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1.7a. Qualia, Misc (Qualia, Misc on PhilPapers)

See also:
Allen, Robert F. (ms). The subject is qualia.   (Google)
Alter, Torin (2003). Qualia. In L Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group.   (Google)
Abstract: Introduction Qualia and causation Do qualia exist? Qualia and cognitive science Qualia and other mental phenomena Knowledge of qualia Are qualia irreducible?
Bailey, Andrew R. (1998). Phenomenal Properties: The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Qualia. Dissertation, University of Calgary   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bailey, Andrew R. (ms). Qualia and the argument from illusion.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bensusan, Hilan & de Carvalho, Eros (forthcoming). Qualia qua qualitons: Mental qualities as abstract particulars. Acta Analytica.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper we advocate the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. The main advantage of the thesis is that we can accept both the Wittgensteinian and Sellarsian assault on the given and the claim that only subjective and private states can do justice to the qualitative character of experience. We hint that if we take qualia to be tropes, we dissolve the problem of inverted qualia. We develop an account of sensory concept acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition for learning. We argue that qualia taken to be qualitons are part of our mechanism of sensory concept acquisition
Block, Ned (2004). Qualia. In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 18 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Qualia include the ways things look, sound and smell, the way it feels to have a pain; more generally, what it's like to have mental states. Qualia are experiential properties of sensations, feelings, perceptions and, in my view, thoughts and desires as well. But, so defined, who could deny that qualia exist? Yet, the existence of qualia is controversial. Here is what is controversial: whether qualia, so defined, can be characterized in intentional, functional or purely cognitive terms. Opponents of qualia think that the content of experience is intentional content (like the content of thought), or that experiences are functionally definable, or that to have a qualitative state is to have a state that is monitored in a certain way or accompanied by a thought to the effect that I have that state. If we include the idea that experiential properties are not intentional or functional or purely cognitive in the definition of `qualia', then it is controversial whether there are qualia
Block, Ned (2007). Wittgenstein and Qualia. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: (Wittgenstein, 1968) endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed (the "innocuous" inverted spectrum hypothesis) is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected (the "dangerous" kind). The danger of the dangerous kind is that it provides an argument for qualia, where qualia are (for the purposes of this paper) contents of experiential states which cannot be fully captured in natural language. I will pinpoint the difference between the innocuous and dangerous scenarios that matters for the argument for qualia, give arguments in favor of the coherence and possibility of the dangerous scenario, and try to show that some standard arguments against inverted spectra are ineffective against the version of the dangerous scenario I will be advocating. The leading idea of the paper is that an argument for qualia based on spectrum inversion does not require that the inversion be behaviorally indistinguishable. At one crucial point, I will rely on a less controversial version of an argument I gave in Block (1999). Wittgenstein's views provide a convenient starting point for a paper that is much more about qualia than about Wittgenstein.
Clark, Austen (1985). Qualia and the psychophysical explanation of color perception. Synthese 65 (December):377-405.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Can psychology explain the qualitative content of experience? A persistent philosophical objection to that discipline is that it cannot. Qualitative states or "qualia" are argued to have characteristics which cannot be explained in terms of their relationships to other psychological states, stimuli, and behavior. Since psychology is confined to descriptions of such relationships, it seems that psychology cannot explain qualia
Clark, Austen (2000). Quality space. In Austen Clar (ed.), A Theory of Sentience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Crane, Tim (2000). The origins of qualia. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy has two parts: the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. These two parts are not unrelated; in fact, it can be helpful to see them as two horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the causal interaction between mental and physical phenomena seems to require that all causally efficacious mental phenomena are physical; but on the other hand, the phenomenon of consciousness seems to entail that not all mental phenomena are physical.2 One may avoid this dilemma by adopting an epiphenomenalist view of consciousness, of course; but there is little independent reason for believing such a view. Rejecting epiphenomenalism, then, leaves contemporary philosophers with their problem: mental causation inclines them towards physicalism, while consciousness inclines them towards dualism
Cunningham, Bryon (2001). Capturing qualia: Higher-order concepts and connectionism. Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):29-41.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Antireductionist philosophers have argued for higher-order classifications of qualia that locate consciousness outside the scope of conventional scientific explanations, viz., by classifying qualia as intrinsic, basic, or subjective properties, antireductionists distinguish qualia from extrinsic, complex, and objective properties, and thereby distinguish conscious mental states from the possible explananda of functionalist or physicalist explanations. I argue that, in important respects, qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties of conscious mental states, and that, contrary to antireductionists' suggestions, these higher-order classifications are compatible with qualia reduction. I demonstrate this compatibility by examining the putative higher-order properties of qualia and comparing them to the higher-order properties characteristic of connectionist models of cognitive processes. I contend that the higher-order properties characteristic of connectionist networks approximate (in intertheoretic terms) the putative higher-order properties of qualia sufficiently well to conclude that qualia reductionism can (1) accommodate claims that qualia are intrinsic, basic, and subjective properties, and (2) explain the motivating intuitions for those claims generated by inverted, absent, and alien qualia thought experiments. In this way I argue that (approximate versions of) the putative higher-order classifications of qualia not only fail to defeat qualia reduction but, ironically, turn out to support it
