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1.6f. Temporal Consciousness (Temporal Consciousness on PhilPapers)

See also:
Akeley, L. E. (1925). The problem of the specious present and physical time: The problem generalized. Journal of Philosophy 22 (21):561-573.   (Google | More links)
Alves, Pedro M. S. (2008). Objective time and the experience of time: Husserl's theory of time in light of some theses of A. Einstein's special theory of relativity. Husserl Studies 24 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I start with the opposition between the Husserlian project of a phenomenology of the experience of time, started in 1905, and the mathematical and physical theory of time as it comes out of Einstein’s special theory of relativity in the same year. Although the contrast between the two approaches is apparent, my aim is to show that the original program of Husserl’s time theory is the constitution of an objective time and a time of the world, starting from the intuitive giveness of time, i.e., from time as it appears. To show this, I stress the structural similarity between Husserl’s original question of time and the problem of a phenomenology of space constitution as it was first developed in the his manuscripts from the nineteenth century, in which we find the threefold question of the origin of our representation of space, of the geometrization of intuitive space, and of the constitution of transcendent world space. Finally, I reconsider some of Husserl’s main theses about the phenomenological constitution of objective time in light of the main results of special relativity time-theory, introducing several corrections to central assumptions that underlie Husserl’s theory of time
Andersen, Holly & Grush, Rick (forthcoming). A brief history of time consciousness: Historical precursors to James and Husserl. Journal of the History of Philosophy.   (Google)
Antony, Michael V. (2001). On the temporal boundaries of simple experiences. Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3):263-286.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: I argue that the temporal boundaries of certain experiences
Bardon, Adrian (2007). Empiricism, Time-Awareness, and Hume's Manners of Disposition. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5.   (Google)
Abstract: The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? Struggles with this problem have cast doubt on empiricism as an adequate account of the origin of our ideas; Kant builds his theory of a priori knowledge on empiricism’s shortcomings with regard to time-awareness. In the first section of this paper I outline the problem of time-awareness for empiricism, along with some recent attempts to answer it. In the second section I explain how a unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume’s comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other attempts. In the third section I discuss some counter-intuitive consequences of this Humean theory. In the final section I introduce and then dismiss one possible defense of the Humean approach based on his rejection of a universal timeline. I conclude that the failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas.
Bennett, Jonathan (2004). Time in human experience. Philosophy 79 (308):165-183.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A set of eight mini-discourses. 1. The conceivability of the physical world's running in the opposite temporal direction. 2. Augustine's reason for thinking this is not conceivable for the world of the mind. 3. Trying to imagine being a creature that lives atemporally. 4. Memory's need for causal input. 5. Acting in the knowledge that how one acts is strictly determined. 6. The Newcomb problem. 7. The idea that all voluntary action is intended to be remedial. 8. Haunted by the strangeness of the idea of the past qua past
Bergmann, Gustav (1960). Duration and the specious present. Philosophy of Science 27 (January):39-47.   (Google | More links)
Bergson, Henri (1913). Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. Dover Publications.   (Google)
Abstract: Bergson argues for free will by showing that the arguments against it come from a confusion of different conceptions of time. As opposed to physicists' idea of measurable time, in human experience life is perceived as a continuous and unmeasurable flow rather than as a succession of marked-off states of consciousness--something that can be measured not quantitatively, but only qualitatively. His conclusion is that free will is an observable fact
Bond, E. J. (2005). Does the subject of experience exist in the world? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):124-133.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I attempt to show, by considering a number of sources, including Wittgenstein, Sartre, Thomas Nagel and Spinoza, but also adding something crucial of my own, that it is impossible to construe the subject of experience as an object among other objects in the world. My own added argument is the following. The subject of experience cannot move in time along with material events and processes or it could not be aware of the passage of time, hence neither of change nor of motion. The subject cannot therefore be identified with any neural process, function, or location since whatever goes on in the CNS is necessarily objective and part of the temporal flux. However this does not imply any form of dualism for experiences exist only for the subject whose experiences they are and hence they have no objective reality
