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1.7. Qualia (Qualia on PhilPapers)

Allen, Robert F. (online). The subject is qualia: Paronyms and temporary identity.   (Google)
Amoroso, Richard L. (2004). Application of double-cusp catastrophe theory to the physical evolution of qualia: Implications for paradigm shift in medicine and psychology. Anticipative and Predictive Models in Systems Science 1 (1):19-26.   (Google)
Armstrong, David M. (1996). Qualia ain't in the head. Psyche 2:31--4.   (Google)
Atlas, Jay David, Qualia, consciousness, and memory: Dennett (2005), Rosenthal (2002), Ledoux (2002), and Libet (2004).   (Google)
Abstract: In his recent (2005) book "Sweet Dreams: philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness," Dennett renews his attack on a philosophical notion of qualia, the success of which attack is required if his brand of Functionalism is to survive. He also articulates once again what he takes to be essential to his notion of consciousness. I shall argue that his new, central argument against the philosophical concept of qualia fails. In passing I point out a difficulty that David Rosenthal's "higher-order thought" theory of consciousness also faces in accounting for qualia. I then contrast Dennett's newest account of consciousness with interestingly different conceptions by contemporary neuro-scientists, and I suggest that philosophers should take the recent suggestions by neuro-scientists more seriously as a subject for philosophical investigation
Bachrach, Jay E. (1990). Qualia and theory reduction: A criticism of Paul Churchland. Iyyun 281.   (Annotation | Google)
Bailey, Andrew R. (2007). Qualia and the argument from illusion: A defence of figment. Acta Analytica 22 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper resurrects two discredited ideas in the philosophy of mind. The first: the idea that perceptual illusion might have something metaphysically significant to tell us about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. The second: that the colours and other qualities that ‘fill’ our sensory fields are occurrent properties (rather than representations of properties) that are, nevertheless, to be distinguished from the ‘objective’ properties of things in the external world. Theories of consciousness must recognize the existence of what Daniel Dennett mockingly labels ‘figment,’ but this result—though metaphysically and epistemologically significant—is not incompatible with either physicalism or naturalized semantics
Bailey, Andrew R. (2005). What is it like to see a bat? A critique of Dretske's representationalist theory of qualia. Disputatio 1 (18).   (Google)
Beaton, Michael (2009). Qualia and Introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (5):88-110.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The claim that behaviourally undetectable inverted spectra are possible has been endorsed by many physicalists. I explain why this starting point rules out standard forms of scientific explanation for qualia. The modern ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ is an updated way of defending problematic intuitions like these, but I show that it cannot help to recover standard scientific explanation. I argue that Chalmers is right: we should accept the falsity of physicalism if we accept this problematic starting point. I further argue that accepting this starting point amounts to at least implicitly endorsing certain theoretical claims about the nature of introspection. I therefore suggest that we allow ourselves to be guided, in our quest to understand qualia, by whatever independently plausible theories of introspection we have. I propose that we adopt a more moderate definition of qualia, as those introspectible properties which cannot be fully specified simply by specifying the non-controversially introspectible ‘propositional attitude’ mental states (including seeing x, experiencing x, and so on, where x is a specification of a potentially public state of affairs). Qualia thus defined may well fit plausible, naturalisable accounts of introspection. If so, such accounts have the potential to explain, rather than explain away, the problematic intuitions discussed earlier; an approach that should allow integration of our understanding of qualia with the rest of science.
Bigelow, John C. & Pargetter, Robert (1990). Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 61 (3):129-147.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google)
Bigelow, John C. & Pargetter, Robert (2006). Re-acquaintance with qualia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):353 – 378.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Frank Jackson argued, in an astronomically frequently cited paper on 'Epiphenomenal qualia'[Jackson 1982 that materialism must be mistaken. His argument is called the knowledge argument. Over the years since he published that paper, he gradually came to the conviction that the conclusion of the knowledge argument must be mistaken. Yet he long remained totally unconvinced by any of the very numerous published attempts to explain where his knowledge argument had gone astray. Eventually, Jackson did publish a diagnosis of the reasons why, he now thinks, his knowledge argument against materialism fails to prove the falsity of materialism [Jackson 2005. He argues that you can block the knowledge argument against materialism - but only if you tie yourself to a dubious doctrine called representationalism. We argue that the knowledge argument fails as a refutation of either representational or nonrepresentational materialism. It does, however, furnish both materialists and dualists with a successful argument for the existence of distinctively first-person modes of acquaintance with mental states. Jackson's argument does not refute materialism: but it does bring to the surface significant features of thought and experience, which many dualists have sensed, and most materialists have missed
Billock, Vincent A. & Tsou, Brian H. (2004). Color, qualia, and psychophysical constraints on equivalence of color experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):164-165.   (Google)
Abstract: It has been suggested that difficult-to-quantify differences in visual processing may prevent researchers from equating the color experience of different observers. However, spectral locations of unique hues are remarkably invariant with respect to everything other than gross differences in preretinal and photoreceptor absorptions. This suggests a stereotyping of neural color processing and leads us to posit that minor differences in observer neurophysiology may be irrelevant to color experience
Braddon-Mitchell, David (2003). Qualia and analytical conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):111-135.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Buck, R. (1993). What is this thing called subjective experience? Reflections on the neuropsychology of qualia. Neuropsychology 7:490-99.   (Cited by 16 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Qualia and intentional content: Reply to Block. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Byrne, Alex & Tye, Michael (2006). Qualia ain't in the head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head.1 Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia.2
Casati, Roberto (2003). Qualia domesticated. In Amita Chatterjee (ed.), Perspectives on Consciousness. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.   (Google | More links)
Cavedon-Taylor, Dan (2009). Still epiphenomenal qualia: Response to Muller. Philosophia 37 (1):105-107.   (Google)
Abstract: Hans Muller has recently attempted to show that Frank Jackson cannot assert the existence of qualia without thereby falsifying himself on the matter of such mental states being epiphenomenal with respect to the physical world. I argue that Muller misunderstands the commitments of qualia epiphenomenalism and that, as a result, his arguments against Jackson do not go through
Chalmers, David J. (1993). Self-ascription without qualia: A case-study. Behavioral And Brain Sciences 16 (1):35-36.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In Section 5 of his interesting article, Goldman suggests that the consideration of imaginary cases can be valuable in the analysis of our psychological concepts. In particular, he argues that we can imagine a system that is isomorphic to us under any functional description, but which lacks qualitative mental states, such as pains and color sensations. Whether or not such a being is empirically possible, it certainly seems to be logically possible, or conceptually coherent. Goldman argues from this possibility to the conclusion that our concepts of qualitative mental states cannot be analyzed entirely in functional terms
Churchland, Paul M. & Churchland, Patricia Smith (1981). Functionalism, qualia, and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):121-145.   (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1989). Knowing qualia: A reply to Jackson. In A Neurocomputational Perspective. MIT Press.   (Cited by 63 | Annotation | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1985). Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.   (Cited by 110 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Clark, Austen (2010). Color, qualia, and attention : A non-standard interpretation. In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press.   (Google)
Cohen, Jonathan (2001). Whither visual representations? Whither qualia? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):980-981.   (Google)
Abstract: This commentary makes two rejoinders to O'Regan & Noë. It clarifies the status of visual representations in their account, and argues that their explanation of the (according to them, illusory) appeal of qualia is unsatisfying
Cole, David J. (1994). Thought and qualia. Minds and Machines 4 (3):283-302.   (Google | More links)
Crooks, Mark (2008). The Churchlands' war on qualia. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case For Qualia. The MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: The systematic phenomenology-denial within the works of Paul and Patricia Churchland is critiqued as to its coherence with the known elelmentary physics and physiology of perception. Paul Churchland misidentifies "qualia" with psychology's sensorimotor schemas, while Patricia Churchland illicitly propounds the intertheoretic identities of logical empiricism while rejecting the premises upon which those identities are based. Their analogies from such arguments to an identity of mind and brain thus have no inductive probability.
de Leon, David (ms). The qualities of qualia.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay is a defence of the traditional notion of qualia - as properties of consciousness that are ineffable, intrinsic, private and immediately apprehensible - against the eliminative attempts of Daniel Dennett in the influential article "Quining Qualia." It is suggested that a thorough exploration of the concept is an appropriate starting point for future explanations of qualia, and the essay ends with some possible explanations of the four traditional properties
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). "Epiphenomenal" qualia? In Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Doesburg, Sam M. & Ward, Lawrence M. (2007). Corticothalamic necessity, qualia, and consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):90-91.   (Google)
Abstract: The centrencephalic theory of consciousness cannot yet account for some evidence from both brain damaged and normally functioning humans that strongly implicates thalamocortical activity as essential for consciousness. Moreover, the behavioral indexes used by Merker to implicate consciousness need more development, as, besides being somewhat vague, they lead to some apparent contradictions in the attribution of consciousness. (Published Online May 1 2007)
Dorsch, Fabian, Conceptual qualia and communication.   (Google)
Abstract: The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often been the focus of attention
Dretske, Fred (1996). Phenomenal externalism, or if meanings ain't in the head, where are qualia? Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.   (Cited by 19 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Flohr, Hans (1992). Qualia and brain processes. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Forster, Malcolm (1991). Preconditions of predication: From qualia to quantum mechanics. Topoi 10 (1).   (Google)
Abstract:   Although in every inductive inference, an act of invention is requisite, the act soon slips out of notice. Although we bind together facts by superinducing upon them a new Conception, this Conception, once introduced and applied, is looked upon as inseparably connected with the facts, and necessarily implied in them. Having once had the phenomena bound together in their minds in virtue of the Conception men can no longer easily restore them back to the detached and incoherent condition in which they were before they were thus combined. The pearls once strung, they seem to form a chain by their nature. Induction has given them unity which it is so far from costing us an effort to preserve, that it requires an effort to imagine it dissolved — William Whewell, 1858. (Quoted from Butts (ed.), 1989, p. 143)
Francescotti, Robert M. (2000). Introspection and qualia: A defense of infallibility. Communication and Cognition 33 (3-4):161-173.   (Google)
Fürst, Martina (2004). Qualia and phenomenal concepts as basis of the knowledge argument. Acta Analytica 19 (32):143-152.   (Google)
Abstract: The central attempt of this paper is to explain the underlying intuitions of Frank Jackson’s “Knowledge Argument” that the epistemic gap between phenomenal knowledge and physical knowledge points towards a corresponding ontological gap. The first step of my analysis is the claim that qualia are epistemically special because the acquisition of the phenomenal concept of a quale x requires the experience of x. Arguing what is so special about phenomenal concepts and pointing at the inherence-relation with the qualia they pick out, I give compelling reasons for the existence of ontologically distinct entities. Finally I conclude that phenomenal knowledge is caused by phenomenal properties and the instantiation of these properties is a specific phenomenal fact, which can not be mediated by any form of descriptive information. So it will be shown that phenomenal knowledge must count as the possession of very special information necessarily couched in subjective, phenomenal conceptions
Gadenne, Volker (2006). In defence of qualia-epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):101-114.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Epiphenomenalism has been criticized with several objections. It has been argued that epiphenomenalism is incompatible with the alleged causal relevance of mental states, and that it renders knowledge of our own conscious states impossible. In this article, it is demonstrated that qualia-epiphenomenalism follows from some well- founded assumptions, and that it meets the cited objections. Though not free from difficulties, it is at least superior to its main competitors, namely, physicalism and interactionism
Gertler, Brie (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell.   (Google)
Globus, Gordon G. (1998). Self, cognition, qualia, and world in quantum brain dynamics. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):34-52.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Goguen, J. (2004). Musical qualia, context, time and emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (3-4):117-147.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Greenberg, L. S. (2003). Review of “emotions, qualia and consciousness” by Alfred kaszniak (ed.). Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):327-333.   (Google)
Gregory, Richard L. (1996). What do qualia do? Perception 25:377-79.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Gustafson, Donald F. (1998). Pain, qualia, and the explanatory gap. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):371-387.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: This paper investigates the status of the purported explanatory gap between pain phenomena and natural science, when the “gap” is thought to exist due to the special properties of experience designated by “qualia” or “the pain quale” in the case of pain experiences. The paper questions the existence of such a property in the case of pain by: (1) looking at the history of the conception of pain; (2) raising questions from empirical research and theory in the psychology of pain; (3) considering evidence from the neurophysiological systems of pain; (4) investigating the possible biological role or roles of pain; and (5) considering methodological questions of the comparable status of the results of the sciences of pain in contrast to certain intuitions underpinning “the explanatory gap” in the case of pain. Skepticism concerning the crucial underlying intuitions seems justified by these considerations
Harman, Gilbert (1996). Qualia and color concepts. Philosophical Issues 7:75-79.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Hawthorne, John (2006). Dancing qualia and direct reference. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hawthorne, John (2007). Direct reference and dancing qualia. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hilbert, David, Qualia.   (Google)
Abstract: Perception and thought are often, although not exclusively, concerned with information about the world. In the case of perceiving though, unlike thinking, it is widely believed that there is an additional element involved, a subjective feeling or, as it is often put, something that it is like to be perceiving. Qualia are these characteristic feelings that accompany perceiving. One motivation for the idea that we experience qualia is that there is a clear difference between seeing a red tomato and thinking that a tomato is red and that the difference has to do with some extra element present in the case of seeing that is absent in the case of thinking. Philosophical attempts to understand qualia and their place in the world have played a central role in recent debates about the nature of mind and its place in the world. Before getting to those debates, we will take a more detailed look at the distinction between the content of perceptual experiences,what they tell us about the world, and their qualitative or phenomenal character, what it is like to experience them
Hill, Christopher S. (online). Visual awareness and visual qualia.   (Google)
Abstract: Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02915
