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Intentionality :: Propositional Attitudes :: Propositional Attitudes, General

See also:
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Richard, Mark E. (1990). Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 172 | Google | More links)
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