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2.1. Propositional Attitudes (Propositional Attitudes on PhilPapers)

See also:
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1995). Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Explaining Attitudes offers a timely and important challenge to the dominant conception of belief found in the work of such philosophers as Dretske and Fodor. According to this dominant view beliefs, if they exist at all, are constituted by states of the brain. Lynne Rudder Baker rejects this view and replaces it with a quite different approach - practical realism. Seen from the perspective of practical realism, any argument that interprets beliefs as either brain states or states of immaterial souls is a 'non-starter'. Practical realism takes beliefs to be states of the whole persons, rather like states of health. What a person believes is determined by what a person would do, say and think in various circumstances. Thus beliefs and other attitudes are interwoven into an integrated, commonsensical conception of reality
Field, Hartry H. (2001). Truth and the Absence of Fact. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Presenting a selection of thirteen essays on various topics at the foundations of philosophy--one previously unpublished and eight accompanied by substantial new postscripts--this book offers outstanding insight on truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes; semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of "factual defectiveness;" and issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. It will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics
Landy, David (2005). Inside doubt: On the non-identity of the theory of mind and propositional attitude psychology. Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Eliminative materialism is a popular view of the mind which holds that propositional attitudes, the typical units of our traditional understanding, are unsupported by modern connectionist psychology and neuroscience, and consequently that propositional attitudes are a poor scientific postulate, and do not exist. Since our traditional folk psychology employs propositional attitudes, the usual argument runs, it too represents a poor theory, and may in the future be replaced by a more successful neurologically grounded theory, resulting in a drastic improvement in our interpersonal relationships. I contend that these eliminativist arguments typically run together two distinct capacities: the folk psychological mechanisms which we use to understand one another, and scientific and philosophical guesses about the structure of those understandings. Both capacities are ontologically committed and therefore empirical. However, the commitments whose prospects look so dismal to the eliminativist, in particular the causal and logical image of propositional attitudes, belong to the guesses, and not necessarily to the underlying mechanisms. It is the commitments of traditional philosophical perspectives about the operation of our folk psychology which are contradicted by?new evidence and modeling methods in connectionist psychology. Our actual folk psychology was not clearly committed to causal, sentential propositional attitudes, and thus is not directly threatened by connectionist psychology
Ludwig, Kirk & Ray, Greg (1998). Semantics for opaque contexts. Philosophical Perspectives 12:141--66.   (Google)

2.1a The Language of Thought

73 / 86 entries displayed

Antony, Louise M. (ms). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought.   (Google)
Arikha, Noga (2005). Deafness, ideas and the language of thought in the late 1600s. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):233 – 262.   (Google | More links)
Aydede, Murat (1995). Connectionism and the language of thought. CSLI Technical Report.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Fodor and Pylyshyn's (F&P) critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought'' (LOT). Some connectionists declined to meet the challenge on the basis that the alleged regularities are somehow spurious. Some, like Smolensky, however, took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that are supposed to be non-classical
Aydede, Murat (1997). Language of thought: The connectionist contribution. Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not implementation models because, it is claimed, the way they obtain syntax and structure sensitivity is not "concatenative," hence "radically different" from the way classicists handle them. In this paper, I offer an analysis of what it is to physically satisfy/realize a formal system. In this context, I examine the minimal truth-conditions of LOT Hypothesis. From my analysis it will follow that concatenative realization of formal systems is irrelevant to LOTH since the very notion of LOT is indifferent to such an implementation level issue as concatenation. I will conclude that to the extent to which they can explain the law-like cognitive regularities, a certain class of connectionist models proposed as radical alternatives to the classical LOT paradigm will in fact turn out to be LOT models, even though new and potentially very exciting ones
Aydede, Murat (online). The language of thought hypothesis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 1 *Common Sense Conception of Beliefs and Other Propositional Attitudes 2 What is the Language of Thought Hypothesis? 3 Status of LOTH 4 Scope of LOTH 5 *Natural Language as Mentalese? 6 *Nativism and LOTH 7 Naturalism and LOTH
Aydede, Murat (ms). Language of thought hypothesis: State of the art.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in syntactic operations defined over representations. Most of the arguments for LOTH derive their strength from their ability to explain certain empirical phenomena like productivity, systematicity of thought and thinking
Barwise, Jon (1987). Unburdening the language of thought. Mind and Language 2:82-96.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Beckermann, Ansgar (1994). Can there be a language of thought? In G. White, B. Smith & R. Casati (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: 1. Cognitive sciences in a broad sense are simply all those sciences which concern themselves with the analysis and explanation of cognitive capacities and achievements. If one speaks of _cognitive science_ in the singular, however, usually something more is meant. Cognitive science is not only characterized by a specific object of research, but also through a particular kind of explanatory paradigm, i.e. the information processing paradigm. Stillings _et. al. _for example begin their book _Cognitive Science _as follows: <blockquote> Cognitive scientists view the human mind as a complex system that receives, stores,<br> retrieves, transforms, and transmits information. (Stillings 1987: 1) </blockquote> The information processing paradigm however, leads directly to the paradigm of symbol processing, because a system can, as it seems, only receive, store and process information if it has at its disposal a system of internal representations or _symbols_, i.e. an internal language in which this information is encoded. At least this appears to be an idea which suggests itself and which Peter Hacker expresses as follows
Blumson, Ben (online). Mental maps.   (Google)
Abstract: It’s often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity for the Language of Thought Hypothesis – the hypothesis that mental structure is language-like. In this paper, I argue that the Map Hypothesis does not undermine the argument, because it is not in fact a genuine alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis
Braddon-Mitchell, David & Fitzpatrick, J. (1990). Explanation and the language of thought. Synthese 83 (1):3-29.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cargile, James (2010). The language of thought revisited. Analysis 70 (2).   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1999). Is there synonymy in Ockham's mental language. In P. V. Spade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: William of Ockham's semantic theory was founded on the idea that thought takes place in a language not unlike the languages in which spoken and written communication occur. This mental language was held to have a number of features in common with everyday languages. For example, mental language has simple terms, not unlike words, out of which complex expressions can be constructed. As with words, each of these terms has some meaning, or signification; in fact Ockham held that the signification of everyday words derives precisely from the signification of mental terms. Furthermore, the meaning of a mental expression depends directly on the meaning of its constituent terms, as is the case with expressions in more familiar languages
Cole, David (2009). Jerry Fodor, lot 2: The language of thought revisited , new York: Oxford university press, 2008, X+228, $37.95, isbn 978-0-119-954877-. Minds and Machines 19 (3).   (Google)
Crane, Tim (1990). The language of thought: No syntax without semantics. Mind and Language 5 (3):187-213.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Davies, Martin (1992). Aunty's own argument for the language of thought. In Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Kluwer.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Davies, Martin (1991). Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought. Philosophy and connectionist theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Annotation | Google)
