeneous pink. Synthese 80 (August):277-304.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: If one examines the sky at sunset on a clear night, one seems to see a continuum of colors from reds, oranges and yellows to a deep blue-black. Between any two colored points in the sky there seem to be other colored points. Furthermore, the changes in color across the sky appear to be continuous. Although the colors at the zenith and the horizon are obviously distinct, nowhere in the sky can one see any color borders, and every sufficiently small region of the sky is made up of regions that all seem to be of the same color
Cornman, James W. (1970). Sellars, scientific realism, and sensa. Review of Metaphysics 23 (March):417-51.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Delaney, Cornelius F. (1971). Sellars' grain argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):14-16.   (Google | More links)
Friedman, Stephen (1989). Ultimate homogeneity: A dialogue. Philosophy Research Archives 14:425-53.   (Google)
Gunderson, Keith (1974). The texture of mentality. In Renford Bambrough (ed.), Wisdom: Twelve Essays. Blackwell.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Huemer, Michael (2004). Elusive freedom? A reply to Helen Beebee. Philosophical Review 113 (3):411-416.   (Google | More links)
Lockwood, Michael (1993). The grain problem. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Annotation | Google)
Lycan, William G. (1987). Sellars' "grain" argument. In W.G. Lycan (ed.), Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Metzinger, Thomas (1995). Faster than thought: Holism, homogeneity, and temporal coding. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (2005). Reading one's own mind: Self-awareness and developmental psychology. In M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton & C. Viger (eds.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, this idea came under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology.1 The attack from developmental psychology arises from the growing body of work on
Revonsuo, Antti (2003). The contents of phenomenal consciousness: One relation to rule them all and in the unity bind them. Psyche 9 (8).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Richardson, Robert C. & Muilenberg, G. (1982). Sellars and sense impressions. Erkenntnis 17 (March):171-212.   (Google | More links)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1963). Philosophy and the scientific image of man. In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview.   (Cited by 94 | Google)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1971). Seeing, sense impressions, and sensa: A reply to Cornman. Review of Metaphysics 24 (March):391-447.   (Cited by 1 | Google)

1.6d Knowledge of Consciousness

Alter, Torin (2009). Does the ignorance hypothesis undermine the conceivability and knowledge arguments? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):756-765.   (Google)
Alter, Torin (web). Phenomenal knowledge without experience. In E. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Phenomenal knowledge usually comes from experience. But it
need not. For example, one could know what it’s like to see red without
seeing red—indeed, without having any color experiences. Daniel Dennett
(2007) and Pete Mandik (forthcoming) argue that this and related
considerations undermine the knowledge argument against physicalism.
If they are right, then this is not only a problem for anti‐physicalists. Their
argument threatens to undermine any version of phenomenal realism—
the view that there are phenomenal properties, or qualia, that are not
conceptually reducible to physical or functional properties. I will argue
that this threat is illusory. Explaining why will clarify what is and is not at issue in discussions of the knowledge argument and phenomenal realism. This will strengthen the case for physically and functionally irreducible qualia.
Aydede, Murat (2003). Is introspection inferential? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose there is a red ball against a uniformly gray background moving toward my left. I am seeing the moving red ball. I am having a visual experience that carries the information (among other things) that [the ball] is red.1 Now supposing that I have the concepts RED and SEEING, and all my other cognitive (including introspective) mechanisms are intact and working normally, the job is to say exactly how I do come to know that I am seeing [the ball] as red. How do I come to know, as I shall sometimes put it, that I am seeing red?
Balog, Katalin (forthcoming). Acquaintance and the mind-body problem. In Christopher Hill & Simone Gozzano (eds.), Identity Theory. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer while maintaining that qualia themselves are non-physical properties. In this case the non-physical nature of qualia may play no role in accounting for the features of acquaintance. But although the account could be used by a dualist, its existence provides enormous support for physicalism. In particular it provides the makings of a positive refutation (i.e., a refutation by construction) of the conceivability arguments and the Mary argument for dualism.
Baruss, Imants (1998). Beliefs about consciousness and reality of participants at 'tucson II'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):483-496.   (Google)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2001). Chalmers on the justification of phenomenal judgments. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):407-19.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bayer, Benjamin (ms). From folk psychology to folk epistemology: The status of radical simulation.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I consider one of the leading philosophic-psychological theories of “folk psychology,” the simulation theory of Robert Gordon. According to Gordon, we attribute mental states to others not by representing those states or by applying the generalizations of theory, but by imagining ourselves in the position of a target to be interpreted and exploiting our own decision-making skills to make assertions which we then attribute to others as ‘beliefs’. I describe a leading objections to Gordon’s theory—the problem of adjustment—and show how a charitably interpreted Gordon could answer this objection. I conclude, however, that the best case for Gordon’s position still runs into a new problem concerning the epistemological presuppositions of belief-attribution. This suggests a new account of folk psychological explanation that draws on children’s basic folk epistemological knowledge. Identifying this new alternative helps undermine the simplicity of a theory based on simulation-based explanation
Bouratinos, E. (2003). A pre-epistemology of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):38-41.   (Google)
Bradley, Raymond D. (1964). Avowals of immediate experience. Mind 73 (April):186-203.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bradley, Francis H. (1909). On our knowledge of immediate experience. Mind 18 (69):40-64.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bush, Wendell T. (1906). The privacy of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (2):42-45.   (Google | More links)
Carloye, Jack C. (1991). Consciousness and introspective knowledge. Methodology and Science 8:8-22.   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1996). The paradox of phenomenal judgment. In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Clark, Thomas W. (2005). Killing the observer. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):38-59.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Phenomenal consciousness is often thought to involve a first-person perspective or point of view which makes available to the subject categorically private, first-person facts about experience, facts that are irreducible to third-person physical, functional, or representational facts. This paper seeks to show that on a representational account of consciousness, we don't have an observational perspective on experience that gives access to such facts, although our representational limitations and the phenomenal structure of consciousness make it strongly seem that we do. Qualia seem intrinsic and functionally arbitrary, and thus categorically private, because they are first-order sensory representations that are not themselves directly represented. Further, the representational architecture that on this account instantiates conscious subjectivity helps to generate the intuition of observerhood, since the phenomenal subject may be construed as outside, not within, experience. Once the seemings of private phenomenal facts and the observing subject are discounted, we can understand consciousness as a certain variety of neurally instantiated, behaviour controlling content, that constituted by an integrated representation of the organism in the world. Neuroscientific research suggests that consciousness and its characteristic behavioural capacities are supported by widely distributed but highly integrated neural processes involving communication between multiple functional sub- systems in the brain. This 'global workspace' may be the brain's physical realization of the representational architecture that constitutes consciousness
Conee, Earl (1994). Phenomenal knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.   (Cited by 23 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (2002). How could I be wrong? How wrong could I be? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):13-16.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the striking, even amusing, spectacles to be enjoyed at the many workshops and conferences on consciousness these days is the breathtaking overconfidence with which laypeople hold forth about the nature of consciousness Btheir own in particular, but everybody =s by extrapolation. Everybody =s an expert on consciousness, it seems, and it doesn =t take any knowledge of experimental findings to secure the home truths these people enunciate with such conviction
Dilworth, John B. (2006). Perception, introspection, and functional consonance. Theoria 72 (4):299-318.   (Google)
Abstract: What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a _conforming _belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be _red _to oneself--rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be green to oneself instead. On such a Cartesian view, our introspective certainly about our own thoughts extends also to our perceptual experiences as to how things seem to be to us, so that our resulting introspective beliefs about our phenomenal states also count as knowledge of them
Dretske, Fred (2003). How do you know you are not a zombie? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1999). The mind's awareness of itself. Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):103-24.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Eilan, Naomi M. & Roessler, Johannes (2003). Agency and self-awareness: Mechanisms and epistemology. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Fischer, Eugen (2001). Discrimination: A challenge to first-person authority? Philosophical Investigations 24 (4):330-346.   (Google)
Francescotti, Robert M. (2000). Introspection and qualia: A defense of infallibility. Communication and Cognition 33 (3-4):161-173.   (Google)
Gertler, Brie (2003). How to draw ontological conclusions from introspective data. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Google)
Gertler, Brie (2001). Introspecting phenomenal states. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Hellie, Benj (2009). Acquaintance. In Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hellie, Benj (2010). An externalist's guide to inner experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!

Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems from shared "qualia". Qualia are compatible with direct realism: while they generate an explanatory gap (and colors do not), so does /seeing/; qualia are excluded from perceptual consciousness by its "transparency"; instead, qualia are aspects of thought about the perceived environment.

