Javascript Menu by Deluxe-Menu.com
MindPapers is now part of PhilPapers: online research in philosophy, a new service with many more features.
 
 Compiled by David Chalmers (Editor) & David Bourget (Assistant Editor), Australian National University. Submit an entry.
 
   
click here for help on how to search

1.6b. The Unity of Consciousness (The Unity of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Alter, Torin (ms). What do split-brain cases show about the unity of consciousness?   (Google)
Abstract: The startling empirical data that concern us here are well known. Severing the corpus callosum produces a kind of mental bifurcation (Sperry 1968). In one experiment, a garlic smell is presented to a patient
Arnold, Felix (1905). The unity of mental life. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 2 (18):487-493.   (Google | More links)
Bach, Kent (1988). Critical notice. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press.   (Google)
Abstract: As philosophical topics go, self-deception has something for everyone. It raises basic questions about the nature of belief and the relation of belief to thought, desire, and the will. It provokes further questions on such topics as reasoning, attention, self-knowledge, the unity of the self, intentional action, motivation, self-esteem, psychic defenses, the unconscious, personal character, and interpersonal relations. There are two basic questions about self-deception itself, which each take a familiar philosophical form: What is it? How is it possible? These questions have both an analytic and a psychological side. Is self-deception, as its name suggests, literally a case of lying to oneself? If not, how different can it be from other-deception and still deserve its name? Psychologically, what processes does self-deception involve and how is it motivated?
Baldner, Kent (1996). Subjectivity and the unity of the world. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (184):333-346.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Baumann, Peter (2007). Experiencing things together: What is the problem? Erkenntnis 66 (1-2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how
Bayne, Timothy J. (2001). Co-consciousness: Review of Barry Dainton's Stream of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8:79-92.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2005). Divided brains and unified phenomenology: A review essay on Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):495-512.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to apply his account of the unity of consciousness to the split-brain syndrome. I provide a critical evaluation of Tye's account of the unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome
Bayne, Tim (2007). Hypnosis and the unity of consciousness. In Graham A. Jamieson (ed.), Hypnosis and Conscious States: The Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Hypnosis appears to generate unusual—and sometimes even astonishing—changes in the contents of consciousness. Hypnotic subjects report perceiving things that are not there, they report not perceiving things that are there, and they report unusual alterations in the phenomenology of agency. In addition to apparent alterations in the contents of consciousness, hypnosis also appears to involve alterations in the structure of consciousness. According to many theorists—most notably Hilgard—hypnosis demonstrates that the unity of consciousness is an illusion (Hilgard 1977)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2004). Self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness. The Monist 87 (2):219-236.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness has a number of puzzling features. One such feature is its unity: the experiences and other conscious states that one has at a particular time seem to occur together in a certain way. I am currently enjoying visual experiences of my computer screen, auditory experiences of bird-song, olfactory experiences of coffee, and tactile experiences of feeling the ground beneath my feet. Conjoined with these perceptual experiences are proprioceptive experiences, experiences of agency, affective and emotional experiences, and conscious thoughts of various kinds. These experiences are unified in a variety of ways, but the kind of unity that I’m interested in here concerns their phenomenal character. Take just two of these experiences: the sound of bird-song and the smell of coffee. There is something it is like to have the auditory experience, there is something it is like to have the olfactory experience, and there is something it is like to have both the auditory and olfactory experiences together. These two experiences occur as parts or components or aspects of a larger, more complex experience. And what holds of these two experiences seems to hold – at least in normal contexts – of all of one’s simultaneous experiences: they seem to be subsumed by a single, maximal experience.2 We could think of this maximal experience as an experiential perspective on the world. What it is like to be me right now is (or involves) an extremely complex conscious state that subsumes the various simpler experiences that I outlined above (seeing my computer screen, hearing bird-song, smelling coffee, and so on). I will follow recent literature in using the term “co-consciousness” for the relation that a set of conscious states bear to each other when they have a complex phenomenology (Bayne and Chalmers 2003; Dainton 2000; Hurley 1998; Lockwood 1989)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2000). The unity of consciousness: Clarification and defence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):248-254.