Davies, Martin (1991). Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought. In W Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a _prima facie_ tension between our commonsense conception of ourselves as thinkers and the connectionist programme for modelling cognitive processes. The language of thought hypothesis plays a pivotal role. The connectionist paradigm is opposed to the language of thought; and there is an argument for the language of thought that draws on features of the commonsense scheme of thoughts, concepts, and inference. Most of the paper (Sections 3-7) is taken up with the argument for the language of thought hypothesis. The argument for an opposition between connectionism and the language of thought comes towards the end (Section 8), along with some discussion of the potential eliminativist consequences (Sections 9 and
Davies, Martin (1998). Language, thought, and the language of thought (aunty's own argument revisited). In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this chapter, I shall be examining an argument for the language of thought hypothesis
DeWitt, Richard (1995). Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought. Psyche 1.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (1990). Conceptual dependency as the language of thought. Synthese 82 (2):275-96.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Egan, M. F. (1991). Propositional attitudes and the language of thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (September):379-88.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Field, Hartry (1978). Mental representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-18.   (Cited by 179 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 1815 | Annotation | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1987). Why there still has to be a language of thought. In Psychosemantics. MIT Press.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Garson, James W. (1998). Chaotic emergence and the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):303-315.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explore the merits of the idea that dynamical systems theory (also known as chaos theory) provides a model of the mind that can vindicate the language of thought (LOT). I investigate the nature of emergent structure in dynamical systems to assess its compatibility with causally efficacious syntactic structure in the brain. I will argue that anyone who is committed to the idea that the brain's functioning depends on emergent features of dynamical systems should have serious reservations about the LOT. First, dynamical systems theory casts doubt on one of the strongest motives for believing in the LOT: principle P, the doctrine that structure found in an effect must also be found in its cause. Second, chaotic emergence is a double-edged sword. Its tendency to cleave the psychological from the neurological undermines foundations for belief in the existence of causally efficacious representations. Overall, a dynamic conception of the brain sways us away from realist conclusions about the causal powers of representations with constituent structure
Garson, James W. (2002). Evolution, consciousness, and the language of thought. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Gauker, Christopher (1998). Are there wordlike concepts too? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):70-71.   (Google)
Abstract: Millikan proposes that there are mapping functions through which spoken sentences represent reality. Such mappings seem to depend on thoughts that words express and on concepts as components of such thoughts, but such concepts would conflict with Millikan's other claims about concepts and language
Glock, Hans-Johann (2010). Reviews lot 2: The language of thought revisited by Jerry A. Fodor oxford university press, 2008. Philosophy 85 (1):164-167.   (Google)
Horsey, Richard (2001). Definitions: Implications for syntax, semantics, and the language of thought, by Annabel Cormack. Mind and Language 16 (3):345–349.   (Google | More links)
Johnson, Kent (2004). On the systematicity of the language of thought. Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):111-139.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Knowles, Jonathan (1998). The language of thought and natural language understanding. Analysis 58 (4):264-272.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2004). Another argument against the thesis that there is a language of thought. Communication and Cognition 37 (2):83-103.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Laurence, Stephen & Margolis, Eric (1997). Regress arguments against the language of thought. Analysis 57 (1):60-66.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Leeds, Stephen (2002). Perception, transparency, and the language of thought. Noûs 36 (1):104-129.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1988). Demonstrating in mentalese. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Losonsky, Michael (1992). Leibniz's adamic language of thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (4).   (Google)
Machery, Edouard (2005). You don't know how you think: Introspection and language of thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):469-485.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non-linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content of our thoughts with their vehicles: while sententialism is a thesis about the vehicles of our thoughts, inner speech sentences are the content of auditory or articulatory images. The rebuttal of the introspective argument for sententialism is shown to have a general significance in cognitive science: introspection does not tell us how we think. The problem The introspective argument for sententialism The argument for the blindness of introspection thesis Objections and replies Conclusion
Markic, Olga (1999). Connectionism and the language of thought: The cross-context stability of representations. Acta Analytica 22 (22):43-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Markic, Olga (2001). Is language of thought a conceptual necessity? Acta Analytica 16 (26):53-60.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
McDonough, Richard (1994). Wittgenstein's reversal on the `language of thought' doctrine. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):482-494.   (Google | More links)
Pollock, John L. (1990). Understanding the language of thought. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):95-120.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Rantala, V. & Vaden, Tere (1997). Minds as connoting systems: Logic and the language of thought. Erkenntnis 46 (3):315-334.   (Google | More links)
Rescorla, Michael (2009). Cognitive maps and the language of thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Fodor advocates a view of cognitive processes as computations defined over the language of thought (or Mentalese). Even among those who endorse Mentalese, considerable controversy surrounds its representational format. What semantically relevant structure should scientific psychology attribute to Mentalese symbols? Researchers commonly emphasize logical structure, akin to that displayed by predicate calculus sentences. To counteract this tendency, I discuss computational models of navigation drawn from probabilistic robotics. These models involve computations defined over cognitive maps, which have geometric rather than logical structure. They thereby demonstrate the possibility of rational cognitive processes in an exclusively non-logical representational medium. Furthermore, they offer much promise for the empirical study of animal navigation.
Rey, Georges (1995). A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thought. Philosophical Perspectives 9:201-22.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (1991). Sensations in a language of thought. Philosophical Issues 1:73-112.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Rives, Bradley, Review of LOT 2: The language of thought revisited.   (Google)
Abstract: It has been over thirty years since the publication of Jerry Fodor’s landmark book The Language of Thought (LOT 1). In LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Fodor provides an update on his thoughts concerning a range of topics that have been the focus of his work in the intervening decades. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), the central thesis of LOT 1, remains intact in LOT 2: mental states are relations between organisms and syntactically-structured mental representations, and mental processes are computations defined over such representations. The differences between LOT 1 and LOT 2 are mostly differences of focus. Whereas LOT 1 had a number of targets—e.g. reductionism, behaviorism, empiricism, and operationalism—LOT 2 identifies “pragmatism” as the main enemy of the “Cartesian” kind of mentalism Fodor favors (pp. 11-12). Moreover, unlike LOT 1, a main aim of LOT 2 is to defend a theory of concepts that is atomistic and referentialist: lexical concepts lack structure, and their meaning is determined by their relation to the world and not by their relations to other concepts (pp. 16-20). In addition to new discussions of concepts and content, LOT 2 treats us to Fodor’s latest thoughts on compositionality, computationalism, nativism, nonconceptual content, and the causal theory of reference. Although those familiar with Fodor’s work over the last thirty years will find its main conclusions unsurprising, LOT 2 is nevertheless an exciting, breezily written book that’s full of stimulating arguments and (in standard Fodor style) immensely interesting digressions. In the Introduction, Fodor bundles together a number of distinct doctrines under “pragmatism”—e.g., that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that in the order of intentional explanation” (p. 10), and that “the distinctive function of the mind is guiding action” (p. 13). But it’s clear by Chapter 2 that his main target is “concept pragmatism,” according to which concepts are individuated by their inferential properties. Fodor’s “Cartesianism,” in contrast, has it that none of the epistemic properties of concepts are constitutive..