Hodgson, David (2002). Three tricks of consciousness: Qualia, chunking and selection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):65-88.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: DAVID HODGSON Abstract: This article supports the proposition that, if a judgment about the aesthetic merits of an artistic object can take into account and thereby be influenced by the particular quality of the object, through gestalt experiences evoked by the object, then we have free will. It argues that it is probable that such a judgment can indeed take into account and be influenced by the particular quality of the object through gestalt experiences evoked by it, so as to make it probable that we do have free will. The proposition is supported by reference to two basic tricks apparently involved in conscious processes, which I call the qualia trick and the chunking trick; and it is suggested that these tricks make possible and indeed probable the existence of a third trick, which I call the selection trick
Hodes, Greg P. (2005). What would it "be like" to solve the hard problem?: Cognition, consciousness, and qualia zombies. Neuroquantology 3 (1):43-58.   (Google)
Holt, Jason (1999). Blindsight in debates about qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (5):54-71.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Holman, Emmett L. (1988). Qualia, Kripkean arguments, and subjectivity. Philosophy Research Archives 13:411-29.   (Annotation | Google)
Honderich, Ted (1992). Seeing qualia and positing the world. In A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Jackson, Frank (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.   (Cited by 566 | Annotation | Google | More links)
John, James (2010). Against qualia theory. Philosophical Studies 147 (3).   (Google)
Abstract: Representational theorists identify experiences’ phenomenal properties with their representational properties. Qualia theorists reject this identity, insisting that experiences’ phenomenal properties can come apart from and completely outrun their representational properties. Qualia theorists account for phenomenal properties in terms of “qualia,” intrinsic mental properties they allege experiences to instantiate. The debate between representational theorists and qualia theorists has focused on whether phenomenal properties really can come apart from and completely outrun representational properties. As a result, qualia theorists have failed (1) to explain how experiences owe their phenomenal properties to their instantiation of qualia and (2) to clarify the nature of subjects’ epistemic access to qualia. I survey qualia theorists’ options for dealing with each issue and find them all wanting
Johnsen, Bredo C. (1997). Dennett on qualia and consciousness: A critique. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):47-82.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Kalat, James W. (2002). Identism without objective qualia: Commentary on Crooks. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):233-238.   (Google)
Kim, Jaegwon (1996). Dretske's qualia externalism. Philosophical Issues 7:159-165.   (Google | More links)
Kind, Amy (2008). How to believe in qualia. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press.   (Google)
Abstract: forthcoming in The Case for Qualia, ed. by Edmond Wright , MIT Press (expected 2008)
Kiverstein, Julian (2008). Wittgenstein, qualia, and the autonomy of grammar. In David K. Levy & Edoardo Zamuner (eds.), Wittgenstein's Enduring Arguments. Routledge.   (Google)
Kurthen, Martin (1990). Qualia, sensa und absolute prozesse. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 21 (1).   (Google)
Lalor, Brendan J. (1999). Intentionality and qualia. Synthese 121 (3):249-290.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Langsam, Harold (2000). Experiences, thoughts, and qualia. Philosophical Studies 99 (3):269-295.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1997). Are qualia just representations? Mind and Language 12:101-13.   (Google)
Levin, Yakir (2004). Criterial semantics and qualia. Facta Philosophica 6 (1):57-76.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Levine, Joseph (1983). Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.   (Cited by 235 | Annotation | Google)
Loar, Brian (2003). Qualia, properties, modality. Philosophical Issues 1 (1):113-29.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Loar, Brian (2003). Transparent experience and the availability of qualia. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Lockwood, Michael (2003). Consciousness and the quantum world: Putting qualia on the map. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Loui, Michael C. (1994). Against qualia: Our direct perception of physical reality. In European Review of Philosophy, Volume 1: Philosophy of Mind. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Google)
L., S. (2003). Review of “emotions, qualia and consciousness” by Alfred kaszniak (ed.). Consciousness and Emotion 4 (2):327-333.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (2006). Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy). Blackwell.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1998). In defense of the representational theory of qualia. Philosophical Perspectives 12:479-87.   (Google)
Lycan, William G. (1998). In defense of the representational theory of qualia (replies to Neander, Rey, and tye). Philosophical Perspectives 12.   (Google)
Mandik, Pete (1999). Qualia, space, and control. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to representionalists, qualia-the introspectible properties of sensory experience-are exhausted by the representational contents of experience. Representationalists typically advocate an informational psychosemantics whereby a brain state represents one of its causal antecedents in evolutionarily determined optimal circumstances. I argue that such a psychosemantics may not apply to certain aspects of our experience, namely, our experience of space in vision, hearing, and touch. I offer that these cases can be handled by supplementing informational psychosemantics with a procedural psychosemantics whereby a representation is about its effects instead of its causes. I discuss conceptual and empirical points that favor a procedural representationalism for our experience of space
Mandler, George (2005). The consciousness continuum: From "qualia" to "free will". Psychological Research/Psychologische Forschung. Vol 69 (5-6):330-337.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Maund, Barry (2008). A defense of qualia in the strong sense. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press.   (Google)
McCauley, Robert N. (1993). Why the blind can't lead the blind: Dennett on the blind spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 2:155-64.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
McIntyre, Ronald (1999). Naturalizing phenomenology? Dretske on qualia. In Ronald McIntyre (ed.), Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in Naturalizing Phenomenology: Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, ed. by Jean Petitot et al. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 429-439
McKinsey, Michael (2005). A refutation of qualia physicalism. In Michael O'Rourke & Corey G. Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Medina, Jeffrey A. (2002). What it's like and why: Subjective qualia explained as objective phenomena. [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)] 12:12.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Notably spurred into the philosophical forefront by Thomas Nagel's 'What Is It Like To Be a Bat?' decades ago, and since maintained by a number of advocates of dualism since that critical publication, is the assertion that our inability to know 'what it's like' to be someone or something else is inexplicable given physicalism. Contrary to this well-known and central objection, I find that a consistent and exhaustive physicalism is readily conceivable. I develop one such theory and demonstrate that not only is it consistent with the private and varied nature of subjective experience, it, in fact, entails it
Miguens, Sofia (2002). Qualia or non epistemic perception: D. Dennett's and F. Dretske's representational theories of consciousness. Agora 21 (2):193-208.   (Google)
Mogi, Ken (online). Creativity and the neural basis of qualia.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In what computational aspect is the brain different from the computer? In what objective measures can the brain said to be “creative”? These are the fundamental questions that concerns the neural basis of human mental activity. Here we discuss several important aspects of the essential computational ingredients of human mind in order to understand the “creative” process going on in the brain. One of the key concepts is the nature of the source of "externality" that adds new ingredients to the system and its output. We argue that in addition to information input and stochasticity, we need to consider a third possibility, namely "dynamics-embedded externality". We discuss how the neural origin of the subjective sensory qualities (qualia) is related to this aspect of creativity. The invariance of qualia under a certain class of transformation, and the mapping of discrete,
Mogi, Ken (1997). Qualia and the brain. Nikkei Science.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: _The concept of qualia describes the unique properties that_ _accompany our senses. It is an essential concept when we try to_ _understand the principle that bridges the neural firings in our_ _brain and our perception. The idea of qualia is also of crucial_ _importance when we try to study the functions of the brain from_ _an objective point of view. Qualia must be part of the_ _mathematical formulation of information we use to understand_ _the function of the brain._
Mogi, Ken (1999). Supervenience and qualia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):844-845.   (Google)
Abstract: The privileged position of neural activity in biological neuroscience might be justified on the grounds of the nonlinear and all-or-none character of neural firing. To justify the neuron doctrine in cognitive neuroscience and make it both plausible and radical, we must consider the supervenience of elementary mental properties such as qualia on neural activity
Monaco, Francesco; Mula, Marco & Cavanna, Andrea E. (2005). Consciousness, epilepsy, and emotional qualia. Epilepsy and Behavior 7 (2):150-160.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Muller, Hans (2008). Why qualia are not epiphenomenal. Ratio 21 (1):85–90.   (Google | More links)
Musacchio, J. M. (2005). Why do qualia and the mind seem nonphysical? Synthese 147 (3):425-460.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this article, I discuss several of the factors that jeopardize our understanding of the nature of qualitative experiences and the mind. I incorporate the view from neuroscience to clarify the na
Newton, Natika (1991). Consciousness, qualia, and re-entrant signaling. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):21-41.   (Google)
Nicholson, Mr D. M. (ms). From a flaw in the knowledge argument to a physicalist account of qualia.   (Google)
Abstract: The Knowledge argument based on the grey Mary thought experiment cannot be claimed as a basis for rejecting physicalism. First, because it is flawed, being so formulated as to predetermine the outcome of the thought experiment in favour of a refutation of physicalism. Second, because, once this is recognised, it becomes clear that there is one - and only one - account of the qualia-physical relationship that will permit physicalism to survive the thought experiment itself. It is suggested that the position in question is worthy of further consideration as a reasonable candidate theory for a physicalist account of qualia
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (online). Qualia: The Knowledge Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Nikolinakos, Drakon (2000). Dennett on qualia: The case of pain, smell and taste. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):505 – 522.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Dennett has maintained that a careful examination of our intuitive notion of qualia reveals that it is a confused notion, that it is advisable to accept that experience does not have the properties designated by it and that it is best to eliminate it. Because most scientists share this notion of qualia, the major line of attack of his project becomes that of raising objections against the ability of science to answer some basic questions about qualia. I try to show that science appeals to qualia and that it in fact adheres to a notion of qualia different from the one that Dennett has attributed to it. It is argued that qualia are amenable to scientific investigation and that this is the reason why science contributes toward the clarification of the notion of qualia. I also try to show that Dennett's skepticism about the abilities of science in answering questions posited by one of his thought experiments is unwarranted. I conclude that we need not accept Dennett's eliminativism about qualia
Northoff, Georg (2003). Qualia and the ventral prefrontal cortical function 'neurophenomenological' hypothesis. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (8):14-48.   (Google)
Northoff, Georg (1995). Qualia im knotenpunkt zwischen Leib und seele: „Argumentatives“ dilemma in der gegenwärtigen diskussion über die subjektivität mentaler zustände. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (2).   (Google)
O'Dea, John (ms). A higher-order, dispositional theory of qualia.   (Google)
Pacherie, Elisabeth (1999). Qualia and representations. In Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution.   (Google | More links)
Palmer, Stephen E. (1999). On qualia, relations, and structure in color experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):976-985.   (Google)
Abstract: In this Response, I defend the notion of intrinsic qualities of experience, discuss the distinction between relational experience and relational structure, clarify the difference between narrow and broad interpretations of color experience, argue against externalist approaches to color experience, defend the concept of isomorphism as a limitation in understanding color experiences, examine critiques of the color machine and color room arguments, and counter objections to within-subject experiments based on memory limitations
Park, Desiree (1992). Ayerian 'qualia' and the empiricist heritage. In The Philosophy of A Jayer. Peru: Open Court.   (Google)
Ramachandran, Vilayanur S. & Hirstein, William (1998). Three laws of qualia: What neurology tells us about the biological functions of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (4-5):429-57.   (Cited by 40 | Google | More links)
Reynaert, Peter (2001). A phenomenology for qualia and naturalizing embodiment. Communication and Cognition 34 (1-2):139-154.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Robinson, William S. (1994). Orwell, stalin, and determinate qualia. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75 (2):151-64.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Robbins, Stephen E. (2007). Time, form and the limits of qualia. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (1):19-43.   (Google)
Ross, P. (2001). Qualia and the senses. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (205):495-511.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Ryder, Dan (online). Explaining the "inhereness" of qualia representationally: Why we seem to have a visual field.   (Google)
Schweizer, Paul (1994). Intentionality, qualia, and mind/brain identity. Minds and Machines 4 (3):259-82.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Schröder, Jürgen (1997). Qualia und physikalismus. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 28 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: Qualia and Physicalism. It is assumed that the following three relations exhaust the possibilities for a physicalist account of qualia: 1. determination, 2. identity, 3. realization. The first relation is immediately rejected because it does not exclude property dualism. The second faces the problem that it is probably impossible to discriminate empirically between the identity thesis and the epiphenomenalist position. The third cannot handle qualia adequately, for qualia are not functional properties and the realization relation is only plausible as a relation between physical realizers and functional properties. Finally, if one attempts to replace multiple realization by multiple identities it is shown that the notion of multiple property identities is unintelligible. The upshot is that if these three relations exhaust the possibilities of a physicalist construal of qualia then physicalism is wrong
Shoemaker, Sydney (1984). Churchland on reduction, qualia, and introspection. Philosophy of Science Association 1984.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Singer, M. (2001). Unbounded Consciousness: Qualia, Mind, and Self. Free Association Books.   (Google)
Smith, Renée (2005). The transparency of qualia and the nature of introspection. Philosophical Writings 29:21-44.   (Google)
Soldati, Gianfranco & Dorsch, Fabian, Conceptual qualia and communication.   (Google)
Abstract: The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often been the focus of attention
Staudacher, Alexander (2006). Epistemological challenges to qualia-epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):153-175.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the strongest objections to epiphenomenalism is that it precludes any kind of knowledge of qualia, since empirical knowledge has to include a causal relationship between the respective belief and the object of knowledge. It is argued that this objection works only if the causal relationship is understood in a very specific sense (as a 'direct' causal relationship). Epiphenomenalism can, however, live well with other kinds of causal relationships ('indirect' causal relationships) or even with a reliability account of knowledge which does not invoke causation at all. Michael Pauen has argued extensively (this volume of Journal of Consciousness Studies), however, that this line of defence doesn't work because it presupposes the existence of psychophysical laws connecting qualia with physical phenomena which cannot be established under epiphenomenalist presuppositions. It is argued that Pauen's arguments lead to sceptical consequences which threaten not only interactionist alternatives to epiphenomenalism but finally his own account
Stjernberg, Fredrik (online). Not so epiphenomenal qualia.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Stubenberg, Leopold (1998). Consciousness and Qualia. John Benjamins.   (Cited by 73 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Consciousness and Qualia is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc.
