MindPapers: 1.7e. Absent Qualia

Averill, Edward W. (1990). Functionalism, the absent qualia objection, and eliminativism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28:449-67. (Cited by 1 | Google | Annotation)

Block, Ned (1980). Are absent qualia impossible? Philosophical Review 89 (2):257-74. (Cited by 37 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Block, Ned (1978). Troubles with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325. (Cited by 440 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Abstract: The functionalist view of the nature of the mind is now widely accepted. Like behaviorism and physicalism, functionalism seeks to answer the question "What are mental states?" I shall be concerned with identity thesis formulations of functionalism. They say, for example, that pain is a functional state, just as identity thesis formulations of physicalism say that pain is a physical state

Block, Ned & Fodor, Jerry A. (1972). What psychological states are not. Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81. (Cited by 121 | Google | Annotation)

Bogen, J. (1981). Agony in the schools. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (March):1-21. (Cited by 3 | Google | Annotation)

Carleton, Lawrence Richard (1983). The population of china as one mind. Philosophy Research Archives 9:665-74. (Google | Annotation)

Chalmers, David J. (1995). Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 17 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Churchland, Paul M. & Churchland, Patricia S. (1981). Functionalism, qualia and intentionality. Philosophical Topics 12:121-32. (Cited by 23 | Google | Annotation)

Conee, Earl (1985). The possibility of absent qualia. Philosophical Review 94 (July):345-66. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Cuda, T. (1985). Against neural chauvinism. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):111-27. (Cited by 6 | Google | Annotation)

Davis, Lawrence H. (1982). Functionalism and absent qualia. Philosophical Studies 41 (March):231-49. (Cited by 7 | Google | Annotation)

Dempsey, L. (2002). Chalmers's fading and dancing qualia: Consciousness and the "hard problem". Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80. (Google)

Doore, G. (1981). Functionalism and absent qualia. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (March):387-402. (Google | More links | Annotation)

Dretske, Fred (1996). Absent qualia. Mind and Language 11 (1):78-85. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Elugardo, Reinaldo (1983). Functionalism and the absent qualia argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (June):161-80. (Google)

Elugardo, Reinaldo (1983). Functionalism, homunculi-heads and absent qualia. Dialogue 21 (March):47-56. (Google | Annotation)

Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1996). Functionalism's response to the problem of absent qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):357-73. (Google)

Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1996). Functionalism's response to the problem of absent qualia: More discussion of zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):357-373. (Google)

Hershfield, Jeffrey (2002). A note on the possibility of silicon brains and fading qualia. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (7):25-31. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Hill, Christopher S. (1991). Introspection and the skeptic. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Google | Annotation)

Jacoby, H. (1990). Empirical functionalism and conceivability arguments. Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):271-82. (Google | Annotation)

Juhl, Cory F. (1998). Conscious experience and the nontrivality principle. Philosophical Studies 91 (1):91-101. (Google)

Levin, Janet (1985). Functionalism and the argument from conceivability. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:85-104. (Cited by 11 | Google | Annotation)

Levine, Joseph M. (1988). Absent and inverted qualia revisited. Mind and Language 3:271-87. (Cited by 5 | Google | Annotation)

Sayan, E. (1988). A closer look at the chinese nation argument. Philosophy Research Archives 13:129-36. (Google | Annotation)

Shoemaker, Sydney (1981). Absent qualia are impossible -- a reply to Block. Philosophical Review 90 (October):581-99. (Cited by 17 | Google | More links | Annotation)

Shoemaker, Sydney (1975). Functionalism and qualia. Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315. (Cited by 95 | Google | Annotation)

Tye, Michael (2006). Absent qualia and the mind-body problem. Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

Abstract: At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by means of specifi c examples and associated comments

Tye, Michael (1993). Blindsight, the absent qualia hypothesis, and the mystery of consciousness. In Christopher Hookway (ed.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 11 | Google | Annotation)

White, Nicholas P. (1985). Professor Shoemaker and the so-called `qualia' of experience. Philosophical Studies 47 (May):369-383. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links | Annotation)

1.7a	Qualia, General [43]

1.7e	Absent Qualia [30]

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