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1.6h. Unconscious States (Unconscious States on PhilPapers)

See also:
Beck, Lewis White (1966). Conscious and unconscious motives. Mind 75 (April):155-179.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Ben-Ze'ev, Aaron (1990). Conscious and unconscious states. Philosophical Studies 44:44-62.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Bodkin, A. M. (1907). The subconscious factors of mental process considered in relation to thought (I). Mind 16 (62):209-228.   (Google | More links)
Bodkin, A. M. (1907). The subconscious factors of mental process considered in relation to thought (II). Mind 16 (63):362-382.   (Google | More links)
Brink, Louise (1918). How the concept of the unconscious is serviceable. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 15 (15):405-414.   (Google | More links)
Dilman, Ilham (1959). The unconscious. Mind 68 (October):446-473.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (2006). Perception without awareness. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (2000). Searle's unconscious mind. Philosophical Psychology 13 (1):123-148.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In his book The rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a role in psychological explanation
Edel, Abraham (1964). The concept of the unconscious: Some analytic preliminaries. Philosophy of Science 31 (January):18-33.   (Google | More links)
Elton, Matthew (2000). Consciousness: Only at the personal level. Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):25-42.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub-personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub-personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better what content ascription at the sub-personal level actually means. When we do we can see how Dennett presents both a philosophical account of consciousness and informed empirical speculation on the nature of its sub-personal underpinnings. Consciousness is a product of certain capacities that are intelligible only at the personal level, capacities that are neither present at the sub-personal level of brain mechanism nor present in 'sub-persons', e.g. some, if not all, non-human animals
Feldman, A. Bronson (1959). The Unconscious In History. New York: Philosophical Library.   (Google)
Field, G. C.; Aveling, F. & Laird, John (1922). Is the conception of the unconscious of value in psychology? Mind 31 (124):413-442.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Finkelstein, David H. (1999). On the distinction between conscious and unconscious states of mind. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (2):79-100.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gardner, Sebastian (2003). The unconscious mind. In Thomas Baldwin (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870-1945. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Gillett, Eric (1996). Searle and the "deep unconscious". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (3):191-200.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
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Haeberlin, Herman K. (1917). The concept of the unconscious. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (20):543-550.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Henry Lewes, George (1877). Consciousness and unconsciousness. Mind 2 (6):156-167.   (Google | More links)
Hilgard, Ernest R. (1958). Unconscious Processes and Man's Rationality. University of Illinois Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Krantz, Susan (1990). Brentano on 'unconscious consciousness'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):745-753.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Landesman, Charles (1965). Reply to professor Whallon. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (March):404-405.   (Google | More links)
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Lloyd, Dan (1996). Commentary on Searle and the 'Deep Unconscious'. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (3):201-202.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Macdonald, Graham F. (1999). Folk-psychology, psychopathology, and the unconscious. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):206-224.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is a 'philosophers' assumption that there is a problem with the very notion of an unconscious mental state.The paper begins by outlining how the problem is generated, and proceeds to argue that certain conditions need to be fulfilled if the unconscious is to qualify as mental. An explanation is required as to why we would ever expect these conditions to be fulfilled, and it is suggested that the Freudian concept of repression has an essential role to play in such an explanation. Notoriously this concept brings with it a further puzzle: it looks as though repression serves a purpose, and so requires an agent to execute this purpose, a repressor. Paradox is avoided only if repression is viewed in biologicalfunctional terms.The result is that the notion of the unconscious is saved from the a priori objections often levelled at it by philosophers.This still leaves considerable theoretical work to be done by psychological science
MacIntyre, Alasdair (2004). The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis (Revised Edition). New York: Routledge.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
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Matthews, Eric (2005). Unconscious reasons. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):55-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
McKee, Patrick (1972). Non-conscious seeing. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (October):319-326.   (Google)
McLoughlin, John (1999). Unwittingly recapitulating Freud: Searle's concept of a vocabulary of the unconscious. Ratio 12 (1):34-53.   (Google | More links)
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. (2000). Mental causation and Searle's impossible conception of unconscious intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (2):155-170.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In my article I evaluate Searle's account of mental causation, in particular his account of the causal efficacy of unconscious intentional states. I argue that top-down causation and overdetermination are unsolved problems in Searle's philosophy of mind, despite his assurances to the contrary. I also argue that there are conflicting claims involved in his account of mental causation and his account of the unconscious. As a result, it becomes impossible to understand how unconscious intentional states can be causally efficacious. My conclusion will be that if Searle's conception of unconscious intentionality is to play a genuine role in the causal explanation of human action, it needs to be rethought
Pierce, A. H. (1906). Should we still retain the expression `unconscious cerebration' to designate certain processes connected with mental life? Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 3 (23):626-630.   (Google | More links)
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Searle, John R. (1989). Consciousness, unconsciousness, and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):193-209.   (Cited by 32 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Searle, John R. (1994). The connection principle and the ontology of the unconscious: A reply to Fodor and Lepore. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):847-55.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1960). Unconscious perception, part II. Aristotelian Society 67:67-78.   (Google)
Vollmer, Fred (1993). Intentional action and unconscious reasons. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (3):315-326.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
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Zemach, Eddy (1986). Unconscious Mind or Conscious Minds? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:121-149.   (Google)