The asymmetry between my treatments of color and seeing is grounded in the asymmetry between ignorance and error: while inversion shows that normal subjects are ignorant of the natures of the colors, hallucination shows not that perceivers are ignorant of the nature of seeing but that hallucinators are prone to error about their condition. Past literature has treated inversion and hallucination as on a par: externalists see error in both cases, while internalists see mutual ignorance. My account is so complicated because plausible results require mixing it up.
Hellie, Benj (2007). Factive phenomenal characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper expands on the discussion in the first section of 'Beyond phenomenal naivete'. Let Phenomenal Naivete be understood as the doctrine that some phenomenal characters of veridical experiences are factive properties concerning the external world. Here I present in detail a phenomenological case for Phenomenal Naivete and an argument from hallucination against it. I believe that these arguments show the concept of phenomenal character to be defective, overdetermined by its metaphysical and epistemological commitments together with the world. This does not establish a gappish eliminativism, but a gluttish pluralism, on which there are many imperfect deservers of the name 'phenomenal character'. Different projects in the philosophy of mind -- phenomenology, philosophy of conscious, metaphysics and epistemology of perception -- are concerned with different deservers of the name.
Hellie, Benj (2007). Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I argue against such "Relation Intentionalist" theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the grounds that they understand a subject's awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than "direct", like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness, based on views expressed by Russell and Price, takes the relation of awareness to be a nonintentional "acquaintance".
Hellie, Benj (2005). Noise and perceptual indiscriminability. Mind 114 (455):481-508.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Perception represents colors inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise, and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by 'transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability'.
Hellie, Benj (forthcoming). The multidisjunctive conception of hallucination. In Fiona Mapherson (ed.), Hallucination. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Direct realists think that we can't get a clear view the nature of /hallucinating a white picket fence/: is it /representing a white picket fence/? is it /sensing white-picket-fencily/? is it /being acquainted with a white' picketed' sense-datum/? These are all epistemic possibilities for a single experience; hence they are all metaphysical possibilities for various experiences. Hallucination itself is a disjunctive or "multidisjunctive" category. I rebut MGF Martin's argument from statistical explanation for his "epistemic" conception of hallucination, but his view embeds in my view as a "reference-fixer".
Hill, Christopher S. (1988). Introspective awareness of sensations. Topoi 7 (March):11-24.   (Google | More links)
Hofmann, Frank (2009). Introspective self-knowledge of experience and evidence. Erkenntnis 71 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: The paper attempts to give an account of the introspective self-knowledge of our own experiences which is in line with representationalism about phenomenal consciousness and the transparency of experience. A two-step model is presented. First, a demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing this’ is formed which refers to what one experiences, by means of attention. Plausibly, this thought is knowledge, since safe. Second, a non-demonstrative thought of the form ‚I am experiencing a pain’ occurs. This second self-ascription is justified inferentially, on the basis of the first, demonstrative thought. Thus, an account of introspective experiential self-knowledge can be developed which is richer and more adequate to the phenomena than pure reliabilism and Dretske’s displaced perception model. There is really such a thing as introspection, but no inner sense
Horgan, Terry; Tienson, John & Graham, George (2006). Internal-world skepticism and the self-presentational nature of phenomenal consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Howell, Robert J. (2010). Subjectivity and the elusiveness of the self. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):pp. 459-483.   (Google | More links)
Imlay, Robert A. (1969). Immediate awareness. Dialogue 8 (September):228-42.   (Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (1971). Armstrong's analogue of introspection. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (April):158-62.   (Google | More links)
Kneale, William C. (1950). Experience and introspection. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 50:I.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Horgan, Terry & Kriegel, Uriah (2007). Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well? Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, self- knowledge has also encountered its share of skeptics – philosophers who refuse to accord it any descriptive, let alone normative, distinction. In this paper, we argue that there is at least one _species_ of self-knowledge that is different from, and better than, other knowledge. It is a specific kind of knowledge of one’s concurrent phenomenal experiences. Call knowledge of one’s own phenomenal experiences _phenomenal knowledge_. Our claim is that some (though not all) phenomenal knowledge is different from, and better than, non-phenomenal knowledge. In other
Langsam, Harold (2002). Consciousness, experience, and justification. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-28.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Leeds, Stephen (1993). Qualia, awareness, Sellars. Noûs 27 (3):303-330.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Lehrer, Keith (2006). Consciousness, representation, and knowledge. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Lemos, Ramon M. (1965). Immediacy, privacy, and ineffability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (June):500-515.   (Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (2003). Knowing what it's like. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Maund, J. Barry (1976). Awareness of sensory experience. Mind 85 (July):412-416.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1989). An examination of four objections to self-intimating states of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10:63-116.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1977). Consciousness: Consideration of an inferential hypothesis. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 7 (April):29-39.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1988). Is any state of consciousness self-intimating? Journal of Mind and Behavior 9:167-203.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Parsons, Kathryn P. (1970). Mistaking sensations. Philosophical Review 79 (April):201-213.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Robinson, William S. (1982). Causation, sensations, and knowledge. Mind 91 (October):524-40.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David M. (1995). Self-knowledge and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3).   (Google)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2000). How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of human echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2002). How well do we know our own conscious experience? The case of visual imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5):35-53.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2007). No unchallengeable epistemic authority, of any sort, regarding our own conscious experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dennett argues that we can be mistaken about our own conscious experience. Despite this, he repeatedly asserts that we can or do have unchallengeable authority of some sort in our reports about that experience. This assertion takes three forms. First, Dennett compares our authority to the authority of an author over his fictional world. Unfortunately, that appears to involve denying that there are actual facts about experience that subjects may be truly or falsely reporting. Second, Dennett sometimes seems to say that even though we may be mistaken about what our conscious experience is, our reports about
Schick, Theodore W. (1992). The epistemic role of qualitative content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):383-93.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Shear, Jonathan & Gallagher, Shaun (eds.) (1999). Models of the Self. Imprint Academic.   (Google)
Siewert, Charles (2001). Self-knowledge and phenomenal unity. Noûs 35 (4):542-68.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Smart, J. J. C. (1971). Reports of immediate experiences. Synthese 22 (May):346-359.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Sosa, Ernest (2003). Consciousness and self-knowledge. In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.   (Google)
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1981). Knowledge of subjectivity. Theoria to Theory 14 (June):313-25.   (Google)
Tibbetts, Paul E. (1972). Feigl on raw feels, the brain, and knowledge claims: Some problems regarding theoretical concepts. Dialectica 26:247-66.   (Google | More links)
van Gulick, Robert (2000). Inward and upward: Reflection, introspection, and self-awareness. Philosophical Topics 28:275-305.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Wallraff, Charles F. (1953). On immediacy and the contemporary dogma of sense-certainty. Journal of Philosophy 50 (January):29-38.   (Google | More links)
Warner, Richard (1996). Facing ourselves: Incorrigibility and the mind-body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (3):217-30.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Warner, Richard (1994). In defense of a dualism. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell.   (Google)
White, Alan R. (1981). Knowledge, acquaintance, and awareness. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6:159-172.   (Google)