Stubenberg, Leopold (1996). The place of qualia in the world of science. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Sweis, Khaldoun A. (2009). Consciousness or qualia: What a conversation from leading thinkers in the field may sound like. Think 8 (23):45-53.   (Google)
Thomas, Michael S. C. & Atkinson, Anthony P. (1999). Quantities of qualia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):169-170.   (Google)
Abstract: We address two points in this commentary. First, we question the extent to which O'Brien & Opie have established that the classical approach is unable to support a viable vehicle theory of consciousness. Second, assuming that connectionism does have the resources to support a vehicle theory, we explore how the activity of the units of a PDP network might sum together to form phenomenal experience (PE)
Tye, Michael (2007). New troubles for the qualia freak. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell Pub..   (Google)
Abstract: The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergo the experience. Experiences vary in their phenomenal character, in what it is like to un- dergo them. Think, for example of the subjective differences between feeling a burning pain in a toe, experiencing an itch in an arm, smelling rotten eggs, tasting Marmite, having a visual experience of bright purple, running one’s fingers over rough sandpaper, feeling hungry, experiencing anger, feeling elated. Insofar as what it is like to undergo each of these experiences is different, their phenomenal character is different
Tye, Michael (2002). Visual qualia and visual content revisited. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is _like_ for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philoso- phers often use the term 'qualia' to refer to the introspectively accessible properties of experiences that characterize what it is like to have them. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is very difficult to deny that there are qualia. There is another, more restricted use of the term
Tye, Michael (1992). Visual qualia and visual content. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 39 | Google)
Unknown, Unknown (online). Qualia realism.   (Google)
Abstract: Philosophical Studies 104: 143-162 (2001)
Vadén, Tere (2001). Qualifying qualia through the skyhook test. Inquiry 44 (2):149 – 169.   (Google)
Abstract: If we are to preserve qualia, one possibility is to take the current academic, philosophical, and theoretical notion less seriously and current natural science and some pre-theoretical intuitions about qualia more seriously. Dennett (1997) is instrumental in showing how ideas of the intrinsicalness and privacy of qualia are misguided and those of ineffability and immediacy misinterpreted. However, by combining ideas of non-mechanicalness used in contemporary natural science with the pre-theoretical idea that qualia are special because they are unique, we get a notion of qualia that is acceptable to naturalistic philosophy. The notion of unique qualia is not opposed to the idea that some of the characterizations of qualia have to be qualified. It is the folk-philosophical, academic, notions of theoreticity and conceptuality that have to be modified
Voltolini, Alberto, Wittgensteinian watered-down qualia.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I want to hold that Wittgenstein’s later position on qualitative states, which sees them as triplets made out of three necessary components - stimulus, qualitative element and manifestability - allows for supervenience of such states over physical ones. Insofar as this is the case, such a position is more akin to naturalism that the one that has been recently defended by Kim, who allows for merely partial supervenience of qualia over physical states. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s conception stems out of a critical refinement of ideas he held in the mid-Thirties and that were developed by Schlick. Insofar as Schlick’s development is the recognized ancestor of Kim’s latest stance on qualia, one may take Wittgenstein’s later theses on qualia as a possible refinement in a naturalist direction of Kim’s own conception
Wager, A. (1999). The extra qualia problem: Synaesthesia and representationism. Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):263-281.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Representationism is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Synaesthesia is a condition in which the phenomenal character of the experience produced in a subject by stimulation of one sensory modality contains elements characteristic of a second, unstimulated sensory modality. After reviewing some of the recent psychological literature on synaesthesia and one of the leading versions of representationism, I argue that cases of synaesthesia, as instances of what I call the extra qualia problem, are counterexamples to externalist versions of representationism
Waskan, Jonathan (forthcoming). A vehicular theory of corporeal qualia (a gift to computationalists). Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: I have argued elsewhere that non-sentential representations that are the close kin of scale models can be, and often are, realized by computational processes. I will attempt here to weaken any resistance to this claim that happens to issue from those who favor an across-the-board computational theory of cognitive activity. I will argue that embracing the idea that certain computers harbor nonsentential models gives proponents of the computational theory of cognition the means to resolve the conspicuous disconnect between the sentential character of the data structures they posit and the nonsentential qualitative character of our perceptual experiences of corporeal (i.e., spatial, kinematic, and dynamic) properties. Along the way, I will question the viability of some externalist remedies for this disconnect, and I will explain why the computational theory put forward here falls quite clearly beyond the useful bounds of the Chinese-Room argument
White, Nicholas P. (1985). Prof. Shoemaker and so-called 'qualia' of experience. Philosophical Studies 47 (3).   (Google)
Wright, Edmond L. (1990). Two more proofs of present qualia. Theoria 56 (1-2):3-22.   (Cited by 25 | Google)

1.7a Qualia, Misc

Allen, Robert F. (ms). The subject is qualia.   (Google)
Alter, Torin (2003). Qualia. In L Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction Qualia and causation Do qualia exist? Qualia and cognitive science Qualia and other mental phenomena Knowledge of qualia Are qualia irreducible?
Bailey, Andrew R. (1998). Phenomenal Properties: The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Qualia. Dissertation, University of Calgary   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bailey, Andrew R. (ms). Qualia and the argument from illusion.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bensusan, Hilan & de Carvalho, Eros (forthcoming). Qualia qua qualitons: Mental qualities as abstract particulars. Acta Analytica.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition for learning. We argue that qualia taken to be qualitons are part of our mechanism of sensory concept acquisition
Block, Ned (2004). Qualia. In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Qualia include the ways things look, sound and smell, the way it feels to have a pain; more generally, what it's like to have mental states. Qualia are experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions and, in my view, thoughts and desires as well. But, so defined, who could deny that qualia exist? Yet, the existence of qualia is controversial. Here is what is controversial: whether qualia, so defined, can be characterized in intentional, functional or purely cognitive terms. Opponents of qualia think that the content of experience is intentional content (like the content of thought), or that experiences are functionally definable, or that to have a qualitative state is to have a state that is monitored in a certain way or accompanied by a thought to the effect that I have that state. If we include the idea that experiential properties are not intentional or functional or purely cognitive in the definition of `qualia', then it is controversial whether there are qualia
Block, Ned (2007). Wittgenstein and Qualia. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: (Wittgenstein, 1968) endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed (the "innocuous" inverted spectrum hypothesis) is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected (the "dangerous" kind). The danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an argument for qualia, where qualia are (for the purposes of this paper) contents of experiential states which cannot be fully captured in natural language. I will pinpoint the difference between the innocuous and dangerous scenarios that matters for the argument for qualia, give arguments in favor of the coherence and possibility of the dangerous scenario, and try to show that some standard arguments against inverted spectra are ineffective against the version of the dangerous scenario I will be advocating. The leading idea of the paper is that an argument for qualia based on spectrum inversion does not require that the inversion be behaviorally indistinguishable. At one crucial point, I will rely on a less controversial version of an argument I gave in Block (1999). Wittgenstein's views provide a convenient starting point for a paper that is much more about qualia than about Wittgenstein.