Rives, Bradley (2009). Lot 2: The language of thought revisited. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):525 – 529.   (Google)
Rowlands, Mark (1994). Connectionism and the language of thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the level of cognition. I shall argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument is based on a crucial misunderstanding, the same misunderstanding which motivates the entire language of thought hypothesis
Rupert, Robert D. (2001). Coining terms in the language of thought: Innateness, emergence, and the lot of Cummins's argument against the causal theory of mental content. Journal of Philosophy 98 (10):499-530.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,
Rupert, Robert (2008). Causal theories of mental content. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):353–380.   (Google | More links)
Rupert, Robert (2008). Frege’s puzzle and Frege cases: Defending a quasi-syntactic solution. Cognitive Systems Research 9:76-91.   (Google)
Rupert, Robert D. (1998). On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought. Synthese 117 (1):95-131.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Schiffer, Stephen R. (1987). Intentionality and the language of thought. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:35-55.   (Google)
Schroder, Jurgen (1998). Knowledge of rules, causal systematicity, and the language of thought. Synthese 117 (3):313-330.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined. It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads to a counterintuitive consequence: it groups together distributed connectionist systems with look-up tables. To avoid this consequence, a modified construal of causal systematicity is proposed and Davies' argument for the causal systematicity of thought is shown to be question-begging. It is briefly sketched how the modified construal links up with multiple dispositions of the same categorical base. Finally, the question of the causal efficacy of single rules is distinguished from the question of their psychological reality: implicit rules might be psychologically real without being causally efficacious
Schneider, Susan (2009). Lot, ctm, and the elephant in the room. Synthese 170 (2):235-250.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol
Schneider, Susan, The central system as a computational engine.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Language of Thought program has a suicidal edge. Jerry Fodor, of all people, has argued that although LOT will likely succeed in explaining modular processes, it will fail to explain the central system, a subsystem in the brain in which information from the different sense modalities is integrated, conscious deliberation occurs, and behavior is planned. A fundamental characteristic of the central system is that it is “informationally unencapsulated” -- its operations can draw from information from any cognitive domain. The domain general nature of the central system is key to human reasoning; our ability to connect apparently unrelated concepts enables the creativity and flexibility of human thought, as does our ability to integrate material across sensory divides. The central system is the holy grail of cognitive science: understanding higher cognitive function is crucial to grasping how humans reach their highest intellectual achievements. But according to Fodor, the founding father of the LOT program and the related Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), the holy grail is out of reach: the central system is likely to be non-computational (Fodor 1983, 2000, 2008). Cognitive scientists working on higher cognitive function should abandon their efforts. Research should be limited to the modules, which for Fodor rest at the sensory periphery (2000).1 Cognitive scientists who work in the symbol processing tradition outside of philosophy would reject this pessimism, but ironically, within philosophy itself, this pessimistic streak has been very influential, most likely because it comes from the most well-known proponent of LOT and CTM. Indeed, pessimism about centrality has become assimilated into the mainstream conception of LOT. (Herein, I refer to a LOT that appeals to pessimism about centrality as the “standard LOT”). I imagine this makes the standard LOT unattractive to those philosophers with a more optimistic approach to what cognitive science can achieve..
Schneider, Susan (2009). The language of thought. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the language of thought (or
Schiffer, Stephen R. (1994). The language-of-thought relation and its implications. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):263-85.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Schneider, Susan (2009). The nature of symbols in the language of thought. Mind and Language 24 (5):523-553.   (Google)
Abstract: The core of the language of thought program is the claim that thinking is the manipulation of symbols according to rules. Yet LOT has said little about symbol natures, and existing accounts are highly controversial. This is a major flaw at the heart of the LOT program: LOT requires an account of symbol natures to naturalize intentionality, to determine whether the brain even engages in symbol manipulations, and to understand how symbols relate to lower-level neurocomputational states. This paper provides the much-needed theory of symbols, and in doing so, alters the LOT program in significant respects
Schneider, Susan (forthcoming). The nature of primitive symbols in the language of thought. Mind and Language.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper provides a theory of the nature of symbols in the language of thought (LOT). My discussion consists in three parts. In part one, I provide three arguments for the individuation of primitive symbols in terms of total computational role. The first of these arguments claims that Classicism requires that primitive symbols be typed in this manner; no other theory of typing will suffice. The second argument contends that without this manner of symbol individuation, there will be computational processes that fail to supervene on syntax, together with the rules of composition and the computational algorithms. The third argument says that cognitive science needs a natural kind that is typed by total computational role. Otherwise, either cognitive science will be incomplete, or its laws will have counterexamples. Then, part two defends this view from a criticism, offered by both Jerry Fodor and Jesse Prinz, who respond to my view with the charge that because the types themselves are individuated
Silby, Brent (ms). Revealing the language of thought.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Smolensky, Paul (1991). Connectionism, constituency and the language of thought. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 68 | Annotation | Google)
Sorensen, Roy A. (1991). Vagueness within the language of thought. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):389-413.   (Google | More links)
Stalnaker, Robert (1991). How to do semantics for the language of thought. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google)
Teng, Norman Y. (1999). The language of thought and the embodied nature of language use. Philosophical Studies 94 (3):237-251.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
ter Hark, Michel (1995). Connectionism, behaviourism, and the language of thought. In Cognitive Patterns in Science and Common Sense. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Google)
Viger, Christopher D. (2001). Locking on to the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):203-215.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I demonstrate that locking on, a key notion in Jerry Fodor's most recent theory of content, supplemented informational atomism (SIA), is cashed out in terms of asymmetric dependence, the central notion in his earlier theory of content. I use this result to argue that SIA is incompatible with the language of thought hypothesis because the constraints on the causal relations into which symbols can enter imposed by the theory of content preclude the causal relations needed between symbols for them to serve as the elements of the medium of thought
Viger, Christopher D. (2005). Learning to think: A response to the language of thought argument for innateness. Mind and Language 20 (3):313-25.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Jerry Fodor's argument for an innate language of thought continues to be a hurdle for researchers arguing that natural languages provide us with richer conceptual systems than our innate cognitive resources. I argue that because the logical/formal terms of natural languages are given a usetheory of meaning, unlike predicates, logical/formal terms might be learned without a mediating internal representation. In that case, our innate representational system might have less logical structure than a natural language, making it possible that we augment our innate representational system and improve our ability to think by learning a natural language
Vinueza, Adam (2000). Sensations and the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I discuss two forms of the thesis that to have a sensation is to token a sentence in a language of thought-what I call, following Georges Rey, the sensational sentences thesis. One form of the thesis is a version of standard functionalism, while the other is a version of the increasingly popular thesis that for a sensation to have qualia is for it to have a certain kind of intentional content-that is, intentionalism. I defend the basic idea behind the sensational sentences thesis, and argue that the intentionalist version is either false or collapses into the standard functionalist thesis
Weiskopf, Daniel (2002). A critical review of Jerry A. Fodor's the mind doesn't work that way. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551 – 562.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The "New Synthesis" in cognitive science is committed to the computational theory of mind (CTM), massive modularity, nativism, and adaptationism. In The mind doesn't work that way , Jerry Fodor argues that CTM has problems explaining abductive or global inference, but that the New Synthesis offers no solution, since massive modularity is in fact incompatible with global cognitive processes. I argue that it is not clear how global human mentation is, so whether CTM is imperiled is an open question. Massive modularity also lacks some of the invidious commitments Fodor ascribes to it. Furthermore, Fodor's anti-adaptationist arguments are in tension with his nativism about the contents of modular systems. The New Synthesis thus has points worth preserving
White, Stephen L. (1982). Partial character and the language of thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (October):347-65.   (Cited by 35 | Annotation | Google)
Wilson, Mark (2009). Review of Jerry A. Fodor, Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).   (Google)
Yagisawa, Takashi (1994). Thinking in neurons: Comments on Stephen Schiffer's The Language-of-Thought Relation and its Implications. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):287-96.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

2.1b The Intentional Stance

Andrews, Kristin (2000). Our understanding of other minds: Theory of mind and the intentional stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a `theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all but meaningless. This entailment should not be accepted; instead, Dennett's position that intentional behaviour is best predictable via the intentional stance should be rejected in favour of a pluralistic view of behaviour prediction. I introduce an additional method which humans often use to predict intentional and non-intentional behaviour, which could be called the inductive stance.