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Bayne, Tim (2008). The unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome. Journal of Philosophy 105 (6).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to conventional wisdom, the split-brain syndrome puts paid to the thesis that consciousness is necessarily unified. The aim of this paper is to challenge that view. I argue both that disunity models of the split-brain are highly problematic, and that there is much to recommend a model of the split-brain—the switch model—according to which split-brain patients retain a fully unified consciousness at all times. Although the task of examining the unity of consciousness through the lens of the split-brain syndrome is not a new one—such projects date back to Nagel’s seminal paper on the topic—the time is ripe for a re-evaluation of the issues
Bayne, Tim, The unity of consciousness: A cartography.   (Google)
Abstract: theorists insist that consciousness is essentially unified. Other theorists assert that the unity of consciousness is an illusion, and that consciousness is often, if not invariably, disunified. Unfortunately, it is rare for proponents of either side of the debate to explain what the unity of consciousness might involve. What would it mean for consciousness to be unified? In this chapter I provide a brief cartography of the unity of consciousness. In the next section I introduce a number of unity relations that can hold between conscious states, and in the following sections I show how these unity relations can be used to construct various conceptions of the unity of consciousness—what I call unity theses. These unity theses provide us with a set of reference points by means of which we can orient discussions of the (dis)unity of consciousness
Bayne, Timothy J. (forthcoming). Unified phenomenology and divided brains: Critical notice of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Philosophical Psychology.   (Google)
Bayne, Timothy J. & Chalmers, David J. (2003). What is the unity of consciousness? In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: At any given time, a subject has a multiplicity of conscious experiences. A subject might simultaneously have visual experiences of a red book and a green tree, auditory experiences of birds singing, bodily sensations of a faint hunger and a sharp pain in the shoulder, the emotional experience of a certain melancholy, while having a stream of conscious thoughts about the nature of reality. These experiences are distinct from each other: a subject could experience the red book without the singing birds, and could experience the singing birds without the red book. But at the same time, the experiences seem to be tied together in a deep way. They seem to be unified, by being aspects of a single encompassing state of consciousness
Beahrs, J. O. (1983). Co-consciousness: A common denominator in hypnosis, multiple personality, and normalcy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 26:100-13.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Beahrs, J. O. (1982). Unity and Multiplicity: Multilevel Consciousness of Self in Hypnosis, Psychiatric Disorder, and Mental Health. Brunner/Mazel.   (Cited by 37 | Google)
Brook, Andrew & Raymont, Paul (forthcoming). A Unified Theory of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Brotherston, Bruce W. (1933). Immediate empiricism and unity. Journal of Philosophy 30 (6):141-149.   (Google | More links)
Brooks, Eugene M. (2005). Multiplicity of consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 24 (3):271-280.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brooks, D. H. M. (1985). Strawson, Hume, and the unity of consciousness. Mind 94 (October):583-86.   (Google | More links)
Brook, Andrew (2000). The unity of consciousness. Consciousness And Cognition 9 (2).   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Brooks, D. H. M. (1995). The Unity of the Mind. St Martin's Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Brook, Andrew (2002). Unified consciousness and the self. In Shaun Gallagher & Jonathan Shear (eds.), Models of the Self. Thorverton UK: Imprint Academic.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Brook, Andrew (1998). Unified consciousness and the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):583-591.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: I am in virtually complete sympathy with Galen Strawson's conclusions in 'The Self'. He takes a careful, measured approach to a topic that lends itself all too easily to speculation and intellectual extravaganzas. The results he achieves are for the most part balanced and plausible. I even have a lot of sympathy with his claim that a memory-produced sense of continuity across time is less central to selfhood than many philosophers think, though I will argue that he goes too far in the opposite direction
Brook, Andrew (1997). Unity of consciousness and other mental unities. In Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Ablex Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Though there has been a huge resurgence of interest in consciousness in the past decade, little attention has been paid to what the philosopher Immanuel Kant and others call the unity of consciousness. The unity of consciousness takes different forms, as we will see, but the general idea is that each of us is aware of many things in the world at the same time, and often many of one's own mental states and of oneself as their single common subject, too