Clark, Austen (1985). Qualia and the psychophysical explanation of color perception. Synthese 65 (December):377-405.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Can psychology explain the qualitative content of experience? A persistent philosophical objection to that discipline is that it cannot. Qualitative states or "qualia" are argued to have characteristics which cannot be explained in terms of their relationships to other psychological states, stimuli, and behavior. Since psychology is confined to descriptions of such relationships, it seems that psychology cannot explain qualia
Clark, Austen (2000). Quality space. In Austen Clar (ed.), A Theory of Sentience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Crane, Tim (2000). The origins of qualia. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy has two parts: the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. These two parts are not unrelated; in fact, it can be helpful to see them as two horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the causal interaction between mental and physical phenomena seems to require that all causally efficacious mental phenomena are physical; but on the other hand, the phenomenon of consciousness seems to entail that not all mental phenomena are physical.2 One may avoid this dilemma by adopting an epiphenomenalist view of consciousness, of course; but there is little independent reason for believing such a view. Rejecting epiphenomenalism, then, leaves contemporary philosophers with their problem: mental causation inclines them towards physicalism, while consciousness inclines them towards dualism
Cunningham, Bryon (2001). Capturing qualia: Higher-order concepts and connectionism. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):29-41.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Antireductionist philosophers have argued for higher-order classifications of qualia that locate consciousness outside the scope of conventional scientific explanations, viz., by classifying qualia as intrinsic, basic, or subjective properties, antireductionists distinguish qualia from extrinsic, complex, and objective properties, and thereby distinguish conscious mental states from the possible explananda of functionalist or physicalist explanations. I argue that, in important respects, qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties of conscious mental states, and that, contrary to antireductionists' suggestions, these higher-order classifications are compatible with qualia reduction. I demonstrate this compatibility by examining the putative higher-order properties of qualia and comparing them to the higher-order properties characteristic of connectionist models of cognitive processes. I contend that the higher-order properties characteristic of connectionist networks approximate (in intertheoretic terms) the putative higher-order properties of qualia sufficiently well to conclude that qualia reductionism can (1) accommodate claims that qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties, and (2) explain the motivating intuitions for those claims generated by inverted, absent, and alien qualia thought experiments. In this way I argue that (approximate versions of) the putative higher-order classifications of qualia not only fail to defeat qualia reduction but, ironically, turn out to support it
de Rosa, Raffaella (2007). The myth of cartesian qualia. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):181�207.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The standard view of Cartesian sensations (SV) is that they present themselves as purely qualitative features of experience (or qualia). Accordingly, Descartes view would be that in perceiving the color red, for example, we are merely experiencing the subjective feel of redness rather than seeming to perceive a property of bodies. In this paper, I establish that the argument and textual evidence offered in support of SV fail to prove that Descartes held this view. Indeed, I will argue that there are textual and theoretical reasons for believing that Descartes held the negation of SV. Qualia aren't Descartes legacy
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (2009). Consciousness makes a difference: A reluctant dualist’s confession. In A. Batthyany & A. C. Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious: Selected Papers on Consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper’s outline is as follows. In sections 1-3 I give an exposi¬tion of the Mind-Body Problem, with emphasis on what I believe to be the heart of the problem, namely, the Percepts-Qualia Nonidentity and its incompatibility with the Physical Closure Paradigm. In 4 I present the “Qualia Inaction Postulate” underlying all non-interactionist theo¬ries that seek to resolve the above problem. Against this convenient postulate I propose in section 5 the “Bafflement Ar¬gument,” which is this paper's main thesis. Sections 6-11 critically dis¬cuss attempts to dismiss the Bafflement Argument by the “Baf¬flement=Mis¬perception Equation.” Section 12 offers a refutation of all such attempts in the form of a concise “Asymmetry Proof.” Section 13 points out the bearing of the Bafflement Argument on the evolutionary role of consciousness while section 14 acknowledges the price that has to be paid for it in terms of basic physical principles. Section 15 summarizes the paper, pointing out the inescapability of interactionist dualism.
Feser, Edward (2001). Qualia: Irreducibly subjective but not intrinsic. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):3-20.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fox, Ivan (1989). On the nature and cognitive function of phenomenal content -- part one. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):81-103.   (Annotation | Google)
Gibbons, John (2005). Qualia: They're not what they seem. Philosophical Studies 126 (3):397-428.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for believing that qualia have the features are epistemically on a par with reasons for believing that ways things seem have the features, and you know that ways things seem do not have the features, then those reasons cannot justify your belief that qualia have the features. I argue that the reasons are epistemically on a par in this way
Gilbert, Paul (1992). Immediate experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:233-250.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Gregory, Richard L. (1996). Peculiar qualia. Perception 25 (7):755-756.   (Google | More links)
Hatfield, Gary (2007). The reality of qualia. Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):133--168.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues for the reality of qualia as aspects of phenomenal experience. The argument focuses on color vision and develops a dispositionalist, subjectivist account of what it is for an object to be colored. I consider objections to dispositionalism on epistemological, metaphysical, and
Jakab, Zolt (2000). Ineffability of qualia: A straightforward naturalistic explanation. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):329-351.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I offer an explanation of the ineffability (linguistic inexpressibility) of sensory experiences. My explanation is put in terms of computational functionalism and standard externalist theories of representational content. As I will argue, many or most sensory experiences are representational states without constituent structure. This property determines both the representational function these states can serve and the information that can be extracted from them when they are processed. Sensory experiences can indicate the presence of certain external states of affairs but they cannot convey any more information about them than that. So, format- or code-conversion mechanisms that link different systems of representation (linguistic and perceptual) to each other will fail to extract any relevant information from sensory experiences that could be coded in language. They only way to establish specific roles for sensory experiences in communication and the organization of behavior is to attach to them, by associative links, words, or other behavioral responses. If a sensory experience has no linguistic label associated to it in a particular subject, then no linguistic description can token, or activate, that state in the subject. In other words, no linguistic description can cause a subject to undergo an unlabeled perceptual state. On the contrary, complex, or syntactically structured perceptual states can be built up, on the basis of descriptions, by mechanisms of constructive imagination (conceived here as one sort of format conversion). It is this difference between complex and unstructured representational states that gives us an understanding of the phenomenon we call the ineffability of qualia
Jakab, Z. (2000). Reply to Thomas Metzinger and Bettina Walde. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):363-369.   (Google | More links)
Kind, Amy (2001). Qualia realism. Philosophical Studies 104 (2):143-162.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent characterizations of the qualia debate construe the point at issue in terms of the existence of intrinsic properties of experience. I argue that such characterizations mistakenly ignore the epistemic dimension of the notion of qualia. Using Ned Block
Kitcher, P. S. (1979). Phenomenal qualities. American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (April):123-9.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Leeds, Stephen (1993). Qualia, awareness, Sellars. Noûs 27 (3):303-330.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1995). Qualia: Intrinsic, relational, or what? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Lormand, Eric (1994). Qualia! (Now showing at a theater near you). Philosophical Topics 22:127-156.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: Despite such widespread acclaim, there are some influential theater critics who have panned Qualia!
Malatesti, Luca (2008). Mary’s Scientific Knowledge. Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):37-59.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument (KA) aims to prove, by means of a thought experiment concerning the hypothetical scientist Mary, that conscious experiences have non-physical properties, called qualia. Mary has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision without having had any colour experience. The central intuition in the KA is that, by seeing colours, Mary will learn what it is like to have colour experiences. Therefore, her scientific knowledge is incomplete, and conscious experiences have qualia. In this paper I consider an objection to the KA raised by Daniel Dennett. He maintains that the KA is vitiated by Jackson’s account of Mary’s scientific knowledge. While endorsing this criticism, I will defend the plausibility and relevance of the type of strategy involved in the KA by offering an account of Mary’s scientific knowledge. This account involves formulating a reasonable and not immediately false version of the physicalist thesis with regard to colour experiences. Whether this version of the KA is successful against this type of physicalism is not investigated here.
Metzinger, Thomas (2000). Commentary on jakab's Ineffability of Qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):352-362.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Zoltan Jakab has presented an interesting conceptual analysis of the ineffability of qualia in a functionalist and classical cognitivist framework. But he does not want to commit himself to a certain metaphysical thesis on the ontology of consciousness or qualia. We believe that his strategy has yielded a number of highly relevant and interesting insights, but still suffers from some minor inconsistencies and a certain lack of phenomenological and empirical plausibility. This may be due to some background assumptions relating to the theory of mental representation employed. Jakab
Place, Ullin T. (2000). The causal potency of qualia: Its nature and its source. Brain and Mind 1 (2):183-192.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is an argument (Medlin, 1967; Place, 1988) whichshows conclusively that if qualia are causallyimpotent we could have no possible grounds forbelieving that they exist. But if, as this argumentshows, qualia are causally potent with respect to thedescriptions we give of them, it is tolerably certainthat they are causally potent in other morebiologically significant respects. The empiricalevidence, from studies of the effect of lesions of thestriate cortex (Humphrey, 1974; Weiskrantz, 1986;Cowey and Stoerig, 1995) shows that what is missing inthe absence of visual qualia is the ability tocategorize sensory inputs in the visual modality. This would suggest that the function of privateexperience is to supply what Broadbent (1971) callsthe evidence on which the categorization ofproblematic sensory inputs are based. At the sametime analysis of the causal relation shows that whatdifferentiates a causal relation from an accidentalspatio-temporal conjunction is the existence ofreciprocally related dispositional properties of theentities involved which combine to make it true thatif one member of the conjunction, the cause, had notexisted, the other, the effect, would not haveexisted. The possibility that qualia might bedispositional properties of experiences which, as itwere, supply the invisible glue that sticks cause toeffect in this case is examined, but finallyrejected
Putnam, Hilary (1981). Mind and body. In Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Robinson, William S. (online). Qualia realism. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (1999). Qualia realism and neural activation patterns. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (10):65-80.   (Google)
Rosenthal, D. R. (1999). Sensory quality and the relocation story. Philosophical Perspectives 26:321-50.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Sharlow, Mark F. (ms). Qualia and the problem of universals.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I explore the logical relationship between the question of the reality of qualia and the problem of universals. I argue that nominalism is inconsistent with the existence of qualia, and that realism either implies or makes plausible the existence of qualia. Thus, one's position on the existence of qualia is strongly constrained by one's answer to the problem of universals
Shoemaker, Sydney (2007). A case for qualia. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). Phenomenal character. Noûs 28 (1):21-38.   (Cited by 71 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1991). Qualia and consciousness. Mind 100 (399):507-24.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1990). Qualities and qualia: What's in the mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Supplement 50 (Supplement):109-131.   (Cited by 49 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Sleutels, Jan (1998). Phenomenal consciousness: Epiphenomenalism, naturalism and perceptual plasticity. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):21-55.   (Google)
Stanley, Richard P. (1999). Qualia space. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):49-60.   (Google)
Tye, Michael (online). Qualia. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (1978). Sensory properties. Behaviorism 6:213-219.   (Google)
Vaden, Tere (2001). Qualifying qualia through the skyhook test. Inquiry 44 (2):149-170.   (Google)
Weiss, J. & Montagnat, M. (2007). Long-range spatial correlations and scaling in dislocation and slip patterns. Philosophical Magazine 87 (8-9):1161-1174.   (Google)
Wright, Edmond L. (ed.) (2008). The Case for Qualia. MIT Press.   (Google)

1.7b Qualia and Materialism

Aranyosi, István (forthcoming). A new argument for mind-brain identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I undertake the tasks of reconsidering Feigl’s notion of a ‘nomological dangler’ in light of recent discussion about the viability of accommodating phenomenal properties, or qualia, within a physicalist picture of reality, and of constructing an argument to the effect that nomological danglers, including the way qualia are understood to be related to brain states by contemporary dualists, are extremely unlikely. I offer a probabilistic argument to the effect that merely nomological danglers are extremely unlikely, the only probabilistically coherent candidates being ‘anomic danglers’ (not even nomically correlated) and ‘necessary danglers’ (more than merely nomically correlated). After I show, based on similar probabilistic reasoning, that the first disjunct (anomic danglers) is very unlikely, I conclude that the identity thesis is the only remaining candidate for the mental/physical connection. The novelty of the argument is that it brings probabilistic considerations in favour of physicalism, a move that has been neglected in the recent burgeoning literature on the subject.
Aranyosi, István (2003). Physical constituents of qualia. Philosophical Studies 116 (2):103-131.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: ABSTRACT. In this paper I propose a defense of a posteriori materialism. Prob- lems with a posteriori identity materialism are identi?ed, and a materialism based on composition, not identity, is proposed. The main task for such a proposal is to account for the relation between physical and phenomenal properties. Compos- ition does not seem to be ?t as a relation between properties, but I offer a peculiar way to understand property-composition, based on some recent ideas in the literature on ontology. Finally, I propose a materialist model for the mind-body relation that is able to resist the attack from conceivability arguments
Bailey, Andrew R. (ms). Multiple realizability, qualia, and natural kinds.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Are qualia natural kinds? In order to give this question slightly more focus, and to show why it might be an interesting question, let me begin by saying a little about what I take qualia to be, and what natural kinds. For the purposes of this paper, I shall be assuming a fairly full-blooded kind of phenomenal realism about qualia: qualia, thus, include the qualitative painfulness of pain (rather than merely the functional specification of pain states), the qualitative redness in the visual field that typically accompanies red discriminations, the taste of lemon (independently of the fact that such states are normally caused by lemons and give rise to puckering of the lips, etc.), and so on. In other words, I am assuming the falsity of functionalism with respect to qualia, though I am not for a moment assuming dualism
Bostrom, Nick (ms). Quantity of experience: Brain duplication and degrees of consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue, and given computationalism, this has implications for what it is to implement a computation. I then consider what happens when a computation is implemented in a system that either uses unreliable components or possesses varying degrees of parallelism. I show that in some of these cases there can be, in a deep and intriguing sense, a fractional (non-integer) number of qualitatively identical phenomenal experiences. This, in turn, has implications for what lessons one should draw from neural replacement scenarios such as Chalmers
Clark, Austen (1985). A physicalist theory of qualia. The Monist 68 (October):491-506.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Although the capacity to discriminate between different qualia is typically admitted to have a definition in terms of functional role, the qualia thereby related are thought to elude functional definition. In this paper I argue that these views are inconsistent. Given a functional model of discrimination, one can construct from it a definition of qualia. The problem is similar in many ways to Goodman's definition of qualia in terms of 'matching', and I argue that many of his findings survive reinterpretation into a physicalistic basis which employs 'indiscriminability' as its primitive term. I show how one can identify the critical properties to which discrimination capacities are sensitive, and then identify their order. A problem arises concerning the different ways in which qualitatively distinct experiences can differ (hue, shape, and so on). Physicalist accounts have often been accused of relying in a circular fashion on some antecedent understanding of phenomenal properties in order to specify those differences. This account avoids such an accusation: ordering of critical properties is determined by the dimensionality of discriminations, and the latter is given by the structure of the discrimination pair lists. Once a topology of quality is constructed, qualia names can be defined by their relative location within the order. In the conclusion I argue that psychophysics employs physicalist techniques to define a topology of quality, and that it can provide what Thomas Nagel calls an "objective phenomenology."
