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2.2. Content Internalism and Externalism (Content Internalism and Externalism on PhilPapers)

See also:
Harman, Gilbert (1988). Wide functionalism. In Stephen Schiffer & Susan Steele (eds.), Cognition and Representation. Westview Press.   (Google)
Nelkin, Norton (1997). Consciousness and the origins of thought. Mind and Language 12 (2):178–180.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This book offers a comprehensive and broadly rationalist theory of the mind which continually tests itself against experimental results and clinical data. Taking issue with Empiricists who believe that all knowledge arises from experience and that perception is a non-cognitive state, Norton Nelkin argues that perception is cognitive, constructive, and proposition-like. Further, as against Externalists who believe that our thoughts have meaning only insofar as they advert to the world outside our minds, he argues that meaning is determined 'in the head'. Finally, he offers an account of how we acquire some of our most basic concepts, including the concept of the self and that of other minds

2.2a Is Content in the Head?

Brown, J. (1998). Natural kind terms and recognitional capacities. Mind 107 (426):275-303.   (Cited by 23 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The main contribution of this paper is a new account of how a community may introduce a term for a natural kind in advance of knowing the correct scientific account of that kind. The account is motivated by the inadequacy of the currently dominant accounts of how a community may do this, namely those proposed by Kripke and by Putman. Their accounts fail to deal satisfactorily with the facts that (1) typically, an item that instantiates one natural kind instantiates several - 'the higher-level natural kinds problem', and (2) natural kinds often occur in nature in impure form - 'the composition problem' .On the account I propose, a term for a natural kind gains its reference by being associated with a recognitional capacity for that kind. I show how members of a scientifically ignorant community could have a recognitional capacity for a natural kind, say gold, as opposed to a certain kind of appearance, for instance the appearance that gold actually has. I argue that members of such a community can have recognitional capacities for particular natural kinds despite the actual or possible existence of duplicate kinds, e.g. water. After developing the account in detail, I show how it can deal with the two problems faced by Kripke's and Putnam's problem. The case of natural kind terms is crucial to the central debate in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind about whether we can refer non-descriptively to objects and kinds in the world. I take the account I propose to be a non-descriptive account of linguistic reference to natural kinds that can be used to support externalism in the philosophy of mind
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2003). Contents just aren't in the head. Erkenntnis 58 (1):1-6.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bruns, M. & Soldati, Gianfranco (1997). Object-dependent and property-dependent concepts. Dialectica 48 (3-4):185-208.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1995). The characteristic thesis of anti-individualism. Analysis 55 (3):146-48.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1982). Other bodies. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 94 | Annotation | Google)
Butler, Keith (1998). Internal Affairs: Making Room for Psychosemantic Internalism. Kluwer.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Campbell, John (1982). Extension and psychic state: Twin earth revisited. Philosophical Studies 42 (June):67-90.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Chomsky, Noam A. (2003). Internalist explorations. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Christensen, Carleton B. (2001). Escape from twin earth: Putnam's 'logic' of natural kind terms. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):123-150.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam built into it , presumably in order to block such entailments. Part II then raises the decisive issue of at what cost these devices do the job they need to do. It argues that - apart from possessing no other motivation than their capacity to block the consequences derived in Part I - they only fulfil this blocking function if they render the theory unable to deal with fiction and related 'make-believe' activities. Part III indicates the affinity Putnam's account has with the classically 'denotative' view of meaning, and thus how its weaknesses may be seen as a variant of the classical weakness of 'denotative' approaches. It concludes that the theory is a conceptual muddle
Crane, Tim (1991). All the difference in the world. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (January):1-25.   (Cited by 25 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Cummins, Robert E. (1991). Methodological reflections on belief. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Mind and Common Sense. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Davis, Steven (2003). Arguments for externalism. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Devitt, Michael (2001). A shocking idea about meaning. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 55 (218):471-494.   (Google)
Devitt, Michael (1990). Meanings just ain't in the head. In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1993). The nature of thought. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):185-99.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Endicott, Ronald P. (forthcoming). Multiple realizability. In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Multiple realizability is a key issue in debates over the nature of mind and reduction in the sciences. The subject consists of two parts:
Farkas, Katalin (2003). Does twin earth rest on a mistake? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8):155-169.   (Google)
Farkas, Katalin (2008). Phenomenal intentionality without compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.   (Google)
Abstract: In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow.
Farkas, Katalin (2006). Semantic internalism and externalism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
Farkas, Katalin (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended here is not dualism--which is not adopted--but internalism. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted externalist thesis, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on certain features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view, which holds that the mind is autonomous, and though it is obviously affected by the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. Defenders of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; Katalin Farkas offers a defence of an uncompromising internalist Cartesian conception
Farkas, Katalin (2003). What is externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
Fisher, Justin C. (2007). Why nothing mental is just in the head. Nous 41 (2):318-334.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Mental internalists hold that an individuals mental features at a given time supervene upon what is in that individuals head at that time. While many people reject mental internalism about content and justification, mental internalism is commonly accepted regarding such other mental features as rationality, emotion-types, propositional-attitude-types, moral character, and phenomenology. I construct a counter-example to mental internalism regarding all these features. My counter-example involves two creatures: a human and an alien from Pulse World. These creatures environments, behavioral dispositions and histories are such that it is intuitively clear that they are mentally quite different, even while they are, for a moment, exactly alike with respect to whats in their heads. I offer positive reasons for thinking that the case I describe is indeed possible. I then consider ways in which mental internalists might attempt to account for this case, but conclude that the only plausible option is to reject mental internalism and to adopt a particular externalist alternative a history-oriented version of teleo-functionalism
Floyd, Juliet (2005). Putnam's 'the meaning of meaning': Externalism in historical context. In Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.), Hilary Putnam (Contemporary Philosophy in Focus). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Frances, Bryan (ms). A philosophically inexpensive introduction to twin-earth.   (Google)
Abstract: I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also briefly discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument
Frances, Bryan (online). Twin earth thought experiments.   (Google)
Abstract: Suppose that you had always had a physical twin, Chris, who on a different planet went through life having physical characteristics, sensory experiences, utterances, and brain processes exactly the same as yours in every physical and sensory respect. Chris
Gavran, Ana (2004). Tim Crane on the internalism-externalism debate. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):207-218.   (Google)
Green, Mitchell S. (2000). The status of supposition. Noûs 34 (3):376–399.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
Horowitz, Amir (2001). Contents just are in the head. Erkenntnis 54 (3):321-344.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Horowitz, Amir (2005). Externalism, the environment, and thought-tokens. Erkenntnis 63 (1):133-138.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Horowitz, Amir (1995). Putnam, Searle, and externalism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1):27-69.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Hyde, William H. (1981). On meaning the micro-state. Philosophical Investigations 4:25-34.   (Google)
Koethe, John L. (1992). And they ain't outside the head either. Synthese 90 (1):27-53.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Korman, Daniel Z. (2006). What externalists should say about dry earth. Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):503-520.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
Lau, Joe (online). Externalism about mental content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way
Liz, Manuel (2003). Intentional states: Individuation, explanation, and supervenience. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Longworth, Guy (2003). Where should we look for the mind? Think 5.   (Google)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1996). Duplicating thoughts. Mind and Language 11 (1):92-102.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ludlow, Peter (2003). Externalism, logical form, and linguistic intentions. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1993). Externalism, naturalism, and method. Philosophical Issues 4:250-264.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Mandelkar, S. (1991). An argument against the externalist account of psychological content. Philosophical Psychology 4:375-82.   (Annotation | Google)
McCulloch, Gregory (1992). The spirit of twin earth. Analysis 52 (3):168-174.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
McGilvray, James A. (1998). Meanings are syntactically individuated and found in the head. Mind and Language 13 (2):225-280.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
McGlone, Michael (forthcoming). Putnam on What Isn't in the Head. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” Putnam argues, among other things, that “‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head”. Putnam’s central arguments in favor of this conclusion are unsound. The arguments in question are the famous intra‐world Twin Earth arguments, given on pages 223‐ 227 of the article in question.
McKinsey, Michael (1991). The internal basis of meaning. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (June):143-69.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Mundale, Jennifer & Bechtel, William P. (online). Multiple realizability revisited.   (Google)
Abstract: The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in a comparative fashion undercuts the likelihood that, at least within organic life forms, we are likely to find cases of multiply realized psychological functions
Owens, Joseph (2003). Anti-individualism, indexicality, and character. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Owens, Joseph (1983). Functionalism and the propositional attitudes. Noûs 17 (November):529-49.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Pelczar, Michael (forthcoming). Content internalism about indexical thought. American Philosophical Quarterly.   (Google)
Abstract: Properly understood, content internalism is the thesis that any difference between the representational contents of two individuals' mental states reduces to a difference in those individuals' intrinsic properties. Some of the strongest arguments against internalism turn on the possibility for two "doppelgangers" –- perfect physical and phenomenal duplicates -– to differ with respect to the contents of those of their mental states that they can express using terms such as "I," "here," and "now." In this paper, I grant the stated possibility, but deny that it poses any threat to internalism. Despite their similarities, doppelgangers differ in some of their intrinsic properties, and it is to such intrinsic differences that differences of indexical content reduce.
Putnam, Hilary (1975). The meaning of 'meaning'. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.   (Cited by 1506 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Robinson, Howard M. (2003). Some externalist strategies and their problems. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (7):21-34.   (Google)
Rosenberg, Alex (2001). On multiple realization: Comments and criticism and the special sciences. Journal of Philosophy XCVIII ( 7.   (Google)
Schroeter, Laura (2007). Illusion of transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):597 – 618.   (Google)
Abstract: It's generally agreed that, for a certain a class of cases, a rational subject cannot be wrong in treating two elements of thought as co-referential. Even anti-individualists like Tyler Burge agree that empirical error is impossible in such cases. I argue that this immunity to empirical error is illusory and sketch a new anti-individualist approach to concepts that doesn't require such immunity
Schroeter, Laura (2008). Why be an anti-individualist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.   (Google)
Abstract: Anti-individualists claim that concepts are individuated with an eye to purely external facts about a subject's environment about which she may be ignorant or mistaken. This paper offers a novel reason for thinking that anti-individualistic concepts are an ineliminable part of commonsense psychology. Our commitment to anti-individualism, I argue, is ultimately grounded in a rational epistemic agent's commitment to refining her own representational practices in the light of new and surprising information about her environment. Since anti-individualism is an implicit part of responsible epistemic practices, we cannot abandon it without compromising our own epistemic agency. The story I tell about the regulation of one's own representational practices yields a new account of the identity conditions for anti-individualistic concepts
Searle, John R. (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 1571 | Google | More links)
Abstract: John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third in the sequence, in effect it provides the philosophical foundations for the other two. Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference. In all these areas John Searle has original and stimulating views. He ends with a resolution of the 'mind-body' problem
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (2005). Can psychology be a unified science? Philosophy of Science 72 (5):953-963.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Jaegwon Kim has argued that if psychological kinds are multiply realizable then no single psychological theory can describe regularities ranging over psychological states. Instead, psychology must be fractured, with human psychology covering states realized in the human way, martian psychology covering states realized in the martian way, and so on. I show that even if one accepts the principles that motivate Kim
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Stalnaker, Robert (1993). Twin earth revisited. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:297-311.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
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Abstract: In this paper I try to make as much sense aspossible of, first, the extensive philosophicalliterature concerned with the status of `Wateris H2O' and, second, the implications ofPutnam's invention of Twin Earth, anotherpossible world stipulated to be just like Earth, except that water is XYZ, notH2O
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Zemach, Eddy M. (1976). Putnam's theory on the reference of substance terms. Journal of Philosophy 73 (March):116-27.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google | More links)

2.2b Social Externalism

Antony, Michael V. (1993). Social relations and the individuation of thought. Mind 102 (406):247-61.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bach, Kent (1988). Burge's new thought experiment: Back to the drawing room. Journal of Philosophy 85 (February):88-97.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2007). Social externalism and first-person authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with first-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”
Benejam, A. (2003). Thought experiments and semantic competence. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Bridges, Jason (2006). Davidson's transcendental externalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):290-315.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: One of the chief aims of Donald Davidson
Brown, Jessica (2000). Against temporal externalism. Analysis 60 (2):178-188.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). Defending Burge's thought experiment. Erkenntnis 55 (3):387-391.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Davidson and forms of anti-individualism: Reply to Hahn. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Descartes, bare concepts, and anti-individualism: Reply to Normore. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1979). Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4:73-122.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1986). Intellectual norms and foundations of mind. Journal of Philosophy 83 (December):697-720.   (Cited by 68 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Psychology and the environment: Reply to Chomsky. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Replies from Tyler Burge. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.   (Google)
Burge, Taylor (2003). Thought experiments: Reply to Donnellan. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). The indexical strategy: Reply to Owens. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Collins, John M. (2006). Temporal externalism, natural kind terms, and scientifically ignorant communities. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):55-68.   (Google | More links)
Loewer, Barry (2009). Why is there anything except physics? Synthese 170 (2):217-233.   (Google)
Abstract: In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim’s objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then, why is there anything except physics?” By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences. In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construal of his view and argue that while in a sense it answers Fodor’s question it is immensely implausible
Davis, Andrew (2005). Social externalism and the ontology of competence. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):297-308.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Social externalism implies that many competences are not personal assets separable from social and cultural environments but complex states of affairs involving individuals and persisting features of social reality. The paper explores the consequences for competence identity over time and across contexts, and hence for the predictive role usually accorded to competences
Elugardo, Reinaldo (1993). Burge on content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):367-84.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Forbes, Graeme R. (1987). A dichotomy sustained. Philosophical Studies 51 (March):187-211.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Frapolli, Maria J. & Romero, E. (eds.) (2003). Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Frances, Bryan (1999). On the explanatory deficiencies of linguistic content. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining their actions. I argue that the considerations motivating this view are best handled with just the ordinary ‘that’-clause contents.
Millikan, Ruth G. (1999). Historical kinds and the "special sciences". Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.   (Cited by 49 | Google | More links)
Gauker, Christopher (1991). Mental content and the division of epistemic labour. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (September):302-18.   (Google | More links)
Gauker, Christopher (2003). Social externalism and linguistic communication. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. CSLI.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the expressive theory of communication, the primary function of language is to enable speakers to convey the content of their thoughts to hearers. According to Tyler Burge's social externalism, the content of a person's thought is relative to the way words are used in his or her surrounding linguistic community. This paper argues that Burge's social externalism refutes the expressive theory of communication.
Georgalis, Nicholas (2003). Burge's thought experiment: Still in need of defense. Erkenntnis 58 (2):267-273.   (Google | More links)
Georgalis, N. (1999). Rethinking Burge's thought experiment. Synthese 118 (2):145-64.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Green, Mitchell S. (2000). The status of supposition. Noûs 34 (3):376–399.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
Grimaltos, Tobies (2003). Terms and content. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Hahn, Martin & Ramberg, B. (eds.) (2003). Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Hahn, Martin (2003). When swampmen get arthritis: "Externalism" in Burge and Davidson. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Haugeland, John (2004). Social cartesianism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Jackman, Henry (2000). Deference and self-knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):171-180.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
Jackman, Henry (1998). Individualism and interpretation. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):31-38.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: 'Interpretational' accounts of meaning are frequently treated as incompatible with accounts stressing language's 'social' character. However, this paper argues that one can reconcile interpretational and social accounts by distinguishing "methodological" from "ascriptional" individualism. While methodological individualism requires only that the meaning of one's terms ultimately be grounded in facts about oneself, ascriptional individualism requires that the meaning of one's terms be independent of how others use theirs. Interpretational accounts are committed only to methodological individualism, while arguments for languages social character are best understood as attacks on ascriptional individualism. As a result, one can recognize language's social character and still be an interpretationalist
Jackman, Henry (1996). Semantic Norms and Temporal Externalism. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: There has frequently been taken to be a tension, if not an incompatibility, between "externalist" theories of content (which allow the make-up of one's physical environment and the linguistic usage of one's community to contribute to the contents of one's thoughts and utterances) and the "methodologically individualist" intuition that whatever contributes to the content of one's thoughts and utterances must ultimately be grounded in facts about one's own attitudes and behavior. In this dissertation I argue that one can underwrite such externalist theories within a methodologically individualistic framework by understanding semantic norms in terms of the need to reach, for each of one's terms, a type of "equilibrium." Each speaker's commitment to making her _own_ beliefs and applications consistent allows one to incorporate these 'external' factors into the contents of their thoughts and utterances in a way that remains methodologically individualistic. Methodologically individualistic accounts are typically taken to be unable to incorporate 'external' factors such as the world's physical make-up or communal usage because of arguments suggesting that the individual's own beliefs and usage underdetermine or even misidentify what, according to externalist accounts, they mean by their terms. These arguments, however, only seem plausible if one presupposes a comparatively impoverished conception of the individual's beliefs. The beliefs a speaker associates with a given term extend far beyond the handful of sentences they would produce if asked to list such beliefs. In particular, speakers have an implicit, but rich, understanding of their language, their world, and the relation between them. Speakers typically understand languages as shared temporally extended practices about which they can be, both individually and collectively, mistaken. Once this conception of language is taken into account, the ascriptions which purportedly forced 'non-individualistic' conceptions of content upon us (particularly ascriptions which seemed to tie what we meant to social use rather than our own beliefs) turn out to be ultimately grounded in the individual's own beliefs. Indeed, our self-conception does much more than merely underwrite 'non-individualistic' ascriptions..
Jackman, Henry (2005). Temporal externalism and our ordinary linguistic practices. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):365-380.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately re?ect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
Jackman, Henry (2006). Temporal externalism, constitutive norms, and theories of vagueness. In Tomas Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Our concept of truth is governed by two principles. The
Jackman, Henry (2005). Temporal externalism, deference, and our ordinary linguistic practice. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):365-380.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Temporal externalists argue that ascriptions of thought and utterance content can legitimately reflect contingent conceptual developments that are only settled after the time of utterance. While the view has been criticized for failing to accord with our
Jackman, Henry (1999). We live forwards but understand backwards: Linguistic practices and future behavior. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):157-177.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ascriptions of content are sensitive not only to our physical and social environment, but also to unforeseeable developments in the subsequent usage of our terms. This paper argues that the problems that may seem to come from endorsing such 'temporally sensitive' ascriptions either already follow from accepting the socially and historically sensitive ascriptions Burge and Kripke appeal to, or disappear when the view is developed in detail. If one accepts that one's society's past and current usage contributes to what one's terms mean, there is little reason not to let its future usage to do so as well
Lewis, Harry A. (1985). Content and community. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:177-196.   (Google)
Liu, Jeeloo (2002). Physical externalism and social externalism: Are they really compatible? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:381-404.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Putnam and Burge have been viewed as launching a joint attack on individualism, the view that the content of one's psychological state is determined by what is in the head . Putnam argues that meanings are not in the head while Burge argues that beliefs are not in the head either, and both have come up with convincing arguments against individualism. It is generally conceived that Putnam's view is a version of physical externalism, which argues that factors in the physical environment play a role in determining the meanings of natural kind terms. Burge, on the other hand, is regarded as following up Putnam's argument to bring in factors in the social environment for the determination of belief. Burge's view has been commonly referred to as 'social externalism.' The general consensus in the field is that physical externalism and social externalism are compatible views. Furthermore, both Putnam and Burge seem to endorse each other’s position for the most part. In this paper, however, I shall argue against this general view to show that the two theories are deep down incompatible
Ludlow, Peter (1995). Social externalism and memory: A problem? Acta Analytica 10 (14):69-76.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Ludlow, Peter (1995). Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory. Analysis 55 (3):157-59.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (ms). The myth of social content.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: Social externalism is the view that the contents of a person's propositional attitudes are logically determined at least in part by her linguistic community's standards for the use of her words. If social externalism is correct, its importance can hardly be overemphasized. The traditional Cartesian view of psychological states as essentially first personal and non-relational in character, which has shaped much theorizing about the nature of psychological explanation, would be shown to be deeply flawed
Onof, Christian & Marsh, Leslie (2008). Introduction to the special issue “perspectives on social cognition”. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: No longer is sociality the preserve of the social sciences, or ‘‘culture’’ the preserve of the humanities or anthropology. By the same token, cognition is no longer the sole preserve of the cognitive sciences. Social cognition (SC) or, sociocognition if you like, is thus a kaleidoscope of research projects that has seen exponential growth over the past 30 or so years.
Marqueze, J. (2003). On orthodox and heterodox externalisms. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
McKinsey, Michael (1993). Curing folk psychology of arthritis. Philosophical Studies 70 (3):323-36.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.1 But I wish to show here, first, that neither Burge's initial thought experiment nor a second type of example that Burge describes supports either of these conclusions. Second, I will identify the proper conclusion to draw from Burge's discussion and show that this conclusion does not really pose a serious problem for individualism about the mental. And finally, I will argue that Burge's discussion does not in fact provide a conclusive reason for believing its proper conclusion
Millikan, Ruth G. (2003). In defense of public language. In Louise M. Antony & H. Hornstein (eds.), Chomsky and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Normore, Calvin G. (2003). Burge, Descartes, and us. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Nordby, Halvor (2005). Davidson on social externalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):88-94.   (Google | More links)
Nordby, Halvor (2004). Incorrect understanding and concept possession. Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):55-70.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Tyler Burge has argued that an incorrect understanding of a word can be sufficient for possessing the concept the word literally expresses. His well-known 'arthritis' case involves a patient who understands 'arthritis' incorrectly, but who nevertheless, according to Burge, possesses the concept arthritis. Critics of Burge have objected that there is an alternative concept that best matches the patient's understanding and that this, therefore, is the patient's concept. The paper first argues that Burge's response to this objection is unconvincing. A better response is then developed. It is argued that there is no alternative concept that matches the incorrect understanding, since the patient thinks he has a partial understanding. This, together with points about ordinary psychological explanation and modes of presentations of concepts, establish that it is impossible to undermine Burge's social externalism by appealing to the idea that an alternative concept matches the incorrect understanding
Pagin, Peter (2006). Intersubjective externalism. In T. Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholar Press.   (Google)
Abstract: in T. Marvan (ed) What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, Cambridge Scholar Press, Newcastle upon Tyne, 39-54, 2006
Pitt, David (ms). The Burgean intuitions.   (Google)
Putnam, Hilary (1987). Meaning, other people, and the world. In Representation and Reality. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Sawyer, Sarah (2003). Conceptual errors and social externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):265-273.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Verheggen, Claudine (2006). How social must language be? Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (2):203-219.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wikforss, Asa Maria (2004). Externalism and incomplete understanding. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):287-294.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wikforss, Asa Maria (2001). Social externalism and conceptual errors. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):217-31.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Ever since Putnam and Burge launched their respective attacks on individualist accounts of meaning the individualist has felt squeezed for space.1 Very little maneuvering room, it seems, is left for the philosopher who wants to deny that meaning and mental content depend on the speaker's social environment. One option, popular amongst individualists, is to grant that reference is socially determined but argue that there is nevertheless a notion of meaning or content that can be understood individualistically. That is, the individualist can opt for a
Woodfield, Andrew (1998). Social externalism and conceptual diversity. In John M. Preston (ed.), Thought and Language. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Woodfield, Andrew (1982). Thought and the social community. Inquiry 25 (December):435-50.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Yalowitz, Steven (1999). Davidson's social externalism. Philosophia 27 (1-2):99-136.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)