Bechtel, William P. (1985). Realism, instrumentalism, and the intentional stance. Cognitive Science 9:265-92.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Beisecker, David (2002). Dennett and the Quest for real meaning: In defense of a myth. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 9 (1):11-18.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bortolotti, Lisa (2003). Inconsistency and interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper my purpose is to examine whether the case of inconsistent believers can offer a reason to object to theories of belief ascription that rely on a rationality constraint. I shall first illustrate how the possibility of inconsistent believers might be a challenge for the rationality constraint and then assess Davidson's influential reply to that challenge.
Bradshaw, Denny E. (1998). Patterns and descriptions. Philosophical Papers 27 (3):181-202.   (Google)
Cam, Philip (1984). Dennett on intelligent storage. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):247-62.   (Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (1990). Belief, opinion and consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):139-154.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Cohen, B. (1995). Patterns lost: Indeterminism and Dennett's realism about beliefs. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 76 (1):17-31.   (Google)
Cummins, Robert E. (1981). What can be learned from brainstorms? Philosophical Topics 12:83-92.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Davies, David (1995). Dennett's stance on intentional realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):299-312.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.   (Cited by 873 | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1971). Intentional systems. Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.   (Cited by 233 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1981). Making sense of ourselves. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):63-81.   (Cited by 19 | Annotation | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1988). Precis of the intentional stance. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9:13-25.   (Annotation | Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Real patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.   (Cited by 189 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist
Dennett, Daniel C. (1990). The interpretation of texts, people and other artifacts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Supplement) 50:177-194.   (Cited by 41 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: I want to explore four different exercises of interpretation: (1) the interpretation of texts (or hermeneutics), (2) the interpretation of people (otherwise known as "attribution" psychology, or cognitive or intentional psychology), (3) the interpretation of other artifacts (which I shall call artifact hermeneutics), (4) the interpretation of organism design in evolutionary biology--the controversial interpretive activity known as adaptationism
Dennett, Daniel C. (1987). The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1920 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
Fodor, Jerry A. & Lepore, Ernest (1993). Is intentional ascription intrinsically normative? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1981). Three cheers for propositional attitudes. In Jerry A. Fodor (ed.), RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Foss, Jeffrey E. (1994). On the evolution of intentionality as seen from the intentional stance. Inquiry 37 (3):287-310.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Foxall, Gordon R. (1999). The contextual stance. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of intentional systems is an exemplar of the interpretive stance radical behaviorism requires; a corresponding interpretive position can be based initially on a radical behaviorist view of human behavior and its determinants. This "contextual stance" is ontologically and methodologically distinct from the intentional stance over the range of explanations for which scientific psychology, cognitive or behaviorist, is responsible
Griffin, Richard (ms). The intentional stance: Developmental and neurocognitive perspectives.   (Google)
Abstract: Nowhere in the psychological sciences has the philosophy of mind had more influence than on the child development literature generally referred to as children’s ‘theory of mind.’ Developmental journals may seem to be an unlikely place to find Brentano, Frege, and Dennett alongside descriptions of referential opacity and the principle of substitutivity, but it is not at all uncommon in this literature. While the many problems and complexities of the propositional attitude literature are still hotly debated by philosophers, and often ill understood by scientists working in this area, a great deal of empirical progress has already been made. We have Dan Dennett to thank for this extraordinary dialogue between these disciplines
Haugeland, John (1993). Pattern and being. In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Heitner, Reese M. (2000). Is design relative or real? Dennett on intentional relativism and physical realism. Minds and Machines 10 (2):267-83.   (Google | More links)
Hornsby, Jennifer (1992). Physics, biology, and common-sense psychology. In David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Joslin, David (2006). Real realization: Dennett's real patterns versus Putnam's ubiquitous automata. Minds and Machines 16 (1):29-41.   (Google | More links)
Kenyon, Timothy A. (2000). Indeterminacy and realism. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Google)
Kirk, Robert E. (1993). Indeterminacy of interpretation, idealization, and norms. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):213-223.   (Google | More links)
Lyons, William E. (1990). Intentionality and modern philosophical psychology I: The modern reduction of intentionality. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):247-69.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In rounded terms and modem dress a theory of intentionality is a theory about how humans take in information via the senses and in the very process of taking it in understand it and, most often, make subsequent use of it in guiding human behaviour. The problem of intentionality in this century has been the problem of providing an adequate explanation of how a purely physical causal system, the brain, can both receive information and at the same time understand it, that is, to put it even more briefly, how a brain can have semantic content. In these two articles, one in this issue of the journal and one in the next, I engage in a critical examination of the two most thoroughly canvassed approaches to the theory and problem of intentionality in philosophical psychology over the last hundred years. In the first article, entitled 'The modern reduction of intentionality, ' I examine the approach pioneered by Carnap and reaching its apotheosis in the work of Daniel Dennett. In the second article, entitled 'The return to representation, 'I examine the approach which can be traced back to the work of Noam Chomsky but which has been given its canonical treatment in the work of Jerry Fodor
McCulloch, Gregory (1990). Dennett's little grains of salt. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):1-12.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. & O'Leary-Hawthorne, John (1995). Dennett's logical behaviorism. Philosophical Topics 22:189-258.   (Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2000). Why intentional systems theory cannot reconcile physicalism with realism about belief and desire. Protosociology 14:145-157.   (Google)
Menuge, Angus (2003). A critique of Dennett's evolutionary account of intentionality. Pcid 2.   (Google)
Millikan, Ruth G. (2000). Reading mother nature's mind. In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I try to focus our differences by examining the relation between what Dennett has termed "the intentional stance" and "the design stance." Dennett takes the intentional stance to be more basic than the design stance. Ultimately it is through the eyes of the intentional stance that both human and natural design are interpreted, hence there is always a degree of interpretive freedom in reading the mind, the purposes, both of Nature and of her children. The reason, or at least a reason, is that intentional interpretation is holistic, hence indeterminate, for the kinds of reasons given by Davidson and Quine. In contrast, I take the design stance to be more basic than the intentional stance. Intentional attributions express our best guesses about the locations of effects of certain kinds of natural design. And although there is often indeterminacy, ambiguity, or vagueness concerning what it is that natural selection (or learning) has selected for, these indeterminacies and vaguenesses are local, not holistic. There is reason to suppose that the better portion of Nature's purposes and the intentional states of her children are determinate in content within quite closely defined limits. I propose to defend this position as well as I can, so as to call from Dennett his own views on precisely where our paths separate (if they really do)
Mirolli, Marco (2002). A naturalistic perspective on intentionality: Interview with Daniel Dennett. Mind and Society 3 (6):1-12.   (Google)