Bradley McGilvary, Evander (1914). Time and the experience of time. Philosophical Review 23 (2):121-145.   (Google | More links)
Brown, J. (2000). Mind and Nature: Essays on Time and Subjectivity. Whurr Publishers.   (Cited by 19 | Google)
Bruzina, Ronald (2000). There is more to the phenomenology of time than meets the eye. In John B. Brough (ed.), The Many Faces of Time. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub.   (Google)
Burton, Robert G. (1976). The human awareness of time: An analysis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (March):303-318.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Butterfield, Jeremy (1998). Seeing the present. In Questions of Time and Tense. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Chari, C. T. K. (1951). Some metaphysical questions about the doctrine of the 'specious present'. Philosophical Quarterly (India) 23 (October):129-138.   (Google)
Cobb-Stevens, Richard M. (1998). James and Husserl: Time-consciousness and the intentionality of presence and absence. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (1954). The experience of time. Acta Psychologica 10:207-19.   (Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (2004). Precis of Stream of Consciousness. Psyche 10 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: That our ordinary everyday experience exhibits both unity and continuity is uncontroversial, and on the face of it utterly unmysterious. At any moment we have some conscious awareness of both the world about us, as revealed through our perceptual experiences, and our own inner states
Dainton, Barry (2008). Sensing change. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):362-384.   (Google)
Dainton, Barry F. (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Stream of Consciousness is about the phenomenology of conscious experience. Barry Dainton shows us that stream of consciousness is not a mosaic of discrete fragments of experience, but rather an interconnected flowing whole. Through a deep probing into the nature of awareness, introspection, phenomenal space and time consciousness, Dainton offers a truly original understanding of the nature of consciousness
Dainton, Barry (2008). The experience of time and change. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):619-638.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Can we directly experience change? Although some philosophers have denied it, the phenomenological evidence is unambiguous: we can, and do. But how is this possible? What structures or features of consciousness render such experience possible? A variety of very different answers to this question have been proposed, answers which have very different implications for the nature of consciousness itself. In this brief survey no attempt is made to engage with the often complex (and sometimes obscure) literature on this topic. Instead, a largely schematic examination of the main options is conducted, with a view to determining the most promising avenues for further investigation
Dainton, Barry F. (2003). Time in experience: Reply to Gallagher. Psyche 9 (12).   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In _Stream of Consciousness_ I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl were fundamentally flawed, and proposed a quite different account: the overlap model. While recognizing that the latter has merits, Gallagher argues that it too is fundamentally flawed; he also takes issue with some of my claims concerning Broad and Husserl. My reply comes in three main parts. I start by clarifying my use of certain terms, in particular _realism_ and _anti-realism_ as applied to theories of phenomenal temporality in general, and the accounts of Broad and Husserl in particular. I then turn to Gallagher
Dennett, Daniel C. (1992). Temporal Anomalies of Consciousness. In Y. Christen & P.S. Churchland (eds.), Neurophilosophy and Alzheimer's Disease. Springer-Verlag.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: As cognitive science, including especially cognitive neuroscience, closes in on the first realistic models of the human mind, philosophical puzzles and problems that have been conveniently postponed or ignored for generations are beginning to haunt the efforts of the scientists, confounding their vision and leading them down hopeless paths of theory. I will illustrate this claim with a brief look at several temporal phenomena which appear anomalous only because of a cognitive illusion: an illusion about the point of view of the observerix. Since there is no point in the brain where "it all comes together," several compelling oversimplifications of traditional theorizing must be abandoned
Dennett, Daniel C. & Kinsbourne, Marcel (1992). Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15:183-201.   (Cited by 394 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274
Dobbs, H. A. C. (1951). The relation between the time of psychology and the time of physics part I. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (6):122-141.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dooley, Patrick K. (2006). William James's "specious present" and Willa cather's phenomenology of memory. Philosophy Today 50 (5):444-449.   (Google)