2.2c Externalism and Psychological Explanation

Arjo, D. (1996). Sticking up for oedipus: Fodor on intentional generalizations and broad content. Mind and Language 11 (3):231-45.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Aydede, Murat & Robbins, P. (2001). Are Frege cases exceptions to intentional generalizations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Let's assume there are psychological generalizations that the folk rely upon in explaining and predicting the behavior of their fellows. Let's further assume these generalizations are intentional, in that they do their explanatory and predictive work by attributing to the subjects in their domain intentional mental states such as beliefs, desires, and the like. Then we can define a broad intentional psychology as one that adverts only to broad, viz. purely denotational/truth-conditional, mental contents in its generalizations; so the sentences expressing its generalizations should be transparently read. A narrow psychology is one that is not so restricted. [1] Accordingly, the sentences expressing narrow generalizations will contain opaque contexts, indicated by `that'-clauses (`believes that ...', `desires that ...', and the like). Here is an example of the sort of generalization we have in mind:
(G) If S desires that P and believes that S can bring it about that P, then, ceteris paribus, S will try
to bring it about that P.
In recent years, the question of whether such generalizations are broad or narrow has received considerable attention in philosophy of psychology. The general consensus among theorists has been that because generalizations like (G) are false when construed transparently, intentional psychology cannot be broad. For example, when read transparently, (G) seems to be falsified by Oedipus's story. Oedipus wished not to marry Mom and believed that he could achieve this, yet he did not avoid marrying her -- on the contrary. So Oedipus satisfied the antecedent and flouted the consequent of (G). In this way, Frege puzzles have served to motivate a narrow intentional psychology, where the intentional properties attributed to mental states are individuated more finely than denotations or truth-conditions
Bach, Kent (1982). "De re" belief and methodological solipsism. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought And Object: Essays On Intentionality. Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (1987). An externalist account of psychological content. Philosophical Topics 15 (1):191-226.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Buller, David J. (1997). Individualism and evolutionary psychology (or: In defense of "narrow" functions). Philosophy of Science 64 (1):74-95.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Millikan and Wilson argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one explanatory paradigm among many in psychology
Buller, David J. (1992). "Narrow"-mindedness breeds inaction. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):59-70.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1986). Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.   (Cited by 186 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (1982). Two thought experiments reviewed. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (July):284-94.   (Cited by 16 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Corazza, Eros (1994). Perspectival thoughts and psychological generalizations. Dialectica 48 (3-4):307-36.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Crawford, Sean (1998). In defence of object-dependent thoughts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):201-210.   (Google | More links)
Crawford, Sean (2003). Relational properties, causal powers and psychological laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect causal powers, it is false that no relational psychological properties do. Examples of relational psychological properties that do affect causal powers are given and psychological laws are sketched that subsume twins in virtue of them instantiating these relational properties rather than them sharing the narrow contents of their thoughts
Davies, Martin (1986). Individualism and supervenience: Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 263:263-283.   (Google)
Dretske, Fred (2001). Where is the mind? In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs. Csli.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (1992). What isn't wrong with folk psychology. Metaphilosophy 23 (1-2):1-13.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Egan, Frances (1991). Must psychology be individualistic? Philosophical Review 100 (April):179-203.   (Cited by 18 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1982). Cognitive science and the twin-earth problem. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (April):98-118.   (Cited by 23 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1980). Methodological solipsism as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3:63-109.   (Cited by 225 | Annotation | Google)
Frances, Bryan (1999). On the explanatory deficiencies of linguistic content. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining their actions. I argue that the considerations motivating this view are best handled with just the ordinary ‘that’-clause contents.
Gauker, Christopher (1987). Mind and chance. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (September):533-52.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Globus, Gordon G. (1984). Can methodological solipsism be confined to psychology? Cognition and Brain Theory 7:233-46.   (Annotation | Google)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1997). [Explanation] is explanation better. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):154-60.   (Google | More links)
Jacob, Pierre (online). Belief attribution and rationality: A dilemma for Jerry Fodor.   (Google | More links)
Jacob, Pierre (2002). Can mental content explain behavior? In Languages of the Brain.   (Google | More links)
Jacob, Pierre (1993). Externalism and the explanatory relevance of broad content. Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Kitcher, P. S. (1985). Narrow taxonomy and wide functionalism. Philosophy of Science 52 (March):78-97.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Kobes, Bernard W. (1989). Semantics and psychological prototypes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (March):1-18.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Losonsky, Michael (1995). Emdedded systems vs. individualism. Minds and Machines 5 (3):357-71.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract:   The dispute between individualism and anti-individualism is about the individuation of psychological states, and individualism, on some accounts, is committed to the claim that psychological subjects together with their environments do not constitute integrated computational systems. Hence on this view the computational states that explain psychological states in computational accounts of mind will not involve the subject''s natural and social environment. Moreover, the explanation of a system''s interaction with the environment is, on this view, not the primary goal of computational theorizing. Recent work in computational developmental psychology (by A. Karmiloff-Smith and J. Rutkowska) as well as artificial agents or embedded artificial systems (by L.P. Kaelbling, among others) casts doubt on these claims. In these computational models, the environment does not just trigger and sustain input for computational operations, but some computational operations actually involve environmental structures
Macdonald, Cynthia (1995). Anti-individualism and psychological explanation. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Google)
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Maloney, J. Christopher (1985). Methodological solipsism reconsidered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology. Philosophy of Science 52 (September):451-69.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Marras, Ausonio (1985). The churchlands on methodological solipsism and computational psychology. Philosophy of Science 52 (June):295-309.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McClamrock, Ron (1995). Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 88 | Google | More links)
Abstract: While the notion of the mind as information-processor--a kind of computational system--is widely accepted, many scientists and philosophers have assumed that this account of cognition shows that the mind's operations are characterizable independent of their relationship to the external world. Existential Cognition challenges the internalist view of mind, arguing that intelligence, thought, and action cannot be understood in isolation, but only in interaction with the outside world. Arguing that the mind is essentially embedded in the external world, Ron McClamrock provides a schema that allows cognitive scientists to address such long-standing problems in artificial intelligence as the "frame" problem and the issue of "bounded" rationality. Extending this schema to cover progress in other studies of behavior, including language, vision, and action, McClamrock reinterprets the importance of the organism/environment distinction. McClamrock also considers the broader philosophical question of the place of mind in the world, particularly with regard to questions of intentionality, subjectivity, and phenomenology. With implications for philosophy, cognitive and computer science, AI, and psychology, this book synthesizes state-of-the-art work in philosophy and cognitive science on how the mind interacts with the world to produce thoughts, ideas, and actions
McClamrock, Ron (1991). Methodological individualism considered as a constitutive principle of scientific inquiry. Philosophical Psychology 4:343-54.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Abstract: The issue of methodological solipsism in the philosophy of mind and psychology has received enormous attention and discussion in the decade since the appearance Jerry Fodor's "Methodological Solipsism" [Fodor 1980]. But most of this discussion has focused on the consideration of the now infamous "Twin Earth" type examples and the problems they present for Fodor's notion of "narrow content". I think there is deeper and more general moral to be found in this issue, particularly in light of Fodor's more recent defense of his view in Psychosemantics [Fodor 1987]. Underlying this discussion are questions about the nature and plausibility of the claim that scientific explanation should observe a constraint of methodological individualism . My goal in what follows is to bring out this more general problem in Fodor's "internalist" account of the mental
Molyneux, Bernard (2007). Primeness, internalism and explanatory generality. Philosophical Studies 135 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Williamson (2000) [Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson
Neander, Karen (ms). The narrow and the normative.   (Google)
Noonan, Harold W. (1984). Methodological solipsism: A reply to Morris. Philosophical Studies 48 (September):285-290.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Noonan, Harold W. (1990). Object-dependent thoughts and psychological redundancy. Analysis 50 (January):1-9.   (Cited by 8 | Google)
Noonan, Harold W. (1993). Object-dependent thoughts: A case of superficial necessity but deep contingency? In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google)
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Owens, Joseph (1994). Psychological externalism and psychological explanation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):921-928.   (Google | More links)
Paprzycka, Katarzyna (2002). False consciousness of intentional psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):271-295.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: According to explanatory individualism, every action must be explained in terms of an agent's desire. According to explanatory nonindividualism, we sometimes act on our desires, but it is also possible for us to act on others' desires without acting on desires of our own. While explanatory nonindividualism has guided the thinking of many social scientists, it is considered to be incoherent by most philosophers of mind who insist that actions must be explained ultimately in terms of some desire of the agent. In the first part of the paper, I show that some powerful arguments designed to demonstrate the incoherence of explanatory nonindividualism fail. In the second part of the paper, I offer a nonindividualist explanation of the apparent obviousness of belief-desire psychology. I argue that there are two levels of the intelligibility of our actions. On the more fundamental (explanatory) level, the question "Why did the agent do something?" admits a variety of folk-psychological categories. But there is another (formation-of-self) level, at which the same question admits only of answers that ultimately appeal only to the agent's own desires. Explanatory individualism results from the confusion of the two levels
Patterson, Sarah (1991). Individualism and semantic development. Philosophy of Science 58 (March):15-35.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Patterson, Sarah (1990). The explanatory role of belief ascriptions. Philosophical Studies 59 (3):313-32.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (1993). Externalist explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:203-30.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google)
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Pettit, Philip (1986). Broad-minded explanation and psychology. In Philip Pettit & John McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Petrie, Bradford (1990). Nonautonomous psychology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 28:539-59.   (Annotation | Google)
Rives, Bradley (2009). Concept cartesianism, concept pragmatism, and Frege cases. Philosophical Studies 144 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about rationality turn on the form, not the content, of thoughts. I then consider Jerry Fodor’s argument that ‘modes of presentation’ are not identical with Fregean senses, and argue that explanatory considerations should leads us to reject his ‘syntactic’ treatment of Frege cases. Rejecting the Cartesian treatment of Frege cases, however, is not tantamount to accepting Peacocke’s claim that reasons and rationality are central to the individuation of concepts. For I argue that we can steer a middle course between Fodor’s Cartesianism and Peacocke’s Pragmatism, and adopt a form of Pragmatism that is constrained by Fregean considerations, but at the same time denies that concepts are constitutively tied to reasons and rationality
Rowlands, Mark (1995). Against methodological solipsism: The ecological approach. Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):5-24.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Abstract: This paper argues that an ecological approach to psychology of the sort advanced by J. J. Gibson provides a coherent and powerful alternative to the computational, information-processing, paradigm. The paper argues for two principles. Firstly, one cannot begin to understand what internal information processing an organism must accomplish until one understands what information is available to the organism in its environment. Secondly, an organism can process information by acting on or manipulating physical structures in its environment. An attempt is made to show how these principles can be extended to cognition as a whole. It is suggested that these principles may have a foundation in evolutionary biology
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Wakefield, Jerome C. (2002). Broad versus narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor on Frege cases. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily adequate broad-content psychology is nonetheless possible because Frege cases rarely occur in intentional-explanatory contexts, and they are not systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that demands intentional explanation. Thus, he claims, behaviors associated with Frege cases can be considered ceteris-paribus exceptions to broad-content intentional laws without significantly decreasing the explanatory power of intentional psychology. I argue that Frege cases are plentiful and systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that requires intentional explanation, specifically in the explanation of why certain actions are not performed. Consequently, Frege-case behaviors cannot be construed as ceteris-paribus exceptions to intentional laws without significantly eroding the explanatory power of intentional psychology and reducing the rationality of the agent. Fodor thus fails to save broad-content psychology from the prima facie objections against it based on Frege cases
Wallace, J. & Mason, H. E. (1990). On some thought experiments about mind and meaning. In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes. Csli.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Wilson, Robert A. (1994). Causal depth, theoretical appropriateness, and individualism in psychology. Philosophy of Science 61 (1):55-75.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Wilson, Robert A. (1995). Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind. Cambridge University Press.   (Cited by 58 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This book offers the first sustained critique of individualism in psychology, a view that has been the subject of debate between philosophers such as Jerry Fodor and Tyler Burge for many years. The author approaches individualism as an issue in the philosophy of science and by discussing issues such as computationalism and the mind's modularity he opens the subject up for non-philosophers in psychology and computer science. Professor Wilson carefully examines the most influential arguments for individualism and identifies the main metaphysical assumptions underlying them. Since the topic is so central to the philosophy of mind, a discipline generating enormous research and debate at present, the book has implications for a very broad range of philosophical issues including the naturalisation of intentionality, psychophysical supervenience, the nature of mental causation, and the viability of folk psychology
Wilson, Robert A. (2004). Recent work on individualism in the social, behavioural, and biological sciences. Biology and Philosophy 19 (3):397-423.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The social, behavioral, and a good chunk of the biological sciences concern the nature of individual agency, where our paradigm for an individual is a human being. Theories of economic behavior, of mental function and dysfunction, and of ontogenetic development, for example, are theories of how such individuals act, and of what internal and external factors are determinative of that action. Such theories construe individuals in distinctive ways
Wilson, Robert A. (2000). Some problems for alternative individualism. Philosophy of Science 67 (4):671-679.   (Google | More links)

2.2d Externalism and Mental Causation

Adams, Frederick R. (1993). Fodor's modal argument. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.   (Google)
Abstract: What we do, intentionally, depends upon the intentional contents of our thoughts. For about ten years Fodor has argued that intentional behavior causally depends upon the narrow intentional content of thoughts (not broad). His main reason is a causal powers argument—brains of individuals A and B may differ in broad content, but, if A and B are neurophysically identical, their thoughts cannot differ in causal power, despite differences in broad content. Recently Fodor (Fodor, 1991) presents a new 'modal' version of this causal powers argument. I argue that Fodor's argument (in old or new dress) is a non sequitur. It neither establishes the existence of narrow content nor the need for a content other than broad content to explain intentional behavior
Barrett, J. (1997). Individualism and the cross-contexts test. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):242-60.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Jerry Fodor has defended the claim that psychological theories should appeal to narrow rather than wide intentional properties. One of his arguments relies upon the cross contexts test, a test that purports to determine whether two events have the same causally relevant properties. Critics have charged that this test is too weak, since it counts certain genuinely explanatory relational properties in science as being causally irrelevant. Further, it has been claimed, the test is insensitive to the fact that special scientific laws allow for exceptions which do not undermine those laws. This paper refines the cross contexts test to meet these objections while still allowing it to play its role in Fodor
Braun, David M. (1991). Content, causation, and cognitive science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (December):375-89.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (1989). Individuation and causation in psychology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 707 (4):303-22.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1995). Intentional properties and causation. In C. Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates About Psychological Explanation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1993). Mind-body causation and explanatory practice. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 76 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1995). Reply: Intentional properties and causation. In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Butler, Keith (1996). Content, causal powers, and context. Philosophy of Science 63 (1):105-14.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Christensen, D. (1992). Causal powers and conceptual connections. Analysis 52 (3):163-8.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Dardis, Anthony B. (2002). Individualism and the new logical connections argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):83-102.   (Google)
de Muijnck, Wim (2002). Causation by relational properties. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):123-137.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In discussions on mental causation and externalism, it is often assumed that extrinsic, or relational, properties cannot have causal efficacy. In this paper I argue that this assumption is based on a category mistake, in that causal efficacy (dependence among events or states of affairs) is confused with causal influence (persistence of and interaction among objects). I then argue that relational properties are indeed causally efficacious, which I explain with the help of Dretske's notion of a 'structuring cause'
Figdor, Carrie (2009). Semantic externalism and the mechanics of thought. Minds and Machines 19 (1):1-24.   (Google)
Abstract: I review a widely accepted argument to the conclusion that the contents of our beliefs, desires and other mental states cannot be causally efficacious in a classical computational model of the mind. I reply that this argument rests essentially on an assumption about the nature of neural structure that we have no good scientific reason to accept. I conclude that computationalism is compatible with wide semantic causal efficacy, and suggest how the computational model might be modified to accommodate this possibility
Fodor, Jerry A. (1991). A modal argument for narrow content. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.   (Cited by 43 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (1994). The supervenience of mental content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:117-135.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Guichard, Lex (1995). The causal efficacy of propositional attitudes. In Cognitive Patterns in Science and Common Sense. Amsterdam: Rodopi.   (Google)
Heil, John & Mele, Alfred R. (1991). Mental causes. American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (January):61-71.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Jacob, Pierre (1992). Externalism and mental causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:203-19.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Jacob, Pierre (1993). Externalism and the explanatory relevance of broad content. Mind and Language 8 (1):131-156.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Klein, M. (1996). Externalism, content, and causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:159-76.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Lalor, Brendan J. (1997). It is what you think: Intentional potency and anti-individualism. Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):165-78.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper I argue against the worried view that intentional properties might be epiphenomenal. In naturalizing intentionality we ought to reject both the idea that causal powers of intentional states must supervene on local microstructures, and the idea that local supervenience justifies worries about intentional epiphenomenality since our states could counterfactually lack their intentional properties and yet have the same effects. I contend that what's wrong with even the good guys (e.g. Dennett, Dretske, Allen) is that they implicitly grant that causal powers supervene locally. Finally, I argue that once we see the truth of an anti-individualism which sees cognition as a fundamentally embedded activity, it becomes clear both that granting local supervenience is granting too much, and that intentional properties do work that mere neurological properties could never do. I also suggest how a transcendental argument for intentional potency might go
Lin, Martin (online). Against wide causation.   (Google)
Abstract: It is commonly held that the content of an agents propositional attitudes play a causal role in generating her actions. It is also commonly held that the content of a mental state is at least partially determined by the relations that an agents internal states bear to her history and environment. But can these two claims peacefully coexist? It seems that they cannot, for relations to history and environment cannot be causally relevant. It makes no di?erence whether the coin dropped into the vending machine was pressed at the mint or in the counterfeiters workshop; its intrinsic features alone determine its e?ect on the vending machine. Causal powers are narrow, whereas content appears to be wide
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1993). Causal relevance and thought content. Philosophical Quarterly 43 (176):334-53.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
McGinn, Colin (1991). Conceptual causation. Mind 100:525-46.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Montgomery, Richard (1995). Non-cartesian explanations meet the problem of mental causation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):221-41.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Newman, Anthony (2006). The burning barn fallacy in defenses of externalism about mental content. Journal of Philosophical Research 31:37-57.   (Google)
Noordhof, Paul (1999). Causation by content? Mind and Language 14 (3):291-320.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Owens, Joseph (1993). Content, causation, and psychophysical supervenience. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):242-61.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (1993). Externalist explanation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:203-30.   (Cited by 17 | Annotation | Google)
Robb, David & Heil, John (online). Mental Causation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.   (Google)
Abstract: Worries about mental causation are prominent in contemporary discussions of the mind and human agency. Originally, the problem of mental causation was that of understanding how a mental substance (thought to be immaterial) could interact with a material substance, a body. Most philosophers nowadays repudiate immaterial minds, but the problem of mental causation has not gone away. Instead, focus has shifted to mental properties. How could mental properties be causally relevant to bodily behavior? How could something mental qua mental cause what it does? After looking at the traditional Problem of Interaction, we survey various versions of the property-based problem and look at proposed solutions to them.
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1994). Content and context. Philosophical Perspectives 8:17-32.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Russow, L. M. (1993). Fodor, Adams, and causal properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):57-61.   (Google)
Saidel, Eric (1994). Content and causal powers. Philosophy of Science 61 (4):658-65.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Segal, Gabriel & Sober, Elliott (1991). The causal efficacy of content. Philosophical Studies 63 (July):1-30.   (Cited by 32 | Google | More links)
Seymour, Daniel (1993). Some of the difference in the world: Crane on intentional causation. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (170):83-89.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Shea, Nicholas (2003). Does externalism entail the anomalism of the mental? Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):201-213.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In ‘Mental Events’ Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified ‘Yes’. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism
Sturgeon, Scott (1994). Good reasoning and cognitive architecture. Mind and Language 9 (1):88-101.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
van Gulick, Robert (1989). Metaphysical arguments for internalism and why they don't work. In Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation. Kluwer.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
Vasilyev, Vadim V. (2006). Brain and consciousness: Exits from the labyrinth. Social Sciences 37 (2):51-66.   (Google)
Walsh, Denis M. (1999). Alternative individualism. Philosophy of Science 66 (4):628-648.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Warren, Dona (1999). Externalism and causality: Simulation and the prospects for a reconciliation. Mind and Language 14 (1):154-176.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Wilson, Robert A. (1993). Against A Priori arguments for individualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):60-79.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google)
Wilson, Robert A. (1992). Individualism, causal powers, and explanation. Philosophical Studies 68 (2):103-39.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Yablo, Stephen (1997). Wide causation. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (11):251-281.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)

