MindPapers: 1.7f. Functionalism and Qualia

Block, Ned (2008). Consciousness and cognitive access. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):289-317. (Google | More links)

Abstract: This article concerns the interplay between two issues that involve both philosophy and neuroscience: whether the content of phenomenal consciousness is 'rich' or 'sparse', whether phenomenal consciousness goes beyond cognitive access, and how it would be possible for there to be evidence one way or the other

Brown, Mark T. (1983). Functionalism and sensations. Auslegung 10:218-28. (Annotation | Google)

Chalmers, David J. (1995). Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Abstract: It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the strength of the psychophysical link is the basis for debates over physicalism and property dualism. The second question concerns the shape of the laws: precisely how do phenomenal properties depend on physical properties? What sort of physical properties enter into the laws' antecedents, for instance; consequently, what sort of physical systems can give rise to conscious experience? It is this second question that I address in this paper

Clark, Andy (2000). A case where access implies qualia? Analysis 60 (1):30-37. (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)

Abstract: Block (1995) famously warns against the confusion of

Dumpleton, S. (1988). Sensation and function. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (September):376-89. (Google | More links)

Eshelman, L. J. (1977). Functionalism, sensations, and materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (June):255-74. (Google)

Georgiev, Danko (ms). Chalmers' principle of organizational invariance makes consciousness fundamental but meaningless spectator of its own drama. (Google | More links)

Abstract: It is argued that if consciousness is a fundamental ingredient of reality then no any psychophysical law such as Chalmers' principle of organizational invariance is needed to keep coherence between experience and function (conscious action). Indeed Chalmers' proposal suggests epiphenomenal consciousness and is regress to a nineteenth century absurd philosophy. The quantum mechanics is the most successful current physical theory and can naturally accommodate consciousness without violation of physical laws

Graham, George & Stephens, G. Lynn (1985). Are qualia a pain in the neck for functionalists? American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (January):73-80. (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)

Greenberg, William J. (1998). On Chalmers' "principle of organizational invariance" and his "dancing qualia" and "fading qualia" thought experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):53-58. (Google)

Hill, Christopher S. (1991). The failings of functionalism. In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge University Press. (Annotation | Google)

Horgan, Terence E. (1984). Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69. (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Huebner, Bryce; Bruno, Michael & Sarkissian, Hagop (2010). What does the nation of china think about phenomenal states? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2). (Google | More links)

Abstract: Critics of functionalism about the mind often rely on the intuition that collectivities cannot be conscious in motivating their positions. In this paper, we consider the merits of appealing to the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity. We demonstrate that collective mentality is not an affront to commonsense, and we report evidence that demonstrates that the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity is, to some extent, culturally specific rather than universally held. This being the case, we argue that mere appeal to the intuitive implausibility of collective consciousness does not offer any genuine insight into the nature of mentality in general, nor the nature of consciousness in particular

Jarrett, Greg (1996). Analyzing mental demonstratives. Philosophical Studies 84 (1):49-62. (Google | More links)

Levine, Joseph (1999). Philosophy as massage: Seeking relief from conscious tension. Philosophical Topics 26:159-78. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Littlejohn, Clayton (2009). On the coherence of inversion. Acta Analytica 24 (2). (Google | More links)

Abstract: In this paper, I shall evaluate a strategy recently used to try to demonstrate the impossibility of behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion. After showing that the impossibility proof proves too much, I shall identify where it goes wrong. In turn, I shall explain why someone attracted to functionalist and representationalist assumptions might rightly remain agnostic about the possibility of inversion

Lycan, William G. (1981). Form, function and feel. Journal of Philosophy 78 (January):24-50. (Cited by 32 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Lycan, William G. (1987). Homunctionalism and qualia. In Consciousness. MIT Press. (Annotation | Google)

Macpherson, Fiona (2007). Synaesthesia. In Mario de Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Kleuwer. (Google | More links)

Moor, James H. (1988). Testing robots for qualia. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer. (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)

Nemirow, Laurence (1979). Functionalism and the Subjective Quality of Experience. Dissertation, Stanford University (Cited by 2 | Google)

Pelczar, Michael (2008). On an argument for functional invariance. Minds and Machines 18 (3). (Google | More links)

Abstract: The principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of phenomenal experience

Pettit, Philip (2003). Looks as powers. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):221-52. (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)

Abstract: Although they may differ on the reason why, many philosophers hold that it is a priori that an object is red if and only if it is such as to look red to normal observers in normal conditions

Rey, Georges (1994). Wittgenstein, computationalism, and qualia. In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky. (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)

Seager, William E. (1983). Functionalism, qualia and causation. Mind 92 (April):174-88. (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Shoemaker, Sydney (1994). The first-person perspective. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 68 (2):7-22. (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)

Van Gulick, Robert (2007). Functionalism and qualia. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. (Google)

van Heuveln, B.; Dietrich, Eric & Oshima, M. (1998). Let's dance! The equivocation in Chalmers' dancing qualia argument. Minds and Machines 8 (2):237-249. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)

van Gulick, Robert (1988). Qualia, functional equivalence and computation. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on Mind. Kluwer. (Annotation | Google)

White, Stephen L. (1986). Curse of the qualia. Synthese 68 (August):333-68. (Cited by 30 | Annotation | Google | More links)

Wright, Edmond L. (1993). More qualia trouble for functionalism: The Smythies TV-Hood analogy. Synthese 97 (3):365-82. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)

Abstract: It is the purpose of this article to explicate the logical implications of a television analogy for perception, first suggested by John R. Smythies (1956). It aims to show not only that one cannot escape the postulation of qualia that have an evolutionary purpose not accounted for within a strong functionalist theory, but also that it undermines other anti-representationalist arguments as well as some representationalist ones

Zuboff, Arnold (1994). What is a mind? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19:183-205. (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)

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