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Intentionality :: Propositional Attitudes :: Eliminativism

See also:
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Churchland, Paul M. (1989). A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science. MIT Press. (Cited by 465 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Churchland, Paul M. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90. (Cited by 488 | Google | More links)
Churchland, Paul M. (1993). Evaluating our self-conception. Mind and Language 8 (2):211-22. (Cited by 13 | Google | Annotation)
Churchland, Paul M. (1985). On the speculative nature of our self-conception. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:157-173. (Cited by 3 | Google | Annotation)
Churchland, Paul M. (2007). The evolving fortunes of eliminative materialism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Google)
Churchland, Paul M. (1993). Theory, taxonomy, and methodology: A reply to Haldane's Understanding Folk. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:313-19. (Google | Annotation)
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Cling, Andrew (1989). Eliminative materialism and self-referential inconsistency. Philosophical Studies 56 (May):53-75. (Google | Annotation)
Cling, Andrew (1991). The empirical virtues of belief. Philosophical Psychology 4:303-23. (Cited by 3 | Google | Annotation)
Foss, Jeffrey E. (1985). A materialist's misgivings about eliminative materialism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11:105-33. (Google | Annotation)
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Greenwood, John D. (1992). Against eliminative materialism: From folk psychology to volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68. (Cited by 6 | Google)
Greenwood, John D. (1991). Reasons to believe. In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 8 | Google | Annotation)
Haldane, John J. (1993). Theory, realism and common sense: A reply to Paul Churchland. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:321-327. (Google)
Haldane, John J. (1988). Understanding folk. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement 62:222-46. (Cited by 9 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Hannan, Barbara (1993). Don't stop believing: The case against eliminative materialism. Mind and Language 8 (2):165-179. (Cited by 9 | Google | Annotation)
Hannan, Barbara (1990). `Non-scientific realism' about propositional attitudes as a response to eliminativist arguments. Behavior and Philosophy 18:21-31. (Cited by 2 | Google)
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Horgan, Terence E. & Woodward, James F. (1985). Folk psychology is here to stay. Philosophical Review 94 (April):197-225. (Cited by 51 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Horgan, Terence E. & Graham, George (1991). In defense of southern fundamentalism. Philosophical Studies 62 (May):107-134. (Cited by 16 | Google | Annotation)
Horgan, Terence E. (1993). The austere ideology of folk psychology. Mind and Language 8 (2):282-297. (Cited by 11 | Google | Annotation)
Horgan, Terence E. & Henderson, David K. (2005). What does it take to be a true believer? Against the opulent ideology of eliminative materialism. In Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press. (Google)
Horst, Steven (1995). Eliminativism and the ambiguity of `belief'. Synthese 104 (1):123-45. (Cited by 5 | Google | Annotation)
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Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1993). Folk belief and commonplace belief. Mind and Language 8 (2):298-305. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1990). In defense of folk psychology. Philosophical Studies 59 (1):31-54. (Cited by 32 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Keeley, Brian L. (2006). Paul Churchland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Google | More links)
Kincaid, Harold (1990). Eliminativism and methodological individualism. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):141-148. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Kitcher, P. S. (1984). In defense of intentional psychology. Journal of Philosophy 81 (February):89-106. (Cited by 13 | Google | More links | Annotation)
Lahav, Ran (1992). The amazing predictive power of folk psychology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1):99-105. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
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Lycan, William G. (2005). A particularly compelling refutation of eliminative materialism. In D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.), The Mind As a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oup. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
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O'Brien, Gerard (1987). Eliminative materialism and our psychological self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):49-70. (Cited by 1 | Google | Annotation)
Philipse, Herman (1998). Shifting position? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):885-892. (Google | More links)
Philipse, Herman (1997). The end of plasticity. Inquiry 40 (3):291-306. (Google | More links)
Pitman, Michael M. (2003). Eliminative materialism and the integrity of science. South African Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):207-219. (Google | More links)
Pojman, Paul (1994). Are beliefs and experiences candidates for elimination? Dialogue 37 (1):11-14. (Google)
Ramsey, William; Stich, Stephen P. & Garon, J. (1991). Connectionism, eliminativism, and the future of folk psychology. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum. (Cited by 85 | Google | Annotation)
Ramsey, William (1990). Where does the self-refutation objection take us? Inquiry 33 (December):453-65. (Google | Annotation)
Reppert, Victor (1992). Eliminative materialism, cognitive suicide, and begging the question. Metaphilosophy 23 (4):378-92. (Cited by 1 | Google | Annotation)
Reppert, Victor (1991). Ramsey on eliminativism and self-refutation. Inquiry 34 (4):499-508. (Cited by 1 | Google | Annotation)
Resnick, P. (1994). Intentionality is phlogiston. In Eric Dietrich (ed.), Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons. Academic Press. (Google)
Richards, G. (1996). On the necessary survival of folk psychology. In W. O'Donahue & Richard F. Kitchener (eds.), The Philosophy of Psychology. Sage Publications. (Google)
Robinson, William S. (1985). Toward eliminating Churchland's eliminationism. Philosophical Topics 13:60-67. (Cited by 1 | Google | Annotation)
Rockwell, Teed (1995). Beyond eliminative materialism: Some unnoticed implications of Paul Churchland's pragmatic pluralism. In Proceedings American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, 1995, San Francisco, CA. (Google | More links)
Roe, John H. (1992). Revisionary materialism: A critique of Stich. Conference 3 (2):67-75. (Google)
Rosenberg, A. (1991). How is eliminative materialism possible? In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press. (Google | Annotation)
Rosenberg, A. (1999). Naturalistic epistemology for eliminative materialists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):335-358. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Saidel, Eric (1992). What price neurophilosophy? Philosophy of Science Association 1:461-68. (Cited by 1 | Google | Annotation)
Schouten, Maurice K. D. & de Jong, Huib L. (1998). Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):489-509. (Cited by 5 | Google)
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Stich, Stephen P. (1991). Do true believers exist? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplement 65:229-44. (Cited by 7 | Google | Annotation)
Stich, Stephen P. (1996). Deconstructing the mind. In Deconstructing the Mind. Oxford University Press, 1996. (Cited by 93 | Google | More links)
Stich, Stephen P. (1992). What is a theory of mental representation? Mind 101 (402):243-61. (Cited by 48 | Google | More links |