2.2e Externalism and the Theory of Vision

Burge, Tyler (1986). Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.   (Cited by 186 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Butler, Keith (1996). Content, computation, and individualism in vision theory. Analysis 56 (3):146-54.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Butler, Keith (1996). Individualism and Marr's computational theory of vision. Mind and Language 11 (4):313-37.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Cain, M. J. (2000). Individualism, twin scenarios and visual content. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):441-463.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I address an important question concerning the nature of visual content: are the contents of human visual states and experiences exhaustively fixed or determined (in the non-causal sense) by our intrinsic physical properties? The individualist answers this question affirmatively. I will argue that such an answer is mistaken. A common anti-individualist or externalist tactic is to attempt to construct a twin scenario involving humanoid duplicates who are embedded in environments that diverge in such a way that it appears to be necessary to attribute divergent contents to their respective visual states. In the first half of the paper I discuss some of the twin scenarios that are prominent in the literature and argue that they fail to undermine individualism. Indeed I argue that due to important facts about our internal workings, a convincing externalist twin scenario involving humanoid protagonists cannot be constructed. However, I argue that such a result does not conclusively establish an individualist thesis and that in order to settle the question at issue it is necessary to construct an independently motivated theory of visual content. I attempt to do this in the second half of the paper by developing a theory at the core of which is the idea that the contents of our visual states and experiences are determined by the causal powers vis-
Davies, Martin (1991). Individualism and perceptual content. Mind 100 (399):461-84.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Egan, Frances (1996). Intentionality and the theory of vision. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Egan, Frances (1992). Individualism, computation, and perceptual content. Mind 101 (403):443-59.   (Cited by 25 | Google | More links)
Francescotti, Robert M. (1991). Externalism and Marr's theory of vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Kitcher, P. S. (1988). Marr's computational theory of vision. Philosophy of Science 55 (March):1-24.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Kroustallis, Basileios (2006). Content individuation in Marr's theory of vision. Journal of Mind and Behavior 27 (1):57-71.   (Google)
Morton, P. (1993). Supervenience and computational explanation in vision theory. Philosophy of Science 60 (1):86-99.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Patterson, Sarah (1996). Success-orientation and individualism in the theory of vision. In Kathleen Akins (ed.), Perception. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Segal, Gabriel (1991). Defence of a reasonable individualism. Mind 100 (399):485-94.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Segal, Gabriel (1989). Seeing what is not there. Philosophical Review 97 (April):189-214.   (Cited by 31 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (1997). A clearer vision. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (1993). Content, kinds, and individualism in Marr's theory of vision. Philosophical Review 102 (4):489-513.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (1997). Junk representations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):345-361.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Many philosophers and psychologists who approach the issue of representation from a computational or measurement theoretical perspective end up having to deny the possibility of junk representations?representations present in an organism's head but that enter into no psychological processes or produce no behaviour. However, I argue, a more functional perspective makes the possibility of junk representations intuitively quite plausible?so much so that we may wish to question those views of representation that preclude the possibility of junk representations. I explore some of the reasons we should care about the possibility of junk representations and conclude with some speculation about whether junk representations are in fact present in our heads
Silverberg, Arnold (2006). Chomsky and Egan on computational theories of vision. Minds and Machines 16 (4):495-524.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr
Wright, Wayne (online). Individualism, behavior, and Marr's theory of vision.   (Google)

2.2f Externalism and Computation

Andler, Daniel (1995). Can we knock off the shackles of syntax? Philosophical Issues 6:265-270.   (Google | More links)
Aydede, Murat (2000). Computation and intentional psychology. Dialogue 39 (2):365-379.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The relation between computational and intentional psychology has always been a vexing issue. The worry is that if mental processes are computational, then these processes, which are defined over symbols, are sensitive solely to the non-semantic properties of symbols. If so, perhaps psychology could dispense with adverting in its laws to intentional/semantic properties of symbols. Stich, as is well-known, has made a great deal out of this tension and argued for a purely "syntactic" psychology by driving a wedge between a semantic individuation of symbol tokens and their narrow functional individuation. If the latter can be carried out, he claimed, we do not need semantic typing. I argue that since a narrow functional individuation cannot type-identify symbol tokens across organisms, a semantic account of typing must be the only option given that interpersonal physical individuation of tokens is not to be taken seriously
Bontly, Thomas D. (1998). Individualism and the nature of syntactic states. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):557-574.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely assumed that the explanatory states of scientific psychology are type-individuated by their semantic or intentional properties. First, I argue that this assumption is implausible for theories like David Marr's [1982] that seek to provide computational or syntactic explanations of psychological processes. Second, I examine the implications of this conclusion for the debate over psychological individualism. While most philosophers suppose that syntactic states supervene on the intrinsic physical states of information-processing systems, I contend they may not. Syntatic descriptions must be adequately constrained, and the most plausible such constraints appeal to a system's teleological function or design and hence to its history. As a result, physical twins may not realize the same syntactic states
Butler, Keith (1998). Content, computation, and individuation. Synthese 114 (2):277-92.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The role of content in computational accounts of cognition is a matter of some controversy. An early prominent view held that the explanatory relevance of content consists in its supervenience on the the formal properties of computational states (see, e.g., Fodor 1980). For reasons that derive from the familiar Twin Earth thought experiments, it is usually thought that if content is to supervene on formal properties, it must be narrow; that is, it must not be the sort of content that determines reference and truth-conditions. An interesting alternative to this view has recently been proposed by Egan (1995). According to Egan, the explanatory role of content is such that contents must in general be broad to be explanatorily relevant. But Egan’s view involves a non-realist interpretation of content assignments. I will argue here that this non-realism about contents is undermotivated. A realist variation on her view of the explanatory role of content, however, would survive this criticism. This realist variation, I suggest, shares with the views of other commentators on Marr’s theory (e.g., Burge 1986; Shapiro 1993; forthcoming) certain commitments concerning the supervenience base of visual contents and processes. I will argue, however, that these commitments beg important questions regarding the individuation of cognitive states and processes. I conclude, contrary to Burge and Shapiro, that Marr’s theory does not favor anti-individualism.
Egan, Frances (1995). Computation and content. Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Egan, Frances (1999). In defence of narrow mindedness. Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Horowitz, Amir (2007). Computation, external factors, and cognitive explanations. Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Computational properties, it is standardly assumed, are to be sharply distinguished from semantic properties. Specifically, while it is standardly assumed that the semantic properties of a cognitive system are externally or non-individualistically individuated, computational properties are supposed to be individualistic and internal. Yet some philosophers (e.g., Tyler Burge) argue that content impacts computation, and further, that environmental factors impact computation. Oron Shagrir has recently argued for these theses in a novel way, and gave them novel interpretations. In this paper I present a conception of computation in cognitive science that takes Shagrir's conception as its starting point, but further develops it in various directions and strengthens it. I argue that the explanatory role of computational properties emerges from the idea that syntactical properties and the relevant external factors presented by cognitive systems compose wide computational properties. I also elaborate upon the notion of content that is in play, and argue that it is contents of the kind that are ascribed by transparent interpretations of content ascriptions that impact computation. This fact enables the thesis that external factors impact computation to rebuff the challenge which concerns the claim that psychology must be individualistic
Jacobson-Horowitz, Hilla (2004). Syntax, semantics, and intentional aspects. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):67-95.   (Google | More links)
Kazez, J. R. (1994). Computationalism and the causal role of content. Philosophical Studies 75 (3):231-60.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Kobes, Bernard W. (1990). Individualism and artificial intelligence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:429-56.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Miscevic, Nenad (1996). Computation, content, and cause. Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-63.   (Google)
Miščević, Nenad (1996). Computation, content and cause. Philosophical Studies 82 (2):241-263.   (Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (1999). Computation as involving content: A response to Egan. Mind and Language 14 (2):195-202.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Peacocke, Christopher (1995). Content, computation, and externalism. Philosophical Issues 6:227-264.   (Cited by 24 | Google | More links)
Schneider, Susan (2005). Direct reference, psychological explanation, and Frege cases. Mind and Language 20 (4):423-447.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions corefer (e.g. that 'Cicero' and 'Tully' corefer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that Frege Cases are a major problem, if not the major problem, that this sort of theory faces. In this essay, I hope to show that the theory can surmount the Frege Cases
Seager, William E. (1992). Thought and syntax. Philosophy of Science Association 1992:481-491.   (Cited by 1 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Shagrir, Oron (2001). Content, computation and externalism. Mind 110 (438):369-400.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The paper presents an extended argument for the claim that mental content impacts the computational individuation of a cognitive system (section 2). The argument starts with the observation that a cognitive system may simultaneously implement a variety of different syntactic structures, but that the computational identity of a cognitive system is given by only one of these implemented syntactic structures. It is then asked what are the features that determine which of implemented syntactic structures is the computational structure of the system, and it is contended that these features are certain aspects of mental content. The argument helps (section 3) to reassess the thesis known as computational externalism, namely, the thesis that computational theories of cognition make essential reference to features in the individual's environment. It is suggested that the familiar arguments for computational externalism?which rest on thought experiments and on exegesis of Marr's theories of vision?are unconvincing, but that they can be improved. A reconstruction of the visex/audex thought experiment is offered in section 3.1. An outline of a novel interpretation of Marr's theories of vision is presented in section 3.2. The corrected arguments support the claim that computational theories of cognition are intentional. Computational externalism is still pending, however, upon the thesis that psychological content is extrinsic

