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1.7d. The Inverted Spectrum (The Inverted Spectrum on PhilPapers)

See also:
Alter, Torin, Comments on John Kulvicki's “what is what it's like?” (2003 eastern div. Apa).   (Google)
Abstract: Kulvicki’s goal is to give a representationalist account of what it’s like to see a property that is “fully externalist about perceptual representation” (p. 1) and yet accommodates a certain “internalist intuition” (p. 4), which he describes as follows: “something about what it is like to see a property is internally determined, dependent only on the way one is built from the skin in” (p. 3). He illustrates this intuition with an inverted spectrum case and the manifest-image problem. On his view, there’s an apparent conflict between the intuition and representationalism. That’s because, on representationalism, “what it is like to see a shade of color can be exhaustively explained in terms of what is perceptually represented” (p. 1) and, he claims, “all representational facts are externally determined” (p. 4). In short, if what it’s like is partly internally determined, then how can it be fully explained in terms of externally determined representational facts?
Bangert, U.; Barnes, R.; Hounsome, L. S.; Jones, R.; Blumenau, A. T.; Briddon, P. R.; Shaw, M. J. & Oberg, S. (2006). Electron energy loss spectroscopic studies of brown diamonds. Philosophical Magazine 86 (29-31):4757-4779.   (Google | More links)
Block, Ned (1990). Inverted earth. Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.   (Cited by 146 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Broackes, Justin (2007). Black and white and the inverted spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):161-175.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Byrne, Alex (online). Gert on the shifted spectrum.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: As Gert says, the basic claim of representationism is that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Restricted to color experience, representationism may be put as follows
Byrne, Alex & Hilbert, David R. (2006). Hoffman's "proof" of the possibility of spectrum inversion. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):48-50.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple mathematical result
Byrne, Alex (online). Inverted qualia. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Abstract: Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind (largely due to the influence of Shoemaker 1982 and Block 1990). The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of
Byrne, Alex (1999). Subjectivity is no barrier. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):949-950.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Palmer's subjectivity barrier seems to be erected on a popular but highly suspect conception of visual experience, and his color room argument is invalid
Campbell, Neil (2004). Generalizing qualia inversion. Erkenntnis 60 (1):27-34.   (Google | More links)
Campbell, Neil (2000). Physicalism, qualia inversion, and affective states. Synthese 124 (2):239-256.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Canfield, John V. (2009). Ned Block, Wittgenstein, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophia 37 (4):691-712.   (Google)
Abstract: In ‘Wittgenstein and Qualia’ Ned Block argues for the existence of inverted spectra and those ineffable things, qualia. The essence of his discussion is a would-be proof, presented through a series of pictures, of the possible existence of an inverted spectrum. His argument appeals to some remarks by Wittgenstein which, Block holds, commit the former to a certain ‘dangerous scenario’ wherein inverted spectra, and consequently qualia live and breath. I hold that a key premise of this proof is incoherent. Furthermore, Block’s dangerous scenario does not follow from Wittgenstein’s innocent one, as Block believes it does, but rather is in conflict with it
Casati, Roberto (1990). What is wrong in inverting spectra? Teoria 10:183-6.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. & Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). Functionalism, qualia and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12:121-32.   (Cited by 23 | Annotation | Google)
Clark, Austen (online). A subjectivist reply to spectrum inversion.   (Google)
Abstract: Subjectivists hold that you cannot specify color kinds without implicitly or explicitly referring to the dispositions of observers. Even though "yellow" is ascribed to physical items, and presumably there is something physical in each such item causing it to be so characterized, the only physical similarity between all such items is that they all affect an observer in the same way. So the principles organizing the colors are all found within the skin
Clark, Austen (online). Inversions spectral and bright: Comments on Melinda Campbell.   (Google)
Abstract: Spectrum inversion is a thought experiment, and I would wager that there is no better diagnostic test to the disciplinary affiliation of a randomly selected member of the audience than your reaction to a thought experiment. It is a litmus test. If you find that you are paying close attention, subvocalizing objections, and that your heart-rate and metabolism go up, you have turned pink: you are a philosopher. If on the other hand the thought experiment leaves you cold, and you wonder why otherwise sensible people would worry about such things, you have turned blue and you are a psychologist