Cornman, James W. (1971). Materialism and Sensations. Yale University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Double, Richard (1985). Phenomenal properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (March):383-92.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Harding, Gregory (1991). Color and the mind-body problem. Review of Metaphysics 45 (2):289-307.   (Cited by 49 | Annotation | Google)
Holborow, L. C. (1973). Materialism and phenomenal qualities. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47 (July):107-19.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1987). Supervenient qualia. Philosophical Review 96 (October):491-520.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Howell, Robert J. (online). The Hard Problem of Consciousness. Scholarpedia.   (Google)
Jolley, Kelly D. & Watkins, Michael (1998). What is it like to be a phenomenologist? Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):204-9.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Lewis, David (1995). Should a materialist believe in qualia? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):140-44.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1987). Phenomenal objects: A backhanded defense. Philosophical Perspectives 3:513-26.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Mandik, Pete & Weisberg, Josh (2008). Type-q materialism. In Chase Wrenn (ed.), Naturalism, Reference and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson. Peter Lang Publishing Group.   (Google)
Abstract: s Gibson (1982) correctly points out, despite Quine’s brief flirtation with a “mitigated phenomenalism” (Gibson’s phrase) in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, Quine’s ontology of 1953 (“On Mental Entities”) and beyond left no room for non-physical sensory objects or qualities. Anyone familiar with the contemporary neo-dualist qualia-freak-fest might wonder why Quinean lessons were insufficiently transmitted to the current generation
Marras, Ausonio (1993). Materialism, functionalism, and supervenient qualia. Dialogue 32 (3):475-92.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Marsh, Leslie (ms). Man Without Qualities.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The question of how a physical system gives rise to the phenomenal or experiential (olfactory, visual, somatosensitive, gestatory and auditory), is considered the most intractable of scientific and philosophical puzzles. Though this question has dominated the philosophy of mind over the last quarter century, it articulates a version of the age-old mind-body problem. The most famous response, Cartesian dualism, is on Daniel Dennett’s view still a corrosively residual and redundant feature of popular (and academic) thinking on these matters. Fifteen years on from his anti-Cartesian theory of consciousness (Consciousness Explained, 1991), Dennett’s frustration with this tradition is still palpable. This frustration is primarily aimed at philosophers
Mellor, D. H. (1973). Materialism and phenomenal qualities II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47 (July):107-19.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Newman, David V. (2004). Chaos and qualia. Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-21.   (Google)
Nicholson, Dennis (ms). How qualia can be physical.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Assume that a quale as we experience it is a perspective on an underlying physical state, rather than the physical state as such – the reality as known as distinct from the reality as such. Assume, further, that this inner perspective is integral to, and materially co-extensive with, the physical state itself. Assume, finally, that the physical state in question is known as a brain state of a particular kind by an external observer of the brain in which it occurs. The result is a perspective in which a quale is entirely physical; a position that resolves several known difficulties for physicalism, including those associated with the explanatory gap, Jackson’s knowledge argument, and Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness
P, (2002). Physicalism, qualia and mental concepts. Theoria 17 (44):359-379.   (Google)
Robinson, Howard M. (1972). Professor Armstrong on 'non-physical sensory items'. Mind 81 (January):84-86.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Robb, David (2008). Zombies from Below. In Simone Gozzano Francesco Orilia (ed.), Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology. Ontos Verlag.   (Google)
Abstract: A zombie is a creature just like a conscious being in certain respects, but wholly lacking in consciousness. In this paper, I look at zombies from the perspective of basic ontology (“from below”), taking as my starting point a trope ontology I have defended elsewhere. The consequences of this ontology for zombies are mixed. Viewed from below, one sort of zombie—the exact dispositional zombie—is impossible. A similar argument can be wielded against another sort—the exact physical zombie—but here supplementary principles are needed to get to the impossibility result. Finally, at least two sorts of zombie—the behavioural and functional zombies—escape these arguments from below.
Tallis, Raymond C. (1989). Tye on 'the subjective qualities of experience': A critique. Philosophical Investigations 12 (July):217-222.   (Google)
Tye, Michael (1986). The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95 (January):1-17.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Unwin, Nicholas (ms). Explaining Colour Phenomenology: Reduction versus Connection.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A major part of the mind–body problem is to explain why a given set of physical processes should give rise to qualia of one sort rather than another. Colour hues are the usual example considered here, and there is a lively debate between, for example, Hardin, Levine, Jackson, Clark and Chalmers as to whether the results of colour vision science can provide convincing explanations of why colours actually look the way they do. This paper examines carefully the type of explanation that is needed here, and it is concluded that it does not have to be reductive to be effective. What needs to be explained more than anything is why inverted hue scenarios are more intuitive than other sensory inversions: and the issue of physicalism versus dualism is only of marginal relevance here.
Weslake, Brad, Review of understanding phenomenal consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In recent philosophy of mind, epiphenomenalism—that strain of dualism according to which the mind is caused by the body but does not cause the body in turn—has undergone something of a renaissance. Contemporary epiphenomenalists bear only partial resemblance to their more extravagantly metaphysical ancestors, however. Traditional epiphenomenalists thought that (at least) two sorts of mental properties were epiphenomenal—intentional properties such as the meaning or representational content of the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires and so on); and conscious properties such as awareness and the qualitative nature of experience. Contemporary epiphenomenalists, on the other hand, are largely sanguine about the prospects for intentionality to be brought within the purview of a physicalist worldview; what forces their dualism is one particular feature of consciousness—what irks them are qualia, the..

1.7c Eliminativism about Qualia

Arvan, Marcus (1998). Out with Qualia and in with Consciousness: Why the Hard Problem is a Myth. Dissertation, Tufts Honours Thesis   (Google)
Abstract: The subjective features of conscious mental processes--as opposed to their physical causes and effects--cannot be captured by the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the physical world that underlies appearances." (Nagel, in Dennett, 1991, p. 372)
de Leon, David (2001). The qualities of qualia. Communication and Cognition 34 (1):121-138.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay is a defence of the traditional notion of qualia - as properties of consciousness that are ineffable, intrinsic, private and immediately apprehensible - against the eliminative attempts of Daniel Dennett in the influential article "Quining Qualia." It is suggested that a thorough exploration of the concept is an appropriate starting point for future explanations of qualia, and the essay ends with some possible explanations of the four traditional properties
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Lovely and suspect qualities. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), [Book Chapter]. Ridgeview.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A family of compelling intuitions work to keep "the problem of consciousness" systematically insoluble, and David Rosenthal, in a series of papers including the one under discussion, has been resolutely driving these intuitions apart, exposing them individually to the light, and proposing alternatives. In this instance the intuition that has seemed sacrosanct, but falls to his analysis, is the intuition that "sensory quality" and consciousness are necessarily united: that, for instance, there could not be unconscious pains, or unconscious subjective shades of blue, or unconscious aromas of freshly roasted coffee beans. The particular airborne polymers that are the vehicles of freshly roasted coffee beans could exist, of course, in the absence of any observer, and hence of any consciousness, but the sensory quality of that aroma requires--according to well-entrenched intuition--not only an observer but a conscious observer. Such properties have no esse except as percipi
Dennett, Daniel C. (1988). Quining qualia. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 191 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: "Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. As is so often the case with philosophical jargon, it is easier to give examples than to give a definition of the term. Look at a glass of milk at sunset; the way it looks to you--the particular, personal, subjective visual quality of the glass of milk is the quale of your visual experience at the moment. The way the milk tastes to you then is another, gustatory quale, and how it sounds to you as you swallow is an auditory quale; These various "properties of conscious experience" are prime examples of qualia. Nothing, it seems, could you know more intimately than your own qualia; let the entire universe be some vast illusion, some mere figment of Descartes' evil demon, and yet what the figment is made of (for you) will be the qualia of your hallucinatory experiences. Descartes claimed to doubt everything that could be doubted, but he never doubted that his conscious experiences had qualia, the properties by which he knew or apprehended them
Dennett, Daniel C. (ms). Two Black boxes: A fable.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Once upon a time, there were two large black boxes, A and B, connected by a long insulated copper wire. On box A there were two buttons, marked *a* and *b*, and on box B there were three lights, red, green, and amber. Scientists studying the behavior of the boxes had observed that whenever you pushed the *a* button on box A, the red light flashed briefly on box B, and whenever you pushed the *b* button on box A, the green light flashed briefly. The amber light never seemed to flash. They performed a few billion trials, under a very wide variety of conditions, and found no exceptions. There seemed to them to be a causal regularity, which they conveniently summarized thus
Dennett, Daniel C. (1981). Wondering where the yellow went. The Monist 64 (January):102-8.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Everett, Anthony (1996). Qualia and vagueness. Synthese 106 (2):205-226.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (2003). Qualia that it is right to Quine. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):357-377.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hacker, R. S. (2005). Goodbye to qualia and all what? A reply to David Hodgson. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (11):61-66.   (Google)
Hall, Richard J. (2007). Phenomenal properties as dummy properties. Philosophical Studies 135 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Can the physicalist consistently hold that representational content is all there is to sensory experience and yet that two perceivers could have inverted phenomenal spectra? Yes, if he holds that the phenomenal properties the inverts experience are dummy properties, not instantiated in the physical objects being perceived nor in the perceivers
Hodgson, David (2005). Goodbye to qualia and all that? Review article. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (2):84-88.   (Google)
Abstract: Max Bennett is a distinguished Australian neuroscientist, Peter Hacker an Oxford philosopher and leading authority on Wittgenstein. A book resulting from their collaboration, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, has received high praise. According to the Blackwell website, G.H. von Wright asserts that it 'will certainly, for a long time to come, be the most important contribution to the mind-body problem that there is'; and Sir Anthony Kenny says it 'shows that the claims made on behalf of cognitive science are ill-founded'. M.R. Bennett & P.M.S. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003)
Jacoby, H. (1985). Eliminativism, meaning, and qualitative states. Philosophical Studies 47 (March):257-70.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1994). Out of the closet: A qualophile confronts qualophobia. Philosophical Topics 22:107-126.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Levin, Michael E. (1981). Phenomenal properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (March):42-58.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Mason, Danielle (2005). Demystifying without quining: Wittgenstein and Dennett on qualitative states. South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):33-43.   (Google | More links)
Park, Eugene (1997). Against Dennett's eliminativism: Preserving qualia as a coherent concept. The Dualist 4.   (Google)
Pradhan, R. C. (2002). Why qualia cannot be quined. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):85-102.   (Google)
P, (2000). Naturalizing qualia, destroying qualia. Dialogos 35 (76):65-83.   (Google)
Ross, Don (1993). Quining qualia Quine's way. Dialogue 32 (3):439-59.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Seager, William E. (1993). The elimination of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):345-65.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Wright, Edmond L. (1989). Querying "quining qualia". Acta Analytica 4 (5):9-32.   (Google)
Wright, Edmond L. (online). The defence of qualia.   (Google)
Abstract: In view of the excellent arguments that have been put forth recently in favour of qualia, internal sensory presentations, it would strike an impartial observer - one could imagine a future historian of philosophy - as extremely odd why so many philosophers who are opposed to qualia, that is, sensory experiences internal to the brain, have largely ignored those arguments in their own. There has been a fashionable assumption that any theory of perception which espouses qualia has long since been overcome by a number of 'formidable' objections, in particular, the Homunculus/Infinite Regress Objection, the Solipsism Objection, Austin's Illusion/Delusion Objection, the Ludicrousness-of-Colours-in-the-Brain Objection, the Indirect-Realist-has-to-assume-Direct-Realism Objection, the Impossibility-of-Comparing-Internal-with-External Objection, the Impossibility of Intrinsic Experience, and several more minor varieties of these. It is uncanny how they continue to be repeated, indeed, with a kind of automatism, evidenced by the fact that none of those who repeat them appear to have taken note of the answers to the objections. Indeed, they only appear to refer to those philosophers with whom they agree: it has long been insisted upon in the study of rhetoric that one of the weakest things to do in an argument is to ignore the main points made by one's opponent:
[it is] the wisest plan _to state Objections in their full force_ ; at least, wherever there does exist a satisfactory
answer to them; otherwise, those who hear them stated more strongly than by the uncandid advocate who
had undertaken to repel them, will naturally enough conclude that they are unanswerable. It is but a
momentary and ineffective triumph that can be obtained by man

1.7d The Inverted Spectrum

Alter, Torin, Comments on John Kulvicki's “what is what it's like?” (2003 eastern div. Apa).   (Google)
Abstract: Kulvicki’s goal is to give a representationalist account of what it’s like to see a property that is “fully externalist about perceptual representation” (p. 1) and yet accommodates a certain “internalist intuition” (p. 4), which he describes as follows: “something about what it is like to see a property is internally determined, dependent only on the way one is built from the skin in” (p. 3). He illustrates this intuition with an inverted spectrum case and the manifest-image problem. On his view, there’s an apparent conflict between the intuition and representationalism. That’s because, on representationalism, “what it is like to see a shade of color can be exhaustively explained in terms of what is perceptually represented” (p. 1) and, he claims, “all representational facts are externally determined” (p. 4). In short, if what it’s like is partly internally determined, then how can it be fully explained in terms of externally determined representational facts?