1.6e The Function of Consciousness

Baars, Bernard J. (1988). The functions of consciousness. In Bernard J. Baars (ed.), A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Banks, William P. (1996). How much work can a quale do? Consciousness and Cognition 5:368-80.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Barham, James (2003). Thoughts on thinking matter. Progress in Complexity, Information, and Design 2 (3).   (Google | More links)
Bechtel, William P. & Richardson, Robert C. (1983). Consciousness and complexity: Evolutionary perspectives on the mind-body problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):378-95.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Bering, Jesse M. (2004). Consciousness was a 'trouble-maker': On the general maladaptiveness of unsupported mental representation. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):33-56.   (Google)
Bickhard, Mark H. (2001). The Emergence of Contentful Experience. In T. Kitamura (ed.), What Should Be Computed to Understand and Model Brain Function? World Scientific.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There are many facets to mental life and mental experience. In this chapter, I attempt to account for some central characteristics among those facets. I argue that normative function and representation are emergent in particular forms of the self-maintenance of far from thermodynamic equilibrium systems in their essential far-from-equilibrium conditions. The nature of representation that is thereby modeled
Black, David M. (2001). Psychoanalysis and the function of consciousness. In Anthony Molino & Christine Ware (eds.), Where Id Was: Challenging Normalization in Psychoanalysis. Disseminations, Psychoanalysis in Contexts. Wesleyan University Press.   (Google)
Block, Ned (ms). On a confusion about a function of consciousness.   (Cited by 567 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on the phenomenon of blindsight. Some information about stimuli in the blind field is represented in the brains of blindsight patients, as shown by their correct "guesses," but they cannot harness this information in the service of action, and this is said to show that a function of phenomenal consciousness is somehow to enable information represented in the brain to guide action. But stimuli in the blind field are BOTH access-unconscious and phenomenally unconscious. The fallacy is: an obvious function of the machinery of access-consciousness is illicitly transferred to phenomenal consciousness
Block, Ned (1995). On a confusion about the function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18:227--47.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on the phenomenon of blindsight. Some information about stimuli in the blind field is represented in the brains of blindsight patients, as shown by their correct "guesses," but they cannot harness this information in the service of action, and this is said to show that a function of phenomenal consciousness is somehow to enable information represented in the brain to guide action. But stimuli in the blind field are BOTH access-unconscious and phenomenally unconscious. The fallacy is: an obvious function of the machinery of access-consciousness is illicitly transferred to phenomenal consciousness
Bogen, Joseph E. (2001). An experimental disconnection approach to a function of consciousness. International Journal of Neuroscience 111 (3):135-136.   (Google)
Bolton, Thaddeus L. (1909). On the efficacy of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (16):421-432.   (Google | More links)
Boodin, John E. (1908). Consciousness and reality. . Consciousness and its implications. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (9):225-234.   (Google | More links)
Bringsjord, Selmer & Noel, Ron (1998). Why did evolution engineer consciousness? In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Cole, David J. (2002). The function of consciousness. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
DeLancey, Craig (1996). Emotion and the function of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):492-99.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1997). What good is consciousness? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):1-15.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. & Polger, Thomas W. (1998). Consciousness, adaptation, and epiphenomenalism. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Flanagan, Owen J. & Polger, Thomas W. (1995). Zombies and the function of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):313-21.   (Cited by 20 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Gomes, Gilberto (2005). Is consciousness epiphenomenal? Comment on Susan Pockett. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):77-79.   (Google)
Gregory, Richard L. (1996). What do qualia do? Perception 25:377-79.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Guzeldere, Guven; Flanagan, Owen J. & Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (2000). The nature and function of consciousness: Lessons from blindsight. In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The New Cognitive Neurosciences: 2nd Edition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Hilbert, David R. (ms). Why have experiences?   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In _An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision_ George Berkeley made the claim that,
Himma, Kenneth E. (2004). Moral biocentrism and the adaptive value of consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):25-44.   (Google)
Hodgson, David (2002). Three tricks of consciousness: Qualia, chunking and selection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):65-88.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: DAVID HODGSON Abstract: This article supports the proposition that, if a judgment about the aesthetic merits of an artistic object can take into account and thereby be influenced by the particular quality of the object, through gestalt experiences evoked by the object, then we have free will. It argues that it is probable that such a judgment can indeed take into account and be influenced by the particular quality of the object through gestalt experiences evoked by it, so as to make it probable that we do have free will. The proposition is supported by reference to two basic tricks apparently involved in conscious processes, which I call the qualia trick and the chunking trick; and it is suggested that these tricks make possible and indeed probable the existence of a third trick, which I call the selection trick
Humphrey, Nicholas (2000). The privatization of sensation. In Celia Heyes & Ludwig Huber (eds.), The Evolution of Cognition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is the ambition of evolutionary psychology to explain how the basic features of human mental life came to be selected because of their contribution to biological survival. Counted among the most basic must be the subjective qualities of conscious sensory experience: the felt redness we experience on looking at a ripe tomato, the felt saltiness on tasting an anchovy, the felt pain on being pricked by a thorn. But, as many theorists acknowledge, with these qualia, the ambition of evolutionary psychology may have met its match. Everyone agrees that a trait can only contribute to an organism's biological survival in so far as it operates in the public domain. Yet almost everyone also agrees that the subjective quality of sensory experience is (at least for all practical purposes) private and without external influence. Then, maybe we must either concede that the subjective quality of sensations cannot after all have been determined by selection (even if this is theoretically depressing) or else demonstrate that the quality of sensations is not as private as it seems to be (even if this is intuitively unconvincing). No. I believe neither of these solutions to the puzzle is in fact the right one. I argue instead that the truth is that the quality of sensations has indeed been shaped by selection in the past, despite the fact that it is today effectively private. And this situation has come about as a result of a remarkable evolutionary progression, whereby the primitive activity of sensing slowly became "privatized" - that is to say, removed from the domain of overt public behavior and transformed into a mental activity that is now, in humans, largely if not exclusively internal to the subject's mind
Humphrey, Nicholas, The uses of consciousness.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Reflexive consciousness evolved in the context of early human social life, as a means by which 'natural psychologists' could develop working models of their own and others' minds
Huss Parkhurst, Helen (1920). The obsolescence of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 17 (22):596-606.   (Google | More links)
James, William (1885). On the function of cognition. Mind 10 (37):27-44.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Johnston, Mark (2006). Better than mere knowledge? The function of sensory awareness. In T.S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Kim, Jaegwon (2007). The causal efficacy of consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Kirkpatrick, E. A. (1908). The part played by consciousness in mental operations. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5 (16):421-429.   (Google | More links)
Kraemer, Eric Russert (1984). Consciousness and the exclusivity of function. Mind 93 (April):271-5.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Kriegel, Uriah (2004). The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Lau, Hakwan, Volition and the function of consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: What are the psychological functions that could only be performed consciously? People have intuitively assumed that many acts of volition are not influenced by unconscious information. These acts range from simple examples such as making a spontaneous motor movement, to higher cognitive control. However, the available evidence suggests that under suitable conditions, unconscious information can influence these behaviors and the underlying neural mechanisms. One possibility is that stimuli that are consciously perceived tend to yield strong signals in the brain, which makes us think that consciousness has the function of such strong signals. However, if we could create conditions where the stimuli could yield strong signals but not the conscious experience of perception, perhaps we would find that such stimuli are just as effective in influencing volitional behavior. Future studies that focus on clarifying this issue may tell us what the defining functions of consciousness are
Lehar, Steven (online). The function of conscious experience: An analogical paradigm of perception and behavior.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The question of whether conscious experience has any functional purpose depends on a more fundamental issue concerning the nature of conscious experience. In particular, whether the world of experience is the external world itself, as suggested by direct realism, or whether it is merely a virtual- reality replica of that world in an internal representation, as in indirect realism, or representationalism. There is an epistemological problem with the notion of direct realism, for we cannot be consciously aware of objects beyond the sensory surface. Therefore the world of experience can only be an internal replica of the external world. This in turn validates a phenomenological approach to studying the nature of the perceptual representation in the brain. Phenomenology reveals that the representational strategy employed in the brain is an analogical one, in which objects are represented in the brain by constructing full spatial replicas of those objects in an internal representation
Levy, Neil (online). Are zombies responsible? The role of consciousness in moral responsibility.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Compatibilists often think they can afford to be complacent with regard to scientific findings. But there are apparent threats to free will besides determinism. Robert Kane has recently claimed that if consciousness does not initiate action, all accounts of free will go down, compatibilist and incompatibilist. Some cognitive scientists argue that in fact consciousness does not initiate action. In this paper I argue that they are right (though not for the reasons they advance): as a matter of fact consciousness does not initiate action. But, I contend, Kane is wrong in thinking that it follows that we have no free will. I sketch how we might have free will in spite of the finding that consciousness does not initiate action, and remark on the implications for several well-known accounts of responsibility, include Clarke's agent-causal theory and Fischer and Ravizza's reasons-responsiveness account
Levy, Neil (2008). Restoring control: Comments on George Sher. Philosophia 36 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: In a recent article, George Sher argues that a realistic conception of human agency, which recognizes the limited extent to which we are conscious of what we do, makes the task of specifying a conception of the kind of control that underwrites ascriptions of moral responsibility much more difficult than is commonly appreciated. Sher suggests that an adequate account of control will not require that agents be conscious of their actions; we are responsible for what we do, in the absence of consciousness, so long as our obliviousness is explained by some subset of the mental states constitutive of the agent. In this response, I argue that Sher is wrong on every count. First, the account of moral responsibility in the absence of consciousness he advocates does not preserve control at all; rather, it ought to be seen as a variety of attributionism (a kind of account of moral responsibility which holds that control is unnecessary for responsibility, so long as the action is reflective of the agent’s real self). Second, I argue that a realistic conception of agency, that recognizes the limited role that consciousness plays in human life, narrows the scope of moral responsibility. We exercise control over our actions only when consciousness has played a direct or indirect role in their production. Moreover, we cannot escape this conclusion by swapping a volitionist account of moral responsibility for an attributionist account: our actions are deeply reflective of our real selves only when consciousness has played a causal role in their production
Libet, Benjamin W. (2003). Can conscious experience affect brain activity? Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (12):24-28.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Mackie, J. L. (1981). The efficacy of consciousness: Comments on Honderich's paper. Inquiry 24 (October):343-352.   (Google)
McGinn, Colin (1981). A note on functionalism and function. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):169-70.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Menant, Christophe (ms). Performances of self-awareness used to explain the evolutionary advantages of consciousness (2004).   (Google)
Abstract: The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years before consciousness as we know it for humans. The interest of such an approach is that the analysis of selectional advantage is done at an evolution step sigificantly simpler that the step of Human Consciousness. We analyse how evolutionary advantages have resulted from this specific Self Awareness step. This is done by taking into consideration the possibility for a subject to identify with a conspecific at this level of evolution. We use the results made available by Mirror Neuron researchs where intersubjectivity and some level of identification with conspecifics have been evidenced for non human primates. Selectional advantages related to Self Awareness are analysed two ways: - Reformulating the performances of imitation and of development of language. - Showing that Self Awareness within group life can naturaly produce an important increase in fear/anxiety for a subject, and that the means implemented by the subject to overcome this fear/anxiety can act as significant evolution advantages opening the road to Human Consciousness. Such approach brings new elements supporting the view that consciousness is grounded in emotions. It also proposes some more evolutionist explanations to the widely dicussed subject of Empathy (S. Preston & F. de Waal) in terms of specific behaviour implemented to limit fear/anxiety increase. This approach also provides some explanation for limited anxiety within dolphins and introduces a basis for a possible phylogenesis of emotions
Moore, A. W. (1906). The function of thought. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (19):519-522.   (Google | More links)
Morsella, Ezequiel; Krieger, Stephen C. & Bargh, John A. (2009). The primary function of consciousness: Why skeletal muscles are voluntary muscles. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Mott, Peter (1982). On the function of consciousness. Mind 91 (July):423-9.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Oatley, Keith (1988). On changing one's mind: A possible function of consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
O'Regan, Kevin J.; Myin, Erik & No, (2001). Toward an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of "Bodiliness" and "Grabbiness". In A. Carsetti (ed.), Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition. Kluwer.   (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, we present an account of phenomenal con- sciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is experience, and the _problem _of phenomenal consciousness is to explain how physical processes
Pauen, Michael (2006). Feeling causes. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):129-152.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to qualia-epiphenomenalism, phenomenal properties are causally inefficacious, they are metaphysically distinct from, and nomologically connected with certain physical properties. The present paper argues that the claim of causal inefficacy undermines any effort to establish the alleged nomological connection. Epiphenomenalists concede that variations of phenomenal properties in the absence of any variation of physical/functional properties are logically possible, however they deny that these variations are nomologically possible. But if such variations have neither causal nor functional consequences, there is no way to detect themanot only in scientific experiments, but also from the first-person perspective. Since neither third- nor first- person evidence can rule out the actual occurrence of such dissociations, the alleged nomological connection between phenomenal and physical properties cannot be established, in principle. As a consequence, the distinction between logical and nomological possibility breaks down and it cannot be ruled out that such dissociations occur in an unlimited number of cases
Perlis, Donald R. (1997). Consciousness as self-function. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):509-25.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Pierson, Lee & Trout, Monroe (ms). What is consciousness for?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: What is Consciousness For? Lee Pierson and Monroe Trout Copyright © 2005 Abstract: The answer to the title question is, in a word, volition. Our hypothesis is that the ultimate adaptive function of consciousness is to make volitional movement possible. All conscious processes exist to subserve that ultimate function. Thus, we believe that all conscious organisms possess at least some volitional capability. Consciousness makes volitional attention possible; volitional attention, in turn, makes volitional movement possible. There is, as far as we know, no valid theoretical argument that consciousness is needed for any function other than volitional movement and no convincing empirical evidence that consciousness performs any other ultimate function. Consciousness, via volitional action, increases the likelihood that an organism will direct its attention, and ultimately its movements, to whatever is most important for its survival and reproduction
Place, Ullin T. (2000). The causal potency of qualia: Its nature and its source. Brain and Mind 1 (2):183-192.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is an argument (Medlin, 1967; Place, 1988) whichshows conclusively that if qualia are causallyimpotent we could have no possible grounds forbelieving that they exist. But if, as this argumentshows, qualia are causally potent with respect to thedescriptions we give of them, it is tolerably certainthat they are causally potent in other morebiologically significant respects. The empiricalevidence, from studies of the effect of lesions of thestriate cortex (Humphrey, 1974; Weiskrantz, 1986;Cowey and Stoerig, 1995) shows that what is missing inthe absence of visual qualia is the ability tocategorize sensory inputs in the visual modality. This would suggest that the function of privateexperience is to supply what Broadbent (1971) callsthe evidence on which the categorization ofproblematic sensory inputs are based. At the sametime analysis of the causal relation shows that whatdifferentiates a causal relation from an accidentalspatio-temporal conjunction is the existence ofreciprocally related dispositional properties of theentities involved which combine to make it true thatif one member of the conjunction, the cause, had notexisted, the other, the effect, would not haveexisted. The possibility that qualia might bedispositional properties of experiences which, as itwere, supply the invisible glue that sticks cause toeffect in this case is examined, but finallyrejected
Polger, Thomas W. & Flanagan, Owen J. (online). Explaining the evolution of consciousness: The other hard problem.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Recently some philosophers interested in consciousness have begun to turn their attention to the question of what evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism. The issue has been pressed in recent dicussions involving David Chalmers, Todd Moody, Owen Flanagan and Thomas Polger, Daniel Dennett, and others. The purpose of this essay is to consider some of the problems that face anyone who wants to give an evolutionary explanation of consciousness. We begin by framing the problem in the context of some current debates. Then we
Polger, Thomas W. (1995). Zombies and the function of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):313-321.   (Google | More links)
Popper, Karl R. (1978). Natural selection and the emergence of mind. Dialectica 32:339-55.   (Cited by 66 | Google | More links)
Ramachandran, Vilayanur S. & Hirstein, William (1998). Three laws of qualia: What neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):429-57.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Rosenthal, David (online). Consciousness and its function.   (Google)
Abstract: MS, under submission, derived from a Powerpoint presentation at a Conference on Consciousness, Memory, and Perception, in honor of Larry Weiskrantz, City University, London, September 15, 2006
Rosenthal, David (online). The function and facilitation of consciousness.   (Google)
Shaw, Robert & Kinsella-Shaw, Jeffrey (2007). The survival value of informed awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1):137-154.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Various hypotheses about the importance of psycho-neural concomitants are reviewed and their implications discussed for the 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness -- especially, as viewed by cognitive and ecological psychology. In Ecological Psychology, where the subjective-objective dichotomy is repudiated, these concepts are without foundation, and are replaced by informed awareness, which is argued to play an important, perhaps, indispensable role in goal- directed actions and thus to have survival value. The significance of informed awareness is illustrated in several real- world goal-directed tasks
Shanon, Benny (1998). What is the function of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies 5:295-308.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Tye, Michael (1996). The function of consciousness. Noûs 30 (3):287-305.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
van Gulick, Robert (1994). Deficit studies and the function of phenomenal consciousness. In George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Philosophical Psychopathology. MIT Press.   (Cited by 9 | Google)
van Gulick, Robert (1989). What difference does consciousness make? Philosophical Topics 17 (1):211-30.   (Annotation | Google)
Velmans, Max (1991). Is human information processing conscious? [Journal (Paginated)] 14 (4):651-69.   (Cited by 162 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity

1.6f Temporal Consciousness

Akeley, L. E. (1925). The problem of the specious present and physical time: The problem generalized. Journal of Philosophy 22 (21):561-573.   (Google | More links)
Alves, Pedro M. S. (2008). Objective time and the experience of time: Husserl's theory of time in light of some theses of A. Einstein's special theory of relativity. Husserl Studies 24 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between Husserl’s original question of time and the problem of a phenomenology of space constitution as it was first developed in the his manuscripts from the nineteenth century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our representation of space, of the geometrization of intuitive space, and of the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time
Andersen, Holly & Grush, Rick (forthcoming). A brief history of time consciousness: Historical precursors to James and Husserl. Journal of the History of Philosophy.   (Google)
Antony, Michael V. (2001). On the temporal boundaries of simple experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):263-286.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: I argue that the temporal boundaries of certain experiences
Bardon, Adrian (2007). Empiricism, Time-Awareness, and Hume's Manners of Disposition. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5.   (Google)
Abstract: The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? Struggles with this problem have cast doubt on empiricism as an adequate account of the origin of our ideas; Kant builds his theory of a priori knowledge on empiricism’s shortcomings with regard to time-awareness. In the first section of this paper I outline the problem of time-awareness for empiricism, along with some recent attempts to answer it. In the second section I explain how a unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume’s comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other attempts. In the third section I discuss some counter-intuitive consequences of this Humean theory. In the final section I introduce and then dismiss one possible defense of the Humean approach based on his rejection of a universal timeline. I conclude that the failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas.
Bennett, Jonathan (2004). Time in human experience. Philosophy 79 (308):165-183.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A set of eight mini-discourses. 1. The conceivability of the physical world's running in the opposite temporal direction. 2. Augustine's reason for thinking this is not conceivable for the world of the mind. 3. Trying to imagine being a creature that lives atemporally. 4. Memory's need for causal input. 5. Acting in the knowledge that how one acts is strictly determined. 6. The Newcomb problem. 7. The idea that all voluntary action is intended to be remedial. 8. Haunted by the strangeness of the idea of the past qua past
Bergmann, Gustav (1960). Duration and the specious present. Philosophy of Science 27 (January):39-47.   (Google | More links)
Bergson, Henri (1913). Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Dover Publications.   (Google)
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Abstract: In this paper I attempt to show, by considering a number of sources, including Wittgenstein, Sartre, Thomas Nagel and Spinoza, but also adding something crucial of my own, that it is impossible to construe the subject of experience as an object among other objects in the world. My own added argument is the following. The subject of experience cannot move in time along with material events and processes or it could not be aware of the passage of time, hence neither of change nor of motion. The subject cannot therefore be identified with any neural process, function, or location since whatever goes on in the CNS is necessarily objective and part of the temporal flux. However this does not imply any form of dualism for experiences exist only for the subject whose experiences they are and hence they have no objective reality
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Abstract: That our ordinary everyday experience exhibits both unity and continuity is uncontroversial, and on the face of it utterly unmysterious. At any moment we have some conscious awareness of both the world about us, as revealed through our perceptual experiences, and our own inner states
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Abstract: Stream of Consciousness is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness
Dainton, Barry (2008). The experience of time and change. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):619-638.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Can we directly experience change? Although some philosophers have denied it, the phenomenological evidence is unambiguous: we can, and do. But how is this possible? What structures or features of consciousness render such experience possible? A variety of very different answers to this question have been proposed, answers which have very different implications for the nature of consciousness itself. In this brief survey no attempt is made to engage with the often complex (and sometimes obscure) literature on this topic. Instead, a largely schematic examination of the main options is conducted, with a view to determining the most promising avenues for further investigation
Dainton, Barry F. (2003). Time in experience: Reply to Gallagher. Psyche 9 (12).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In _Stream of Consciousness_ I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl were fundamentally flawed, and proposed a quite different account: the overlap model. While recognizing that the latter has merits, Gallagher argues that it too is fundamentally flawed; he also takes issue with some of my claims concerning Broad and Husserl. My reply comes in three main parts. I start by clarifying my use of certain terms, in particular _realism_ and _anti-realism_ as applied to theories of phenomenal temporality in general, and the accounts of Broad and Husserl in particular. I then turn to Gallagher
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Abstract: As cognitive science, including especially cognitive neuroscience, closes in on the first realistic models of the human mind, philosophical puzzles and problems that have been conveniently postponed or ignored for generations are beginning to haunt the efforts of the scientists, confounding their vision and leading them down hopeless paths of theory. I will illustrate this claim with a brief look at several temporal phenomena which appear anomalous only because of a cognitive illusion: an illusion about the point of view of the observerix. Since there is no point in the brain where "it all comes together," several compelling oversimplifications of traditional theorizing must be abandoned
Dennett, Daniel C. & Kinsbourne, Marcel (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:183-201.   (Cited by 394 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274
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Abstract: about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton's interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton's own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content, and a lack of phenomenological clarity concerning the central concept of overlapping experiences
Gallagher, Shaun (1979). Suggestions towards a revision of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness. Man and World 12:445-464.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
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Abstract: Roger Penrose, in _The Emperor's New Mind_ (1989), writes about the way Mozart perceived music. Mozart did not play a piece in his mind in real time, or even speeded up, but could hold it before him all at once. We all do this, although usually for much shorter riffs than entire symphonies. I have argued that the all-at-onceness of our thoughts and perceptions is at least as inexplicable as what it is like to see red; I think the aural/temporal all-at-onceness makes the point at least as vividly as the visual/spatial all-at-onceness of the curl of smoke in an art nouveau poster
Grush, Holly K. Andersen Rick (2009). A brief history of time-consciousness: Historical precursors to James and Husserl. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2):pp. 277-307.   (Google)
Abstract: William James' Principles of Psychology , in which he made famous the "specious present" doctrine of temporal experience, and Edmund Husserl's Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins were giant strides in the philosophical investigation of the temporality of experience. However, an important set of precursors to these works has not been adequately investigated. In this article, we undertake this investigation. Beginning with Reid's essay "Memory" in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , we trace out a line of development of ideas about the temporality of experience that runs through Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, William Hamilton, and finally the work of Shadworth Hodgson and Robert Kelly, both of whom were immediate influences on James (though James pseudonymously cites the latter as 'E.R. Clay'). Furthermore, we argue that Hodgson, especially his Metaphysic of Experience (1898), was a significant influence on Husserl
Grush, Rick (2005). Brain time and phenomenological time. In A. Brooks & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Cambridge.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: ... there are cases in which on the basis of a temporally extended content of consciousness a unitary apprehension takes place which is spread out over a temporal interval (the so-called specious present). ... That several successive tones yield a melody is possible only in this way, that the succession of psychical processes are united "forthwith" in a common structure
Grush, Rick (2006). How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness. Synthese 153 (3):417-450.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts
Hameroff, Stuart R. (online). Time, consciousness, and quantum events in fundamental space-time geometry.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction: The problems of time and consciousness What is time? St. Augustine remarked that when no one asked him, he knew what time was; however when someone asked him, he did not. Is time a process which flows? Is time a dimension in which processes occur? Does time actually exist? The notion that time is a process which "flows" directionally may be illusory (the "myth of passage") for if time did flow it would do so in some medium or vessel (e.g. minutes per what?) [1]. But if time is a dimension in which processes occurred, e.g. as one component of a 4 dimensional spacetime, then why would processes occur unidirectionally in time? Yet we perceive time as an orderly, unidirectional process. An alternative explanation is that time does not exist as either a process or dimension, but that reality is a collage of discrete, disconnected and haphazardly arranged configurations of the universe, e.g. as described in Julian Barbour's "The end of time" [2]. In this view our perception of a unidirectional flow of time occurs because each moment, or "Now" as Barbour terms them, involves memory of other conceptually relevant moments, and the orderly flow of time is an illusion. Barbour's deconstruction of time contrasts the Newtonian reality of objects moving deterministically through 4 dimensional spacetime. Newton's contemporary (and rival) Leibniz [3] viewed the world in a manner consistent with Barbour (and with Mach's principle that the spatiotemporal structure of the universe is dependent on the distribution of mass, a foundation of Einstein's general relativity). According to Leibniz the world is to be understood not as matter/mass moving in a framework of space and time, but of more fundamental snapshot-like entities that momentarily fuse space and matter into single possible arrangements or configurations of the entire universe. Such configurations, which can be fabulously rich and complex considering the vastness of the universe, are the ultimate "things" of reality, which Leibniz termed "monads"..
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Hoerl, Christoph (2008). On being stuck in time. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):485-500.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is sometimes claimed that non-human animals (and perhaps also young children) live their lives entirely in the present and are cognitively ‘stuck in time’. Adult humans, by contrast, are said to be able to engage in ‘mental time travel’. One possible way of making sense of this distinction is in terms of the idea that animals and young children cannot engage in tensed thought, which might seem a preposterous idea in the light of certain findings in comparative and developmental psychology. I try to make this idea less preposterous by looking into some of the cognitive requirements for tensed thought. In particular, I suggest that tensed thought requires a specific form of causal understanding, which animals and young children may not possess.
Hoerl, Christoph & McCormack, Teresa (2001). Perspectives on time and memory: an introduction. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: What is the connection between the way we represent time and things in time, on the one hand, and our capacity to remember particular past events, on the other? This is the substantive question that has stood behind the project of putting together this volume. The methodological assumption that has informed this project is that any progress with the difficult and fascinating set of issues that are raised by this question must draw on the resources of various areas both in philos- ophy and in psychology
Hoerl, Christoph (2009). Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (12):1-18.   (Google)