Cassam, Quassim (1989). Kant and reductionism. Review of Metaphysics 43 (September):72-106.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Cleeremans, Axel (ed.) (2003). The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration, and Dissociation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 26 | Google | More links)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (2003). Conscious unity, emotion, dreaming, and the solution of the hard problem. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Cotterill, Rodney M. J. (1995). On the unity of conscious experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):290-311.   (Cited by 75 | Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (2007). Coming together: The unity of conscious experience. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Higher-order consciousness and phenomenal space: Reply to Meehan. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Meehan finds fault with a number of my arguments, and proposes that better solutions to the problems I was addressing are available if we adopt a higher-order theory of consciousness. I start with some general remarks on theories of this sort. I connect what I had to say about the A-thesis with different forms of higher-order sense theories, and explain why I ignored higher-order thought theories altogether: there are compelling grounds for thinking they cannot provide a viable account of phenomenal unity in phenomenal terms. Meehan
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Precis of Stream of Consciousness. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: That our ordinary everyday experience exhibits both unity and continuity is uncontroversial, and on the face of it utterly unmysterious. At any moment we have some conscious awareness of both the world about us, as revealed through our perceptual experiences, and our own inner states
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Replies to commentators. Psyche.   (Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Stream of Consciousness is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness
Revonsuo, Antti (2003). The contents of phenomenal consciousness: One relation to rule them all and in the unity bind them. Psyche 9 (8).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Unity and introspectibility: Reply to Gilmore. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Gilmore concentrates on two arguments which I took to undermine the claim that introspectibility is necessary for co-consciousness: the
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Unity in the void: Reply to Revonsuo. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: While agreeing with me on many issues, Revonsuo rejects my claim that phenomenal states could be co-conscious without being spatially related (in experience). In defence of my claim I described a thought-experiment in which
Deweese-Boyd, Ian (online). Self-deception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Virtually every aspect of the current philosophical discussion of self-deception is a matter of controversy including its definition and paradigmatic cases. We may say generally, however, that self-deception is the acquisition and maintenance of a belief (or, at least, the avowal of that belief) in the face of strong evidence to the contrary motivated by desires or emotions favoring the acquisition and retention of that belief. Beyond this, philosophers divide over whether this action is intentional or not, whether self-deceivers recognize the belief being acquired is unwarranted on the available evidence, whether self-deceivers are morally responsible for their self-deception, and whether self-deception is morally problematic (and if it is in what ways and under what circumstances). The discussion of self-deception and its associated puzzles gives us insight into the ways in which motivation affects belief acquisition and retention. And yet insofar as self-deception represents an obstacle to self-knowledge, which has potentially serious moral implications, self-deception is more than an interesting philosophical puzzle. It is a problem of particular concern for moral development, since self-deception can make us strangers to ourselves and blind to our own moral failings
Eccles, John C. (1985). The Brain and the Unity of Conscious Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Edwards, Jonathan C. W. (2005). Is consciousness only a property of individual cells? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):60-76.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We perceive colour, shape, sound and touch 'bound together' in a single experience. The following arguments about this binding phenomenon are raised: (1) The individual signals passing from neurone to neurone are not bound together, whether as elements of information or physically. (2) Within a single cell, binding in terms of bringing together of information is potentially feasible. A physical substrate may also be available. (3) It is therefore proposed that a bound conscious experience must be a property of an individual cell, not of a group of cells. Since it is unlikely that one specific neurone is conscious, it is suggested that every neurone has a version of our consciousness, or at least some form of sentience. However absurd this may seem it appears to be consistent with the available evidence; arguably the only explanation that is. It probably does not alter the way we should expect to experience the world, but may help to explain the ways we seem to differ from digital computers and some of the paradoxes seen in mental illness. It predicts non-digital features of intracellular computation, for which there is already evidence, and which should be open to further experimental exploration. The arguments given may well prove flawed or the conclusion biologically or physically untenable, but the idea is raised for discussion not least because a formal demonstration that it is invalid may help to identify more fruitful avenues