Bangert, U.; Barnes, R.; Hounsome, L. S.; Jones, R.; Blumenau, A. T.; Briddon, P. R.; Shaw, M. J. & Oberg, S. (2006). Electron energy loss spectroscopic studies of brown diamonds. Philosophical Magazine 86 (29-31):4757-4779.   (Google | More links)
Block, Ned (1990). Inverted earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.   (Cited by 146 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Broackes, Justin (2007). Black and white and the inverted spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):161-175.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (online). Gert on the shifted spectrum.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: As Gert says, the basic claim of representationism is that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Restricted to color experience, representationism may be put as follows
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (2006). Hoffman's "proof" of the possibility of spectrum inversion. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):48-50.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple mathematical result
Byrne, Alex (online). Inverted qualia. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind (largely due to the influence of Shoemaker 1982 and Block 1990). The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of
Byrne, Alex (1999). Subjectivity is no barrier. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):949-950.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Palmer's subjectivity barrier seems to be erected on a popular but highly suspect conception of visual experience, and his color room argument is invalid
Campbell, Neil (2004). Generalizing qualia inversion. Erkenntnis 60 (1):27-34.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, Neil (2000). Physicalism, qualia inversion, and affective states. Synthese 124 (2):239-256.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (2009). Ned Block, Wittgenstein, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophia 37 (4):691-712.   (Google)
Abstract: In ‘Wittgenstein and Qualia’ Ned Block argues for the existence of inverted spectra and those ineffable things, qualia. The essence of his discussion is a would-be proof, presented through a series of pictures, of the possible existence of an inverted spectrum. His argument appeals to some remarks by Wittgenstein which, Block holds, commit the former to a certain ‘dangerous scenario’ wherein inverted spectra, and consequently qualia live and breath. I hold that a key premise of this proof is incoherent. Furthermore, Block’s dangerous scenario does not follow from Wittgenstein’s innocent one, as Block believes it does, but rather is in conflict with it
Casati, Roberto (1990). What is wrong in inverting spectra? Teoria 10:183-6.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. & Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). Functionalism, qualia and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12:121-32.   (Cited by 23 | Annotation | Google)
Clark, Austen (online). A subjectivist reply to spectrum inversion.   (Google)
Abstract: Subjectivists hold that you cannot specify color kinds without implicitly or explicitly referring to the dispositions of observers. Even though "yellow" is ascribed to physical items, and presumably there is something physical in each such item causing it to be so characterized, the only physical similarity between all such items is that they all affect an observer in the same way. So the principles organizing the colors are all found within the skin
Clark, Austen (online). Inversions spectral and bright: Comments on Melinda Campbell.   (Google)
Abstract: Spectrum inversion is a thought experiment, and I would wager that there is no better diagnostic test to the disciplinary affiliation of a randomly selected member of the audience than your reaction to a thought experiment. It is a litmus test. If you find that you are paying close attention, subvocalizing objections, and that your heart-rate and metabolism go up, you have turned pink: you are a philosopher. If on the other hand the thought experiment leaves you cold, and you wonder why otherwise sensible people would worry about such things, you have turned blue and you are a psychologist
Clark, Austen (1985). Spectrum inversion and the color solid. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23:431-43.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: The possibility that what looks red to me may look green to you has traditionally been known as "spectrum inversion." This possibility is thought to create difficulties for any attempt to define mental states in terms of behavioral dispositions or functional roles. If spectrum inversion is possible, then it seems that two perceptual states may have identical functional antecedents and effects yet differ in their qualitative content. In that case the qualitative character of the states could not be functionally defined
Cohen, Jonathan (2001). Color, content, and Fred: On a proposed reductio of the inverted spectrum hypothesis. Philosophical Studies 103 (2):121-144.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Cole, David J. (1990). Functionalism and inverted spectra. Synthese 82 (2):207-22.   (Cited by 56 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cole, David J. (ms). Inverted spectrum arguments.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Formerly a spectral apparition that haunted behaviorism and provided a puzzle about our knowledge of other minds, the inverted spectrum possibility has emerged as an important challenge to functionalist accounts of qualia. The inverted spectrum hypothesis raises the possibility that two individuals might think and behave in the same way yet have different qualia. The traditional supposition is of an individual who has a subjective color spectrum that is inverted with regard to that had by other individuals. When he looks at red objects, this individual has the qualia normally produced in others by blue objects. And when presented with a blue object, this individual experiences qualia that most persons experience only when presented with red objects. And so forth - the Invert's color spectrum is the inverse of normal; there are systematic inter-subjective differences in qualia
Dennett, Daniel C. (1994). Instead of qualia. In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have adopted various names for the things in the beholder (or properties of the beholder) that have been supposed to provide a safe home for the colors and the rest of the properties that have been banished from the "external" world by the triumphs of physics: "raw feels", "sensa", "phenomenal qualities" "intrinsic properties of conscious experiences" "the qualitative content of mental states" and, of course, "qualia," the term I will use. There are subtle differences in how these terms have been defined, but I'm going to ride roughshod over them. I deny that there are
Dennett, Daniel C. (1999). Swift and enormous. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6).   (Google)
Abstract: As a lefthanded person, I can wonder whether I am a left-hemisphere-dominant speaker or a right-hemisphere-dominant speaker or something mixed, and the only way I can learn the truth is by submitting myself to objective, Athird-person@ testing. I don =t Ahave access to @ this intimate fact about how my own mind does its work. It escapes all my attempts at introspective detection, and might, for all I know, shunt back and forth every few seconds without my being any the wiser. In striking contrast to this is the traditional idea that there are
Gert, Bernard (1965). Imagination and verifiability. Philosophical Studies 16 (3):44-47.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl A. (1999). Qualia and private language. Philosophical Topics 26:121-38.   (Google)
Hardin, C. L. & Hardin, W. J. (2006). A tale of Hoffman. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):46-47.   (Google | More links)
Hardin, C. L. (1988). Color for Philosophers. Hackett.   (Cited by 383 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Harrison, Bernard (1973). Form and Content. Blackwell.   (Cited by 19 | Annotation | Google)
Harrison, Bernard (1967). On describing colors. Inquiry 10 (1-4):38-52.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Hardin, C. L. (1987). Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):281-98.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hardin, C. L. (1991). Reply to Levine's 'cool red'. Philosophical Psychology 4:41-50.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hardin, C. L. (1997). Reinverting the spectrum. In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Harvey, J. (1979). Systematic transposition of colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (September):211-19.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hatfield, Gary (1992). Color perception and neural encoding: Does metameric matching entail a loss of information? Philosophy of Science Association 1992:492-504.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Hilbert, David R. & Kalderon, Mark Eli (2000). Color and the inverted spectrum. In Steven Davis (ed.), Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Abstract: If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on for other colors, still he would not yet be describing objects by their colors. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description. A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance)
Hoffman, Donald D. (2006). The scrambling theorem: A simple proof of the logical possibility of spectrum inversion. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):31-45.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hoffman, Donald D. (2006). The scrambling theorem unscrambled: A response to commentaries. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):51-53.   (Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. (1984). Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Johnsen, Bredo C. (1993). The intelligibility of spectrum inversion. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):631-6.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Johnsen, Bredo C. (1986). The inverted spectrum. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (December):471-6.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kalderon, Mark (ms). Color and the inverted spectrum.   (Google)
Abstract: If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on for other colors, still he would not yet be describing objects by their colors. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description. A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance)
Kirk, Robert E. (1982). Goodbye to transposed qualia. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82:33-44.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (1994). Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 48 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1988). Absent and inverted qualia revisited. Mind and Language 3:271-87.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1991). Cool red. Philosophical Psychology 4:27-40.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google)
Linsky, Leonard (1962). The incommunicability of content. Journal of Philosophy 59 (January):21-22.   (Google | More links)
Littlejohn, Clayton (2009). On the coherence of inversion. Acta Analytica 24 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I shall evaluate a strategy recently used to try to demonstrate the impossibility of behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion. After showing that the impossibility proof proves too much, I shall identify where it goes wrong. In turn, I shall explain why someone attracted to functionalist and representationalist assumptions might rightly remain agnostic about the possibility of inversion
Lycan, William G. (1973). Inverted spectrum. Ratio 15 (July):315-9.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
MacLaury, Robert E. (1999). Asymmetry among Hering primaries thwarts the inverted spectrum argument. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):960-961.   (Google)
Abstract: Purest points of Hering's six primary colors reside at different levels of lightness such that inversion of each hue pair would be detectable in subjects' choice of foci on the Munsell array. An inverted spectrum would not impose the isomorphism constraint on a contrast of red-green or yellow-blue, whatever we conclude about inference in functionalism
Macpherson, Fiona (2005). Colour inversion problems for representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more damaging to externalist representationalist views than have been previously thought. More specifically, I argue that representationalists who endorse externalism about experiential content either have to become internalists about the content of propositional attitudes or they have to adopt a novel variety of externalism about the content of propositional attitudes. This novel type of propositional attitude externalism is investigated. It can be seen that adopting it forces one to reject Putnam
Marcus, Eric (2006). Intentionalism and the imaginability of the inverted spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to which the representational content of an experience fixes what it
Maund, Barry (2006). Comments. Dialectica 60 (3):347-353.   (Google | More links)
McKeon, B. J. & Morrison, J. F. (2007). Asymptotic scaling in turbulent pipe flow. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society a-Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences 365 (1852):771-787.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Meyer, Ulrich (2000). Do pseudonormal persons have inverted qualia? Facta Philosophica 2:309-25.   (Google)
Mizrahi, Vivian & Nida-Rumelin, Martine (2006). Introduction. Dialectica 60 (3):209-222.   (Google | More links)
Myin, Erik (1999). Beyond intrinsicness and dazzling blacks. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):964-965.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Palmer's target article is surely one of the most scientifically detailed and knowledgeable treatments of spectrum inversion ever. Unfortunately, it is built on a very shaky philosophical foundation, the notion of the "intrinsic". In the article's ontology, there are two kinds of properties of mental states, intrinsic properties and relational properties. The whole point of the article is that these aspects of experience are mutually exclusive: the intrinsic is nonrelational and the relational is nonintrinsic
Myin, Erik (2001). Color and the duplication assumption. Synthese 129 (1):61-77.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some ofthe spatial cases. This is due not only to motor factors, but to the basic physicalasymmetry between black and white. I then argue that the case can be extendedfrom lightness perception to hue perception. Overall, the aims of this paper are:(1) to extend Susan Hurley''s critique of the Duplication Assumption; (2) to argueagainst highly constrained versions of Inverted Spectrum arguments; (3) to proposea broader conception of the vehicle for color perception
Myin, Erik (2001). Constrained inversions of sensations. Philosophica (Belgium) 68 (2):31-40.   (Google)