de Rosa, Raffaella (2007). The myth of cartesian qualia. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):181�207.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The standard view of Cartesian sensations (SV) is that they present themselves as purely qualitative features of experience (or qualia). Accordingly, Descartes view would be that in perceiving the color red, for example, we are merely experiencing the subjective feel of redness rather than seeming to perceive a property of bodies. In this paper, I establish that the argument and textual evidence offered in support of SV fail to prove that Descartes held this view. Indeed, I will argue that there are textual and theoretical reasons for believing that Descartes held the negation of SV. Qualia aren't Descartes legacy
Elitzur, Avshalom C. (2009). Consciousness makes a difference: A reluctant dualist’s confession. In A. Batthyany & A. C. Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious: Selected Papers on Consciousness.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper’s outline is as follows. In sections 1-3 I give an exposi¬tion of the Mind-Body Problem, with emphasis on what I believe to be the heart of the problem, namely, the Percepts-Qualia Nonidentity and its incompatibility with the Physical Closure Paradigm. In 4 I present the “Qualia Inaction Postulate” underlying all non-interactionist theo¬ries that seek to resolve the above problem. Against this convenient postulate I propose in section 5 the “Bafflement Ar¬gument,” which is this paper's main thesis. Sections 6-11 critically dis¬cuss attempts to dismiss the Bafflement Argument by the “Baf¬flement=Mis¬perception Equation.” Section 12 offers a refutation of all such attempts in the form of a concise “Asymmetry Proof.” Section 13 points out the bearing of the Bafflement Argument on the evolutionary role of consciousness while section 14 acknowledges the price that has to be paid for it in terms of basic physical principles. Section 15 summarizes the paper, pointing out the inescapability of interactionist dualism.
Feser, Edward (2001). Qualia: Irreducibly subjective but not intrinsic. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (8):3-20.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fox, Ivan (1989). On the nature and cognitive function of phenomenal content -- part one. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):81-103.   (Annotation | Google)
Gibbons, John (2005). Qualia: They're not what they seem. Philosophical Studies 126 (3):397-428.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Whether or not qualia are ways things seem, the view that qualia have the properties typically attributed to them is unjustified. Ways things seem do not have many of the properties commonly attributed to them. For example, inverted ways things seem are impossible. If ways things seem do not have the features commonly attributed to them, and qualia do have those same features, this looks like good reason to distinguish the two. But if your reasons for believing that qualia have the features are epistemically on a par with reasons for believing that ways things seem have the features, and you know that ways things seem do not have the features, then those reasons cannot justify your belief that qualia have the features. I argue that the reasons are epistemically on a par in this way
Gilbert, Paul (1992). Immediate experience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:233-250.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Gregory, Richard L. (1996). Peculiar qualia. Perception 25 (7):755-756.   (Google | More links)
Hatfield, Gary (2007). The reality of qualia. Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):133--168.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues for the reality of qualia as aspects of phenomenal experience. The argument focuses on color vision and develops a dispositionalist, subjectivist account of what it is for an object to be colored. I consider objections to dispositionalism on epistemological, metaphysical, and
Jakab, Zolt (2000). Ineffability of qualia: A straightforward naturalistic explanation. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):329-351.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I offer an explanation of the ineffability (linguistic inexpressibility) of sensory experiences. My explanation is put in terms of computational functionalism and standard externalist theories of representational content. As I will argue, many or most sensory experiences are representational states without constituent structure. This property determines both the representational function these states can serve and the information that can be extracted from them when they are processed. Sensory experiences can indicate the presence of certain external states of affairs but they cannot convey any more information about them than that. So, format- or code-conversion mechanisms that link different systems of representation (linguistic and perceptual) to each other will fail to extract any relevant information from sensory experiences that could be coded in language. They only way to establish specific roles for sensory experiences in communication and the organization of behavior is to attach to them, by associative links, words, or other behavioral responses. If a sensory experience has no linguistic label associated to it in a particular subject, then no linguistic description can token, or activate, that state in the subject. In other words, no linguistic description can cause a subject to undergo an unlabeled perceptual state. On the contrary, complex, or syntactically structured perceptual states can be built up, on the basis of descriptions, by mechanisms of constructive imagination (conceived here as one sort of format conversion). It is this difference between complex and unstructured representational states that gives us an understanding of the phenomenon we call the ineffability of qualia
Jakab, Z. (2000). Reply to Thomas Metzinger and Bettina Walde. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):363-369.   (Google | More links)
Kind, Amy (2001). Qualia realism. Philosophical Studies 104 (2):143-162.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent characterizations of the qualia debate construe the point at issue in terms of the existence of intrinsic properties of experience. I argue that such characterizations mistakenly ignore the epistemic dimension of the notion of qualia. Using Ned Block
Kitcher, P. S. (1979). Phenomenal qualities. American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (April):123-9.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Kriegel, Uriah (2003). Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Leeds, Stephen (1993). Qualia, awareness, Sellars. Noûs 27 (3):303-330.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1995). Qualia: Intrinsic, relational, or what? In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Lormand, Eric (1994). Qualia! (Now showing at a theater near you). Philosophical Topics 22:127-156.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: Despite such widespread acclaim, there are some influential theater critics who have panned Qualia!
