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2.1a. The Language of Thought (The Language of Thought on PhilPapers)

See also:
Antony, Louise M. (ms). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought.   (Google)
Arikha, Noga (2005). Deafness, ideas and the language of thought in the late 1600s. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):233 – 262.   (Google | More links)
Aydede, Murat (1995). Connectionism and the language of thought. CSLI Technical Report.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Fodor and Pylyshyn's (F&P) critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought'' (LOT). Some connectionists declined to meet the challenge on the basis that the alleged regularities are somehow spurious. Some, like Smolensky, however, took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that are supposed to be non-classical
Aydede, Murat (1997). Language of thought: The connectionist contribution. Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not implementation models because, it is claimed, the way they obtain syntax and structure sensitivity is not "concatenative," hence "radically different" from the way classicists handle them. In this paper, I offer an analysis of what it is to physically satisfy/realize a formal system. In this context, I examine the minimal truth-conditions of LOT Hypothesis. From my analysis it will follow that concatenative realization of formal systems is irrelevant to LOTH since the very notion of LOT is indifferent to such an implementation level issue as concatenation. I will conclude that to the extent to which they can explain the law-like cognitive regularities, a certain class of connectionist models proposed as radical alternatives to the classical LOT paradigm will in fact turn out to be LOT models, even though new and potentially very exciting ones
Aydede, Murat (online). The language of thought hypothesis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Abstract: 1 *Common Sense Conception of Beliefs and Other Propositional Attitudes 2 What is the Language of Thought Hypothesis? 3 Status of LOTH 4 Scope of LOTH 5 *Natural Language as Mentalese? 6 *Nativism and LOTH 7 Naturalism and LOTH
Aydede, Murat (ms). Language of thought hypothesis: State of the art.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in syntactic operations defined over representations. Most of the arguments for LOTH derive their strength from their ability to explain certain empirical phenomena like productivity, systematicity of thought and thinking
Barwise, Jon (1987). Unburdening the language of thought. Mind and Language 2:82-96.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Beckermann, Ansgar (1994). Can there be a language of thought? In G. White, B. Smith & R. Casati (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: 1. Cognitive sciences in a broad sense are simply all those sciences which concern themselves with the analysis and explanation of cognitive capacities and achievements. If one speaks of _cognitive science_ in the singular, however, usually something more is meant. Cognitive science is not only characterized by a specific object of research, but also through a particular kind of explanatory paradigm, i.e. the information processing paradigm. Stillings _et. al. _for example begin their book _Cognitive Science _as follows: <blockquote> Cognitive scientists view the human mind as a complex system that receives, stores,<br> retrieves, transforms, and transmits information. (Stillings 1987: 1) </blockquote> The information processing paradigm however, leads directly to the paradigm of symbol processing, because a system can, as it seems, only receive, store and process information if it has at its disposal a system of internal representations or _symbols_, i.e. an internal language in which this information is encoded. At least this appears to be an idea which suggests itself and which Peter Hacker expresses as follows
Blumson, Ben (online). Mental maps.   (Google)
Abstract: It’s often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map-like rather than language-like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity for the Language of Thought Hypothesis – the hypothesis that mental structure is language-like. In this paper, I argue that the Map Hypothesis does not undermine the argument, because it is not in fact a genuine alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis
Braddon-Mitchell, David & Fitzpatrick, J. (1990). Explanation and the language of thought. Synthese 83 (1):3-29.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cargile, James (2010). The language of thought revisited. Analysis 70 (2).   (Google)
Chalmers, David J. (1999). Is there synonymy in Ockham's mental language. In P. V. Spade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: William of Ockham's semantic theory was founded on the idea that thought takes place in a language not unlike the languages in which spoken and written communication occur. This mental language was held to have a number of features in common with everyday languages. For example, mental language has simple terms, not unlike words, out of which complex expressions can be constructed. As with words, each of these terms has some meaning, or signification; in fact Ockham held that the signification of everyday words derives precisely from the signification of mental terms. Furthermore, the meaning of a mental expression depends directly on the meaning of its constituent terms, as is the case with expressions in more familiar languages