Clark, Austen (1985). Spectrum inversion and the color solid. Southern Journal of Philosophy 23:431-43.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: The possibility that what looks red to me may look green to you has traditionally been known as "spectrum inversion." This possibility is thought to create difficulties for any attempt to define mental states in terms of behavioral dispositions or functional roles. If spectrum inversion is possible, then it seems that two perceptual states may have identical functional antecedents and effects yet differ in their qualitative content. In that case the qualitative character of the states could not be functionally defined
Cohen, Jonathan (2001). Color, content, and Fred: On a proposed reductio of the inverted spectrum hypothesis. Philosophical Studies 103 (2):121-144.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Cole, David J. (1990). Functionalism and inverted spectra. Synthese 82 (2):207-22.   (Cited by 56 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cole, David J. (ms). Inverted spectrum arguments.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Formerly a spectral apparition that haunted behaviorism and provided a puzzle about our knowledge of other minds, the inverted spectrum possibility has emerged as an important challenge to functionalist accounts of qualia. The inverted spectrum hypothesis raises the possibility that two individuals might think and behave in the same way yet have different qualia. The traditional supposition is of an individual who has a subjective color spectrum that is inverted with regard to that had by other individuals. When he looks at red objects, this individual has the qualia normally produced in others by blue objects. And when presented with a blue object, this individual experiences qualia that most persons experience only when presented with red objects. And so forth - the Invert's color spectrum is the inverse of normal; there are systematic inter-subjective differences in qualia
Dennett, Daniel C. (1994). Instead of qualia. In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: Philosophers have adopted various names for the things in the beholder (or properties of the beholder) that have been supposed to provide a safe home for the colors and the rest of the properties that have been banished from the "external" world by the triumphs of physics: "raw feels", "sensa", "phenomenal qualities" "intrinsic properties of conscious experiences" "the qualitative content of mental states" and, of course, "qualia," the term I will use. There are subtle differences in how these terms have been defined, but I'm going to ride roughshod over them. I deny that there are
Dennett, Daniel C. (1999). Swift and enormous. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6).   (Google)
Abstract: As a lefthanded person, I can wonder whether I am a left-hemisphere-dominant speaker or a right-hemisphere-dominant speaker or something mixed, and the only way I can learn the truth is by submitting myself to objective, Athird-person@ testing. I don =t Ahave access to @ this intimate fact about how my own mind does its work. It escapes all my attempts at introspective detection, and might, for all I know, shunt back and forth every few seconds without my being any the wiser. In striking contrast to this is the traditional idea that there are
Gert, Bernard (1965). Imagination and verifiability. Philosophical Studies 16 (3):44-47.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Ginet, Carl A. (1999). Qualia and private language. Philosophical Topics 26:121-38.   (Google)
Hardin, C. L. & Hardin, W. J. (2006). A tale of Hoffman. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):46-47.   (Google | More links)
Hardin, C. L. (1988). Color for Philosophers. Hackett.   (Cited by 383 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Harrison, Bernard (1973). Form and Content. Blackwell.   (Cited by 19 | Annotation | Google)
Harrison, Bernard (1967). On describing colors. Inquiry 10 (1-4):38-52.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Hardin, C. L. (1987). Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):281-98.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hardin, C. L. (1991). Reply to Levine's 'cool red'. Philosophical Psychology 4:41-50.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Hardin, C. L. (1997). Reinverting the spectrum. In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Harvey, J. (1979). Systematic transposition of colours. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (September):211-19.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hatfield, Gary (1992). Color perception and neural encoding: Does metameric matching entail a loss of information? Philosophy of Science Association 1992:492-504.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Hilbert, David R. & Kalderon, Mark Eli (2000). Color and the inverted spectrum. In Steven Davis (ed.), Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 23 | Google)
Abstract: If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on for other colors, still he would not yet be describing objects by their colors. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description. A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance)
Hoffman, Donald D. (2006). The scrambling theorem: A simple proof of the logical possibility of spectrum inversion. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):31-45.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Hoffman, Donald D. (2006). The scrambling theorem unscrambled: A response to commentaries. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):51-53.   (Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. (1984). Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Johnsen, Bredo C. (1993). The intelligibility of spectrum inversion. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):631-6.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Johnsen, Bredo C. (1986). The inverted spectrum. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (December):471-6.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kalderon, Mark (ms). Color and the inverted spectrum.   (Google)