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (1999). Intrinsic phenomenal properties in color science: A reply to Peter Ross. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (1996). Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion? Philosophical Studies 82 (2):145-57.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google)
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (1999). Pseudonormal vision and color qualia. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (1999). Finding a place for experience in the physical-relational structure of the brain. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):966-967.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In restricting his analysis to the causal relations of functionalism, on the one hand, and the neurophysiological realizers of biology, on the other, Palmer has overlooked an alternative conception of the relationship between color experience and the brain - one that liberalises the relation between mental phenomena and their physical implementation, without generating functionalism
O'Connor, D. J. (1955). Awareness and communication. Journal of Philosophy 52 (September):505-514.   (Google | More links)
Palmer, Stephen . (1999). Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):923-943.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The relations among consciousness, brain, behavior, and scientific explanation are explored in the domain of color perception. Current scientific knowledge about color similarity, color composition, dimensional structure, unique colors, and color categories is used to assess Locke
Peirce, M. (2001). Inverted intuitions: Occupants and roles. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-298.   (Google)
Pelczar, Michael (2008). On an argument for functional invariance. Minds and Machines 18 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of phenomenal experience
Rey, Georges (1992). Sensational sentences reversed. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289-319.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google)
Ross, Peter W. (1999). Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Rumelin. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Ross, Peter W. (1999). Color science and spectrum inversion: Further thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):575-6.   (Google | More links)
Saunders, Barbara (1999). One machine among many. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):969-970.   (Google)
Abstract: In this commentary I point out that Palmer mislocates the source of the inverted spectrum, misrepresents the nature of colour science, and offers no reason for prefering one colour machine over another. I conclude nonetheless that talk about “colour machines” is a step in the right direction
Seager, William E. (1988). Weak supervenience and materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (June):697-709.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1996). Color, subjective reactions, and qualia. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Let me begin by indicating where I think Harman and I are in agreement. We both think that "subjective reactions" must come into an account of color, although we have different views about how they do. We both think that perceptual experience has a "presentational or representational character," and that color is represented by our visual experiences as a feature of external objects, not as a feature of our experience. Moreover, we agree that, as Harman puts it, "color is experienced as a simple basic quality, rather than a disposition or complex of causal properties." As Harman emphasized in an earlier paper, 1 what we are introspectively aware of in our experience is its presentational or representational content, not any "mental paint" which bestows this content. I shall refer to all of this as Harman's "phenomenological point." Because we agree on this, we also agree that if his characters George and Mary were spectrum inverted relative to each other, supposing that to be possible, this would have to involve their perceiving the same objects as having different properties, this despite the fact that as normal perceivers they would perceive these objects as having the same colors. And I think we agree that in this case the properties would have to be relational ones, defined or constituted by their relations to the experiences of the subject perceiving them
Shoemaker, Sydney (1996). Intersubjective/intrasubjective. In Sydney Shoemaker (ed.), The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1975). Phenomenal similarity. Critica 7 (October):3-37.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (2006). The Frege-Schlick view. In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1982). The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.   (Cited by 82 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Speaks, Jeff (forthcoming). Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: Even if spectrum inversion of various sorts is possible, spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is not. So spectrum inversion does not pose a challenge for the intentionalist thesis that, necessarily, within a given sense modality, if two experiences are alike with respect to content, they are also alike with respect to their phenomenal character. On the contrary, reflection on variants of standard cases of spectrum inversion provides a strong argument for intentionalism. Depending on one's views about the possibility of various other sorts of spectrum inversion, the impossibility of spectrum inversion without difference in representation can also be used as an argument against a wide variety of reductive theories of mental representation.
Stalnaker, Robert (1999). Comparing qualia across persons. Philosophical Topics 26:385-406.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Sundstrom, Par (2002). An argument against spectrum inversion. In Sten Lindstrom & Par Sundstrom (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Takenaga, R. (2002). Inverting intentional content. Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.   (Google | More links)
Taylor, Daniel M. (1966). The incommunicability of content. Mind 75 (October):527-41.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Thau, Michael (2002). Spectrum inversion. In Consciousness and Cognition. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Thompson, Brad J. (2008). Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra. Synthese 160 (2):203-213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of (...) Standard Russellianism is to hold that spectrum inversion without illusion is conceivable but not in fact possible. I argue that this response fails. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent mind-independent physical properties
Tolliver, Joseph Thomas (1999). Sensory holism and functionalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):972-973.   (Google)
Abstract: I defend the possibility of a functional account of the intrinsic qualities of sensory experience against the claim that functional characterization can only describe such qualities to the level of isomorphism of relational structures on those qualities. A form sensory holism might be true concerning the phenomenal, and this holism would account for some antifunctionalist intuition evoked by inverted spectrum and absent qualia arguments. Sensory holism is compatible with the correctness of functionalism about the phenomenal
Triplett, Timm (2006). Shoemaker on qualia, phenomenal properties and spectrum inversions. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Sydney Shoemaker offers an account of color perception that attempts to do justice, within a functionalist framework, to the commonsense view that colors are properties of ordinary objects, to the existence of qualia, and to the possibility of spectrum inversions. Shoemaker posits phenomenal properties as dispositional properties of colored objects that explain how there can be intersubjective variation in the experience of a particular color. I argue that his account does not in fact allow for the description of a spectrum inversion scenario, and that it cannot sustain a functionalist relationship between an object's color and its phenomenal properties. Functionalists must, however, come to terms with Shoemaker's recognition that intersubjective spectrum shifts are possible
Tye, Michael (1993). Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum. Noûs 27 (2):159-183.   (Cited by 21 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (1994). Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum. Noûs 28 (2):159-183.   (Google | More links)
Viger, Christopher D. (1999). The possibility of subisomorphic experiential differences. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):975-975.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Palmer=s main intuition pump, the Acolor machine, @ greatly underestimates the complexity of a system isomorphic in color experience to humans. The neuroscientific picture of this complexity makes clear that the brain actively produces our experiences by processes that science can investigate, thereby supporting functionalism and leaving no (color) room for a passive observer to witness subisomorphic experiential differences
Webster, W. R. (2006). Human zombies are metaphysically impossible. Synthese 151 (2):297-310.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, Oxford Unversity Press, Oxford 1996) has argued for a form of property dualism on the basis of the concept of a zombie (which is physically identical to normals), and the concept of the inverted spectrum. He asserts that these concepts show that the facts about consciousness, such as experience or qualia, are really further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts. He claims that they are the hard part of the mind-body issue. He also claims that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the world like mass, charge, etc. He says that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical and all current attempts to assert an identity between consciousness and the physical are just as non-reductive as his dualism. They are simply correlations and are part of the problem of the explanatory gap. In this paper, three examples of strong identities between a sensation or a quale and a physiological process are presented, which overcome these problems. They explain the identity in an a priori manner and they show that consciousness or sensations (Q) logically supervene on the physical (P), in that it is logically impossible to have P and not to have Q. In each case, the sensation was predicted and entailed by the physical. The inverted spectrum problem for consciousness is overcome and explained by a striking asymmetry in colour space. It is concluded that as some physical properties realize some sensations or qualia that human zombies are not metaphysically possible and the explanatory gap is bridged in these cases. Thus, the hard problem is overcome in these instances
Widmer, R.; Groning, O.; Ruffieux, P. & Groning, P. (2006). Low-temperature scanning tunneling spectroscopy on the 5-fold surface of the icosahedral alpdmn quasicrystal. Philosophical Magazine 86 (6-8):781-787.   (Google | More links)
Zemplén, Gábor A. (2004). Newton's colour circle and Palmer's “normal” colour space. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):166-168.   (Google)
Abstract: Taking the real Newtonian colour circle – and not the one Palmer depicts as Newton's – we don't have to wait 300 years for Palmer to say no to the Lockean aperçu about the inverted spectrum. One of the aims of this historical detour is to show that one's commitment about the “topology” of the colour space greatly affects Palmer's argument

1.7e Absent Qualia

Averill, Edward W. (1990). Functionalism, the absent qualia objection, and eliminativism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28:449-67.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Beckermann, Ansgar (1995). Visual information processing and phenomenal consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: As far as an adequate understanding of phenomenal consciousness is concerned, representationalist theories of mind which are modelled on the information processing paradigm, are, as much as corresponding neurobiological or functionalist theories, confronted with a series of arguments based on inverted or absent qualia considerations. These considerations display the following pattern: assuming we had complete knowledge about the neural and functional states which subserve the occurrence of phenomenal consciousness, would it not still be conceivable that these neural states (or states with the same causal r
Block, Ned (1980). Are absent qualia impossible? Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74.   (Cited by 37 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (1978). Troubles with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.   (Cited by 440 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state
Block, Ned & Fodor, Jerry A. (1972). What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.   (Cited by 121 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Bogen, J. (1981). Agony in the schools. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (March):1-21.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Burwood, Stephen (1999). Philosophy of Mind. Mcgill-Queen's University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Machine generated contents note: 1 The Cartesian legacy -- The dominant paradigm -- Cartesian dualism -- The secret life of the body -- The Cartesian theatre -- The domain of reason -- The causal relevance of the mind -- Conclusion -- Further reading --2 Reductionism and the road to functionalism -- Causation, scientific realism, and physicalism -- Reductionism and central state materialism -- Problems with central state materialism -- Modified ontological physicalism: supervenience -- Modified explanatory physicalism: the disunity of -- science picture -- Supervenient causation -- Functionalism -- Further reading --3 Computational models of mind -- Intentionality -- Rationality: the calculative account -- The computational model of mind -- Objections to the language of thought (1) -- Objections to the language of thought (2) -- Conclusion -- Further reading --4 The content of thought -- The internalist picture -- Externalism -- Singular thoughts -- Dual component theories -- Naturalistic externalism -- Teleological theories -- Conclusion -- Further reading --5 Anti-reductionist alternatives -- Interpretationalism -- Real patterns -- Direct interpretationalism -- Psychological causalism -- Modified psychological causalism -- Third-personalism and perspectivity -- The world from the point of view of the subject -- Context and culture -- Conclusion -- Further reading --6 The content of experience -- Consciousness -- The knowledge argument -- Absent qualia and inverted spectra -- Functionalist responses -- Internal monitoring -- Intentionalism -- Form and content -- The private language argument -- Further reading -- 7 Subjects of experience -- Subjectivity -- The subjective viewpoint -- Intersubjectivity -- Simulation theory -- Normativity and normality -- Expression -- Self-knowledge -- Conclusion -- Further reading --8 The embodied subject -- Mentality -- Desire -- Beyond the Cartesian body -- Metaphysical questions: multiple narratives -- Further reading -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.