Abstract: We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as 'before' and 'after' (rather than, say, 'past', 'present' and 'future'), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process that is being experienced. Both claims have been made before, though usually separately from each other, and I don't believe the connection between them has been sufficiently recognized.
Hoerl, Christoph (1998). The perception of time and the notion of a point of view. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):156-171.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper aims to investigate the temporal content of perceptual experience. It argues that we must recognize the existence of temporal perceptions, i.e., perceptions the content of which cannot be spelled out simply by looking at what is the case at an isolated instant. Acts of apprehension can cover a succession of events. However, a subject who has such perceptions can fall short of having a concept of time. Similar arguments have been put forward to show that a subject who has spatial perceptions can fall short of having a concept of space. In both cases, it is the fact that perception is from a point of view which stands in the way of it constituting an exercise of a concept of how things are objectively. However, the paper also shows that the way in which perception is perspectival takes a different form in each of the two cases.
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Abstract: There you are at the opera house. The soprano has just hit her high note – a glassshattering high C that fills the hall – and she holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds the note for such a long time that after a while a funny thing happens: you no longer seem only to hear it, the note as it is currently sounding, that glass-shattering high C that is loud and high and pure. In addition, you also seem to hear something more. It is difficult to express precisely what this extra feature is. One is tempted to say, however, that the note now sounds like it has been going on for a very long time. Perhaps it even sounds like a note that has been going on for too long. In any event, what you hear no longer seems to be limited to the pitch, timbre, loudness, and other strictly audible qualities of the note. You seem in addition to experience, even to hear, something about its temporal extent
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Abstract: John Searle has argued that all perceptual experiences are token-reflexive, in the sense that they are constituents of their own veridicality conditions. Many philosophers have found the kind of token-reflexivity he attributes to experiences, which I will call _causal_ token-reflexivity, unfaithful to perceptual phenomenology. In this paper, I develop an argument for a different sort of token-reflexivity in perceptual (as well as some non- perceptual) experiences, which I will call _temporal_ token-reflexivity, and which ought to be phenomenologically unobjectionable
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Abstract: In this transdisciplinary article which stems from philosophical considerations (that depart from phenomenology -after Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Rosen- and Hegelian dialectics), we develop a conception based on topological (the Moebius surface and the Klein bottle) and geometrical considerations (based on torsion and non-orientability of manifolds), and multivalued logics which we develop into a unified world conception that surmounts the Cartesian cut and Aristotelian logic. The role of torsion appears in a self-referential construction of space and time, which will be further related to the commutator of the True and False operators of matrix logic, still with a quantum superposed state related to a Moebius surface, and as the physical field at the basis of Spencer-Brown’s primitive distinction in the protologic of the calculus of distinction. In this setting, paradox, self-reference, depth, time and space, higher-order non-dual logic, perception, spin and a time operator, the Klein bottle, hypernumbers due to Mus`es which include non-trivial square roots of ±1 and in particular non-trivial nilpotents, quantum field operators, the transformation of cognition to spin for two-state quantum systems, are found to be keenly interwoven in a world conception compatible with the philosophical approach taken for basis of this article. The Klein bottle is found not only to be the topological in-formation for self-reference and paradox whose logical counterpart in the calculus of indications are the paradoxical imaginary time waves, but also a classicalquantum transformer (Hadamard’s gate in quantum computation) which is indispensable to be able to obtain a complete multivalued logical system, and still to generate the matrix extension of classical connective Boolean logic. We further find that the multivalued logic that stems from considering the paradoxical equation in the calculus of distinctions, and in particular, the imaginary solutions to this equation, generates the matrix logic which supersedes the classical logic of connectives and which has for particular subtheories fuzzy and quantum logics. Thus, from a primitive distinction in the vacuum plane and the axioms of the calculus of distinction, we can derive by incorporating paradox, the world conception succintly described above.
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Abstract: The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced
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Abstract: This is an expanded and revised discussion of the argument briefly put forward in my 'A New Problem for the A-Theory of Time', where it is claimed that it is impossible to experience real temporal passage and that no such phenomenon exists. In the first half of the paper the premises of the argument are discussed in more detail than before. In the second half responses are given to several possible objections, none of which were addressed in the earlier paper. There is also some discussion of some related epistemic arguments against the passage of time given by Huw Price and David Braddon-Mitchell along with objections raised against them recently by Tim Maudlin and Peter Forrest respectively
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Rosenthal, David M. (1992). Time and consciousness. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 15 (2):220-221.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ruhnau, Eva (1995). Time gestalt and the observer. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
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Sandowsky, Louis N. (2006). Hume and Husserl: The problem of the continuity or temporalization of consciousness. International Philosophical Quarterly, Pt 1 (181):59-74.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper examines Husserl’s fascination with the issues raised by Hume’s critique of the philosophy of the ego and the continuity of consciousness. The path taken here follows a continental and phenomenological approach. Husserl’s 1905 lecture course on the temporalization of immanent time-consciousness is a phenomenological-eidetic examination of how the continuity of consciousness and the consciousness of continuity are possible. It was by way of Husserl’s reading of Hume’s discussion of “flux” or “flow” that his discourse on temporal phenomena led to the classification of a point-like now as a “fiction” and opened up a horizonal approach to the present that Hume’s introspective analyses presuppose but that escaped the limitations of the language that was available to him. In order to demonstrate the radicality of Husserl’s temporal investigations and his inspiration in the work of Hume, I show how his phenomenological discourse on the living temporal flow of consciousness resolves the latter’s concern about the problem of continuity by re-thinking how, in the absence of an abiding impression of Self, experience is continuous throughout the flux of its impressions
Searle, John R. (1956). Report on does it make sense to suppose that all events, including personal experiences, could occur in reverse? Analysis 16 (June):124.   (Google)
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Sherover, Charles M. (1975). The Human Experience of Time: The Development of its Philosophic Meaning. Northwestern University Press.   (Google)
Spicker, Stuart F. (1973). Inner time and lived-through time: Husserl and Merleau-ponty. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 4 (October):235-247.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Tani, Jun (2004). The dynamical systems accounts for phenomenology of immanent time: An interpretation by revisiting a robotics synthetic study. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):5-24.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Thompson, David L. (online). The phenomenology of internal time-consciousness.   (Google)
Abstract: Outline by Section: I. INTRODUCTION: METHOD OF PHENOMENOLOGY II. REDUCTION FROM DOGMAS III. EXAMPLES OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF A. SENTENCE B. MELODY C. DIAGRAM OF TIME IV. MODIFICATIONS AS MODES OF TEMPORAL STRUCTURE V. RETENTION VI. CONSTITUTION OF EXTERNAL TIME Time present and time past
Thurstone, Louis L. (1919). The anticipatory aspect of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16 (21):561-568.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Valaris, Markos (2008). Inner sense, self-affection, and temporal consciousness in Kant's critique of pure reason. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (4):1-18.   (Google)
Abstract: In §24 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant remarks that his account of the capacity of the understanding to spontaneously determine sensibility explains how empirical self-knowledge is possible through inner-sense. Although most commentators consider Kant's conception of empirical self-knowledge through inner sense to be either a failure or at least drastically under-developed, I argue that (just as Kant claims) his account of the capacity of the understanding to determine sensibility - the "productive imagination" - can ground an attractive account of self-knowledge. The account of inner sense I propose, however, may seem to conflict with some of Kant's views on time. I close the paper by arguing that the apparent conflict is not a fault specific to my account of inner sense, but rather indicative of a deeper tension, internal to Kant's views on time
Varela, Francisco J. (1999). Present-time consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (2-3):111-140.   (Cited by 38 | Google)
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Vogeley, Kai & Kupke, Christian (2007). Disturbances of time consciousness from a phenomenological and neuroscientific perspective. Schizophrenia Bulletin 33 (1):157-165.   (Google | More links)
Waldenfels, Bernhard (2000). Time lag: Motifs for a phenomenology of the experience of time. Research in Phenomenology 30 (1):107-119.   (Google)
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Zahavi, Dan (2003). Inner time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness. In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore settled with a model of self-awareness based upon the subject-object dichotomy, with its entailed difference between the intending and the intended. As a consequence, Husserl never discovered the existence of pre-reflective self- awareness, but remained stuck in the traditional, but highly problematic reflection model of self-awareness
Zahavi, Dan (2007). Perception of duration presupposes duration of perception - or does it? Husserl and Dainton on time. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):453 – 471.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also challenges Husserl's classical account in a number of ways. In the following contribution, I will compare Dainton's and Husserl's respective accounts. Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat opportunity to appraise the contemporary relevance of Husserl's analysis. How does it measure up against one of the more recent analytical accounts?
Zahavi, Dan (2004). Time and consciousness in the bernau manuscripts. Husserl Studies 20 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Even a cursory glance in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein makes it evident that one of Husserl’s major concerns in his 1917-18 reflections on time-consciousness was how to account for the constitution of time without giving rise to an infinite regress. Not only does Husserl constantly refer to this problem in Husserliana XXXIII – as he characteristically writes at one point “Überall drohen, scheint es, unendliche Regresse”(Hua 33/81) – but he also takes care to distinguish between several different regresses (cf. Hua 33/271). One of the more troubling ones is the one that might be called the regress of foundation. It concerns the problem of how to avoid always having to presuppose yet another underlying constituting consciousness. As we will soon see, the attempt to avoid this specific regress is closely linked to the problem of how to come up with a satisfactory account of self-awareness. That Husserl himself was well aware of this link can be inferred from some of his reflections in the beginning of Husserliana XXXIII. As he writes at one point, consciousness exists, it exists as a stream, and it appears to itself as a stream. But how the stream of consciousness is capable of being conscious of itself, how it is possible and comprehensible that the very being of the stream is a form of self-consciousness, is the enduring problem of the entire treatise (Hua 33/44, 46). In this article, I wish to take a closer look at some of Husserl’s attempts in the Bernau Manuscripts to account for time-consciousness without giving rise to an infinite regress