Cole, David (2009). Jerry Fodor, lot 2: The language of thought revisited , new York: Oxford university press, 2008, X+228, $37.95, isbn 978-0-119-954877-. Minds and Machines 19 (3).   (Google)
Crane, Tim (1990). The language of thought: No syntax without semantics. Mind and Language 5 (3):187-213.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Davies, Martin (1992). Aunty's own argument for the language of thought. In Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Kluwer.   (Cited by 13 | Google)
Davies, Martin (1991). Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought. Philosophy and connectionist theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.   (Annotation | Google)
Davies, Martin (1991). Concepts, connectionism, and the language of thought. In W Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.   (Cited by 40 | Google)
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a _prima facie_ tension between our commonsense conception of ourselves as thinkers and the connectionist programme for modelling cognitive processes. The language of thought hypothesis plays a pivotal role. The connectionist paradigm is opposed to the language of thought; and there is an argument for the language of thought that draws on features of the commonsense scheme of thoughts, concepts, and inference. Most of the paper (Sections 3-7) is taken up with the argument for the language of thought hypothesis. The argument for an opposition between connectionism and the language of thought comes towards the end (Section 8), along with some discussion of the potential eliminativist consequences (Sections 9 and
Davies, Martin (1998). Language, thought, and the language of thought (aunty's own argument revisited). In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this chapter, I shall be examining an argument for the language of thought hypothesis
DeWitt, Richard (1995). Vagueness, semantics, and the language of thought. Psyche 1.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Dunlop, Charles E. M. (1990). Conceptual dependency as the language of thought. Synthese 82 (2):275-96.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Egan, M. F. (1991). Propositional attitudes and the language of thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (September):379-88.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Field, Hartry (1978). Mental representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-18.   (Cited by 179 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.   (Cited by 1815 | Annotation | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1987). Why there still has to be a language of thought. In Psychosemantics. MIT Press.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Garson, James W. (1998). Chaotic emergence and the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):303-315.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explore the merits of the idea that dynamical systems theory (also known as chaos theory) provides a model of the mind that can vindicate the language of thought (LOT). I investigate the nature of emergent structure in dynamical systems to assess its compatibility with causally efficacious syntactic structure in the brain. I will argue that anyone who is committed to the idea that the brain's functioning depends on emergent features of dynamical systems should have serious reservations about the LOT. First, dynamical systems theory casts doubt on one of the strongest motives for believing in the LOT: principle P, the doctrine that structure found in an effect must also be found in its cause. Second, chaotic emergence is a double-edged sword. Its tendency to cleave the psychological from the neurological undermines foundations for belief in the existence of causally efficacious representations. Overall, a dynamic conception of the brain sways us away from realist conclusions about the causal powers of representations with constituent structure
Garson, James W. (2002). Evolution, consciousness, and the language of thought. In James H. Fetzer (ed.), Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.   (Google)
Gauker, Christopher (1998). Are there wordlike concepts too? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):70-71.   (Google)
Abstract: Millikan proposes that there are mapping functions through which spoken sentences represent reality. Such mappings seem to depend on thoughts that words express and on concepts as components of such thoughts, but such concepts would conflict with Millikan's other claims about concepts and language
Glock, Hans-Johann (2010). Reviews lot 2: The language of thought revisited by Jerry A. Fodor oxford university press, 2008. Philosophy 85 (1):164-167.   (Google)
Horsey, Richard (2001). Definitions: Implications for syntax, semantics, and the language of thought, by Annabel Cormack. Mind and Language 16 (3):345–349.   (Google | More links)
Johnson, Kent (2004). On the systematicity of the language of thought. Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):111-139.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Knowles, Jonathan (1998). The language of thought and natural language understanding. Analysis 58 (4):264-272.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Kuczynski, John-Michael M. (2004). Another argument against the thesis that there is a language of thought. Communication and Cognition 37 (2):83-103.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Laurence, Stephen & Margolis, Eric (1997). Regress arguments against the language of thought. Analysis 57 (1):60-66.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Leeds, Stephen (2002). Perception, transparency, and the language of thought. Noûs 36 (1):104-129.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Levine, Joseph (1988). Demonstrating in mentalese. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Losonsky, Michael (1992). Leibniz's adamic language of thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (4).   (Google)