Ellis, Ralph D. & Newton, Natika (2005). The unity of consciousness: An enactivist approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):225-280.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Feinberg, Todd E. (2000). The nested hierarchy of consciousness: A neurobiological solution to the problem of mental unity. Neurocase 6 (2):75-81.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fox, Ivan (1985). The individualization of consciousness. Philosophical Topics 13 (3):119-43.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Sync-ing in the stream of experience sync-ing in the stream of experience: Time-consciousness in broad, Husserl, and Dainton. Psyche 9 (10).   (Google)
Gennaro, Rocco J.; Herrmann, Douglas J. & Sarapata, Michael (2006). Aspects of the unity of consciousness and everyday memory failures. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):372-385.   (Google | More links)
Gilmore, Cody S. (2003). The introspectibility thesis. Psyche 9 (5).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to what Barry Dainton calls the 'Strong Introspectibility thesis', it is a necessary truth that mental states S and S* are co-conscious (experienced together) if and only if they are 'jointly introspectible', i.e., if and only if it is possible for there to be some single state of introspective awareness that represents both S and S*. Dainton offers two arguments for the conclusion that joint introspectibility is unnecessary for co-consciousness. In these comments I attempt to show, first, that Dainton's arguments fail, and, second, that joint introspectibility is actually insufficient for co-consciousness. (As to whether it is also unnecessary, I take no stance.)
Hamlyn, David W. (1996). The unity of the senses and self-consciousness. In D.W. Hamlyn (ed.), Understanding Perception: The Concept and its Conditions. Avebury Press.   (Google)
Hasker, William (2009). Persons and the unity of consciousness. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (1991). Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal space. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Hughes, Bret Alan (online). The functioning hypothesis of consciousness.   (Google)
Humphrey, N. (2000). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness. [Journal (Paginated)] 67 (4):1059-1066.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: What unites the many selves that constitute the human mind? How is the self-binding problem solved? I argue that separate selves come to belong together as one Self as a result of their dynamic participation in creating a single life, rather as the members of an orchestra come to belong together as a result of their jointly creating a single work of music
Humphrey, Nicholas (ms). One self: A meditation on the unity of consciousness. Social research, 67, no. 4, 32-39, 2000.   (Google)
Abstract: I am looking at my baby son, as he thrashes around in his crib, two arms flailing, hands grasping randomly, legs kicking the air, head and eyes turning this way and that, a smile followed by a grimace crossing his face. . . And I’m wondering: what is it like to be him? What is he feeling now? What kind of experience is he having of himself?
Hurley, Susan L. (2003). Action and the unity of consciousness. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (2003). Action, the unity of consciousness, and vehicle externalism. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1996). Myth upon myth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:253-260.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1994). Unity and objectivity. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Unity, neuropsychology, and action. In Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
James, William (1895). The knowing of things together. Psychological Review 2:105-24.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Janew, Claus (2009). Omnipresent Consciousness and Free Will. In How Consciousness Creates Reality. CreateSpace.   (Google)
Abstract: This article is not an attempt to explain consciousness in terms basically of quantum physics or neuro-biology. Instead I should like to place the term "Consciousness" on a broader footing. I shall therefore proceed from everyday reality, precisely where we experience ourselves as conscious beings. I shall use the term in such a general way as to resolve the question whether only a human being enjoys consciousness, or even a thermostat. Whilst the difference is considerable, it is not fundamental. Every effect exists in the perception of a consciousness. I elaborate on its freedom of choice, in my view the most important source of creativity, in a similarly general way. The problems associated with a really conscious decision do not disappear by mixing determination with a touch of coincidence. Both must enter into a higher unity. In so doing it will emerge that a certain degree of freedom of choice is just as omnipresent as consciousness - an inherent part of reality itself.





