Dunlap, Knight (1911). Rhythm and the specious present. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 8 (13):348-354.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Eames, Elizabeth R. (1986). Russell and the experience of time. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (June):681-682.   (Google | More links)
Ewer, Bernard C. (1909). The time paradox in perception. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (6):145-149.   (Google | More links)
Falk, Arthur E. (2003). Perceiving temporal passage. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.   (Google)
Farrell, B. A. (1973). Temporal precedence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:193-216.   (Google)
Ferrari, Donald & Ferrari, Melanie (eds.) (2001). Consciousness in Time. Heidelberg: C Winter University Verlag.   (Google)
Findlay, J. N. (1956). Report on does it make sense to suppose that all events, including personal experiences, could occur in reverse? Analysis 16 (June):121.   (Google)
Franck, Georg (2004). Mental presence and the temporal present. In Gordon G. Globus, Karl H. Pribram & Giuseppe Vitiello (eds.), Brain and Being: At the Boundary Between Science, Philosophy, Language and Arts. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gale, Richard M. (1997). From the specious to the suspicious present: The jack Horner phenomenology of William James. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 11 (3):163-189.   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Sync-ing in the stream of experience sync-ing in the stream of experience: Time-consciousness in broad, Husserl, and Dainton. Psyche 9 (10).   (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2003). Sync-ing in the stream of experience. Psyche 9 (10).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: about the specious present and time consciousness in both the Jamesian and the phenomenological traditions, I raise critical objections to his overlap model. Dainton's interpretations of Broad and Husserl are both insightful and problematic. In addition, there are unresolved problems in Dainton's own analysis of conscious experience. These problems involve ongoing content, lingering content, and a lack of phenomenological clarity concerning the central concept of overlapping experiences
Gallagher, Shaun (1979). Suggestions towards a revision of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness. Man and World 12:445-464.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (1998). The Inordinance of Time. Northwestern University Press.   (Google)
Greene, David B. (1984). Mahler: Consciousness And Temporality. Gordon & Breach.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Gregg, John R. (online). Time consciousness and the specious present.   (Google)
Abstract: Roger Penrose, in _The Emperor's New Mind_ (1989), writes about the way Mozart perceived music. Mozart did not play a piece in his mind in real time, or even speeded up, but could hold it before him all at once. We all do this, although usually for much shorter riffs than entire symphonies. I have argued that the all-at-onceness of our thoughts and perceptions is at least as inexplicable as what it is like to see red; I think the aural/temporal all-at-onceness makes the point at least as vividly as the visual/spatial all-at-onceness of the curl of smoke in an art nouveau poster
Grush, Holly K. Andersen Rick (2009). A brief history of time-consciousness: Historical precursors to James and Husserl. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (2):pp. 277-307.   (Google)
Abstract: William James' Principles of Psychology , in which he made famous the "specious present" doctrine of temporal experience, and Edmund Husserl's Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins were giant strides in the philosophical investigation of the temporality of experience. However, an important set of precursors to these works has not been adequately investigated. In this article, we undertake this investigation. Beginning with Reid's essay "Memory" in Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man , we trace out a line of development of ideas about the temporality of experience that runs through Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, William Hamilton, and finally the work of Shadworth Hodgson and Robert Kelly, both of whom were immediate influences on James (though James pseudonymously cites the latter as 'E.R. Clay'). Furthermore, we argue that Hodgson, especially his Metaphysic of Experience (1898), was a significant influence on Husserl
Grush, Rick (2005). Brain time and phenomenological time. In A. Brooks & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Cambridge.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: ... there are cases in which on the basis of a temporally extended content of consciousness a unitary apprehension takes place which is spread out over a temporal interval (the so-called specious present). ... That several successive tones yield a melody is possible only in this way, that the succession of psychical processes are united "forthwith" in a common structure
Grush, Rick (2006). How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness. Synthese 153 (3):417-450.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts
Hameroff, Stuart R. (online). Time, consciousness, and quantum events in fundamental space-time geometry.   (Google)