Machery, Edouard (2005). You don't know how you think: Introspection and language of thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):469-485.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non-linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content of our thoughts with their vehicles: while sententialism is a thesis about the vehicles of our thoughts, inner speech sentences are the content of auditory or articulatory images. The rebuttal of the introspective argument for sententialism is shown to have a general significance in cognitive science: introspection does not tell us how we think. The problem The introspective argument for sententialism The argument for the blindness of introspection thesis Objections and replies Conclusion
Markic, Olga (1999). Connectionism and the language of thought: The cross-context stability of representations. Acta Analytica 22 (22):43-57.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Markic, Olga (2001). Is language of thought a conceptual necessity? Acta Analytica 16 (26):53-60.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
McDonough, Richard (1994). Wittgenstein's reversal on the `language of thought' doctrine. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):482-494.   (Google | More links)
Pollock, John L. (1990). Understanding the language of thought. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):95-120.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Rantala, V. & Vaden, Tere (1997). Minds as connoting systems: Logic and the language of thought. Erkenntnis 46 (3):315-334.   (Google | More links)
Rescorla, Michael (2009). Cognitive maps and the language of thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Fodor advocates a view of cognitive processes as computations defined over the language of thought (or Mentalese). Even among those who endorse Mentalese, considerable controversy surrounds its representational format. What semantically relevant structure should scientific psychology attribute to Mentalese symbols? Researchers commonly emphasize logical structure, akin to that displayed by predicate calculus sentences. To counteract this tendency, I discuss computational models of navigation drawn from probabilistic robotics. These models involve computations defined over cognitive maps, which have geometric rather than logical structure. They thereby demonstrate the possibility of rational cognitive processes in an exclusively non-logical representational medium. Furthermore, they offer much promise for the empirical study of animal navigation.
Rey, Georges (1995). A not "merely empirical" argument for the language of thought. Philosophical Perspectives 9:201-22.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Rey, Georges (1991). Sensations in a language of thought. Philosophical Issues 1:73-112.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Rives, Bradley, Review of LOT 2: The language of thought revisited.   (Google)
Abstract: It has been over thirty years since the publication of Jerry Fodor’s landmark book The Language of Thought (LOT 1). In LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Fodor provides an update on his thoughts concerning a range of topics that have been the focus of his work in the intervening decades. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM), the central thesis of LOT 1, remains intact in LOT 2: mental states are relations between organisms and syntactically-structured mental representations, and mental processes are computations defined over such representations. The differences between LOT 1 and LOT 2 are mostly differences of focus. Whereas LOT 1 had a number of targets—e.g. reductionism, behaviorism, empiricism, and operationalism—LOT 2 identifies “pragmatism” as the main enemy of the “Cartesian” kind of mentalism Fodor favors (pp. 11-12). Moreover, unlike LOT 1, a main aim of LOT 2 is to defend a theory of concepts that is atomistic and referentialist: lexical concepts lack structure, and their meaning is determined by their relation to the world and not by their relations to other concepts (pp. 16-20). In addition to new discussions of concepts and content, LOT 2 treats us to Fodor’s latest thoughts on compositionality, computationalism, nativism, nonconceptual content, and the causal theory of reference. Although those familiar with Fodor’s work over the last thirty years will find its main conclusions unsurprising, LOT 2 is nevertheless an exciting, breezily written book that’s full of stimulating arguments and (in standard Fodor style) immensely interesting digressions. In the Introduction, Fodor bundles together a number of distinct doctrines under “pragmatism”—e.g., that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that in the order of intentional explanation” (p. 10), and that “the distinctive function of the mind is guiding action” (p. 13). But it’s clear by Chapter 2 that his main target is “concept pragmatism,” according to which concepts are individuated by their inferential properties. Fodor’s “Cartesianism,” in contrast, has it that none of the epistemic properties of concepts are constitutive..
