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Philosophy of Consciousness :: Aspects of Consciousness :: Consciousness of Agency

See also:
Andersen, Holly (manuscript). Two causal mistakes in Wegner's illusion of conscious will. (Google | More links)
Annas, Julia (2008). The phenomenology of virtue. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):21-34. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bayne, Timothy J. (2006). Phenomenology and the feeling of doing: Wegner on the conscious will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. (Cited by 5 | Google)
Bayne, Timothy J. (manuscript). Putting the experience of acting in its place. (Google)
Bayne, Timothy J. & Levy, Neil (2006). The feeling of doing: Deconstructing the phenomenology of agency. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Carruthers, Peter (2007). The illusion of conscious will. Synthese 96. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Carter, William R. (1982). Comments on L. H. Davis, What is It Like to Be an Agent?. Erkenntnis 18 (September):215-221. (Google)
Choudhury, Suparna & Blakemore, Sarah-Jayne (2006). Intentions, actions, and the self. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press. (Google)
Cole, Jonathan (2007). The phenomenology of agency and intention in the face of paralysis and insentience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):309-325. (Google | More links)
Cunning, David (1999). Agency and consciousness. Synthese 120 (2):271-294. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Davis, Lawrence H. (1982). What is it like to be an agent? Erkenntnis 18 (September):195-213. (Google | Annotation)
Dokic, Jérôme (2003). The sense of ownership: An analogy between sensation and action. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Eilan, Naomi M. & Roessler, Johannes (2003). Agency and self-awareness: Mechanisms and epistemology. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Filice, Carlo (1988). Non-substantial streams of consciousness and free action. International Studies in Philosophy 20:1-11. (Google)
Gallagher, Shaun (2005). Consciousness and free will. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 39:7-16. (Google)
Gill, Michael (2008). Variability and moral phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):99-113. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hannay, Alastair (1991). Consciousness and the experience of freedom. In Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. (Google)
Hohwy, Jakob (2005). The experience of mental causation. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):377-400. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hohwy, Jakob (2004). The experience of mental causation. Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):377-400. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Holton, Richard (2006). The act of choice. Philosophers' Imprint 6 (3):1-15. (Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E.; Tienson, John L. & Graham, George (2003). The phenomenology of first-person agency. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Horgan, Terry & Timmons, Mark (2008). Prolegomena to a future phenomenology of morals. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):115-131. (Google | More links)
Hossack, Keith (2003). Consciousness in act and action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Self-consciousness, spontaneity, and the myth of the giving. In Consciousness in Action. Cambridge. (Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Moral phenomenology: Foundational issues. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Leiter, Brian (2007). Nietzsche's theory of the will. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (7):1-15. (Google | More links)
Metzinger, Thomas (2006). Conscious volition and mental representation: Toward a more fine-grained analysis. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press. (Cited by 11 | Google)
Mossel, Benjamin (2005). Action, control and sensations of acting. Philosophical Studies 124 (2):129-180. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Nahmias, Eddy (2005). Agency, authorship, and illusion. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):771-785. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Nahmias, Eddy A. (2002). When consciousness matters: A critical review of Daniel Wegner's the illusion of conscious will. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):527-541. (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Nida-Rümelin, Martine (2007). Doings and subject causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2). (Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (2003). Action: Awareness, ownership, and knowledge. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Cited by 7 | Google)
Preston, Jesse; Gray, Kurt & Wegner, Daniel M. (2006). The godfather of soul. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):482-+. (Google | More links)
Sachse, Christian (2007). What about a reductionist approach? Comments on Terry Horgan. Erkenntnis 67 (2). (Google | More links)
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2008). Is moral phenomenology unified? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):85-97. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Smith, David Woodruff (1992). Consciousness in action. Synthese 90 (1):119-43. (Cited by 9 | Google)
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Strawson, Galen (2003). Mental ballistics or the involuntariness of spontaniety. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-257. (Google)
Sundstrom, Par (online). Consciousness and intentionality of action. (Google)
Velmans, Max (2004). Why conscious free will both is and isn't an illusion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wakefield, Jerome C. & Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1991). Intentionality and the phenomenology of action. In Ernest Lepore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Wegner, Daniel M. & Wheatley, T. (1999). Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will. American Psychologist 54:480-492. (Cited by 123 | Google | More links)
Wegner, Daniel M. (2004). Frequently asked questions about conscious will. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):679-692. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Whiteley, C. H. (1973). Mind In Action: An Essay In Philosophical Psychology. Oxford University Press,. (Cited by 5 | Google)

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