Abstract: 1. Introduction: The problems of time and consciousness What is time? St. Augustine remarked that when no one asked him, he knew what time was; however when someone asked him, he did not. Is time a process which flows? Is time a dimension in which processes occur? Does time actually exist? The notion that time is a process which "flows" directionally may be illusory (the "myth of passage") for if time did flow it would do so in some medium or vessel (e.g. minutes per what?) [1]. But if time is a dimension in which processes occurred, e.g. as one component of a 4 dimensional spacetime, then why would processes occur unidirectionally in time? Yet we perceive time as an orderly, unidirectional process. An alternative explanation is that time does not exist as either a process or dimension, but that reality is a collage of discrete, disconnected and haphazardly arranged configurations of the universe, e.g. as described in Julian Barbour's "The end of time" [2]. In this view our perception of a unidirectional flow of time occurs because each moment, or "Now" as Barbour terms them, involves memory of other conceptually relevant moments, and the orderly flow of time is an illusion. Barbour's deconstruction of time contrasts the Newtonian reality of objects moving deterministically through 4 dimensional spacetime. Newton's contemporary (and rival) Leibniz [3] viewed the world in a manner consistent with Barbour (and with Mach's principle that the spatiotemporal structure of the universe is dependent on the distribution of mass, a foundation of Einstein's general relativity). According to Leibniz the world is to be understood not as matter/mass moving in a framework of space and time, but of more fundamental snapshot-like entities that momentarily fuse space and matter into single possible arrangements or configurations of the entire universe. Such configurations, which can be fabulously rich and complex considering the vastness of the universe, are the ultimate "things" of reality, which Leibniz termed "monads"..
Hicks, R. E.; Miller, George W.; Gaes, G. & Bierman, K. (1977). Concurrent processing demands and the experience of time-in-passing. American Journal of Psychology 90:431-46.   (Cited by 33 | Google)
Hodson, Shadworth H. (1900). Perception of change and duration-a reply. Mind 9 (34):240-243.   (Google | More links)
Hoerl, Christoph (2008). On being stuck in time. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):485-500.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is sometimes claimed that non-human animals (and perhaps also young children) live their lives entirely in the present and are cognitively ‘stuck in time’. Adult humans, by contrast, are said to be able to engage in ‘mental time travel’. One possible way of making sense of this distinction is in terms of the idea that animals and young children cannot engage in tensed thought, which might seem a preposterous idea in the light of certain findings in comparative and developmental psychology. I try to make this idea less preposterous by looking into some of the cognitive requirements for tensed thought. In particular, I suggest that tensed thought requires a specific form of causal understanding, which animals and young children may not possess.
Hoerl, Christoph & McCormack, Teresa (2001). Perspectives on time and memory: an introduction. In Christoph Hoerl & Teresa McCormack (eds.), Time and memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: What is the connection between the way we represent time and things in time, on the one hand, and our capacity to remember particular past events, on the other? This is the substantive question that has stood behind the project of putting together this volume. The methodological assumption that has informed this project is that any progress with the difficult and fascinating set of issues that are raised by this question must draw on the resources of various areas both in philos- ophy and in psychology
Hoerl, Christoph (2009). Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (12):1-18.   (Google)
Abstract: We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as 'before' and 'after' (rather than, say, 'past', 'present' and 'future'), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process that is being experienced. Both claims have been made before, though usually separately from each other, and I don't believe the connection between them has been sufficiently recognized.
Hoerl, Christoph (1998). The perception of time and the notion of a point of view. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):156-171.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper aims to investigate the temporal content of perceptual experience. It argues that we must recognize the existence of temporal perceptions, i.e., perceptions the content of which cannot be spelled out simply by looking at what is the case at an isolated instant. Acts of apprehension can cover a succession of events. However, a subject who has such perceptions can fall short of having a concept of time. Similar arguments have been put forward to show that a subject who has spatial perceptions can fall short of having a concept of space. In both cases, it is the fact that perception is from a point of view which stands in the way of it constituting an exercise of a concept of how things are objectively. However, the paper also shows that the way in which perception is perspectival takes a different form in each of the two cases.