Kennett, Jeanette & Matthews, Steve (2003). The unity and disunity of agency. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):308-312.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Effective agency, according to contemporary Kantians, requires a unity of purpose both at a time, in order that we may eliminate conflict among our motives, and over time, because many of the things we do form part of longer-term projects and make sense only in the light of these projects and life plans. Call this the unity of agency thesis. This thesis can be regarded as a normative constraint on accounts of personal identity and indeed on accounts of what it is to have the life of a person in the broad, rather than narrowly biological sense. It is also a fundamental condition of social life that persons within society fulfill a range of longitudinal roles: parenthood is one such obvious example, as are teachers, health professionals, engineers, artists, and many others. The fulfillment of these and other valuable social roles requires that agents have the capacity to rationally conceive of themselves as engaged in these roles and subject to the demands of them. To be unable to fulfill any such longitudinal social roles is to have a life deficient in value. The unity of agency is thus, we argue, something we rationally strive for, and something to be morally promoted. Psychiatric states that undermine the unity of agency are morally and rationally disvaluable. Using the example of dissociation, we explain how one such state may have this undermining or disruptive effect on the unity of agency. The therapeutic ends for psychiatry in conditions involving such states are thus seen more globally as the restoration of effective agency, that is, unified agency.
Kim, Chin-Tai (1978). Brentano on the unity of mental phenomena. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (December):199-207.   (Google | More links)
Kim, Chin-Tai (1971). Cartesian dualism and the unity of a mind. Mind 80 (July):337-353.   (Google | More links)
Kobes, Bernard W. (2005). Review of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons. Psyche 11 (5).   (Google)
Abstract: Consciousness has been defined as that annoying period between naps, and this grumpy definition may not be wholly facetious, if Michael Tye's latest book is right. Tye's main goal here is to develop a theory of the phenomenal unity of experience at a time, and its diachronic analog, the moment-to-moment continuity of one's experiential stream from the time one wakes up to the time consciousness lapses
Kobes, Bernard W. (2000). Unity of consciousness and bi-level externalism. Mind and Language 15 (5):528-544.   (Google | More links)
LaRock, Eric (2007). Disambiguation, binding, and the unity of visual consciousness. Theory and Psychology 17 (6):747-77.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
LaRock, Eric (2007). Intrinsic perspectives, object feature binding, and visual consciousness. Theory and Psychology 17 (6):799-09.   (Google | More links)
LaRock, Eric F. (2006). Why neural synchrony fails to explain the unity of visual consciousness. Behavior and Philosophy 34:39-58.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Lockwood, Michael (1994). Issues of unity and objectivity. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Marks, Charles E. (1980). Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and Unity of Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Mark Baldwin, J. (1909). Motor processes and mental unity. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (7):182-185.   (Google | More links)
Marcel, Anthony J. (1993). Slippage in the unity of consciousness. In Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. (Ciba Foundation Symposium 174).   (Cited by 65 | Google)
Marks, L. E. (1978). The Unity of the Senses: Interrelations Among the Modalities. Academic Press.   (Cited by 179 | Google)
Marcel, Anthony J. (1994). What is relevant to the unity of consciousness? In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Matsuda, M.; Hara, T.; Okunishi, E. & Nishida, M. (2007). High-angle annular dark field scanning transmission electron microscopy of the antiphase boundary in a rapidly solidified b2 type tipd compound. Philosophical Magazine Letters 87 (1):59-64.   (Google)
Maxwell, Grover (1978). Unity of consciousness and mind-brain identity. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Mind and Brain. Paragon House.   (Google)
McInerney, Peter K. (1985). Person-stages and unity of consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (July):197-209.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Meehan, Douglas B. (2003). Phenomenal space and the unity of conscious experience. Psyche 9 (12).   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Menon, Sangeetha (2009). Persistent Puzzles of Consciousness: What is it? Where is it? In Ramakrishna Mission (ed.), Understanding Consciousness - Recent Advances.   (Google)