2.2g Externalism and Self-Knowledge

Baker, Lynne Rudder (2007). Social externalism and first-person authority. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google)
Abstract: Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with first-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”
Bar-On, Dorit (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: Content, use, and expression. Noûs 38 (3):430-55.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There
Beebee, Helen (2002). Transfer of warrant, begging the question, and semantic externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Beebee, Helen (2001). Transfer of warrant, begging the question and semantic externalism. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-374.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (1996). Davidson on first-person authority and externalism. Inquiry 39 (1):121-39.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (1996). Externalism and the attitudinal component of self-knowledge. Noûs 30 (2):262-75.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Berg, Jonathan (1998). First-person authority, externalism, and wh-knowledge. Dialectica 52 (1):41-44.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (2000). Knowing the world by knowing one's mind. Synthese 123 (1):1-34.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (2004). Memory and externalism. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):605-632.   (Google | More links)
Bernecker, Sven (1997). On knowing one's own mind. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Bernecker, Sven (2006). Prospects for epistemic compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):81-104.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels
Bernecker, Sven (1998). Self-knowledge and closure. In Peter Ludlow & N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Csli.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (2003). A trilemma for redeployment. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):22-30.   (Google | More links)
Bilgrami, Akeel (1992). Can externalism be reconciled with self-knowledge? Philosophical Topics 20 (1):233-68.   (Cited by 11 | Google)
Bilgrami, Akeel (1991). Thought and its objects. Philosophical Issues 1:215-232.   (Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1989). Content and self-knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.   (Cited by 70 | Annotation | Google)
Boghossian, Paul (1989). Content and self-knowledge. In Christopher S. Hill (ed.), Philosophy of Mind. University of Arkansas Press.   (Google)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1992). Externalism and inference. Philosophical Issues 2:11-28.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1998). Replies to commentators. Philosophical Issues 9:253-260.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Boghossian, Paul A. (1994). The transparency of mental content. Philosophical Perspectives 8:33-50.   (Cited by 27 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use
Boghossian, Paul A. (1997). What the externalist can know A Priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (2):161-75.   (Cited by 53 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Controversy continues to attach to the question whether an externalism about mental content is compatible with a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge. By an externalism about mental content, I mean the view that what concepts our thoughts involve may depend not only on facts that are internal to us, but on facts about our environment. It is worth emphasizing, if only because it is still occasionally misperceived, that this thesis is supposed to apply at the level of sense and not merely at that of reference: what concepts we think in terms of -- and not just what they happen to pick out -- is said by the externalist to depend upon environmental facts. By a traditional doctrine of privileged self-knowledge, I mean the view that we are able to know, without the benefit of empirical investigation, what our thoughts are in our own case. Suppose I entertain a thought that I would express with the sentence `Water is wet'. According to the traditional doctrine, I can know without empirical investigation (a) that I am entertaining a thought; (b) that it has a particular conceptual content, and (c) that its content is that water is wet
Brewer, Bill (2000). Externalism and A Priori knowledge of empirical facts. In Christopher Peacocke & Paul A. Boghossian (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxfordo.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
Brewer, Bill (2004). Self-knowledge and externalism. In J.M. Larrazabal & L.A. PC)rez Miranda (eds.), Language, Knowledge and Representation. Kluwer.   (Google)
Abstract: I want to discuss the possibility of combining a so-called
Brown, J. (2001). Anti-individualism and agnosticism. Analysis 61 (3):213-24.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Brown, Jessica (1999). Boghossian on externalism and privileged access. Analysis 59 (1):52-59.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Brown, J. (2000). Critical reasoning, understanding and self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):659-676.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Brown, J. (2000). Reliabilism, knowledge, and mental content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):115-35.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brown, J. (1995). The incompatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 55 (3):149-56.   (Cited by 46 | Google)
Brown, J. (2003). The reductio argument and transmission of warrant. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2002). Anti-individualism and analyticity. Analysis 62 (1):87-91.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2000). Ambiguity and knowledge of content. Analysis 60 (3):257-60.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). A Priori knowledge of the world not easily available. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):109-114.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2004). Brewer on the McKinsey problem. Analysis 64 (1):41-43.   (Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1998). Content externalism and a priori knowledge. Protosociology 11:149-159.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1997). Externalism and memory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1):1-12.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2007). Externalism and privileged access are consistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2000). Externalism and the a prioricity of self-knowledge. Analysis 60 (1):132-136.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1997). Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Analysis 57 (4):287-90.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1994). Knowledge of content and knowledge of the world. Philosophical Review 103 (2):327-343.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2004). McKinsey redux? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2005). Noordhof on McKinsey-brown. Analysis 65 (285):86-88.   (Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2001). Problems for a recent account of introspective knowledge. Facta Philosophica.   (Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1993). Skepticism and externalism. Philosophia 22 (1-2):169-71.   (Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1990). Scepticism about knowledge of content. Mind 99 (395):447-51.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1992). Semantic answers to skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):200-19.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1999). Transcendental arguments from content externalism. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1999). Two recent approaches to self-knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 13:251-71.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (2003). Two transcendental arguments concerning self-knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1995). Trying to get outside your own skin. Philosophical Topics 23:79-111.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Brueckner, Anthony L. (1992). What an anti-individualist knows A Priori. Analysis 52 (2):111-18.   (Cited by 32 | Annotation | Google)
Burge, Tyler (1988). Individualism and self-knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.   (Cited by 152 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Mental agency in authoritative self-knowledge: Reply to Kobes. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Burge, Tyler (1998). Memory and self-knowledge. In Peter Ludlow & N. Martin (eds.), Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Csli.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
Burge, Tyler (2003). Some reflections on scepticism: Reply to Stroud. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Butler, Keith (1998). Externalism and skepticism. Dialogue 37 (1):13-34.   (Google)
Butler, Keith (1997). Externalism, internalism, and knowledge of content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):773-800.   (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
Butler, Keith (2000). Problems for semantic externalism and A Priori refutations of skeptical arguments. Dialectica 54 (1):29-49.   (Google | More links)
Chase, James (2001). Is externalism about content inconsistent with internalism about justification? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):227-46.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Child, William (2006). Wittgenstein's externalism: Context, self-knowledge & the past. In Tomáš Marvan (ed.), What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute. Cambridge Scholars Press.   (Google)
Corbi, Josep E. (1998). A challenge to Boghossian's incompatibilist argument. Philosophical Issues 9.   (Google | More links)
Cullison, Andrew (2007). Privileged access, externalism, and ways of believing. Philosophical Studies 136 (3):305-318.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: By exploiting a concept called ways of believing, I offer a plausible reformulation of the doctrine of privileged access. This reformulation will provide us with a defense of compatibilism, the view that content externalism and privileged access are compatible.
Davies, Martin (2000). Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant. In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 47 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome prospect of transferring a ‘non-empirical’ warrant from premises about our own mental states and about philosophical theory to a conclusion about external environment or internal architecture seems to depend upon little more than the possibility of knowledge by inference. (The use of the scare-quoted term ‘non-empirical’ is explained a couple of paragraphs further on.)
Davies, Martin (2000). Externalism and armchair knowledge. In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: [I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously _can
Davies, Martin (2003). Externalism, self-knowledge and transmission of warrant. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism about some mental property, M, is the thesis that whether a person (or other physical being) has M depends, not only on conditions inside the person
Davidson, Donald (1987). Knowing one's own mind. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 60 (3):441-458.   (Cited by 190 | Google)
Davies, Martin (2003). The problem of armchair knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 14 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (2003). Externalism and self-knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Dretske, Fred (2006). Representation, teleosemantics, and the problem of self-knowledge. In Graham F. Macdonald & David Papineau (eds.), Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Ebbs, Gary (2003). A puzzle about doubt. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Ebbs, Gary (1996). Can we take our words at face value? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):499-530.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Ebbs, Gary (2001). Is skepticism about self-knowledge coherent? Philosophical Studies 105 (1):43-58.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Ebbs, Gary (2005). Why scepticism about self-knowledge is self-undermining. Analysis 65 (287):237-244.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Edwards, J. (1998). The simple theory of colour and the transparency of sense experience. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the transparency of sense experience. The simple theory of colour (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Google | More links)
Ellis, Jonathan (2007). Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access. Synthese 159 (1).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject
Falvey, Kevin & Owens, Joseph (1994). Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism. Philosophical Review 103 (1):107-37.   (Cited by 42 | Google | More links)
Falvey, Kevin (2003). Memory and knowledge of content. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Falvey, Kevin (2000). The compatibility of anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 60 (1):137-142.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Farkas, Katalin (2006). Semantic internalism and externalism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.
Farkas, Katalin (2008). The Subject's Point of View. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Descartes's philosophy has had a considerable influence on the modern conception of the mind, but many think that this influence has been largely negative. The main project of The Subject's Point of View is to argue that discarding certain elements of the Cartesian conception would be much more difficult than critics seem to allow, since it is tied to our understanding of basic notions, including the criteria for what makes someone a person, or one of us. The crucial feature of the Cartesian view defended here is not dualism--which is not adopted--but internalism. Internalism is opposed to the widely accepted externalist thesis, which states that some mental features constitutively depend on certain features of our physical and social environment. In contrast, this book defends the minority internalist view, which holds that the mind is autonomous, and though it is obviously affected by the environment, this influence is merely contingent and does not delimit what is thinkable in principle. Defenders of the externalist view often present their theory as the most thoroughgoing criticism of the Cartesian conception of the mind; Katalin Farkas offers a defence of an uncompromising internalist Cartesian conception
Farkas, Katalin (2003). What is externalism? Philosophical Studies 112 (3):187-208.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access
Fernandez, Jordi (2004). Externalism and self-knowledge: A puzzle in two dimensions. European Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):17-37.   (Google | More links)
Frapolli, Maria J. & Romero, E. (2003). Anti-individualism and basic self-knowledge. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Frapolli, Maria J. & Romero, E. (eds.) (2003). Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. University of Chicago Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Fumerton, Richard A. (2003). Introspection and internalism. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Gallois, Andr (1994). Deflationary self-knowledge. In M. Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Gallois, Andr (1996). Externalism and skepticism. Philosophical Studies 81 (1):1-26.   (Annotation | Google)
Georgalis, N. (1994). Asymmetry of access to intentional states. Erkenntnis 40 (2):185-211.   (Cited by 9 | Google | More links)
Georgalis, N. (1990). No access for the externalist: Discussion of Heil's 'privileged access'. Mind 100 (393):101-8.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Gerken, Mikkel (2009). Conceptual equivocation and epistemic relevance. Dialectica 63 (2):117-132.   (Google)
Abstract: Much debate has surrounded "switching" scenarios in which a subject's reasoning is said to exhibit the fallacy of equivocation ( Burge 1988 ; Boghossian 1992, 1994 ). Peter Ludlow has argued that such scenarios are "epistemically prevalent" and, therefore, epistemically relevant alternatives ( Ludlow 1995a ). Since a distinctive feature of the cases in question is that the subject blamelessly engages in conceptual equivocation, we may label them 'equivocational switching cases'. Ludlow's influential argument occurs in a discussion about compatibilism with regards to anti-individualism (or content externalism) and self-knowledge. However, the issue has wide-reaching consequences for many areas of epistemology. Arguably, the claim that equivocational switching cases are epistemically relevant may bear on the epistemology of inference, testimony, memory, group rationality and belief revision. Ludlow's argument proceeds from a now well-known "down to Earth" switching-case of a subject, Biff, who travels between the US and the UK. I argue that Ludlow's case-based argument fails to support the general claim that conceptual equivocational switching cases are prevalent and epistemically relevant. Thus, the discussion addresses the basis of some poorly understood issues regarding the epistemological consequences of anti-individualism. Simultaneously, the discussion is broadened from the narrow focus on self-knowledge. Finally, the critical discussion serves as the basis for some general reflections on epistemic relevance and the epistemic risks associated with conceptual equivocation. Specifically, I suggest that philosophy is an area where the risk of conceptual equivocation is extraordinarily high
Gertler, Brie (2004). We can't know a priori that H2O exists. But can we know a priori that water does? Analysis 64 (1):44-47.   (Google | More links)
Gibbons, John (1996). Externalism and knowledge of content. Philsophical Review 105 (3):287-310.   (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
Gibbons, John (2001). Externalism and knowledge of the attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):13-28.   (Google | More links)
Glock, H. J. & Preston, John M. (1995). Externalism and first-person authority. The Monist 78 (4):515-33.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2003). Anti-individualism, conceptual omniscience, and skepticism. Philosophical Studies 116 (1):53-78.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Given anti-individualism, a subjectmight have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking thatp, have complete and exhaustiveexplicational knowledge of all of the conceptscomposing the content that p, and yetstill need empirical information (e.g.regarding her embedding conditions and history)prior to being in a position to apply herexhaustive conceptual knowledge in aknowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed byanti-individualists: it squares with everythingthat compatibilist-minded anti-individualistshave said regarding e.g. the compatibility ofanti-individualism and basic self-knowledge;and more importantly it contains the crux of aresponse to McKinsey-style arguments againstanti-individualism
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2007). Anti-individualism, content preservation, and discursive justification. Nos 41 (2):178�203.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most explorations of the epistemic implications of Semantic Anti- Individualism (SAI) focus on issues of self-knowledge (first-person au- thority) and/or external-world skepticism. Less explored has been SAIs implications forthe epistemology of reasoning. In this paperI argue that SAI has some nontrivial implications on this score. I bring these out by reflecting on a problem first raised by Boghossian (1992). Whereas Boghos- sians main interest was in establishing the incompatibility of SAI and the a priority of logical abilities (Boghossian 1992: 22), I argue that Boghossians argument is better interpreted as pointing to SAIs implications for the na- ture of discursive justification
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2002). Belief and its linguistic expression: Toward a belief box account of first-person authority. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):65-76.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2006). Brown on self-knowledge and discriminability. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):301�314.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In her recent book Anti-Individualism and Knowledge, Jessica Brown has presented a novel answer to the self-knowledge achievement problem facing the proponent of anti-individualism. She argues that her answer is to be preferred to the traditional answer (based on Burge, 1988a). Here I present three objections to the claim that her proposed answer is to be preferred. The significance of these objections lies in what they tell us about the nature of the sort of knowledge that is in dispute. Perhaps the most important lesson I draw from this discussion is that, given the nature of knowledge of one's own thoughts, discriminability (from relevant alternatives) is not a condition on knowledge as such
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2002). Do anti-individualistic construals of propositional attitudes capture the agent's conception? Noûs 36 (4):597-621.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Burge 1986 presents an argument for anti-individualism about the proposi- tional attitudes. On the assumption that such attitudes are
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2000). Externalism and authoritative knowledge of content: A new incompatibilist strategy. Philosophical Studies 100 (1):51-79.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A typical strategy of those who seek to show that externalism is compatible with authoritative knowledge of content is to show that externalism does nothing to undermine the claim that all thinkers can at any time form correct and justi?ed self-ascriptive judgements concerning their occurrent thoughts. In reaction, most incompat- ibilists have assumed the burden of denying that externalism is compatible with this claim about self-ascription. Here I suggest another way to attack the compatibilist strategy. I aim to show that forming a justi?ed true self-ascriptive judgement about one
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2005). (Nonstandard) lessons from world-switching cases. Philosophia 32 (1-4):85-131.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2003). On our alleged A Priori knowledge that water exists. Analysis 63 (1):38-41.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2004). Review of Maria Frapolli (ed.), Esther Romero (ed.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind: Essays on Tyler Burge. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (1).   (Google)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (1997). Self-ascription, self-knowledge, and the memory argument. Analysis 57 (3):211-19.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Abstract: is tendentious. (Throughout this paper I shall refer to this claim as
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2005). The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):135-48.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism1 is the thesis that some propositional attitudes depend for their individuation on features of the thinker’s (social and/or physical) environment. The doctrine of self-knowledge of thoughts is the thesis that for all thinkers S and occurrent thoughts that p, S has authoritative and non-empirical knowledge of her thought that p. A much-discussed question in the literature is whether these two doctrines are compatible. In this paper I attempt to respond to one argument for an incompatibilist conclusion, Boghossian’s 1989 ‘Memory Argument.’
Goldberg, Sanford C. (1999). The psychology and epistemology of self-knowledge. Synthese 118 (2):165-201.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (1999). The relevance of discriminatory knowledge of content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (2):136-56.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80:2, 136-56 (June 1999)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2003). What do you know when you know your own thoughts? In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (1999). Word-ambiguity, world-switching, and knowledge of content: Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 59 (263):212-217.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Goldberg, Sanford C. (2000). Word-ambiguity, world-switching, and semantic intentions. Analysis 60 (267):260-264.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Greco, John (2004). Externalism and skepticism. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Hall, Lisa L. (1998). The self-knowledge that externalists leave out. Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (2):115-123.   (Google)
Haukioja, Jussi (2006). Semantic externalism and A Priori self-knowledge. Ratio 19 (2):149-159.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The argument known as the 'McKinsey Recipe' tries to establish the incompatibility of semantic externalism (about natural kind concepts in particular) and _a priori _self- knowledge about thoughts and concepts by deriving from the conjunction of these theses an absurd conclusion, such as that we could know _a priori _that water exists. One reply to this argument is to distinguish two different readings of 'natural kind concept': (i) a concept which _in fact _denotes a natural kind, and (ii) a concept which _aims_ to denote a natural kind. Paul Boghossian has argued, using a _Dry Earth _scenario, that this response fails, claiming that the externalist cannot make sense of a concept aiming, but failing, to denote a natural kind. In this paper I argue that Boghossian's argument is flawed. Borrowing machinery from two-dimensional semantics, using the notion of 'considering a possible world as actual', I claim that we can give a determinate answer to Boghossian's question: which concept would 'water' express on Dry Earth?
Heal, Jane (1998). Externalism and memory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (72):77-94.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Heil, John (1988). Privileged access. Mind 98 (April):238-51.   (Cited by 33 | Google | More links)
Hohwy, Jakob (2002). Privileged self-knowledge and externalism: A contextualist approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):235-52.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Hymers, Michael (1997). Realism and self-knowledge: A problem for Burge. Philosophical Studies 86 (3):303-325.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jackman, Henry (2000). Deference and self-knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review 16 (1):171-180.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It has become increasingly popular to suggest that non-individualistic theories of content undermine our purported a priori knowledge of such contents because they entail that we lack the ability to distinguish our thoughts from alternative thoughts with different contents. However, problems relating to such knowledge of 'comparative' content tell just as much against individualism as non-individualism. Indeed, the problems presented by individualistic theories of content for self-knowledge are at least, if not more, serious than those presented by non-individualistic theories. Consequently, considerations of self-knowledge give one no reason to embrace individualism. If anything, they give one reason to reject it
Jacob, Pierre (2004). Do we know how we know our own minds yet? In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google | More links)
Jackman, Henry (web). Incompatibility arguments and semantic self-knowledge. Southwest Philosophy Review.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: There has been much discussion recently of what has been labeled the
Jacob, Pierre (ms). Is self-knowledge compatible with externalism?   (Google | More links)
Kennedy, Matthew (forthcoming). Naive Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Nous.   (Google)
Abstract: Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one’s perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind.
Klaas, (2002). Externalism, Memory, and Self-Knowledge. Erkenntnis 56:297-317.   (Google)
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Kobes, Bernard W. (2003). Mental content and hot self-knowledge. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 5 | Google)
Korman, Daniel Z. (2006). What externalists should say about dry earth. Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):503-520.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
Korman, Daniel Z. (2006). What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth. The Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):503-520.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word ‘water’ in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concering the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism.
Kraay, Klaas J. (2002). Externalism, memory, and self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 56 (3):297-317.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Externalism holds that the individuation of mental content depends on factors external to the subject. This doctrine appears to undermine both the claim that there is a priori self-knowledge, and the view that individuals have privileged access to their thoughts. Tyler Burge’s influential inclusion theory of self-knowledge purports to reconcile externalism with authoritative self-knowledge. I first consider Paul Boghossian’s claim that the inclusion theory is internally inconsistent. I reject one line of response to this charge, but I endorse another. I next suggest, however, that the inclusion theory has little explanatory value
Langsam, Harold (2002). Externalism, self-knowledge, and inner observation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):42-61.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Larkin, William S. (1999). Brute error with respect to content. Philosophical Studies 94 (1-2):159-71.   (Google | More links)
Larkin, William S. (ms). Burge on our privileged access to the external world.   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (ms). Concepts and introspection: An externalist defense of inner sense.   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (online). Comments on Pryor's “externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning”.   (Google)
Abstract: I. Pryor on McKinsey:
A. Pryor’s Version of McKinsey-style Reasoning
1. Given authoritative self-knowledge, I can usually tell the contents of my own thoughts just by introspection.
So
I can know the following claim on the basis of reflection alone:
McK-1: I am thinking a thought with the content _water puts out fires_
Larkin, William S. (2000). Content skepticism. Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (1):33-43.   (Google)
Abstract: Skeptical theses in general claim that we cannot know what we think we know. Content skepticism in particular claims that we cannot know the contents of our own occurrent thoughtsat least not in the way we think we can. I argue that an externalist account of content does engender a mild form of content skepticism but that the condition is no real cause for concern. Content externalism forces us to reevaluate some of our assumptions about introspective knowledge, but it is compatible with privileged access and the distinctive epistemic character of introspective judgments
Larkin, William S. (online). Content skepticism and reliable self-knowledge.   (Google)
Abstract: Sub-Thesis 1: We should be contingent reliabilists to avoid the threat of an unacceptably strong content skeptical thesis posed by content externalism and the possibility of twin thoughts. The predominant strategy for resisting this threat has been to rely on the claim that introspective self-attributions are immune to brute error; but this claim is problematic from a naturalistic standpoint
Larkin, William S. (online). Twin earth, dry earth, and knowing the width of Water.   (Google)
Larkin, William S. (online). Twin earth, dry earth, and brains in vats.   (Google)
Larkin, Willian (ms). The non-apriority of concept width.   (Google)
Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria (2006). Externalism and A Priori knowledge of the world: Why privileged access is not the issue. Dialectica 60 (4):433-445.   (Google | More links)
LePore, Ernest (1990). Subjectivism and environmentalism. Inquiry 33 (2):197-214.   (Annotation | Google)
Loar, Brian (1998). Is there a good epistemological argument against concept-externalism. Philosophical Issues 9:213-217.   (Google | More links)
Ludlow, Peter & Martin, N. (1998). Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Csli.   (Cited by 36 | Google)
Ludlow, Peter (1995). Externalism, self-knowledge, and the prevalence of slow-switching. Analysis 55 (1):45-49.   (Cited by 15 | Annotation | Google)
Ludlow, Peter (1999). First-person authority and memory. In Mario De Caro (ed.), Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Kluwer.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Ludlow, Peter (2004). Memory targets. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Ludlow, Peter (1997). On the relevance of slow switching. Analysis 57 (4):285-86.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Ludlow, Peter (1995). Social externalism and memory: A problem? Acta Analytica 10 (14):69-76.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Ludlow, Peter (1995). Social externalism, self-knowledge, and memory. Analysis 55 (3):157-59.   (Cited by 18 | Google)
Macdonald, C. (1998). Externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. In C. Wright, Peter K. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism in the philosophy of mind has been thought by many to pose a serious threat to the claim that subjects are in general authoritative with regard to certain of their own intentional states.1 In a series of papers, Tyler Burge (1985_a_, 1985_b_, 1988, 1996) has argued that the distinctive entitlement or right that subjects have to self- knowledge in certain cases is compatible with externalism, since that entitlement is environmentally neutral, neutral with respect to the issue of the individuation dependence of subjects' intentional states on factors beyond their bodies. His reason is that whereas externalism—the view that certain intentional states of persons are individuation-dependent on objects and/or phenomena external to their bodies—is a metaphysical thesis, authoritative self-knowledge is an epistemological matter. This being so, there is no reason to suppose that the two need conflict with one another
Macdonald, C. (1995). Externalism and first-person authority. Synthese 104 (1):99-122.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Majors, Brad & Sawyer, Sarah (2005). The epistemological argument for content externalism. Noûs 39 (1):257-280.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Malatesti, Luca (ms). Externalism and the knowledge of mental states.   (Google)
Manley, David (2007). Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-knowledge. The Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-23.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This essay motivates a revised version of the epistemic condition of safety and then employs the revision to (i) challenge the traditional conceptions of apriority, (ii) refute 'strong privileged access', and (iii) resolve a well-known puzzle about externalism and self-knowledge
McCulloch, Gregory (1999). Content externalism and cartesian scepticism: A reply to Brueckner. In Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
McKinsey, Michael (1991). Anti-individualism and privileged access. Analysis 51 (January):9-16.   (Cited by 86 | Annotation | Google)
McKinsey, Michael (1987). Apriorism in the philosophy of language. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):1-32.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google | More links)
McKinsey, Michael (1994). Accepting the consequences of anti-individualism. Analysis 54 (2):124-8.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google)
McKinsey, Michael (2006). Direct reference and logical truth: A reply to Lasonen-aamio. Dialectica 60 (4):447-451.   (Google | More links)
McKinsey, Michael (2007). Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
McKinsey, Michael (2002). Forms of externalism and privileged access. Philosophical Perspectives 16:199-224.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
McKinsey, Michael (2002). On knowing our own minds. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107-16.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This is an anthology of ?fteen papers concerning various philosophical problems related to the topic of self-knowledge. All but one of the papers were previously unpublished, and all but two are descendants of presentations at a conference on self-knowledge held at the University of St Andrews in 1995. The collection
McKinsey, Michael (2003). Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Abstract: In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the thesis that we have privileged , nonempirical access to the contents of our own thoughts.1 One of the most interesting responses to my argument has been that of Martin Davies (1998, 2000, and Chapter _ above) and Crispin Wright (2000 and Chapter _ above), who describe several types of cases to show that warrant for a premise does not always transmit to a known deductive consequence of that premise, and who contend that this fact under-mines my argument for incompatibilism. I will try to show here that the Davies/Wright point about transmission of warrant does not adversely affect my argument
McKinsey, Michael (2001). The semantic basis of externalism. In J. Campbell, M.O. Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth. New York: Seven Bridges Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: 1. The primary evidence and motivation for externalism in the philosophy of mind is provided by the semantic facts that support direct reference theories of names, indexi- cal pronouns, and natural kind terms. But many externalists have forgotten their sem- antic roots, or so I shall contend here. I have become convinced of this by a common reaction among externalists to the main argument of my 1991 paper AAnti-Individual- ism and Privileged Access.@ In that argument, I concluded that externalism is incompat- ible with the principle that we can have privileged, non-empirical knowledge of the contents of our own thoughts. The reaction in question amounts to a dismissive denial of one of my argument=s main premises. This premise, which I defended at length in the paper, is that an externalist thesis regarding a cognitive property should hold that possession of the property by a person _logically_, or _conceptually_, implies the existence of objects external to that person
McLaughlin, Brian P. & Tye, Michael (1998). Externalism, twin earth, and self-knowledge. In C. Macdonald, Peter K. Smith & C. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 27 | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. & Tye, Michael (1998). Is content-externalism compatible with privileged access? Philosophical Review 107 (3):349-380.   (Cited by 22 | Google | More links)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2001). Introspecting thoughts. Facta Philosophica 3:77-84.   (Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2003). McKinsey's challenge, warrant transmission, and skepticism. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2004). Of Ebbs's puzzle. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2000). Self-knowledge, externalism, and skepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):93-118.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
McLaughlin, Brian P. (2000). Self-knowledge, externalism, and skepticism,I. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):93–118.   (Google | More links)
Miller, Richard W. (1997). Externalist self-knowledge and the scope of the a priori. Analysis 57 (1):67-74.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Moya, Carlos J. (1998). Boghossian's reduction of compatibilism. Philosophical Issues 9:243-251.   (Google | More links)
Moya, Carlos J. (2003). Externalism, inclusion, and knowledge of content. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Nagasawa, Yujin (2002). Externalism and the memory argument. Dialectica 56 (4):335-46.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Nagasawa, Yujin (2000). 'Very-slow-switching' and memory (a critical note on Ludlow's paper). Acta Analytica 15 (25):173-175.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Newen, Albert; Hoffmann, Vera & Esfeld, Michael (2007). Preface to mental causation, externalism and self-knowledge. Erkenntnis 67 (2).   (Google | More links)
Noonan, P. (2004). Against absence-dependent thoughts. Analysis 64 (1):92-93.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Noonan, Harold W. (2000). McKinsey-brown survives. Analysis 60 (268):353-356.   (Google | More links)
Noordhof, Paul (2004). Outsmarting the McKinsey-brown argument? Analysis 64 (1):48-56.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Externalists about mental content are supposed to face the following dilemma. Either they must give up the claim that we have privileged access to our own mental states or they must allow that we have privileged access to the world. The dilemma is posed in its most precise form through the McKinsey-Brown argument (McKinsey 1991; Brown 1995). Over the years since it was ?rst published in 1991, our understanding of the precise character of the premisses which constitute the argument has been re?ned. It is based on three claims (where A partially serves to characterise the content of some belief state for which Externalism is true and E is some proposition about the external world)
Noordhof, Paul (2005). The transmogrification of a posteriori knowledge: Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 65 (285):88-89.   (Google | More links)
Nuccetelli, Susana (2001). Is self-knowledge an entitlement? And why should we care? Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):143-155.   (Google)
Nuccetelli, Susana (2003). Knowing that one knows what one is talking about. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Nuccetelli, Susana (ed.) (2003). New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 25 | Google)
Abstract: This book shows that the debate over the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge has led to the investigation of a variety of topics, including the a...
Nuccetelli, Susana (1999). What anti-individualist cannot know A Priori. Analysis 59 (1):48-51.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Owens, David J. (2003). Externalis, Davidson, and knowledge of comparative content. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Owens, David J. & McLaughlin, Brian P. (2000). Self-knowledge, externalism and scepticism: II--David Owens, scepticisms: Descartes and Hume. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):119-142.   (Google)
Owens, David (2000). Self-knowledge, externalism and scepticism, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):119–142.   (Google | More links)
Parent, T. (2007). Infallibilism about self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies 133 (3):411-424.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Descartes held the view that a subject has infallible beliefs about the contents of her thoughts. Here, I first examine a popular contermporary defense of this claim, given by Burge, and find it lacking. I then offer my own defense appealing to a minimal thesis about the compositionality of thoughts. The argument has the virtue of refraining from claims about whether thoughts are “in the head;” thus, it is congenial to both internalists and externalists. The considerations here also illuminate how a subject may have epistemicially priviledged and a priori beliefs about her own thoughts
Peacocke, Christopher (1996). Entitlement, self-knowledge, and conceptual redeployment. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Sociey 96:117-58.   (Cited by 26 | Google)
Phillips, Ian (online). Reflections on externalism and self-knowledge.   (Google)
Abstract: In the mid-nineties a large number of philosophers (most famously, Michael McKinsey, Jessica Brown and Paul Boghossian) raised and discussed a certain form of challenge to externalism. In Boghossian
Pritchard, Duncan & Kallestrup, Jesper (2004). An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism. Philosophia 31 (3-4):345-354.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Whereas a number of recent articles have focussed upon whether the thesis of content externalism is compatible with a certain sort of knowledge that is gained via first-person authority,1 far less attention has been given to the relationship that this thesis bears to the possession of knowledge in general and, in particular, its relation to internalist and externalist epistemologies. Nevertheless, although very few actual arguments have been presented to this end, there does seem to be a shared suspicion that content externalism must be incompatible with epistemic internalism. In a recent and influential paper, however, James Chase has challenged this conventional wisdom by offering a subtle defence of the view that content externalism and epistemic internalism are, in fact, compatible after all.2 Our aim here is twofold. First, to show that Chase is only able to achieve this result because he focuses upon the internalist conception of justification, rather than knowledge. Second, to formulate one prima facie argument which shows that an internalist conception of knowledge is incompatible with an externalist conception of content, an argument which, moreover, is not touched by Chase
Pritchard, Duncan (2003). McDowell on reasons, externalism and scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):273-294.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Abstract: At the very least, externalists about content will accept something like the following claim
Pritchard, Duncan (2002). McKinsey paradoxes, radical skepticism, and the transmission of knowledge across known entailments. Synthese 130 (2):279-302.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Pryor, James (web). Externalism about content and McKinsey-style reasoning. In S C. Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: (revisions posted 12/5/2006) to appear in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, ed. by Sanford Goldberg (to be published by Oxford in 2006 or 2007) Michael McKinsey formulated an argument that raises a puzzle about the relation between externalism about content and our introspective awareness of content. The puzzle goes like this: it seems like I can know the contents of my thoughts by introspection alone; but philosophical reflection tells me that the contents of those thoughts are externalist, and so I couldn
Puhl, Klaus (1994). Davidson on intentional content and self-knowledge. In Language, Mind, and Epistemology: On Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.   (Google)
Quesada, Daniel (2003). Basic self-knowledge and externalism. In Maria J. Frapolli & E. Romero (eds.), Meaning, Basic Self-Knowledge, and Mind. Csli.   (Google)
Raffman, Diana (1998). First-person authority and the internal reality of beliefs. In C. Wright, B. Smith, C. Macdonald & the internal reality of beliefs. First-person authority (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Sawyer, Sarah (1999). Am externalist account of introspectve knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 4 (4):358-78.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Content Sceptic argues that a subject could not have introspective knowledge of a thought whose content is individuated widely. This claim is incorrect, relying on the tacit assumption that introspective knowledge differs significantly from other species of knowledge. The paper proposes a reliabilist model for understanding introspective knowledge according to which introspective knowledge is simply another species of knowledge, and according to which claims to introspective knowledge are not, as suggested by the Content Sceptic, defeated by the mere possibility of error. This way of understanding introspective knowledge affords a robust theory of privileged access consistent with semantic externalism
Sawyer, Sarah (2004). Absences, presences, and sufficient conditions. Analysis 64 (4):354-57.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Sawyer, Sarah (2002). In defense of Burge's thesis. Philosophical Studies 107 (2):109-28.   (Google | More links)
Sawyer, Sarah (1998). Privileged access to the world. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):523-533.   (Cited by 20 | Google | More links)
Sawyer, Sarah (2003). Sufficient absences. Analysis 63 (3):202-8.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Sawyer, Sarah & Majors, Brad (2005). The epistemological argument for content externalism. Philosophical Perspectives 19:257-280.   (Google)
Schiffer, Stephen R. (1992). Boghossian on externalism and inference. Philosophical Issues 2:29-38.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Shoemaker, Sydney (1988). On knowing one's own mind. Philosophical Perspectives 2:183-209.   (Cited by 38 | Google | More links)
Smith, Andrew F. (2003). Semantic externalism, authoritative self-knowledge, and adaptation to slow switching. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):71-87.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: I here argue against the viability of Peter Ludlow’s modified version of Paul Boghossian’s argument for the incompatibility of semantic externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. Ludlow contends that slow switching is not merely actual but is, moreover, prevalent; it can occur whenever we shift between localized linguistic communities. It is therefore quite possible, he maintains, that we undergo unwitting shifts in our mental content on a regular basis. However, there is good reason to accept as plausible that despite their prevalence we are in fact able to readily adapt to such switches, as well as to the shifts in mental content that accompany them. The prevalence of slow switching between linguistic communities does not then necessarily entail incompatibility after all
Sosa, David (1996). Representing Thoughts and Language. Dissertation, Princeton University   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Spicer, Finn (2004). On the identity of concepts, and the compatibility of externalism and privileged access. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2):155-168.   (Google)
Abstract: ism is compatible with privileged access. it is in some sense direct, or that it is non-
Stalnaker, Robert (2008). Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Starting in the middle -- Epistemic possibilities and the knowledge argument -- Locating ourselves in the world -- Notes on models of self-locating belief -- Phenomenal and epistemic indistinguishability -- Acquaintance and essence -- Knowing what one is thinking -- After the fall.
Steup, Matthias (2003). Two forms of antiskepticism. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Stoneham, Tom (1999). Boghossian on empty natural kind concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):119-22.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Stroud, Barry G. (2003). Anti-individualism and scepticism. In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.   (Google)
Szubka, Tadeusz (2000). Meaning rationalism, a priori, and transparency of content. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):491-503.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Most current theories of meaning and mental content accept externalism. One of its forceful exponents is Ruth Garrett Millikan. She argues that externalism leads to the abandonment of "the last myth of the given", that is, of the idea that identity of meaning and mental content is somehow unproblematically given to us, and that we can easily recognize the sameness of meaning and mental content. If one refuses such a "mythical" giveness or meaning rationalism, one has to admit that there is no logical possibility known a priori . The paper tries to show that even if one abandons meaning rationalism one can still hold that there are logical possibilities known a priori . The claim is defended by arguing that a priori knowledge is not completely independent from experience and does not demand the absolute transparency of meaning from the first-person point of view. A priori knowledge requires only a priori justification, that is, such a justification that is based merely on relations between meanings or contents
Tian, Ping (2009). Narrow memory and wide knowledge: An argument for the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):604-615.   (Google)
Abstract: The development of the semantic externalism in the 1970s was followed by a debate on the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Boghossian’s memory argument is one of the most important arguments against the compatibilist view. However, some compatibilists attack Boghossian’s argument by pointing out that his understanding of memory is internalistic. Ludlow and others developed the externalist view of memory to defend the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. However, the externalist view of memory undermines the epistemic status of memory since it gives memory a burden that is too heavy for it to carry. This paper argues that only if we take the content of memory to be narrow and take that of self-knowledge to be wide and replace Cartesian self-knowledge with contextually constrained self-knowledge, can the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge be effectively defended
Tye, Michael (1998). Externalism and memory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (72):77-94.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Vahid, Hamid (2003). Externalism, slow switching and privileged self-knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):370-388.   (Google | More links)
Warfield, Ted A. (1997). Externalism, privileged self-knowledge, and the irrelevance of slow switching. Analysis 57 (4):282-84.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Warfield, Ted A. (1995). Knowing the world and knowing our minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):525-545.   (Cited by 24 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Warfield, Ted A. (1992). Privileged self-knowledge and externalism are compatible. Analysis 52 (4):232-37.   (Cited by 12 | Annotation | Google)
Warfield, Ted A. (2005). Tyler Burge's self-knowledge. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):169-178.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The question of whether externalism about mental content is compatible with privileged access is a question of ongoing concern within philosophy of mind. Some philosophers think that Tyler Burge's early work on what he calls "basic self-knowledge" shows that externalism and privileged access are compatible. I critically assess this claim, arguing that Burge's work does not establish the compatbility thesis
Whiting, Daniel, Fregean sense and anti-individualism.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The definitive version of this article is published in Philosophical Books 48.3 July 2007 pp. 233-240 by Blackwell Publishing, and is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com
Wikforss, Asa Maria (2001). On self-knowledge and grasping the content of one's own thoughts. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):229-260.   (Google)
Wikforss, Asa Maria (online). Self-knowledge and knowledge of content.   (Google | More links)
Wright, C. (2000). Cogency and question-begging: Some reflections on McKinsey's paradox and Putnam's proof. Philosophical Issues 10:140-63.   (Cited by 35 | Google | More links)
Wright, C. (2003). Some reflections on the acquisition of warrant by inference. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Wyler, T. (1994). First-person authority and singular thoughts. Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie Forschung 48 (4):585-94.   (Google)
Yablo, Stephen (1998). Self-knowledge and semantic luck. Philosophical Issues 9:219-229.   (Google | More links)