Narayanan, Ajit (1996). The intentional stance and the imitation game. In Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Nelkin, Norton (1994). Patterns. Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.   (Annotation | Google)
Price, Huw (1995). Psychology in perspective. In M. Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: [email: huw@extro.su.oz.au] If recent literature is to be our guide, the main place of philosophy in the study of the mind would seem to be to determine the place of psychology in the study of the world. One distinctive kind of answer to this question begins by noting the central role of intentionality in psychology, and goes on to argue that this sets psychology apart from the natural sciences. Sometimes to be thus set apart is to be exiled, or rejected, but more often it is a protective move, intended to show that psychology is properly insulated from the reductionist demands of natural science. I am interested here in the general issue as to how this move to insulate intentional psychology should best be characterised-how to make sense of the idea that there can be a legitimate enterprise of this kind. I shall concentrate on what is perhaps the best known version of such a view, that of Daniel Dennett. I think that my conclusions apply to other versions as well, but Dennett provides a particularly accessible example
Radner, Daisie M. & Radner, Michael (1995). Cognition, natural selection, and the intentional stance. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9 (2):109-19.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Ratcliffe, Matthew (2001). A Kantian stance on the intentional stance. Biology and Philosophy 16 (1):29-52.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Richardson, Robert C. (1980). Intentional realism or intentional instrumentalism? Cognition and Brain Theory 3:125-35.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Richard, Mark E. (1995). What isn't a belief? Philosophical Topics 22:291-318.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). Instrumentalism: Back from the Brink? In Lynne Rudder Baker (ed.), Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1989). Instrumental intentionality. Philosophy of Science 56 (June):303-16.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Seager, William E. (2000). Real patterns and surface metaphysics. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Naturalism is supposed to be a Good Thing. So good in fact that everybody wants to be a naturalist, no matter what their views might be1. Thus there is some confusion about what, exactly, naturalism is. In what follows, I am going to be pretty much, though not exclusively, concerned with the topics of intentionality and consciousness, which only deepens the confusion for these are two areas
Sharpe, R. A. (1989). Dennett's journey towards panpsychism. Inquiry 32 (2):233-40.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Shoham, Yoav (1991). Implementing the intentional stance. In Philosophy and AI. Cambridge: MIT Press.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Slors, Marc V. P. (2007). Intentional systems theory, mental causation and empathic resonance. Erkenntnis 67 (2):321-336.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In the first section of this paper I argue that the main reason why Daniel Dennett’s Intentional Systems Theory (IST) has been perceived as behaviourist or antirealist is its inability to account for the causal efficacy of the mental. The rest of the paper is devoted to the claim that by emending the theory with a phenomenon called ‘empathic resonance’ (ER), it can account for the various explananda in the mental causation debate. Thus, IST + ER is a much more viable option than IST, even though IST + ER assigns a crucial role to the phenomenology of agency, a role that is incompatible with Dennett’s writings on consciousness
Slors, Marc (1996). Why Dennett cannot explain what it is to adopt the intentional stance. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):93-98.   (Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. (1981). Dennett on intentional systems. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):39-62.   (Cited by 22 | Annotation | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1980). Headaches. Philosophical Books 21:65-73.   (Annotation | Google)
Talvitie, Vesa (2003). Repressed contents reconsidered: Repressed contents and Dennett's intentional stance approach. Theoria Et Historia Scientiarum 7 (2):19-30.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Viger, Christopher D. (2000). Where do Dennett's stances stand? Explaining our kinds of minds. In Andrew Brook, Don Ross & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press.   (Google)
Weber, Marcel, Behavioral traits, the intentional stance, and biological functions.   (Google)
Abstract: It has been claimed that the intentional stance is necessary to individuate behavioral traits. This thesis, while clearly false, points to two interesting sets of problems concerning biological explanations of behavior: The first is a general in the philosophy of science: the theory-ladenness of observation. The second problem concerns the principles of trait individuation, which is a general problem in philosophy of biology. After discussing some alternatives, I show that one way of individuating the behavioral traits of an organism is by a special use of the concept of biological function, as understood in an enriched causal role (not selected effect) sense. On this view, a behavioral trait is essentially a special kind of regularity, namely a regularity that is produced by some regulatory mechanism. Regulatory mechanisms always require goal states, which can only be provided by functional considerations. As an example from actual (as opposed to folk) science, I examine the case of social behavior in nematodes. I show that the attempt to explain this phenomenon actually transformed it. This supports the view that scientific explanation does not explain an explanandum phenomenon that is given prior to the explanation; rather, the explanandum is changed by the explanation. This means that there could be a plurality of stances that have some heuristic value initially, but which will be abandoned in favor of a functional characterization eventually
Webb, Sherisse (1994). Witnessed behavior and Dennett's intentional stance. Philosophical Topics 22:457-70.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Wilkerson, William S. (1997). Real patterns and real problems: Making Dennett respectable on patterns and beliefs. Southern Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):557-70.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Yu, Paul & Fuller, Gary (1986). A critique of Dennett. Synthese 66 (March):453-76.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)

2.1c Eliminativism about Propositional Attitudes

Berm, (2006). Arguing for eliminativism. In Brian L Keeley (ed.), Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Bertolet, Rod (1994). Saving eliminativism. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):87-100.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: This paper contests Lynne Rudder Baker's claim to have shown that eliminative materialism is bound to fail on purely conceptual grounds. It is argued that Baker's position depends on knowing that certain developments in science cannot occur, and that we cannot know that this is so. Consequently, the sort of argument Baker provides is question-begging. For similar reasons, the confidence that the proponents of eliminative materialism have in it is misplaced
Bickle, John (1992). Revisionary physicalism. Biology and Philosophy 7 (4):411-30.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Blunt, Paul K. (1992). A defense of folk psychology. International Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):487-98.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Bogdan, Radu J. (1988). Mental attitudes and common sense psychology: The case against elimination. Noûs 22 (September):369-398.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Aside from brute force, there are several philosophically respectable ways of eliminating the mental. In recent years the most popular elimination strategy has been directed against our common sense or folk psychological understanding of the mental. The strategy goes by the name of eliminative materialism (or eliminativism, in short). The motivation behind this strategy seems to be the following. If common sense psychology can be construed as the principled theory of the mental, whose vocabulary and principles implicitly define what counts as mental, then eliminating the theory is eliminating its subject matter. If the theory is shown to be false, then its subject matter does not exist. If, in other words, common sense psychology can be shown to describe and explain nothing real in human cognition, then the mental itself is a fiction
Campbell, Keith (1993). What motivates eliminativism? Mind and Language 8 (2):206-210.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Chater, Nick & Oaksford, Mike (1996). The falsity of folk theories: Implications for psychology and philosophy. In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Cheyne, Colin (1993). Reduction, elimination, and firewalking. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):349-357.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press.   (Cited by 465 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: A Neurocomputationial Perspective illustrates the fertility of the concepts and data drawn from the study of the brain and of artificial networks that model the...