Montecucco, Nitamo Federico (2006). Coherence, brain evolution, and the unity of consciousness: The evolution of planetary consciousness in the light of brain coherence research. World Futures 62 (1 & 2):127 – 133.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The law of coherence helps us understand the physical force behind the increasing complexity of the evolutionary process, from quanta, to cells, to self-awareness and collective consciousness. The coherent electromagnetic field is the inner glue of every system, the "intelligent" energy-information communication that assures a cooperative and synergic behavior to all the components of the system, as a whole, allowing harmonious evolution and unity of consciousness. Neuropsychological experiments show that the different brain areas communicate with more or less coherence according to different states of consciousness: high values are correlated with states of psychophysical integrity and well-being, whereas low values with states of conflict and depression. If we expand isomorphically these brain discoveries, we will have four main general states of coherence: from disgregation to unity, which represents an important element, in the General System Theory, to differentiate between inanimate and animate system, and to understand how billions cells become a single living organism, and then how billions of human beings could eventually generate planetary consciousness. In this light the resolution of the global ecosystem crisis implicates human transformation from a low to a highly coherent state of consciousness. The key to the entire process seems to be the coherent nature of consciousness
Montgomery, Edmund (1895). The integration of mind. Mind 4 (15):307-319.   (Google | More links)
Morrison, Ronald P. (1978). Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger on time and the unity of "consciousness". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (2):182-198.   (Google | More links)
Nagel, Thomas (1971). Brain bisection and the unity of consciousness. Synthese 22 (May):396-413.   (Cited by 62 | Google | More links)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1984). Concerning the unity of consciousness: I. Varieties of Conscious Unity. Imagination, Cognition and Personality 3:281-303.   (Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1986). Concerning the unity of consciousness: . William James on personal conscious unity. Imagination, Cognition And Personality 5:21-30.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Natsoulas, Thomas (1979). The unity of consciousness. Behaviorism 7:45-63.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Nikolinakos, Drakon (2004). Anosognosia and the unity of consciousness. Philosophical Studies 119 (3):315-342.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Oaklander, L. Nathan (1987). Parfit, circularity, and the unity of consciousness. Mind 96 (October):525-29.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Oakley, David A. & Eames, L. C. (1986). The plurality of consciousness. In David A. Oakley (ed.), Mind and Brain. Methuen.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (2000). Disunity defended: A reply to Bayne. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):255-263.   (Google)
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (1998). The disunity of consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.   (Google | More links)
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (2003). The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self. In A.S. David & T. T. J. Kircher (eds.), The Self and Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological Perspective. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I look out the window and I think that the garden looks nice and the grass looks cool, but the
thoughts of Eammon Andrews come into my mind
O'Dea, John (2008). Transparency and the unity of experience. In E. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: If we assume that the operation of each sense modality constitutes a different experience – a visual experience, an auditory experience, etc – we are faced with the problem of how those distinct experiences come together to form a unified perceptual encounter with the world. Michael Tye has recently argued that the best way to get around this problem is to deny altogether that there are such things as purely visual (and so forth) experiences. Here I aim to show not simply that Tye’s proposed solution fails, but that its failure is highly instructive because it allows us to see that the transparency thesis, which lies at the heart of the case against qualia, and of most representationalist theories of experience, is more problematic than is often supposed
O'Shaughnessy, Brian (1992). The diversity and unity of action and perception. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Peterson, Charles W. (2003). Unity of consciousness in Schlick. Dialogue 45 (2-3):57-60.   (Google)
Picard, Maurice (1921). The unity of consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 18 (13):347-357.   (Google | More links)
Pincock, Christopher (web). Accounting for the unity of experience in Dilthey, Rickert, Bradley and ward. In U. Feest (ed.), Historical Perspectives on Erkl. Max Planck Institute for the History of Science.   (Google)
Abstract: Forthcoming in U. Feest (ed.), Historical Perspectives on Erkl
Radden, Jennifer (2003). Learning from disunity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):357-359.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Radden, Jennifer (1998). Pathologically divided minds, synchronic unity and models of self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):658-672.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Revonsuo, Antti (1999). Binding and the phenomenal unity of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (2):173-85.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The binding problem is frequently discussed in consciousness research. However, it is by no means clear what the problem is supposed to be and how exactly it relates to consciousness. In the present paper the nature of the binding problem is clarified by distinguishing between different formulations of the problem. Some of them make no mention of consciousness, whereas others are directly related to aspects of phenomenal experience. Certain formulations of the binding problem are closely connected to the classical philosophical problem of the unity of consciousness and the currently fashionable search for the neural correlates of consciousness. Nonetheless, only a part of the current empirical research on binding is directly relevant to the study of consciousness. The main message of the present paper is that the science of consciousness needs to establish a clear theoretical view of the relation between binding and consciousness and to encourage further empirical work that builds on such a theoretical foundation
