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1.6c. Homogeneity of Consciousness (Homogeneity of Consciousness on PhilPapers)

Byrne, Alex (2005). Knowing our minds. Boston Review.   (Google)
Abstract: ancient Greek temple at Delphi and is quoted approvingly by Socrates in the _First_
Clark, Austen (1989). The particulate instantiation of homogeneous pink. Synthese 80 (August):277-304.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: If one examines the sky at sunset on a clear night, one seems to see a continuum of colors from reds, oranges and yellows to a deep blue-black. Between any two colored points in the sky there seem to be other colored points. Furthermore, the changes in color across the sky appear to be continuous. Although the colors at the zenith and the horizon are obviously distinct, nowhere in the sky can one see any color borders, and every sufficiently small region of the sky is made up of regions that all seem to be of the same color
Cornman, James W. (1970). Sellars, scientific realism, and sensa. Review of Metaphysics 23 (March):417-51.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Delaney, Cornelius F. (1971). Sellars' grain argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):14-16.   (Google | More links)
Friedman, Stephen (1989). Ultimate homogeneity: A dialogue. Philosophy Research Archives 14:425-53.   (Google)
Gunderson, Keith (1974). The texture of mentality. In Renford Bambrough (ed.), Wisdom: Twelve Essays. Blackwell.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Huemer, Michael (2004). Elusive freedom? A reply to Helen Beebee. Philosophical Review 113 (3):411-416.   (Google | More links)
Lockwood, Michael (1993). The grain problem. In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 19 | Annotation | Google)
Lycan, William G. (1987). Sellars' "grain" argument. In W.G. Lycan (ed.), Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Google)
Metzinger, Thomas (1995). Faster than thought: Holism, homogeneity, and temporal coding. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P. (2005). Reading one's own mind: Self-awareness and developmental psychology. In M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton & C. Viger (eds.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The idea that we have special access to our own mental states has a distinguished philosophical history. Philosophers as different as Descartes and Locke agreed that we know our own minds in a way that is quite different from the way in which we know other minds. In the latter half of the 20th century, however, this idea came under serious attack, first from philosophy (Sellars 1956) and more recently from developmental psychology.1 The attack from developmental psychology arises from the growing body of work on
Revonsuo, Antti (2003). The contents of phenomenal consciousness: One relation to rule them all and in the unity bind them. Psyche 9 (8).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Richardson, Robert C. & Muilenberg, G. (1982). Sellars and sense impressions. Erkenntnis 17 (March):171-212.   (Google | More links)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1963). Philosophy and the scientific image of man. In Robert Colodny (ed.), Science, Perception, and Reality. Humanities Press/Ridgeview.   (Cited by 94 | Google)
Sellars, Wilfrid S. (1971). Seeing, sense impressions, and sensa: A reply to Cornman. Review of Metaphysics 24 (March):391-447.   (Cited by 1 | Google)