Hoy, Ronald C. (1976). A note on Gustav Bergmann's treatment of temporal consciousness. Philosophy of Science 43 (4):610-617.   (Google | More links)
Hoy, Ronald C. (1976). Science and temporal experience: A critical defense. Philosophy Research Archives 1156.   (Google)
Husserl, Edmund G. (1991). On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917). Translated by John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
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Kelly, Sean D. (forthcoming). On time and truth. In Kurt J. Pritzl (ed.), Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy. Catholic University of America Press.   (Google)
Kelly, Sean D. (2005). Temporal awareness. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Kelly, Sean D. (forthcoming). Time and experience. In A. Brooks & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Philosophy and the Neurosciences. Cambridge.   (Google)
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Abstract: There you are at the opera house. The soprano has just hit her high note – a glassshattering high C that fills the hall – and she holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds it. She holds the note for such a long time that after a while a funny thing happens: you no longer seem only to hear it, the note as it is currently sounding, that glass-shattering high C that is loud and high and pure. In addition, you also seem to hear something more. It is difficult to express precisely what this extra feature is. One is tempted to say, however, that the note now sounds like it has been going on for a very long time. Perhaps it even sounds like a note that has been going on for too long. In any event, what you hear no longer seems to be limited to the pitch, timbre, loudness, and other strictly audible qualities of the note. You seem in addition to experience, even to hear, something about its temporal extent
Kriegel, Uriah (2009). Temporally token-reflexive experiences. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):585-617.   (Google)
Abstract: John Searle has argued that all perceptual experiences are token-reflexive, in the sense that they are constituents of their own veridicality conditions. Many philosophers have found the kind of token-reflexivity he attributes to experiences, which I will call _causal_ token-reflexivity, unfaithful to perceptual phenomenology. In this paper, I develop an argument for a different sort of token-reflexivity in perceptual (as well as some non- perceptual) experiences, which I will call _temporal_ token-reflexivity, and which ought to be phenomenologically unobjectionable
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Rapoport, Diego L. (2009). surmounting the cartesian cut with philosophy, physics, cybernetics and geometry; self.reference, torsion, the klein bottle, multivalued logics and quantum mechanics. foundations of physics 39 (09).   (Google)
Abstract: In this transdisciplinary article which stems from philosophical considerations (that depart from phenomenology -after Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger and Rosen- and Hegelian dialectics), we develop a conception based on topological (the Moebius surface and the Klein bottle) and geometrical considerations (based on torsion and non-orientability of manifolds), and multivalued logics which we develop into a unified world conception that surmounts the Cartesian cut and Aristotelian logic. The role of torsion appears in a self-referential construction of space and time, which will be further related to the commutator of the True and False operators of matrix logic, still with a quantum superposed state related to a Moebius surface, and as the physical field at the basis of Spencer-Brown’s primitive distinction in the protologic of the calculus of distinction. In this setting, paradox, self-reference, depth, time and space, higher-order non-dual logic, perception, spin and a time operator, the Klein bottle, hypernumbers due to Mus`es which include non-trivial square roots of ±1 and in particular non-trivial nilpotents, quantum field operators, the transformation of cognition to spin for two-state quantum systems, are found to be keenly interwoven in a world conception compatible with the philosophical approach taken for basis of this article. The Klein bottle is found not only to be the topological in-formation for self-reference and paradox whose logical counterpart in the calculus of indications are the paradoxical imaginary time waves, but also a classicalquantum transformer (Hadamard’s gate in quantum computation) which is indispensable to be able to obtain a complete multivalued logical system, and still to generate the matrix extension of classical connective Boolean logic. We further find that the multivalued logic that stems from considering the paradoxical equation in the calculus of distinctions, and in particular, the imaginary solutions to this equation, generates the matrix logic which supersedes the classical logic of connectives and which has for particular subtheories fuzzy and quantum logics. Thus, from a primitive distinction in the vacuum plane and the axioms of the calculus of distinction, we can derive by incorporating paradox, the world conception succintly described above.
