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Intentionality :: Propositional Attitudes :: Beliefs

See also:
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Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). Saving Belief. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 50 | Google | Annotation)
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Cohen, L. Jonathan (1996). Does belief exist? In A. Clark & Peter Millican (eds.), Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology. Oxford University Press. (Google)
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Falvey, Kevin (1999). A natural history of belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (4):324-345. (Google | More links)
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Frankish, Keith (1998). A matter of opinion. Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):423-442. (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
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Garfield, Jay L. (1988). Belief in Psychology: A Study in the Ontology of Mind. MIT Press. (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Geirsson, Heimir (1998). True belief reports and the sharing of beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Research 23 (January):331-342. (Google)
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Gilbert, M. (2002). Belief and acceptance as features of groups. Protosociology 16:35-69. (Cited by 15 | Google)
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Jones, Todd (2001). What CBS wants: How groups can have (difficult to uncover) beliefs. Philosophical Forum 32 (3):221-251. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Kallestrup, Jesper (2003). Paradoxes about belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):107-117. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Kraemer, Eric Russert (1985). Beliefs, dispositions and demonstratives. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (June):167-176. (Google | More links)
Kripke, Saul A. (1979). A puzzle about belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. (Cited by 314 | Google)
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Marcus, Ruth Barcan (1995). The anti-naturalism of some language-centered accounts of beliefs. Dialectica 49 (2-4):113-30. (Google)
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McKinsey, Michael (1998). The grammar of belief. In William J. Rapaport & F. Orilia (eds.), Thought, Language, and Ontology, Essays in Memory of Hector-Neri Castaneda. Kluwer. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
McKinsey, Michael (1999). The semantics of belief ascriptions. Noûs 33 (4):519-557. (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Mclean, Murdith (1970). Episodic belief. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (October):389-396. (Google | More links)
Meihers, A. W. M. (ed.) (1999). Belief, Cognition, and the Will. Tilburg University Press. (Google)
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. (1999). Believing and accepting as a group. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Belief, Cognition, and the Will. Tilburg University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. (ed.) (2001). Explaining Beliefs. University of Chicago Press. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Meijers, Anthonie W. M. (ed.) (2001). Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Meyering, Theo C. (2001). The causal powers of belief: A critique from practical realism. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli. (Google)
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Owens, David J. (2003). Does belief have an aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305. (Cited by 14 | Google | More links)
Paglieri, Fabio (2007). Changing minds: The role of beliefs in cognitive dynamics. Synthese 155 (2):163-166. (Google | More links)
Parrett, H. (ed.) (1983). On Believing. De Gruyter. (Google)
Penco, Carole (2005). Keeping track of individuals: Brandom's analysis of Kripke's puzzle and the content of belief. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):177-201. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
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Ramsey, William (1992). Belief and cognitive architecture. Dialogue 31 (1):115-120. (Google)
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Schiffer, Stephen R. (2006). A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports. Noûs 40 (2):361-368. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Schwitzgebel, Eric (manuscript). Acting contrary to our (professed) beliefs. (Google | More links)