1.6g Consciousness of Action

Aguilar, Jesús H. & Buckareff, Andrei A. (2009). Agency, consciousness, and executive control. Philosophia 37 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the proper role of consciousness in agency. In this paper we criticize Schroeter’s analysis of the type of consciousness involved in executive control and examine the way in which the conscious self allegedly intervenes in action. We argue that Schroeter’s proposal should not be preferred over recent versions of CTA
Andersen, Holly, Causation and the awareness of agency.   (Google)
Abstract: I criticize the tendency to address the causal role of awareness in agency in terms of the awareness of agency, and argue that this distorts the causal import of experimental results in significant ways. I illustrate, using the work of Shaun Gallagher, how the tendency to focus on the awareness of agency obscures the role of extrospective awareness by considering it only in terms of what it contributes to the awareness of agency. Focus on awareness of agency separates awareness from agency itself, and then turns it inwards to introspect distinct agentive processes. If we then assume that the causal influence of awareness is directed at the same object as awareness itself, then the only avenue for conscious causal involvement in action is to somehow interfere with the separate, even neuronal, processes leading to action. I label this the Micromanagement Model of conscious agency, because it forces awareness to micromanage other, nonconscious, processes in order to be causally efficacious. Implicit adherence to the Micromanagement Model prejudices us towards the mistaken conclusion that awareness has limited to no causal role in action
Andersen, Holly (ms). Two causal mistakes in Wegner's illusion of conscious will.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Daniel Wegner argues that our feelings of conscious will are illusory: these feelings are not causally involved in the production of action, which is rather governed by unconscious neural processes. I argue that Wegner's interpretation of neuroscientific results rests on two fallacious causal assumptions, neither of which are supported by the evidence. Each assumption involves a Cartesian disembodiment of conscious will, and it is this disembodiment that results in the appearance of causal inefficacy, rather than any interesting features of conscious will. Wegner's fallacies illustrate two take-away points to heed if making claims about the causal structure of agency
Annas, Julia (2008). The phenomenology of virtue. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):21-34.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What is it like to be a good person? I examine and reject suggestions that this will involve having thoughts which have virtue or being a good person as part of their content, as well as suggestions that it might be the presence of feelings distinct from the virtuous person’s thoughts. Is there, then, anything after all to the phenomenology of virtue? I suggest that an answer is to be found in looking to Aristotle’s suggestion that virtuous activity is pleasant to the virtuous person. I try to do this, using the work of the contemporary social psychologist Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi and his work on the ‘flow experience’. Crucial here is the point that I consider accounts of virtue which take it to have the structure of a practical expertise or skill. It is when we are most engaged in skilful complex activity that the activity is experienced as ‘unimpeded’, in Aristotle’s terms, or as ‘flow’. This experience does not, as might at first appear, preclude thoughtful involvement and reflection. Although we can say what in general the phenomenology of virtue is like, each of us only has some more or less dim idea of it from the extent to which we are virtuous—that is, for most of us, not very much
Bayne, Timothy J. (2006). Phenomenology and the feeling of doing: Wegner on the conscious will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: Given its ubiquitous presence in everyday experience, it is surprising that the phenomenology of doing—the experience of being an agent—has received such scant attention in the consciousness literature. But things are starting to change, and a small but growing literature on the content and causes of the phenomenology of first-person agency is beginning to emerge.2 One of the most influential and stimulating figures in this literature is Daniel Wegner. In a series of papers and his book The Illusion of Conscious Will (ICW) Wegner has developed..
Bayne, Timothy J. (ms). Putting the experience of acting in its place.   (Google)
Abstract: Although the notion can be found in Anscombe
Bayne, Timothy J. & Levy, Neil (2006). The feeling of doing: Deconstructing the phenomenology of agnecy. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Abstract: Disorders of volition are often accompanied by, and may even be caused by, disruptions in the phenomenology of agency. Yet the phenomenology of agency is at present little explored. In this paper we attempt to describe the experience of normal agency, in order to uncover its representational content
Bayne, Tim (forthcoming). The phenomenology of agency. Philosophy Compass.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The phenomenology of agency has, until recently, been rather neglected, overlooked by both philosophers of action and philosophers of consciousness alike. Thankfully, all that has changed, and of late there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent. 1 This burgeoning field crosses the traditional boundaries between disciplines: philosophers of psychopathology are speculating about the role that unusual experiences of agency might play in accounting for disorders of thought and action; cognitive scientists are developing models of how the phenomenology of agency is generated; and philosophers of mind are drawing connections between the phenomenology of agency and the nature of introspection, phenomenal character, and agency itself. My aim in this paper is not to provide an exhaustive survey of this recent literature, but to provide a..
Bayne, Tim, The sense of agency.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Where in cognitive architecture do experiences of agency lie? This chapter defends the claim that such states qualify as a species of perception. Reference to ‘the sense of agency’ should not be taken as a mere façon de parler but picks out a genuinely perceptual system. The chapter begins by outlining the perceptual model of agentive experience before turning to its two main rivals: the doxastic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of belief, and the telic model, according to which agentive experience is really a species of agency. I conclude by defending the perceptual model against a number of objections to it, and by briefly exploring its implications for the question of how to approach the study of perception
Bittner, T. J. (1996). Consciousness and the act of will. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):31-41.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter, Action-awareness and the active mind.   (Google)
Abstract: Anscombe (1957) famously claimed that we have non-observational knowledge of our own physical actions. We have immediate knowledge of what it is that we are doing, she argued, without having to rely on or draw inferences from any independently accessible perceptual cues or bodily sensations. In a pair of recent papers and his new book, Peacocke (2007, 2008a, 2008b) takes up and defends this claim, and extends it into the domain of mental action.1 He aims to provide an account of action-awareness that will generalize to explain how we have immediate, non-inferential, awareness of our own judgments, decisions, imaginings, and so forth. These claims form an important component in a much larger philosophical edifice, with many implications for the philosophy of mind and for epistemology. But Peacocke’s argument limps at both steps. I shall show that he has provided insufficient grounds for accepting Anscombe’s claim, and that the account of action-awareness that he provides doesn’t, in any case, generalize to mental actions of the sort that he intends
Carter, William R. (1982). Comments on L. H. Davis, What is It Like to Be an Agent?. Erkenntnis 18 (September):215-221.   (Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2007). The illusion of conscious will. Synthese 96.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Wegner (Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press) argues that conscious will is an illusion, citing a wide range of empirical evidence. I shall begin by surveying some of his arguments. Many are unsuccessful. But one—an argument from the ubiquity of self-interpretation—is more promising. Yet is suffers from an obvious lacuna, offered by so-called ‘dual process’ theories of reasoning and decision making (Evans, J., & Over, D. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press; Stanovich, K. (1999). Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. Lawrence Erlbaum; Frankish, K. (2004). Mind and supermind. Cambridge University Press). I shall argue that this lacuna can be filled by a plausible a priori claim about the causal role of anything deserving to be called ‘a will.’ The result is that there is no such thing as conscious willing: conscious will is, indeed, an illusion.
Choudhury, Suparna & Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne (2006). Intentions, actions, and the self. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Cole, Jonathan (2007). The phenomenology of agency and intention in the face of paralysis and insentience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):309-325.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Studies of perception have focussed on sensation, though more recently the perception of action has, once more, become the subject of investigation. These studies have looked at acute experimental situations. The present paper discusses the subjective experience of those with either clinical syndromes of loss of movement or sensation (spinal cord injury, sensory neuronopathy syndrome or motor stroke), or with experimental paralysis or sensory loss. The differing phenomenology of these is explored and their effects on intention and agency discussed. It is shown that sensory loss can have effects on the focussing of motor command and that for some a sense of agency can return despite paralysis
Carruthers, Glenn (2009). Commentary on Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen 2008. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):515-520.   (Google)
Abstract: Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) offer a powerful explanation of the sense of agency. To argue for their model they attempt to show that one of the standard models (the comparator model) fails to explain the sense of agency and that their model offers a more general account than is aimed at by the standard model. Here I offer comment on both parts of this argument. I offer an alternative reading of some of the data they use to argue against the comparator model. I argue that contrary to Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s reading the case of G.L. supports rather than contradicts the comparator model. Next I suggest how the comparator model can differentiate failures of action attribution in patients suffering parietal lobe lesions and delusions of alien control. I also argue that the apparently unexpected phenomenon of “hyperassociation” is predicted by the comparator model. Finally I suggest that as it stands Synofzik, Vosgerau and Newen’s model is not well specified enough to explain deficits in the sense of agency associated with delusions of thought insertion. Thus they have not met their second argumentative burden of showing how their model is more general than the comparator model.
Cunning, David (1999). Agency and consciousness. Synthese 120 (2):271-294.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Daprati, E.; Franck, N.; Georgieff, N.; Proust, Joëlle; Pacherie, Elisabeth; Dalery, J. & Jeannerod, Marc (1997). Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients. Cognition 65:71-86.   (Cited by 179 | Google | More links)
Davis, Lawrence H. (1982). What is it like to be an agent? Erkenntnis 18 (September):195-213.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Dokic, J (2003). The sense of ownership: An analogy between sensation and action. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Eilan, Naomi M. & Roessler, Johannes (2003). Agency and self-awareness: Mechanisms and epistemology. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Filice, Carlo (1988). Non-substantial streams of consciousness and free action. International Studies in Philosophy 20:1-11.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Consciousness and free will. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 39:7-16.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2007). The natural philosophy of agency. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):347–357.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A review of several theories and brain-imaging experiments shows that there is no consensus about how to define the sense of agency. In some cases the sense of agency is construed in terms of bodily movement or motor control, in others it is linked to the intentional aspect of action. For some theorists it is the product of higher-order cognitive processes, for others it is a feature of first-order phenomenal experience. In this article I propose a multiple aspects account of the sense of agency
Georgieff, N. & Jeannerod, Marc (1998). Beyond consciousness of external reality: A ''who'' system for consciousness of action and self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):465-477.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper offers a framework for consciousness of internal reality. Recent PET experiments are reviewed, showing partial overlap of cortical activation during self-produced actions and actions observed from other people. This overlap suggests that representations for actions may be shared by several individuals, a situation which creates a potential problem for correctly attributing an action to its agent. The neural conditions for correct agency judgments are thus assigned a key role in self/other distinction and self-consciousness. A series of behavioral experiments that demonstrate, in normal subjects, the poor monitoring of action-related signals and the difficulty in recognizing self-produced actions are described. In patients presenting delusions, this difficulty dramatically increases and actions become systematically misattributed. These results point to schizophrenia and related disorders as a paradigmatic alteration of a ''Who?'' system for self-consciousness
Georgieff, Nicolas & Rossetti, Yves (1999). How does implicit and explicit knowledge fit in the consciousness of action? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):765-766.   (Google)
Abstract: Dienes & Perner's (D&P's) target articles proposes an analysis of explicit knowledge based on a progressive transformation of implicit into explicit products, applying this gradient to different aspects of knowledge that can be represented. The goal is to integrate a philosophical concept of knowledge with relevant psychophysical and neuropsychological data. D&P seem to fill an impressive portion of the gap between these two areas. We focus on two examples where a full synthesis of theoretical and empirical data seems difficult to establish and would require further refinement of the model: action representation and the closely related consciousness of action, which is in turn related to self-consciousness
Gill, Michael (2008). Variability and moral phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):99-113.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many moral philosophers in the Western tradition have used phenomenological claims as starting points for philosophical inquiry; aspects of moral phenomenology have often been taken to be anchors to which any adequate account of morality must remain attached. This paper raises doubts about whether moral phenomena are universal and robust enough to serve the purposes to which moral philosophers have traditionally tried to put them. Persons’ experiences of morality may vary in a way that greatly limits the extent to which moral phenomenology can constitute a reason to favor one moral theory over another. Phenomenology may not be able to serve as a pre-theoretic starting point or anchor in the consideration of rival moral theories because moral phenomenology may itself be theory-laden. These doubts are illustrated through an examination of how moral phenomenology is used in the thought of Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Joseph Butler, Francis Hutcheson, and Søren Kierkegaard
Hannay, Alastair (1991). Consciousness and the experience of freedom. In Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
Hohwy, Jakob (2005). The experience of mental causation. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):377-400.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: subjects mean when they report their mental states it is useful to be guided by a sound grasp of their concepts for mental events. 3 Though this is often ignored in favor of libertarian notions of free will, in which free action is seen as completely undetermined by the subject
Horgan, Terry & Timmons, Mark (2008). Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):115-131.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness. In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye on some of the main philosophical issues in ethics and how moral phenomenology might be brought to bear on them. In discussing such matters, we consider some of the doubts about moral phenomenology and its value to ethics that are brought up by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Michael Gill in their contributions to this issue
Horgan, Terence E.; Tienson, John L. & Graham, George (2003). The phenomenology of first-person agency. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Hossack, Keith (2003). Consciousness in act and action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Self-consciousness, spontaneity, and the myth of the giving. In Consciousness in Action. Cambridge.   (Google)