Rives, Bradley (2009). Lot 2: The language of thought revisited. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):525 – 529.   (Google)
Rowlands, Mark (1994). Connectionism and the language of thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):485-503.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: In an influential critique, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn point to the existence of a potentially devastating dilemma for connectionism (Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988]). Either connectionist models consist in mere associations of unstructured representations, or they consist in processes involving complex representations. If the former, connectionism is mere associationism, and will not be capable of accounting for very much of cognition. If the latter, then connectionist models concern only the implementation of cognitive processes, and are, therefore, not informative at the level of cognition. I shall argue that Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument is based on a crucial misunderstanding, the same misunderstanding which motivates the entire language of thought hypothesis
Rupert, Robert D. (2001). Coining terms in the language of thought: Innateness, emergence, and the lot of Cummins's argument against the causal theory of mental content. Journal of Philosophy 98 (10):499-530.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,
Rupert, Robert (2008). Causal theories of mental content. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):353–380.   (Google | More links)
Rupert, Robert (2008). Frege’s puzzle and Frege cases: Defending a quasi-syntactic solution. Cognitive Systems Research 9:76-91.   (Google)
Rupert, Robert D. (1998). On the relationship between naturalistic semantics and individuation criteria for terms in a language of thought. Synthese 117 (1):95-131.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Schiffer, Stephen R. (1987). Intentionality and the language of thought. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:35-55.   (Google)
Schroder, Jurgen (1998). Knowledge of rules, causal systematicity, and the language of thought. Synthese 117 (3):313-330.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:   Martin Davies' criterion for the knowledge of implicit rules, viz. the causal systematicity of cognitive processes, is first exposed. Then the inference from causal systematicity of a process to syntactic properties of the input states is examined. It is argued that Davies' notion of a syntactic property is too weak to bear the conclusion that causal systematicity implies a language of thought as far as the input states are concerned. Next, it is shown that Davies' criterion leads to a counterintuitive consequence: it groups together distributed connectionist systems with look-up tables. To avoid this consequence, a modified construal of causal systematicity is proposed and Davies' argument for the causal systematicity of thought is shown to be question-begging. It is briefly sketched how the modified construal links up with multiple dispositions of the same categorical base. Finally, the question of the causal efficacy of single rules is distinguished from the question of their psychological reality: implicit rules might be psychologically real without being causally efficacious
Schneider, Susan (2009). Lot, ctm, and the elephant in the room. Synthese 170 (2):235-250.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol
Schneider, Susan, The central system as a computational engine.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Language of Thought program has a suicidal edge. Jerry Fodor, of all people, has argued that although LOT will likely succeed in explaining modular processes, it will fail to explain the central system, a subsystem in the brain in which information from the different sense modalities is integrated, conscious deliberation occurs, and behavior is planned. A fundamental characteristic of the central system is that it is “informationally unencapsulated” -- its operations can draw from information from any cognitive domain. The domain general nature of the central system is key to human reasoning; our ability to connect apparently unrelated concepts enables the creativity and flexibility of human thought, as does our ability to integrate material across sensory divides. The central system is the holy grail of cognitive science: understanding higher cognitive function is crucial to grasping how humans reach their highest intellectual achievements. But according to Fodor, the founding father of the LOT program and the related Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), the holy grail is out of reach: the central system is likely to be non-computational (Fodor 1983, 2000, 2008). Cognitive scientists working on higher cognitive function should abandon their efforts. Research should be limited to the modules, which for Fodor rest at the sensory periphery (2000).1 Cognitive scientists who work in the symbol processing tradition outside of philosophy would reject this pessimism, but ironically, within philosophy itself, this pessimistic streak has been very influential, most likely because it comes from the most well-known proponent of LOT and CTM. Indeed, pessimism about centrality has become assimilated into the mainstream conception of LOT. (Herein, I refer to a LOT that appeals to pessimism about centrality as the “standard LOT”). I imagine this makes the standard LOT unattractive to those philosophers with a more optimistic approach to what cognitive science can achieve..