Abstract: If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on for other colors, still he would not yet be describing objects by their colors. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description. A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance)
Kirk, Robert E. (1982). Goodbye to transposed qualia. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82:33-44.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (1994). Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 48 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1988). Absent and inverted qualia revisited. Mind and Language 3:271-87.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1991). Cool red. Philosophical Psychology 4:27-40.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google)
Linsky, Leonard (1962). The incommunicability of content. Journal of Philosophy 59 (January):21-22.   (Google | More links)
Littlejohn, Clayton (2009). On the coherence of inversion. Acta Analytica 24 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper, I shall evaluate a strategy recently used to try to demonstrate the impossibility of behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion. After showing that the impossibility proof proves too much, I shall identify where it goes wrong. In turn, I shall explain why someone attracted to functionalist and representationalist assumptions might rightly remain agnostic about the possibility of inversion
Lycan, William G. (1973). Inverted spectrum. Ratio 15 (July):315-9.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
MacLaury, Robert E. (1999). Asymmetry among Hering primaries thwarts the inverted spectrum argument. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):960-961.   (Google)
Abstract: Purest points of Hering's six primary colors reside at different levels of lightness such that inversion of each hue pair would be detectable in subjects' choice of foci on the Munsell array. An inverted spectrum would not impose the isomorphism constraint on a contrast of red-green or yellow-blue, whatever we conclude about inference in functionalism
Macpherson, Fiona (2005). Colour inversion problems for representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more damaging to externalist representationalist views than have been previously thought. More specifically, I argue that representationalists who endorse externalism about experiential content either have to become internalists about the content of propositional attitudes or they have to adopt a novel variety of externalism about the content of propositional attitudes. This novel type of propositional attitude externalism is investigated. It can be seen that adopting it forces one to reject Putnam
Marcus, Eric (2006). Intentionalism and the imaginability of the inverted spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to which the representational content of an experience fixes what it
Maund, Barry (2006). Comments. Dialectica 60 (3):347-353.   (Google | More links)
McKeon, B. J. & Morrison, J. F. (2007). Asymptotic scaling in turbulent pipe flow. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society a-Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences 365 (1852):771-787.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Meyer, Ulrich (2000). Do pseudonormal persons have inverted qualia? Facta Philosophica 2:309-25.   (Google)
Mizrahi, Vivian & Nida-Rumelin, Martine (2006). Introduction. Dialectica 60 (3):209-222.   (Google | More links)
Myin, Erik (1999). Beyond intrinsicness and dazzling blacks. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):964-965.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Palmer's target article is surely one of the most scientifically detailed and knowledgeable treatments of spectrum inversion ever. Unfortunately, it is built on a very shaky philosophical foundation, the notion of the "intrinsic". In the article's ontology, there are two kinds of properties of mental states, intrinsic properties and relational properties. The whole point of the article is that these aspects of experience are mutually exclusive: the intrinsic is nonrelational and the relational is nonintrinsic
Myin, Erik (2001). Color and the duplication assumption. Synthese 129 (1):61-77.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some ofthe spatial cases. This is due not only to motor factors, but to the basic physicalasymmetry between black and white. I then argue that the case can be extendedfrom lightness perception to hue perception. Overall, the aims of this paper are:(1) to extend Susan Hurley''s critique of the Duplication Assumption; (2) to argueagainst highly constrained versions of Inverted Spectrum arguments; (3) to proposea broader conception of the vehicle for color perception
Myin, Erik (2001). Constrained inversions of sensations. Philosophica (Belgium) 68 (2):31-40.   (Google)
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (1999). Intrinsic phenomenal properties in color science: A reply to Peter Ross. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (1996). Pseudonormal vision: An actual case of qualia inversion? Philosophical Studies 82 (2):145-57.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google)