Carleton, Lawrence Richard (1983). The population of china as one mind. Philosophy Research Archives 9:665-74.   (Annotation | Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1995). Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the strength of the psychophysical link is the basis for debates over physicalism and property dualism. The second question concerns the shape of the laws: precisely how do phenomenal properties depend on physical properties? What sort of physical properties enter into the laws' antecedents, for instance; consequently, what sort of physical systems can give rise to conscious experience? It is this second question that I address in this paper
Churchland, Paul M. & Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). Functionalism, qualia and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12:121-32.   (Cited by 23 | Annotation | Google)
Conee, Earl (1985). The possibility of absent qualia. Philosophical Review 94 (July):345-66.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cuda, T. (1985). Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):111-27.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Davis, Lawrence H. (1982). Functionalism and absent qualia. Philosophical Studies 41 (March):231-49.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Dempsey, L. (2002). Chalmers's fading and dancing qualia: Consciousness and the "hard problem". Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80.   (Google)
Doore, G. (1981). Functionalism and absent qualia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (March):387-402.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Dretske, Fred (1996). Absent qualia. Mind and Language 11 (1):78-85.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Elugardo, Reinaldo (1983). Functionalism and the absent qualia argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (June):161-80.   (Google)
Elugardo, Reinaldo (1983). Functionalism, homunculi-heads and absent qualia. Dialogue 21 (March):47-56.   (Annotation | Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1996). Functionalism's response to the problem of absent qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):357-73.   (Google)
Hershfield, Jeffrey (2002). A note on the possibility of silicon brains and fading qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (7):25-31.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (1991). Introspection and the skeptic. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (1991). The failings of functionalism. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Jacoby, H. (1990). Empirical functionalism and conceivability arguments. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):271-82.   (Annotation | Google)
Abstract: Functionalism, the philosophical theory that defines mental states in terms of their causal relations to stimuli, overt behaviour, and other inner mental states, has often been accused of being unable to account for the qualitative character of our experimential states. Many times such objections to functionalism take the form of conceivability arguments. One is asked to imagine situations where organisms who are in a functional state that is claimed to be a particular experience either have the qualitative character of that experience altered or absent altogether. Many of these arguments are surprisingly advanced by materialist philosophers. I argue that if the conceivability arguments were successful against functionalism, then they would be successful against their alternative materialist views as well. So the conceivability arguments alone do not provide a good reason for materialists to abandon functionalism. I further argue that functionalism is best understood to be an empirical theory, and if it is so understood then the conceivability arguments have no force against it at all. A further consequence that emerges is that on an empirical functionalist view, qualia, if real, are properties in the domain of psychology
Juhl, Cory F. (1998). Conscious experience and the nontrivality principle. Philosophical Studies 91 (1):91-101.   (Google)
Levine, Joseph (1988). Absent and inverted qualia revisited. Mind and Language 3:271-87.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Levin, Janet (1985). Functionalism and the argument from conceivability. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:85-104.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Lycan, William G. (1987). Homunctionalism and qualia. In Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Mallah, Jacques (ms). The partial brain thought experiment: Partial consciousness and its implications.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The ‘Fading Qualia’ thought experiment of Chalmers purports to show that computationalism is very probably true even if dualism is true by considering a series of brains, with biological parts increasingly substituted for by artificial but functionally analagous parts in small steps, and arguing that consciousness would not plausibly vanish in either a gradual or sudden way. This defense of computationalism inspired an attack on computationalism by Bishop, who argued that a similar series of substitutions by parts that have the correct physical activity but not the correct causal relationships must likewise preserve consciousness, purportedly showing that ‘Counterfactuals Cannot Count’ and if so ruining a necessary condition for computation to meaningfully distinguish between physical systems. In this paper, the case in which a series of parts are simply removed and substituted for only by imposing the correct boundary conditions to exactly preserve the functioning of the remaining partial brain is described. It is argued that consciousness must gradually vanish in this case, not by fading but by becoming more and more partial. This supports the non-centralized nature of consciousness, tends to support the plausibility of physicalism against dualism, and provides the proper counterargument to Bishop’s contention. It also provides an avenue of attack against the “Fading Qualia” argument for those who remain dualists
Marras, Ausonio (1993). Materialism, functionalism, and supervenient qualia. Dialogue 32 (3):475-92.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Nussbaum, Charles (2003). Another look at functionalism and the emotions. Brain and Mind 4 (3):353-383.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Two chronic problems have plagued functionalism in the philosophy of mind. The first is the chauvinism/liberalism dilemma, the second the absent qualia problem. The first problem is addressed by blocking excessively liberal counterexamples at a level of functional abstraction that is high enough to avoid chauvinism. This argument introduces the notion of emotional functional organization (EFO). The second problem is addressed by granting Block's skeptical conclusions with respect to mentality as such, while arguing that qualitative experience is a concomitant of human mentality considered as a special case: a system with EFO implemented in an organic substrate
Pineda, David (2001). Functionalism and nonreductive physicalism. Theoria 16 (40):43-63.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Most philosophers of mind nowadays espouse two metaphysical views: Nonreductive Physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental. Throughout this work I will refer to the conjunction of both claims as the Causal Autonomy of the Mental. Nevertheless, this position is threatened by a number of difficulties which are far more serious than one would imagine given the broad consensus that it has generated during the last decades. This paper purports to offer a careful examination of some of these difficulties and show the considerable efforts that one has to undertake in order to try to overcome them. The difficulties examined will concern only metaphysical problems common to all special science properties but not specific of mental properties. So, in proposing a functionalist version of Nonreductive Physicalism in what follows, I will not attempt to answer to well known objections such as the absent qualia argument and the like. This should not be interpreted as a limitation! in the scope of this work. On the contrary, in dealing with more general objections we will try to evaluate a position which entails (under common assumptions) the Causal Autonomy of the Mental, namely: Nonreductive Physicalism plus the causal efficacy of special science properties
Sayan, E. (1988). A closer look at the chinese nation argument. Philosophy Research Archives 13:129-36.   (Annotation | Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1981). Absent qualia are impossible -- a reply to Block. Philosophical Review 90 (October):581-99.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1975). Functionalism and qualia. Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.   (Cited by 95 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Tolliver, Joseph Thomas (1999). Sensory holism and functionalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):972-973.   (Google)
Abstract: I defend the possibility of a functional account of the intrinsic qualities of sensory experience against the claim that functional characterization can only describe such qualities to the level of isomorphism of relational structures on those qualities. A form sensory holism might be true concerning the phenomenal, and this holism would account for some antifunctionalist intuition evoked by inverted spectrum and absent qualia arguments. Sensory holism is compatible with the correctness of functionalism about the phenomenal
Tye, Michael (2006). Absent qualia and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by means of specifi c examples and associated comments
Tye, Michael (1993). Blindsight, the absent qualia hypothesis, and the mystery of consciousness. In Christopher Hookway (ed.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Van Gulick, Robert (1999). Out of sight but not out of mind: Isomorphism and absent qualia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):974-974.   (Google)
Abstract: The isomorphism constraint places plausible limits on the use of third-person evidence to explain color experience but poses no difficulty for functionalists; they themselves argue for just such limits. Palmer's absent qualia claim is supported by neither the Color Machine nor Color Room examples. The nature of color experience depends on relations external to the color space, as well as internal to it
van Gulick, Robert (1993). Understanding the phenomenal mind: Are we all just armadillos? In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Blackwell.   (Cited by 51 | Annotation | Google)
van Gulick, Robert (1989). What difference does consciousness make? Philosophical Topics 17 (1):211-30.   (Annotation | Google)
White, Nicholas P. (1985). Professor Shoemaker and the so-called `qualia' of experience. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):369-383.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)

1.7f Functionalism and Qualia

Block, Ned (2008). Consciousness and cognitive access. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This article concerns the interplay between two issues that involve both philosophy and neuroscience: whether the content of phenomenal consciousness is 'rich' or 'sparse', whether phenomenal consciousness goes beyond cognitive access, and how it would be possible for there to be evidence one way or the other
Brown, Mark T. (1983). Functionalism and sensations. Auslegung 10:218-28.   (Annotation | Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1995). Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the strength of the psychophysical link is the basis for debates over physicalism and property dualism. The second question concerns the shape of the laws: precisely how do phenomenal properties depend on physical properties? What sort of physical properties enter into the laws' antecedents, for instance; consequently, what sort of physical systems can give rise to conscious experience? It is this second question that I address in this paper
Clark, Andy (2000). A case where access implies qualia? Analysis 60 (1):30-37.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Block (1995) famously warns against the confusion of
Dumpleton, S. (1988). Sensation and function. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (September):376-89.   (Google | More links)
Eshelman, L. J. (1977). Functionalism, sensations, and materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (June):255-74.   (Google)
Georgiev, Danko (ms). Chalmers' principle of organizational invariance makes consciousness fundamental but meaningless spectator of its own drama.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is argued that if consciousness is a fundamental ingredient of reality then no any psychophysical law such as Chalmers' principle of organizational invariance is needed to keep coherence between experience and function (conscious action). Indeed Chalmers' proposal suggests epiphenomenal consciousness and is regress to a nineteenth century absurd philosophy. The quantum mechanics is the most successful current physical theory and can naturally accommodate consciousness without violation of physical laws
Graham, George & Stephens, G. Lynn (1985). Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists? American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (January):73-80.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
Greenberg, William J. (1998). On Chalmers' "principle of organizational invariance" and his "dancing qualia" and "fading qualia" thought experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):53-58.   (Google)
Hill, Christopher S. (1991). The failings of functionalism. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1984). Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Huebner, Bryce; Bruno, Michael & Sarkissian, Hagop (2010). What does the nation of china think about phenomenal states? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Critics of functionalism about the mind often rely on the intuition that collectivities cannot be conscious in motivating their positions. In this paper, we consider the merits of appealing to the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity. We demonstrate that collective mentality is not an affront to commonsense, and we report evidence that demonstrates that the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity is, to some extent, culturally specific rather than universally held. This being the case, we argue that mere appeal to the intuitive implausibility of collective consciousness does not offer any genuine insight into the nature of mentality in general, nor the nature of consciousness in particular
Jarrett, Greg (1996). Analyzing mental demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 84 (1):49-62.   (Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1999). Philosophy as massage: Seeking relief from conscious tension. Philosophical Topics 26:159-78.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Littlejohn, Clayton (2009). On the coherence of inversion. Acta Analytica 24 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I shall evaluate a strategy recently used to try to demonstrate the impossibility of behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion. After showing that the impossibility proof proves too much, I shall identify where it goes wrong. In turn, I shall explain why someone attracted to functionalist and representationalist assumptions might rightly remain agnostic about the possibility of inversion
Lycan, William G. (1981). Form, function and feel. Journal of Philosophy 78 (January):24-50.   (Cited by 32 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Lycan, William G. (1987). Homunctionalism and qualia. In Consciousness. MIT Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Macpherson, Fiona (2007). Synaesthesia. In Mario de Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Kleuwer.   (Google | More links)
Moor, James H. (1988). Testing robots for qualia. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Nemirow, Laurence (1979). Functionalism and the Subjective Quality of Experience. Dissertation, Stanford University   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Pelczar, Michael (2008). On an argument for functional invariance. Minds and Machines 18 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of phenomenal experience
Pettit, Philip (2003). Looks as powers. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Although they may differ on the reason why, many philosophers hold that it is a priori that an object is red if and only if it is such as to look red to normal observers in normal conditions
Rey, Georges (1994). Wittgenstein, computationalism, and qualia. In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Seager, William E. (1983). Functionalism, qualia and causation. Mind 92 (April):174-88.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). The first-person perspective. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (2):7-22.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Van Gulick, Robert (2007). Functionalism and qualia. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.   (Google)
van Heuveln, B.; Dietrich, Eric & Oshima, M. (1998). Let's dance! The equivocation in Chalmers' dancing qualia argument. Minds and Machines 8 (2):237-249.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
van Gulick, Robert (1988). Qualia, functional equivalence and computation. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer.   (Annotation | Google)
White, Stephen L. (1986). Curse of the qualia. Synthese 68 (August):333-68.   (Cited by 30 | Annotation | Google | More links)
White, Stephen L. (1989). Transcendentalism and its discontents. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):231-61.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Wright, Edmond L. (1993). More qualia trouble for functionalism: The Smythies TV-Hood analogy. Synthese 97 (3):365-82.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   It is the purpose of this article to explicate the logical implications of a television analogy for perception, first suggested by John R. Smythies (1956). It aims to show not only that one cannot escape the postulation of qualia that have an evolutionary purpose not accounted for within a strong functionalist theory, but also that it undermines other anti-representationalist arguments as well as some representationalist ones
Zuboff, Arnold (1994). What is a mind? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19:183-205.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)