2.2h Narrow Content

Adams, Frederick R. & Fuller, Gary (1992). Names, contents, and causes. Mind and Language 7 (3):205-21.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Adams, Frederick R.; Drebushenko, David; Fuller, Gary & Stecker, Robert A. (1990). Narrow content: Fodor's folly. Mind and Language 5:213-29.   (Cited by 10 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Adams, Frederick R. (1993). Reply to Russow's Fodor, Adams and Causal Properties. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63-65.   (Google)
Antony, Louise M. (1990). Semantic anorexia: On the notion of content in cognitive science. In George S. Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method. Cambridge University Press.   (Annotation | Google)
Antony, Louise M. (ms). What are you thinking? Character and content in the language of thought.   (Google)
Arnold, Dan (2009). Svasamvitti as methodological solipsism: Narrow content and the problem of intentionality in buddhist philosophy of mind. In Mario D'Amato, Jay L. Garfield & Tom J. F. Tillemans (eds.), Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism, Logic, Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Aydede, Murat (1997). Has Fodor really changed his mind on narrow content? Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-58.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: ABSTRACT. In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to the notion of narrow content in explaining Frege cases and cases involving the so-called deferential concepts. And for good reason: his notion of narrow content (1985-91) couldn't explain them. The only apparent change concerns his treatment of Twin Earth cases. However, I argue that the notion of broad content that his purely informational semantics delivers is, in some interesting sense, equivalent to the mapping notion of narrow content he officially gave up. For his pure informational semantics fails to avoid assigning disjunctive content to twins, since nomic covariations take care not only actual but also counterfactual contexts into account. I show that none of the attempts made by Fodor to block this consequence of his theory works. The present notion of broad content he now operates with is therefore in a position to take over all the important jobs that his previous notion of narrow content could do
Bach, Kent (1996). Content: Wide vs. narrow. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: narrow content as a function from context to wide content.)
Bernier, Paul (1993). Narrow content, context of thought, and asymmetric dependence. Mind and Language 8 (3):327-42.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Biro, John I. (1992). In defense of social content. Philosophical Studies 67 (3):277-93.   (Annotation | Google)
Block, Ned (1995). Ruritania revisited. Philosophical Issues 6:171-187.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Block, Ned (1991). What narrow content is not. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 29 | Annotation | Google)
Boër, Steven E. (2001). A slim book about narrow content. Gabriel M. A. Segal. Mind 110 (440).   (Google)
Braun, David M. (2002). Cognitive significance, attitude ascriptions, and ways of believing propositions. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):65-81.   (Cited by 10 | Google | More links)
Branquinho, Joao (1999). The problem of cognitive dynamics. Grazer Philosophische Studien Grazen 56:2-15.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper is devoted to an examination of some aspects of the central issue of Cognitive Dynamics, the issue about the conditions under which intentional mental states may persist over time. I discuss two main sorts of approach to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in David Kaplan?s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans?s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan?s account and Evans?s account are on the whole defective (for different sorts of reason, of course); even though there are features of each of those views which seem to me to be along the right lines. On the other, and in spite of that, I claim that a broadly Fregean theory is still to be preferred since by positing semantically efficacious modes of presentation it is clearly better equipped to deal adequately with some important phenomena in the area. In particular, I argue that the notion of a memory-based demonstrative mode of presentation of an object (a spatio-temporal particular, a region in space, a period of time, etc.) turns out to be indispensable for the purpose of accounting for the persistence of an important range of mental states with propositional content over time
Brown, Curtis (1993). Belief states and narrow content. Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.   (Cited by 3 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Brogaard, Berit, Centered worlds and the content of perception: Short version.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: 0. Relativistic Content In standard semantics, propositional content, whether it be the content of utterances or mental states, has a truth-value relative only to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is sitting now’ is true just in case Jim is sitting at the time of utterance in the actual world, and the content of my belief that Alice will give a talk tomorrow is true just in case Alice will give a talk on the day following the occurrence of my belief state in the actual world. Let us call propositional content which has a truth-value relative only to a possible world ‘non-relativistic content’. Non-relativistic content can be treated as either structured or unstructured. On the unstructured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set of possible worlds and bears the truth-value true just in case the actual world is a member of that set. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is working now’ at time t is the set of worlds in which Jim is working at t, and this content is true just in case the actual world is among those worlds. On the structured-content view, non-relativistic content is a set or conglomeration of properties and/or objects, where properties are features which objects possess regardless of who considers or observes them and regardless of when they are being considered or observed. Such properties are said to be (or represent) functions from possible worlds to extensions. Relative to a possible world they determine a set of objects instantiating the property. For example, relative to the actual world the property of being human determines the set of actual humans. Not all content is non-relativistic. Let us say that propositional content is relativistic just in case it possesses a truth-value only relative to a centered world. A centered world is a possible world in which an individual and a time are marked, where the marked individual..
Chalmers, David J. (2002). The components of content. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 46 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: [[This paper appears in my anthology _Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings_ (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 608-633. It is a heavily revised version of a paper first written in 1994 and revised in 1995. Sections 1, 7, 8, and 10 are similar to the old version, but the other sections are quite different. Because the old version has been widely cited, I have made it available (in its 1995 version) at http://consc.net/papers/content95.html
Chalmers, David (manuscript). The components of content (1995 version). .   (Google)
Abstract: (1) Is content in the head? I believe that water is wet. My twin on Twin Earth, which is just like Earth except that H2O is replaced by the superficially identical XYZ, does not. His thoughts concern not water but twin water: I believe that water is wet, but he believes that twin water is wet. It follows that that what a subject believes is not wholly determined by the internal state of the believer. Nevertheless, the cognitive similarities between me and my twin are striking. Is there some wholly internal aspect of content that we might share?
Chalmers, David J. (2003). The nature of narrow content. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
Cheng, Kam-Yuen (2002). Narrow content and historical accounts: Can Fodor live without them? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.   (Google)
Crawford, Sean (2003). Relational properties, causal powers and psychological laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect causal powers, it is false that no relational psychological properties do. Examples of relational psychological properties that do affect causal powers are given and psychological laws are sketched that subsume twins in virtue of them instantiating these relational properties rather than them sharing the narrow contents of their thoughts
Davies, Martin (1986). Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:263-83.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google)
Davies, Martin (1986). Individualism and supervenience: Externality, psychological explanation, and narrow content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 263:263-283.   (Google)
Dennett, Daniel C. (1983). Beyond belief. In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 58 | Annotation | Google)
Devitt, Michael (1990). The narrow representational theory of mind. In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google)
Field, Hartry (1990). "Narrow" aspects of intentionality and the information-theoretic approach to content. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1991). A modal argument for narrow content. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.   (Cited by 43 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Fodor, Jerry A. (1986). Individualism and supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60:235-262.   (Cited by 7 | Annotation | Google)
Frances, Bryan (ms). A philosophically inexpensive introduction to twin-earth.   (Google)
Abstract: I say that it’s philosophically inexpensive because I think it is more convincing than any other Twin-Earth thought experiment in that it sidesteps many of the standard objections to the usual thought experiments. I also briefly discuss narrow contents and give an analysis of Putnam’s original argument
Frances, Bryan (1999). On the explanatory deficiencies of linguistic content. Philosophical Studies 93 (1):45-75.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: The Burge-Putnam thought experiments have generated the thesis that beliefs are not fixed by the constitution of the body. However, many philosophers have thought that if this is true then there must be another content-like property. Even if the contents of our attitudes such as the one in ‘believes that aluminum is a light metal’, do not supervene on our physical makeups, nevertheless people who are physical duplicates must be the same when it comes to evaluating their rationality and explaining their actions. I argue that the considerations motivating this view are best handled with just the ordinary ‘that’-clause contents.
Georgalis, N. (1996). Awareness, understanding, and functionalism. Erkenntnis 44 (2):225-56.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Georgalis, Nick (2006). First-person intentionality. In The Primacy of the Subjective. MIT Press.   (Google)
Georgalis, Nicholas (2006). The Primacy of the Subjective: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and Language. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Gertler, Brie (ms). The narrow mind.   (Google)
Haas-Spohn, Ulrike (1999). Anti-individualism and cognitive semantics. DFG-Forschergruppe Logik in Der Philosophie 15.   (Google)
Haas-Spohn, Ulrike (1994). Hidden Indexicality and Subjective Meaning. Dissertation, Universitaet Tuebingen   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Hardcastle, Valerie Gray (1997). Discussion: [Explanation] is explanation better. Philosophy of Science 64 (1):154-160.   (Google)
Hunter, David (2003). Gabriel Segal's a slim book about narrow content. Noûs 37 (4):724–745.   (Google | More links)
Hunter, David, Gabriel Segal, a slim book about narrow content(mit press, 2000), 177 pp.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The Mind-Body problem is the problem of saying how a person’s mental states and events relate to his bodily ones. How does Oscar’s believing that water is cold relate to the states of his body? Is it itself a bodily state, perhaps a state of his brain or nervous system? If not, does it nonetheless depend on such states? Or is his believing that water is cold independent of his bodily states? And, crucially, what are the notions of dependence and independence at issue here?
Jacob, Pierre (1990). Externalism revisited: Is there such a thing as narrow content? Philosophical Studies 60 (November):143-176.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank (2003). Narrow content and representation--or twin earth revisited. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2):55-70.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is the only legitimate notion of content, but for anyone who takes seriously the representational nature of intentional states, it must be one legitimate and central notion of content. To discover that DNA has a double helix structure is to make a selection from the various possible structures
Jackson, Frank (2003). Representation and narrow belief. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):99-112.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1993). Some content is narrow. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 14 | Annotation | Google)
Abstract: ONE way t0 defend narrow content is to produce a sentence 0f the form ‘S believes that P’, and show that this sentence is true 0f S if and 0nly if it is true 0f any duplicate from the skin in, any doppclgangcr, of S. N0toriously, this is hard to d0. Twin Earth examples are pervasivc.1 Another way to defend narrow content; is t0 show that Only 2. narrow notion can play thc causal explanatory r01c we require 0f contcnt in 2. properly scicntiicm psychology 0r cognitive science. Notoriously, this is hard t0 d0. The considerations—mcthod010gicaI solipsism, the principle 0f autonomy, 0r what:cvcr—invokcd to show that a broad notion 0f content cannot..
Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Real narrow content. Mind and Language 23 (3):304–328.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content
Kriegel, Uriah & Horgan, Terry (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In T. Horgan & U. Kriegel (eds.), Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: We review some of the work already done around the notion of phenomenal intentionality and propose a way of turning this body of work into a self-conscious research program for understanding intentionality.
Kriegel, Uriah (online). The primacy of narrow content.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I want to explore a line of thought that would create a new case for a strong form of content internalism. I will not argue that all representational content is narrow content. Rather, I will argue that the source of all representational content is a narrow content. This means that there would be no wide content in a world without narrow content. The argument I will pursue is fairly straightforward: 1) the only non-derivative kind of representation is conscious representation; 2) conscious representation is narrow; therefore, 3) the only non-derivative kind of representation is narrow. If so, there would be no content without narrow content
Lau, Joe (ms). Three motivations for narrow content.   (Google)
Abstract: In everyday life, we typically explain what people do by attributing mental states such as beliefs and desires. Such mental states belong to a class of mental states that are _intentional_, mental states that have content. Hoping that Johnny will win, and believing that Johnny will win are of course rather different mental states that can lead to very different behaviour. But they are similar in that they both have the same content : what is being hoped for and believed is the very same thing. According to the thesis of externalism that has been defended most notably by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, not all of the contents of our mental states are determined by our intrinsic properties. Instead, the contents of our beliefs and desires are often determined in part by our relations to the environment. They are, so to speak, "wide" contents that are "not in our heads." Although externalism is accepted by most philosophers, many have argued that mental states with wide contents must also have a kind of content wholly determined by the intrinsic properties of the individuals who are in those states. This kind of content is called "narrow content". The aim of this paper is to distinguish between three rather different motivations for postulating narrow content. I argue that, given a certain conception of narrow content that I shall explain below, none of these three motivations succeed in establishing the existence of narrow content
LePore, Ernest & Loewer, Barry M. (1989). Dual aspect semantics. In Stuart Silvers (ed.), ReRepresentation. Kluwer.   (Cited by 10 | Google)
LePore, Ernest & Loewer, Barry M. (1986). Solipsistic semantics. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:595-614.   (Cited by 11 | Annotation | Google)
Loar, Brian (1987). Social content and psychological content. In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.   (Cited by 72 | Annotation | Google)
Loar, Brian (1987). Subjective intentionality. Philosophical Topics 15 (1):89-124.   (Cited by 17 | Google)
Ludwig, Kirk A. (1996). Singular thought and the cartesian theory of mind. Noûs 30 (4):434-460.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: (1) Content properties are nonrelational, that is, having a content property does not entail the existence of any contingent object not identical with the thinker or a part of the thinker.2 (2) We have noninferential knowledge of our conscious thoughts, that is, for any of our..
Maloney, J. Christopher (1991). Saving psychological solipsism. Philosophical Studies 61 (March):267-83.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Manfredi, Pat A. (1993). Two routes to narrow content: Both dead ends. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: If psychology requires a taxonomy that categorizes mental states according to their causal powers, the common sense method of individuating mental states (a taxonomy by intentional content) is unacceptable because mental states can have different intentional content, but identical causal powers. This difference threatens both the vindication of belief/desire psychology and the viability of scientific theories whose posits include intentional states. To resolve this conflict, Fodor has proposed that for scientific purposes mental states should be classified by their narrow content. Such a classification is supposed to correspond to a classification by causal powers. Yet a state's narrow content is also supposed to determine its (broad) intentional content whenever that state is 'anchored' to a context. I examine the two most plausible accounts of narrow content implicit in Fodor's work, arguing that neither account can accomplish both goals
McDermott, M. (1986). Narrow content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):277-88.   (Cited by 4 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Morris, Katherine J. (1984). In defense of methodological solipsism: A reply to Noonan. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):399-412.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Newman, Andrew E. (2005). Two grades of internalism (pass and fail). Philosophical Studies 122 (2):153-169.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Internalism about mental content holds that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates full-stop. Anyone particle-for-particle indiscernible from someone who believes that Aristotle was wise, for instance, must share that same belief. Externalism instead contends that many perfectly ordinary propositional attitudes can be had only in certain sorts of physical, sociolinguistic, or historical context. To have a belief about Aristotle, for instance, a person must have been causally impacted in the right way by Aristotle himself (e.g., by hearing about him, or reading some of his works).An interesting third view, which I call
Noonan, Harold W. (1981). Methodological solipsism. Philosophical Studies 40 (September):269-274.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Putnam, Hilary (1987). Fodor and Block on narrow content. In Representation and Reality. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Quillen, Keith (1986). Propositional attitudes and psychological explanation. Mind and Language 1:133-57.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Recanati, F. (1990). Externalism and narrow content. Noûs 24.   (Annotation | Google)
Recanati, François (1994). How narrow is narrow content? Dialectica 48 (3-4):209-29.   (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Rechenauer, Martin (1993). How not to taxonomize mental kinds. Acta Analytica 10 (10):135-141.   (Google)
Rechenauer, Martin (1997). Individualism, individuation and that-clauses. Erkenntnis 46 (1):49-67.   (Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1985). A farewell to functionalism. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):1-14.   (Cited by 9 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1994). Content and context. Philosophical Perspectives 8:17-32.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). Content by courtesy. Journal of Philosophy 84 (April):197-213.   (Cited by 7 | Google | More links)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1985). Just what do we have in mind? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10:25-48.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google)
Baker, Lynne Rudder (1987). Saving Belief. Princeton University Press.   (Cited by 50 | Annotation | Google)
Sawyer, Sarah (2007). There is no viable notion of narrow content. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Schiffer, Stephen R. (1990). Fodor's character. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.   (Google)
Segal, Gabriel (2000). A Slim Book About Narrow Content. MIT Press.   (Cited by 57 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.
Segal, Gabriel (1999). A Slim Book on Narrow Content. The Mit Press.   (Google)
Segal, Gabriel (online). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions.   (Google)
Abstract: Tyler Burge (Burge (1979)) has developed a very influential line of anti-individualistic thought. He argued that the cognitive content of a person
Segal, Gabriel (2007). Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.   (Google)
Silverberg, Arnold (1995). Narrow content: A defense. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):109-27.   (Google)
Stalnaker, Robert (1990). Narrow content. In C. Anthony Anderson & Joseph Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Stanford: CSLI.   (Cited by 27 | Annotation | Google)
Stich, Stephen P. (1991). Narrow content meets fat syntax. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.   (Cited by 13 | Annotation | Google)
Taylor, Kenneth A. (1989). Narrow content functionalism and the mind-body problem. Noûs 23 (3):355-72.   (Cited by 5 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Taylor, Kenneth A. (1989). Supervenience and levels of meaning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 27:443-58.   (Cited by 2 | Annotation | Google)
Toribio, Josefa (1995). Ruritania and ecology. In Contents. Atascadero: Ridgeview.   (Google | More links)
Vaughan, R. (1989). Searle's narrow content. Ratio 2 (2):185-90.   (Google)
Voltolini, Alberto, Holistic narrow content?   (Google)
Abstract: 1. In the course of his philosophical development, Jerry Fodor has indicated two sorts of non-broad (i.e., non-truthconditional) content of mental representations, namely content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) and narrow content (NC) qua mapping function from contexts (of thought) to broad contents. According to the former conceptualization, mental state tokens which are truth-conditionally identical may be such that they cannot both truthfully ascribed to one and the same subject at the same time, for they differ in their respective DDC. In Fodor's own example, Oedipus' thoughts that he will marry Jocasta and that he will marry Mum are truth-conditionally identical, but different as far their DDC is concerned; one cannot indeed truthfully ascribe both thoughts to him simultaneously1. According to the latter conceptualization instead, mental state tokens of molecularly identical twins placed in different environments (such as Earth and Twin-Earth) are such that, although they differ in their truth-conditions, they share the same NC2. For instance, these twins respectively think that water quenches thirst and that twater (a liquid similar to water but its chemical composition) quenches thirst. Although these thoughts thus differ in broad content, they have the same NC: had the Twin-Earthling twin been brought up on Earth rather than on Twin-Earth where he actually lives, he would have thought that water quenches thirst rather than that twater quenches thirst3. According to Fodor's picture, both concepts are invoked for the purpose of psychology in order to account for one and the same thing, namely subjects' behavior. On the one hand, difference in behavior of a subject whose thought-tokens have the same truth-conditions may be ascribed to difference in the DDC of these tokens4. On the other hand, identity in behavior between two molecularly identical subjects whose thought-tokens have different truth-conditions is explained in terms of the NC- identity of these tokens5..
Voltolini, Alberto (1997). Is narrow content the same as content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized? In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.   (Google)
Abstract: Jerry Fodor now holds (1990) that the content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) is determined by the 'orthographical' syntax + the computational/functional role of such states. Mental states whose tokens are both orthographically and truth-conditionally identical may be different with regard to the computational/functional role played by their respective representational cores. This make them tantamount to different contentful states, i.e. states with different DDCs, insofar as they are opaquely taxonomized. Indeed they cannot both be truthfully ascribed to a single subject at the same time. Some years ago (1987), Fodor postulated a notion of mental content which also went beyond that of a mental state's truth-conditions. States whose tokens differ in their truth-conditions, or broad content, might, he claimed, still share a narrow content (NC), which was causally responsible for the shared behavior of the subjects of these states. For instance, two molecularly identical individuals, living in environments in all respects the same, except for the chemical substance of the phenomenically indistinguishable liquids filling their respective lakes and rivers, would behave similarly when having truth-conditionally different thoughts regarding those liquids. According to Fodor, this sameness of behavior was causally dependent on the sameness of the NC of the two individuals' truth-conditionally different thoughts. Now, this way of individuating mental states is still of interest for semantics. Indeed, NC allows one contextually to fix the broad content of a mental state token. Echoing Kaplan's notion of character,1 Fodor explained NC as a function that mapped contexts (of thought) onto broad contents. NC was thus invoked by Fodor mainly in order to account for sameness of intentional behavior. But DDC also plays a role in explaining intentional behavior, precisely by explaining why a subject whose thought-tokens have identical truthconditions may behave differently..
Wakefield, Jerome C. (2002). Broad versus narrow content in the explanation of action: Fodor on Frege cases. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an explanatorily adequate broad-content psychology is nonetheless possible because Frege cases rarely occur in intentional-explanatory contexts, and they are not systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that demands intentional explanation. Thus, he claims, behaviors associated with Frege cases can be considered ceteris-paribus exceptions to broad-content intentional laws without significantly decreasing the explanatory power of intentional psychology. I argue that Frege cases are plentiful and systematically linked to intentional laws in a way that requires intentional explanation, specifically in the explanation of why certain actions are not performed. Consequently, Frege-case behaviors cannot be construed as ceteris-paribus exceptions to intentional laws without significantly eroding the explanatory power of intentional psychology and reducing the rationality of the agent. Fodor thus fails to save broad-content psychology from the prima facie objections against it based on Frege cases
White, Stephen L. (1992). Narrow content and narrow interpretation. In The Unity of the Self. MIT Press.   (Cited by 8 | Annotation | Google)
White, Stephen L. (1982). Partial character and the language of thought. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (October):347-65.   (Cited by 35 | Annotation | Google)
Williams, Michael (1990). Social norms and narrow content. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15:425-462.   (Annotation | Google)
Williamson, Timothy (1998). The broadness of the mental: Some logical issues. Philosophical Perspectives 12:389-410.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)

