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  1. Individual Consciousness.Roderick Malcolm MacLeod - manuscript
    If there is a plurality of absolutely separate individual conscious existences, corresponding to individual living organisms, then the directly experienced fact that only a particular one of these consciousnesses, one's own, stands out as immediately present, can not be true absolutely, but only relative to some specific context of conditions and qualifications singling out that particular consciousness. But further consideration demonstrates that it is not possible for any such context to be specified. This implies that all conscious existences must ultimately (...)
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  2. The Problem of the External World in René Descartes, Edmund Husserl, Immanuel Kant and the Evil Genius.Robert Elliott Allinson - 2020 - Dialogue and Universalism 30 (1):57-66.
    The need to prove the existence of the external world has been a subject that has concerned the rationalist philosophers, particularly Descartes and the empiricist philosophers such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Taking the epoché as the key mark of the phenomenologist—the suspension of the question of the existence of the external world—the issue of the external world should not come under the domain of the phenomenologist. Ironically, however, I would like to suggest that it could be (...)
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  3. There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.
    The Nagel inspired “something-it-is-like” conception of conscious experience remains a dominant approach in philosophy. In this paper I criticize a prevalent philosophical construal of SIL consciousness, one that understands SIL as a property of mental states rather than entities as a whole. I argue against thinking of SIL as a property of states, showing how such a view is in fact prevalent, under-warranted, and philosophically pernicious in that it often leads to an implausible reduction of conscious experience to qualia. I (...)
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  4. Have we vindicated the motivational unconscious yet? A conceptual review.Alexandre Billon - 2011 - Frontiers in Psychoanalysis and Neuropsychoanalysis 2.
    Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject’s behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation to some seemingly non rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the ‘cognitive unconscious’ I assess those objections. I argue that (...)
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  5. Knowing our minds.Alex Byrne - 2005 - Boston Review.
    ancient Greek temple at Delphi and is quoted approvingly by Socrates in the _First_.
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  6. Elusive freedom? A reply to Helen Beebee.Michael Huemer - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):411-416.
    I defend my earlier argument for incompatibilism, against Helen Beebee’s reply. Beebee’s reply would allow one to have free will despite that nothing one does counts as an exercise of that freedom, and would grant one the ability to do A even when one’s doing A requires something to happen that one cannot bring about and that in fact will not happen.
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  7. Reading one's own mind: Self-awareness and developmental psychology.Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):297-339.
    The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, this idea came under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology.1 The attack from developmental psychology arises from the (...)
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  8. New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 30.R. Stanton, M. Ezcurdia & C. Viger (eds.) - 2004 - University of Calgary Press.
  9. The contents of phenomenal consciousness: One relation to rule them all and in the unity bind them.Antti Revonsuo - 2003 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 9.
    commentary on Dainton, B. (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. London: Routledge. ABSTRACT: Stream of Consciousness is a detailed and insightful analysis of the nature of phenomenal consciousness, especially its unity at a time and continuity over stretches of time. I find Dainton's approach to phenomenal consciousness in many ways sound but I also point out one major source of disgreement between us. Dainton believes that to explain phenomenal unity and continuity, no reference to anything outside (...)
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  10. Faster than Thought.Thomas Metzinger - 1995 - In Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    In this speculative paper I would like to show how important the integration of mental content is for a theory of phenomenal consciousness. I will draw the reader's attention to two manifestations of this problem which already play a role in the empirical sciences concerned with consciousness: The binding problem and the superposition problem. In doing so I hope to be able to leave the welltrodden paths of the debate over consciousness. My main concern is to gain a fresh access (...)
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  11. The grain problem.Michael Lockwood - 1993 - In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 271-291.
  12. The particulate instantiation of homogeneous pink.Austen Clark - 1989 - Synthese 80 (August):277-304.
    If one examines the sky at sunset on a clear night, one seems to see a continuum of colors from reds, oranges and yellows to a deep blue-black. Between any two colored points in the sky there seem to be other colored points. Furthermore, the changes in color across the sky appear to be continuous. Although the colors at the zenith and the horizon are obviously distinct, nowhere in the sky can one see any color borders, and every sufficiently small (...)
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  13. Ultimate homogeneity: A dialogue.Stephen Friedman - 1988 - Philosophy Research Archives 14:425-53.
    Throughout his metaphysical writings, Sellars maintains that current microtheory, with its particulate paradigm, can never depict adequately---even in principle---a universe populated with sentient beings like us. Why not? Experience for us involves the presence of an occurrent perceptual core of ultimately homogeneous secondary qualities. Sellars’ “Grain Argument” demonstrates that physical objects qua clouds of discrete particles cannot instantiate such qualities and that they cannot be assigned to an intrasentient realm construed as clusters of discrete, particulate neurons. Neither, contends Sellars, can (...)
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  14. Sellars' "grain" argument.William G. Lycan - 1987 - In W.G. Lycan (ed.), Consciousness. MIT Press.
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  15. Sellars and sense impressions.RobertC Richardson & Gregg Muilenburg - 1982 - Erkenntnis 17 (2):171-212.
  16. Wisdom: Twelve Essays.Renford Bambrough (ed.) - 1974 - Totowa, N.J.,: Blackwell.
  17. The texture of mentality.Keith Gunderson - 1974 - In Renford Bambrough (ed.), Wisdom: Twelve Essays. Totowa, N.J.,: Blackwell.
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  18. Sellars' grain argument.Cornelius F. Delaney - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):14-16.
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  19. Sellars, scientific realism, and sensa.James W. Cornman - 1970 - Review of Metaphysics 23 (3):417-51.
    One thing that would profit both the frustrated readers of Sellars and Sellars himself would be a careful attempt to explicate and evaluate critically the many interrelated theses stated and defended by Sellars. But, so far as I know, there has been little work of this kind done. I know only of two fine reviews by Keith Lehrer and Gilbert Harman, and a very helpful expository article by Richard Bernstein that deal directly and in some detail with Sellars' work. This (...)
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  20. Seeing, sense impressions, and sensa: A reply to Cornman.Wilfrid Sellars - 1970 - Review of Metaphysics 24 (3):391-447.
  21. Science, Perception, and Reality.Robert Colodny (ed.) - 1963 - Humanities Press/Ridgeview.
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  22. Philosophy and the scientific image of man.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1962 - In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview. pp. 35-78.
    The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term. Under 'things in the broadest possible sense' I include such radically different items as not only 'cabbages and kings', but numbers and duties, possibilities and finger snaps, aesthetic experience and death. To achieve success in philosophy would be, to use a contemporary turn of phrase, to 'know one's way around' with respect (...)
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