Churchland, Paul M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.   (Cited by 488 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. (1993). Evaluating our self-conception. Mind and Language 8 (2):211-22.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Churchland, Patricia S. (1980). Language, thought, and information processing. Noûs 14 (May):147-70.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. (1985). On the speculative nature of our self-conception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:157-173.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (2007). The evolving fortunes of eliminative materialism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1993). Theory, taxonomy, and methodology: A reply to Haldane's Understanding Folk. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:313-19.   (Annotation | Google)
Clark, Andy (1996). Dealing in futures: Folk psychology and the role of representations in cognitive science. In Robert N. McCauley (ed.), The Churchlands and Their Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Clark, Andy (1993). The varieties of eliminativism: Sentential, intentional and catastrophic. Mind and Language 8 (2):223-233.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cling, Andrew (1990). Disappearance and knowledge. Philosophy of Science 57 (2):226-47.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Cling, Andrew (1989). Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 56 (May):53-75.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Cling, Andrew (1991). The empirical virtues of belief. Philosophical Psychology 4:303-23.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Foss, Jeffrey E. (1985). A materialist's misgivings about eliminative materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:105-33.   (Annotation | Google)
Fricker, Elizabeth (1993). The threat of eliminativism. Mind and Language 8 (2):253-281.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Garzon, Francisco Calvo (2001). Can we turn a blind eye to eliminativism? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):485-498.   (Google)
Gibson, Roger (1995). A note on Boghossian's master argument. In Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview.   (Google | More links)
Graham, George & Horgan, Terence E. (1994). Southern fundamentalism and the end of philosophy. Philosophical Issues 5:219-247.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Greenwood, John D. (1992). Against eliminative materialism: From folk psychology to volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper it is argued that we would not be logically obliged or rationally inclined to reject the ontology of contentful psychological states postulated by folk psychology even if the explanations advanced by folk psychology turned out to be generally inaccurate or inadequate. Moreover, it is argued that eliminativists such as Paul Churchland do not establish that folk psychological explanations are, or are likely to prove, generally inaccurate or inadequate. Most of Churchland's arguments—based upon developments within connectionist neuroscience—only cast doubt upon the adequacy of 'sentential' theories of cognitive processing, not upon scientifically developed forms of folk psychological explanation of behavior, such as those offered by contemporary social psychology. Finally, it is noted that Churchland's brand of eliminativism rests upon a crude reductive criterion of theoretical adequacy that has little to recommend it, and suggested that the recognized theoretical limitations of contemporary social psychology may be precisely due to its historical commitment to this reductive criterion
Greenwood, John D. (1991). Reasons to believe. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Haldane, John J. (1993). Theory, realism and common sense: A reply to Paul Churchland. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:321-327.   (Google)
Haldane, John J. (1988). Understanding folk. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:222-46.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hannan, Barbara (1993). Don't stop believing: The case against eliminative materialism. Mind and Language 8 (2):165-179.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hannan, Barbara (1990). `Non-scientific realism' about propositional attitudes as a response to eliminativist arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 18:21-31.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Henderson, David K. & Horgan, Terence E. (2004). What does it take to be a true believer?: Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism. In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Henderson, David & Horgan, Terry (2004). What does it take to be a true believer? In Christina E. Erneling & David Martel Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Eliminative materialism, as William Lycan (this volume) tells us, is materialism plus the claim that no creature has ever had a belief, desire, intention, hope, wish, or other “folk-psychological” state. Some contemporary philosophers claim that eliminative materialism is very likely true. They sketch certain potential scenarios, for the way theory might develop in cognitive science and neuroscience, that they claim are fairly likely; and they maintain that if such
Hermes, Charles M. (2006). The overdetermination argument against eliminativism. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):113-119.   (Google)
Horgan, Terence E. (1987). Cognition is real. Behaviorism 15:13-25.   (Google)
Horst, Steven (1995). Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief'. Synthese 104 (1):123-45.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. & Woodward, James F. (1985). Folk psychology is here to stay. Philosophical Review 94 (April):197-225.   (Cited by 51 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. & Graham, George (1991). In defense of southern fundamentalism. Philosophical Studies 62 (May):107-134.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. (1993). The austere ideology of folk psychology. Mind and Language 8 (2):282-297.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Horgan, Terence E. & Henderson, David K. (2005). What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism. In Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Hunter, Geoffrey (1995). The churchlands' eliminative materialism. Philosophical Investigations 18 (1):13-30.   (Google)
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1993). Folk belief and commonplace belief. Mind and Language 8 (2):298-305.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1990). In defense of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies 59 (1):31-54.   (Cited by 32 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires
Keeley, Brian L. (2006). Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This collection offers an introduction to Churchland's work, as well as a critique of some of his most famous philosophical positions.
Kincaid, Harold (1990). Eliminativism and methodological individualism. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):141-148.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Kitcher, P. S. (1984). In defense of intentional psychology. Journal of Philosophy 81 (February):89-106.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Lahav, Ran (1992). The amazing predictive power of folk psychology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):99-105.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Livingston, Kenneth R. (1996). The neurocomputational mind meets normative epistemology. Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):33-59.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The rapid development of connectionist models in computer science and of powerful computational tools in neuroscience has encouraged eliminativist materialist philosophers to propose specific alternatives to traditional mentalistic theories of mind. One of the problems associated with such a move is that elimination of the mental would seem to remove access to ideas like truth as the foundations of normative epistemology. Thus, a successful elimination of propositional or sentential theories of mind must not only replace them for purposes of our psychology, it must also replace them for purposes of the evaluation of our theories and explanations, psychological and otherwise. This paper briefly reviews eliminativist arguments for doubting the correctness of sentential accounts of explanation, understanding, and normative evaluation. It then considers Paul Churchland's (1989) proposed alternative norms, which are framed neurocomputationally. The alternative is found wanting in several specific ways. The arguments for eliminating propositionally-based norms are then re-examined and it is suggested that the need for wholesale elimination is overstated. A clear gap in the traditional epistemological story is identified, however, and a more modest set of norms is proposed as a way of filling this gap, rather than as a way of entirely replacing the traditional framework
Lockie, Robert (2003). Transcendental arguments against eliminativism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):569-589.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Eliminativism was targeted by transcendental arguments from the first. Three responses to these arguments have emerged from the eliminativist literature, the heart of which is that such arguments are question-begging. These responses are shown to be incompatible with the position, eliminativism, they are meant to defend. Out of these failed responses is developed a general transcendental argument against eliminativism (the "Paradox of Abandonment"). Eliminativists have anticipated this argument, but their six different attempts to counter it are shown to be separately inadequate, mutually incompatible, and, again, incompatible with the position that they are seeking to defend.