2.2i The Extended Mind

Adams, Frederick R. & Aizawa, Kenneth (ms). Andy Clark on intrinsic content and extended cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist views of cognition apparently allow for the possibility that cognition extends into the external world.[3] So, the (logical, conceptual, or nomological) possibility of extended cognition seems to us not the kind of radical view the advocates of this view have often implied. This is not, of course, to assess or pass judgment on the truth of these possibilities; it is only to note that they are not what most agitates people about the hypothesis of extended cognition. Framing the radical extended cognition hypothesis is a more delicate matter than framing the modal extended cognition hypothesis, but something like the following is in the ballpark. The radical extended cognition hypothesis maintains that, in many mundane cases of tool use, human cognitive processes extend into the tools. The principal reason this hypothesis is so delicate is that there remains much room for dispute about what constitutes a
Adams, Frederick R. & Aizawa, Kenneth (forthcoming). Challenges to active externalism. In P. Robbins & Murat Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. Cambridge.   (Google)
Adams, Frederick R. & Aizawa, Kenneth (2005). Defending non-derived content. Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):661-669.   (Google | More links)
Adams, Frederick R. & Aizawa, Kenneth (forthcoming). Defending the Bounds of cognition. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: That about sums up what is wrong with Clark
Adams, Frederick R. & Aizawa, Kenneth (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell Pub..   (Cited by 34 | Google | More links)
Abstract: An alarming number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have argued that mind extends beyond the brain and body. This book evaluates these arguments and suggests that, typically, it does not. A timely and relevant study that exposes the need to develop a more sophisticated theory of cognition, while pointing to a bold new direction in exploring the nature of cognition Articulates and defends the “mark of the cognitive”, a common sense theory used to distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive processes Challenges the current popularity of extended cognition theory through critical analysis and by pointing out fallacies and shortcoming in the literature Stimulates discussions that will advance debate about the nature of cognition in the cognitive sciences
Adams, Frederick & Aizawa, Kenneth (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell.   (Google)
Adams, Fred & Aizawa, Ken (forthcoming). Why the mind is still in the head. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, the mind is still in the head
Aizawa, Kenneth (ms). Clark's conditions on extended cognition are too strong.   (Google)
Aizawa, Ken (ms). Clark missed the mark: Andy Clark on intrinsic content and extended cognition.   (Google)
Abstract: This is a plausible reading of what Clark and Chalmers had in mind at the time, but it is not the radical claim at stake in the extended cognition debate.[1] It is a familiar functionalist view of cognition and the mind that it can be realized in a wide range of distinct material bases. Thus, for many species of functionalism about cognition and the mind, it follows that they can be realized in extracranial substrates.[2] And, in truth, even some non-functionalist views of cognition apparently allow for the possibility that cognition extends into the external world.[3] So, the (logical, conceptual, or nomological) possibility of extended cognition seems to us not the kind of radical view the advocates of this view have often implied. This is not, of course, to assess or pass judgment on the truth of these possibilities; it is only to note that they are not what most agitates people about the hypothesis of extended cognition. Framing the radical extended cognition hypothesis is a more delicate matter than framing the modal extended cognition hypothesis, but something like the following is in the ballpark. The radical extended cognition hypothesis maintains that, in many mundane cases of tool use, human cognitive processes extend into the tools. The principal reason this hypothesis is so delicate is that there remains much room for dispute about what constitutes a “mundane” case of tool use, such as keeping a notebook at hand at all times, versus an exotic case of tool use, such as having a computer memory chip implanted in one’s brain. Clark never in so many words defends the idea that there are actual cases of extended cognition. Rather, his tacit commitment must be inferred from such things as his proposal that the brain is made to use tools, so we should view tools as part of the mind (Cf., Clark, 2005, p. 8ff.)
Aizawa, Ken (ms). Defending the Bounds of cognition.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: That about sums up what is wrong with Clark’s extended mind hypothesis. Clark apparently thinks that the nature of the processes internal to a pencil, Rolodex, computer, cell phone, piece of string, or whatever, has nothing to do with whether that thing carries out cognitive processing.[1] Rather, what matters is how the thing interacts with a cognitive agent; the thing has to be coupled to a cognitive agent in a particular kind of way. Clark (20??) gives three conditions that constitute a rough or partial specification of the kind of coupling required
Baker, Lynne Rudder (2009). Persons and the extended-mind thesis. Zygon 44 (3):642-658.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The extended-mind thesis (EM) is the claim that mentality need not be situated just in the brain, or even within the boundaries of the skin. Some versions take "extended selves" be to relatively transitory couplings of biological organisms and external resources. First, I show how EM can be seen as an extension of traditional views of mind. Then, after voicing a couple of qualms about EM, I reject EM in favor of a more modest hypothesis that recognizes enduring subjects of experience and agents with integrated bodies. Nonetheless, my modest hypothesis allows subpersonal states to have nonbiological parts that play essential roles in cognitive processing. I present empirical warrant for this modest hypothesis and show how it leaves room for science and religion to coexist
Bartlett, Gary (2008). Whither internalism? How internalists should respond to the extended mind hypothesis. Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: A new position in the philosophy of mind has recently appeared: the extended mind hypothesis (EMH). Some of its proponents think the EMH, which says that a subject's mental states can extend into the local environment, shows that internalism is false. I argue that this is wrong. The EMH does not refute internalism; in fact, it necessarily does not do so. The popular assumption that the EMH spells trouble for internalists is premised on a bad characterization of the internalist thesis—albeit one that most internalists have adhered to. I show that internalism is entirely compatible with the EMH. This view should prompt us to reconsider the characterization of internalism, and in conclusion I make some brief remarks about how that project might proceed
Bradley, Francis H. (1895). In what sense are psychical states extended? Mind 4 (14):225-235.   (Google | More links)
Browne, Derek (2009). The Bounds of cognition • by Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa. Analysis 69 (2).   (Google)
Campbell, John (1993). The role of physical objects in spatial thinking. In Naomi M. Eilan, R McCarthy & M.W Brewer (eds.), Problems in the Philosophy and Psychology of Spatial Representation. Blackwell.   (Cited by 73 | Google)
Case, J. (2004). Offloading memory to the environment: A quantitative example. Minds and Machines 14 (3):387-89.   (Google | More links)
Chalmers, David J. & Clark, Andy (1998). The extended mind. Analysis 58:10--23.   (Google)
Chemero, Anthony (2007). Asking what's inside the head: Neurophilosophy meets the extended mind. Minds and Machines 17 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In their historical overview of cognitive science, Bechtel, Abraham- son and Graham (1999) describe the field as expanding in focus be- ginning in the mid-1980s. The field had spent the previous 25 years on internalist, high-level GOFAI (“good old fashioned artificial intelli- gence” [Haugeland 1985]), and was finally moving “outwards into the environment and downards into the brain” (Bechtel et al, 1999, p.75). One important force behind the downward movement was Patricia Churchland’s Neurophilosophy (1986). This book began a movement bearing its name, one that truly came of age in 1999 when Kath- leen Akins won a million-dollar fellowship to begin the McDonnell Project in Philosophy and the Neurosciences. The McDonnell Project put neurophilosophy at the forefront of philosophy of mind and cogni- tive science, yielding proliferating articles, conferences, special journal issues and books. In two major new books, neurophilosophers Patricia Churchland (2002) and John Bickle (2003) clearly feel this newfound prominence: Churchland mocks those who do not apply findings in neuroscience to philosophical problems as “no-brainers”; Bickle mocks anyone with traditional philosophical concerns, including “naturalistic philosophers of mind” and other neurophilosophers
Chemero, Tony & Silberstein, Michael, Defending extended cognition.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this talk, we defend extended cognition against several criticisms. We argue that extended cognition does not derive from armchair theorizing and that it neither ignores the results of the neural sciences, nor minimizes the importance of the brain in the production of intelligent behavior. We also argue that explanatory success in the cognitive sciences does not depend on localist or reductionist methodologies; part of our argument for this is a defense of what might be called ‘holistic science’
Drayson, Zoe & Clark, Andy (forthcoming). Augmentation, Agency, and the Spreading of the Mental State. Neuroethics.   (Google)
Clark, Andy (2007). Curing cognitive hiccups: A defense of the extended mind. Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):163-192.   (Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (2005). Intrinsic content, active memory, and the extended mind. Analysis 65 (285):1-11.   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Clark, Andy & Chalmers, David (forthcoming). Introduction: The extended mind in focus / Richard menary the extended mind. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Mit Press.   (Google)
Clark, Andy (2006). Memento's revenge: The extended mind, extended. In Richard Menary (ed.), Objections and Replies to the Extended Mind. Ashgate.   (Cited by 11 | Google | More links)
Abstract: In the movie, Memento, the hero, Leonard, suffers from a form of anterograde amnesia that results in an inability to lay down new memories. Nonetheless, he sets out on a quest to find his wife
Clark, Andy (2003). Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies and the Future of Human Intelligence. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 181 | Google | More links)
Clark, Andy (2001). Reasons, robots and the extended mind. Mind and Language 16 (2):121-145.   (Cited by 49 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and De-centralized Cogition, Real-world Robotics and Artificial Life1. Such approaches, however, are often criticized for giving certain aspects of rationality too wide a berth. They focus their attention on on such superficially poor cousins as
Clark, Andy & Chalmers, David J. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis 58 (1):7-19.   (Cited by 320 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Abstract: Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? The question invites two standard replies. Some accept the demarcations of skin and skull, and say that what is outside the body is outside the mind. Others are impressed by arguments suggesting that the meaning of our words "just ain't in the head", and hold that this externalism about meaning carries over into an externalism about mind. We propose to pursue a third position. We advocate a very different sort of externalism: an _active externalism_ , based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes
Collins, Harry; Clark, Andy & Shrager, Jeff (2008). Keeping the collectivity in mind? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3).   (Google)
Abstract:  The key question in this three way debate is the role of the collectivity and of agency. Collins and Shrager debate whether cognitive psychology has, like the sociology of knowledge, always taken the mind to extend beyond the individual. They agree that irrespective of the history, socialization is key to understanding the mind and that this is compatible with Clark’s position; the novelty in Clark’s “extended mind” position appears to be the role of the material rather than the role of other minds. Collins and Clark debate the relationship between self, agency, and the human collectivity. Collins argues that the Clark’s extended mind fails to stress the asymmetry of the relationship between the self and its material “scaffolding.” Clark accepts that there is asymmetry but that an asymmetrical ensemble is sufficient to explain the self. Collins says that we know too little about the material world to pursue such a model to the exclusion of other approaches including that both the collectivity and language have agency. The collectivity must be kept in mind! (Though what follows is a robust exchange of views it is also a cooperative effort, authors communicating “backstage” with each other to try to make the disagreements as clear and to the point as possible.)
Dartnall, Terry (2005). Does the world Leak into the mind? Active externalism, "internalism", and epistemology. Cognitive Science 29:135-43.   (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Dartnall, Terry (2004). Epistemology, emulators, and extended minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):401-402.   (Google)
Abstract: Grush's framework has epistemological implications and explains how it is possible to acquire offline empirical knowledge. It also complements the extended-mind thesis, which says that mind leaks into the world. Grush's framework suggests that the world leaks into the mind through the offline deployment of emulators that we usually deploy in our experience of the world
De Cruz, Helen (2008). An extended mind perspective on natural number representation. Philosophical Psychology 21 (4):475 – 490.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Experimental studies indicate that nonhuman animals and infants represent numerosities above three or four approximately and that their mental number line is logarithmic rather than linear. In contrast, human children from most cultures gradually acquire the capacity to denote exact cardinal values. To explain this difference, I take an extended mind perspective, arguing that the distinctly human ability to use external representations as a complement for internal cognitive operations enables us to represent natural numbers. Reviewing neuroscientific, developmental, and anthropological evidence, I argue that the use of external media that represent natural numbers (like number words, body parts, tokens or numerals) influences the functional architecture of the brain, which suggests a two-way traffic between the brain and cultural public representations
Di Paolo, Ezequiel (2009). Extended life. Topoi 28 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper reformulates some of the questions raised by extended mind theorists from an enactive, life/mind continuity perspective. Because of its reliance on concepts such as autopoiesis, the enactive approach has been deemed internalist and thus incompatible with the extended mind hypothesis. This paper answers this criticism by showing (1) that the relation between organism and cogniser is not one of co-extension, (2) that cognition is a relational phenomenon and thereby has no location, and (3) that the individuality of a cogniser is inevitably linked with the question of its autonomy, a question ignored by the extended mind hypothesis but for which the enactive approach proposes a precise, operational, albeit non-functionalist answer. The paper raises a pespective of embedded and intersecting forms of autonomous identity generation, some of which correspond to the canonical cases discussed in the extended mind literature, but on the whole of wider generality. In addressing these issues, this paper proposes unbiased, non-species specific definitions of cognition, agency and mediation, thus filling in gaps in the extended mind debates that have led to paradoxical situations and a problematic over-reliance on intutions about what counts as cognitive
Fenton, Andrew & Alpert, Sheri (2008). Extending our view on using BCIs for locked-in syndrome. Neuroethics 1 (2).   (Google)
Abstract:   Locked-in syndrome (LIS) is a severe neurological condition that typically leaves a patient unable to move, talk and, in many cases, initiate communication. Brain Computer Interfaces (or BCIs) promise to enable individuals with conditions like LIS to re-engage with their physical and social worlds. In this paper we will use extended mind theory to offer a way of seeing the potential of BCIs when attached to, or implanted in, individuals with LIS. In particular, we will contend that functionally integrated BCIs extend the minds of individuals with LIS beyond their bodies, allowing them greater autonomy than they can typically hope for in living with their condition. This raises important philosophical questions about the implications of BCI technology, particularly the potential to change selves, and ethical questions about whether society has a responsibility to aid these individuals in re-engaging with their physical and social worlds. It also raises some important questions about when these interventions should be offered to individuals with LIS and respecting the rights of these individuals to refuse intervention. By aiding willing individuals in re-engaging with their physical and social worlds, BCIs open up avenues of opportunity taken for granted by able individuals and introduce new ways in which these individuals can be harmed. These latter considerations serve to highlight our emergent social responsibilities to those individuals who will be suitable for, and receive, BCIs
Fodor, Jerry (2009). Where is my mind? London Review of Books 31 (3).   (Google)
Fulda, Joseph S. (ms). "The extended mind"--extended.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We review the argument made by Clark and Chalmers in _Analysis_ for a limited externalism and extend their argument from declarative knowledge to procedural knowledge
Gallagher, Shaun & Crisafi, Anthony (2009). Mental institutions. Topoi 28 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: We propose to extend Clark and Chalmer’s concept of the extended mind to consider the possibility that social institutions (e.g., legal systems, museums) may operate in ways similar to the hand-held conveniences (notebooks, calculators) that are often used as examples of extended mind. The inspiration for this suggestion can be found in the writings of Hegel on “objective spirit” which involves the mind in a constant process of externalizing and internalizing. For Hegel, social institutions are pieces of the mind, externalized in their specific time and place. These institutions are the products of shared mental processes. We then use these institutions instrumentally to do further cognitive work, for example, to solve problems or to control behavior
Noë, Alva (2006). Experience without the head. In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szab'o Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? If active externalism is right, then the boundary cannot be drawn at the skull. The mind reaches – or at least can reach --- beyond the limits of the body out into the world
Gertler, Brie (2007). Overextending the mind? In Brie Gertler & Lawrence Shapiro (eds.), Arguing About the Mind. Routledge.   (Google | More links)
Abstract:      Clark and Chalmers argue that the mind is extended – that is, its boundary lies beyond the skin. In this essay, I will criticize this conclusion. However, I will also defend some of the more controversial elements of Clark and Chalmers's argument. I reject their conclusion because I think that their argument shows that a seemingly innocuous assumption, about internal states and processes, is flawed. My goal is not to conclusively refute Clark and Chalmers's conclusion. My aim is only to reveal the best alternative for those who remain skeptical about the existence – or, perhaps, even the possibility – of extended minds
Gershenson, C. (ms). Where is the problem of “where is the mind?”?   (Google | More links)
Abstract: We propose that the discussions about “where the mind is” depend directly on the metaphysical preconception and definition of “mind”. If we see the mind from one perspective (individualist), it will be only in the brain, and if we see it from another (active externalist), it will be embedded in the body and extended into the world. The “whereabouts” of the mind depends on our 1 of mind. Therefore, we should not ask if the mind is somewhere, but if it is somehow
Green, Mitchell S. (2000). The status of supposition. Noûs 34 (3):376–399.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: According to many forms of Externalism now popular in the Philosophy of Mind, the contents of our thoughts depend in part upon our physical or social milieu.1 These forms of Externalism leave unchallenged the thesis that the ~non-factive! attitudes we bear towards these contents are independent of physical or social milieu. This paper challenges that thesis. It is argued here that publicly forwarding a content as a supposition for the sake of argument is, under conditions not themselves guaranteeing the existence of that state, sufficient for occupancy of the intentional state of supposing that content. Because a saying may literally create an intentional state, whether one is in such a state does not depend solely upon how things are within one’s skin. Rather, even leaving content fixed, the attitude borne toward that content depends in part upon what norms are in force in one’s milieu
Haugeland, John (1993). Mind embodied and embedded. In Yu-Houng H. Houng & J. Ho (eds.), Mind and Cognition: 1993 International Symposium. Academica Sinica.   (Cited by 49 | Annotation | Google)
Heath, Joseph & Anderson, Joel, Procrastination and the extended will.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Less than a decade ago, “rational choice theory” seemed oddly impervious to criticism. Hundreds of books, articles and studies were published every year, attacking the theory from every angle, yet it continued to attract new converts. How times have changed! The “anomalies” that Richard Thaler once blithely cataloged for the Journal of Economic Perspectives are now widely regarded, not as curious deviations from the norm, but as falsifying counterexamples to the entire project of neoclassical economics. The work of experimental game theorists has perhaps been the most influential in showing that people do not maximize expected utility, in any plausible sense of the terms “maximize,” “expected,” or “utility.” The evidence is so overwhelming and incontrovertible that, by the time one gets to the end of a book like Dan Ariely’s Predictably Irrational,1 it begins to feel like piling on. The suggestion is pretty clear: not only are people not as rational as decision and game theorists have traditionally taken them to be, they are not even as rational as they themselves take themselves to be. This conclusion, however, is not self-evident. The standard interpretation of these findings is that people are irrational: their estimation of probabilities is vulnerable to framing effects, their treatment of (equivalent) losses and gains is asymmetric, their choices violate the sure-thing principle, they discount the future hyperbolically, and so on. Indeed, after surveying the experimental findings, one begins to wonder how people manage to get on in their daily lives at all, given the seriousness and ubiquity of these deliberative pathologies. And yet, most people do manage to get on, in some form or another. This in itself suggests an..
Horgan, Terence M. & Kriegel, Uriah (2008). Phenomenal intentionality meets the extended mind. The Monist 91:347-373.   (Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Active perception and vehicle externalism. In Susan L. Hurley (ed.), Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Certain empirical results suggest a way of challenging two natural and widespread assumptions about the mind. One assumption is about the relations between perception and action. This shows up in the widespread conception of perception and action in terms of input and output, respectively. Perception is conceived as input from world to mind and action is conceived as output from mind to world. The other assumption is about the relations between mind and world. It influences various opposed views about whether the contents of the mind are in principle independent of the outside world
Hurley, Susan L. (2003). Action, the unity of consciousness, and vehicle externalism. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 4 | Google)
Hurley, Susan L. (1998). Vehicles, contents, conceptual structure and externalism. Analysis 58 (1):1-6.   (Cited by 19 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We all know about the vehicle/content distinction (see Dennett 1991a, Millikan 1991, 1993). We shouldn't confuse properties represented in content with properties of vehicles of content. In particular, we shouldn't confuse the personal and subpersonal levels. The contents of the mental states of subject/agents are at the personal level. Vehicles of content are causally explanatory subpersonal events or processes or states. We shouldn't suppose that the properties of vehicles must be projected into what they represent for subject/agents, or vice versa. This would be to confuse the personal and subpersonal levels
Hurley, Susan L. (forthcoming). Varieties of externalism. In R. Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Ashgate.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism comes in varieties. While the landscape isn
Keijzer, Fred A. & Schouten, Maurice K. D. (2007). Embedded cognition and mental causation: Setting empirical Bounds on metaphysics. Synthese 158 (1).   (Google | More links)
Kirsh, David & Maglio, P. (1995). On distinguishing epistemic from pragmatic action. Cognitive Science 18:513-49.   (Cited by 246 | Google | More links)
Abstract: We present data and argument to show that in Tetris - a real-time interactive video game - certain cognitive and perceptual problems are more quickly, easily, and reliably solved by performing actions in the world rather than by performing computational actions in the head alone. We have found that some translations and rotations are best understood as using the world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to change the world in order to simplify the problem-solving task. Thus, we distinguish pragmatic actions ñ actions performed to bring one physically closer to a goal - from epistemic actions - actions performed to uncover information that is hidden or hard to compute mentally. To illustrate the need for epistemic actions, we first develop a standard information-processing model of Tetris-cognition, and show that it cannot explain performance data from human players of the game - even when we relax the assumption of fully sequential processing. Standard models disregard many actions taken by players because they appear unmotivated or superfluous. However, we describe many such actions that are actually taken by players that are far from superfluous, and that play valuable roles in improving human performance. We argue that traditional accounts are limited because they regard action as having a single function: to change the world. By recognizing a second function of action - an epistemic function - we can explain many of the actions that a traditional model cannot. Although, our argument is supported by numerous examples specifically from Tetris, we outline how the one category of epistemic action can be incorporated into theories of action more generally.