Abstract: From my Consciousness in Action, ch. 2; see Consciousness in Action for bibligraphy. This chapter revises material from "Kant on Spontaneity and the Myth of the Giving", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1993-94, pp. 137-164, and "Myth Upon Myth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1996, vol. 96, pp. 253-260
Jeannerod, Marc (2003). Consciousness of action and self-consciousness: A cognitive neuroscience approach. In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Jeannerod, Marc (2006). Consciousness of action as an embodied consciousness. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press.   (Google)
Jeannerod, Marc (2007). Consciousness of action. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Moral phenomenology: Foundational issues. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):1-19.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I address the what, the how, and the why of moral phenomenology. I consider first the question What is moral phenomenology?, secondly the question How to pursue moral phenomenology?, and thirdly the question Why pursue moral phenomenology? My treatment of these questions is preliminary and tentative, and is meant not so much to settle them as to point in their answers’ direction
Leiter, Brian (2007). Nietzsche's theory of the will. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (7):1-15.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The essay offers a philosophical reconstruction of Nietzsche’s theory of the will, focusing on (1) Nietzsche’s account of the phenomenology of “willing” an action, the experience we have which leads us (causally) to conceive of ourselves as exercising our will; (2) Nietzsche’s arguments that the experiences picked out by the phenomenology are not causally connected to the resulting action (at least not in a way sufficient to underwrite ascriptions of moral responsibility); and (3) Nietzsche’s account of the actual causal genesis of action. Particular attention is given to passages from Daybreak, Beyond Good and Evil and Twilight of the Idols and a revised version of my earlier account of Nietzsche’s epiphenomenalism is defended. Finally, recent work in empirical psychology (Libet, Wegner) is shown to support Nietzsche’s skepticism that our “feeling” of will is a reliable guide to the causation of action
Mandik, Pete (forthcoming). Control consciousness. Topics in Cognitive Science.   (Google)
Abstract: Control consciousness is the awareness or experience of seeming to be in control of one’s actions. One view, which I will be arguing against in the present paper, is that control consciousness is a form of sensory consciousness. On such a view, control consciousness is exhausted by sensory elements such as tactile and proprioceptive information. An opposing view, which I will be arguing for, is that sensory elements cannot be the whole story and must be supplemented by direct contributions of nonsensory, motor elements. More specifically, I will be arguing for the view that the neural basis of control consciousness is constituted by states of recurrent activation in relatively intermediate levels of the motor hierarchy.
Metzinger, Thomas (2006). Conscious volition and mental representation: Toward a more fine-grained analysis. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Abstract: A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England
Mossel, Benjamin (2005). Action, control and sensations of acting. Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements.The events required for action according to the causal theory, or Searle
Nahmias, Eddy (2005). Agency, authorship, and illusion. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):771-785.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Daniel Wegner argues that conscious will is an illusion. I examine the adequacy of his theory of apparent mental causation and whether, if accurate, it suggests that our experience of agency and authorship should be considered illusory. I examine various interpretations of this claim and raise problems for each interpretation. I also distinguish between the experiences of agency and authorship.
Nahmias, Eddy A. (2002). When consciousness matters: A critical review of Daniel Wegner's the illusion of conscious will. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):527-541.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In The illusion of conscious will , Daniel Wegner offers an exciting, informative, and potentially threatening treatise on the psychology of action. I offer several interpretations of the thesis that conscious will is an illusion. The one Wegner seems to suggest is "modular epiphenomenalism": conscious experience of will is produced by a brain system distinct from the system that produces action; it interprets our behavior but does not, as it seems to us, cause it. I argue that the evidence Wegner presents to support this theory, though fascinating, is inconclusive and, in any case, he has not shown that conscious will does not play a crucial causal role in planning, forming intentions, etc. This theory's potential blow to our self-conception turns out to be a glancing one
Newen, Albert, Reply to Carruthers.   (Google)
Abstract: Glenn Carruthers presents a very detailed and thorough critique of our multi-factorial twostep account of agency to the effect that it would not succeed in being superior and more general as the comparator model (CM). This critique gives us the opportunity to refine some of our points and to make the overall argument clearer. As Carruthers notes, “This move [the distinction between a feeling of agency (FoA) and a judgment of agency (JoA)] usefully limits the explanatory target of the CM to FoA”. This is exactly right in our view but contrasts with a lot of views present in the empirical literature which neglect this important difference. As a paradigmatic example see the claim by Jeannerod that “agency judgements made by the subject are based on the state of the comparator (Jeannerod, 1999, pp. 17-18) (for further experimental conflation of feeling and judgement of agency see e.g.Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer et al., 2003b). Thus, with this point we are not only fighting straw men but show severe limits of the explanatory force of the comparator model
Nida-Rümelin, Martine (2007). Doings and subject causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent error to human experience. A theory of ‘subject causation’ according to which the active subject continuously and simultaneously causes physical changes is sketched. This account is—according to the phenomenological claim defended—compatible with the content of our daily experiences in doing something and in observing others in their doings and it has a number of further more theoretical advantages: it does not touch the autonomy of neurophysiology and it is compatible with a thesis of supervenience of the mental on the physical. It does however require a weak version of subject-body dualism
Pacherie, Elisabeth & Bayne, Tim (2007). Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-awareness. Synthese 159:475 - 491.   (Google)
Abstract: This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.
Pacherie, Elisabeth (2007). The Anarchic Hand Syndrome and Utilization Behavior: A Window onto Agentive Self-Awareness. Functional Neurology 22 (4):211 - 217.   (Google)
Abstract: Two main approaches can be discerned in the literature on agentive self-awareness: a top-down approach, according to which agentive self-awareness is fundamentally holistic in nature and involves the operations of a central-systems narrator, and a bottom-up approach that sees agentive self-awareness as produced by lowlevel processes grounded in the very machinery responsible for motor production and control. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory if taken in isolation; however, the question of whether their combination would yield a full account of agentive self-awareness remains very much open. In this paper, I contrast two disorders affecting the control of voluntary action: the anarchic hand syndrome and utilization behavior. Although in both conditions patients fail to inhibit actions that are elicited by objects in the environment but inappropriate with respect to the wider context, these actions are experienced in radically different ways by the two groups of patients. I discuss how top-down and bottom-up processes involved in the generation of agentive self-awareness would have to be related in order to account for these differences.
Pacherie, Elisabeth (2008). The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework. Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.   (Google)
Abstract: After a long period of neglect, the phenomenology of action has recently regained its place in the agenda of philosophers and scientists alike. The recent explosion of interest in the topic highlights its complexity. The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework allowing for a more precise characterization of the many facets of the phenomenology of agency, of how they are related and of their possible sources. The key assumption guiding this attempt is that the processes through which the phenomenology of action is generated and the processes involved in the specification and control of action are strongly interconnected. I argue in favor of a three-tiered dynamic model of intention, link it to an expanded version of the internal model theory of action control and specification, and use this theoretical framework to guide an analysis of the contents, possible sources and temporal course of complementary aspects of the phenomenology of action.
Pacherie, Elisabeth (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. Psyche 13 (1):1 - 30.   (Google)
Abstract: The now growing literature on the content and sources of the phenomenology of first-person agency highlights the multi-faceted character of the phenomenology of agency and makes it clear that the experience of agency includes many other experiences as components. This paper examines the possible relations between these components of our experience of acting and the processes involved in action specification and action control. After a brief discussion of our awareness of our goals and means of action, it will focus on the sense of agency for a given action, understood as the sense the agent has that he or she is the author of that action. I argue that the sense of agency can be analyzed as a compound of more basic experiences, including the experience of intentional causation, the sense of initiation and the sense of control. I further argue that the sense of control may itself be analysed into a number of more specific, partially dissociable experiences.
Peacocke, Christopher (2003). Action: Awareness, ownership, and knowledge. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Preston, Jesse; Gray, Kurt & Wegner, Daniel M. (2006). The godfather of soul. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):482-+.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: An important component of souls is the capacity for free will, as the origin of agency within an individual. Belief in souls arises in part from the experience of conscious will, a compelling feeling of personal causation that accompanies almost every action we take, and suggests that an immaterial self is in charge of the physical body
Prinz, Jesse J. (2007). All consciousness is perceptual. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2002). The timing of conscious states. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning
Sachse, Christian (2007). What about a reductionist approach? Comments on Terry Horgan. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In his work, Horgan argues for the compatibilism of agency, mental state-causation, and physical causal-closure. We generally assume a causally closed physical world that seems to exclude agency in the sense of mental state-causation in addition to physical causation. However, Horgan argues for an account of agency that satisfies the experience of our own as acting persons and that is compatible with physical causal-closure. Mental properties are causal properties but not identical with physical properties because there are different ontological levels. In this commentary, I shall reconsider the essential issues of this compatibilism (1), focus on a problem for Horgan’s conception of agent causation that arises from the causal argument for ontological reductionism (2), and propose to embed Horgan’s conception of agency within a reductionist approach in order to vindicate the indispensable character of agency (3)
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2008). Is moral phenomenology unified? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):85-97.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this short paper, I argue that the phenomenology of moral judgment is not unified across different areas of morality (involving harm, hierarchy, reciprocity, and impurity) or even across different relations to harm. Common responses, such as that moral obligations are experienced as felt demands based on a sense of what is fitting, are either too narrow to cover all moral obligations or too broad to capture anything important and peculiar to morality. The disunity of moral phenomenology is, nonetheless, compatible with some uses of moral phenomenology for moral epistemology and with the objectivity and justifiability of parts of morality
Smith, David Woodruff (1992). Consciousness in action. Synthese 90 (1):119-43.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Strawson, Galen (2003). Mental ballistics or the involuntariness of spontaniety. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-257.   (Google | More links)
Straus, Erwin W. (ed.) (1967). Phenomenology Of Will And Action. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.   (Google)
Sundstrom, Par (online). Consciousness and intentionality of action.   (Google)
Synofzik, M.; Vosgerau, G. & Newen, A. (2008). Beyond the comparator model: A multi-factorial two-step account of agency. Consciousness and Cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the ‘‘comparator model’’. In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able to explain either. Rather, we argue for a two-step account: a multifactorial weighting process of different agency indicators accounts for the feeling of agency, which is, in a second step, further processed by conceptual modules to form an attribution judgement. This new framework is then applied to disruptions of agency in schizophrenia, for which the comparator model also fails. Two further extensions are discussed: We show that the comparator model can neither be extended to account for the sense of ownership (which also has to be differentiated into a feeling and a judgement of ownership) nor for the sense of agency for thoughts. Our framework, however, is able to provide a unified account for the sense of agency for both actions and thoughts.
Synofzik, Matthis; Vosgerau, Gottfried & Newen, Albert (2008). I move, therefore I am: A new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership. Consciousness and Cognition 17:411 - 424.   (Google)
Abstract: The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and (self-)representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually evolving, onto- and phylogenetically plausible framework which proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex conceptual and meta-representational processes of agency and ownership, respectively. In particular, three fundamental levels of agency and ownership processing have to be distinguished: The level of feeling, thinking and social interaction. This naturalistic account will not only allow to ‘‘ground the self in action”, but also provide an empirically testable taxonomy for cognitive neuroscience and a new tool for disentangling agency and ownership disturbances in psychopathology (e.g. alien hand, anarchic hand, anosognosia for one’s own hemiparesis).
Siegel, Susanna (2005). The Phenomenology of Efficacy. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):265-84.   (Google)
Velmans, Max (2004). Why conscious free will both is and isn't an illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Wegner’s analysis of the illusion of conscious will is close to my own account of how conscious experiences relate to brain processes. But our analyses differ somewhat on how conscious will is not an illusion. Wegner argues that once conscious will arises it enters causally into subsequent mental processing. I argue that while his causal story is accurate, it remains a first-person story. Conscious free will is not an illusion in the sense that this first-person story is compatible with and complementary to a third-person account of voluntary processing in the mind/brain
Vosgerau, Gottfried & Newen, Albert (2007). Thoughts, motor actions, and the self. Mind and Language 22 (1):22–43.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The comparator-model, originally developed to explain motor action, has recently been invoked to explain several aspects of the self. However, in the first place it may not be used to explain a basic self-world distinction because it presupposes one. Our alternative account is based on specific systematic covariation between action and perception. Secondly, the comparator model cannot explain the feeling of ownership of thoughts. We argue—contra Frith and Campbell—that thoughts are not motor processes and therefore cannot be described by the comparator-model. Rather, thoughts can be the triggering cause (intention) for actions. An alternative framework for the explanation of thought insertion in schizophrenics is presented
Wakefield, Jerome C. & Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1991). Intentionality and the phenomenology of action. In Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Wegner, Daniel M. & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will. American Psychologist 54:480-492.   (Cited by 123 | Google | More links)
Wegner, Daniel M. (2004). Frequently asked questions about conscious will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):679-692.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The commentators' responses to The Illusion of Conscious Will reveal a healthy range of opinions – pro, con, and occasionally stray. Common concerns and issues are summarized here in terms of 11 “frequently asked questions,” which often center on the theme of how the experience of conscious will supports the creation of the self as author of action
Whiteley, C. H. (1973). Mind In Action: An Essay In Philosophical Psychology. Oxford University Press,.   (Cited by 5 | Google)