Schneider, Susan (2009). The language of thought. In John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the language of thought (or
Schiffer, Stephen R. (1994). The language-of-thought relation and its implications. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):263-85.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Schneider, Susan (2009). The nature of symbols in the language of thought. Mind and Language 24 (5):523-553.   (Google)
Abstract: The core of the language of thought program is the claim that thinking is the manipulation of symbols according to rules. Yet LOT has said little about symbol natures, and existing accounts are highly controversial. This is a major flaw at the heart of the LOT program: LOT requires an account of symbol natures to naturalize intentionality, to determine whether the brain even engages in symbol manipulations, and to understand how symbols relate to lower-level neurocomputational states. This paper provides the much-needed theory of symbols, and in doing so, alters the LOT program in significant respects
Schneider, Susan (forthcoming). The nature of primitive symbols in the language of thought. Mind and Language.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper provides a theory of the nature of symbols in the language of thought (LOT). My discussion consists in three parts. In part one, I provide three arguments for the individuation of primitive symbols in terms of total computational role. The first of these arguments claims that Classicism requires that primitive symbols be typed in this manner; no other theory of typing will suffice. The second argument contends that without this manner of symbol individuation, there will be computational processes that fail to supervene on syntax, together with the rules of composition and the computational algorithms. The third argument says that cognitive science needs a natural kind that is typed by total computational role. Otherwise, either cognitive science will be incomplete, or its laws will have counterexamples. Then, part two defends this view from a criticism, offered by both Jerry Fodor and Jesse Prinz, who respond to my view with the charge that because the types themselves are individuated
Silby, Brent (ms). Revealing the language of thought.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Smolensky, Paul (1991). Connectionism, constituency and the language of thought. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 68 | Annotation | Google)
Sorensen, Roy A. (1991). Vagueness within the language of thought. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):389-413.   (Google | More links)
Stalnaker, Robert (1991). How to do semantics for the language of thought. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google)
Teng, Norman Y. (1999). The language of thought and the embodied nature of language use. Philosophical Studies 94 (3):237-251.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
ter Hark, Michel (1995). Connectionism, behaviourism, and the language of thought. In Cognitive Patterns in Science and Common Sense. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Google)
Viger, Christopher D. (2001). Locking on to the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):203-215.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I demonstrate that locking on, a key notion in Jerry Fodor's most recent theory of content, supplemented informational atomism (SIA), is cashed out in terms of asymmetric dependence, the central notion in his earlier theory of content. I use this result to argue that SIA is incompatible with the language of thought hypothesis because the constraints on the causal relations into which symbols can enter imposed by the theory of content preclude the causal relations needed between symbols for them to serve as the elements of the medium of thought
Viger, Christopher D. (2005). Learning to think: A response to the language of thought argument for innateness. Mind and Language 20 (3):313-25.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Jerry Fodor's argument for an innate language of thought continues to be a hurdle for researchers arguing that natural languages provide us with richer conceptual systems than our innate cognitive resources. I argue that because the logical/formal terms of natural languages are given a usetheory of meaning, unlike predicates, logical/formal terms might be learned without a mediating internal representation. In that case, our innate representational system might have less logical structure than a natural language, making it possible that we augment our innate representational system and improve our ability to think by learning a natural language
Vinueza, Adam (2000). Sensations and the language of thought. Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I discuss two forms of the thesis that to have a sensation is to token a sentence in a language of thought-what I call, following Georges Rey, the sensational sentences thesis. One form of the thesis is a version of standard functionalism, while the other is a version of the increasingly popular thesis that for a sensation to have qualia is for it to have a certain kind of intentional content-that is, intentionalism. I defend the basic idea behind the sensational sentences thesis, and argue that the intentionalist version is either false or collapses into the standard functionalist thesis
Weiskopf, Daniel (2002). A critical review of Jerry A. Fodor's the mind doesn't work that way. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551 – 562.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The "New Synthesis" in cognitive science is committed to the computational theory of mind (CTM), massive modularity, nativism, and adaptationism. In The mind doesn't work that way , Jerry Fodor argues that CTM has problems explaining abductive or global inference, but that the New Synthesis offers no solution, since massive modularity is in fact incompatible with global cognitive processes. I argue that it is not clear how global human mentation is, so whether CTM is imperiled is an open question. Massive modularity also lacks some of the invidious commitments Fodor ascribes to it. Furthermore, Fodor's anti-adaptationist arguments are in tension with his nativism about the contents of modular systems. The New Synthesis thus has points worth preserving
White, Stephen L. (1982). Partial character and the language of thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (October):347-65.   (Cited by 35 | Annotation | Google)
Wilson, Mark (2009). Review of Jerry A. Fodor, Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (2).   (Google)
Yagisawa, Takashi (1994). Thinking in neurons: Comments on Stephen Schiffer's The Language-of-Thought Relation and its Implications. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):287-96.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)