Krueger, Joel W. (2009). Empathy and the extended mind. Zygon 44 (3):675-698.   (Google)
Abstract: I draw upon the conceptual resources of the extended mind thesis (EM) to analyze empathy and interpersonal understanding. Against the dominant mentalistic paradigm, I argue that empathy is fundamentally an extended bodily activity and that much of our social understanding happens outside of the head. First, I look at how the two dominant models of interpersonal understanding, theory theory and simulation theory, portray the cognitive link between folk psychology and empathy. Next, I challenge their internalist orthodoxy and offer an alternative "extended" characterization of empathy. In support of this characterization, I analyze some narratives of individuals with Moebius syndrome, a kind of expressive deficit resulting from bilateral facial paralysis. I conclude by discussing how a Zen Buddhist ethics of responsiveness is helpful for articulating the practical significance of an extended, body-based account of empathy
Levy, Neil (2007). Rethinking neuroethics in the light of the extended mind thesis. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):3-11.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics
Marsh, Leslie (2009). Mindscapes and landscapes: Exploring the extended mind. Zygon 44 (3):625-627.   (Google)
Abstract: This brief article introduces a symposium discussing the extended mind thesis and its suggestive relation to religious thought. Essays by Mark Rowlands, Lynne Rudder Baker, Teed Rockwell, Joel Krueger, Leonard Angel, and Matthew Day present a variety of perspectives
Marsh, Leslie (2005). Review Essay: Andy Clark's Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence_. Cognitive Systems Research 6:405-409.   (Google)
Abstract: The notion of the cyborg has exercised the popular imagination for almost two hundred years. In very general terms the idea that a living entity can be a hybrid of both organic matter and mechanical parts, and for all intents and purposes be seamlessly functional and self-regulating, was prefigured in literary works such as Shellys Frankenstein (1816/18) and Samuel Butlers Erewhon (1872). This notion of hybridism has been a staple theme of 20th century science fiction writing, television programmes and the cinema. For the most part, these works trade on a deep sense of unease we have about our personal identity – how could some non-organic matter to which I have so little conscious access count as a bona fide part of me? Cognitive scientist and philosopher, Andy Clark, picks up this general theme and presents an empirical and philosophical case for the following inextricably linked theses.
Marsh, Leslie & Onof, Christian (2008). Stigmergic epistemology, stigmergic cognition. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2).   (Google)
Abstract: To know is to cognize, to cognize is to be a culturally bounded, rationality-bounded and environmentally located agent. Knowledge and cognition are thus dual aspects of human sociality. If social epistemology has the formation, acquisition, mediation, transmission and dissemination of knowledge in complex communities of knowers as its subject matter, then its third party character is essentially stigmergic. In its most generic formulation, stigmergy is the phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by modifications of the environment. Extending this notion one might conceive of social stigmergy as the extra-cranial analog of an artifcial neural network providing epistemic structure. This paper recommends a stigmergic framework for social epistemology to account for the supposed tension between individual action, wants and beliefs and the social corpora. We also propose that the so-called "extended mind" thesis offers the requisite stigmergic cognitive analog to stigmergic knowledge. Stigmergy as a theory of interaction within complex systems theory is illustrated through an example that runs on a particle swarm optimization algorithm.
Menary, Richard (2006). Attacking the Bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):329-344.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Recently internalists have mounted a counter-attack on the attempt to redefine the bounds of cognition. The counter-attack is aimed at a radical project which I call "cognitive integration," which is the view that internal and external vehicles and processes are integrated into a whole. Cognitive integration can be defended against the internalist counter arguments of Adams and Aizawa (A&A) and Rupert. The disagreement between internalists and integrationists is whether the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes a cognitive process. Integrationists think that they do, typically for reasons to do with the close coordination and causal interplay between internal and external processes. The internalist criticisms of the manipulation thesis fail because they misconstrue the nature of manipulation, ignore the hybrid nature of cognition, and take the manipulation thesis to be dependent upon a weak parity principle
Menary, Richard (2007). Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded. Palgrave Macmillan.   (Google)
Abstract: In Cognitive Integration: Attacking The Bounds of Cognition Richard Menary argues that the real pay-off from extended-mind-style arguments is not a new form of externalism in the philosophy of mind, but a view in which the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of cognition are integrated into a whole. Menary argues that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks. However, we cannot make good on these claims without understanding the cognitive norms by which we manipulate bodily external vehicles of cognition. Shaun Gallagher: “Menary sets out some extremely welcome clarifications that help to integrate the models of embodied and extended cognition. He not only provides convincing responses to all of the main objections that have been made against these approaches, he also puts flesh on the integrated model by incorporating concepts such as epistemic action, by expanding the discussion to include a Peircean view of representation, by demonstrating its evolutionary roots, and by exploring its implications for language and cognition. This is one of those books that takes us forward a number of giant steps. Menary makes it comprehensive and comprehensible.”
Menary, Richard (2009). Intentionality, cognitive integration and the continuity thesis. Topoi 28 (1):31-43.   (Google)
Abstract: Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore, be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality, I suggest, and can be overcome by revealing that the concept of intentional directedness as he receives it from the Scholastics is quite consistent with the continuity thesis. It is only when intentional directedness is conjoined with intentional inexistence that intentionality and content are consistent with a discontinuity thesis (such as Brentano’s thesis). This makes room to develop an account of intentional directedness that is consistent with the continuity thesis in the form of Peirce’s representational principle. I also argue against a form of the discontinuity thesis in the guise of the derived/underived content distinction. Having shown that intentionality is consistent with the continuity thesis I argue that we should focus on intentionality and representation as bodily enacted. I conclude that we would be better off focussing on representation and intentionality in action rather than giving abstract functional accounts of extended cognition
Menary, Richard (forthcoming). The extended mind and cognitive integration. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Mit Press.   (Google)
Menary, Richard (2007). Writing As Thinking. Language Sciences 29:621-632.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I aim to show that the creation and manipulation of written vehicles is part of our cognitive processing and, therefore, that writing transforms our cognitive abilities. I do this from the perspective of cognitive integration: completing a complex cognitive, or mental, task is enabled by a co-ordinated interaction between neural processes, bodily processes and manipulating written sentences. In section one I introduce Harris’ criticisms of ways in which writing has been said to restructure thought (Goody 1968; McLuhan 1962, 1964; Ong 1982). This will give us a preliminary idea about possible pitfalls for a cognitive integrationist account. The second section outlines, firstly, how integrated cognitive systems function. Secondly, the model is applied to a hybrid mental act where writing allows us to complete complex cognitive tasks. The final section outlines the sense in which, following Harris, there is “a more realistic picture of how writing restructures thought” [Harris, R., 1989. How does writing restructure thought? Language and Communication 9 (2/3) 99–106] that is concealed by the ‘romantic fantasies’ of theorists such as the above. This picture is one of writing providing an autoglottic space in which a new form of theoretical thinking becomes prevalent. The cognitive integrationist understands this in terms of the nature of the written vehicles and how we manipulate them.
O'Brien, Gerard (1998). The mind: Embodied, embedded, but not extended. [Journal (Paginated)] 7:8-83.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clark’s advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind
O'Regan, Kevin J. (1992). Solving the "real" mysteries of visual perception: The world as an outside memory. Canadian Journal of Psychology 46:461-88.   (Cited by 359 | Google | More links)
Parsell, Mitch (2006). The cognitive cost of extending an evolutionary mind into the environment. Cognitive Processing 7 (1): 3-10.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Clark and Chalmers (1998) have argued that mental states can be extended outside an organism
Rowlands, Mark (2009). Enactivism and the extended mind. Topoi 28 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: According to the view that has become known as the extended mind , some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed (partly) of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. Enactivist models understand mental processes as (partly) constituted by sensorimotor knowledge and by the organism’s ability to act, in appropriate ways, on environmental structures. Given the obvious similarities between the two views, it is both tempting and common to regard them as essentially variations on the same theme. In this paper, I shall argue that the similarities between enactivist and extended models of cognition are relatively superficial, and the divergences are deeper than commonly thought
Rowlands, Mark (2009). Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive. Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):1 – 19.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the thesis of the extended mind (EM) , at least some token cognitive processes extend into the cognizing subject's environment in the sense that they are (partly) composed of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. EM has attracted four ostensibly distinct types of objection. This paper has two goals. First, it argues that these objections all reduce to one basic sort: all the objections can be resolved by the provision of an adequate and properly motivated criterion—or mark—of the cognitive. Second, it provides such a criterion—one made up of four conditions that are sufficient for a process to count as cognitive
Rowlands, Mark, 1. the extended mind.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the view known variously as the extended mind (Clark & Chalmers 1998), vehicle externalism (Hurley 1998; Rowlands 2003, 2006) active externalism (Clark and Chalmers 1998), locational externalism (Wilson 2004) and environmentalism (Rowlands 1999), at least some token mental processes extend into the cognizing organism’s environment in that they are composed, partly (and, on most versions, contingently), of manipulative, exploitative, and transformative operations performed by that subject on suitable environmental structures. More precisely, what I shall refer to as the thesis of the extended mind (EM) is constituted by the following claims: • The world is an external store of information relevant to processes such as perceiving, remembering, reasoning … (and possibly) experiencing. • At least some mental processes are hybrid – they straddle both internal and external operations. • The external operations take the form of action: manipulation, exploitation and transformation of environmental structures – ones that carry information relevant to the accomplishing of a given task. • At least some of the internal processes are ones concerned with supplying a subject with the ability to appropriately use relevant structures in its environment. As I shall understand it, therefore, the thesis of the extended mind is (1) an ontic thesis, of (2) partial and (3) contingent (4) composition of (5) some mental processes.[1] 1. It is ontic in the sense that it is a thesis about what (some) mental processes are, as opposed to an epistemic thesis about the best way of understanding mental processes. This ontic claim, of course, has an epistemic consequence: it is not possible to understand the nature of at least some of the mental processes without understanding the extent to which that organism is capable of manipulating, exploiting and transforming relevant structures in its environment (Rowlands 1999)..
Rowlands, Mark (2009). The extended mind. Zygon 44 (3):628-641.   (Google)
Abstract: The extended mind is the thesis that some mental—typically cognitive—processes are partly composed of operations performed by cognizing organisms on the world around them. The operations in question are ones of manipulation, transformation, or exploitation of environmental structures. And the structures in question are ones that carry information pertinent to the success or efficacy of the cognitive process in question. This essay examines the thesis of the extended mind and evaluates the arguments for and against it
Rupert, Robert D. (forthcoming). Cognitive Systems and the Supersized Mind. Philosophical Studies.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Clark, 2008), Andy Clark bolsters his case for the extended mind thesis and casts a critical eye on some related views for which he has less enthusiasm. To these ends, the book canvasses a wide range of empirical results concerning the subtle manner in which the human organism and its environment interact in the production of intelligent behavior. This fascinating research notwithstanding, Supersizing does little to assuage my skepticism about the hypotheses of extended cognition and extended mind. In particular, Supersizing fails to make the case for the extended view as a revolutionary thesis in the theoretical foundations of cognitive science
Rupert, Robert D. (forthcoming). Critical Study of Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind. Journal of Mind and Behavior.   (Google)
Rupert, Robert D. (2004). Challenges to the hypothesis of extended cognition. Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.   (Cited by 13 | Google | More links)
Rupert, Robert D. (2009). Innateness and the situated mind. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press.   (Google)
Abstract: forthcoming in P. Robbins and M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge UP)
Rupert, Robert D. (ms). Keeping HEC in CHEC.   (Google)
Rupert, Robert D. (forthcoming). Representation in extended cognitive systems: Does the scaffolding of language extend the mind? In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: forthcoming in R. Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind
Rupert, Robert D. (2010). Systems, Functions, and Intrinsic Natures: On Adams and Aizawa's The Bounds of Cognition. Philosophical Psychology.   (Google)
Abstract: Review essay contrasting Adams and Aizawa's approach to cognition with a functionalist, systems-based view.
Shapiro, Lawrence A. (2009). A review of Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa, the Bounds of cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2).   (Google)
Shapiro, Larry (web). Functionalism and mental boundaries. Cognitive Systems Research 9 (1-2).   (Google)
Sneddon, Andrew (2002). Towards externalist psychopathology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):297-316.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: The "width" of the mind is an important topic in contemporary philosophical psychology. Support for active externalism derives from theoretical, engineering, and observational perspectives. Given the history of psychology, psychopathology is notable in its absence from the list of avenues of support for the idea that some cognitive processes extend beyond the physical bounds of the organism in question. The current project is to defend the possibility, plausibility, and desirability of externalist psychopathology. Doing so both adds to the case for externalism and suggests ways of improving our study of cognitive dysfunction. I establish the possibility of externalist psychopathology through the development of models of wide cognitive processing, and, by implication, failure of such processing, from the work of S.L. Hurley and Robert Wilson. The plausibility of wide conceptualization and explanation of cognitive disorders is shown through an examination of apraxia, disorders of learned, skilled movements. The desirability of externalist psychopathology is suggested through a look at theoretical and therapeutic virtues, again drawing on Wilson's work
Sprevak, Mark (2009). Extended cognition and functionalism. Journal of Philosophy 106 (9).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Andy Clark and David Chalmers claim that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head.1 Call this the “hypothesis of extended cognition” (HEC). HEC has been strongly criticised by Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa and Robert Rupert.2 In this paper I argue for two claims. First, HEC is a harder target than Rupert, Adams and Aizawa have supposed. A widely-held view about the nature of the mind, functionalism—a view to which Rupert, Adams and Aizawa appear to subscribe— entails HEC. Either HEC is true, or functionalism is false. The relationship between functionalism and HEC goes beyond support for the relatively uncontroversial claim that it is logically or nomologically possible for cognition to extend (the “can” part of HEC); functionalism entails that cognitive processes do extend in the actual world. Second, I argue that the version of HEC entailed by functionalism is more radical than the version that Clark and Chalmers suggest. I argue that it is so radical as to form a counterexample to functionalism. If functionalism is modified to prevent these consequences, then HEC falls victim to Rupert, Adams and Aizawa’s original criticism. An advocate of HEC has two choices: (1) accept functionalism and radical HEC; (2) give up HEC entirely. Clark and Chalmers’ intermediate position of a modest form of HEC is unsustainable. The argument of this paper, although initially appearing to support Clark and Chalmers, ultimately argues against their position. The price of HEC is rampant expansion of the mind into the world, and the implausibility of such expansion is indicative of deep-seated problems with functionalism. The argument of this paper consequently speaks to wider issues than just the status of HEC. The reasons for..
Sterelny, Kim (2004). Externalism, epistemic artefacts and the extended mind. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Cited by 15 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A common picture of evolution by natural selection sees it as a process through which organisms change so that they become better adapted to their environment. However, agents do not merely respond to the challenges their environments pose. They modify their environments, filtering and transforming the action of the environment on their bodies A beaver, in making a dam, engineers a stream, increasing both the size of its safe refuge and reducing its seasonal variability. Beavers, like many other animals, are ecological engineers. They act to modify the physical challenges posed by their environment. Nests, burrows and other shelters reduce the impacts of adverse weather and of other agents. Animal also modify their exposure to biological risks. Hygienic behaviour reduces the impact of disease. Intensive grooming; moving to new roosts; using a
Sutton, John (2006). Exograms and interdisciplinarity: History, the extended mind and the civilizing process. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Ashgate.   (Google)
Sutton, John (2006). Introduction: Memory, embodied cognition, and the extended mind. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):281-289.   (Cited by 21 | Google | More links)
Abstract: I introduce the seven papers in this special issue, by Andy Clark, J
Menary, Richard (ed.) (forthcoming). The Extended Mind. MIT Press.   (Google)
Abstract: Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? In their famous 1998 paper "The Extended Mind," philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers posed this question and answered it provocatively: cognitive processes "ain't all in the head." The environment has an active role in driving cognition; cognition is sometimes made up of neural, bodily, and environmental processes. Their argument excited a vigorous debate among philosophers, both supporters and detractors. This volume brings together for the first time the best responses to Clark and Chalmers's bold proposal. These responses, together with the original paper by Clark and Chalmers, offer a valuable overview of the latest research on the extended mind thesis. The contributors first discuss (and answer) objections raised to Clark and Chalmers's thesis. Andy Clark himself responds to critics in an essay that uses the movie Memento's amnesia-aiding notes and tattoos to illustrate the workings of the extended mind. Contributors then consider the different directions in which the extended mind project might be taken, including the need for an approach that focuses on cognitive activity and practice.
Thompson, Evan & Stapleton, Mog (2009). Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories. Topoi 28 (1).   (Google)
Abstract: This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation
Walter, Sven & Kyselo, Miriam (2009). Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa: The Bounds of cognition. Erkenntnis 71 (2).   (Google)
Weiskopf, Daniel A. (2008). Patrolling the mind's boundaries. Erkenntnis 68 (2).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Defenders of the extended mind thesis say that it is possible that some of our mental states may be constituted, in part, by states of the extra-bodily environment. Often they also add that such extended mentation is a commonplace phenomenon. I argue that extended mentation, while not impossible, is either nonexistent or far from widespread. Genuine beliefs as they occur in normal biologically embodied systems are informationally integrated with each other, and sensitive to changes in the person
Wheeler, Michael (forthcoming). In defence of extended functionalism. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Mit Press.   (Google)
Abstract: According to the extended cognition hypothesis (henceforth ExC), there are conditions under which thinking and thoughts (or more precisely, the material vehicles that realize thinking and thoughts) are spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors concerned are rightly accorded fully-paid-up cognitive status.1 According to functionalism in the philosophy of mind, “what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part” (Levin 2008). The respective fates of these two positions may not be independent of each other. The claim that ExC is in some way a form of, dependent on, entailed by, or at least commonly played out in terms of, functionalism is now pretty much part of the received view of things (see, e.g., Adams and Aizawa 2008; Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2005, 2008, this volume a, b, forthcoming; Menary 2007; Rupert 2004; Sprevak manuscript; Wheeler forthcoming). Thus ExC might be mandated by the existence of functionally specified cognitive systems whose boundaries are located partly outside the skin. This is the position that Andy Clark has recently dubbed extended functionalism (Clark 2008, forthcoming; see also Wheeler forthcoming)
Wheeler, Michael (ms). Minds, things, and materiality.   (Google)
Abstract: In a rich and thought-provoking paper, Lambros Malafouris argues that taking material culture seriously means to be ‘systematically concerned with figuring out the causal efficacy of materiality in the enactment and constitution of a cognitive system or operation’ (Malafouris 2004, 55). As I understand this view, there are really two intertwined claims to be established. The first is that the things beyond the skin that make up material culture (in other words, the physical objects and artefacts in which cultural networks and systems of human social relations are realized) may be essential to the enactment of, and be partly constitutive of, certain cognitive systems or operations. The consequence of establishing this claim is supposed to be that we have a mandate to recast the boundaries of the mind so as to include, as proper parts of the mind, things located beyond the skin. Thus, in talking about the contribution of the world to cognition, Malafouris (2004, 58) concludes that ‘what we have traditionally construed as an active or passive but always clearly separated external stimulus for setting a cognitive mechanism into motion, may be after all a continuous part of the machinery itself; at least ex hypothesi’. This is the position that, in philosophical circles, is known increasingly as the extended mind hypothesis (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Menary forthcoming). Henceforth I shall refer to this hypothesis as EM. A stock example will help bring the idea into view. Rumelhart et al. (1986) note that most of us solve difficult multiplication problems by using ‘pen and paper’ as an external resource. This environmental prop enables us to transform a difficult cognitive problem into a set of simpler ones, and to temporarily store the results of certain intermediate calculations. For the fan of EM, the distributed combination of this external resource and certain inner psychological processes constitutes a cognitive system in its own right
Wilson, Robert A. (2005). Collective memory, group minds, and the extended mind thesis. Cognitive Processing 6 (4).   (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
Wilson, Robert A. (2010). Meaning making and the mind of the externalist. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: This paper attempts to do two things. First, it recounts the problem of intentionality, as it has typically been conceptualized, and argues that it needs to be reconceptualized in light of the radical form of externalism most commonly referred to as the extended mind thesis. Second, it provides an explicit, novel argument for that thesis, what I call the argument from meaning making, and offers some defense of that argument. This second task occupies the core of the paper, and in completing it I distinguish _active _ _cognition_ from _cyborg fantasy arguments_ for externalism, and develop the analogy between the extended mind thesis in the cognitive sciences and developmental systems theory in developmental biology. The rethinking of the problem of intentionality on offer leads not so much to a solution as to a dissolution of that problem, as traditionally conceived
Wilson, Robert A. (2000). The mind beyond itself. In Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Wilson, Robert A. (1994). Wide computationalism. Mind 103 (411):351-72.   (Cited by 39 | Google | More links)
Yates, John (ms). The Many Bubble Interpretation, externalism, the extended mind of David Chalmers and Andy Clark, and the work of Alva Noe in connection with Experimental Philosophy and Dreamwork.   (Google)

