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2.1d. Propositional Attitudes, Misc (Propositional Attitudes, Misc on PhilPapers)

See also:
Anderson, C. Anthony (ed.) (1990). Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Antony, Louise M. (2001). Brain states with attitude. In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Google)
Armstrong, David M. (1975). Beliefs and desires as causes of actions: A reply to Donald Davidson. Philosophical Papers 4 (May):1-7.   (Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2002). Attitudes in action: A causal account. Manuscrito 25:47-78.   (Google)
Abstract: This article aims to vindicate the commonsensical view that what we think affects what we do. In order to show that mental properties like believing, desiring and intending are causally explanatory, I propose a nonreductive, materialistic account that identifies beliefs and desires by their content, and that shows how differences in the contents of beliefs and desires can make causal differences in what we do
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1995). Explaining Attitudes. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 75 | Google | More links)
Balaguer, Mark (1998). Attitudes without propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):805-26.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Barnes, Gerald W. (1977). Some remarks on belief and desire. Philosophical Review 86 (July):340-349.   (Google | More links)
Bealer, George (1998). Propositions. Mind 107 (425):1-32.   (Cited by 16 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts to reduce propositions to extensional entities-either extensional functions or sets. The second group concerns problems of fine grained content-both traditional 'Cicero'/'Tully' puzzles and recent variations on them which confront scientific essentialism. After characterizing the problems, I outline a non-reductionist approach-the algebraic approach-which avoids the problems associated with reductionism. I then go on to show how the theory can incorporate non-Platonic (as well as Platonic) modes of presentation. When these are implemented nondescriptively, they yield the sort of fine-grained distinctions which have been eluding us. The paper closes by applying the theory to a cluster of remaining puzzles, including a pair of new puzzles facing scientific essentialism
Ben-Yami, Hanoch (1997). Against characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bennett, Jonathan (1991). Analysis without noise. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Boër, Steven E. (1994). Propositional attitudes and formal ontology. Synthese 98 (2).   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data
Brownstein, Donald (1985). Individuating propositional attitudes. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):205-212.   (Google)
Clark, Austen (1994). Beliefs and desires incorporated. Journal of Philosophy 91 (8):404-25.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose we admit for the sake of argument that "folk" explanations of human behavior--explanations in terms of beliefs and desires--sometimes succeed. They sometimes enable us to understand and predict patterns of motion that otherwise would remain unintelligible and unanticipated. Is the only explanation for such success that folk psychology is a viable proto-scientific theory of human psychology? I shall describe an analysis which yields a negative answer to that question. It was suggested by an observation and an analogy, both of which may initially seem remote from the topic at hand
Clark, Andy (1991). Radical ascent. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:211-27.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
David, Marian (2002). Content essentialism. Acta Analytica 17 (28):103-114.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Davies, David (1995). Davidson, indeterminacy, and measurement. Acta Analytica 10 (14):37-56.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Davies, David (1998). On gauging attitudes. Philosophical Studies 90 (2):129-54.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1989). What is present to the mind? In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
Davidson, Donald (1991). What is present to the mind. Philosophical Issues 1:197-213.   (Cited by 37 | Google | More links)
De Clercq, Rafael (2006). Presentism and the Problem of Cross-Time Relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):386-402.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Presentism is the view that only present entities exist. Recently, several authors have asked the question whether presentism is able to account for cross-time relations, i.e., roughly, relations between entities existing at different times. In this paper I claim that this question is to be answered in the affirmative. To make this claim plausible, I consider four types of cross-time relation and show how each can be accommodated without difficulty within the metaphysical framework of presentism.
Devitt, Michael (1984). Thoughts and their ascription. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9:385-420.   (Google)
Egan, M. F. (1989). What's wrong with the syntactic theory of mind. Philosophy of Science 56 (December):664-74.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Elugardo, Reinaldo (2001). Brain states, causal explanation, and the attitudes. In Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.   (Google)
Falk, Arthur E. (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Recent Philosophical Debates. Hamilton Books, University Press of America.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: This work examines the nature of what philosophers call de re mental attitudes, paying close attention to the controversies over the nature of these and allied...
Falk, Arthur (2004). Desire and Belief: Introduction to Some Philosophical Debates. University Press of America.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: First published in 2004, this book is a rigorous textbook on the metaphysics of the mind for advanced students of philosophy, covering the background they need to understand the debates and bringing them to the frontiers of current research. It is also a monograph on the nature of de re and de se states of mind, incorporating material the author published in journals. The short file you will see is only a gateway to more than two dozen other files which are rewrites of the book
Feit, Neil (2006). The doctrine of propositions, internalism, and global supervenience. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):447-457.   (Google | More links)
Feldman, Richard H. (1986). Davidson's theory of propositional attitudes. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (December):693-712.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goldstein, Irwin (1981). Cognitive pleasure and distress. Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Explaining pleasure's 'intentional object', I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleased. Bernard Williams, Irving Thalberg, and Gilbert Ryle, who reject this analysis, are discussed.