1.6h Unconscious States

Beck, Lewis White (1966). Conscious and unconscious motives. Mind 75 (April):155-179.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1990). Conscious and unconscious states. Philosophical Studies 44:44-62.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Bernet, Rudolf (2002). Unconscious consciousness in Husserl and Freud. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):327-351.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Bodkin, A. M. (1907). The subconscious factors of mental process considered in relation to thought (I). Mind 16 (62):209-228.   (Google | More links)
Bodkin, A. M. (1907). The subconscious factors of mental process considered in relation to thought (II). Mind 16 (63):362-382.   (Google | More links)
Brink, Louise (1918). How the concept of the unconscious is serviceable. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (15):405-414.   (Google | More links)
Dilman, Ilham (1959). The unconscious. Mind 68 (October):446-473.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (2006). Perception without awareness. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (2000). Searle's unconscious mind. Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):123-148.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In his book The rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a role in psychological explanation
Edel, Abraham (1964). The concept of the unconscious: Some analytic preliminaries. Philosophy of Science 31 (January):18-33.   (Google | More links)
Elton, Matthew (2000). Consciousness: Only at the personal level. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):25-42.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub-personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub-personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better what content ascription at the sub-personal level actually means. When we do we can see how Dennett presents both a philosophical account of consciousness and informed empirical speculation on the nature of its sub-personal underpinnings. Consciousness is a product of certain capacities that are intelligible only at the personal level, capacities that are neither present at the sub-personal level of brain mechanism nor present in 'sub-persons', e.g. some, if not all, non-human animals
Feldman, A. Bronson (1959). The Unconscious In History. New York: Philosophical Library.   (Google)
Field, G. C.; Aveling, F. & Laird, John (1922). Is the conception of the unconscious of value in psychology? Mind 31 (124):413-442.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Finkelstein, David H. (1999). On the distinction between conscious and unconscious states of mind. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2):79-100.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gardner, Sebastian (2003). The unconscious mind. In Thomas Baldwin (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Gillett, Eric (1996). Searle and the "deep unconscious". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (3):191-200.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gunnarsson, Logi (2005). Trapped in a secret cellar: Breaking the spell of a picture of unconscious states. Philosophical Investigations 28 (3):273-288.   (Google | More links)
Haeberlin, Herman K. (1917). The concept of the unconscious. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (20):543-550.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Henry Lewes, George (1877). Consciousness and unconsciousness. Mind 2 (6):156-167.   (Google | More links)
Hilgard, Ernest R. (1958). Unconscious Processes and Man's Rationality. University of Illinois Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Krantz, Susan (1990). Brentano on 'unconscious consciousness'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):745-753.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Landesman, Charles (1965). Reply to professor Whallon. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (March):404-405.   (Google | More links)
Lee, Byeong D. (2004). Finkelstein on the difference between conscious and unconscious belief. Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.   (Google)
Lehman, Craig K. (1981). Conscious and unconscious mental states. Philosophy Research Archives 1451.   (Google)
Lloyd, Dan (1996). Commentary on Searle and the 'Deep Unconscious'. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (3):201-202.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Macdonald, Graham F. (1999). Folk-psychology, psychopathology, and the unconscious. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):206-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is a 'philosophers' assumption that there is a problem with the very notion of an unconscious mental state.The paper begins by outlining how the problem is generated, and proceeds to argue that certain conditions need to be fulfilled if the unconscious is to qualify as mental. An explanation is required as to why we would ever expect these conditions to be fulfilled, and it is suggested that the Freudian concept of repression has an essential role to play in such an explanation. Notoriously this concept brings with it a further puzzle: it looks as though repression serves a purpose, and so requires an agent to execute this purpose, a repressor. Paradox is avoided only if repression is viewed in biologicalfunctional terms.The result is that the notion of the unconscious is saved from the a priori objections often levelled at it by philosophers.This still leaves considerable theoretical work to be done by psychological science
MacIntyre, Alasdair (2004). The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis (Revised Edition). New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Manson, Neil Campbell (2000). 'A tumbling-ground for whimsies'? The history and contemporary role of the conscious/unconscious contrast. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Manson, Neil Campbell (2005). Consciousness-dependence, and the conscious/unconscious contrast. Philosophical Studies 126 (1):115-129.   (Google | More links)
Matthews, Eric (2005). Unconscious reasons. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):55-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
McKee, Patrick (1972). Non-conscious seeing. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (October):319-326.   (Google)
McLoughlin, John (1999). Unwittingly recapitulating Freud: Searle's concept of a vocabulary of the unconscious. Ratio 12 (1):34-53.   (Google | More links)
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. (2000). Mental causation and Searle's impossible conception of unconscious intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):155-170.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In my article I evaluate Searle's account of mental causation, in particular his account of the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that top-down causation and overdetermination are unsolved problems in Searle's philosophy of mind, despite his assurances to the contrary. I also argue that there are conflicting claims involved in his account of mental causation and his account of the unconscious. As a result, it becomes impossible to understand how unconscious intentional states can be causally efficacious. My conclusion will be that if Searle's conception of unconscious intentionality is to play a genuine role in the causal explanation of human action, it needs to be rethought
Pierce, A. H. (1906). Should we still retain the expression `unconscious cerebration' to designate certain processes connected with mental life? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (23):626-630.   (Google | More links)
Schwankl, Peter (1959). Attempt to understand a common vague conception of the unconscious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (March):380-390.   (Google | More links)
Searle, John R. (1989). Consciousness, unconsciousness, and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):193-209.   (Cited by 32 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Searle, John R. (1994). The connection principle and the ontology of the unconscious: A reply to Fodor and Lepore. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):847-55.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1960). Unconscious perception, part II. Aristotelian Society 67:67-78.   (Google)
Vollmer, Fred (1993). Intentional action and unconscious reasons. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (3):315-326.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Weintraub, Ruth (1987). Unconscious mental states. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (October):423-32.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Zemach, Eddy (1986). Unconscious Mind or Conscious Minds? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:121-149.   (Google)

1.6i Collective Consciousness

1.6j Aspects of Consciousness, Misc

Balog, Katalin (2007). Comments on Ned Block's target article “Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.   (Google)
Abstract: Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of the second notion that is not touched by Block’s argument.