Lycan, William G. (2005). A particularly compelling refutation of eliminative materialism. In D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.), The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oup.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations
Malone, Michael E. (1994). On assuming other folks have mental states. Philosophical Investigations 17 (1):37-52.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Melnyk, Andrew (1996). Testament of a recovering eliminativist. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S185-S193.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Nelson, Mark T. (1991). Eliminative materialism and substantive commitments. International Philosophical Quarterly (March) 39 (March):39-49.   (Google)
O'Brien, Gerard (1987). Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):49-70.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Philipse, Herman (1998). Shifting position? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):885-892.   (Google | More links)
Philipse, Herman (1997). The end of plasticity. Inquiry 40 (3):291-306.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Paul Churchland has become famous for holding three controversial and interrelated doctrines which he put forward in early papers and in his first book. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979): eliminative materialism, the doctrine of the plasticity of perception, and a general network theory of language. In his latest book, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (1995), Churchland aims to make some results of connectionist neuroscience available to the general public and explores the philosophical and social consequences that neuroscience is likely to have. I argue that these results of neuroscience refute the three doctrines that Churchland advocated in his earlier works. Yet youthful dreams do not die easily and Churchland is reluctant to relinquish his early views
Pitman, Michael M. (2003). Eliminative materialism and the integrity of science. South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):207-219.   (Google | More links)
Pojman, Paul (1994). Are beliefs and experiences candidates for elimination? Dialogue 37 (1):11-14.   (Google)
Ramsey, William; Stich, Stephen P. & Garon, J. (1991). Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Cited by 85 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Ramsey, William (1990). Where does the self-refutation objection take us? Inquiry 33 (December):453-65.   (Annotation | Google)
Reppert, Victor (1992). Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the question. Metaphilosophy 23 (4):378-92.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Reppert, Victor (1991). Ramsey on eliminativism and self-refutation. Inquiry 34 (4):499-508.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Resnick, P. (1994). Intentionality is phlogiston. In Eric Dietrich (ed.), Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press.   (Google)
Richards, G. (1996). On the necessary survival of folk psychology. In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications.   (Google)
Robinson, William S. (1985). Toward eliminating Churchland's eliminationism. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):60-67.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google)
Rockwell, Teed, Beyond eliminative materialism: Some unnoticed implications of Paul Churchland's pragmatic pluralism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Paul Churchland's epistemology contains a tension between two positions, which I will call pragmatic pluralism and eliminative materialism. Pragmatic pluralism became predominant as Churchland's epistemology became more neurocomputationally inspired, which saved him from the skepticism implicit in certain passages of the theory of reduction he outlined in Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. However, once he replaces eliminativism with a neurologically inspired pragmatic pluralism, Churchland 1) cannot claim that folk psychology might be a false theory, in any significant sense 2) cannot claim that the concepts of Folk psychology might be empty of extension and lack reference. 3) cannot sustain Churchland's criticism of Dennett's "intentional stance" . 4) cannot claim to be a form of scientific realism, in the sense of believing that what science describes is somehow realer that what other conceptual systems describe
Roe, John H. (1992). Revisionary materialism: A critique of Stich. Conference 3 (2):67-75.   (Google)
Rosenberg, A. (1991). How is eliminative materialism possible? In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Rosenberg, A. (1999). Naturalistic epistemology for eliminative materialists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):335-358.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1988). Cognitive suicide. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1993). Eliminativism and an argument from science. Mind and Language 8 (2):180-188.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). The threat of cognitive suicide. In Lynne Rudder Baker (ed.), Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Saidel, Eric (1992). What price neurophilosophy? Philosophy of Science Association 1:461-68.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Schouten, Maurice K. D. & de Jong, Huib L. (1998). Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):489-509.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: The doctrine of eliminative materialism holds that belief-desire psychology is massively referentially disconnected. We claim, however, that it is not at all obvious what it means to be referentially (dis)connected. The two major accounts of reference both lead to serious difficulties for eliminativism: it seems that elimination is either impossible or omnipresent. We explore the idea that reference fixation is a much more local, partial, and context-dependent process than was supposed by the classical accounts. This pragmatic view suggests that elimination is not the prime model for understanding the complex relations between the mind and brain sciences, and that we have little ground for concluding that in general psychological kinds do not exist. We suggest that reference changes are better seen as continuous rather than completely eliminative
Schwartz, J. (1991). Reduction, elimination, and the mental. Philosophy of Science 58 (June):203-20.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Smith, Joseph Wayne (1982). Two recent self-referential arguments. Auslegung 9:333-346.   (Google)
Sterelny, Kim (1993). Refuting eliminative materialism on the cheap? Mind and Language 8 (2):306-15.   (Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. (1991). Do true believers exist? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:229-44.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1996). Deconstructing the mind. In Deconstructing the Mind. Oxford University Press, 1996.   (Cited by 93 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Over the last two decades, debates over the viability of commonsense psychology have been center stage in both cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. Eliminativists have argued that advances in cognitive science and neuroscience will ultimately justify a rejection of our "folk" theory of the mind, and of its ontology. In the first half of this book Stich, who was at one time a leading advocate of eliminativism, maintains that even if the sciences develop in the ways that eliminativists foresee, none of the arguments for ontological elimination are tenable. Rather than being resolved by science, he contends, these ontological disputes will be settled by a pragmatic process in which social and political considerations have a major role to play. In later chapters, Stich argues that the widespread worry about "naturalizing" psychological properties is deeply confused, since there is no plausible account of what naturalizing requires on which the failure of the naturalization project would lead to eliminativism. He also offers a detailed analysis of the many different notions of folk psychology to be found in philosophy and psychology, and argues that simulation theory, which purports to be an alternative to folk psychology, is not supported by recent experimental findings
Stich, Stephen P. (1992). What is a theory of mental representation? Mind 101 (402):243-61.   (Cited by 48 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Stoljar, Natalie (1988). Churchland's eliminativism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (December):489-497.   (Google | More links)
Tait, William W. (2002). The myth of the mind. Topoi 21 (1-2):65-74.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Of course, I do not mean by the title of this paper to deny the existence of something called
Taylor, Kenneth A. (1994). How not to refute eliminative materialism. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):101-125.   (Annotation | Google)
Abstract: This paper examines and rejects some purported refutations of eliminative materialism in the philosophy of mind: a quasi-transcendental argument due to Jackson and Pettit (1990) to the effect that folk psychology is “peculiarly unlikely” to be radically revised or eliminated in light of the developments of cognitive science and neuroscience; and (b) certain straight-out transcendental arguments to the effect that eliminativism is somehow incoherent (Baker, 1987; Boghossian, 1990). It begins by clarifying the exact topology of the dialectical space in which debates between eliminativist and anti-eliminativist ought to be framed. I claim that both proponents and opponents of eliminativism have been insufficiently attentive to the range of dialectical possibilities. Consequently, the debate has not, in fact, been framed within the correct dialectical setting. I then go onto to show how inattentiveness to the range of dialectical possibilities undermines both transcendental and quasi-transcendental arguments against eliminativism. In particular, I argue that the quasi-transcendentalist overestimates the degree to which folk psychology can be insulated from the advance of neuroscience and cognitive science just in virtue of being a functional theory. I argue further that transcendental arguments are fallacious and do not succeed against even the strongest possible form of eliminativism. Finally, I argue that that transcendental arguments are irrelevant. Even if such arguments do succeed against a certain'very strong form of eliminativism, they remain complete non-starters against certain weaker forms of eliminativism. And I argue that if any of these weaker forms is true, folk psychology is in trouble enough to vindicate Paul Ckurchland's claim that our common sense psychological framework is “a radically false and misleading conception of the causes of human behavior and the nature of cognitive activity”
Tomberlin, James E. (1994). Whither southern fundamentalism? Philosophical Issues 5.   (Google)
Trout, J. D. (1991). Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress. Synthese 87 (June):379-400.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Waskan, Jonathan A. (2003). Folk psychology and the gauntlet of irrealism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):627-656.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Wright, C. (1995). Can there be a rationally compelling argument for anti-realism about ordinary ("folk") psychology? Philosophical Issues 6:197-221.   (Google | More links)