2.2j Content Internalism and Externalism, Misc

Ball, Derek (2007). Twin-earth externalism and concept possession. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):457-472.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely believed that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments show that the contents of a person's thoughts fail to supervene on her intrinsic properties. Several recent philosophers have made the further claim that Twin-Earth-style thought experiments produce metaphysically necessary conditions for the possession of certain concepts. I argue that the latter view is false, and produce counterexamples to several proposed conditions. My thesis is of particular interest because it undermines some attempts to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged access
Bar-Elli, G. (1994). Intentionality and belief de re: A critical study of Searle's representative internalism. Erkenntnis 41 (1):65-85.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Borg, Emma (2009). Must a semantic minimalist be a semantic internalist? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):31-51.   (Google)
Abstract: I aim to show that a semantic minimalist need not also be a semantic internalist. §I introduces minimalism and internalism and argues that there is a prima facie case for a minimalist being an internalist. §II sketches some positive arguments for internalism which, if successful, show that a minimalist must be an internalist. §III goes on to reject these arguments and contends that the prima facie case for uniting minimalism and internalism is also not compelling. §IV returns to an objection from §I and argues for a way to meet it which does not depend on giving up semantic externalism
Briscoe, Robert (2006). Individualism, externalism and idiolectical meaning. Synthese 152 (1):95-128.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Semantic externalism in contemporary philosophy of language typically – and often tacitly – combines two supervenience claims about idiolectical meaning (i.e., meaning in the language system of an individual speaker). The first claim is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her intrinsic, physical properties. The second is that the meaning of a word in a speaker’s idiolect may vary without any variation in her understanding of its use. I here show that a conception of idiolectical meaning is possible that accepts the “anti-internalism” of the first claim while rejecting (what I shall refer to as) the “anti-individualism” of the second. According to this conception, externally constituted idiolectical meaning supervenes on idiolectical understanding.
Brown, Deborah J. (1996). A furry tile about mental representation. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):448-66.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Brooks, David (1995). Cartesian inner space. South African Journal of Philosophy 14 (4):135-144.   (Google)
Brown, Jessica (2003). Externalism and the Fregean tradition. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.   (Cited by 2 | Google)
Brower-Toland, Susan (2007). Intuition, Externalism, and Direct Reference in Ockham. History of Philosophy Quarterly 24:317-336.   (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. In particular, I claim that the causal thesis doesn’t square with Ockham’s account of supernaturally produced intuition and that the direct reference thesis sits uneasily with Ockham’s characterization of the intentional structure of intuitive states.
Brook, D. (1992). Substantial mind. South African Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):15-21.   (Google)
Brown, Deborah J. (1993). Swampman of la mancha. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):327-48.   (Annotation | Google)
Buekens, Filip (1994). Externalism, content, and causal histories. Dialectica 48 (3-4):267-86.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Campbell, John (1987). Is sense transparent? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:273-292.   (Cited by 15 | Google)
Carpenter, Andrew (1998). Davidson's externalism and the unintelligibility of massive error. Disputatio 4.   (Google)
Collins, John (2009). Methodology, not metaphysics: Against semantic externalism. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):53-69.   (Google)
Abstract: Borg (2009) surveys and rejects a number of arguments in favour of semantic internalism. This paper, in turn, surveys and rejects all of Borg's anti-internalist arguments. My chief moral is that, properly conceived, semantic internalism is a methodological doctrine that takes its lead from current practice in linguistics. The unifying theme of internalist arguments, therefore, is that linguistics neither targets nor presupposes externalia. To the extent that this claim is correct, we should be internalists about linguistic phenomena, including semantics
Davidson, Donald (2003). Quine's externalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):281-297.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: In this paper, I credit Quine with having implicitly held a view I had long urged on him: externalism. Quine was the first fully to recognize that all there is to meaning is what we learn or absorb from observed usage. This entails the possibility of indeterminacy, thus destroying the myth of meanings. It also entails a powerful form of externalism. There is, of course, a counter-current in Quine's work of the mid century: the idea of stimulus meaning. Attractive as this choice of empirical base is compared to such options as sense data, appearances, and percepts, it has serious difficulties. In general, an externalism which ties the contents of observation sentences and perceptual beliefs directly to the sorts of situations that usually make them true is superior to those forms of empiricism which introduce intermediaries between word and object
de Vries, Willem A. (1996). Experience and the swamp creature. Philosophical Studies 82 (1):55-80.   (Annotation | Google)
Drai, Dalia (2003). Externalism and identity. Synthese 134 (3):463-475.   (Google | More links)
Edwards, S. (1994). Externalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Avebury.   (Cited by 6 | Google)
Engel, Pascal (1987). Functionalism, belief, and content. In S. Torrance (ed.), The Mind and the Machine. Horwood.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Frances, Bryan (2007). Externalism, physicalism, statues, and hunks. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):199-232.   (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: Content externalism is the dominant view in the philosophy of mind. Content essentialism, the thesis that thought tokens have their contents essentially, is also popular. And many externalists are supporters of such essentialism. However, endorsing the conjunction of those views either (i) commits one to a counterintuitive view of the underlying physical nature of thought tokens or (ii) commits one to a slightly different but still counterintuitive view of the relation of thought tokens to physical tokens as well as a rejection of realist physicalism. In this essay I reveal the problem and articulate and adjudicate among the possible solutions. I will end up rejecting content essentialism
Gauker, Christopher (1991). Mental content and the division of epistemic labour. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (September):302-18.   (Google | More links)
Gerken, Mikkel (2007). A false dilemma for anti-individualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):329-42.   (Google)
Gertler, Brie (2007). Content externalism and the epistemic conception of the self. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37–56.   (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic: selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self
Gertler, Brie (2009). Review of Katalin Farkas, The Subject's Point of View. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):743-47.   (Google)
Abstract: A few decades ago, in the wake of influential arguments by Putnam and Burge, prevailing opinion among philosophers shifted from internalism to externalism about thought contents. While there was always a vocal minority opposed to externalism, internalist opposition has grown markedly in the past several years. This book represents a major advance in the internalist campaign. Farkas’ ambitious agenda is to advance a strongly internalist account of the mental. She makes impressive strides towards achieving this goal. Along the way, she presents important new arguments on a number of topics, including: how best to understand the ‘twin’ cases used in debates about content, the alleged incompatibility of content externalism and privileged access, and the prospects for defending Frege’s claim that sense determines reference
Gerken, Mikkel (2008). Is internalism about knowledge consistent with content externalism? Philosophia 36 (1):87-96.   (Google)
Abstract: There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However, Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the argument are faulty and, in part, because there are promising responses available to the compatibilists
Gibbons, John (1993). Identity without supervenience. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):59-79.   (Cited by 6 | Google | More links)
Gregg, John (online). Language and meaning.   (Google)
Hacker, P. M. S. (1998). Davidson on intentionality and externalism. Philosophy 73 (286):539-552.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: Davidson has attempted to integrate externalism into his account of meaning and understanding. He contends that what words mean is fixed in part by the circumstances in which they were learnt, in which the basic connection between words and things is established. This connection is allegedly established by causal interaction between people and the world. Words and sentences derive their meanings from the objects and circumstances in which they were learnt, which
Haukioja, Jussi (2009). Intuitions, Externalism, and Conceptual Analysis. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2:81-93.   (Google)
Abstract: Semantic externalism about a class of expressions is often thought to make conceptual analysis about members of that class impossible. In particular, since externalism about natural kind terms makes the essences of natural kinds empirically discoverable, it seems that mere reflection on one's natural kind concept will not be able to tell one anything substantial about what it is for something to fall under one's natural kind concepts. Many hold the further view that one cannot even know anything substantial about the reference-fixers of one's natural kind concepts by armchair reflection. In this paper I want to question this latter view and claim that, because of the way our standard methodology of doing theories of reference relies on semantic intuitions, typical externalists in fact presuppose that one can know the reference-fixers of one's natural kind concepts by mere armchair reflection. The more interesting question is how substantial such knowledge can be. I also take some steps toward answering this question.
H, (2007). Externalism and a posteriori semantics. Erkenntnis 67 (3).   (Google | More links)
Abstract: It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual
Hickey, Lance P. (1999). The chomskian challenge to externalism. International Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):39-51.   (Google)
Houghton, David (1997). Mental content and external representations: Internalism, anti-internalism. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):159-77.   (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
Hurley, Susan L. (forthcoming). Varieties of externalism. In R. Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. Ashgate.   (Cited by 3 | Google)
Abstract: Externalism comes in varieties. While the landscape isn
Jackson, Frank & Pettit, Philip (1988). Functionalism and broad content. Mind 97 (July):318-400.   (Cited by 79 | Annotation | Google | More links)
Jackman, Henry (2005). Intuitions and semantic theory. Metaphilosophy 36 (3):363-380.   (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Abstract: While engaged in the analysis of topics such as the nature of knowledge, meaning, or justice, analytic philosophers have traditionally relied extensively on their own intuitions about when the relevant terms can, and can't, be correctly applied. Consequently, if intuitions about possible cases turned out not to be a reliable tool for the proper analysis of philosophically central concepts, then a radical reworking of philosophy's (or at least analytic philosophy's) methodology would seem to be in order. It is thus not surprising that the increasingly critical scrutiny that intuitions have received of late has produced what has been referred to as a "crisis" in analytic philosophy. This paper will argue, however, that at least those criticisms that stem from recent work on semantic externalism are not as serious as their proponents have claimed. Indeed, this paper will argue while the conceptual intuitions (and the analyses that result from them) will have to be recognized as fallible, they still have a prima facie claim to correctness. A naturalistic and externalistic account of concepts thus merely requires that the methodology of conceptual analysis be reinterpreted (from a 'Platonic' to a 'constructive' model) rather than given up
Jackson, Frank (2004). On an argument from properties of words to broad content. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.   (Google)
Katz, J. M. (1990). The Domino theory. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):3-39.   (Annotation | Google | More links)
Korman, Daniel Z. (2006). What externalists should say about dry earth. Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):503-520.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word 'water' in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism
Korman, Daniel Z. (2006). What Externalists Should Say About Dry Earth. The Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):503-520.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: Dry earth seems to its inhabitants (our intrinsic duplicates) just as earth seems to us, that is, it seems to them as though there are rivers and lakes and a clear, odorless liquid flowing from their faucets. But, in fact, this is an illusion; there is no such liquid anywhere on the planet. I address two objections to externalism concerning the nature of the concept that is expressed by the word ‘water’ in the mouths of the inhabitants of dry earth. Gabriel Segal presents a dilemma for the externalist concering the application conditions of the concept, and Paul Boghossian presents a dilemma for the externalist concerning the complexity of the concept. I show that, in both cases, the externalist may occupy the horn of his choice without departing from either the letter or spirit of externalism.
Larkin, William S. (online). Content and metacognition.   (Google)
Abstract: C. Theses: 1. Content Externalism strictly implies the possibility of acquiring a new concept as the result of an unwitting switch of environments. 2. This intuitively compels us to accept the possibility of someone possessing a concept without being aware that she does. 3. This possibility strictly favors causal models of meta-cognition over constitution models. 4. The possibility of possessing a concept unawares suggests that the contents of metacognitive
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Madison, B. J. C. (2009). On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism. Acta Analytica 24 (3):173-183.   (Google | More links)
Abstract: In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson’s that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However, I argue that epistemic internalism, properly understood, remains substantially unaffected no matter which view of content turns out to be correct. What is key to the New Evil Genius thought experiment is that, given everything of which the inhabitants are consciously aware, the two worlds are subjectively indistinguishable for them, which is what matters on internalist accounts of epistemic justification. I argue that even if a standard moral of the New Evil Genius intuition is untenable due to considerations arising from content externalism, the case can be understood as supporting epistemic internalism in a way that is wholly compatible with content externalism. In short, epistemic internalism is committed to sameness of justificatory status between subjectively indistinguishable counterparts, not sameness of content of their justifiers.
Malmgren, Helge (online). The "internal/external" metaphor in the philosophy of mind.   (Google)
Abstract: The being of the _cogitatio,_ or to be more exact, of the knowledge-phenomenon itself, cannot
be questioned, and it is free from the riddle of transcendence. /.../ It is also obvious, that the
_cogitationes_ represent a sphere of absolute immanent givens, in which sense we also interpret
immanence. In the seeing [Schauen] of the pure phenomenon, the object is not outside the
knowledge, outside consciousness, and at the same time it is given in the sense of the absolute
self-givenness of a purely seen object."
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Abstract: Since Descartes, the mind has been thought to be "in the head," separable from the world and even from the body it inhabits. In The Mind and its World , Gregory McCulloch considers the latest debates in philosophy and cognitive science about whether the thinking subject actually requires an environment in order to be able to think. McCulloch explores the mind/body duality from the Enlightenment to the 20th century. He examines such figures as Descartes, Frege, Locke, and Wittgenstein. His method is comparative, and his insights are illuminating. By pitting Descartes against such thinkers as Wittgenstein and Frege, McCulloch produces a dynamic account of the implications of the Descartian argument about consciousness and the mind. The contrast evolves into McCulloch's original theory of externalism, the notion that the mind is not in the head, and is constituted by environmental, and linguistic object relations. The Mind and its World is a clearand compelling reading of the one of the dominant elements and debates within Western philosophy. Its synthesis of the arguments and controversies will make this book necessary reading for the general reader who is interested in the claims the Enlightenment and its aftermath have made about consciousness, our "minds", and even our brains._
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Millikan, Ruth G. (1997). On cognitive luck: Externalism in an evolutionary frame. In Peter K. Machamer & Martin Carrier (eds.), Philosophy and the Sciences of Mind.   (Cited by 7 | Google)
Abstract: "Paleontologists like to say that to a first approximation, all species are extinct (ninety- nine percent is the usual estimate). The organisms we see around us are distant cousins, not great grandparents; they are a few scattered twig-tips of an enormous tree whose branches and trunk are no longer with us." (p. 343-44). The historical life bush consists mainly in dead ends
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