Green, Mitchell S. (1999). Attitude ascription's affinity to measurement. International Journal Of Philosophical Studies 7 (3):323-348.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The relation between two systems of attitude ascription that capture all the empirically significant aspects of an agents thought and speech may be analogous to that between two systems of magnitude ascription that are equivalent relative to a transformation of scale. If so, just as an objects weighing eight pounds doesnt relate that object to the number eight (for a different but equally good scale would use a different number), similarly an agents believing that P need not relate her to P (for a different but equally adequate interpretive scheme could use a different proposition). In either case the only reality picked out by any system of ascription is what is common to all equivalent rivals. By emphasizing some contrasts between decision theory and belief-desire psychology, it is argued that if attitude ascription is appropriately analogous to measurement then not only is being related to a proposition an artifact of the system of representation chosen, so are belief and desire
Hieronymi, Pamela (2006). Controlling attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will
Hill, Christopher S. (1988). Intentionality, folk psychology, and reduction. In Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives On Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Google)
Humberstone, I. L. (1992). Direction of fit. Mind 101 (401):59-83.   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Jacquette, Dale (1990). Intentionality and Stich's theory of brain sentence syntax. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):169-82.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Jackman, Henry (online). Truth, rationality, and humanity.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: When we interpret someone in terms of their beliefs and desires, we are doing something other than merely describing them, but it is far from clear what this something else is. As Dennett puts it, while there is a growing consensus about the "not-purely-descriptive nature of intentional attribution," there remains considerable disagreement over which norms govern the play of this "dramatic interpretation game." This paper will discuss three candidates for specifying the content of these norms, truth, rationality and humanity. It will argue that while truth has frequently been taken to be the least plausible candidate, once the regulative rather than constitutive status of these norms are recognized, it turns out to be the best one. It will then close with a discussion of the 'indirect' role that rationality constraints can still be seen to play in a theory of belief
Kissine, Mikhail (2007). Direction of fit. Logique Et Analyse 198 (57):113-128.   (Google)
MacKenzie, J. S. (1916). Laws of thought. Mind 25 (99):289-307.   (Google | More links)
Margolis, Joseph (1977). Cognitive agents, mental states, and internal representation. Behaviorism 5:63-74.   (Google)
Matthews, Robert J. (1994). The measure of mind. Mind 103 (410):131-46.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McEvoy, Mark (2003). A defense of propositional functionalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:421-436.   (Google)
Millikan, Ruth G. (1986). Thoughts without laws: Cognitive science with content. Philosophical Review 95 (January):47-80.   (Cited by 48 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Montague, Michelle (2007). Against propositionalism. Noûs 41 (3):503–518.   (Google | More links)
Morton, Adam (1988). The explanatory depth of propositional attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives 2:67-80.   (Google)
Moser, Paul K. (1990). Physicalism and intentional attitudes. Behavior and Philosophy 18:33-41.   (Google)
Muskens, Reinhard (1993). Propositional Attitudes. In R.E. Asher & J.M.Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Pergamon Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Verbs such as know, believe, hope, fear, regret and desire are commonly taken to express an attitude that one may bear towards a proposition and are therefore called verbs of propositional attitude. Thus in (1) below the agent Cathy is reported to have a certain attitude
Peacocke, Christopher (1983). Between instrumentalism and brain-writing. In Christopher Peacocke (ed.), Sense and Content. Oxford University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Pelczar, Michael W. (2007). Forms and objects of thought. Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):97-122.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises
Perry, John (1986). Circumstantial attitudes and benevolent cognition. In Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind and Logic. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: From: _Language, Mind and Logic_, edited by Jeremy Butter?eld. 123
Possin, Kevin (1986). The case against Stich's syntactic theory of mind. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):405-18.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Pratt, Ian (1993). Analysis and the attitudes. In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.   (Google)
Recanati, Francois (2000). Opacity and the attitudes. In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Rechtin, Lisbeth & Todd, William L. (1974). Propositional attitudes and self-reference. Philosophia 4 (April-July):271-295.   (Google | More links)
Richard, Mark E. (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 172 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book makes a stimulating contribution to the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. It begins with a spirited defense of the view that propositions are structured and that propositional structure is "psychologically real." The author then develops a subtle view of propositions and attitude ascription. The view is worked out in detail with attention to such topics as the semantics of conversations, iterated attitude ascriptions, and the role of propositions as bearers of truth. Along the way important issues in the philosophy of mind are addressed
Robbins, Philip (2004). To structure, or not to structure? Synthese 139 (1):55-80.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rooney, Margaret M. (1980). What do we hope for: Some puzzles involving propositional hoping. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:75-92.   (Google)
Ross, Don (1986). Stich, Fodor and the status of belief. Eidos 5 (December):119-141.   (Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1994). Attitudes as nonentities. Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Saidel, Eric (1998). Beliefs, desires, and the ability to learn. American Philosophical Quarterly 35 (1):21-37.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Schroeder, Timothy (2006). Propositional attitudes. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):65-73.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Schwartz, J. (1992). Propositional attitude psychology as an ideal type. Topoi 11 (1):5-26.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Sher, George A. (1977). Armstrong and the interdependence of the mental. Philosophical Quarterly 27 (July):227-235.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Smith, D. M. (1994). Toward a perspicuous characterization of intentional states. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):103-20.   (Google | More links)
Stalnaker, Robert (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 415 | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1984). Relativism, rationality, and the limits of intentional ascription. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Poland, Jeffrey S. & Von Eckardt, Barbara (2000). In defense of the standard view. Protosociology 14:312-331.   (Google)
Zaitchik, Alan (1981). Reply to professor Fodor on physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December):294-295.   (Google)