Wright, Crispin (1993). Eliminative materialism: Going concern or passing fancy? Mind and Language 8 (2):316-326.   (Cited by 1 | Google)

2.1d Propositional Attitudes, Misc

65 / 66 entries displayed

Anderson, C. Anthony (ed.) (1990). Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Antony, Louise M. (2001). Brain states with attitude. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Google)
Armstrong, David M. (1975). Beliefs and desires as causes of actions: A reply to Donald Davidson. Philosophical Papers 4 (May):1-7.   (Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2002). Attitudes in action: A causal account. Manuscrito 25:47-78.   (Google)
Abstract: This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1995). Explaining Attitudes. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 75 | Google | More links)
Balaguer, Mark (1998). Attitudes without propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Barnes, Gerald W. (1977). Some remarks on belief and desire. Philosophical Review 86 (July):340-349.   (Google | More links)
Bealer, George (1998). Propositions. Mind 107 (425):1-32.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts to reduce propositions to extensional entities-either extensional functions or sets. The second group concerns problems of fine grained content-both traditional 'Cicero'/'Tully' puzzles and recent variations on them which confront scientific essentialism. After characterizing the problems, I outline a non-reductionist approach-the algebraic approach-which avoids the problems associated with reductionism. I then go on to show how the theory can incorporate non-Platonic (as well as Platonic) modes of presentation. When these are implemented nondescriptively, they yield the sort of fine-grained distinctions which have been eluding us. The paper closes by applying the theory to a cluster of remaining puzzles, including a pair of new puzzles facing scientific essentialism
Ben-Yami, Hanoch (1997). Against characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bennett, Jonathan (1991). Analysis without noise. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Boër, Steven E. (1994). Propositional attitudes and formal ontology. Synthese 98 (2).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data
Brownstein, Donald (1985). Individuating propositional attitudes. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):205-212.   (Google)
Clark, Austen (1994). Beliefs and desires incorporated. Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):404-25.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose we admit for the sake of argument that "folk" explanations of human behavior--explanations in terms of beliefs and desires--sometimes succeed. They sometimes enable us to understand and predict patterns of motion that otherwise would remain unintelligible and unanticipated. Is the only explanation for such success that folk psychology is a viable proto-scientific theory of human psychology? I shall describe an analysis which yields a negative answer to that question. It was suggested by an observation and an analogy, both of which may initially seem remote from the topic at hand
Clark, Andy (1991). Radical ascent. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:211-27.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
David, Marian (2002). Content essentialism. Acta Analytica 17 (28):103-114.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Davies, David (1995). Davidson, indeterminacy, and measurement. Acta Analytica 10 (14):37-56.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Davies, David (1998). On gauging attitudes. Philosophical Studies 90 (2):129-54.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1989). What is present to the mind? In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1991). What is present to the mind. Philosophical Issues 1:197-213.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
De Clercq, Rafael (2006). Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386-402.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, i.e., roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.
Devitt, Michael (1984). Thoughts and their ascription. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:385-420.   (Google)
Egan, M. F. (1989). What's wrong with the syntactic theory of mind. Philosophy of Science 56 (December):664-74.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Elugardo, Reinaldo (2001). Brain states, causal explanation, and the attitudes. In Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Google)
Falk, Arthur E. (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
Falk, Arthur (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Philosophical Debates. University Press of America.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: First published in 2004, this book is a rigorous textbook on the metaphysics of the mind for advanced students of philosophy, covering the background they need to understand the debates and bringing them to the frontiers of current research. It is also a monograph on the nature of de re and de se states of mind, incorporating material the author published in journals. The short file you will see is only a gateway to more than two dozen other files which are rewrites of the book
Feit, Neil (2006). The doctrine of propositions, internalism, and global supervenience. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.   (Google | More links)
Feldman, Richard H. (1986). Davidson's theory of propositional attitudes. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):693-712.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goldstein, Irwin (1981). Cognitive pleasure and distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Explaining pleasure's 'intentional object', I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleased. Bernard Williams, Irving Thalberg, and Gilbert Ryle, who reject this analysis, are discussed.
Green, Mitchell S. (1999). Attitude ascription's affinity to measurement. International Journal Of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):323-348.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The relation between two systems of attitude ascription that capture all the empirically significant aspects of an agents thought and speech may be analogous to that between two systems of magnitude ascription that are equivalent relative to a transformation of scale. If so, just as an objects weighing eight pounds doesnt relate that object to the number eight (for a different but equally good scale would use a different number), similarly an agents believing that P need not relate her to P (for a different but equally adequate interpretive scheme could use a different proposition). In either case the only reality picked out by any system of ascription is what is common to all equivalent rivals. By emphasizing some contrasts between decision theory and belief-desire psychology, it is argued that if attitude ascription is appropriately analogous to measurement then not only is being related to a proposition an artifact of the system of representation chosen, so are belief and desire
Hieronymi, Pamela (2006). Controlling attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will
Hill, Christopher S. (1988). Intentionality, folk psychology, and reduction. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Google)
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Jacquette, Dale (1990). Intentionality and Stich's theory of brain sentence syntax. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):169-82.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Jackman, Henry (online). Truth, rationality, and humanity.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When we interpret someone in terms of their beliefs and desires, we are doing something other than merely describing them, but it is far from clear what this something else is. As Dennett puts it, while there is a growing consensus about the "not-purely-descriptive nature of intentional attribution," there remains considerable disagreement over which norms govern the play of this "dramatic interpretation game." This paper will discuss three candidates for specifying the content of these norms, truth, rationality and humanity. It will argue that while truth has frequently been taken to be the least plausible candidate, once the regulative rather than constitutive status of these norms are recognized, it turns out to be the best one. It will then close with a discussion of the 'indirect' role that rationality constraints can still be seen to play in a theory of belief
Kissine, Mikhail (2007). Direction of fit. Logique Et Analyse 198 (57):113-128.   (Google)
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Margolis, Joseph (1977). Cognitive agents, mental states, and internal representation. Behaviorism 5:63-74.   (Google)
Matthews, Robert J. (1994). The measure of mind. Mind 103 (410):131-46.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McEvoy, Mark (2003). A defense of propositional functionalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:421-436.   (Google)
Millikan, Ruth G. (1986). Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content. Philosophical Review 95 (January):47-80.   (Cited by 48 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Montague, Michelle (2007). Against propositionalism. Noûs 41 (3):503–518.   (Google | More links)
Morton, Adam (1988). The explanatory depth of propositional attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives 2:67-80.   (Google)
Moser, Paul K. (1990). Physicalism and intentional attitudes. Behavior and Philosophy 18:33-41.   (Google)
Muskens, Reinhard (1993). Propositional Attitudes. In R.E. Asher & J.M.Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Pergamon Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Verbs such as know, believe, hope, fear, regret and desire are commonly taken to express an attitude that one may bear towards a proposition and are therefore called verbs of propositional attitude. Thus in (1) below the agent Cathy is reported to have a certain attitude
Peacocke, Christopher (1983). Between instrumentalism and brain-writing. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Sense and Content. Oxford University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Pelczar, Michael W. (2007). Forms and objects of thought. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):97-122.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises
Perry, John (1986). Circumstantial attitudes and benevolent cognition. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: From: _Language, Mind and Logic_, edited by Jeremy Butter?eld. 123
Possin, Kevin (1986). The case against Stich's syntactic theory of mind. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):405-18.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Pratt, Ian (1993). Analysis and the attitudes. In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Recanati, Francois (2000). Opacity and the attitudes. In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Rechtin, Lisbeth & Todd, William L. (1974). Propositional attitudes and self-reference. Philosophia 4 (April-July):271-295.   (Google | More links)
Richard, Mark E. (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 172 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defense of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is "psychologically real." The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues in the philosophy of mind are addressed
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