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McKinnon, Neil (2003). Presentism and consciousness. Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):305-323.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The presentist view of time is psychologically appealing. I argue that, ironically, contingent facts about the temporal properties of consciousness are very difficult to square with presentism unless some form of mind/body dualism is embraced
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Abstract: This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being and Time , shedding light on the latter’s concept of ecstatic temporality. It also discusses implications for self-management of chronic illness, especially in children
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Abstract: It is argued that a subject who has an experience as of succession can have this experience at a time, or over a period of time, during which there occurs in him no succession of conscious mental states at all. Various metaphysical implications of this conclusion are explored. One premise of the main argument is that every experience is an experience as of succession. This implies that we cannot understand phenomenal temporality as a relation among experiences, but only as a primitive feature of experience, or else as something analyzable into wholly non-phenomenal terms.
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Abstract: e are no less directly acquainted with the temporal structure of the world than with its spatial structure. We hear one word succeeding another; feel two taps as simultaneous; or see the glow of a firework persisting, before it finally fizzles and fades. However, time is special, for we not only experience temporal properties; experience itself is structured in time
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Abstract: This is an expanded and revised discussion of the argument briefly put forward in my 'A New Problem for the A-Theory of Time', where it is claimed that it is impossible to experience real temporal passage and that no such phenomenon exists. In the first half of the paper the premises of the argument are discussed in more detail than before. In the second half responses are given to several possible objections, none of which were addressed in the earlier paper. There is also some discussion of some related epistemic arguments against the passage of time given by Huw Price and David Braddon-Mitchell along with objections raised against them recently by Tim Maudlin and Peter Forrest respectively
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Abstract: In §24 of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant remarks that his account of the capacity of the understanding to spontaneously determine sensibility explains how empirical self-knowledge is possible through inner-sense. Although most commentators consider Kant's conception of empirical self-knowledge through inner sense to be either a failure or at least drastically under-developed, I argue that (just as Kant claims) his account of the capacity of the understanding to determine sensibility - the "productive imagination" - can ground an attractive account of self-knowledge. The account of inner sense I propose, however, may seem to conflict with some of Kant's views on time. I close the paper by arguing that the apparent conflict is not a fault specific to my account of inner sense, but rather indicative of a deeper tension, internal to Kant's views on time
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Abstract: If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore settled with a model of self-awareness based upon the subject-object dichotomy, with its entailed difference between the intending and the intended. As a consequence, Husserl never discovered the existence of pre-reflective self- awareness, but remained stuck in the traditional, but highly problematic reflection model of self-awareness
Zahavi, Dan (2007). Perception of duration presupposes duration of perception - or does it? Husserl and Dainton on time. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):453 – 471.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also challenges Husserl's classical account in a number of ways. In the following contribution, I will compare Dainton's and Husserl's respective accounts. Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat opportunity to appraise the contemporary relevance of Husserl's analysis. How does it measure up against one of the more recent analytical accounts?
Zahavi, Dan (2004). Time and consciousness in the bernau manuscripts. Husserl Studies 20 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Even a cursory glance in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein makes it evident that one of Husserl’s major concerns in his 1917-18 reflections on time-consciousness was how to account for the constitution of time without giving rise to an infinite regress. Not only does Husserl constantly refer to this problem in Husserliana XXXIII – as he characteristically writes at one point “Überall drohen, scheint es, unendliche Regresse”(Hua 33/81) – but he also takes care to distinguish between several different regresses (cf. Hua 33/271). One of the more troubling ones is the one that might be called the regress of foundation. It concerns the problem of how to avoid always having to presuppose yet another underlying constituting consciousness. As we will soon see, the attempt to avoid this specific regress is closely linked to the problem of how to come up with a satisfactory account of self-awareness. That Husserl himself was well aware of this link can be inferred from some of his reflections in the beginning of Husserliana XXXIII. As he writes at one point, consciousness exists, it exists as a stream, and it appears to itself as a stream. But how the stream of consciousness is capable of being conscious of itself, how it is possible and comprehensible that the very being of the stream is a form of self-consciousness, is the enduring problem of the entire treatise (Hua 33/44, 46). In this article, I wish to take a closer look at some of Husserl’s attempts in the Bernau Manuscripts to account for time-consciousness without giving rise to an infinite regress