Revonsuo, Antti & Tarkko, K. (2002). Binding in dreams: The bizarreness of dream images and the unity of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (7):3-24.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Rossman, Neil I. (1991). Consciousness: Separation and Integration. SUNY Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rosenberg, Jay F. (1997). Kantian schemata and the unity of perception. In Language and Thought. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (1998). The boundary problem for phenomenal individuals. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness: The First Tucson Discussions and Debates (Complex Adaptive Systems). MIT Press.   (Google)
Rosenberg, Gregg H. (2004). The boundary problem for experiencing subjects. In A Place for Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Rosenthal, David M. (2003). Unity of consciousness and the self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):325-352.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Rutgers Marshall, Henry (1902). The unity of process in consciousness. Mind 11 (44):470-502.   (Google | More links)
Schrader, Warren (online). A unity of consciousness argument against causal emergence.   (Google)
Schleichert, Hubert (1985). On the concept of unity of consciousness. Synthese 64 (September):411-20.   (Google | More links)
Schachter, Josef (2002). Pierre Bayle, matter, and the unity of consciousness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):241-266.   (Google)
Shand, Alexander F. (1888). The unity of consciousness. Mind 13 (50):231-243.   (Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (2003). Consciousness and co-consciousness. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1996). Unity of consciousness and consciousness of unity. In The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Shrader, Warren (2006). The unity of consciousness: Trouble for the materialist or the emergent dualist? Faith and Philosophy 23 (1):33-44.   (Google)
Abstract: As part of his case for emergent dualism, William Hasker proffers a _unity-of-_ _consciousness_ (UOC) argument against materialism. I formalize the argument and show how the warrant for two of its premises accrues from the warrant one assigns to two distinct theses about unified conscious experience. I then argue that though both unity theses are plausible, the materialist has little to fear from Hasker
Shrader, Warren (ms). What is the unity of consciousness argument?   (Google)
Stevenson, Leslie F. (2000). Synthetic unities of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):281-306.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Tinnin, Louis (1990). Mental unity, altered states of consciousness, and dissociation. Dissociation 3:154-59.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Tomy, C. A. (2003). An argument for the unity of consciousness. In Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.   (Google)
Tye, Michael (2007). The problem of common sensibles. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities. Kluwer.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In _On The Soul_ (425a-b), Aristotle drew a distinction between those qualities that are perceptible only via a single sense and those that are perceptible by more than one. The latter qualities he called
Varela, F. & Thompson, Evan (2003). Neural synchrony and the unity of mind: A neurophenomenological perspective. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
von der Malsburg, Christoph (1997). The coherence definition of consciousness. In M. Ito, Y. Miyashita & Edmund T. Rolls (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I will focus in this essay on a riddle that in my view is central to the consciousness issue: How does the mind or brain create the unity we perceive out of the diversity that we know is there? I contend this is a technical issue, not a philosophical one, although its resolution will have profound philosophical repercussions, and although we have at present little more than the philosophical method to attack it
Ward, Andrew (1980). Materialism and the unity of consciousness. Analysis 40 (June):144-46.   (Google)
Watkins, J. W. N. (1982). A basic difficulty in the mind-brain identity hypothesis. In John C. Eccles (ed.), Mind and Brain. Paragon House.   (Google)
Weisberg, Josh (2001). The appearance of unity: A higher-order interpretation of the unity of consciousness. Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual Conference of The.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: subjective appearance of unity, but respects unity can be adequately dealt with by the theory. I the actual and potential disunity of the brain will close by briefly considering some worries about processes that underwrite consciousness. eliminativism that often accompany discussions of unity and consciousness
Weiner, Scott E. (2003). Unity of agency and volition: Some personal reflections. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (4):369-372.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Zeki, Semir (2003). The disunity of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (5):214-218.   (Cited by 41 | Google | More links)