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (1999). Pseudonormal vision and color qualia. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
O'Brien, Gerard & Opie, Jonathan (1999). Finding a place for experience in the physical-relational structure of the brain. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):966-967.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In restricting his analysis to the causal relations of functionalism, on the one hand, and the neurophysiological realizers of biology, on the other, Palmer has overlooked an alternative conception of the relationship between color experience and the brain - one that liberalises the relation between mental phenomena and their physical implementation, without generating functionalism
O'Connor, D. J. (1955). Awareness and communication. Journal of Philosophy 52 (September):505-514.   (Google | More links)
Palmer, Stephen . (1999). Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):923-943.   (Cited by 78 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The relations among consciousness, brain, behavior, and scientific explanation are explored in the domain of color perception. Current scientific knowledge about color similarity, color composition, dimensional structure, unique colors, and color categories is used to assess Locke
Peirce, M. (2001). Inverted intuitions: Occupants and roles. Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-298.   (Google)
Pelczar, Michael (2008). On an argument for functional invariance. Minds and Machines 18 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of phenomenal experience
Rey, Georges (1992). Sensational sentences reversed. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):289-319.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google)
Ross, Peter W. (1999). Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Rumelin. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Ross, Peter W. (1999). Color science and spectrum inversion: Further thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):575-6.   (Google | More links)
Saunders, Barbara (1999). One machine among many. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):969-970.   (Google)
Abstract: In this commentary I point out that Palmer mislocates the source of the inverted spectrum, misrepresents the nature of colour science, and offers no reason for prefering one colour machine over another. I conclude nonetheless that talk about “colour machines” is a step in the right direction
Seager, William E. (1988). Weak supervenience and materialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (June):697-709.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1996). Color, subjective reactions, and qualia. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues. Atascadero: Ridgeview.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Let me begin by indicating where I think Harman and I are in agreement. We both think that "subjective reactions" must come into an account of color, although we have different views about how they do. We both think that perceptual experience has a "presentational or representational character," and that color is represented by our visual experiences as a feature of external objects, not as a feature of our experience. Moreover, we agree that, as Harman puts it, "color is experienced as a simple basic quality, rather than a disposition or complex of causal properties." As Harman emphasized in an earlier paper, 1 what we are introspectively aware of in our experience is its presentational or representational content, not any "mental paint" which bestows this content. I shall refer to all of this as Harman's "phenomenological point." Because we agree on this, we also agree that if his characters George and Mary were spectrum inverted relative to each other, supposing that to be possible, this would have to involve their perceiving the same objects as having different properties, this despite the fact that as normal perceivers they would perceive these objects as having the same colors. And I think we agree that in this case the properties would have to be relational ones, defined or constituted by their relations to the experiences of the subject perceiving them
Shoemaker, Sydney (1996). Intersubjective/intrasubjective. In Sydney Shoemaker (ed.), The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1975). Phenomenal similarity. Critica 7 (October):3-37.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (2006). The Frege-Schlick view. In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Google)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1982). The inverted spectrum. Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.   (Cited by 82 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Speaks, Jeff (forthcoming). Spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is impossible. Philosophical Studies.   (Google)
Abstract: Even if spectrum inversion of various sorts is possible, spectrum inversion without a difference in representation is not. So spectrum inversion does not pose a challenge for the intentionalist thesis that, necessarily, within a given sense modality, if two experiences are alike with respect to content, they are also alike with respect to their phenomenal character. On the contrary, reflection on variants of standard cases of spectrum inversion provides a strong argument for intentionalism. Depending on one's views about the possibility of various other sorts of spectrum inversion, the impossibility of spectrum inversion without difference in representation can also be used as an argument against a wide variety of reductive theories of mental representation.