Malatesti, Luca (2008). Mary’s Scientific Knowledge. Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):37-59.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument (KA) aims to prove, by means of a thought experiment concerning the hypothetical scientist Mary, that conscious experiences have non-physical properties, called qualia. Mary has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision without having had any colour experience. The central intuition in the KA is that, by seeing colours, Mary will learn what it is like to have colour experiences. Therefore, her scientific knowledge is incomplete, and conscious experiences have qualia. In this paper I consider an objection to the KA raised by Daniel Dennett. He maintains that the KA is vitiated by Jackson’s account of Mary’s scientific knowledge. While endorsing this criticism, I will defend the plausibility and relevance of the type of strategy involved in the KA by offering an account of Mary’s scientific knowledge. This account involves formulating a reasonable and not immediately false version of the physicalist thesis with regard to colour experiences. Whether this version of the KA is successful against this type of physicalism is not investigated here.
Metzinger, Thomas (2000). Commentary on jakab's Ineffability of Qualia. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (3):352-362.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Zoltan Jakab has presented an interesting conceptual analysis of the ineffability of qualia in a functionalist and classical cognitivist framework. But he does not want to commit himself to a certain metaphysical thesis on the ontology of consciousness or qualia. We believe that his strategy has yielded a number of highly relevant and interesting insights, but still suffers from some minor inconsistencies and a certain lack of phenomenological and empirical plausibility. This may be due to some background assumptions relating to the theory of mental representation employed. Jakab
Place, Ullin T. (2000). The causal potency of qualia: Its nature and its source. Brain and Mind 1 (2):183-192.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There is an argument (Medlin, 1967; Place, 1988) whichshows conclusively that if qualia are causallyimpotent we could have no possible grounds forbelieving that they exist. But if, as this argumentshows, qualia are causally potent with respect to thedescriptions we give of them, it is tolerably certainthat they are causally potent in other morebiologically significant respects. The empiricalevidence, from studies of the effect of lesions of thestriate cortex (Humphrey, 1974; Weiskrantz, 1986;Cowey and Stoerig, 1995) shows that what is missing inthe absence of visual qualia is the ability tocategorize sensory inputs in the visual modality. This would suggest that the function of privateexperience is to supply what Broadbent (1971) callsthe evidence on which the categorization ofproblematic sensory inputs are based. At the sametime analysis of the causal relation shows that whatdifferentiates a causal relation from an accidentalspatio-temporal conjunction is the existence ofreciprocally related dispositional properties of theentities involved which combine to make it true thatif one member of the conjunction, the cause, had notexisted, the other, the effect, would not haveexisted. The possibility that qualia might bedispositional properties of experiences which, as itwere, supply the invisible glue that sticks cause toeffect in this case is examined, but finallyrejected
Putnam, Hilary (1981). Mind and body. In Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Robinson, William S. (online). Qualia realism. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (1999). Qualia realism and neural activation patterns. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (10):65-80.   (Google)
Rosenthal, D. R. (1999). Sensory quality and the relocation story. Philosophical Perspectives 26:321-50.   (Cited by 12 | Google)
Sharlow, Mark F. (ms). Qualia and the problem of universals.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I explore the logical relationship between the question of the reality of qualia and the problem of universals. I argue that nominalism is inconsistent with the existence of qualia, and that realism either implies or makes plausible the existence of qualia. Thus, one's position on the existence of qualia is strongly constrained by one's answer to the problem of universals
Shoemaker, Sydney (2007). A case for qualia. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). Phenomenal character. Noûs 28 (1):21-38.   (Cited by 71 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1991). Qualia and consciousness. Mind 100 (399):507-24.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1990). Qualities and qualia: What's in the mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Supplement 50 (Supplement):109-131.   (Cited by 49 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Sleutels, Jan (1998). Phenomenal consciousness: Epiphenomenalism, naturalism and perceptual plasticity. Communication and Cognition 31 (1):21-55.   (Google)
Stanley, Richard P. (1999). Qualia space. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):49-60.   (Google)
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Tye, Michael (1978). Sensory properties. Behaviorism 6:213-219.   (Google)
Vaden, Tere (2001). Qualifying qualia through the skyhook test. Inquiry 44 (2):149-170.   (Google)
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Wright, Edmond L. (ed.) (2008). The Case for Qualia. MIT Press.   (Google)