Stalnaker, Robert (1999). Comparing qualia across persons. Philosophical Topics 26:385-406.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Sundstrom, Par (2002). An argument against spectrum inversion. In Sten Lindstrom & Par Sundstrom (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
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Taylor, Daniel M. (1966). The incommunicability of content. Mind 75 (October):527-41.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
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Thompson, Brad J. (2008). Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra. Synthese 160 (2):203-213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense of (...) Standard Russellianism is to hold that spectrum inversion without illusion is conceivable but not in fact possible. I argue that this response fails. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent mind-independent physical properties
Tolliver, Joseph Thomas (1999). Sensory holism and functionalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):972-973.   (Google)
Abstract: I defend the possibility of a functional account of the intrinsic qualities of sensory experience against the claim that functional characterization can only describe such qualities to the level of isomorphism of relational structures on those qualities. A form sensory holism might be true concerning the phenomenal, and this holism would account for some antifunctionalist intuition evoked by inverted spectrum and absent qualia arguments. Sensory holism is compatible with the correctness of functionalism about the phenomenal
Triplett, Timm (2006). Shoemaker on qualia, phenomenal properties and spectrum inversions. Philosophia 34 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Sydney Shoemaker offers an account of color perception that attempts to do justice, within a functionalist framework, to the commonsense view that colors are properties of ordinary objects, to the existence of qualia, and to the possibility of spectrum inversions. Shoemaker posits phenomenal properties as dispositional properties of colored objects that explain how there can be intersubjective variation in the experience of a particular color. I argue that his account does not in fact allow for the description of a spectrum inversion scenario, and that it cannot sustain a functionalist relationship between an object's color and its phenomenal properties. Functionalists must, however, come to terms with Shoemaker's recognition that intersubjective spectrum shifts are possible
Tye, Michael (1993). Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum. Noûs 27 (2):159-183.   (Cited by 21 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Tye, Michael (1994). Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum. Noûs 28 (2):159-183.   (Google | More links)
Viger, Christopher D. (1999). The possibility of subisomorphic experiential differences. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):975-975.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Palmer=s main intuition pump, the Acolor machine, @ greatly underestimates the complexity of a system isomorphic in color experience to humans. The neuroscientific picture of this complexity makes clear that the brain actively produces our experiences by processes that science can investigate, thereby supporting functionalism and leaving no (color) room for a passive observer to witness subisomorphic experiential differences
Webster, W. R. (2006). Human zombies are metaphysically impossible. Synthese 151 (2):297-310.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Chalmers (The Conscious Mind, Oxford Unversity Press, Oxford 1996) has argued for a form of property dualism on the basis of the concept of a zombie (which is physically identical to normals), and the concept of the inverted spectrum. He asserts that these concepts show that the facts about consciousness, such as experience or qualia, are really further facts about our world, over and above the physical facts. He claims that they are the hard part of the mind-body issue. He also claims that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the world like mass, charge, etc. He says that consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical and all current attempts to assert an identity between consciousness and the physical are just as non-reductive as his dualism. They are simply correlations and are part of the problem of the explanatory gap. In this paper, three examples of strong identities between a sensation or a quale and a physiological process are presented, which overcome these problems. They explain the identity in an a priori manner and they show that consciousness or sensations (Q) logically supervene on the physical (P), in that it is logically impossible to have P and not to have Q. In each case, the sensation was predicted and entailed by the physical. The inverted spectrum problem for consciousness is overcome and explained by a striking asymmetry in colour space. It is concluded that as some physical properties realize some sensations or qualia that human zombies are not metaphysically possible and the explanatory gap is bridged in these cases. Thus, the hard problem is overcome in these instances
Widmer, R.; Groning, O.; Ruffieux, P. & Groning, P. (2006). Low-temperature scanning tunneling spectroscopy on the 5-fold surface of the icosahedral alpdmn quasicrystal. Philosophical Magazine 86 (6-8):781-787.   (Google | More links)
Zemplén, Gábor A. (2004). Newton's colour circle and Palmer's “normal” colour space. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):166-168.   (Google)
Abstract: Taking the real Newtonian colour circle – and not the one Palmer depicts as Newton's – we don't have to wait 300 years for Palmer to say no to the Lockean aperçu about the inverted spectrum. One of the aims of this historical detour is to show that one's commitment about the “topology” of the colour space greatly affects Palmer's argument